SummaryofHume'sandMill'sregularityaccountsofcausation

Hume Humesaysthatwedonotobservecausalityinnatureandinsteadonlyseedistinctevents.IfeventA andeventBareclosetoeachotherinspaceandtime(contiguity),andeventAoccursbeforeeventB (temporal priority), and all events similar to A are always followed by events similar to event B (constantconjunction),andifinourmindsweanticipateeventBwhenobservingeventA,eventA causeseventB. Thenecessaryconnectionthatweexperienceinourmindsis not innature(Beebee holdsthatHumemeansthatweprojectourinferenceontheworld). Hume'swasan epistemological andnota metaphysical theory:hisquestionwaswhethera)wecan observecausality(and,givenhisconceptempiricism,whattheterm'causality'thenmeans(whichisa semanticquestion))andb)whetherwearejustifiedinconcludingfromthefactthateventAisthecase thateventBisthecaseifthecriteriaforcausationaremet.Hisanswerwasa)thatwecannotobserve thecausalrelationinnature,andb)thatinductioncanneverbelogicallyjustified(foritrequiresan appealtothevalidityofinductionitselfwhichisbeggingthequestion)butthatwedoandcannotbut useitaswewouldstarvewaitingforcertainty. SomeproblemswithHume'sregularityaccount,especiallywhencomparedwithourintuitionsabout whatcountsascausal: 1. Uniquesequencesofeventscanbecausal. 2. Humeseemstoprejudgethecourseofscientific(andother)evaluationsofwhatiscausal: a)Causesmaynothavetobecloseinspaceandtimetotheireffects b)Causesmaynothavetooccurpriortoeffects 3. If we see regularities between two events A and B they may also both be caused by an underlyingthirdcauseCratherthanBbyA 4. Regularitiesmaybeaccidentalratherthancausal 5. Causationmaybeprobabilisticratherthandeterministic(eitherbecausethatisthewaythe worldisorbecausewelacktheknowledgetoseetherealdeterministicprocess) 6. Whywouldcausationbeminddependent?(thoughthequestioniswhetherthisproblemdoesn't onlyariseifweascribeametaphysicalpositionaboutcausationtoHume) 7. Whatisthedegreeofresemblancethattwoeventshavetoexhibitforthemtocountasthesame typeofeventandhenceforustoseeregularitiesbetweentypesofevents? 8. IfthereisacounteractingforceandsoeventBdoesnotoccur(ortheeventthatdoesoccurisat leastnotsimilarenoughtoeventBtocountasthesametype)doesthatmeanthateventAno longercauseseventBastherequirementofconstantconjunctionsays? 9. Other than event A a whole web of events, or rather conditions (because they seem more permanentthanevents), C,D,E,F,etc.hastobepresupposedforeventBtooccur.Isour assigningcausesthennotapragmatic,contextdependentaffair?Andisitbecauseofthisnot bettertospeakofconditionsratherthaneventsascauses?

10. TheremaybeapluralityofcausesofaneffectB(sointhesensethattherearedifferentwaysin whichBiscaused,ratherthaninthesenseof(9)) SoHume'scriteriaareneithernecessary(1,2,5,6,8)norsufficient(3,4)andhiscriteriaarenot alwaysclear(7)orseemtobetooselectivelyandnarrowlyfocused(9,10) Mill Millthoughtthatinductiveinferencecangiveusgenuine(albeitfallible)knowledge,andhetriedto findtheconditionsnecessaryforreasonableinductiveinference.Thisinvolvedananalysisofcausality as for him inductioncanonlybevalidlybasedonuniversalcausallawsholdinginnature (which addresses(6).(Hume'sinductionproblem,totheextentthatitarisesinMill,isansweredbyanappeal tothereasonablenessofinduction(whichinturnisbasedonhiscriteriaforsensibleinduction.He avoidsbeggingthequestionbynotstrivingforcertainty))Mill'swasalsoaregularityaccountbuthis wassomewhatmoresophisticatedthanHume'sinthathe: A.Accepted(9)above B.Heldthataneffectmaybebroughtaboutbydifferentsetsofconditions(10) C.Heldthatcauseshavetoholdunconditionally(whichseemsincontradictionwith(A)and also,whatisempiricistaboutademandforunconditionality?) Assaid,Millwasinterestedinseeingwheninductiveinferenceisreasonable.Tothisendheproposeda numberofmethodsthatwouldallowusto'isolate'causes. 1. Methodofagreement:iftwosimilarphenomenahaveonlyonecircumstanceincommonthen thatcircumstanceisthecauseoreffectofthattypeofphenomenon 2. (Direct)Methodofdifference:ifasituationinwhichaphenomenonoccurshaseverythingin commonwithasituationinwhichthephenomenonnotoccursexceptforonecondition,then thatoneconditionis(anindispensablepartof)thecauseoreffectofthatphenomenon 3. Joint method of agreement and difference: if a circumstance is absent in two or more instancesthathavenothingincommonotherthantheabsenceofthatcircumstanceandthe absenceofacertainphenomenon,andifthesamecircumstanceiscommontotwoormore instancesofanoccurrenceofthatphenomenon,thenthatcircumstanceistheeffector(an indispensablepartof)thecauseofthatphenomenon. 4. Methodofresidues:Ifyouknowbypreviousdeductionsthatapartofaphenomenonisthe effectofcertainantecedentsthentakeawaythatpart,andwhatremainsofthephenomenonis theeffectoftheremainingantecedents. 5. Methodofconcomitantvariations: ifaphenomenonvariesinsomewaywheneveranother phenomenonvariesinsomewaythenacausalrelationconnectsthetwophenomena A big problemwithMill's accountis thatproblem(10)runs countertothefirstmethod. Wecan eliminate(10)byasuperdetailedanalysisoftheunderlyingcauses(whichthenmightshowthat(10)is

nottrue(andwhichwouldalsopossiblyaddress(5))butsinceitispracticallyimpossibletocarryout suchananalysisthestatusofthefirstmethodremainsindoubt. Mackie Mackiedoessomejusticetotheconcernin(9)and(10)bygivingthefollowingconditionforustobe abletosaythatstateofaffairsCcausedstateofaffairsE:CisanInsufficientbutNonredundantpart ofanUnnecessarybutSufficientconditionfortheoccurrenceofE. Moreover,bytalkingaboutstatesofaffairsratherthaneventsMackiedoesjusticetotheconcernin(7) because'stateofaffairs'allowsformoreresemblanceonamoregeneralorabstractlevelthan'event'. Butatleastproblems(1(atleastquitepossibly),2,3,4)remainforbothMillandMackie.