NATIONALITY THEORY

VIVO vs CLORIBEL
FACTS:
This is a case of Chinese nationals who came to the Philippines for a visit but who refused to leave. And one where the improvident issuance of an ex-parte preliminary injunction, followed by judicial inaction, actually extended the stay of aliens beyond the period authorized by law, and even beyond what the visitors had asked for.

Private respondents are a Chinese mother, and her 2 minor children, They arrived from Hongkong and were admitted in the Philippines as temporary visitors on October 1960, with an initial authorized stay of three (3) months. The husband and father of these aliens applied for naturalization, and CFI granted his petition in 1961 The said temporary visitors petitioned for an indefinite extension of their stay. By virtue of a Cabinet Resolution granting aliens concurrent jurisdiction to act on petitions for extension of stay of temporary visitors, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs authorized (in 1961) the change in category from temporary visitors to that of special non-immigrants under the Immigration Law for a period of stay extending up to 11 April 1963 The Secretary of Justice approved the extension thus authorized, subject to the condition that the said aliens shall: o secure reentry permits to Hongkong valid at least two months over and beyond their extended stay, and o maintain their cash bonds filed with the Bureau of Immigration and to pay the corresponding fees. But the petitioner, Commissioner of Immigration, refused to recognize the said extension further than 16 June 1962, and denied acceptance of payment of the extension fees. The respondents requested the President to extend their stay up to April 1963 in order to coincide with their hope for and forthcoming oath-taking of allegiance of the husband/father. The request was referred to the Immigration Commissioner. The commissioner informed the respondents that the new Secretary of Justice ruled in that the Cabinet Resolution had no force and effect, and denied the request for extension of stay of the respondents and advised them to leave the country voluntarily not later than June 1962; otherwise, they would be proceeded against, in accordance with law. The respondents did not leave the country on the date specified, but instead filed a petition for mandamus with injunction, to restrain the Commissioner of Immigration from issuing a warrant for their arrest and from confiscating their bond for their temporary stay and to order the Commissioner to implement the extension. The court then denied the prayer for preliminary injunction for lack of a prima facie showing and set the case for hearing on 13 July 1962 On July 1962, respondents re-filed the same petition with the same court. The petition alleged three grounds therefor, namely: (1) the extension of their stay was authorized and approved by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice; (2) they were due for eventual conversion into Filipino citizens by virtue of the granting of the husband/fathers petition for naturalization, which had not been appealed, and he was due to take his oath of allegiance on 11 April 1963; and (3) their departure from the Philippines would work great injury and injustice to themselves. The judge issued ex-parte and without hearing an order granting preliminary injunction, and, on a bond of P3,000.00

The Immigration Commissioner filed his answer stating that: o the visitors authorized stay expired on June 1962; their change in category from temporary visitors to special non-immigrants and the extension of their authorized by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice was invalid as it is the Commissioner of Immigration who is vested by law with power to grant extensions of stay; o the petition filed was not the proper remedy; o the Solicitor General will oppose the oath-taking of the father/husband and even if he will become a Filipino citizen, his wife would not automatically become a Filipino citizen, as she has yet to show that she, herself, can be lawfully naturalized. On 1965, the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the case for the unreasonable length of time that the petitioners had failed to prosecute their case But the court denied the motion to dismiss for being not well taken. On December 1965, the Commissioner filed with the SC an action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondent court

ISSUE: WON Chua (the mother/wife) automatically became a naturalized Filipino RULING: The court ruled that the wife, Chua Pic Luan, does not, under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law, automatically become a Filipino citizen on account of her marriage to a naturalized Filipino citizen, since she must first prove that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization. By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and administrative authorities that she came to the country for only a temporary visit when, in fact, her intention was to stay permanently; and for having intentionally delayed court processes the better to prolong her stay, respondent Chua Pic Luan demonstrated her incapacity to satisfy the qualifications exacted by the third paragraph of Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, that she must be of good moral character and must have conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the Philippines in her relation with the constituted government. And, having lawfully resided in the Philippines only from her arrival on 16 October 1960 to 16 June 1962, she (Chua Pick Luan) also failed to meet the required qualification of continuous residence in the Philippines for ten (10) years, her stay beyond 16 June 1962 being illegal. As to the foreign born minors, Uy Koc Siong and Uy Tian Siong, our pronouncement in Vivo vs. Cloribel, L-23239, 23 November 1966, 18 SCRA 713, applies to them: As to foreign born minor children, they are extended citizenship if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalzation of the parent. Dwelling means lawful residence. Since prior to the time the father of respondents visitors was supposed to have taken his oath of citizenship their lawful period of stay had already expired and they had already been required to leave, they were no longer lawfully residing here (Kua Suy et al. v. The Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, Oct. 31, 1963). Nor can these temporary visitors claim any right to a stay coterminous with the result of the naturalization proceeding of their husband and father, Uy Pick Tuy, because their authorized stay was for a definite period, up to a fixed day, a circumstance incompatible with the termination of the naturalization proceeding, which is uncertain and can not be set at a definite date.4

MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER GR L-21289 OCT 4 1971

FACTS: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a nonimmigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina PROVIDED SHE IS NOT DISQUALIFIED TO BE A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE SAME LAW. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

YUNG UAN CHU VS REPUBLIC GR 34973 APRIL 14 1988

DOCTRINE: An alien woman married to a Filipino citizen does not necessarily acquire Philippine citizenship. She must prove in an appropriate proceeding that she does not have any disqualification for Philippine citizenship FACTS:

This is an appeal on the courts decision in granting the petition for naturalization of Yung Uan Chu alias Lina Yung Yu Hui Tin. The appellee is Yung Uan Chu alias Lina Yung alias Yu Hui Tin was born on August 3, 1933 in Iloilo City to spouses Yu Bun Juan and Po Kuan, both Chinese citizens. She studied, upon attaining school age, at the Chinese Commercial High School Iloilo City where she finished her primary and secondary education. Records show that on October 1, 1954, she married one Miguel Cupang Jr. admittedly a native-born citizen of the Philippines which marriage took place in Iloilo City Because of said wedlock and at the time of the filing of the petition, the couple had six (6) children, to wit: o Shirley (15), Henry (13), Terry (11), Wilson (9), Belly (7), Cherry (6) All of their children were registered as Natural born Filipino citizens and are all enrolled in public and private schools recognized by the government and not limited to any race or nationality and where Philippine History, Government and Civics are taught as part of the school curriculum. After their marriage, the couple transferred their residence to Lagao, General Santos City where they engaged in the rice and corn business under the name General Santos Rice mill. From the said business they derived an average annual income of P20,000.00. They own real properties worth not less than P5,000.00 and have been paying their income tax to the government. Petitioner writes and speaks Ilongo and English; believes in the principles underlying the Constitution of the Philippines, and has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the Philippines not only with the duly constituted authorities but also with the community in which she lives. She has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has adopted Filipino customs, traditions and Idiosyncracies She never left the Philippines since her birth. She claims to be a woman of good character, a Catholic in faith and in practice. She is not opposed to organized government nor is she affiliated with any association or group or persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government, or defend or teach the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of mens Ideas. She is not a polygamist nor a believer in the practice of polygamy. She was never indicted nor convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. Neither is she suffering from any incurable contagious disease. After trial, a decision was rendered on December 7, 1971 finding petitioner Yung Uan Chu baptized as Lina Yung, known in school in her registered name as Lina Uan Chu and now as Mrs. Lina Y. Cupang, as possessed of all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a Filipino citizen and therefore authorized to take her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the same in the proper civil registrar. On January 5, 1972, the SolGen thru the City Fiscal filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision which Motion the court denied in its Order dated January 26, 1972. On January 27,1972, the City Fiscal filed his Notice of Appeal from the judgment of the Court. SolGen submitted that in the case of Moy Yu Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, SC held that an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen ipso facto becomes a Filipino provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 473, reiterated the rule that a judicial declaration that the person is a Filipino citizen cannot be made in a petition for naturalization and that, in this jurisdiction there can be no independent action for the judicial declaration of citizenship of an individual.

ISSUE: WON an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen acquires Filipino citizenship RULING: the sole and only purpose of the petitioner is to have the petitioner declared a Filipino citizen.

SC stated that: o Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. o Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. o As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. o Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan Yu Chu v. Rep. supra) o Hence, a "judicial declaration that a person is a Filipino citizen cannot be made in a petition for naturalization because under our laws there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Such a declaration or pronouncement is beyond the court's jurisdiction." (Lao Yup Hun Diok v. Republic, supra) AN ALIEN WOMAN MARRIED TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN DOES NOT NECESSARILY ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. SHE MUST PROVE IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING THAT SHE DOES NOT HAVE ANY DISQUALIFICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. This rule also applies even if her husband is a native born Filipino. (Austria et al., v. Conchu) In Moy Ya Lim Yao the Court adverted to the administrative procedure which up to the present is followed in the Commission of Immigration and Deportation. The steps to be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration are embodied in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958 of then Acting Secretary to the effect that "The alien woman must the a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her husband to the effect and thus secure recognition of her status as a Filipino citizen. Judicial recourse would be available to the petitioner in a case of adverse action by the Immigration Commissioner. Although as already stated, administrative proceedings should have been undertaken by the appellee, still, in the instant case, We find no necessity therefor because in this judicial proceeding, it is clear she is already a Filipino citizen.

AUSTRIA ET AL VS CONCHU L-20716 JUNE 22 1965 14 SCRA 336

FACTS: A widow and her minor son, namely, Chan Yuen Ying and Sy Sun Kin, Chinese citizens, were admitted to the Philippines on November 16, 1960 as temporary visitors. Subsequently, their stay was extended up to April 24, 1962. About a month before the expiration of the extended temporary stay, or on March 20, 1962, Agustin de Austria, a natural-born Filipino citizen, married Chan Yuen Ying.

15 days later, she petitioned the Commissioner of Immigration for cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration on the ground that she acquired Philippine Citizenship upon her marriage to Agustin de Austria. On April 10, 1962 the Commissioner of Immigration denied her petition, stating that her marriage to a Filipino citizen did not automatically confer Philippine Citizenship on her, that she must, in addition, possess all the qualifications for naturalization required by law. A petition for mandamus and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed in the CFI, by Chan Yuen Ying, her husband and her minor son, against the Commissioner of Immigration, to compel the cancellation of Chan Yuen Ying's Alien Certificate of Registration and to stop her and her son's deportation. The trial court temporarily enjoined Chan Yuen Ying's and her son's arrest and deportation. Answer to the petition was filed on May 4, 1962. Trial court granted a writ of permanent injunction against the Commissioner restraining them from deporting the petitioners and rendered Commissioners denial as null and void. The court also ordered the cancellation of the alien registry of the petitioner. The Commissioner of Immigration has appealed.

ISSUE: WON an alien woman married to a natural-born Filipino citizen ipso facto acquires Filipino citizenship (NO) RULING: It is admitted that petitioner Chan Yuen Ying and her minor son, Sy Sun Kin, * do not possess all the qualifications required for naturalization Pursuant to the requirements of the Bureau of Immigration, however, petitioners Agustin de Austria and Chan Yuen Ying executed a joint affidavit, showing that petitioner Chan Yuen Ying is not suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law Appellant contends that an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen does not thereby become a Filipino unless she proves that she is qualified to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization, that is, that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications therefor. Appellees, on the other hand, maintain that she need only show lack of disqualifications for naturalization. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law states: SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Passing upon the same issue raised herein, this Court ruled, in Choy King Tee vs. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965, that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 above-mentioned refers to the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Accordingly, we therein held that: "The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Filipino citizen." It may not be amiss to note that in the Choy King Tee case, supra, the petitioner, Choy King Tee ' married an alien, Tan Beng Seng, in 1948 and the provision was invoked after Tan Beng Seng became a Filipino citizen by naturalization in 1961. In the present case, petitioner married a Filipino citizen on March 20, 1962, or only a month and four days before the scheduled expiration of her stay in the Philippines on April 24, 1962. With more reason, therefore, should the ruling in Choy King Tee apply herein, since there obtains in this case a

ground to doubt whether petitioner Chan Yuen Ying's marriage was not taken with a view to avoid her deportation and that of her minor son. Petitioner Sy Sun Kin, the minor son of Chan Yuen Ying, relies merely on the acquisition by his mother of Filipino citizenship by her marriage to Agustin de Austria. It follows, therefore, that he has likewise remained an alien.

BURCA VS REPUBLIC 1 SCRA 248 1973

FACTS: On April 24, 1964, petitioner filed with the CFI of Leyte a petition alleging that she is married to Filipino citizen and possesses all the qualifications and none the disqualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 and praying that a declaration to such effect be made by the Court for the purpose of laying the basis for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration. On April 17, 1964, the court set the petition for hearing and ordered notified thereof to be given to the Solicitor General. In the same order it was required that said notice of hearing be published in the Official Gazette once a month for three consecutive months a once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Morning Times, a newspaper edited in the City of Ormoc, where petition resides, and posted in a public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court. On November 13, 1964, the Solicitor General filed an "Opposition and Motion to Dismiss" on the following grounds:

(1) As an application for Philippine Citizenship, the petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended, such as petitioner's former places of residence, and that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications specified under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Specifically, as can be gathered in the Notice of Hearing, there is no allegation that she is of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the Philippines; or that she has some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. Likewise, there is no showing that the petition is supported by the affidavits of at least two credible persons stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act, and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines, and is not in any way disqualified under the provision of the Act. Similarly, there is no showing that she has filed a declaration of intention or is exempt from such requirement. Even in the Notice of Hearing, there is failure to mention the names of witnesses whom she proposes to introduce in support of the petition, as required under Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.

(2) As a separate proceedings to declare the petitioner a citizen being allegedly the wife of a Filipino citizen, and to direct the cancellation of her alien Registry, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual (Palaran vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15047, January 30, 1962; Channie Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-14159, April 18, 1960; Tan Yu Chin vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15775, April 29, 1961; Delumen vs. Republic, G.R. No. L552. January 28, 1954; in re Hospicion Obiles 49 Off. Gaz. 923), and that citizenship is not the proper subject for declaratory judgment (Feliseta Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-16108, October 31, 1960: Santiago vs.

Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-14653, January 31, 1963; Board of Commissioners, et al. vs. Hon. Felix R. Domingo, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-21274, July 31, 1963).

Thereafter, the court proceeded to hear the case and rendered its decision, in which it found inter alia the following:

After the necessary publications of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette for July 6, July 13 and 20, 1964, (Exhibit A) and the Morning Times for April 26, May 3, 10, 1964 (Exhibits B, B-1, B-2 and B-3) this case was called for trial with the Honorable Solicitor General opposing the petition as aforesaid.

It appears from the evidence presented that petitioner is a native born Nationalist Chinese Citizen who was born at Gigaquit Surigao on March 30, 1933 (Exhibit D). In 1946, she transferred to Surigao, Surigao until her marriage to Florencio Burca a native born Filipino Citizen on May 14, 1961 (Exhibit C) when she transferred to Ormoc City to live with her husband. Petitioner studied at Surigao, Surigao from first grade to fourth year where she graduated. Thereafter she took home economics special course at the University of San Carlos, Cebu City.

Petitioner knows how to read and write the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, and the English language (Exhibits G and H).

She has not left the Philippines since birth up to the present time.

She is a holder of ACR No. A-14805 (Exh. E) and Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333 (Exh. F).

Petitioner has no criminal record and that she has no pending case, civil or criminal or administrative, and that she has never been convicted of any crime (Exhibits J, K, L).

She is engaged in farming and in business and had a net income with her husband in the sum of P16,034.84 for which they paid an Income Tax of P1,556.00 per O.R. C-050357 dated at Ormoc City on April 14, 1964 (Exhibits 1 and 1-1).

She is a person of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the Philippines in her relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which she is living.

She is supporting a two-year old legitimate child.

She is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments.

She is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas.

She is not a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy.

She has mingled socially with the Filipinos, and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos. She is a Catholic and was joined in wedlock by a Catholic priest (Exh. C).

No evidence was presented by the oppositor and City Fiscal Ramon de Veyra, representing the Solicitor General limited himself to the cross examination of the petitioner.

and held:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the opposition, and declaring that ZITA NGO BURCA petitioner, has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino Citizen and that she being married to a Filipino Citizen, is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final and executory.

The Solicitor General appealed in due time and made the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE DECLARATION OF PETITIONER AS A FILIPINO CITIZEN BY REASON OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER HAS ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS TO BECOME A FILIPINO CITIZEN.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONER A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES SHE BEING MARRIED TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE OPPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

In the decision of this Court in this case rendered on January 30, 1967, the position of the Solicitor General was upheld the above judgment of the trial court was reversed, the Court holding (1) that the only means by which the alien wife Filipino citizen may have herself declared as having become a Filipino citizen by reason of her marriage is through compliance with the procedure for naturalization contained in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, and (2) in said proceeding aside from the showing that she is laboring under any of the disqualifications enumerate Section 4, thereof, she must prove that she possesses all qualifications under Section 2 of the same statute. More specifically the alien wife of a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire the citizenship of her husband is required to file corresponding petition for naturalization in court, allege prove all the requisite requirements such as continuous residence for a period of at least ten years, lucrative income and the like. In other words, she was required to follow procedure for the judicial naturalization of aliens, thus rendering for naught the first paragraph of Section 15 of Revised Naturalization Law. Under such doctrine the alien wife of a Filipino was placed in some cases in a disadvantageous position than an ordinary alien.

To accord substance to the obvious legislative purpose this Court in the Moy Ya Lim Yao case, held thru Mr. Justice Barredo:

With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase 'who may be lawfully naturalized', found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course, in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws, We should realize the disparity in the circumstances between

the United States, as the so-called 'melting pot' of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the extreme. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they could show they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. (41 SC 292, 350-351.)

Withal, the Court also held that it is not necessary for alien wife of a Filipino citizen to resort to the procedure naturalization cases before she can be declared a citizen reason of her marriage We further added:

The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is there for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own, citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same situation obtains even as to native born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. This, as we view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these are not really binding.

It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have good starting point and so that the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of

1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties:

'Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.'

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition." .

As already stated, it is the view of the majority of the Court that insofar as the decision in the case at bar conflicts with the above rulings laid down in Moy Ya Lim Yao, it should be reconsidered and modified. Truth to tell, We can hardly do otherwise. As may be gathered from the opinion written for the Court by Justice Barredo in that case, the Court not only made reference to but actually sustained many of the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration of herein appellee as well as in the memorandum submitted by the amici curiae in this case.

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, We cannot grant petitioner-appellee's prayer for the affirmance of the trial court's judgment declaring her a Filipino citizen. It must be noted that the sole and only purpose of the petition is to have petitioner declared a Filipino citizen. Under our laws there can be no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of the citizenship of an individual. It is as an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, that the courts may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. In Moy Ya Lim Yao, We adverted to administrative procedure heretofore followed in the Bureau Immigration regarding the steps to be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration, and thus secure recognition of her status Filipino citizen. Such a procedure could be availed of Petitioner. Judicial recourse would be avoidable to Petitioner in case of an adverse action by the Immigration Commissioner.

II

At the same time, it may not be amiss to clarify a matter related to the point involved in this case, which has given to a certain degree of confusion and unnecessary difficulties on the part of all concerned. We deem it wise to deal with it here in order to preclude unnecessary litigations, not to speak of legal complications that

may ensue as a consequence of the lack of finality of judicial or administrative determinations on person's citizenship in certain cases.

Heretofore up to Moy Ya Lim Yao, it has been the constant doctrine of this Court, that a final and executory decision the question of citizenship, by a court other than in naturalization proceedings, or by an administrative body, generally not considered binding in other cases and for other purpose than that specifically involved in the case where such decision is rendered. Thus for instance, in a case involving the determination of the citizenship of a party as a prerequisite to the exercise of a license, franchise or privilege, such as operation of a public utility, and where the administration agency concerned shall have found as an established fact to the applicant is a Filipino citizen, even if such finding, may have been affirmed by this Court on appeal, the same will be considered as conclusive on the question of such citizenship. Hence if such party should apply for a license to engage in retail trade or for the lease or purchase of any disposable lands of the public domain, the question of his citizenship may litigated again.

Understandably such a result is unfair to the party concerned. Instead of according finality and stability judicial or administrative decisions, it engenders confusion and multiplicity of suits.

Certainly if the decision of the administrative agency on the matter of citizenship, as an important issue involved in the case, is affirmed by this Court, We find no cogent reason why such decision on the matter can not be given preclusive effect. We have conceded the authority of certain administrative agencies to ascertain the citizenship of the parties involved in the cases therein, as a matter inherent in or essential to the efficient exercise of their powers. Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end to litigations, some authorities recognize that administrative rulings or decisions should have res judicata or preclusive effect. In discussing this point, Professor Allan D. Vestal of the University of Iowa, holds the view that: Preclusive effect may or may not be given to an administrative ruling depending on a number of factors. If the decision is a factual matter and if it has been rendered by an agency with fact-finding procedures which approximate those of a court, then preclusion should obtain." (Vestal Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 Georgetown Law Journal, 857, 874.) Obviously, if the decision of an administrative agency on the question of citizenship, is affirmed by this Court on the ground that the same is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, there appears to be no valid reason why such finding should have no conclusive effect in other cases, where the same issue is involved. The same observation holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case before it, which is affirmed by this Court. For the "effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the parties, the general public and the courts themselves. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and their decisions and invites litigation" (Clear, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale Law Journal, 345).

It must be stressed however that in the public interest, in such cases, the Solicitor General or his authorized representative should be allowed to intervene on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, and to take appropriate steps the premises. For only in that manner can there be assurance that the claim to Filipino citizenship was thoroughly threshed out before the corresponding court or administration agency.

Accordingly, in response to the vigorous and able plea of amici curiae, We declare it to be a sound rule, that where citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in controversy, after a full-blown hearing, with the act participation of the Solicitor General or his authority representative, and this finding on the Citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shows constitute conclusive proof of such person's citizenship, in a other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.

In resume, therefore, since Our opinion in the decision January 30, 1967, requiring an alien woman married to Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this Country, to submit a judicial proceeding in all respects similar to a naturalization case, wherein in addition, she has to prove not only that she not laboring under any of the disqualifications under section but also possesses all the qualifications set forth in section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, conflicts with Our ruling Moy Ya Lim Yao, the decision has to that extent be consider modified. 1 We cannot, however, affirm petitioner's claim Filipino citizenship in these proceedings. That is a matter which in accordance with Our suggestion in Moy Ya Lim Yao the appropriate governmental agency, such as the Commissioner on Immigration, shall have to pass upon.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, and consistently with the foregoing opinion, the decision herein of January 30, 1967 is hereby modified; the reversal of the decision of the court a quo and the dismissal of the petition, are however affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner's availing of the procedure indicated above. No costs.

AZNAR VS COMELEC GR 83820 MAY 25 1990 185 SCRA 703

FACTS: 1) On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. 2) On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. 3) On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1"). 4) During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. 5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship?

HELD: SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELECs decision. The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that PRIVATE RESPONDENT OSMEA DID NOT LOSE HIS PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY ANY OF THE THREE MENTIONED HEREINABOVE OR BY ANY OTHER MODE OF LOSING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

CHEN TECK LAO VS REPUBLIC 55 SCRA 1 1974

The 1967 leading case of Gan Tsitung v. Republic 1 with former Chief Justice Concepcion as spokesman for the Court, indicates clearly the merit of this appeal by petitioner Chan Teck Lao from a lower court decision promulgated in 1965 ordering the cancellation of his certificate of naturalization that dates back to 1952 as a result of 1950 decision of this Tribunal sustaining his plea to become a Filipino. Gan Tsitung, in language plain and unequivocal makes manifest that no retroactive effect is to be given a judicial pronouncement that would impose on a party proceeded against in a denaturalization proceeding a requirement not in existence at a time that his application was heard and favorably acted on. There would be manifest unfairness in setting aside a decision that had subsequently become final and did lead to the grant of the coveted boon citizenship. Unfortunately, the lower court decision came out in 1965, a full two years earlier. The Republic thus emerged victorious in its suit to declare null and void the original judgment in favor of petitioner in view of Tan Ten Koc v. Republic, 2 which the year before held for the first time that an applicant must present positive evidence the newspaper where his petition was published was indeed of general circulation in the province where the proceeding was had. With the principle of nonretroactivity now firmly adhered to, there is no more justification for what the low court did.<re||an1w> The status of petitioner as a national of this country for well-nigh thirteen years ought to have remained undisturbed. What is more, a 1970 resolution of this Court penned by the present Chief Justice in Republic v. Co Keng, 3 warning against undue receptivity to claims by the State in denaturalization proceedings, further strengthens the position of petitioner-appellant in seeking a reversal. Such an approach can likewise be discerned in our resolution, with Justice Antonio as ponente, in Burca v. Republic. 4 We therefore cannot affirm.

The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision now on appeal: "This case was filed on March 28, 1949. The application for naturalization of Chan Teck Lao was denied on October 31, 1949. Upon appeal the Supreme Court, ..., [on] June 15, 1950, reversed this Court's decision." 5 It was then noted that more than ten years later, on July 16, 1962, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the petition for the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization, raising the alleged jurisdictional question based on the subsequent Tan Ten Koc ruling that there was no showing or proof that the Nueva Era was a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Tarlac, where the petitioner then resided. Such an objection was considered insuperable by the lower court in view of the tacit admission by counsel for petitioner of such failure on his part. It did, however, note in its decision: "The Court is not unaware that the trial court denied the application for naturalization of Chan Teck Lao; that it was reversed by the Supreme Court in its Resolution of June 15, 1950." 6 In its dispositive portion, it held "that it did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the application of Chan Teck Lao when it heard the same on September 6, 1949, and therefore [ordered] the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of Chan Teck Lao as a Filipino citizen." 7

The decision now on appeal lends itself to the interpretation that by virtue of Tan Ten Koc the outcome could not have been otherwise, notwithstanding the admittedly strong, equitable and legal considerations in favor of petitioner-appellant, who had in his favor a decision no less from this Tribunal granting him citizenship, dating back to 1950. Nor is this to find fault with the lower court. Rightly, it could have felt it had no other choice. With the categorical pronouncement however, in Gan Tsitung, 8 a reversal, as noted at the outset, is indicated.

1. In a manifestation and addendum to petitioner-appellant's brief filed with this Court on January 24, 1969, 9 our attention was invited to the Gan Tsitung ruling in further support of his stand that the lower court's decision cannot be upheld. As already made clear, such a plea is of the utmost persuasiveness. As was clearly set forth in the opinion of the Chief Justice: "After mature deliberation and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before, May 29, 1957. Although there are divergent views on the precise time at which the decision of a court of last resort, declaring a given statute, process or proceeding null and void as unconstitutional or illegal, shall affect the validity of acts performed under such law or of similar processes or proceedings in analogous cases, the precedents appear overwhelmingly to favor such a solution as is just, fair and reasonable, having in mind public interest, as well as that of the parties directly concerned. As Professor Freund has put it, the issue "involves considerations, not only of principle, but, also, of practical administration." " 10 Herein this case, the very same consideration presents itself with equal validity. To rely on the 1964 Tan Ten Koc ruling which, after all these years, would require that positive proof as to the paper wherein the application was published in the place where the proceeding was had being of general application to petitioner-appellant who, as far back as June 15, 1950, had already been granted his citizenship by this Court, his certificate being issued two years thereafter, would, in the language of Gan Tsitung, be far from "just, fair and reasonable." 11

2. The conclusion reached by us receives additional reinforcement that stems from the fundamental law itself. Chief Justice Concepcion, in Gan Tsitung, appeared to be of the same mind. Thus: "It should be noted, furthermore, that a similar view was, in principle, taken in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68) in which this Court declared void, the Moratorium Law unconstitutional, and, hence, null and void, but only from the date of the promulgation of the decision therein (May 18, 1953), said moratorium being deemed effective prior thereto, despite the fundamental infirmity of the legislation that established it." 12 If it were otherwise, the decision

would not, in his language, be "just, fair and reasonable." 13 It would be infected with the virus of arbitrariness and thus offend against the due process guarantee.

In the 1970 resolution in Republic v. Co Keng 14 that finally put an end to what was a long-drawn-out litigation, the present Chief Justice was equally alert to a possible disregard of this basic safeguard. What is more, earlier, in the 1968 resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, he displayed sensitivity to the equal protection angle. 15 For it was in Co Keng that for the first time the attention of this Court was invited by counsel to Schneiderman v. United States, 16 Baumgartner v. United States, 17 and Knauer vs. United States. 18 All of these three leading American Supreme Court cases stand for the proposition that a naturalized citizen is entitled to similar treatment as a native-born citizen except where the Charter itself provides otherwise. If it were not so, there would be an infringement of the equal protection guarantee. 19 In Schneiderman, it was merely hinted at. Justice Murphy called attention to the fact that this was not a naturalization proceeding, in which the government was asked to confer a privilege; instead the government "seeks to turn the clock back twelve years after full citizenship was conferred" and to deprive petitioner of the "priceless benefits that stem from citizenship." 20 Once conferred then, it "should not be taken away without the clearest sort of justification." 21 In Baumgartner, Justice Frankfurter was quite explicit to the effect that under the American Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on equal footing with a native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility to the Presidency. 22 So was Justice Douglas in Knauer. Thus: "Citizenship obtained through naturalization is not a second-class citizenship." 23 From such a perspective then, to impose an additional burden for the first time to warrant the denaturalization of a citizen whose naturalization was obtained after the most exacting scrutiny not only by the lower courts but by this Tribunal, and especially so after a long lapse of time, would be clearly to subject him to a risk that certainly the Constitution, with its pledge of equal protection, cannot countenance.

3. Then, there is our resolution in Burca v. Republic, 24 promulgated only last June. While this is a naturalization and not a denaturalization proceeding, the juridical philosophy that informs it is of some relevance. As was made clear in the opinion of Justice Antonio: "Certainly if the decision of the administrative agency on the matter of citizenship, as an important issue involved in the case, is affirmed by this Court, We find no cogent reason why such decision on the matter can not be given preclusive effect. We have conceded the authority of certain administrative agencies to ascertain the citizenship of the parties involved in the cases therein, as a matter inherent in or essential to the efficient exercise of their powers. Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end to litigations, some authorities recognize that administrative rulings or decisions should have res judicata or preclusive effect. ... The same observation holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case before it, which is affirmed by this Court. For the "effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the parties, the general public and the courts themselves. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and their decisions and invites litigation" (Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale Law Journal, 345)." 25 This Court spoke in no uncertain terms as far back as 1950 that petitioner-appellant met all the qualifications for citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of January 20, 1965 ordering the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of Chan Teck Lao as a Filipino citizen is set aside and reversed.

KOOKOORITCHIN VS SOL GEN GR L-1787 AUG 27 1948

In August, 1941, appellee filed with the lower court a petition for naturalization, accompanied with supporting affidavits of two citizens, copy of a declaration of intention sworn in July, 1940, and proper notice of the hearing. The petition was finally set for hearing on December 18, 1941, but it was held on that date because the province was invaded by the Japanese forces on December 14, and the case remained pending until the records were destroyed during the military operations for liberation in March, 1945. The case was declared reconstituted on May 10, 1947, and the evidence was presented on August 28 and September 30, 1947. On the same day resolution was issued granting the petition.

Although appellant was represented at the hearing and cross-examined the witnesses for the petitioner, he did not file an opposition or presented any evidence.

The lower court made the findings of fact in the following paragraphs of its resolution:

Eremes Kookooritchkin applies for Philippine citizenship naturalization under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 473, as amended by Act 535.

The records shows that in August, 1941, he filed his petition for naturalization supported by the affidavits of exJudge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr. Salvador Mariano, both residents of Camarines Sur. In the preceding year, in July, 1940 to be precise, he filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen of this country. Notice of the hearing was published as required by law.

It was established at the hearing that the petitioner is a native-born Russian, having first seen the light of day on November 4, 1897 in the old City of St. Petersburg, Russia. He grew up as a citizen of the defunct Imperial Russian Government under the Czars. World War I found him in the military service of this Government. In 1915 he volunteered for the Imperial Russian navy and was sent to the Navy Aviation School. He fought with the Allies in the Baltic Sea, was later transferred to the eastern front in Poland, and much later was sent as a navy flier to Asia Minor. In the latter part of the war, but before the Russian capitulation, he was transferred to the British Air Force under which he served for fourteen months. When the revolution broke out in Russia in 1917, he joined the White Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought against the Bolsheviks until 1922 when the White Russian Army was overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. As he refused to join the Bolshevik regime, he fled by sea from Vladivostok to Shanghai and from this Chinese port he found his way to Manila, arriving at this port as a member of a group of White Russians under Admiral Stark in March, 1923. He stayed in Manila for about seven months, then moved to Olongapo, Zambales, where he resided for about a year, and from this place he went to Iriga, Camarines Sur, where he established his permanent residence since May, 1925. He has remained a resident of this municipality, except for a brief period from 1942 to July, 1945, when by reason of his underground activities he roamed mountains of Caramoan as a guerrilla officer. After liberation he returned to Iriga where again he resides up to the present time.

The applicant is married to a Filipino by the name of Concepcion Segovia, with whom he has one son named Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is at present studying in Saint Agnes Academy, at Legaspi, Albay, a school duly recognized by the Government.

The applicant is shop superintendent of A. L. Ammen Transportation Company, with about eighty Filipino employees working under him. He receives an annual salary of P13,200 with free quarters and house allowance. He also owns stocks and bonds of this and other companies.

The applicant speaks and writes English and the Bicol dialect. Socially he intermingles with the Filipinos, attending parties, dances and other social functions with his wife. He has a good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. He has never been accused of any crime. On the other hand, he has always conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire period of residence in Camarines Sur, in his relations with the constituted authorities as well as with the community.

Although he could have lived in ease by maintaining good relations with the enemy by reason of his being Russian-born during the years preceding the declaration of war by Russia against Japan, the applicant of his own volition chose to cast his lot with the guerrilla movement and fought the enemy in several encounters in the Province of Camarines Sur. He belonged to the guerrilla outfit of Colonel Padua with rank of major. Upon the arrival of the forces of liberation he was attached to the American Army from April to June, 1945.

Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the present Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State, much less to the present Government of the land of his birth to which he is uncompromisingly opposed. He is not against organized government or affiliated with any association which upholds and teaches doctrine opposing all organized governments. He does not believe in the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of his ideas. Neither is he a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious disease.

Appellant assigns four errors in the appealed resolution. We will consider them separately.

Appellant claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen filed by appellee is invalid and insufficient as a basis for the petition of naturalization. The question calls for the application of the following provision of section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law:

No declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate showing the date, place and manner of his arrival has been issued.

Appellant alleges that no documentary or testimonial evidence was introduced to establish the fact that appellee had lawfully been admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence.

In the reconstituted declaration (page 11, record on appeal) the following can be read:

I arrived at the Port of Manila on or about the first day of March, 1923, as shown by the attached certificate of arrival or landing certificate of residence.

The records of the Bureau of Justice, where the declarations of intention to become a Filipino citizen were filed, had been lost or destroyed during the battle for the liberation of Manila, and the certificate alluded to has not been reconstituted.

Appellant's contention that attachment of the certificate of arrival is essential to the validity of a declaration finds no support in the wordings of the law, as the above-quoted section 5 of Commonwealth Act no. 473 uses the words "has been issued.

Appellee suggests that we would not consider the question here raised by appellant, the latter having failed to raise it in lower court and points out that there is testimonial evidence showing appellee's arrival March, 1923, and that he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and the testimony of petitioner has not been refuted. Appellee's alleges that the office of the President has certified that it is a matter of record that petitioner was one of the Russian refugees who entered the Philippines under the command of Admiral Stark, the facts regarding arrival of the latter fleet being a matter of common knowledge, widely publicized in the newspapers at the time, of which this Court may properly take judicial notice under section 5 of Rule 123. When the fleet entered the Philippine waters, it was met by a Governor General Wood who, later, took the matter up with the authorities in Washington in lengthy correspondence, and the 1,200 persons manning the fleet were allowed to land and to remain in the Philippines or proceed to other countries, except about 800 who were allowed to go to the United States and given free transportation on the naval transport "Merritt." The ships of the fleet were sold in the Philippines.

The undisputed fact that the petitioner has been continuously residing in the Philippines for about 25 years, without having been molested by the authorities, who are presumed to have been regularly performing their duties and would have arrested petitioner if his residence is illegal, as rightly contended by appellee, can be taken as evidence that he is enjoying permanent residence legally. That a certificate of arrival has been issued is a fact that should be accepted upon the petitioner's undisputed statement in his declaration of July, 1940, that the certificate cannot be supposed that the receiving official would have accepted the declaration without the certificate mentioned therein as attached thereto.

We conclude that petitioner's declaration is valid under section 5 of the Naturalization Law, failure to reconstitute the certificate of arrival notwithstanding. What an unreconstituted document intended to prove may be shown by other competent evidence.

II

The second assignment of error touches upon two questions, that the lower court erred (1) in not finding that appellee has not established a legal residence in the Philippines, and (2) in not finding that he cannot speak and write any of the principal Philippine languages.

The first question has already been disposed of in the above discussion. Perusal of the testimonies on record leads to the conclusion that petitioner has shown legal residence in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years as required by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

As to the next question, appellant alleges that in the oral test at the hearing, it was demonstrated that petitioner has only a smattering of Bicol, the Filipino language that petitioner alleges to know, and he cannot speak it as he was not able to translate from English to Bicol questions asked by the court and the provincial fiscal, although, in the continuation of the hearing on September 30, 1947, "surprisingly enough, he succeeded answering correctly in Bicol the questions propounded by his counsel, however, he fumbled and failed to give the translation of such a common word as 'love' which the fiscal asked of him.

The lower court made the finding of fact that applicant speaks and writes English and Bicol and there seems to be no question about the competency of the judge who made the pronouncement, because he has shown by the appealed resolution and by his questions propounded to appellee, that he has command of both English and Bicol.

The law has not set a specific standard of the principal Philippine languages. A great number of standards can be set. There are experts in English who say that Shakespeare has used in his works 15,000 different English words, and the King's Bible about 10,000, while about 5,000 are used by the better educated persons and about 3,000 by the average individual. While there may be persons ambitious enough to have a command of the about 600,000 words recorded in the Webster's International Dictionary, there are authorities who would reduce basic English to a few hundred words. Perhaps less than one hundred well selected words will be enough for the ordinary purposes of daily life.

There is a reason to believe that the lower court's pronouncement is well taken considering the fact that, after he was liberated in 1942 from the Japanese in the Naga prison, petitioner joined the guerrilla in the Bicol region, took part in encounters and skirmishes against the Japanese, and remained with the guerrilla until the Americans liberated the Bicol provinces. If appellee with his smattering of Bicol was able to get along with his Bicol comrades in the hazardous life of the resistance movement, we believe that his knowledge of the language satisfies the requirement of the law.

But appellant contends that there is no piece of positive evidence to support petitioner's allegation that he can write too in the Bicol language. There, is, however, on record circumstantial evidence from which it can be concluded that petitioner ought to know also how to write Bicol. We know that Bicol, as all the important Philippine languages, uses the same alphabet used in English, and it is much easier to write Bicol than English, because it is phonetic. Vowels and consonants have in them single and not interchangeable phonetic values, while English words deviate very often from the basic sounds of the alphabet. The ability to write cannot be denied to a person like petitioner, who has undergone the exacting technical training to be able to render services as flier in the Russian Naval Squadron in the Baltic Sea and in the British Air Forces during the first World War. The difference between the Cyrillic alphabet, as now used by Russians, and our Roman alphabet, cannot weigh much to deny petitioner the ability to use the latter. A person who has shown the command of English which can be seen in his testimony on record can easily make use of an alphabet of twenty or more letters universally used in this country where he has been residing continuously for 25 years.

III

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding appellee stateless and not a Russian citizen and in not finding that he has failed to establish that he is not disqualified for Philippine citizenship under section 4 (h) of the Revised Naturalization Law.

It is contended that petitioner failed to show that under the laws of Russia, appellee has lost his Russian citizenship and failed to show that Russia grants to Filipinos the right to become a naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. The controversy centers on the question as to whether petitioner is a Russian citizen or is stateless.

Petitioner testified categorically that he is not a Russian citizen and that he has no citizenship. His testimony supports the lower court's pronouncement that petitioner is a stateless refugee in this country.

Appellant points out that petitioner stated in his petition for naturalization that he is citizen or subject of the Empire of Russia, but the Empire of Russia has ceased to exist since the Czars were overthrown in 1917 by the Bolshevists, and the petitioner disclaims allegiance or connection with the Soviet Government established after the overthrow of the Czarist Government.

We do not believe that the lower court erred in pronouncing appellee stateless. Appellee's testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-fortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of stateless refugees.

Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know, the history, nature and character of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to humanity and civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further evidence of petitioner's claim that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes no allegiance to the Russian Communist Government and, is because he has been at war with it, he fled from Russia to permanently reside in the Philippines. After finding in this country economic security in a remunerative job, establishing a family by marrying a Filipina with whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after showing his resolution to retain the happiness he found in our political system to the extent of refusing to claim Russian citizenship even to secure his release from the Japanese and of casting his lot with that of our people by joining the fortunes and misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond comprehension to support that the petitioner could feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.

IV

The fourth and last assignment of error need not be discussed, it being only a sequel of the other assignments and has necessarily been disposed of in their discussion.

The appealed resolution is affirmed.

DOMICILIARY THEORY
VELLILLA VS POSADAS DEC 19 1935 GR L-43314 62 PHIL 624
FACTS: The case is an action filed by the CIR to recover inheritance and income taxes assessed against the estate of Arthur G. Moody (deceased) That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 1931. He executed in the Philippines a will where he bequeathed her only sister Ida M. Palmer, a US citizen. A petition for appointment of special administrator was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut. The will of the deceased was duly probated Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of the deceased by virtue of an order issued by the court The property left by the deceased consisted principally of bonds and shares of stock of Philippine corporations, bank deposits and other personal properties, shown in the inventory filed by the special administrator with the court. This stipulation does not, however, cover the respective values of said properties for the purpose of the inheritance tax. BIR prepared for the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return An income tax return was also prepared by the BIR for the estate of the said deceased BIR sent a letter to the attorney of Ida M. Palmer

The estate of the deceased paid under protest the sum of P50,000 and the other sum of P40,019.75 for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 for income tax against said estate CIR overruled the protest Both parties introduced oral and documentary evidence showing that: o Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came to the Philippines in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in business up to the time of his death in Calcutta o He had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock, bank deposits and other intangibles and personal property o All of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. o He left no property of any kind located anywhere else. o In his will executed without date in Manila in accordance with the formalities of the Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his sister, Ida M. Palmer

ISSUE RULING:

The substance of the plaintiff's cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his complaint as follows:

That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal properties of a person not domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, credits and other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of the Philippine Islands.

Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as follows:

SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. Every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance. devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands and real rights in such property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the Philippine Islands, of any shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation or sociedad anonima organized or constituted in the Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or rights in any partnership, business or any personal property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to the following tax:

It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a "non-resident of the Philippine Islands". The answer, besides the general denial, sets up as a special defense "Arthur G. Moody, now deceased, was and prior to the date of his death, a resident in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, where he

was engaged actively in business." Issue was thus joined on the question: Where was the legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death?

The Solicitor-General raises a preliminary objection to the consideration of any evidence that Moody's domicile was elsewhere than in Manila at the time of his death based on the proposition that as no such objection was made before the Collector of Internal Revenue as one of the grounds of the protest against the payment of the tax, this objection cannot be considered in a suit against the Collector to recover the taxes paid under protest. He relies upon the decision in the case of W.C. Tucker vs. A.C. Alexander, Collector (15 Fed. [21, 356). We call attention, however, to the fact that this decision was reversed in 275 U.S., 232; 72 Law. ed., 256, and the case remanded for trial on the merits on the ground that the requirement that the action shall be based upon the same grounds, and only such, as were presented in the protest had been waived by the collector. In the case before us no copy of the taxpayer's protest is included in the record and we have no means of knowing its contents. We think, therefore, the preliminary objection made on behalf of the appellee does not lie.

We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the question on the merits as to whether Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his death. Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal domicile in the Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a fortune from his business in the Philippine Islands He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to the date he left Manila the latter part of February, 1928, under the following circumstances: He was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law. Distressed at the thought of being thus segregated and in violation of his promise to Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part of February, 1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax clearance certificate. The record does not show where Moody was during the remainder of the year 1928. He lived with a friend in Paris, France, during the months of March and April of the year 1929 where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur Institute. The record does not show where Moody was in the interval between April, 1929, and November 26, 1930, on which latter date he wrote a letter, Exhibit B, to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him mis interest in the Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares. In this letter, among other things, he states: "Certainly I'll never return there to live or enter business again." In this same letter he says:

I wish to know as soon as now (as to the purchase) for I have very recently decided either to sell or put in a line of school or office supplies ... before I go to the necessary investments placing any side lines, I concluded to get your definite reply to this ... I have given our New York buying agent a conditional order not to be executed until March and this will give you plenty of time ... anything that kills a business is to have it peddled around as being for sale and this is what I wish to avoid. He wrote letters dated December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the same line to Wendt. As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after these letters were written, there can be no doubt that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he returned to the Philippine Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive, not from justice, but from confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands.

There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his

death there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there again. Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there. The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for by the same motive that caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Cullion Leper Colony for he doubtless knew that on his return he would be immediately confined, because his affliction became graver to us while he was absent than it was on the day of his precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well known, as he might do in foreign parts.

Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual residence". The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.

The contention under the appellant's third assignment of error that the defendant collector illegally assessed an income tax of P13,001.41 against the Moody estate is, in our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this assessment, stated by the Collector of Internal Revenue in his letter, Exhibit NN, appear to us to be sound. That the amount of P59,986.69 was received by the estate of Moody as dividends declared out of surplus by the Camera Supply Company is clearly established by the evidence. The appellant contends that this assessment in taxation: First, because the corporation paid income tax on the same amount during the years it was accumulated as surplus; second, that an inheritance tax on the same amount was assessed against the estate, and third, the same amount is assessed as income of the estate. As to the first, it appears from the collector's assessment, Exhibit 11, to the collector allowed the estate a deduction of the normal income tax on said amount because it had already been paid at the source by the Camera Supply Company. The only income tax assessed against the estate was the additional tax or surtax that had not been paid by the Camera Supply Company for which the estate, having actually received the income, is clearly liable. As to the second alleged double taxation, it is clear that the inheritance tax and the additional income tax in question are entirely distinct. They are assessed under different statutes and we are not convinced by the appellant's argument that the estate which received these dividends should not be held liable for the payment of the income tax thereon because the operation was simply the conversion of the surplus of the corporation into the property of the individual stockholders. (Cf. U.S. vs. Phellis, 257 U.S., 171, and Taft vs. Bowers, 278 U.S., 460.) Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended, which is relied on by the appellant, plainly provides that the income from exempt property shall be included as income subject to tax.

Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and, second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine Islands. Costs against the appellant.

UYTENGSU VS REPUBLIC 95 PHIL 890

FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He went to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word residence, as used in the aforesaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that time, being, merely to study therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. HELD: While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residence combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed permanently for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return to the true domicile. Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for naturalization and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship, he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment in his favor.