Port Security Aff

1AC

1AC Inherency
First, Ports are underfunded nowhurts competitiveness and national security MAR, 3-7-12
*Maritime Activity Reports, Press Release, Ports Urge Congress to Support Port Security Grants. Online, http://www.marinelink.com/news/congress-security-support342938.aspx] MB At two separate Congressional hearings, representatives of the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) emphasized the need for federal support for seaport security and maintenance and improvements to federal navigation channels. Port industry leaders illustrated the challenges underfunding security and dredging pose for national security and U.S. international competitiveness. As the House Appropriations Committee begins work on the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, AAPA executives reminded Congressional leaders of the critical role ports play for the nation serving as a front line of defense on international borders and facilitating overseas trade, 99 percent of which moves by water. Captain John Holmes, Deputy Executive Director of Operations at the Port of Los Angeles, testified before the Homeland Security Subcommittee regarding Port Security Grants within the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The fiscal year 2012 funding level represents a 59 percent cut from the prior year and 75 percent less than the authorized level, Holmes stated. This will harm our ability to expand protection of our maritime assets, carry out Port-Wide Risk Management Plans, and fund federal mandates, such as installation of TWIC readers. Kurt Nagle, President and CEO, submitted testimony to the Energy and Water Subcommittee on the budget for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works program. The testimony focused on the need for full use of the Harbor Maintenance Tax annual revenue for maintenance dredging and the need to adequately fund needed channel deepening projects. The federal government has a unique Constitutional responsibility to maintain and improve the infrastructure which enables the flow of commerce, and much of that infrastructure in and around seaports have been neglected for too long, particularly the capacity of the federal channels, which affects the ports ability to move cargo efficiently into and out of the U.S, Nagle wrote. This hurts U.S. business, hurts U.S. workers, and hurts our national economy.

And, reforms to the Port Security Grant Program are needed, Changing grant structure is key to effective port security investment and preparedness against terrorist attacksreforms are key GAO, 2011
*Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB FEMA has faced several challenges in distributing PSGP grant funds, and FEMA has implemented specific steps to overcome these challenges. Only about one-quarter of awarded grant funding has been drawn down by grantees, and an additional onequarter remains unavailable (see table below). Funding is unavailablemeaning that grantees cannot begin using the funds to work on projectsfor two main reasons: federal requirements have not been met (such as environmental reviews), or the port area has not yet identified projects to fund with the grant monies. Several challenges contributed to funds being unavailable. For example, DHS was slow to review costshare waiver requests requests from grantees to forego the cost-share requirement. Without a more expedited

waiver review process, grant applicants that cannot afford the cost-share may not apply for important security projects. Other challenges included managing multiple open grant rounds, complying with program requirements, and using an antiquated grants management system. FEMA has taken steps to address these challenges. For example FEMA and DHS have, among other things, increased staffing levels, introduced project submission time frames, implemented new procedures for environmental reviews, and implemented phase one of a new grants management system. However, it is too soon to determine how successful these efforts will be in improving the distribution of grant funds. FEMA is developing performance measures to assess its administration of the PSGP but it has not implemented measures to assess PSGP grant effectiveness. Although FEMA has taken initial steps to develop measures to assess the effectiveness of its grant programs, it does not have a plan and related milestones for implementing measures specifically for the PSGP. Without such a plan, it may be difficult for FEMA to effectively manage the process of implementing measures to assess whether the PSGP is achieving its stated purpose of strengthening critical maritime infrastructure against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks.

1AC Plan
Thus the plan: The United States Federal Government should implement Government Accountability Office reforms for risk assessment management to the Port Security Grant Program to award $400 Million in unused grant funds for port security infrastructure investment

1AC Solvency
Reforms are key to ensure all FEMA PSGP grant money is effectively allocated key to port security GAO, 2011
[Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB Port areas have unique characteristicsthey are centers of commerce, hubs of transportation, and often close to major population centers. These characteristics result in specific vulnerabilities that must be addressed to avoid the human or economic losses that would result from a terrorist attack. The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)administered by FEMA and supported with subject matter expertise from the Coast Guardis one tool DHS uses to protect critical maritime infrastructure from these risks. Risk management has been endorsed by the federal government to help direct finite resources to areas of greatest risk and grant programs have provided substantial resources toward this effort. We found that PSGP allocations were highly correlated to risk for the grant years we examined and DHS has taken steps to strengthen the PSGP risk allocation model by improving the quality and precision of the data inputs. However, additional effortssuch as accounting for how new security measures affect port vulnerability and using the most precise data available in the risk modelcould further strengthen the model and build upon the progress made. While the allocation process has been risk- based, FEMA has faced significant challenges administering the grant program. For example, FEMA awarded nearly $1.7 billion in port security grants for fiscal years 2006 through 2010; however, draw down levels for the PSGP are lowwith about one-quarter of fiscal year 2006 through 2010 grant monies drawn down as of September 2011. While FEMA may not consider draw down levels to be an accurate measure of progress made in improving port security, this measure has become the de facto yardstick for assessing progress in securing our ports because no other measures exist. Additionally, about a quarter of the awarded funding remains unavailable due to delays in using grant funds, challenges with the cost-match and associated waiver process, and challenges that grantees have had complying with postaward requirements. As a result, about $400 million in awarded grant funding remains unavailable to grantees for port security projects. FEMA has taken steps to improve the availability of funds and has developed internal performance measures to begin evaluating its administration of the grant program. However, FEMA has not evaluated the effectiveness of the program because it does not have measures to track progress towards achieving program goals. To establish a more accurate measurement of grant effectiveness, FEMA should expedite its efforts to implement performance measures for the PSGP. Initial steps have been taken to develop performance measures for the PSGP, but the time frame for implementing them is unclear. Without a plan, there is little assurance that these measures will be implemented in a timely way to assess the programs effectiveness in ensuring that critical port infrastructure is protected. We are making four recommendations to help strengthen the implementation and oversight of the PSGP. To strengthen DHSs methodology for measuring vulnerability in ports, and to improve the precision of grant allocations to high-risk port areas, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to: Develop a vulnerability index that accounts for how security improvements affect port vulnerability, and incorporate these changes into future iterations of the PSGP risk model.

Coordinate with the Coast Guard to determine the most precise data available to populate the data elements within the vulnerability index and to utilize these data as an interim measure, until a revised vulnerability index is developed. To ensure that waiver requestsincluding those submitted under previous cost-share years in which money remains unassigned and those that may be submitted in future grant rounds if a cost-share requirement is appliedare evaluated promptly, we recommend that the FEMA Administratorin conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Securityevaluate the waiver review process to identify sources of delay and take measures to expedite the process. To strengthen the administration, oversight, and internal controls of the PSGP, and to streamline processes, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to developin collaboration with the Coast Guardtime frames and related milestones for implementing performance measures to monitor the effectiveness of the PSGP.

And, Reform of the risk assessment model for providing grants solves port securityensures the best data is used to direct grants properly GAO, 2011
[Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB In fiscal year 2011, DHS modified how port vulnerabilitythe relative exposure to an attack is calculated in the PSGP risk model, but additional changes could improve how vulnerability is measured in the model. Prior to fiscal year 2011, the PSGP risk model held vulnerability constant, rather than accounting for differences across ports. We have reported on the value of measuring vulnerability in risk analysis models in two prior reports. In June 2008, we reported that DHS chose to hold vulnerability constant and consider all states and urban areas equally vulnerable in the HSGP risk analysis model, which reduced the value of the model in estimating risk. 24 In June 2009, we reported that DHS also chose to consider all transit agencies equally vulnerable in its Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) risk analysis model. 25 Regarding both modelswhich are similar in structure to the PSGP risk modelwe recommended that DHS formulate a method to measure vulnerability in a manner that captures variations across jurisdictions, and apply this vulnerability measure in future iterations of the grant allocation model. To respond to these recommendations and other external feedback regarding the grant programs, and to produce a more complete risk picture, DHS modified the vulnerability index in the fiscal year 2011 PSGP model such that vulnerability is no longer held constant. 26 Instead, the new vulnerability index recognizes that different ports can have different vulnerability levels. In the fiscal year 2011 PSGP model, port vulnerability is assessed using four data components thought to influence a ports vulnerability to attack, as shown below in table 4. The fiscal year 2011 PSGP risk model is provided in full in appendix II. Although FEMA has taken the first step towards improving how port vulnerability is measured in the PSGP risk model, further improvements are needed to ensure that the vulnerability score for a specific port is responsive to changes in security that may occur in that portsuch as the implementation of new security measures. The fiscal year 2011 vulnerability index does not provide a mechanism to account for how new security measuressuch as the installation of cameras or the provision of additional training to security officials affect a ports vulnerability, even if those security measures were funded using PSGP grant dollars. This limitation is due to the fact that the data elements within the vulnerability index are counts of activities, which recognize the number

of activities that may occursuch as how many ferry passengers board a ferrybut do not account for the protective actions taken to secure them. For example, if a port installed security cameras throughout a ferry system to monitor vessel or ferry passenger activity, one would expect to reduce the ferry systems vulnerability to attack. However, because the ferry passenger data element within the models vulnerability index is simply a count of passengers utilizing the ferry system and is not a reflection of the security measures in place to protect the ferry system, the new camera system would not reduce the ports vulnerability score as calculated by the risk model. Thus, with this type of measure, in this example, a port could only reduce its vulnerability score by reducing the number of passengers utilizing the ferry system. The models robustness is thereby limited because activity counts do not reflect improvements made to port security. It is important to note that some security improvements may be captured by the inclusion of the Coast Guards Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) results in the PSGP risk model. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan states that when measuring vulnerability, one should describe all protective measures in place and how they reduce vulnerability. FEMA officials reported that capturing data on all security improvements would be challenging due to the need to collect and validate data for all ports included in the PSGP risk model. The MSRAM data which are updated annually provide information to the model on the percentage of national high-risk assets that reside within each port. However, MSRAM does not account for all types of security improvements because it is an asset-based model that assesses improvements to individual port assets such as a ferry terminal or a chemical plant. As such, MSRAM is not designed, for example, to evaluate security projects that may affect multiple assets in a port. However, FEMA officials acknowledged the importance of incorporating completed security projects as part of the vulnerability component of the risk model and stated that FEMA will continue to refine its vulnerability assessments. Without accounting for the reductions in vulnerability achieved through new security measures implemented in a port, including those funded through the PSGP, the robustness of the risk model may be limited and not accurately reflect the relative risk of port areas throughout the nation. Instead, the risk model would likely continue to recognize the same ports as the highest risk, regardless of the security improvements made in those ports. In addition, by not accounting for security improvements resulting from PSGP grants, the security benefits of the PSGP are also not recognized. Incorporating completed security projects into the vulnerability component of the risk model could help increase its robustness and more accurately direct allocations to the highest risk port areas.

1AC Terrorism
First, Terrorist attacks on ports are coming and we are lagging behind in security now Nadler et all, 6-26-12
[JERROLD L. NADLER, EDWARD J. MARKEY and BENNIE G. THOMPSON, NYT contributors, Cargo, the Terrorists Trojan Horse. Online, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/thedangerous-delay-on-port-security.html] MB MILLIONS of cargo containers are unloaded from ships each year at American seaports, providing countless opportunities for terrorists to smuggle and unleash a nuclear bomb or weapon of mass destruction on our shores. To counter this threat, Congress passed a law five years ago mandating
that by July 2012, all maritime cargo bound for the United States must be scanned before it is loaded on ships. But the Obama administration will miss this deadline, and it is not clear to us, as the authors of the law, whether it ever plans to comply with the law. Over the years, terrorists have shown themselves to be frighteningly inventive. They have hidden explosives in printer cartridges transported by air and embedded explosives in the shoes and underwear of airline passengers. The

cargo containers arriving on ships from foreign ports offer terrorists a Trojan horse for a devastating attack on the United States. As the Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison has put it, a nuclear attack is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile. But for the past five years, the Department of Homeland Security has done little to counter this threat and instead has wasted precious time arguing that it would be too expensive and too
difficult, logistically and diplomatically, to comply with the law. This is unacceptable.

And, the nature of container shipping industry makes terrorism likely Chalk, 2008
*Peter, RAND corporation, The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism, piracy, and challenges for the United States. Online, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf] MB Finally, the expansive global container-shipping complex oers terrorists a logistical channel that favors the covert movement of weapons and personnel. Most commentators generally agree that terrorist contingencies involving this class of vessel are more likely to involve exploitation of the cargo supply chain than attacks directed against carriers themselves. Merchant craft are not only large, they also have a high
waterline, which means that a considerable quantity of explosives would be needed to cause a critical breach. Even if sucient quanti ties could be smuggled aboard hidden in a container, there would be no way of ensuring that the targeted crate would be loaded and placed in a position that could allow a bomb to be detonated with maximum eect. 24 By contrast, leveraging

container carriers for logistical purposes is not only viable, but also relatively easy. This is largely because the international trading system is deliberately designed to be as open and accessible as possible (to keep costs low and turnover high), which necessarily means minimizing the disruptive impact of any security measures thereby instituted. Reecting this, only two to ve percent of containers shipped around the world are physically inspected at their port of arrival. 25 Simply put, the statistical probability of successfully smuggling a weapon or bomb is much greater than the probability of intercepting one. 26 Just as importantly, the highly complex nature of the containerized supply chain creates a plethora of openings for terrorist inltration. Unlike other cargo vessels that typically handle
payloads for a single customer loaded at port, container ships deal with commodities from hundreds of companies and individuals that, in most cases are received and transported from inland warehouses. 27 Each

point of transfer along this spectrum of movement is a potential source of vulnerability for the overall integrity of the cargo and provides extremists with numerous opportunities to stu or otherwise tamper with boxed crates. 28 Compounding the situation is the highly rudimentary nature of the locks that are used to seal containers, the bulk of which consist of little more than plastic ties or bolts that can be

quickly cut and then reattached using a combination of superglue and heat. 29 Underscoring

all of these considerations is the ineectiveness of point of origin inspections. Many littoral states fail to routinely
vet dock workers, 30 do not require that truck drivers present valid identication before entering an ooading facility, 31 and frequently over look the need to ensure that all cargo is accompanied by an accurate manifest. The

absence of uniform and concerted dockside safeguards works to the direct advantage of the terrorist, both because it
is virtually impossible to inspect containers once they are on the high seas and due to the fact that only a tiny fraction of boxed freight is actually checked on arrival at its destination.

And, specifically port infrastructure attacks are likely Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Another key aspect of maritime terrorism scenarios is identifying potential targets. There are numerous possibilities, especially in and around ports. As a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) analyst testified before Congress in 2006, Ports contain a number of specific facilities that could be targeted by terrorists, including military vessels and bases, cruise ships, passenger ferries, terminals, dams and locks, factories, office buildings, power plants, refineries, sports complexes, and other critical infrastructure. 23 In addition to vessels and infrastructure, terrorists may seek to attack maritime communities using ships as delivery vehicles for WMDs or by exploiting chemicals or explosives in cargo ships or onshore storage tanks in populated port areas. The Homeland Security Council included terrorist attacks on ships carrying flammable and toxic chemical cargoes in a U.S. port among the hazard scenarios it developed in 2004 as the basis for U.S. homeland security national preparedness standards. 24 Because the characteristics of infrastructure targets or human targets may be unique to any specific category of target (e.g., propane tankers) or community (e.g., Charleston), understanding how target characteristics relate to terrorist capabilities and objectives may offer valuable insights into the credibility of particular attack scenarios.

And, the risk of terrorists smuggling in nuclear weapons through shipping containers extremely highmany steps in container loading process that could allow terrorist infiltration Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Method of Delivery. The potential smuggling and detonation of a nuclear or dirty bomb device in a shipping container at a U.S. port is one of the threats most specifically and frequently mentioned by legislators in the context of maritime security.89 Shipping containers may be particularly vulnerable to terrorist infiltration compared to other types of cargo for three reasons. First, shipping containers are relatively large. They come in standard sizes from 20 to 53 feet long, although the most common are 40 feet or longerabout the size of a truck semi-trailer. Second, the containers on any given ship are packed at the factories or warehouses of many different companies that can be dispersed far and wide from the loading port, making it impossible for government authorities to ensure that only legitimate cargo has been packed. Third, the containers are typically trucked to the port of loading, during which the integrity of the shipments rests entirely on the trustworthiness or due diligence of the truck drivers. A maritime security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, who is a former Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, outlines a scenario that most concerns him: Let me share with you the terrorist

scenario that most keeps me awake at night.... A container of athletic foot wear for a name brand company is loaded at a manufacturing plant in Surabaya, Indonesia. The container doors are shut and a mechanical seal is put into the door pad-eyes. These designer sneakers are destined for retail stores in malls across America. The container and seal numbers are recorded at the factory.

A local truck driver, sympathetic to al Qaeda picks up the container. On the way to the port, he turns into an alleyway and backs up the truck at a nondescript warehouse where a small team of operatives pry loose one of the door hinges to open the container so that they can gain access to the shipment. Some of the sneakers are removed and in their place, the operatives load a dirty bomb wrapped in lead shielding, and they then refasten the door.

And, Terrorists can build the a Hiroshima style nuke materials are available and technical skills arent needed Mendalia, 2005
[Jonathan, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response. CRS report for congress, Online, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21293.pdf] MB Build a Bomb. The Hiroshima bomb was a gun assembly weapon. Its nuclear explosive was a gun barrel about 6 inches in diameter by 6 feet long. It was capped at each end, with standard explosive at one end, a mass of uranium highly enriched in the isotope 235 (highly enriched uranium, or HEU) next to the explosive, and a second HEU mass at the other end. Detonating the explosive shot one mass of HEU into the other, rapidly assembling a mass large enough to support a fission chain reaction. (Plutonium cannot be used.) This is the simplest type of nuclear weapon. U.S. scientists had such high confidence in the design that they did not test the Hiroshima bomb. Experts agree11 that terrorist groups could not make special nuclear material (SNM, i.e., fissile plutonium or HEU). Many believe that a terrorist group with access to HEU and key skills could build a crude nuclear weapon. Five former Los Alamos nuclear weapons experts held that such a weapon could be constructed by a group not previously engaged in designing or building nuclear weapons, providing a number of requirements were adequately met. 7 A National Research Council study stated: The basic technical information needed to construct a workable nuclear device is readily available in the open literature. The primary impediment that prevents countries or technically competent terrorist groups from developing nuclear weapons is the availability of SNM, especially HEU. 8 Many believe it would be hard for a terrorist group to obtain enough HEU for a weapon; others fear that terrorists could do so. The National Research Council study rated the threat level from SNM from Russia as High large inventories of SNM are stored at many sites that apparently lack inventory controls and indigenous threats have increased. 9

And independently dirty bomb attacks on Ports are extremely likelythey are coming now by 2015 Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Terrorist attacks on U.S. ports with radiological dispersion devices (dirty bombs)is also considered among the gravest maritime terrorism scenarios.77 A2003 simulation of a series of such attacks concluded that they could cripple global trade and have a devastating impact on the nations economy.78 Many terrorism analysts view such a dirty bomb attack as relatively likely. In a 2005 survey, for example, nuclear non-proliferation experts expressed their beliefs (on average) that there was a 25% chance of a dirty bomb attack in the United States by 2010

and a 40% chance of such an attack by 2015.79 Studies suggest that the materials required to make a dirty bomb may be widely available and poorly controlled internationally.80 According to some press reports, U.S. and British intelligence agencies have reportedly concluded that Al Qaeda has succeeded in making such a bomb.81 Port operators have testified before Congress that they believe it is just a question of time before terrorists with dirty bombs successfully attack a U.S. port.82

And, dirty bomb attacks are just as bad as nuclear attacks BERES IN 94
(Prof., Political Science, Purdue University) 94 *Louis Rene, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24Georgia Jounral of International and Comparative Law 1, Spring, LN//] Radiological weapons are not as widely understood as nuclear explosives, but they may be equally ominous in their effects. Placed in the hands of 8955*27 terrorists, such weapons could pose a lethal hazard for human beings anywhere in the world. Even a world already dominated by every variety of numbing could not fail to recoil from such a prospect. Radiological weapons are devices designed to disperse radioactive materials that have been produced a substantial time before their dispersal. The targets against which terrorists might choose to use radiological weapons include concentrations of people inside buildings, concentrations of people on urban streets or at sporting events, urban areas with a high population density as a whole, and agricultural areas. The form such weapons might take include plutonium dispersal devices (only 3.5 ounces of plutonium could prove lethal to everyone within a large office building or factory) or devices designed to disperse other radioactive materials. In principle, the dispersal of spent nuclear reactor fuel and the fission products separated from reactor fuels would create grave hazards in a populated area, but the handling of such materials would be very dangerous to terrorists themselves. It is more likely, therefore, that would-be users of radiological weapons would favor plutonium over radioactive fission products. The threat of nuclear terrorism involving radiological weapons is potentially more serious than the threat involving nuclear explosives. This is because it would be easier for terrorists to achieve nuclear capability with radiological weapons. Such weapons, therefore, could also be the subject of a more plausible hoax than nuclear explosives.

And, nuclear terrorism risks extinction ALEXANDER (Dir. Inter-University Center for Terrorism) 2000
*Yonah, Terrorism in the 21st Century, Depaul Business Law Journal, p. ln] More specifically, present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new scale of terror violence in terms of both threats and responses that has made clear that we have entered into an Age of Terrorism with all of its serious implications to national, regional, and global security concerns. n25 Perhaps the most significant dangers that evolve from modern day terrorism are those relating to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of economic [*67] development; the expansion of democracy; and possibly the survival of civilization itself.

Additionally, a terror attack causes retaliation and freak-out that ensues will guarantee extinction draws in Russia and China and causes massive nuclear war Ayson 10

[Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld] /Wyo-MB
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there

are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance
alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an

act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the
early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if

the act of nuclear terrorism

came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of
this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The

reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it
must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the

act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington

might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not
impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russias use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russias traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In

the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase how dare they tell us what to do immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

Finally, effective PGSP funding is necessary to solve a terrorist attack emanating from US ports GAO, 2011
[Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the nations ports have been viewed as potential targets of attack for many reasons. According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ports, waterways, and vessels are part of an economic engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, and an attack on this system could have a widespread impact on global shipping, international trade, and the global economy. Additionally, ports often are not only gateways for the movement of goods, but also industrial hubs and close to population centers, presenting additional opportunities for terrorists intending to harm U.S. interests. They are also potential conduits for weapons prepared elsewhere and concealed in cargo designed to move quickly to many locations beyond the ports themselves. Further, cruise ships, tankers, and cargo ships present potentially

desirable terrorist targets given the potential for loss of life, environmental damage, or disruption of commerce. Balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of people and commerce remains an ongoing challenge for the public and private sectors alike. To strengthen the security of the nations ports against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks, DHS administers the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) through its component agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Coast Guard provides subject matter expertise to FEMA on the maritime industry to inform grant award decisions. The PSGP is to provide funding to the nations highest risk port areas to support increased portwide risk management; to enhance domain awareness; to train and exercise; to expand port recovery and resiliency capabilities; and to further capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from attacks involving improvised explosive devices and other nonconventional weapons. Since the programs inception in fiscal year 2002, the federal government has provided almost $2.5 billion in PSGP funding to state, local, and private entities to increase portwide risk management, enhance domain awareness, and improve recovery and resiliency through the development of security plans, the purchase of security equipment, and the provision of security training to employees.

Inherency

Inherency Inefficient Funding Now

Funding is being allocated inefficientlywhile ports are vital to national security, their funding is either unspent, cut, or forgotten Wallman 11
*Brittany, Wasserman Schultz Blasts Port Security Budget Cuts, Web, 3/8/11, South Florida Sentinel, Accessed online via Proquest] "1.4 billion dollars remains ready for us, unspent, in protecting America's ports ," a statement from his Washington, D.C., office says. "This means the Obama Administration has failed to allocate $1.4 billion into port security. That, along with the fact that Congressional Democrats failed to pass a budget last year, should be our focus, and should be of major concern for the American people." Democratic
Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz blasted Republicans' proposed 2011 budget Monday, saying one of the many cuts would crimp security at Port Everglades and in ports across the country. Wasserman Schultz, D-Weston, said a

two-thirds slicing of the national Port Security Grant Program would translate to a loss of $1.5 million for Port Everglades. Those grants are not used for day-to-day security, but pay for new projects and technology. Standing in the port in front of a foreign cargo ship, with heavy trucks roaring by, she said "a tight web of security" at the nation's ports is essential to the safety of the community, and also to the economy. Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Port Everglades security has been beefed up substantially. "Why would we go backwards?" she asked. Broward Sheriff Al Lamberti, a Republican, joined her, saying the port is Broward County's economic engine, and that " if the port fails, the country fails."

Inherency Security Ineffective Now

Inefficient and slow grants and cost-share programs make current security ineffective PR Newswire 2011
*American Association of Port Authorities, 10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S. Ports Accessed online via lexis+
In the decade since Sept. 11, 2001, America's seaports and the federal government have joined forces to make major gains in fortifying and hardening port facilities against intruder attack. Since then, public port authorities have made terrorism detection and prevention one of their top priorities. With the combined efforts of port authorities and initiatives of federal agencies within the FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Domestic Nuclear Protection Office, ports are significantly safer now than prior to 9/11. "For

centuries, seaports have been a vital part of this nation's transportation infrastructure, and safe, secure seaport facilities are critical to protecting our borders and moving goods," said Kurt Nagle, American Association of Port Authorities' president and CEO. "Regrettably, the more than 50 percent funding level cut recommended for FEMA's State and Local Program grants, which includes the Port Security Grant Program, could impact the current security capabilities of many U.S. ports as well as hamper their ability to carry out their five-year port protection plans." He added, "With the death of Bin Laden, critical infrastructure facilities, such as ports,
are being asked to be extra vigilant to protect against retaliatory terrorist attacks. In addition to making continued enhancements, the Port Security Grant Program helps pay for maintaining and replacing our current security assets at ports." Security Improvements Significant, But Costs High The comprehensive Maritime Transportation Security Act Port Act of 2006 changed the way ports handle cargo and passenger movements. To implement the security measures in this legislation, America's ports and their terminal operators have invested billions of dollars into security personnel and training, enhancements to perimeter security, access control and credentialing systems, interoperable communications technology, and waterside security such as patrol boats, vessel tracking and underwater threat detection systems. While federal

Port Security Grant Program funds have helped pay for the sweeping security overhaul at U.S. ports, the grants oftentimes require ports to pay a 25 percent "cost-share," pay 100 percent of their security program operations, management and policing personnel expenses (representing the highest ongoing cost for security at most ports), and limit infrastructure construction costs to 10 percent of the grant total. Furthermore, in addition to the huge funding cuts proposed for fiscal 2012 and beyond, the lumping of port grant funds with other State and Local Program grants-such those for first responders, urban areas and transit systems-will likely result in even less funding for port security. Although insufficient security grant funding is a chief concern among ports, there is also a significant concern about the time delay between when DHS announces grant awards and when it completes all reviews and gives grantees authority to begin their security improvements. Consequently, AAPA has urged DHS to streamline their
processes and get funding out more quickly.

Advantages

Terrorism Inherency Risk High

Terror risk highports are high value targets GAO, 2011
*Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB The United States has approximately 360 commercial sea and river ports. While no two ports in the United States are exactly alike, many share certain characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist attacks: they are sprawling, easily accessible by water and land, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and interwoven with complex transportation networks designed to move cargo and commerce as quickly as possible (see fig 1). They contain not only terminals where goods bound for import or export are unloaded or loaded onto vessels, but also other facilities critical to the nations economy, such as refineries, factories, and power plants. To reduce the opportunity for terrorists to exploit port vulnerabilities, port stakeholders are taking mitigation steps. For example, port stakeholders have installed fences, hired security guards, and purchased cameras to reduce the potential for unauthorized entry and help prevent vulnerabilities from being exploited.

Terrorism Inherency Terrorism on the Rise

Global terrorism on the rise Coker and Johnson, 5-3-2011
*Margaret and Keith, Middle East Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, As Al Qaeda Adapts Its Tactics, Threat From Splinter Group Persists, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703703304576299041912668436.html] /WyoMB Long before Osama bin Laden's death, al Qaeda had adapted itself to survive and operate without him, ensuring the threat his terror network poses will live well beyond his demise. Bin
Laden spent the last decade on the run following the al Qaeda-mounted terrorist attacks in the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001. But his fugitive status didn't render the network impotent. Instead, it forced an evolution: The original group splintered, popping up in new places with new leaders who, in addition to attempting high-profile attacks, encouraged their radicalized followers to strike on their

Strong al Qaeda offshoots exist not just in hot spots such as Yemen, Somalia and Indonesia, but increasingly in more far-flung locations, such as Sweden and Norway. The leaders of these groups consider bin Laden a religious and philosophical guide, but have worked independently from his command for years. The expansion of al Qaeda affiliates comes against a backdrop of political upheaval in the Middle East that is disrupting counterterrorism cooperation by onetime key U.S. allies such as Egypt and Yemen and giving terrorists potentially more operational breathing space. "We've struck a substantial blow at part of the [radical Islamic] movement, but this is far, far from over," said James Woolsey, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
own if the opportunity presented itself. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, bin Laden's operational role at the head of al Qaeda had faded while his role as charismatic figurehead increased, burnished by videotapes he released featuring him wearing his faded camouflage jacket and brandishing an AK-47 assault rifle. However, in recent years, other high-profile jihadisfrom Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq to Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen threatened to eclipse bin Laden as the global jihadist movement's most powerful spokesman. His death, especially since it came in close-quarters combat with U.S. troops, could change that. "His martyrdom has the potential to reinvigorate al Qaeda's brand among those already radicalized to the cause," said Leah Farrall, an Australian counterterrorism expert. Bin Laden's command largely moved out of Afghanistan in 2001, after the fall of the Taliban, and many core players were caught or killed after the U.S.-led

invasion. As the old guard was decimated, bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, his second in command, were isolated. But their absence only served to diffuse operations over a wider collection of groups and individuals that carried on al Qaeda's mission around the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia and Europe. The most active offshoot group is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, led by Nasir al
Wahishi, bin Laden's former secretary in Afghanistan who escaped to Iran, was arrested, and subsequently extradited to Yemen in 2003. He escaped from prison in 2006 and spearheaded the merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al Qaeda in 2009. More than any other group, AQAP serves as connective tissue between al Qaeda branches in other regions. Mr. Wahishi was buttressed in that regard by Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born radical cleric who gained a following via his Internet sermons and who has become a key recruiter. The new al Qaeda leaders in Yemen have surpassed their godfather by adapting their message for Western audiences. AQAP is adept at using technology: It publishes an online magazine called "Inspire"part fanzine, part recruiting tool, offering advice and instruction for would-be bombers. The subliminal message from AQAP is that new recruits don't need to seek military training in Pakistan or Yemen to score a hit against the "far enemy," the phrase al Qaeda uses for the U.S. and other Western countries. Radicalized converts don't seek permission from headquarters before acting. AQAP's profile has risen in lockstep with that of Mr. Awlaki, who gained a wide following on the Internet thanks to his flawless English and heated sermons. He inspired Maj. Nidal Hasan, who went on a shooting spree at Fort Hood in Texas in 2009, and prepared Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber who attempted to blow up a U.S.-bound passenger plane on Christmas Day that year. Mr. Awlaki has been singled out by U.S. counterterrorism officials as one of al Qaeda's most dangerous leaders. AQAP's ability to attempt fresh attacks against the U.S. has increasingly worried U.S. officials because of the instability in Yemen. While current President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been a less-than-perfect ally in the fight against AQAP, some U.S. officials worry about the future of cooperation there if he steps down. Some

In Africa, al Qaeda and its affiliates have found refuge in lawless pockets of the continent, from Somalia in the east to Mali in the west. The cells appear to have little connection, but have provided ominous glimpses of what they may be capable ofas in the failed airline attack involving the Nigerian, Mr. Abdulmutallab,
terror experts think AQAP may inherit al Qaeda central's mantle as the focal point of resistance to the U.S.

and the three suicide bombings in July 2010 at restaurants in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, as patrons watched the World Cup soccer tournament. The groups include Algeria-based al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, which has been linked to several killings and kidnappings of Westerners in recent years. In Southeast Asia, veterans of al Qaeda's Afghanistan operation helped establish franchises in places like Indonesia. As time passed, these disparate groups became increasingly autonomous, often working with minimal funding or sourcing funds from sympathizers independently from the main al Qaeda leadership. In some ways this increased their effectiveness, security analysts say.

And there are numerous Islamic terror outfits not allied

with al Qaeda that could gain in prominence following bin Laden's death, including the Pakistani
Taliban, behind the May 2010 plot to explode a car bomb in New York's Times Square. Other groups include Pakistan-based Lashkare-Taiba, which carried out the deadly 2008 assault in Mumbai, India. Daniel Benjamin, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, last week highlighted the group's "continued menace."

Terrorism Link Risk High

Ports are a key vulnerability that terrorists will exploitcontainers are an easy vessel to smuggle in a weapon Mendalia, 2005
[Jonathan, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response. CRS report for congress, Online, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21293.pdf] MB Terrorists might try to smuggle a bomb into a U.S. port in many ways, but containers may offer an attractive route. A container is a metal box, typically 8 ft wide by 8 ft high by 20 ft or 40 ft long, that can be used on and moved between a tractor-trailer, a rail car, or a ship. Much global cargo moves by container. Nearly 9 million containers a year enter the United States by ship. 2 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens data for all containers, and reportedly inspects about 6 percent of them. 3 Containers could easily hold a nuclear weapon. Many believe that ports and containers are vulnerable. An FBI official stated, The intelligence that we have certainly points to the ports as a key vulnerability of the United States and of a key interest to certain terrorist groups.... 4 CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner believes an attack using a nuclear bomb in a container would halt container shipments, leading to devastating consequences for the global economy. ... 5 People can, however, find ways to minimize economic problems.

Despite potential setbacksmaritime terrorism is likely Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007

[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Given these challenges, it remains an open question how likely maritime attacks against the United States may be. In terms of the scenario framework in this report, although a successful attack on U.S. maritime targets would likely satisfy certain objectives of known international perpetrators such as Al Qaeda, tactical uncertainties and security deterrents may lead terrorist planners to turn their attention elsewhere. It bears repeating, however, that maritime terror attacks against the U.S. have occurred and there is evidence they have been planned for the future, despite the operational challenges. The same naval analyst cited above calls for continued vigilance: Rather than develop a false sense of security based on the belief that inherent difficulties will limit maritime terrorism ... caution is warranted in light of al Qaedas adaptability, ingenuity, tenacity, and audacity. Successful development and application of maritime tactics, techniques, and procedures has already occurred within the terrorist community.124 It appears, therefore, that while maritime terrorist attacks against the United States may be more difficult to execute and, consequently, less likely to occur than other types of attacks, they remain a significant possibility and warrant continued policy attention.

Terrorism Impact - Death

Port terror attack would cause massive loss of lives Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Acts of maritime terrorism may have many objectives. They may seek to cause human casualties, economic losses, environmental damage, or other negative impacts, alone or in combination, of minor or major consequence.9 If human casualties are the principal objective, passenger vessels such as cruise ships and ferries, which together account for less than 4% of U.S. commercial vessel inventory, may be more attractive terrorist targets than cargo and other vessels.10 Consistent with this reasoning, federal agencies reportedly concluded in 2004 that the Washington state ferry system had been under surveillance as a possible terrorism target.11 A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack on a heavily populated U.S. port could inflict the greatest number of human casualties. The Defense Departments Joint Task ForceCivil Support developed such a scenario in a 2005 exercise involving the smuggling and detonation of a 10kiloton nuclear device in the port of Charleston, SC.12

Terrorism Impact Economy

Terror attack on ports will hurt the global economyfunding for security is key Mendalia, 2005
[Jonathan, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response. CRS report for congress, Online, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21293.pdf] MB A terrorist nuclear attack on a U.S. seaport could cause local devastation and affect the global economy. Terrorists might obtain a bomb in several ways, though each poses difficulties. Ability to detect a bomb appears limited. The United States is using technology, intelligence, international cooperation, etc., to try to thwart an attack. Issues for Congress include safeguarding foreign nuclear material, mitigating economic effects of an attack, and allocating funds between ports and other potential targets. This report will be updated as needed.

A terrorist attack on ports would kill millions and tank the global economy from trade disruption Mendalia, 2005
[Jonathan, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response. CRS report for congress, Online, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21293.pdf] MB Terrorists have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. While it would probably be more difficult for terrorists to obtain or fabricate a nuclear weapon than other WMD, an attack using a nuclear weapon merits consideration because it would have much higher consequence. U.S. seaports could be targets for terrorist attack. A terrorist Hiroshima-sized nuclear bomb (15 kilotons, the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT) detonated in a port would destroy buildings out to a mile or two; start fires, especially in a port that handled petroleum and chemicals; spread fallout over many square miles; disrupt commerce; and kill many people. Many ports are in major cities. By one estimate, a 10- to 20-kiloton weapon detonated in a major seaport would kill 50,000 to 1 million people and would result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of $100 billion to $200 billion, and indirect costs of $300 billion to $1.2 trillion. 1

A port terrorist attack could shut down the global oil trade causing economic damage Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] If economic loss is the primary objective, terrorists may seek to carry out different types of attacks, with potentially few human casualties but significant impacts to critical infrastructure or commerce. The Limburg bombing may have been an attack of this type, threatening to disrupt the global oil trade and causing considerable consternation among tanker operators.13 Although the bombing killed only one member of the Limburgs crew, it caused insurance rates among Yemeni shippers to rise 300% and reduced Yemeni port shipping volumes by 50% in the

month after the attack.14 The bombing also caused significant environmental damage, spilling 90,000 barrels of oil into the Gulf of Aden.15 Other types of maritime attacks could disrupt more directly the shipping operations of key commercial ports. For example, in a 2005 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) exercise, terrorists hypothetically destroyed the International Bridge in Sault Ste. Marie, MI, blocking the shipping channel below with debris, by exploding a fuel tanker truck on the bridge.16

Maritime terrorism damages the US and global economy from trade and oil disruptions Chalk, 2008
*Peter, RAND corporation, The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism, piracy, and challenges for the United States. Online, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf] MB While long-term or widespread disruption to the global economy is unlikely, it is certainly possible that temporary, localized scal damage could result from an act of terrorism. The suicide strike on the M/V Limburg in 2002 is a case in point. Although the incident only resulted in three deaths (including the two bombers), it directly contributed to a short-term collapse of international shipping business in the Gulf, led to a 48 cent per barrel hike in the price of Brent crude oil, and due to the tripling of war risks premiums levied on ships calling at Aden, resulted in a 93-percent drop in container terminal throughput that cost the Yemeni economy an estimated $3.8 million a month in port revenues. 14 It is also worth bearing in mind that maritime terrorism, to the extent that it does have at least a residual disruptive economic potential, resonates with the underlying operational and ideological rationale of al Qaeda and the wider global jihadist nebula. Indeed, attacking key pillars of the Western commercial, trading, and energy system is a theme that, at least rhetorically, has become increasingly prominent in the years since 9/11, and that is viewed as integral to the Islamist war on the United States and its major allies. Portraying the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon as a single dening point in exposing the fallacy of American (nancial) power, 15 Bin Laden and his chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, have both squarely put the thrust of their continuing campaign against Washington in the context of economic war. 16 his was made explicitly apparent in a video statement released by the al Qaeda emir in December 2004, when he reected on a guerrilla conict in Afghanistan that had bled Russia for ten years until it went bankrupt, arming that al Qaeda is continuing in the same policy to make the US bleed profusely to the point of bankruptcy. 17

Terrorism Impact Dirty Bomb

Terrorists will use dirty bombsbenefits outweigh the risks Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Faced with contradictory perspectives on the likelihood of a dirty bomb attack scenario at a U.S. port, analysts and policy makers draw qualified conclusions about such an attack. If a weak dirty bomb attack is more likely than a strong one, but a weak attack will have limited effects, it is unclear whether such an attack would meet terrorist objectives. On the other hand, the effects on the general public of any dirty bomb attack, even a weak one, may be great enough to motivate potential attackers. As one analyst has stated, not withstanding the challenges to dirty bombers, the chances of a dirty bomb being deployed by al Qaeda cannot be discounted... Given the exponential psychological and economic effects of such a weapon, the benefits of deploying one may far outweigh the costs and difficulties entailed in its construction.88

Terrorism Impact LNG Tanker Attack

Terror attacks on LNG tankers likely Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Potential terrorist attacks on LNG tankers in U.S. waters have been a key concern of policy makers in ports with LNG facilities because such attacks could cause catastrophic fires in port and nearby populated areas. The Coast Guards FY2006 budget specifically requested funding for additional boat crews and screening personnel at key LNG hubs.97 To date, no LNG tanker or land-based LNG facility in the world has been attacked by terrorists. However, similar natural gas and oil assets have been favored terror targets internationally. The attack on the Limburg, although an oil tanker, is often cited as an indication of LNG tanker vulnerability. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) specifically included LNG tankers among a list of potential terrorist targets in a security alert late in 2003.98 The DHS also reported that in early 2001 there was some suspicion of possible associations between stowaways on Algerian flagged LNG tankers arriving in Boston and persons connected with the so-called Millennium Plot to bomb targets in the United States. While these suspicions could not be proved, DHS stated that the risks associated with LNG shipments are real, and they can never be entirely eliminated.99 A 2004 report by Sandia National Laboratories concluded that potential terrorist attacks on LNG tankers, could be considered credible and possible.100 The Sandia report identified LNG tankers as vulnerable to ramming, pre-placed explosives, insider takeover, hijacking, or external terrorist actions (such as a Limburg-type, missile or airplane attack).101 Former Bush Administration counter-terrorism advisor Richard Clarke has asserted that terrorists have both the desire and capability to attack LNG shipping with the intention of harming the general population.102

Terrorism Impact Nuke War

Nuclear Terrorism risks Global Nuclear War Sid-Ahmed 2004 (Mohamed; Al-Ahram staff) Extinction! Al-Ahram Weekly issue no. 705
WBW http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

Terrorism Impact Retaliation

Terrorism causes retaliation that guarantees extinction Morgan 9
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus South Korea (Dennis, Futures, November, World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race, Science Direct), accessed 9-16-2011,WYO/JF
In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question Is Nuclear War Inevitable?? In Section , Moore points out what most

terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, theyve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian dead hand system, where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed, it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal Samson option against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even anti-Semitic European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or lone wolf act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the use them or lose them strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to win the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them.
Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors In other words, as

long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

Terrorism Impact Hegemony

Terror attacks on ports damage DOD effectiveness and military deployments Chalk, 2008
*Peter, RAND corporation, The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism, piracy, and challenges for the United States. Online, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf] MB As one of the globes principal maritime trading states, accounting for nearly 20 percent (measured in metric tons) of all international sea-borne freight in any given year, the United States has a direct, vested interest in securing the worlds oceanic environment. Commercial carriers transport more than 95 percent of the countrys nonNorthern American trade by weight and 75 percent by value. Commodities shipped by sea currently constitute a full quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, more than double the gure recorded in 1970. Besides economic considerations, the marine transportation system plays an important role in U.S. national security. The Departments of Defense and Transportation have jointly designated 17 American ports13 of which also act as commercial trading hubsas strategic because they are necessary to expedite major military deployments. 1 In the view of the Government Accountability Oce, if these terminals were decisively attacked, not only could civilian casualties be sustained, but DoD [Department of Defense] could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its [already] overburdened airlift capabilities. 2

Terrorism Impact Cruise Ship Attacks

Attacks on cruise lines would devastate US economy Chalk, 2008
[Peter, RAND corporation, The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism, piracy, and challenges for the United States. Online, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf] MB Finally, attacks against a rapidly growing cruise industryin 2004, 78 percent of all passengers vacationing on luxury liners were from North America 7need to be taken seriously, not least because they could expose the country to a new form of highly damaging terrorism. A decisive attack against a fully laden passenger ship could be expected to result in a casualty count of several hundred or more. 8 Quite apart from the widespread physical suering and psychological trauma that this would necessarily engender, it could also have genuinely disruptive political and scal eects. Critics, albeit with the benet of hindsight, would undoubtedly demand to know why the sector was left exposed and why the intelligence services in the relevant ag nation failed to foresee that an attack was imminent. In an age where counterterrorism has emerged as one of the states most pressing responsibilities, such a reaction could easily precipitate a chain of events that, if not carefully managed, could erode popular perceptions of governing credibility and legitimacy (as it did in Spain following the catastrophic commuter train bombings of 2004). 9 The economic fallout could be every bit as serious, especially given the highly concentrated character of the cruise business and the fact that this mode of transportation is not integral to an individuals day-to-day life, travel needs or, indeed, leisure pursuits. 10 As one maritime security analyst in London put it: If a major cruise liner was hit, the industry will be in big trouble. People just wont sail anymoreeither with the company owning the vessel or with one of its *few+ competitors. 11 In the United States, this could result in considerable losses, jeopardizing not only approximately $16.2 billion in direct monetary benet but also the revenue base of major tourist portsnotably Miami, Galveston, Canaveral, New York, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Tampa, Seattle, and (assuming a post-Katrina recovery) New Orleansas well as some 330,000 fulland part-time jobs. 12

Terrorism Impact Ayson Helper

Terrorism would cause mass panic Chalk, 2008
*Peter, RAND corporation, The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism, piracy, and challenges for the United States. Online, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf] MB Terrorist contingencies involving containerized freight have also been consistently highlighted as particularly relevant to U.S. national security. One scenario that has been repeatedly played out because of the volume of (unchecked) containers shipped to U.S. shores is the use of a boxed crate to hide a radiological dispersal device that is then detonated on land. 5 Although the eects of such an attack would depend on the size and sophistication of the dirty bomb employed, it would cause at least localized contamination of the immediate surrounding area (often referred to as ground shine) and could reasonably be expected to elicit mass public panic of radiological fallout if deaths actually occurred. 6

Terrorism AT: Low Nuke Terror Risk

Even if nuke terror is low risk, costs are so high we cant ignore them Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Other experts concede that evaluating the likelihood of nuclear terrorism is inherently uncertain, but that such potential attacks warrant attention even if they are unlikely. The probability of a terrorist attack with an actual nuclear weapon cannot be reliably estimated, and it is surely lower than the probability of virtually any other type of terrorist attack. But the devastation from such an attack would be so overwhelming that, based on expected damages the probability multiplied by the consequences this threat must be considered one of the greatest dangers America faces....76

Solvency

Solvency Risk Management Key

Effective risk management key to effective PSGP funding GAO, 2011
*Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiv eness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB In recent years, we, the Congress, the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and others have endorsed risk management as a way to direct finite resources to areas that are most at risk of terrorist attack. Risk management is a continuous process that includes the assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to determine what actions should be taken to reduce one or more of these elements of risk. One way in which DHS has applied risk management principles to the PSGP is through the use of a risk model to assess the relative risk posed to ports throughout the nation and to help determine PSGP eligibility and funding levels. The PSGP risk methodology is similar to the methodology used to determine funding eligibility for other DHS state and local grant programs. The model consists of three variables: threat (the relative likelihood of an attack occurring), vulnerability (the relative exposure to an attack), and consequence (the relative expected impact of an attack). Data for each of these variables are collected from offices and components throughout DHS, as well as from other data sources, and then, using the model, each port is ranked against one another and assigned a relative risk score. At the recommendation of the Coast Guard, DHS considers some ports as a single clusterknown as a port areadue to geographic proximity, shared risk, and a common waterway. Based on risk, each port area is placed into one of three funding groups Group I, Group II, or Group III. Ports not identified in Group I, II, or III are eligible to apply for funding as part of the All Other Port Areas Group. Figure 2 below shows the location of port areas for groups I and IIthe two highest risk groups that receive the bulk of grant funding.

Solvency Reform Key To PSGP Allocation

Inefficient funding decisions lead to poor grant allocationreform is key GAO, 2011
*Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB For fiscal years 2010 and 2011, DHS allocations of PSGP funds were based on DHSs risk model and implementation decisions, and were made largely in accordance with risk. For example, we found that allocations to port areas were highly positively correlated to port risk, as calculated by the risk model. 18 In addition to the risk scores of the port areas, DHS made two implementation decisions when finalizing grant allocations for fiscal year 2011. First, DHS opted to direct the majority of available funding to the highest risk port areas. Second, DHS chose to limit fluctuations in grant funding from year to year to any given port area. Overall, as shown in table 2 below, DHS directed 60 percent of available grant funding to the 7 Group I port areas in fiscal year 2011, which represented about 54 percent of the total risk for port areas, according to the models determination of risk. After DHS determined the percentage of
total funding it would direct to each group, it then provided each port area within Groups I and II with a designated allocation based on the results of the risk model. For example, in fiscal year 2011, the

average allocation to a Group I port area was about $20 million, with allocations ranging from about $12 million for the Delaware Bay port area to about $30 million for the New York-New Jersey port area. The average allocation to a Group II port area was about $1.5 million, with allocations ranging from $1 million, received by 21 Group II port areas, to $3.5 million for the Chicago/Lake Michigan port area. In contrast to Groups I and II, port areas in Group III or the All Other Port Areas Group do not receive a designated allocation. Instead, port areas in Group III and the All Other Port Areas Group compete within their group for a portion of the groups total fundingwhich was about $11.8 million for each group in fiscal year 2011. In addition to directing the majority of available grant money to the highest risk port areas, DHS also opted to provide stability in the funding levels of Group I and II port areas through another implementation decision. To achieve this stability, DHS utilized funding floors in the fiscal year 2011 risk model, which limited how much a port area allocation could decrease from year to year, despite changes in risk identified by the model. A senior FEMA official reported that floors were used in the fiscal year 2011 PSGP risk model to mitigate wide
fluctuations in funding so that port areas could better plan for long-term security improvements. This official also noted that floors have been used in the PSGP risk model since fiscal year 2008 and were also used in the fiscal year 2011 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) risk model. In the fiscal year 2011 model, DHS

set the funding floor for Group I port areas at 25 percentmeaning that the port areas funding level could not decrease by more than 25 percent from its fiscal year 2010 allocation regardless of how much its risk profile changed.
Similarly, for fiscal year 2011, DHS set the funding floor for Group II port areas at 50 percent meaning that the port areas allocation could not decrease by more than 50 percent from its fiscal year 2010 allocation regardless of changes in risk. According to FEMA data, if the floors had not been used in fiscal year 2011, the allocations to 3 Group I port areas would have fallen by more than 25 percent and the allocations to 8 Group II port areas would have fallen by more than 50 percent. However,

due to the use of funding floors, these 11 port areas collectively received fiscal year 2011 allocations that were about $11.6 millionor about 26 percenthigher than their risk profiles would have indicated.
See table 3 below.

Reforms key to streamlined review processsolves grant allocation and use GAO, 2011
*Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB

Fiduciary agents reported that the lengthy cost-share waiver process used by applicants seeking an exemption from the required cost-share further exacerbated the impact of the cost-share requirement under the PSGP. Grant applicants unable to meet the cost-share requirement are eligible to apply for a waiver. The waiver approval process requires 22 stepswhich include approval by leadership within FEMAs GPD, approval by
FEMAs Administrator, and finally, approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security.41 According to statute, the Secretary can grant a waiver of the cost-share requirement if she determines that a proposed project is meritorious but cannot be undertaken without additional federal support.42 However, 5 of the 11 fiduciary agents we interviewed told us that they had

concerns with the cost-waiver request processincluding with the length of time required for a decision. For example, one fiduciary agentwho oversaw a cost-waiver application that took about 7 months to be approvedtold us that the cost-waiver request process was time- consuming and confusing. According to
FEMA officials, an unknown portion of this 7-month approval process was spent ensuring that the fiduciary agent had submitted all of the required documentation and thus, the actual approval time once the request was finalized was less than 7 months. The costshare requirement was waived for all applicants under the ARRA, fiscal year 2010, and fiscal year 2011 grant cycles. However, grant applicants may continue to submit cost-share waiver requests for new projects to be funded under the fiscal year 2007 supplemental, fiscal year 2008, and fiscal year 2009 grant cycleswhich were cost-share yearsif money in their port area remains unused from those years. As shown earlier in table 8, about

$110 million in PSGP funds awarded to Group I port

areas from fiscal year 2007 through 2009years in which the cost-share was requiredremains unused. As port areas solicit projects for these unused funds, some applicants may submit cost-share waiver requests as well. For example, one fiduciary agent from a Group 1 port area reported that her port area recently completed the field-review process to identify projects to fund using their unused fiscal year 2009 grant monies. As a result, the port area submitted 10 projects to FEMA for approval in October 2011, of which 8 projects include a cost-share waiver request. Although

FEMA has taken steps to improve the cost-waiver process, it continues to be lengthy and additional efforts may help expedite these reviews. In July 2009, FEMA issued an information bulletin to clarify the process that grantees should follow
when submitting cost-share waiver requests.43 Since the issuance of this information bulletin, FEMA has received a total of 31 costshare waiver requestsof which, 22 were approved.44 In November 2009, following a Fiduciary Agent Workshop, FEMA released written responses to questions posed at the workshop. In this document, FEMA stated that a decision on a waiver request could be expected approximately 30 days after all documentation was provided to FEMA in accordance with the process outlined in the July 2009 information bulletin. However, according to FEMA records, for cost-share

waivers reviewed since December 2009

DHS tookon average126 days to approve a request once all of the required information had been received. Approval time lines ranged between 55 days and 268 days for these waiver requests. Of the 126 days, on average, it took 74 days from the date requests were considered complete to achieve approval by GPDs leadership. It took an additional 52 days, on average, to complete the remaining 11 steps of the waiver processincluding approval at the Administrator of FEMA level and the Secretary of Homeland Security level. According to DHS, due diligence requires both component and department level clearances, including secretarial clearance, in order to responsibly award funding. This process ensures that PSGP projects meet program goals and objectives. However, FEMA records show that no approval recommendations from GPD leadership were overturned as a result of the additional 52 days, on average, of required review. Further, only 1 of the 31 waiver requests submitted since the July 2009 information bulletin was issued has been deniedand it was denied at the GPD level. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that pertinent information should be identified, captured, and distributed in a form and time frame that permits people to perform their duties efficiently.45 FEMA officials told us that FEMA has taken internal actions to improve the review process such as meeting with other key offices involved in the waiver process in the spring of 2011 to discuss and standardize information requirements for the waiver package. FEMA officials reported that they believe that this effort has helped improve some aspects of the process, but further action may be required to streamline the process. Additionally, fiduciary

agents remain wary of the cost-waiver request process. For example, one fiduciary agent told us that its field review teamincluding the COTPwould be unlikely to recommend a project for funding if that project relies on a cost-share waiver. Another fiduciary agent told us that there is little interest in the fiscal year 2009 funds due in part to the lengthy waiver review process. Without a more efficient review process, certain grant applicants that cannot fund the cost-match requirement may not receive grant funds to implement their projects, or may not even apply for funds. Evaluating the waiver review process could help to ensure that the process is completed in a timely manner.

Solvency Reforms to PSGP Key

Reform of risk assessment for allocating grants is needed to effectively manage PSGP grants GAO, 2011
*Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB Why GAO Did This Study From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has awarded nearly $1.7 billion dollars to port areas through its Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) to protect critical maritime infrastructure and the public from terrorist attacks. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)a DHS component agencyis the agency responsible for distributing grant funds. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which DHS has (1) allocated PSGP funds in accordance with risk; (2) encountered challenges in administering the grant program and what actions, if any, DHS has taken to overcome these challenges; and (3) evaluated the effectiveness of the PSGP. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the PSGP risk model, funding allocation methodology, grant distribution data, and program documents, such as PSGP guidance. Additionally, GAO interviewed DHS and port officials about grant processes, funding distribution, and program challenges, among other things. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS strengthen its methodology for measuring vulnerability in ports by accounting for how past security investments reduce vulnerability and by using the most precise data available. GAO also recommends that DHS evaluate the cost-share waiver review process and take steps to expedite the process where appropriate and develop a plan with milestones for implementing performance measures for the PSGP. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations.

Solvency Terrorism Reforms Key

Port security is essential to solve terrorism Grants are key to solve Mendalia, 2005
[Jonathan, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response. CRS report for congress, Online, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21293.pdf] MB What Priority Should Port Security Have? The 9/11 Commission wrote, Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation [compared to commercial aviation]. Initiatives to secure shipping containers have just begun. Terrorists may be deterred by a significant chance of failure. 20 Improving the ability to detect terrorist nuclear weapons in the maritime transportation system may make a terrorist attack on a port less likely to succeed, and thus less probable. The American Association of Port Authorities, a trade association, welcomed federal grants for port security upgrades to comply with the MTSA, but called for substantially greater resources. 21 Others agree that more resources are needed to secure U.S. ports, such as to reduce overcrowding of cargo-handling facilities and to hire more workers. 22 A similar case could be made for gas pipelines, electric power plants, rail yards, or bridges. At issue for Congress is how to allocate security funds among ports and other potential targets.

Plans reforms to PSGP risk assessment is key to solve terrorismaddresses a wide variety of security threats Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Development and assessment of maritime terrorism scenarios is a key element of federal port security exercises, grant administration, and legislative oversight. It appears, however, that these three dimensions of the nations maritime security strategy emphasize terrorism scenarios in different ways. Port security exercises (conducted under a number of independent programs) address the broadest range of terrorism scenarios, with no obvious focus on any particular scenario. The DHS port security grant program currently emphasizes a subset of these scenariosIED attacks on ferries and cruise ships in major ports, for example. Federal legislators appear to focus oversight on a different subset of scenarios, notably WMDs aboard container vessels and attacks on LNG tankers. As this report states, there is a logical basis underlying the scenario priorities established for exercises, grants, and oversight. Nonetheless, if these activities are intended to derive from a uniform federal maritime security strategy the question arises to what degree these activities are complementary or inconsistent. If port officials, grant administrators, and legislators disagree on what types of attack scenarios are of greatest priority, either because their security assessments are inconsistent, or because they lack sufficient intelligence about terrorist threats, port security resources may be deployed inefficiently. For example, sharply increasing security against specific types of maritime attacks in specific locations may have limited benefits for overall port security if other significant vulnerabilities are not addressed as a result. A key question is whether policymakers are too focused on a narrow spectrum of the threat. A former Federal Maritime Commissioner has stated that it *is+ fair to say there has been little to no emphasis on non-containerized cargo in

the political arena, while in contrast, virtually everyone in the industry thinks noncontainerized cargo is in many respects a more vulnerable path.125 While concern, in this case, for container security may not be misplaced, there are other forms of cargo that terrorists could exploit just as effectively.

Solvency Reforms Key to Solve Risk Assessment

Inefficiencies in the review process caused by an antiquated risk-data system means that grants arent effectively allocatedreview process is key to solve GAO, 2011
*Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB In addition to funding that is unavailable because it is unused, some funding is also unavailable because it is onhold due to delays in achieving compliance with postaward requirements and challenges with FEMAs grant management system. After FEMA approves the use of grant funds for a specific project, stakeholders reported that additional delays in making funds available resulted from compliance with postaward requirements. FEMA cannot make grant funds available to grantees to begin work on approved projects until all postaward requirements, including budgetary and environmental reviews, are met. One cause of delay was inefficiency in the reviews conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, which requires a
review of the impacts of proposed actions as well as reasonable alternatives to those actions.46 Grantees submit Environmental and Historical Preservation (EHP) information to the Grant Program DirectorateEnvironmental and Historical Preservation (GPD-EHP) office for review. If the project does not require a detailed EHP analysis, it can be reviewed and approved by a GPD analyst. However, projects that require a more detailed analysis are reviewed either by the GPD-EHP team or passed to a FEMA regional environmental officer depending on the scope of the review. Fiduciary agents we interviewed in 5 of 11 port areas reported that slow EHP reviews caused delays.47 During

a July 2009 FEMA-sponsored stakeholder conference, participating port areas stated that the EHP submission and review process associated with the PSGP was causing delays, which increased project costs and limited what grantees could accomplish with grant funds. The group requested the establishment of a more structured postaward time line, including deadlines for EHP reviews, so that grantees would be better able to plan their projects. A senior FEMA official reported that delays in EHP reviews were due to the fact that prior to 2008, GPD had not
historically conducted EHP reviews on preparedness projects and thus, had no established program for doing so. This official further reported that creating an EHP Team within GPD with the assistance of subject matter specialists via technical support contract and standardizing the format for project submittals has helped expedite EHP reviews. According

to FEMA officials, the delays caused by inefficient review processes have been amplified by FEMAs reliance on an antiquated data management system. As we reported in our June 2009 report on the Transit Security Grant Program, FEMA did not have a mechanism for systematically collecting data on the status of individual grant projects through the review process.48 For example, although FEMA has systems to track the financial
information related to its grants programs, these systems did not allow FEMA to track the status of grant reviews, such as EHP reviews. According

to FEMA, the data management system used to manage the Transit Security Grant Program is also used to manage the PSGP and no changes have been made to the system since our 2009 report. As such, GPD officials reported that each PSGP program analyst maintained separate spreadsheets that tracked the grants for which they were responsible. Using numerous data systems and spreadsheets resulted in inefficiencies and, in some cases, lost data, as program analysts had to search across systems for information or were reliant on systemssuch as the Homeland Security Information Networkthat lost application information.49 The overall result was a data system that did not provide information in a timely manner and that could not be used effectively to manage the grant lifecycle.

Solvency AT: FEMA reforms solve now

Current forms havent solvedmore comprehensive reform is key to program effectiveness GAO, 2011
*Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB FEMA has not evaluated the effectiveness of this program in strengthening critical maritime infrastructure against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks because it has not implemented measures to track progress toward achieving program goals. In 2006, the Department of
Homeland Securitys Office of Inspector General reported that as the PSGP continues to evolve, an important challenge DHS should undertake is the measurement of its impact.50 The Inspector General also reported that DHS

has raised the overall bar of preparedness through the port security grants but it is not clear that DHS knows how much actual risk reduction has been achieved. Four years later, in January 2010, FEMA formed a task force to develop
draft performance measures for the PSGP. This task force conceptualized 11 potential measures of effectiveness for the PSGP; however, baseline data needed to implement the measures did not exist for all 11 draft measures. According to FEMA documentation, baseline data existed for 2 of the 11 measures, additional data collection would be needed to populate 3 measures, and 6 measures would require further refinement or coordination with federal partners. In December 2010, FEMA transferred responsibility for developing performance measures from GPD to FEMAs National Preparedness Directorate, specifically the National Preparedness Assessment Division (NPAD).51 FEMA officials report that this change was made to consolidate the development of effectiveness measures within the directorate containing assessment experts. However, this may have contributed to delays in developing performance measures because the staff at NPAD, including the new Director, who began in March 2011, needed time to familiarize themselves with the grant program and draft measures. In July 2011, a senior NPAD official told us that the division was briefed on the draft measures developed by the GPD task force, but they were considering developing different measures as well. In

October 2011, the same official told us that the division had developed a number of prospective performance measures for the PSGP, but that FEMA was still reviewing the draft measures. As a result, the official told us that it has not been determined whether the performance measures will be included in the fiscal year 2012 guidance. Additionally, FEMA did not have a plan in place, with milestones, to ensure the implementation of such measures. According to best practices for project management, the development of a project management planwhich defines how the project is executed, monitored and controlled, and closedis a key element of project management.52 Best practices for project management also call for milestone dates, among other factors, in carrying out a project successfully. As a result, FEMAs progress toward implementing measures to assess whether the program is achieving its stated purpose remains unclear.

2AC - AT

AT: States CP
Congress key to effective port security measuresensures uniformity Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Clear perspectives on the nature and likelihood of specific types of maritime terrorist attacks are essential for prioritizing the nations maritime anti-terrorism activities. In practice, however, there has been considerable public debate about the likelihood of scenarios frequently given high priority by federal policy makers, such as nuclear or dirty bombs smuggled in shipping containers, liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker attacks, and attacks on passenger ferries. Differing priorities set by port officials, grant officials, and legislators lead to differing allocations of port security resources and levels of protection against specific types of attacks. How they ultimately relate to one another under a national maritime security strategy remains to be seen. Maritime terrorist threats to the United States are varied, and so are the nations efforts to combat them. As oversight of the federal role in maritime security continues, Congress may raise questions concerning the relationship among the nations various maritime security activities, and the implications of differing protection priorities among them. Improved gathering and sharing of maritime terrorism intelligence may enhance consistency of policy and increase efficient deployment of maritime security resources. In addition, Congress may assess how the various elements of U.S. maritime security fit together in the nation's overall strategy to protect the public from terrorist attacks.

Only congress has effective oversight to coordinate counter-terrorism, its key to solve Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Public information suggests that the threat of maritime terrorism is significant, and can take myriad forms, but that different dimensions of the nations maritime security activities prioritize these activities in different ways. As oversight of the federal role in maritime security continues, Congress may raise questions concerning the relationship among these activities, and the implications of differing terrorism scenario priorities among them. Improved gathering and sharing of maritime terrorism intelligence may enhance consistency across various U.S. maritime security activities and increase the efficient deployment of maritime security resources. In addition to these issues, Congress may assess how the various elements of U.S. maritime security fit together in the nation's overall strategy to protect the public from terrorist attacks. For example, bulk quantities of hazardous chemicals are found in marine vessels, in rail and highway tankers, and in chemical facilities on land. Terrorists may seek to exploit such chemicals in any of these sectors. Balancing the nation's homeland security resources across the maritime and non-maritime sectors is a policy challenge because specific sectors may fall under different homeland security authorities and regulations. Uncertainty about terrorist capabilities and activities complicates this problem by making it difficult to

compare terrorist attack scenarios across sectors. Without such a comprehensive perspective on terrorist threats, security analysts may have difficulty identifying which assets to protect and how well to protect them with the limited security resources available. Reviewing how these security priorities and activities fit together to achieve common goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress.

Ports Neg

AT Terrorism Advantage
No terror risk nowmitigation strategies GAO, 2011
[Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB The United States has approximately 360 commercial sea and river ports. While no two ports in the United States are exactly alike, many share certain characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist attacks: they are sprawling, easily accessible by water and land, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and interwoven with complex transportation networks designed to move cargo and commerce as quickly as possible (see fig 1). They contain not only terminals where goods bound for import or export are unloaded or loaded onto vessels, but also other facilities critical to the nations economy, such as refineries, factories, and power plants. To reduce the opportunity for terrorists to exploit port vulnerabilities, port stakeholders are taking mitigation steps. For example, port stakeholders have installed fences, hired security guards, and purchased cameras to reduce the potential for unauthorized entry and help prevent vulnerabilities from being exploited.

Cant solve terrorismwill just circumvent security Mendalia, 2005

[Jonathan, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response. CRS report for congress, Online, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21293.pdf] MB Terrorists can counter new technologies. If the United States deploys sensors at some ports, terrorists might detonate a weapon before it is inspected, or ship it to another port. If foreign ports screened containers before being loaded onto U.S.-bound ships, terrorists could infiltrate the ports. Securing the largest ports might lead terrorists to use smaller ones. Securing every U.S.-bound container might lead terrorists to smuggle a weapon in a small boat or airplane. Detecting an HEU bomb is difficult because HEU emits very little radiation. R&D is underway to address this key issue. In 2002 and 2003, ABC News shipped shielded 15pound cylinders of depleted uranium (DU, natural uranium minus most uranium-235) into U.S. ports in containers. CBP did not detect these shipments. ABC claimed that DU is a good surrogate for HEU; CBP claimed the opposite. In September 2004, DHS issued a report on the topic. It concluded *i+mprovements are needed in the inspection process to ensure that weapons of mass destruction ... do not gain access to the U.S. through oceangoing cargo containers and recommended improving detection equipment and search methods. 19

Too many scenarios to effectively secure portscant solve terrorism Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] The dimensions of maritime terrorism defined above may be used to characterize both historical terrorist attacks and potential future attacks against the United States. Table 1 provides a set of illustrative characteristics which could serve as the basis for the development

of potential attack scenarios. What is apparent from Table 1 is the possibility of generating numerous unique, logically consistent, and operationally credible attack scenarios based on different combinations of perpetrators, objectives, locations, targets, and tactics. Doing so exhaustively, however, leads to far more potential attack scenarios than likely ones, and far more than could be meaningfully addressed with limited counter-terrorism resources. As one security analyst has articulated the problem, An accurate assessment of the current nature and scope of the global maritime terrorist threat should be driven by an assessment of what is probable, rather than merely possible. However, sober analysis of this issue has been clouded amid the anxiety created by the current global security climate, with much discussion turning on the notion that terrorists could potentially strike any target with virtually any means available....29

Port terrorism threat is overblown Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007

[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Clear perspectives on the likelihood of specific types of maritime terrorist attacks are essential for prioritizing the nations maritime anti-terrorism activities. Especially when security policies seek to concentrate resources against a relatively limited number of terrorism scenarios, as appears to be the case for DHS port security grants, the responsible agencies must be confident that these scenarios are credible and do, indeed, pose the greatest threat to the United States. In practice, however, there has been considerable public debate about the likelihood of scenarios frequently identified as having high priority by federal policy makers. As a 2006 RAND study of maritime security concluded many perceptions of maritime terrorism risks do not align with the reality of threats and vulnerabilities.67 The following section discusses perceptions and uncertainties pertaining to three prominent maritime attack scenarios, including nuclear or dirty bombs smuggled in shipping containers, liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker attacks, and attacks on passenger ferries.

Low risk of nuke terror Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007

[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Although much attention is paid to the threat of nuclear terrorism, there are divergent opinions about the likelihood of a terrorist group such as al Qaeda constructing or otherwise obtaining a workable nuclear weapon.71 Expert estimates of the probability of terrorists obtaining a nuclear device have ranged from 50% to less than 1%.72 Among other challenges to obtaining such a device, experts believe it unlikely that countries with nuclear weapons or materials would knowingly supply them to a terrorist group.73 It also may be technically difficult to successfully detonate such a nuclear device. North Korea experienced technical failures in conducting its 2006 nuclear weapons test, and this test took place under highly controlled conditions.74 Attempting to detonate a nuclear device in a maritime terror attack could pose even greater operational challenges. Consistent with these perspectives, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has stated, I don't think that in the near term there's a significant likelihood of a traditional nuclear device being detonated in the United States.75

No risk of a terror attack using a dirty bombmultiple reasons Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Although many experts consider attacks with dirty bombs among the most likely maritime terrorism scenarios, other experts dispute this conclusion. Scientists have long questioned whether terrorists could actually build a dirty bomb with catastrophic potential since handling the necessary radioactive materials could cause severe burns and would likely expose the builders to lethal doses of radiation.83 Building and transporting such a bomb safely and to avoid detection would likely require so much shielding that it would be nearly impossible to move.84 Weaker dirty bombs made from less radioactive (and more common) materials would be easier to build and deploy, but would have a much smaller physical impact and would likely cause few human casualties. Consequently, some analysts argue that terrorists will forego dirty bombs, restricting themselves to the use of more conventional explosives.85 In support of this argument, analysts point to the fact that there have been no U.S. dirty bomb attacks, notwithstanding the supposed ease of perpetrating such attacks.86 They also note that the 2005 U.S. indictment of alleged dirty bomber Jose Padilla, in fact, contained no evidence of, or references to, a dirty bomb plot.87

Port containers are not a terror riskdont fit with their goals Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Other analysts assert that, if terrorists were to attempt a nuclear or dirty bomb attack in a U.S. port, they would be unlikely to do so using a shipping container because it would put the device beyond a terrorist groups control. These analysts question whether the container shipping system offers the routing or scheduling precision required by terrorists to position the bomb in the right place at the right time. Other observers assert that some types of noncontainerized cargo could also be used for smuggling a bomb.90 The manager of port security at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey states that their biggest concern is roll-on/rolloff cargo (ships that carry automobiles, trucks, and other vehicles).91 Non-containerized cargo is more plentiful. By tonnage, containers carry only 11% of U.S. overseas waterborne trade92 and container ships account for about one in every three U.S. port calls.93 Other types of cargo also face less security screening.94 Relatively low-value cargo might be targeted if terrorists perceive it receives less attention from U.S. Coast Guard and customs officials. For instance, a federal official familiar with New York harbor, pointing to a scrap metal terminal in Jersey City, stated the following to a reporter, If I wanted to bring an atomic bomb into the port, Id do it through that scrap operation.95

No risk of LNG tanker attacks Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007

[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf]

Although they acknowledge the security information put forth by federal agencies, many experts believe that concern about threats to LNG tankers is overstated.103 In 2003, the head of one university research consortium remarked, for example, from all the information we have ... we dont see LNG as likely or credible terrorist targets.104 Industry representatives argue that deliberately causing an LNG catastrophe to injure people might be possible in theory, but would be extremely difficult to accomplish. Likewise, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and other experts believe that LNG facilities are relatively secure compared to other hazardous chemical infrastructures which receives less public attention. In a December 2004 report, the FERC stated that for a new LNG terminal proposal ... the perceived threat of a terrorist attack may be considered as highly probable to the local population. However, at the national level, potential terrorist targets are plentiful.... Many of these pose a similar or greater hazard to that of LNG.105 The FERC also remarked, however, that unlike accidental causes, historical experience provides little guidance in estimating the probability of a terrorist attack on an LNG vessel or onshore storage facility.106 Former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, has stated his belief that a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker in U.S. waters would be unlikely because its potential impacts would not be great enough compared to other potential targets.107 LNG terminal operators which have conducted proprietary assessments of potential terrorist attacks against LNG tankers, have expressed similar views.108 In a September, 2006, evaluation of a proposed LNG terminal in Long Island Sound, the USCG states that there are currently no specific, credible threats against the proposed LNG facility or tankers serving the facility.109 The evaluation also notes, however, that the threat environment is dynamic and that some threats may be unknown.110

Terrorist attacks on ports unlikelywell protected, not high priority, hard to train for, and difficult to conceal Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] Other analysts believe future maritime attacks against the United States are relatively unlikely, especially in U.S. waters. Notwithstanding specific acts of terrorism in the past, such as the Cole bombing, they note that fewer than 1% of all global terrorist attacks since 1997 have involved maritime targets.119 Furthermore, international terrorists have attacked no maritime targets in U.S. territory since the anti-Castro attacks in 1976 despite their demonstrated ability to do so overseas.120 Analysts also argue that U.S. ports and waterways are increasingly well-protected against terrorists due to the ongoing security activities of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107295), protections added using DHS port security grants, and other U.S. maritime security measures.121 Classification issues may also influence differing perceptions of maritime terrorism risk since piracy unrelated to terrorism is common in Southeast Asia and may be conflated with terrorism in maritime security statistics.122 A key consideration in assessing the general likelihood of a maritime attack against the United States is the inherent operational difficulty in mounting such attacks, especially compared to land attacks which may alternatively satisfy terrorist objectives. One U.S. naval analyst has identified a number of specific challenges for terrorists in the maritime environment: ! Maritime targets are relatively more scarce than land targets; ! Surveillance at sea offers less cover and concealment than surveillance on land; ! Tides, currents, wind, sea state, visibility, and proximity to land must all

be factored into a maritime terror operation; ! Maritime terror operations may require skills that are not quickly or easily acquired such as special training in navigation, coastal piloting, and ship handling; ! Testing weapons and practicing attack techniques, hallmarks of Al Qaedas typically meticulous preparation, are harder and more difficult to conceal at sea than on land; ! The generally singular nature of maritime targets, the low probability of damage and casualties secondary to the intended target, and the problems associated with filming attacks at sea for terrorist publicity may also reduce the desirability of maritime targets.123

AT Solvency FEMA Solves

Port security ok nowFEMA mandates solve GAO, 2011
*Government accountability office report to congress, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened. November 2011, Online, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf] MB To promote a regional approach to risk management in the highest risk port areas, FEMA requiredbeginning with the fiscal year 2007 supplemental guidancethat all Group I and II port areasthe highest risk port areasdevelop and implement a Portwide Risk Mitigation Plan (PRMP). The primary goal of a PRMP is to provide a port area with a mechanism for considering its entire port system strategically as a whole, and to identify and execute a series of actions designed to effectively mitigate risks to the systems maritime critical infrastructure.

AT Solvency Risk Assessment Fails

Risk assessment models failaff cant solve Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007
[Paul and John, Resources, Sciences and Industry division of the Congressional Research Service, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities. Prepared for members of congress, 3-14-2007, online, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf] One significant disadvantage of emphasizing priority scenarios is dependence upon intelligence and risk assessment in an environment where neither may be robust. As the Presidents National Strategy for Homeland Security stated in 2002, the ambiguous nature of most intelligence on terrorist threats means that ... decisions must often be made in conditions of great uncertainty.66 To the extent that priority attack scenarios identified by DHS or port security officials are not the right ones, serious threats to U.S. maritime security may remain. Perhaps predictably, there appears to be disagreement among security analysts about the credibility and likelihood of specific attack scenarios frequently cited in maritime security policy discussions. Specific examples are discussed in the following section.

Working

AT Solvency Port Security Fails

No way to ensure port security against terrorism Haveman et all, 2006
[Jon D. Haveman, Howard J. Shatz, and Ernesto Vilchis, THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: U.S. PORT SECURITY PROGRAMS. In Protecting the Nations Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost. Edited by Jon Haveman and Howard Shatz. Available Online] MB The Department of Homeland Security has a simple goal in terms of cargo security. Specifically, it aims to correctly identify high-risk cargo and inspect 100 percent of it.51 Unfortunately, there is no way to guarantee that the department will identify all high-risk cargo: Simply put, there is no truly secure substitute for 100% checking of all cargo for WMD, particularly in light of the adaptive and shifting nature of terrorist strategies.52 Unfortunately again, careful inspection of all cargo will wreak economic havoc. This leaves security planners in the difficult position of designing programs that will have high likelihoods of detection success. We might never know whether these programs are successful. Absence of detection and absence of a terrorist incident might simply mean that terrorists used other methods and pathways for their goals or that they succeeded in infiltrating a weapon but that it failed to work.