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The Iranian Geopolitical Perspectives

Revist de Geografie Politic, Geopolitic i Geostrategie

(recunoscut de Consiliul Naional al Cercetrii tiinifice din nvmntul Superior - CNCSIS)

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Bucureti 2007

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CONSILIUL TIINIFIC
academician Dan BERINDEI academician Constantin BLCEANU-STOLNICI prof. univ. dr. Dan BLTEANU membru corespondent al Academiei prof. univ. dr. Nicholas DIMA prof. univ. dr. Jean-Baptiste HUMEAU prof. univ. dr. Wilfried HELLER prof .univ. dr. Mohammad HAFEZNIA prof. univ. dr. Traian ANASTASIEI prof. univ. dr. Cristian BRAGHIN prof. univ. dr. Mihaela DINU prof. univ. dr. George ERDELI prof. univ. dr. Iulian FOTA prof. univ. dr. Constantin HLIHOR prof. univ. dr. Ioan IANO prof. univ. dr. George MAIOR prof. univ. dr. Gheorghe MARIN academician tefan TEFNESCU prof. univ. dr. Radu-tefan VERGATTI membru al Academiei Oamenilor de tiin prof. univ. dr. Jean-Pierre HOUSSEL prof. univ. dr. Hans-Heinrich REISER prof. univ. dr. Karolina ILIESKA prof. univ.dr. Mohammad AKHBARI prof. univ. dr. Vasile MARIN prof. univ. dr. Vasile NAZARE prof. univ. dr. Silviu NEGU prof. univ. dr. Mihail OPRIESCU prof. univ. dr. Nicolae POPA prof. univ. dr. Cristian TLNG prof. univ. dr. Cristian TRONCOT conf. univ. dr. Stan PETRESCU conf. univ. dr. Florin PINTESCU

NOT Autorii sunt direct responsabili de alegerea i prezentarea datelor coninute n articole, de autenticitatea i originalitatea acestora, ct i de opiniile exprimate. Formulrile i prezentarea materialelor nu reprezint ntotdeauna poziia revistei GeoPolitica i nu angajeaz n nici un fel redacia. Reproducerea integral sau parial a oricrui material scris sau ilustrativ din aceast publicaie este interzis n lipsa unui acord scris din partea editorului. Redacia revistei nu-i asum responsabilitatea pentru coninutul materialelor prezentate de sponsori.

COLEGIUL DE REDACIE AL REVISTEI GeoPolitica

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DIRECTOR

Vasile SIMILEANU
REDACTOR EF

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Documentare: Redactori: Corespondeni:

Cristina GEORGESCU

Secretar general de redacie Cecilia MUNTEANU Redactor coordonator Silviu NEGU Coperta i grafica Vasile SIMILEANU

Editura TOP

FORM

tel. / fax: 665.28.82; tel.: 0722.704.176, 0722.207.617; www.geopolitic.ro e-mail: simi@b.astral.ro, editura.topform@yahoo.com; geopolytyka@yahoo.com

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Fildiz ALI - Turcia Ramona BUCUR - Spania Karimli FAXRI - Azerbaidjan Igbal HACIYEV - Azerbaidjan Ctlina HUNT - SUA Sergean OSMAN - Frana Oleg SEREBRIAN - Rep. Moldova

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Ioan Mihail OPRIESCU Dnu Radu SGEAT Cristian JURA Roxana FILIMON Roxana MANEA Irina PARASCHIV Teodora VLAICONI

Anul V, nr. 22 (2 / 2007)

SUMAR

RESTITUIRI

GEOPOLITIC

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Benjamin E. THOMAS North Africa and the Near East.................................................... ..... 19

Mohammad Reza HAFEZNIA A new Definition of Geopolitics................................................... ..... 21 Gheorghe VDUVA ........ Areal - for sau pivot central n geopolitica Orientului Mijlociu ..... 36 Mdlina Virginia ANTONESCU ........ The Empires of Ancient Persia and the European Union..................... 43 Marius VCRELU ........ Analyzing property - Romanian Questions, Persian Answers ... ..... 56

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GEOSTRATEGIE

.................................................. ........ Mohammad Reza HAFEZNIA ........ Natural Insecurity and Deterrence of Development.................... ........
Case Study: Iran............. .............................................................. ..... 61 Stan PETRESCU ......... Unele aspecte colaterale implicaiilor dosarului nuclear iranian..... 69 Tiberiu TRONCOT ........ The New U.S. Foreign Policy for Iran .......................................... ..... 79 Darius George STAN ........ War against Terrorism or Oil Quest ............................................ ..... 85

GEOISTORIE

Radu tefan VERRGATI Universities in Iran - Beginnings .................................................. ..... 89 Zahra AHMADIPOR, Mohammad Reza HAFEZNIA ........ Political and Social Participation in Iran................................................... ..... 94

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Nicholas DIMA Iran - Nuclear Perspective and Geopolitics ...................................... ....... 5

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EDITORIAL

Marius LAZR ........ Le chiisme irakien dans le contexte de la rivalit gopolitique . ........ Irak - Iran ...................................................................................... ... 101

GEOGRAFIE POLITIC

Mohammad HAFEZNIA Political Organization of Space in Iran........................................ ... 129 Zahra AHMADYPUR, Mohammad Reza HAFEZNIA, Hassan RAHIMI ........ The Spatial Effect of Reopening of the Border. Case Study: ..... ........ Jolfa Border between Iran and Azerbaijan/Former USSR .......... ... 134

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GEOECONOMIE

Dnu Radu SGEAT Romania - a Favorable Destination for Iranian Investments ...... ... 149

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SEMNAL EDITORIAL

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IRAN - NUCLEAR PERSPECTIVE AND GEOPOLITICS

Nicholas DIMA
The contemporary world is faced with a difficult moral dilemma: Who has the right to possess nuclear weapons and who has the right to decide about such a right?

As a schoolboy in Romania I learned that some twenty five hundreds years ago Darius, the great king of Persia, and his army had crossed the Danube River into Dacia and were surprised by the bounty of the local wheat fields. As a child I was impressed and the idea stuck to my mind. In those remote times Persia was a well developed country and a superpower. Much later, as an immigrant to the United States with a brand new PhD I was looking for a teaching position when I saw some university openings in Iran. An acquaintance of mine who was teaching in Tehran warned me however that the situation there was extremely tense and that the country could soon explode. Initially, I did not believe it because the American media did not mention anything grave about Iran in its reporting. Later I realized that in spite of its freedom the American press would not inform the readers properly on many events. It wasnt the first time. Neither was it the last. After a few years of college teaching I joined the Voice of America in Washington as a writer-editor when Iran indeed exploded. The United States had bet everything on the shah, but the shah had abused the country, had repressed the people, and had alienated its religious leadership. The result was a total collapse of the old regime which took most Americans by surprise. By sheer ignorance or on purpose the US mass media had failed the public again. As a trained reporter with a good understanding of communism I was afraid of the new course of Iran. The country held a special place in my heart. It was the old Persia that had fascinated me as a child and the new Iran where as an adult I had dreamed of a university position. And what I was seeing in the late seventies in Washington, DC, was unsettling. The demonstrations against the shah and his regime were led by young Iranians wearing red bands and carrying red banners. Was Iran to become another communist satellite? No. After sorting out its internal problems the new Iran turned away from communism and instead became an authoritarian theocracy. The new regime did not please America, but the West had no choice except live with the new reality. As old Persia and the new Iran was a country to recognize, to respect, and to reckon with... The current Islamic Republic of Iran is a country of 1.6 million square kilometers with a growing population of fast approaching 70 million people. It is three times bigger than France and if placed in Europe it would be the second most populated

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Dr. Dima has retired recently from the US Federal Government and for the last two years has taught at university level in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Dr. Dima is the author of Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet-Romanian Territorial Dispute, Journey to Freedom, and Cross Cultural Communication. All these three books were published in English in the United States. This year Top Form publishing house of Bucharest also published his new book Jurnal Etiopian (in Romanian). Presently, Dr. Dima has been offered another university position in the Horn of Africa.

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country of the continent. Furthermore, Iran is undoubtedly a regional power with a significant geopolitical location between the Middle East and South Asia and between Russia and the Arab world. In addition, Iran is a mineral rich country with huge energy resources and especially with large petroleum reserves. According to the 2007 World Almanac Iran has 128 billion bbls of crude oil reserves which makes it one of the top oil producers of the world. To put in a better perspective, Germany has only 400 million, Romania has about one billion, and rich Russia has just 60 billion. Certainly, from a Western standpoint a country in such a sensitive location, with huge energy resources, and with a pro-Islamic policy unfriendly toward the US and Israel is looked upon with suspicion. And the fact that in recent years Tehran has pursued a policy of nuclear energy and possibly nuclear military capabilities has alarmed the two above named countries. This potential nuclear trend made President George W. Bush to label Iran as one of the rogue countries of the contemporary world and a member of the so-called axis of evil. However, such public pronouncements and their possible consequences raise serious questions for the international community. Who has the right to nuclear capabilities? Who has the right to control such a right? And specifically, does Iran really need either nuclear energy or nuclear weapons? And if Tehran acquires nuclear weapons, who is it going to defend it against or who is it going to threaten it with? Will Iran have the capability and maturity to control a nuclear arsenal? But then, what do we know about the maturity, responsibility, and possible behavior of other nuclear club members? There are no easy answers to any of these questions and dilemmas. From a military point of view the situation in the Middle East and South Asia is very complex. Tehran denies any military intentions, but the possibility of a future nuclear-armed Iran is real and for some countries it is grim. Yet, the nuclear reality in the region is even grimmer. To the North of Iran, Russia continues to be a nuclear superpower. To the East of it, Pakistan and India are nuclear powers. And to the West, Israel is fully nuclear. Who is to tell Tehran that Iran is not allowed to become nuclear? After all, who allowed India and Pakistan to become nuclear powers? As a matter of fact, publicly, the United States condemned Pakistans efforts of acquiring nuclear capability, but behind the scene it provided it with billions of dollars that helped it become nuclear. With an inimical Iraq to the West, with a nuclear-armed Pakistan to the East and with Israel as a declared enemy in the vicinity, Tehran must have posed for long before deciding to take the nuclear path. From among the countries that surround it, Iran is probably afraid only of Israel and especially of its striking capabilities. Though very small by comparison with most countries, Israel is apparently the third military power in the contemporary world. Allegedly, Israel has between 200 and 300 nuclear warheads that can be launched from land, from air and from submarines. Also allegedly, Israel has the best tanks, bombers and submarines currently in existence and undoubtedly one of the most efficient intelligence agencies. But Israel also has problems. It is surrounded by enemies and its very existence is yet to be accepted by most Arab countries. And Israel perceives of a nuclear Iran as a deadly danger to its security. Can Israel launch a preemptive attack against Irans nuclear installations before it would be too late as it did against Iraq in 1981? Would Israel do it as it alluded to? Does Israel or any other power have the moral right to a preemptive attack? It is the same moral dilemma as the very right to become nuclear... I was a visiting professor with the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode

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Island, in September 2001 when the terrorists attacked and destroyed the twin towers of New York. As a former professor with the US Army I had been appointed to teach two courses related to international relations. I was revolted like everybody else after that attack and approved wholeheartedly the war on terrorism declared by President Bush. I even published an article on the subject and sided with the president when we invaded Afghanistan. Later, the administration and the media began to bombard the public with subliminal messages about Iraq... Saddam was making weapons of mass destruction. Iraq was harboring terrorists and Baghdad was a danger for the peace of the region. The US and the West had to do something Many Americans fell in line and I was one of them. In March 2003 US attacked Iraq and everybody expected a quick victory and a radical change toward peace and stability in the region. We could not be more wrong than we were. Looking back it seems that Washington either did not have any elementary intelligence with regard to what was awaiting the American intervention, or worse, the agenda of those who decided the intervention was completely different from what was offered to the American people. Consequently, the results were catastrophic for the Republican Party and they showed in the November 2006 elections. Yet, President Bush and his diminishing team of supporters have continued their failed policy. Worse still, they began to threaten Iran as well, but this time the American public would not buy the arguments anymore. Will the United States or Israel launch a preemptive attack against Iran in todays situation? The answer is very difficult to venture. The psychological preparations and subliminal messages that were used prior to the invasion of Iraq do not work in the current circumstances. Besides, for all practical purposes, George W. Bush is now a lame president. He still has the power to order an attack, but he will no longer have the support of the people. In addition, Iran is not Iraq. Iran is a much bigger and stronger country. Its population is more unified, more educated too, and it overwhelmingly sides with the government on the right of Iran to go nuclear. Furthermore, bombing Iran is one thing, but occupying it is all together another story. Who can do it knowing that Western Europe is reluctant to intervene and the US troops are already stretched very thin? Will Israel launch an attack by itself? What will be the consequences of such an attack in the new world configuration? And then, how will Moscow and Beijing react in case of such an act? And what if Tehran already has several suitcase-type of nuclear warheads as it is rumored? The former Kremlin security adviser, General Alexander Lebed, found that about a dozen of such warheads were missing when he tried to account for them. Later, the inconvenient general was properly eliminated in a helicopter accident, but the question persists. Where are the missing nuclear warheads? Are some of them in Iran? It is said that ownership is 80 percent of the title to any property. The international nuclear club is a self appointed club. There are no inherited rights to join it. You have the power, you impose your rights. In this case, if you are strong and acquire nuclear weapons, you become a member of the select club. There is not much room for morality in politics and morality is anyway a very delicate issue. If you are powerful, you are always right and moral. According to Newsweek of 7 May 2007, for example, from a US point of view all American wars were just, justified and moral. To quote the magazine, they were fought to bring or to guard liberty, justice, law and order, peace, happiness and democracy... Thus, in the name of all of the above, a nuclear threatening Iran could be justifiably attacked. Who or how should launch the preemptive attack is probably still being analyzed and discussed. And what will

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history say later if such an attack would indeed be launched? To quote an English thinker, history will tell lies as usual. But what if Iran is strong, determined, and able to counteract a preemptive attack? What if Iran is strong enough to answer in kind? We already know that Tehran has medium-range missile capability. Does it have some nuclear warheads as well? Then, God forbids, the world could be confronted with an apocalyptic scenario. If launching a preemptive attack against Iran by any outside power poses a moral question to the international community, defending itself will be a moral right for Iran. The world should think twice about consequences!

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Benjamin E. THOMAS,

Petroleum is by far the most important product of Iran. The export of oil, by value, is normally several times that of all other exports combined and the Iranian government largely depends upon the income from oil for its expenses and for the foreign exchange. Usually the industry employs almost as many industrial workers as all industries together. The refinery at Abadan, in the southwest, is one of the largest in the world. All the oil fields lie near the head of Persian Gulf. The great majority of Iranians are farmers. The main corps of wheat, barley, rice, dates, cotton, and tobacco are mostly consumed locally. Only moderate quantities of dried fruits and cotton, and a few other agricultural items are exported. Except for refined sugar and tea, the country is self-sufficient in food. The more productive farmlands of the north make up for the deficit in the drier sections. The deserts and mountains of Iran occupy most of the surface. Only about 10 per cent of the land is cultivated. Methods of farming are often ancient and primitive, irrigation facilities are inadequate, and productivity is low. Approximately 90 per cent of the people are illiterate. As in Egypt, there are large numbers of tenants or sharecroppers who work on the estates of wealthy landlords. The main industrial products, aside from petroleum, are hand-woven rugs and textiles. Persian rugs have been well-known since ancient times, and rank next to petroleum as an export. The major centers of Iran lie in the interior. Teheran is the capital and largest city. It is an important irrigated district and is the focus for several caravan routes and rail lines. Growth has been rapid since World War I and the modern buildings contrast sharply with the older sections. Tabriz is the main commercial center for the farmlans of the northwest, and manufactures carpets, textiles, and leather goods. Isfahan is noted for its textiles, cotton, silk, and wool. It is also a center for animal products and dried fruits. In northeastern Iran the oasis town of Meshed lies on the caravan route to India and is connected to Teheran by railway. Products of the region include fruits, cotton, grain, sheep, and goats. All the large centers of Iran have colourful bazaars and ancient and famous mosques. Many of these cities were the capitals of past empires. Bandar Shahpur, at the head of the Persian Gulf, is the most important seaport of Iran. In 1938 a railroad was built to connect it via Teheran with Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea. Over this route the Allies, especially the United States, shipped supplies to aid the Soviet Union against Germany in World War II.
(World Geography, Part Two, Eastern Hemisphere, Edited by Otis W. Freeman, John W. Morris, McGraw-Hill Company, Inc. 1958, pp. 422 - 423)

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A NEW DEFINITION OF GEOPOLITICS

Mohammad Reza HAFEZNIA
Abstract: Geopolitics, since its enactment by R. Kjellen in 1899, has been in rise and fall, and has had different uses in different subjects. For this reason there has not been a comprehensive definition to show its scientific identity. Among the definitions of the word geopolitics, those which indicated that geopolitics means the influence of geographical factors on politics were prevalent. Although there are more limited definitions about the bilateral relations between them, and also spatial analysis of the relations and power structure and global rivalry, there is not a comprehensive definition, and each definition usually covers some part of the subject. In this article, the author, considering 28 definitions about geopolitics which had been expressed by the scholars, has presented a new definition on the basis of reciprocal relations between geography, power and politics, which is more comprehensive than the others. Then he explains it more by three dimensional models. Keywords: Geopolitics, Geography, Power, Politics.

Introduction The word geopolitics has had many ups and downs from the viewpoint of meaning, as well as social and scientific position. Geographers, professional politicians, military men, political scientists and experts of international relations have used the word in their works. Nowadays, geopolitics is studied in universities and scientific environments as educational credits or even study courses, and some research institutions are established under this title, for example in the United Kingdom, French and Iran. The 1970s and 1980s have witnessed the prevalence of the term, so that, in addition to its use in mass media and sayings and writings of the politicians, many articles and books were published under the title of geopolitics. More over the collapse of bipolar system and cold war era, after the year 1990, brought about the new geopolitics issues throughout the world. So the geopolitical studies developed and the literature of geopolitics flourished and enriched. Also many people, experts, politicians, academics and students became interested in geopolitics. Therefore, geopolitics revived and found a new life, especially in the field of geography, political sciences and international relations. However there is not yet a full consensus about the definition of the term and some experts accept it as a subject for study, discourse, argument, etc and dont believe it to be a scientific and specialized subject. The geopolitics literature increased day by day, and new divisions has been created, like energy geopolitics, water geopolitics, and information geopolitics. According to Gray (1977), literature does not have a scientific system. Taylor (1984) declares that, there are some key concepts in geopolitics, which can be organized in national, regional and international levels (Pacione, 1985:54). Although up to now, conceptual and theoretical subjects have been used in literature, but some scholars, like John OLoughlin and Luc Anselin, Jan Nijman (Donword, 1992:11, 39, 91), Patrick OSullivan (OSullivan, 1986:39,106) and others have

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included quantitative and mathematical methods in geopolitical studies. The process of development and accomplishment of a scientific field may cause some difficulties from the viewpoint of concept and paradigm establishment process, but its continue may cause some ambiguities about its scientific entity and identity. Although the events after the Second World War have caused the word geopolitics to be forgotten, but from the conceptual aspects, it has more than one century of past records. Despite the fact that the word has been the subject of discussion during the past century, because of different reasons there was no clear definition and concept for it, and its connection to political geography, despite their close relations, is not clearly know yet, and there are different view points about it. This situation has caused more ambiguities, so that a set of different ideas, general concepts, political opinions, non-scientific opinions, exaggerated terms and expressions have altered and decreased its scientific values, theories and literature, and also has caused instability in its philosophy, subject, methodology and scientific logic. The reason may be because of the nature of its main field of study, namely geography, which is confronted with many difficulties because geography itself has some ambiguities in philosophy, subject, domain and methodology, and there is not consensus and agreement on it among geographers. On the basis of this, the main problem is to define a subject, philosophy, laws, principles, general propositions and clear literature for geopolitics, so that it can be considered as a meaningful scientific discipline in the universities and academic centres. Also there is no strong belief that geopolitics can dissolve the problems and to meet the needs of human beings, via general laws and propositions. Of course it doesnt mean that there has been no definition for geopolitics. The point is that, different definitions by the geopoliticians and scholars are not comprehensive, and in most of the sources and writings, instead of a clear definition, different explanations, interpretations, and descriptions are given, such as the knowledge to gain power, knowledge of competition, study of critical areas, regional and international systems analysis, knowledge of governments challenges and borders disputes, science of struggles and quarrels, analysis of geographical situations of the countries, knowledge of recognition and control of strategic areas, creation of foreign policy, strategic problems analyzer, international managements, a comprehensive view of the world, universalizing the international policies etc Some people believe that geopolitics and political geography are the same, and some others say that they are apart. Some believe that it is a branch of political geography, while others call it applied political geography. For example, Mojtahed Zadeh, in his writings, calls it along with political geography, and uses it as suffix of the words like system, world, region, etc (Ettelaat, 2000:12; Mojtahed Zadeh, 1998:123). Therefore, it is necessary to have a definition for the meaning and concept of the word, which clarifies the nature of the subject (Khansari, 1990:84).

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Change in the concept of geopolitics The new political geography, which was introduced by Ratzel, the German geographer (1844-1904), was formed on the basis of the concept of geopolitics (Mirheidar, 1994:7). The word geopolitics was used for the first time by R. Kjellen, the parliament member of Sweden and the professor of Uppsala University, who was impressed by Ratzels thoughts, in 1899 (Glassner, 1993:224). He believed that physical and environmental forms of their countries influence the military, political and economic 22

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characteristics of the nation. He used geopolitics to understand the effect of geographical factors (Agnew, 2000a), like mountains, oceans, natural resources, energy and population on political importance of the country. Ratzel himself (according to a biological analogy) believed in the spatial growth of the states, and introduced the seven rules about the living spaces of the countries. He believed that, there are three geographical facts that are very important for development of the countries. They are: a certain area with defined space along with natural condition and political geography situation among other countries; similar population related to the geographical region of the country; development of the country according to its natural framework which is its primary core, because of its population growth which needs more areas (Dikshit, 1995:6). th During the first half of the 20 century the world geopolitics was developed according to different theories. These theories usually considered the role of geographical spaces on the world power and strategies. Theories like hearth of the earth (hearthland) by Mckinder, sea power by Mahan, Rimland by Spykeman, and air power by Severskey, have introduced special space patterns and affected the interpretations about the world power and control (Glassner, 1993:233). During the period between the two world wars, in Germany, a powerful geopolitics school by Carl Hous Houfer, and under the influence of Ratzel, Kjellen and Helford Mckinders thoughts, came into existence, which had a great share on politics and public thoughts of Germany. (Adhikari, 1997:38) Events of the second world war resulted in some pessimism about geopolitics, but during the cold war geopolitics emphasized on the relations between United States and Soviet Unions and strategic options about military and political aims, such as penetration prevention belt (containment) around Soviet Unions, atomic power prevention strategy, space, technological and data concerns, competition, which aimed at increase of world control and competition capability. Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) believed that there is difference between geopolitics and political geography. He said, geopolitics is a dynamic art, while political geography is a static knowledge. Also, according to Otomaol, a German geographer, geopolitics is the spatial need of the state, while political geography is the knowledge of space study (Dwivedi, 1990:4). Hartshorne believed that, geopolitics is the applied political geography. He says, geopolitics is the use of knowledge and technique of political geography in international relations and affairs (Dwivedi, 1990:5). Such idea existed in some countries before the Second World War (Glassner, 1993:233). After the cold war some scholars, like George J. Demco and William B. Wood, considered the new-geopolitics or geo-polinomics equivalent to applied political geography (Demco & Wood, 1994:3-14). Saul B. Cohen, a famous American political geographer, who is a researcher in the field of geopolitics, believes that, geopolitics is the applied study of the relation between geographical spaces and politics. He, who believes in the new and old geopolitics, says, all American geopoliticians belong to the field of history and international relations, and they do not have high-level studies in the field of geography (like Robert Strauz-Hupe, George Kenan, Henry Kisinger, Zebeigino Brezeinschy). They just considered the geographical factors like distance, size and natural form, and according to them geography is not considered as a spatial patterns and

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The existing definitions about geopolitics The author has tried to introduce different definitions about geopolitics which have been expressed by other authors, as under: Robert Strauz Hupe (1942) believes that, Geopolitics is, as a global scheme of political strategy, which was elaborated by German theorists in the 1920s, the master plan that tells us what and why to conquer, guiding the military strategist along the easiest path to conquest (Gray,1977:19) Colin Gray, the author of The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era in 1977, who is one of the contemporary American strategists and a member of national strategy information center of America, says: geopolitics means the unalterable relation between geography and strategic power (Gray, 1986b:7). From another perspective he also in his mentioned book says: security is geopolitics. He refers to this that: The strait of Hormuz may involve us in a war sooner-and for more valid reason-than the Panama canal; for, in this case, geography is energy, energy is economics, economics is security, and security is geopolitics (Gray, 1977a :vii). This expression can be shown as under:

Figure No. 1

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relations, which reflects humanistic and natural dynamic processes. According to Cohen, contrary to the old geopolitics, which was a devise of war; new geopolitics is for the development of international peace and cooperation. New geopolitics refer to and emphasise on the evolution of political world as a linked system in different scales, from regional to national and international level (Cohen, 1994:17). On the other hand, a new idea, by introducing the critical geopolitics, not only challenges classic geopolitics infrastructure and universalizing the political thoughts (OTuathail, 1996:57), but also doubts the scientific aspect and basis of the geopolitics. The famous ones in this field are: Gearoid OTuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge, who are known for editing of the books; Critical Geopolitics and The Geopolitics Reader. Authors of the said books believe that, geopolitics is not a scientific subject, but it is a scientific discourse and knowledge of power. It discusses about, how the scholars, institutions and ideologies create power structures inside the countries (OTuathail & Dalby, 1998:11). Tuathail calls geopolitics as a form of power and knowledge, which is the result of imperialistic competitions between the years 1870 to 1945 especially during the two world wars. The above viewpoints are merely given to explain the scientific structures of geopolitics, because different ideas do not help to have a systematic literature for it, and may cause instability which is dangerous for its existence.

According to the above definitions which seem to have been presented, under the special situation of the Second World War and cold war and the specialized field of the author, they consider geopolitics mostly from the viewpoint of military and strategic aspect, and they believe that its identity is determined by the relation between geography and military and strategic affairs. The matter which constituted the geopolitics principles during the cold war and the relations between the two superpowers, were military strategic plans, atomic prevention, sea controls and communications, political and military agreements, 24

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land and sea power confrontations, etc. The author of strategic geography announces that: Geopolitics is the study of influence of geography on the political character of states, their history, institutions, and especially relations with other states (Faringdon, 1989:14). In this definition, unilateral relations of geographical effect on political identity and nature of the nation and their relations with other nations as the geopolitics entity is emphasized. Moreover the concept of geography is unknown, but it seems that he is referring physical geography and the effect of natural factors on states. Dwivedi, the author of Fundamentals of Political Geography as cited by Mckeen, suggests that: Geopolitics is the science of relationship between space and politics, which attempts to put geographical knowledge at the service of political leaders. It is more than political geography which is descriptive (Dwivedi, 1990:5). At the some times Dwived believes that, geopolitics is also not applied political geography, as Ottomaull, the prominent German geographer opined. This definition, while applying the word of science to geopolitics, considers bilateral relations of space and politics and emphasises on its applied dimension, which is called as applied science. Oxford dictionary has the following meaning for geopolitics: study of how politics is affected by geographical factors (Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, 1989:515). The deterministic and unilateral relations of geographical factors on politics is emphasized in this definition, and it seems that the intention of geographical factor are more physical factor. There are different definitions in Webster dictionary, and two of those definitions are as follow: I. geopolitics is a study of the influence of such physical factors as geography, economics, and demography upon the politics and specially the foreign policy of a state. II. geopolitics is the combination of political and geographic factors characterizing particular state or region (Gove, 1986:950). The unilateral effect of geographical, economic and social factors on political affairs, specially foreign policy, is emphasized in the above definition. Of course, the economic and social factors are clearer, while these factors were included in the word geography. The concept of geopolitics, as knowledge of study of a region or country with special characteristics caused by geographical and political factors are emphasized in the second definition. Ezatti, who is a professor of geopolitics in Iran, in the books Geopolitics and Geo-strategy, present the following definition: I- Geographical politics or geopolitics, in fact, are the geographical results of a policy; in other words, in geopolitics, which can be nominated the policy of the land, the role of geographical factors on international policy is considered (Ezzati, 1992a:1). II- Geopolitics considers the effect of geographical phenomena on political, governmental and non-governmental structures and their changes, and the relations with other governments (Ezzati, 1994b:88). There are some ambiguities in the first definition, because the first part of the

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definition account for the effect of applying a policy on geography, while the second part emphasizes the effect of geographical factors on international policy. The ambiguity is that, it is not clear whether the aim is bilateral relation (between politics and geography) or there is a mistake in word selection, and in fact the aim is the unilateral effect of geographical factors on international policy. The second definition is clearer, and it is the emphasis on the unilateral relation of geographical phenomena on politics, which has cleared the meaning of policy and consists of a combination of political structures (including governmental and non-governmental), their changes and also characteristics of the relation between a government with other governments. Kazemi, who is an expert and specialist on international relations, in his books The Role of Power in Society and International Relations and International Relations in Theory and Practice and Management of International Crisis, introduces the following definition, which is a descriptive definition: The correct recognition of fixed and variable factors arising from geographical constraint and their mutual effect and the necessities by which the confronting policies are made, are called geopolitics (Kazemi, 1990:129). There are ambiguities in the above mentioned definition, because in the next descriptions, some fixed and variable factors (because of constraints on policy and decision making) are emphasized, while it is not clear in the definition. In fact the aim is to define the unilateral effect of geographical factors on politics. These view points on geopolitics is deterministic, because he emphasizes on geographical constraint. Graham Fouler, the American writer, believes that: Geopolitics is a part of an old technique which in its classic form emphasizes on geography as a determining factor of the government behaviour. From traditional point of view, the place where a country is located, its neighbours, communications axis and natural and physical resources are invariable factors that confine a governments behaviours (Fouler, 1991:2). In the above definition, the effect of unilateral relation of geographical factors on government behaviour, as the nature of geopolitics is emphasized. Therefore, his viewpoint to geopolitics is static and deterministic. Peter Taylor, a famous English political geographer and the ex-editor-in-chief of Political Geography journal, in his book Political Geography(1994) writes as: Geopolitics means the study of geographical distribution of power among states across the world, specially the rivalry between the major powers (Taylor, 1993:330). According to the above definition, geopolitics studies the distribution quality of power and the competition between states, so it is different from geopolitics classical definition. It can be classified into spatial viewpoint. The Modern Dictionary of Geography gives the following definition: Geopolitics is an alternative term for that aspect of political geography which emphasizes the geographical relationships of states. In prewar Germany it was more concerned with the study of geographical factors in political systems (Small & Witherick, 1990:94). In the said definition, geopolitics is a part of political geography that studies

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the effect of geographical factors on states and their relations with each other. One of the Persian resources, has introduced the following definition: Geopolitics is an argumentative, and to some extent mathematical and logical which calculates the results of political events, and gives a deep and reliable viewpoints about the international affairs and global issues. In this definition the subject of geopolitics is considered as the political events about international affairs, and by using mathematical and logical methods a correct calculation of these events are possible. So the geopolitics nature consists of the study of political events in global scale. This viewpoint to geopolitics is different from the classical views. According to the Dictionary of Human Geography which has been edited by R-J-Johnston, D. Gregory and D. M. Smith Geopolitics is a long-established area of geographical enquiry, which considers space to be important in understanding the constitution of international relations (Johnston, Gregory & Smith, 1994:228). According to the dictionary, there are three main approaches for global geopolitical order: I. The traditional definition, which was introduced in the early 20th century, with the common theories of organic state, water and land power, which were presented by F. Ratzel, R. Kjellen, A. Mahan, H. Mackinder and J. Spykman. II. Power relations perspective, which focuses on hierarchical character of states in the global order, and ability to influence or change the behaviour of other states in a desired direction. Drawing in particular upon the realist school of international relations, power relations between states have been conceived in terms of global geopolitical equilibrium, by formulating postwar international relations as a model of bipolarity in the late 1940s and early 1950s. III. Political economy approach, which emphasizes on the role of global economic changes and dynamic. This approach is based on the underlying assumption that geopolitics can not be understood fully without considering the dynamics of the global economy. In the perspective of the dictionary, geopolitics has been considered from the three aspects: the effect of geographical factors and space on international relations; power relations between states and global order in a hierarchical pattern; and political economy and interpreting the state and its external relations, as the political organization of the world economy. In this interpretation from the geopolitics, the political economy viewpoint is a new approach. F.J. Monkhouse, in Geographical Dictionary, defines geopolitics as: The word geopolitics is derived from the German term geopolitik, which began with the study of geographical factors in political systems (Monkhouse, 1972:154). In this definition, like some other definitions, geopolitics is the unilateral and

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Figure No. 2

Dimension of Space Spatial Patterns

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Cohens viewpoint about geopolitics is different from other classic observations. He believes in bilateral relations between geography and politics, and describing each of them in special domain, he says that the universal geopolitics system is the result of bilateral and continuous action of them. Gearoid OTuathail, recognizes geopolitics as: Geopolitics is the study of the spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states (OTuathail, 1996:60). Tuathail, as a critical and radical person who criticizes the way of action by the power centers according to the said definition, believes that geopolitics is an applied knowledge for spatial limits, which belong to international policies and their penetration domains. So he has spatial view to geopolitics. John A. Agnew defines geopolitics as: Study of the impact of geography on relations between nations (Agnew, 2000a). According to this definition, he recognizes geopolitics as the study of unilateral 28

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deterministic effect of geographical factors on political systems and governments, which can also have effect on the structure, performance, and behaviour. But the emphasizing on the effect such factors upon the international relations is not clear. Patrick OSullivan introduces the following definition: Geopolitics is the study of the geography of relations between wielders of power, that they can be rulers of nations or of transnational bodies. (OSullivan, 1986:2) From the view point of OSullivan, the basic dimension of contact among nations is geographical, and in this definition the effect of geography and geographical factors on power and the relations of rulers in national and international level is emphasized. Saul B. Cohen, the contemporary American geographer and geopolitician presents the following definition: Geopolitics is the applied study of the relationship of geographical space to politics. Geopolitics is therefore concerned with reciprocal impact of spatial patterns, features and structures and political ideas, institutions, and transactions. The territorial frameworks within which such interrelation are played out vary in scale, function, range, and hierarchical level from the national, inter-transnational, and continentalregional to the provincial and local. The interaction of spatial and political process at all these level creates and molds the international geopolitical system (Cohen, 1994:17). From the view point of Cohen, spatial mutual action and political processes in all levels (national, international, continental, provincial and regional) will create the international geopolitics system. The main point is that, he maintains and mentions some dimensions for both geographical space and politics.

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and deterministic influence of geographical factors on international relations. But the point is that his intention about the geographical factors has not been explained. Michael Pacione in his book Progress in Political Geography after review some definitions about geopolitics, describes the situation of geopolitics concept at the special period, and states that: Post war geopolitical writers all focus their inquiry on the relationship between geography and foreign policy in a changing international environment (Pacione, 1985:51). A bilateral relation between geography and foreign policy in a changing condition, which is the character of international systems, is emphasized to be the geopolitics subjects in this definition. But the international relations, which are considered by the authors, are limited to foreign policy. According to Jay: Geopolitics is the art and process of world competition (Hepel, 1991:25). The above definition, which has been expressed during the competitions of cold war era (1979) and struggle of superpowers to control the geographical regions, reflects the necessities of its own era and indicates that geopolitics is an applied knowledge. Such an idea is introduced in writings of authors like Peter Taylor (Taylor, 1993:52) and Sudeepta Adhikari (Adhikari, 1997:43). They emphasize that From political point of view, geopolitics describes a competitive relation, while imperialism explains the relation of domination. According to this definition, geopolitics is an operational knowledge. Ladis Christof introduces the following definition: Geopolitics in its widespread concept means the study of political phenomena according to the relation of their location with each other (Duerty & Faltzgroph, 1997:138). In the above mentioned definition, the unilateral relations of the effect of geography and location on political phenomena are emphasized, and the analysis of policies and political phenomena according to geographical contents are considered, that is, geographical analysis of policies. Hartshorne has the following definition: The application of the knowledge and techniques of political geography to the problems of international relations (Pacione, 1985:48). Hartshorne in his viewpoint believes in an exclusive role for the knowledge and techniques of political geography on the problems of international relations. It seems in his viewpoint there is not any reference to the geographical factors in general. Mc Coll has this description from geopolitics: Geopolitics is a perfectly legitimate and useful word with explicit meaning and simply refers to geographic factors that lie behind political decisions (Pacione, 1985:47). According to the last section of the statement, the Mc Colls approach to the geopolitics is deterministic and unilateral, namely the effect of geographical factors on politics. Majid Husain who is as Indian geographer writes about geopolitics as under:

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Current usage distinguishes geopolitics as concerned with rivalry between major powers (core and rising semi-periphery states) and imperialism as domination by strong states (in the core) of weak states (in the periphery). Politically geopolitics describes a rivalry relation whereas imperialism describes dominance relation (Husain, 1993:82). According to this description and viewpoint of geopolitics, the subject of geopolitics is limited to the rivalry relation between major powers in the world, so that each of them tries to take more regions under influence and control. Sen has this definition: The scope of geopolitics is wider than that of political geography; it also includes a study of military, naval, and air strategies. Moreover, geopolitics has a double function. Like political geography it represents facts as they are, but unlike political and other department of geography, it analyzes and interprets the national situations of a country and the global scene on the basis of facts presented formulates the internal and external policies of that country (Pacione, 1985:50). He sees geopolitics in a broader context, and sees the military strategies and affairs as the subject of geopolitics. Also he states double function for geopolitics, and expands its study domain to the external and internal affairs and policies. So this definition seems more comprehensive than the others. According to Mirheidar who is the professor of political geography in Iran, geopolitics means: The methods of reading and writing the international policies by the power and thought owners and their effect on political decision making in national and regional level (Mirheidar, 1998:22). In this definition, geopolitics is considered as a method of action or political discourse, not as a scientific subject, (a description instead of definition is given). Therefore, the applied dimension of geopolitics in political decision making is emphasized. Also the relation of geopolitics to geography is rejected or neglected. Simon Dalby, apparently quoted from Agnew and Korbridge, introduces the following definition: Geopolitics is more broadly about ways of reading and writing global political space. In other words, it is about the assumptions, and geographical codes, that the politicians and policy makers to specify the significance of places in the construction of, and arguments legitimating, policies (OTuathail & Dalby, 1998:309). In this definition, the applied aspect of geopolitics with political motives is emphasized, and the understanding quality of politicians from geographical places and its effect on their policies is considered. In fact, this definition also believes in unilateral relation of the effect of geography on politics, but with another interpretation. John Agnew, the author of the book Geopolitics, presents the following definition: The study of the impact of geographical distributions and divisions on the conduct of world politics. In this original usage it referred to the impact on inter-state relations of the

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Conclusion According to the aforementioned definitions: A. There are different viewpoints about the subject and nature of geopolitics. There are five views as follow: 1. The effect of geography on military-strategic affairs. 2. Deterministic unilateral effect of geography on politics, specially international relations. 3. Bilateral effect of geography and politics. 4. Spatial analysis of power structures and international competition. 5. Practical knowledge of spatializing the policies and guiding the competitions. B. Priority of the viewpoint of deterministic and unilateral relation of the effect of geographical factors on politics is clear. Half of the definitions propose that, politics, political organizations, governments, international relations etc are under the influence of geographical factors. C. The viewpoint of deterministic unilateral relation precedes other viewpoints and has influence on common belief about geopolitics, but this viewpoint, is going to be substituted by new viewpoints, specially the spatial analysis of power structure and international competition. D. The said definitions, despite their usefulness, are not comprehensive, and 31

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spatial disposition of continents and oceans and the distribution of natural and human resources. Today, however, the term also covers examination of all the geographical assumptions, designations and understanding that enter into the making of world politics (as in critical geopolitics) (Agnew, 1999b:128). In another place in his book, Agnew writes: The term geopolitics has long been used to refer to the study of the geographical representations and practices that under pin world politics. The word Geopolitics has in fact undergone something of a revival in recent years. The term is now used freely to refer to such phenomena as international boundary disputes, the structure of global finance, and geographical patterns of election results (Agnew, 1992:2). In the above definition, which emphasizes unilateral relation of the effect of geography on the leadership and formation of worlds policies, explanation about different definitions in classic and new concept of geopolitics, has been made. Kathleen E. Braden and Fred Shelley describe geopolitics, in their book, as follow: Geopolitics is the study of international relations and conflicts from a geographical perspective. The geographical perspective suggests that location, distance, and the distribution of natural and human resources have significant influences on international relations (Braden & Shelley, 2000:5). The above definition also considers the unilateral relation of the effect of geographical factors on international relations, and can be considered as a classic definition for geopolitics. They also say geopolitics is that subject of political geography that directly links with international conflicts and foreign politics. Of course, students of geopolitics can not ignore national and local politics investigating international relations from a geographical perspective.

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Thought Structure Action

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In the model, geography is considered in three fields namely, space, environment, and mankind. In the field of space, factors like spatial interactions, area of influence, systems and spatial structures are important. In the field of environment, factors of natural and artificial environment like location, size of resources, weather, water and soil, economics and living affairs, dwelling places, etc, and in the field of mankind, factors of group characters and functions, like characteristics of anthropology, culture, social psychology, rate of development, morality and spirituality, social composition in relation to nation and native groups etc are considered. The field of politics is considered from the view points of political thought and ideology, political systems and structure, like governments, international organizations, social and civil organizations as well as political behaviours and practices by politicians. The politicians also belong to different fields, and include governments, political 32

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Politics Power Geopolitics Geography Space Environment Mankind

Definition of the Author about Geopolitics The author believes that the term geopolitics is a compound concept, in which, three factors, namely geography, power and politics are important. In fact, subjects and phenomena of geopolitics have relations with the said factors. So, the relation between the three factors forms the subject of geopolitics. Therefore, geopolitics means the study of mutual relations of geography, power and politics. This definition could be described in a trilateral model as follow:

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each of them has considered a part of the subject. On the other hand, the new changes arising the collapse of cold war period, that resulted in the revival of geopolitics, caused the necessity of reviewing the definition, subject and scope of the geopolitics. Also a set of new thoughts, approaches and discourses about the geopolitics came into existence, for example: critical geopolitics, rethinking geopolitics, modern and postmodern geopolitics, globalization, geoeconomic, environmental geopolitics, anti-geopolitics etc that some scholars like, G. OTuathail, S. Dalby, J. Agnew, P. Routledge, Luke and others had main role to propound them (OTuathail & Dalby, 1998:1-35; OTuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998). Therefore, a relative complete and comprehensive definition is needed to, not only, cover the said viewpoints, but also, consider the future changes, which may influence the probable definitions.

groups, non-governmental organizations (N.G.O), international and inter-governmental organizations (I.G.O), and persons like social experts and political leaders. The power factor, which is used by the politicians, such as in governments, organizations, individuals, etc in different scales of local, national and international, includes dimensions of political, economics, cultural, military, scientific, technological and communications media. The power factor, at any level and in any dimension, from different viewpoints of production, application, distribution and classification pattern, effects on and is under the effect of other factors, like geography and politics. According to the above definition: Different definitions and viewpoints about geopolitics are included in this definition, so it is relatively a comprehensive subject. Comprehensiveness of the said definition is high and would not be confined to limited areas like geography and international relations, geography and politics, space and politics and spatial patterns. In fact, its conceptual scope includes different affairs like, structure and efficiency of power, quarrel and dispute, convergence and divergence, area of influence, competition, decision making, crisis, control, dominance and penetration, peace and cooperation, resources and environment, space, national interests, national power, national security and stability, national unity, spatial relations, development and welfare, nationalism and internationalism, etc. Geopolitics does not belong only to international realm. According to this definition, the subject of the study of geopolitics belong to, not only the international relations in global scale, but also to national, regional, and local realm and even to the social relations of families. Therefore, just as the study of the role of Persian Gulf oil on international political-military processes, or the changes in international power structure are geopolitical subjects, the local competitions in a country or province in order to take the development chances, or social groups behaviour in forming the nature of civil society and gaining power to control governments behaviour in order to have more welfare and peace, also belong to geopolitics. This definition also includes the historical changes of geopolitics. That means, the evolution process is included in it. In other words, the historical changes, and also changes in observations and tendencies are included in this definition. According to this definition, we can study geopolitics and the related subjects from qualities and quantities point of view, and prepare a scientific system (scientific discipline) for geopolitics, including philosophy, principles, theories, viewpoints, literature, methodology, branches, etc and define its fundamental and applied dimensions scientifically (not politically). Finally, we can extend and increase the themes of geopolitics and its conceptual capacity. Moreover, we can prepare a position for geopolitics as a scientific discipline in the field of geography. This definition gives us a possibility to expand research works on interdisciplinary issues and problems like crisis, competitions, cooperations, environment, nation compounds, scarcity of natural resources, pollutions, poverty, peace and security, social welfare, spatial and geographical justice and injustice, democracy and political participation, ethnic groups etc.

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In the shadow of the studies and research some general propositions, and general laws and knowledges, theories and models which are necessary for remaining and growth of any scientific discipline as well as geopolitics can be provided. At present the questions: What is geopolitics? Or is geopolitics dead? Will be meaningless, and it would have a suitable and permanent answer.
References 1- Adhikari, S.(1997). Political Geography. New Delhi: Rawat Publications. 2- Agnew, J.(1999). Geopolitics. London: Routledge. 3- Agnew.J.A.(2000). Geopolitics. Encyclopedia-Encarta, CD, 2000 4- Albert & Morehead. L. (1979). Webster handy college Dictionary, U.S.A, New American Library. 5- Braden, K. & Shelley, F. (2000). Engaging Geopolitics, England: Pearson Education Limited. 6- Cohen, S.B.(1994). Reordering the World. U.S.A: West view Press. 7- Cowie, A.P.(1989). Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, U.K: Oxford University Press. 8- Demco, G.J. & Wood, W.B. (1994). Reordering the world. U.S.A: Westview press. 9- Dikshit, R.D.(1995).Political Geography. New Delhi: Tata Mc Graw-Hill. 10- Donward. M.(1992).The New Geopolitics. U.S.A: Gordon and Reach. 11- Duerty, J. & Faltzygrogh, R. (1997). Different Recommendation about International Relations. (Vol.1). Translated to Persian by Tayyeb-Vahid Bozorgi. Tehran: Ghomes Publications. 12- Dwivedi, R.L.(1990). Fundamentals of Political Geography. Allahabad-India: Chaitanga Publishing House. 13- Ettelaat Newspaper (1999). No.21302-3. Tehran: Ettelaat Institution. 14- Ettelaat Newspaper (1999). No.21651. Tehran: Ettelaat Institution. 15- Ezzati, E. (1992). Geopolitics. Tehran: Samt Publication Centre. 16- Ezzati, E. (1994). Geo-Strategy. Tehran: Samt Publication Centre. 17- Faringdon,H.(1989). Strategic Geography. London: Routledge. 18- Fouler, G.(1994). Geopolitics of Iran. Translated to persian by Abbas Mokhber, Tehran: Markaz Publication Centre. 19- Girot, P. & Kofman, E.(1987). International Geopolitical Analysis. London: Croom Helm. 20- Glassner, M.E.(1993). Political Geography. Canada: John Wiley and Sons. 21- Gove, P.B.(1986). Websters Dictionary. U.S.A: Merriam Webster Inc. 22- Gray, C.(1986). Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and Defence of the West. New York: Rampo Press. 23- Gray, C.(1977). The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era. New York: Crane, Russak and Company Inc. 24- Hepl, L.(1991). Restoration to Life of Geopolitics. Translated to Persian by Dr. Mirheidar. Tehran Political and Economics Ettelaat, No.47-48, 25. 25- Husain, M.(1993). Perspectives in Human Geography (Vol.6). New Delhi: Anmol Publications. 26- Johnston, R.J. & Gregory, D. & Smith, D.M.(1994). The Dictionary of Human Geography. U.S.A U.K: Black Well. 27- Kazemi, A.(1994). International Relations in Theory and Practice. Tehran: Ghomes Publications. 28- Kazemi, A.(1987). Management of International Crisis. Tehran: Islamic Culture Publications Office. 29- Kazemi, A.(1990). Role of Society and International Relations. Tehran: Ghomes Publications. 30- Khansari, M. (1990). Formal Logic. Tehran: Tehran University. 31- Mojtahed zadeh, P.(1998). A Glance to some Concepts of Political Geography and Geopolitics. Magazin of the College for Law and Political Sciences, 42, 123. 32- Mirheidar, D.(1998). Geopolitics. Geographical Research Quarterly, 20(4), 128. 33- Mirheidar, D.(1994). Principles of Political Geography. Tehran: Samt Publications Center. 34- Mirheidar, D.(1978). The Principles of Political Geography. Tehran: Simorgh Publications. 35- Monkhouse, F.J. (1972). A Dictionary of Geography. England: Edward Arnold. 36- OSullivan, P.(1986). Geopolitics. Australia: Crom helm. 37- OSullivan, P. & Miller, J.W.(1983). The Geography of Warfare. London: Croom Helm. 38- OTuathail, G. (1996). Critical Geopolitics. London: Routledge. 39- OTuathail, G. & Dalby, S.(1998). Rethinking Geopolitics. London: Routledge. 40- OTuathail, G. & Dalby, S. & Routledge, P. (1998). The Geopolitics Reader. London: Routledge. 41- Pacione, M.(1985). Progress in Political Geography. Australia: Croom Helm. 42- Short, J.R. (1993). An Introduction to Political Geography. London: Routledge. 43- Small, J. & Witherick, M.(1990). A Modern Dictionary of Geography. U.K: Edward Arnold. 44- Taylor, P. (1993). Political Geography. England: Long man. 45- Tosh Das, S. (1986). Geo-Strategies. Allahabad: Kitab Mahal.

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AREAL - FOR SAU PIVOT CENTRAL N GEOPOLITICA ORIENTULUI MIJLOCIU?

Gheorghe VDUVA
Rezumat: Cnd vorbim de Iran, considerm c trebuie s avem n vedere cel puin trei orizonturi oarecum distincte i, n acelai timp, destul de bulversate: orizontul istoric, orizontul geopolitic i orizontul energetic. Toate trei creeaz, aproape n orice condiii, zone de liniti prenguite, de furtuni de peste tot i zone paradoxale, cu furtuni linititoare, dar cu efecte greu de prevzut i de contracarat. Iranul nu este o ar oarecare. Ea vine din timpuri strvechi, amintind de civilizaiile de odinioar, i, n acelai timp, este situat ntr-o zon cu impact asupra securitii i stabilitii ntregii lumi. Iranul mai nseamn 1 i ara arienilor , fiind, deopotriv, un pivot geostrategic al Orientului Mijlociu i o zon-cheie n stabilizarea i stabilitatea regiunii i chiar a ntregului spaiu eurasiatic i afro-asiatic. n acest timp, asupra Iranului se centreaz un uria evantai de fore care doresc s-i influeneze deciziile i statutul. Acest lucru creeaz o situaie internaional extrem de tensionat i de periculoas, care poate avea efecte imprevizibile i incomensurabile. Totul se joac, acum, ntre for i raiune, i nu se tie dac, n acest rzboi-mozaic al declaraiilor i al nervilor, va ctiga raiunea forei sau fora raiunii.

O istorie clocotitoare Numele oficial al Iranului, era, pn n 1935, Persia (se trage de la numele provinciei Fars sau Pars, care deinea o poziie dominant n vremea n care grecii, care au numit-o Persis, au ncercat s cucereasc inutul. Astzi, aceast denumire este folosit doar de englezi. Persia exist ns n Iran sub forma unei provincii, Fars sau Pars. Ea este, pentru Iran, ceea ce este Anglia pentru Regatul Unit. Calendarul oficial este cel persan, iar limba oficial este persana (farsi), scris cu litere arabe. Spunem aceasta, ntruct Iranul nu este o ar oarecare, ci una dintre cele mai vechi civilizaii din lume, care are o istorie continu de peste 3000 de ani (peste 2500 de ani de istorie scris). S-au descoperit vestigii care urc pn n paleoliticul inferior, iar la Baluchistan s-au gsit vestigii de peste 800.000 de ani etc. Nimeni nu tie ns foarte exact unde se afl nceputul nceputurilor. Cert este doar c una din cele mai strlucite personaliti ale antichitii, Cyrus II cel Mare (559 529 .Hr.), transform Persia, n numai trei decenii, dintr-o putere local n cel mai vast i puternic imperiu al Orientului. Imperiul Persan (condus de dinastia Ahemenizilor) se ntindea de la Indus pn n Egipt, Asia Mic i Tracia. Acest vast imperiu este oprit ns la porile Greciei i, ulterior, cucerit de Alexandru Macedon (334 - 330 .Hr.). El genereaz lumea elenistic i devine, n acest timp, nucleul regatelor Part (250 .Hr. - 226 d.Hr.) i Sasanid (226 - 651). Imperiul Roman a avut mult de furc cu aceste dou regate, iar cele dou rzboaie mpotriva Daciei (101 - 102 i 105 - 106) erau, de fapt, un fel de pregtire a rzboiului cu Parii. Musulmanii ncep cucerirea Persiei n anul 635, prin Abu Bakr. Pn n secolul al IX-lea se realizeaz conversiunea la islam. Specific, pentru Iran, este c el a fost islamizat, dar niciodat arabizat. Persanii au reuit s-i pstreze o puternic personalitate n cadrul islamului, aportul lor cultural, politic i chiar religios fiind substanial. Iranul cunoate rzboaie, succesiuni de dinastii, dar i evoluii remarcabile n planul tiinei i culturii.
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Renaterea cultural i tiinific din secolul al XI-lea se concretizeaz, ntre altele, prin crearea observatorului de la Estefan i a calendarului persan, ce se folosete nc i azi. De-a lungul secolelor al IX-lea i al X-lea, Iranul se desprinde din Califatul Arab. Dinastia Sefavizilor, ncepnd cu Ismail I (1499 - 1524), pune bazele unui nou stat iranian centralizat. Acesta atinge apogeul de strlucire i deplintate sub Abbas I cel Mare (1588 - 1629). Urmeaz declinul de sub dinastia Kajarilor (1779 - 1925), pierderea rzboaielor cu Rusia, de la nceputul secolului al XIX-lea, apoi influena britanic i rus din a doua jumtate a aceluiai secol, cele dou state - Marea Britanie i Rusia - mprindu-i Persia, prin tratatul din 1907, n dou zone de influen. Dinastia Pahlavi (1925 - 1979), ndeosebi dup Al Doilea Rzboi Mondial, modernizeaz structurile economice, sociale i politice, europenizeaz instituiile i chiar viaa social. Sub aceste auspicii, Iranul devine unul dintre marii productori de petrol i gaze naturale din zon i din ntreaga lume. Dar stabilitatea este relativ. Din cauze foarte complexe - unele interne, altele de alt natur - Iranul ncepe s fiarb. Se declaneaz, n mozaic, o serie de micri antiguvernamentale laice, concomitent cu micri religioase foarte ample. n 1978, majoritatea provinciilor erau cuprinse de febra schimbrilor. ahul Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Aryamehr (1941 - 1971), aliat fidel al SUA, prsete ara la 16 ianuarie 1979. Puterea este luat de ctre Consiliul Revoluionar Islamic, n frunte cu ayatollahul Ruhollah Khomeiny. La 01 aprilie 1979, ara este proclamat republic islamic, iar aceast realitate este confirmat i de Constituia aprobat prin referendum la 2 - 3 decembrie 1979. Efectele acestor schimbri rapide i intempestive sunt deosebite. Relaiile n zon devin ncordate. Cu aproape toat lumea, dar ndeosebi cu SUA i cu Irakul. Irakul chiar gsete potrivit acest moment de bulversare pentru a rezolva, prin rzboi, vechea disput de frontier pentru cteva insulie din zona de confluen a fluviilor Tigru i Eufrat, denumit Shatt-al Arab. n septembrie 1980, Irakul atac Iranul. Urmeaz un rzboi de uzur de opt ani (1980 - 1988), care se soldeaz cu pierderi grele din rndul ambelor pri. Iranul are peste un milion de mori i mari distrugeri materiale. La fel i Irakul. Acest rzboi, absolut inutil pentru cele dou ri (dar foarte util pentru acea formul veche de mii de ani divide et impera), se ncheie n august 1988, prin acceptarea de ctre Iran a Rezoluiei nr. 598 a Consiliului de Securitate al O.N.U., care prevedea ncetarea imediat a tuturor ostilitilor. Dar drama nu avea s se opreasc aici. Criza ostaticilor ambasadei S.U.A. din Teheran (1979 - 1981) va duce la ruperea relaiilor diplomatice americano-iraniene, ceea ce va deschide o adevrat cutie a Pandorei a conflictualitii n ntreaga zon. De-a lungul milenarei sale istorii, Iranul a cunoscut mai ales furtuni. Dar, lucru semnificativ pentru aceast zon nu doar de confluen, ci i de mari sinteze, Iranul a continuat s pstreze ceva din dramele, dar i din lumina, din umbrele i urmele tuturor vremurilor prin care a trecut. Dincolo de problemele extrem de grave cu care se confrunt zona, de ncercrile grele prin care a trecut, trece i va mai trece nc aceast ar, rolul Iranului n geopolitica Orientului Mijlociu nu scade, ci crete. Aceast ar a avut, are i va avea mereu un cuvnt greu de spus n configurarea geopolitic i geostrategic a Orientului Mijlociu, pentru c este unul dintre pivoii cei mai importani ai regiunii. Un pivot care poate fi consolidat sau drmat. Consolidarea lui ar avea unele efecte benefice (dup unii, discutabile) n ceea ce privete locul i rolul acestei ri n geopolitica 36

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regiunii, n timp ce distrugerea lui (n msura n care, dup 3000 de ani de existen, un asemenea pivot poate fi distrus) ar avea, de asemenea, numeroase efecte (cele mai multe, imprevizibile) n stabilitatea i securitatea regiunii i chiar a ntregii lumi. Un orizont geopolitic special O simpl privire asupra unei hri a Orientului Mijlociu poate genera o mulime de ntrebri care nu pot primi rspunsuri simple. Miile de ani de zbuciumat, glorioas sau dramatic istorie a rilor de aici nu permit simplismul n geopolitica acestei zone n care, fr ndoial, Iranul joac un rol de pivot special, de areal-for i nu doar de simplu pivot. Noiunea de pivot nseamn a fi un fel de loc foarte important, asupra cruia se centreaz i se concentreaz atenia i aciunea unor fore extrem de puternice pentru influenarea zonei respective. Pivotul permite aciunea radial, n deplin siguran strategic. Aceast siguran este dat att de calitatea i cantitatea forelor care particip la aciune, de resursele de care acestea dispun, ct mai ales de calitatea spaiului-pivot, adic de mrimea, resursele, sigurana i valoarea acestuia, ca baz de susinere i de plecare. Iranul are toate aceste caliti, dar nu numai astfel de caliti. El nu este nici pe departe doar aa ceva. Nu este, de fapt, deloc aa ceva. Chiar dac, ntr-o vreme, Marea Britanie i Rusia, n alta, Statele Unite, aveau influen asupra Iranului, aceasta nu se exercita asupra unui pivot, ci asupra unei ri care avea numeroase resurse, asupra unui areal - for. Iranul nu a constituit niciodat o baz de plecare la ofensiv pentru alii, ci a fost totdeauna un spaiu plin de istorie, de dinamic social, religioas i civilizaional, dar i de controverse i de nedumeriri. Iranul a fost i a rmas un spaiu de sintez, un spaiu cu totul special care nu radiaz nimic, ci doar atrage i impresioneaz. De aceea, Iranul a fost, de-a lungul timpurilor, fie spaiu - int, fie spaiu cu resurse, fie spaiu de siguran strategic ntre dou zone conflictuale. Peste toate acestea, el a rmas, pn azi, un areal - for. La ora actual, Iranul are o poziionare activ, un rol deosebit i un orizont destul de ferm n geopolitica Orientului Mijlociu. Aceast geopolitic trece prin Iran i depinde n mare msur i de Iran. Funcia cu totul special a Iranului n zon este dat de condiia sa deosebit, definit, ntre altele i de urmtoarele caracteristici: spaiu imens, relativ stabil, situat ntre dou conflicte deschise, cel din Irak i cel din Afganistan; civilizaie cu o istorie multimilenar; zon din vecintatea foaierului perturbator, care se ntindea, odinioar, ntre nordul Mrii Caspice i Manciuria i care mai funcioneaz (desigur, ntr-un mod cu totul specific) i azi; zon de tranzit i de confluen ntre Asia Central, lumea islamic i lumea arab; ar islamic, dar nu arab; ar care adpostete o parte din populaia kurd (8 % din totalul populaiei), populaie ce militeaz, n consens cu populaia kurd din Irak, din Turcia i din zona caucazian (n total, peste 20 de milioane de oameni), pentru desprinderea de rile din care fac parte i renfiinarea statului Kurdistan, stat vechi de peste o mie de ani, atitudine care creeaz o foarte mare problem n ntreaga zon; ar - nucleu pentru civilizaia de tip islamic, dar care, deocamdat, nu radiaz, ci doar focalizeaz n spaiul destul de mare dintre frontierele sale;

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 ar ce tinde s devin, n timp, nu doar pivot, ci i o zon - resurs, un posibil model civilizaional tradiional i, n acelai timp, modern, adic o civilizaie contrast, o civilizaie de sintez, aa cum a fost ea de mii de ani. n situaia n care Iranul va fi atacat sau determinat s se transforme, prin implozie, ntr-un spaiu conflictual ce va trebui gestionat, se va repune pe rol, dar de dimensiuni mult mai periculoase, situaia din 1980 - 1988, cnd Irakul i Iranul se aflau n rzboi, Orientul Apropiat fierbea, iar n Afganistan situaia conflictual era n cretere. O astfel de situaie ar fi dezastruoas, acum, n condiiile foarte grele ale celor dou rzboaie - cel din Irak i cei din Afganistan - conflictualitatea putnd scpa, cu uurin, de sub orice control. Pe atunci, adic n anii 1980 - 1988, prioritatea politic i strategic planetar n-o reprezenta Orientul Mijlociu, ci confruntarea ntre cele dou mari blocuri militare, n care SUA puneau pe rol politica de ndiguire elaborat de Nicolas Spykman, i strategia de ndiguire corespunztoare, iar Uniunea Sovietic, sub Gorbaciov, i reorienta tacit politica i strategia spre o nou redimensionare, de data aceasta, radical, pentru reconstrucia pivotului eurasiatic, dar n cu totul alte dimensiuni dect cele rezultate din previziunile britanicului Mackinder i germanului Haushofer, i, desigur, n ali termeni dect cei ai bipolaritii. Rusia i lua mna de pe o bun parte a lumii, ndeosebi a lumii islamice, pentru a-i rezolva propriile-i probleme, urmnd s revin, la momentul potrivit, foarte sigur i n parteneriate strategice cu lumea puternic i influent. O asemenea perspectiv nu trebuie privit neaprat n termeni de confruntare, ci mai ales n termeni de securitate prin parteneriat, adic de colaborare activ, n vederea prevenirii unor conflicte devastatoare, valorificrii avantajoase a resurselor i folosirii adecvate a pieelor. Situaia din zona Orientului Mijlociu i a Orientului Apropiat nu este n niciun fel linititoare. Criza israeliano - palestinian este departe de a fi soluionat, foaia de parcurs n-a fost nici parcurs n ntregime, nici realizat altfel dect parial, iar o alta va fi foarte greu de alctuit, narmarea n continuare a Israelului, a Arabiei Saudite i a altor ri din zon nu acoper falia strategic extrem de periculoas, ci doar adncete i mai mult diviziunea din lumea arab i poate duce la o nou escaladare a conflictualitii, iar presiunile asupra Iranului nu rezolv problema dect ntr-un singur sens, poate, cel mai puin important: formarea unei coaliii anti-iraniene. Ridicarea unei pri dintre rile Orientului Mijlociu mpotriva Iranului nu poate fi nici realist, nici benefic, ntruct i aa aceast lume este destul de divizat, iar o nou divizare n-ar folosi la nimic. Tipul conducerii politice de aici constituie o problem intern a acestei ri, iar programul nuclear nu poate fi acceptat, din pcate - i nu tim foarte exact de ce - doar ca o opiune energetic legitim. Ceea ce se ntmpl n interiorul rii poate ngrijora comunitatea regional i internaional n msura n care ea reprezint o ameninare pentru aceasta sau ncalc grav drepturile omului. Desigur, multe dintre aceste lucruri sunt i trebuie discutate i lmurite. Dar escaladarea acuzaiilor i a conflictualitii nu poate duce dect la crearea unei rupturi politice i a unui blocaj strategic din care nu se va mai putea iei dect prin rzboi. Iranul este o ar mare care, cu siguran, va riposta n cazul n care va fi atacat. Riposta poate fi normal sau asimetric, pe termen lung, ceea ce va duce la crearea unui focar continuu de rzboi asimetric din Afganistan pn n Irak, cu posibile extensii n spaiul pakistanez i chiar n Caucaz, n Asia Central, n zona uigur i n Kamir. Poate c, de dragul unei stabiliti relative, chiar pe muchie de cuit, Iranul ar putea s renune la programul su nuclear sau mcar la cel de mbogire a Uraniului. Ar 38

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Orizont energetic nesigur Iranul se afl pe cel mai ieftin i mai disputat areal energetic, ntre Golful Persic i Marea Caspic, fiind ar litoral la cele dou mri. nsui Iranul dispune de resurse energetice uriae i, probabil, explorrile viitoare vor descoperi noi zcminte. Rezervele de petrol ale Iranului, erau, n 2006, de 138,4 miliarde barili, potrivit datelor publicate n buletinul anual al Organizaiei rilor Exportatoare de Petrol (OPEC), nregistrndu-se o cretere cu 2,1 miliarde barili n raport cu 2005. Pe ansamblu, rile OPEC au atins cifra de 922,48 miliarde barili la finele anului 2006, avnd o cretere de 9,2 miliarde barili. Creterea rezervelor iraniene reprezint 22,8 % din creterile totale ale rilor OPEC, iar producia Iranului reprezint 15 % din producia total a acestor ri, ceea ce arat rolul deosebit al rii arienilor n dinamica resurselor energetice din zon. n perioada 1986 - 2006, rezervele totale de petrol ale rilor OPEC au crescut n fiecare an, ceea ce reprezint o concluzie extrem de important pentru dinamica resurselor i pieelor energetice. Dar creterea rapid a consumului, ndeosebi n China i n India, meninerea unui consum uria n SUA, crearea unei situaii conflictuale n Golf, escaladarea conflictualitii n Orientul Apropiat, intensificarea atacurilor de tip terorist n Europa Occidental, n Turcia i chiar n unele ri arabe, precum i punerea pe tapet a unei noi i 39

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fi, poate, o soluie. O soluie pe care o sugereaz Statele Unite, Uniunea European, comunitatea internaional i mult alt lume. Desigur, o soluie relativ, limitat i limitativ, cu unele efecte benefice pentru meninerea actualului statu quo al regiunii. n opinia noastr, aceasta poate echivala, la nivel planetar, cu un fel de frecie la un picior de lemn. n lume sunt deja vreo 18.000 de capete nucleare active, care ar putea distruge, dac ar fi explodate, de cteva ori suprafaa pmntului! Ce mai conteaz unul sau dou capete nucleare n plus sau n minus?! De aici nu rezult c rile nucleare din zon - Rusia, China, India, Pakistanul i Israelul - vor face un pas napoi n domeniul narmrilor nucleare, ci doar c nu va mai aprea pe harta rilor capabile s produc i s foloseasc energia nuclear nc una ce poate deveni efectiv, n 2 10 - 20 de ani, o mare putere, datorit suprafeei foarte mari, 1.645.258 km , resurselor numeroase, populaiei, filosofiei i fizionomiei civilizaionale, dar mai ales unei politici identitare severe i ostile Occidentului. Iranul este, de asemenea, suspectat i chiar acuzat c sprijin terorismul, c susine miliiile Hezbollah, c susine rezistena din Irak etc. Toate acestea pot duce la situaii extrem de complicate i de neplcute n acest spaiu. SUA acuz Iranul iit c sprijin violenele iite din Irak, n timp ce Iranul susine c accentuarea violenelor dintre iiii i sunniii din Irak se datoreaz invaziei americano - britanice din 2003 i nu vreunei susineri de prin alte pri. Cauzele acestei conflictualiti sunt mult mai complexe i ele nu pot fi nici decelate i nici rezolvate dect dac se au n vedere toate determinrile i ntreaga realitate. Or, deocamdat, nimeni nu este dispus s fac un astfel de demers. De aceea, Statele Unite - o mare putere efectiv responsabil de starea de securitate a ntregii lumi - i-au ameliorat poziia fa de Iran. Pe 28 mai 2007, ambasadorul iranian i cel american de la Bagdad s-au ntlnit pentru pregtirea unor discuii pe aceast tem. Era prima ntlnire diplomatic dup revoluia islamic din 1979. Dialogul este preferabil oricrei alte soluii. Acest adevr este cunoscut de toat lumea, nc din antichitatea timpurie. Este cazul ca analiza riguroas, pe toate planurile, a dimensiunii geopolitice a Iranului, ca stat-pivot, ca stat-civilizaie, ca arealfor civilizaional, de sintez i de confluen s nceap s dea primele ei roade.

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dificile probleme - cea a programului nuclear al Iranului - au dus la creterea formidabil a preului barilului de petrol, depindu-se de cteva ori pragurile considerate critice, ceea ce a creat i va crea i n continuare serioase probleme civilizaiei tehnologice a nceputului de secol, care se bazeaz nc pe petrol, care continu s fie o civilizaie a petrolului. Iranul, n ceea ce privete petrolul i gazele naturale, are o situaie special. Este prima ar din Golf care a trecut la exploatarea petrolului, nc din 1913. Iranul deine 10 % din rezervele de petrol ale planetei, situndu-se pe locul trei n lume i pe locul doi n ceea ce privete gazele naturale. Aceast realitate - al doilea mare productor de petrol din zona Golfului, dup Arabia Saudit, i al doilea productor de gaze naturale din lume, dup Rusia - i confer Iranului o situaie special. De unde rezult o ntrebare tulburtoare: Dac Iranul deine o asemenea poziie n ceea ce privete resursele energetice naturale, ntr-o civilizaie tehnologic ce se bazeaz pe petrol, deci, ntr-o civilizaie a petrolului, de ce are mai nevoie de energie nuclear, mai ales n condiiile n care, dup evenimentele dramatice de la Cernobl, exploatarea ei nu prezint nc garanii suficiente? La o astfel de ntrebare se pot da rspunsuri dintre cele mai felurite. Energia nuclear va fi, fr ndoial, o energie a viitorului, a civilizaiei tehnologice nucleare, iar Iranul, ar important n aceast parte de lume, nu poate rmne n urm. SUA, o parte dintre rile Europei Occidentale i chiar o parte dintre rile din Golf suspecteaz Iranul, plecnd probabil i de la aceast premis, c ar urmri realizarea armei nucleare, n condiiile n care a semnat un tratat de neproliferare. n aceste condiii, se pune o nou ntrebare: Atta vreme ct Israelul, India, Pakistanul i, probabil, i alte ri s-au dotat cu arma nuclear i nu suport nici un fel de presiuni, din partea nimnui, cum pot fi justificate presiunile asupra Iranului, mai ales c, oficial, aceast ar susine c programul su nuclear nu urmrete scopuri militare? Desigur, orice arm nuclear aprut pe panoplia armelor lumii reprezint un nou pericol, dar n-ar fi oare mai potrivit ca rile deintoare de asemenea arme s fac ele, mai nti, un pas napoi i s dea un semn c vor s se debaraseze de astfel de arme? Or, din cte se tie, n afar de Marea Britanie, toate rile deintoare de arme nucleare au continuat s-i modernizeze, s-i diversifice, s-i miniaturizeze acest armament i, mai ales, s-i perfecioneze continuu vectorii de transport la int. Or, dup prerea noastr, toate aceste ri, inclusiv Israelul, ar fi trebuit s tie c, dotndu-se cu arme nucleare, vor contribui, nolens, volens, ntr-o form sau alta, la declanarea i continuarea cursei nucleare, ntruct ncrederea, n relaiile internaionale, se bazeaz nc pe disuasiune, pe for, pe cnd, din pcate, nencrederea i suspiciunea sunt realiti n vog ale configurrii i reconfigurrii relaiilor dintre state. Parteneriatele strategice par s sparg puin aceast realitate, dar i ele se bazeaz pe armonizarea unor interese i nu pe vreun impuls de armonie universal.

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Perspective incerte Misiunea Rice - Gates (secretarul de stat american, Condoleezza Rice, i ministrul aprrii, Robert Gates) din 31 iulie 2007 a reliefat tocmai falia ce exist ntre vechile politici arabe i noile realiti. Statele arabe sunnite - monarhiile din Golf, Egiptul i Iordania - par s fie ngrijorate de ascensiunea forei Iranului i cred c Statele Unite nu trebuie s prseasc Irakul. n opinia unor lideri ai acestor ri, n cazul retragerii americane, Iranul se va npusti imediat asupra Irakului. Situaia din zon nu este privit i analizat neaprat prin prisma realitilor complexe i implicaiilor posibile pentru pacea i securitatea lumii, ci mai ales prin prisma 40

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intereselor. Interesele prelev adesea realitilor, iar acestea din urm, devenind foarte complexe i deosebit de complicate, nu mai pot servi integral unora sau altora dintre interese. Iranul este privit de ctre unele dintre rile din zon, n consens cu SUA i cu Marea Britanie, dar i cu unele dintre rile europene, ca un pericol potenial, ntruct, n opinia lor, susine micrile Hezbollah i Hamas, are legturi cu Siria i cu reeaua Al-Qaeda, dar i cu aciunile violente iite din Irak. Mai mult, aciunea ofensiv israelian din vara anului 2006 ar fi servit ndeosebi Iranului care, sprijinind Hezbollah-ul, i-ar fi sporit popularitatea i sprijinul lumii islamice. Aceast realitate ar putea constitui o adevrat ameninare pentru rile arabe sunnite. De aceea, dup unele opinii, aceste ri ar sprijini Statele Unite n confruntarea cu Iranul sau, n orice caz, ar dori ca, din aceast confruntare, s ias nvingtori americanii. Dar americanii sunt pur i simplu blocai n Irak i n Afganistan i, n mod normal, nu i-ar mai putea permite i un al treilea rzboi, cu toate c un al treilea front ar face, practic, jonciunea ntre cele dou zone de rzboi - cea din Irak i cea din Afganistan - i ar permite o strategie unitar ofensiv pentru ntregul Orient Mijlociu, divizat n dou tabere, de o parte fiind rile atacate, iar de cealalt restul lumii islamice i arabe. La o astfel de ofensiv s-ar putea ralia i Israelul, pentru rezolvarea, n favoarea sa, a situaiei din Orientul Apropiat. Numai c este foarte greu de presupus c un astfel de scenariu ar avea i sori de izbnd. Exist un prag de ofensare a Orientului Mijlociu care nu poate fi depit, iar problema palestinian nu poate fi soluionat prin distrugerea palestinienilor, fr a se produce aici un haos greu de controlat sau o catastrof de mari proporii. Nu suntem foarte siguri dac o politic de for este cea mai potrivit pentru situaia dramatic din Orientul Mijlociu. Dar o astfel de soluie, din pcate, nu poate fi exclus. Chiar dac Washington-ul ofer armament n valoare de 14 miliarde de euro pentru ase ri membre ale Consiliului de Cooperare din Golf: Emiratele Arabe, Arabia Saudit (10 miliarde de euro), Bahrein, Qatar, Oman i Kuweit, precum i Israelului, situaia nu se va rezolva doar prin simpla presiune a armelor i narmrilor. Aceste arme pot constitui, desigur, o msur de ntrire a aliailor SUA din zon, n cazul escaladrii conflictului, i, evident, un mod de descurajare a Iranului n aciunile sale viitoare. Toat aceast desfurare de fore s-ar putea s nu aib ns un efect foarte mare, ntruct, se tie, Iranul nu a atacat niciodat pe nimeni i este puin probabil s-i propun, n actualele condiii, scopuri ofensive, fie chiar i dintr-o perspectiv disuasiv. rile arabe din Golf consider c inamicii veritabili ce se cer combtui sunt Al-Qaeda i organizaiile sale. Chiar dac exist unele suspiciuni i divergene care opun aceste ri Iranului, Siriei i Hezbollah-ului, rile membre ale Consiliului de Cooperare din Golf caut s gseasc soluii politice. Obiectivul urmrit de acestea este s previn deschiderea unor noi focare de conflict ntr-o regiune deja perturbat de situaia din Irak, din Palestina i din Liban.1 Ostilitatea lor fa de Iran i de Siria nu este de natur s ncurajeze i s susin o intervenie militar mpotriva Iranului, care ar fi potrivnic obiectivului urmrit de ele - acela de a preveni extinderea rzboiului i a conflictelor armate. De aceea, oferta american pare ct se poate de dificil i de problematic. Pe de o parte, ea este generoas - oricare ar din lume prefer s-i ntreasc forele militare, pentru securitatea proprie -, iar refuzul ei ar contraria SUA, o ar aliat. Pe de alt parte, acceptarea ei ar mri i mai mult ostilitatea din zon.
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3218,36-940627@51-823016,0.html, Mouna Nam, Les EtatsUnis tentent de former un front anti-Iran, 01.08.2007.
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Se tie, rile Consiliului din Golf, mai ales Arabia Saudit, consider Iranul i Siria vinovate de destabilizarea Irakului, iar programul nuclear al Iranului, suspectat i de aceste ri c ar urmri obiective militare, deci dotarea cu arma nuclear, adncete i mai mult ruptura. Iranul s-a angajat s se in la distan de grupurile iite de pe cellalt rm al Golfului. Care va fi ns atitudinea Iranului n condiiile n care rile Consiliului accept oferta american este greu de spus. n loc de concluzii Nimeni nu are, de-a gata, o soluie viabil pentru Orientul Mijlociu, pentru Orientul Apropiat, pentru ntreaga conflictualitate din zon i nici mcar pentru o prticic din aceasta. Marile interdependene din aceast controversat epoc de nceput a globalizrii, numeroasele vulnerabiliti generate de jocul intereselor, de btlia continu pentru piee i resurse, precum i efortul excepional al comunitii internaionale pentru gestionarea crizelor i conflictelor i prevenirea rzboiului, n condiiile extrem de grave ale unor realiti create de-a lungul unor milenii de conflicte armate i rzboaie, de dominare, inegalitate, totalitarism de toate felurile i politici de for pe toate planurile, au generat i menin mecanisme greu de neles, de schimbat, de transformat i de folosit. Unele dintre marile obiective ale acestei epoci de stpnire a conflictualitii i de reaezare a lumii pe temeiurile tiinei, ncrederii, parteneriatelor i securitii sunt foarte greu de realizat. i, oricum, o astfel de realizare nu poate clca peste trei mii de ani de civilizaie, peste memoria colectiv, peste oameni i obiceiuri. Dar poate i trebuie s ajute omenirea s ias din haos i s intre n adevrata ei nelepciune. Care nu este neaprat nelepciunea btei, chiar dac, potrivit unor vechi experiene omeneti, totdeauna, cui pe cui se scoate. Iranul este o ar mare, cu o civilizaie milenar i, n pofida unor realiti greu de acceptat sau de trecut cu vederea, ea poate contribui n mod substanial la stabilitatea i stabilizarea regiunii, dac se schimb complet, adic la 180 de grade, filosofia, fizionomia i atitudinile din zon, angajndu-se cu aceast ar un dialog realist, firesc, constructiv. Un nou rzboi ar fi, mai ales n actuala situaie dramatic a zonei, un nou dezastru. Iranul este o ar de sintez civilizaional, de contact ntre lumi i civilizaii, ntre realiti complexe i dinamice. Datorit acestor caliti, considerm c, ntr-o perspectiv ceva mai bine elaborat sub raportul ncrederii i cooperrii, Iranul ar putea fi un areal - for civilizaional, adic una dintre cheile diminurii i chiar ncetrii conflictualitii din Orientul Mijlociu i crearea acelei stabilitii a arealului energetic de care lumea are, totui, o foarte mare nevoie.

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THE EMPIRES OF ANCIENT PERSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Mdlina Virginia ANTONESCU
Rezumat: Articolul ncearc s surprind cteva din deosebirile dintre dou tipuri de suprastructuri imperiale, precum Imperiul Persan antic i Uniunea European. Dac suprastructura persan este un tip de imperiu vechi, format ntr-un mod specific, printr-o combinaie de cuceriri teritoriale i de aliane matrimoniale, Uniunea European se definete ca un imperiu postmodern, format de state suverane i extins ntr-un mod panic, prin negocieri diplomatice cu statele candidate. Dac imperiul Persan este un tip de entitate politic personalizat, condus de un mprat, ca persoan sacr, zeificat, cazul UE este foarte diferit, reflectnd marea transformare a tiparului imperial de-a lungul istoriei: astfel, UE este un tip depersonalizat de imperiu care pare s aib o Preedinie - ca o instituie colectiv, informal, neconsacrat expres n tratatele comunitare -, ns nu i un Preedinte UE, ca ef suprem al imperiului. Pe de alt parte, imperiul Persan este unul centralizat, teritoriile cucerite fiind organizate n satrapii sau provincii, n timp ce UE este format din state suverane, n ciuda naturii integraioniste care pretinde existena unui anumit transfer de suveranitate. UE nu are un teritoriu personal, ci un tip special de teritoriu, funcional, format din teritoriile tuturor statelor membre, n sens economic - piaa unic -, mai degrab dect ntr-un sens politic. UE, ca o uniune de state nu are provincii imperiale conduse de autoriti locale dotate cu largi prerogative, precum imperiul Persan. Articolul ncearc mai degrab s surprind transformrile majore ale tiparului imperial de-a lungul istoriei, de la vechile tipuri de imperii la construciile imperiale postmoderne, depersonalizate, tehnocratice.

Covering various political shapes, depending on the ruling tribe / clan / royal dynasty (the Med Empire, the Achemenid Empire, the Sassanid Empire), the imperial superstructures of Ancient Persia are representing classical types of empires, that are not constituting exceptions to the ancient imperial conception of territorial accumulation by manu militari1 (sometime temperate by the use of soft methods, as the practice of matrimonial alliances2 between royal dynasties), empires whose religious and political unity lays on deified person of the sovereign as supreme source of divine legitimacy for the whole empire. On a contrary, European Union can be seen as a new type, of postmodern empire (created as a mixture between unique market, regional integrationist agreements and political union of states decided to put in common their sovereignty in restricted areas), empire extended through diplomatic negotiations with candidate states and not through the use of military force or territorial conquests as the old types of empires were usually did. European Union, a post modern empire, in our vision, knows that one of its main objectives (to insure political governance at the European level as near as to its citizens) can easily be compromised by some specific risks (the degeneration of
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Ovidiu Drmba - History of culture and civilization; tome I; The Persian culture and civilization; pg. 277-284; Ed. Saeculum I.O. and Ed. Vestala, Bucharest, 2000. In the opinion of Pierre Chaunu ( History and decay, trad. Corina Margineanu, Clusium, 1995, pg. 156-158), the first real empire was the Achemenid one, based on unified, peaceful, suprastate base, with the respect of local specificities. 2 For example, Cyrus get married to Asyages dother (Astyage being the last Med king); Alexander Macedon get married to Daras dother ( Dara being the last Achemeid king); Ardechir Babekan, from the Sassanid dynasty get married to a Parch princess. The matrimonial alliance is guaranteeing a sacred meaning of the empire, considered as a source of stability and political unity. The genealogy of Persian kings/conquerors is obligatory including mythological royal ascendants with a non-affected glory and authenticity (the conferral of the celest principle, Kvareno). See Seyyed Taghi Nasr - Essai sur lhistoire du droit persan lpoque des Sassanides; thse pour le doctorate en droit; Ed. Albert Mechelinck, Paris, 1932, pg. 146-151.

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European bureaucracy into a sacralised, vast and rigid body, risking to become a source of legitimacy for itself). The office worker risks to become, in an European institutional framework progressively distanced in rapport with the European citizens, a presence of a divine necessity, a sacred person, difficult to be contested, and whose responsibility escapes to the democratic control .The European Union is thus, characterized as a lay political super-order, in which European bureaucracy plays the role of a sacred level of decision, similar to the situation of the deified monarch, from the old empires, whose responsibility was never questioned by its subjects. In these conditions, EU seems to convert itself- only if we agree to give some credit to this hypothesis, of a bureaucratic European political regime- into a real celestial order, similar to the Persian mythological order of 50.000 Immortals. This European autonomous bureaucracy (because it doesnt respond in front of the national parliaments, nor directly to European citizens; an isolate case is that of the European Commission, politically responsible, as a whole, through the approval of the motion of censure against it, in front of the European Parliament) is intending to separate itself from the political control of the member states, representing in this way, the EU political will as postmodern imperial superstructure capable to have its own administration. As consequence, one can note the genuine struggle between the supranational tendency ant the sovereignist tendency at the European level, where the sovereignists are tempting to diminish the supranational dimension and prerogatives of some EU institutions as the European Commission, in order to increase the political control of member states over these supranational institutions (inclusively European Central Bank) and also, to augment the political responsibility of such institutions in front of the European Council or the European Council of Ministers. If, within the Ancient Persian empires (lato sensu), the divine or semi-divine function (existing almost in any political imperial model, from the chief of tribe to the absolutist monarchs or to the cult of personality in the totalitarian regimes, or even to the celestial bureaucracy in some types of lay, postmodern empires as EU) is laying into the hands of a single individual (the sovereign, the emperor) funded initially on a warrior legitimacy (the founder of the empire as a divinity, as a hero, as a quasidivinity; the affiliation of the emperor with the royal dynasty which has founded or conquered the empire), on the contrary, we can note that EU doesnt know the existence of a similar sacred royal function (EU emperor as EU President, or as the founder of EU as empire). The European Union is created by the will of sovereign states (see the initial core of six founders western European states, that signed and ratified the three treaties of European Communities: the treaty of European Community of Charcoal and Steel, EURATOM, the Treaty of European Economic Communities). These founder states have created EU, on a base of the mandate given by their peoples and in the framework of legal norms of international law (this is another factor distinguishing the postmodern empires, more preoccupied to inscribe their actions and policies within the legal framework, in comparison with old empires, based on conquest, where the force is the preeminent, if not the only element necessary to create and maintain the empire. The EU Presidency can also be seen as a collective informal institution, because it never figures among the EU institutions mentioned in the EU institutional framework: attributes concerning EU Presidency (and not the EU President, that is an essential distinction, because it is not recognized the legal existence of an EU President, as such) are hold by different EU institutions, in a specialized way: thus, 44

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the High Representative of the Common Foreign Security Policy; the President of the European Commission; the President of the Council of Ministers (who is also the chief of the state holding for six months, by rotation, the Presidency of another intergovernmental institution, the European Council) are all exercising specific attributions connected to the EU Presidency. They are all, in some way, considered as participating to the materialization of the EU Presidency, but never exclusive and individual EU Presidents. In such conditions, it is hard enough to say who from all these persons, can be considered, individually, as representative of the EU supranational legitimacy, as the supreme chief of EU, because each of them is holding a different kind of legitimacy (either derived from the national governments, as the two Councils; either from the European Parliament, as in the case of the President of the European Commission). As a result of the European constitutional treaty failure (in 2005), the new simplified intergovernmental treaty (whose future elaboration was the object of the debates at the summit of the European Council, in Brussels, in 22-23 June 2007) might take into consideration the possibility to create a permanent function of President of the European Council (mandated for two and half years), as an enforcement of the supranational EU dimension. However, it is not possible for the Permanent President of an EU institution (as the European Council) representing the member states interests at the European level of decision, to incarnate the function of EU supreme chief, to become the EU President, to hold the supreme political position in this postmodern empire, similar to an emperor. EU remains an original political entity, it is not a state, neither an international intergovernmental organization, nor a confederation, nor a federation, despite the paradoxical fact that it holds specific elements of each model. From the pompous Sassanid ceremony1 (highlighting and protecting the sacrality of the monarch by making him inaccessible to the ordinary people, through splendor and distance - here, it happens to be a specific scission of the imperial society, in two different categories: the King and the rivals of the king, the high priests, holding the monopoly of the sacred functions, and being also, the owners of a divine type of legitimacy) and on the other hand, the ordinary people, led by the lay aristocracy), until the lay political order of the European Union, transgressed into a political sacred zone, having the EU bureaucrats as the sacred administrative pillar of the EU (if we are admitting some sort of sacrality for the office worker or for the technocrat), we can note that each empire, during its history, is creating an entire ceremony of image, of communication, of rituals and protocols that have produced a separation between the top of decision and the imperial subjects. This ceremony can also be present in various aspects of the EU official life (however, we cannot admit the existence of an EU Court Life as it was in the old empires endowed with absolutist monarchical regimes).
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See William Mc Neill - The rise of Occident : a history of human community and an retrospective essay ; trad. Diana Stanciu; Ed. Arc, Chisinu, pg. 128. The martial legitimacy is not anymore sufficient to guarantee the stability of empire. Darius, who is confronted with rival claims at his hereditary succession at Persian throne, can not built its authority only on the traditional base of a leader in a national war (as in the case of Cyrus and his son, Cambyses). Darius get inspired from the Assyrian model and from the Babylonian model in organizing the Persian empire, by improving these models, in some aspects as: the organization of the imperial army; the insertion of an imperial bureaucracy in the imperial system of governance; the promulgation of a legislative code; the royal inspectors send in provinces; the guarantee of priests autonomy. These measures have increased the centrifuge movements, provoking the rebellions of Egypt and Babylon. This has created, as response, a Persian policy of undermining the influence of priests in the temples from Egypt and Babylon and especially, of high priests (genuine rivals for the king, in the issue of empire divine legitimacy ).

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These aspects are, however, obvious in various official European protocols, from those having as object the conclusion of the communitarian treaties, to the protocols used or the discussions within the Council of Ministers or within other EU institutions, to the protocol regarding the accession of a new state into the Union; the conclusion of a treaty with tiers states, the meetings of EU officials with tiers states and with international organizations, the investiture of the President of the European Commission by the European Parliament and subsequently, by the Council etc. All these protocols and procedures are involving specific obligations for the EU institutions, for the EU as such, as postmodern empire, as the respect of all diplomatic customs and rules connected to the international law (lato sensu). On the other hand, the EU institutions activity is marked by some disadvantages (lack of institutional transparency, sacralisation of the EU bureaucracy; an urgent need for policies of governance destined to approach the Union to its citizens; the opacity during the concrete decision-making process within the Councils - many of the meetings of the Council of Ministers being with closed doors). Moreover, within the Union, we can find another disadvantage (for the democratic kind of decision-making process) that is a technocratic, hermetic language of treaties and normative acts, risking to transform the EU into an inaccessible structure of supranational decisions. If, within ancient Persia, the human rights dimension1 is representing the monopoly of some specific category of persons (we can find rights of imperial citizens; a policy based on positive discrimination of the man; specific rights recognized only to the majoritary native population), that is a typical dimension for a legal imperial order, in the European Union case the situation looks different. Here, we can find in the fundamental European treaties, some references to the common constitutional democratic customs of the EU states, all based on democratic political regimes. Nevertheless, it must be noted that, at Nice (2000) the EU member states have not wanted to include in the treaty a document devoted to the problem of human rights and to the relation between EU and the rights of its citizens. Thus, the Fundamental Charter of the European Citizen Rights was never become a compulsory juridical text, incorporated in the Nice treaty. The obligation for the EU and its member states to respect the human rights is representing one of the basic features of their democracies and a main political condition during the process of negotiations of adhesion of new states at EU. But this obligation come from international law, not from the communitarian law, in the absence of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Citizen ratification. Secondly, we can regard the European citizens sphere of rights - the European citizenship representing a specific imperial feature of the Union -, as a sphere of new type of imperial rights, especially connected to the economic market, to the four freedoms of circulation within the Union (for example, the freedom to work on the EU territory). On the other hand, the European treaties consecrate only in the benefice of the European citizens (as persons holding the citizenship of a member state) a specific package of political and economic rights (specific for a post-modern, integrationist type of empire as EU). If the bureaucratic system of ancient empires is developing and transforming itself into a state body based on divine legitimacy of one sacred person (the Emperor, the Great King, the Sahinsah) which is the supreme authority of the empire, the central
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Iran has sacrificed the individual freedoms in the favor of collective freedoms, because its history was a continuous line of reactions against foreign occupation. See Ali Asahar Khachayar - Le culte d Etat chez la Nation Iranienne; Univ. de Paris, Facult de droit, Paris, Libr. Lipschutz, 1936, pg. 46.

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element, that makes a composite, hybrid entity as an empire, into a coherent political unity, in the EU framework the bureaucracy knows a specific period of apogee, consolidating its autonomy in relation with the members states (despite the absence of a Great King or Emperor, or a unique and powerful EU President capable to give, in the sense of old empires, internal strength and coherence to the whole Union, and capable to enforce the power of its actions and policies in relation with member states and especially with tiers states or international organizations). The European bureaucracy is not subordinated, in the meaning of old empires, to a Great King of EU, nor to an EU President (as the High Representative of CFSP who is one of many officials participating to the EU Presidency in the CFSP pillar). Moreover, the European bureaucracy is partially placed under the authority of the President of the European Commission (for the departments and the administrative structure of the Commission and its services), or under the authority of the President of the Council of Ministers (for the administrative structure of this institution) President which is considered to be not only a political authority but also, an administrative chief of those part of European administration placed under its orders. Empires of ancient Persia had known a historical evolution reflecting the systematic attempt of political survival (during the large period of transition- the Partian and Arsacid dynasties -, which separated the Achemenid imperial era from the Sassanid era). The national idea1 becomes an ideal of the Achemenid and Sassanid official policies; on a contrary, in the EU case, it cannot be possible to admit the idea of an European people or an European nation, this original, quasi-statalised superstructure including 27 member states with different and well individualized national identities. So, it is difficult to build any common identity or a European state. The Persian Empire, during its evolution, remains within the territorial borders of its originary populations2 (the Meds and the Persians being Indo-Europeans from the North of Persian Bay). The Persian superstructure was disputed and conquered by local rulers as Cyrus the Second belonging to the Persian tribe, who was subsequently proclaimed King of Anzan in 549 B. C. - the Anzan being a little kingdom affiliated to the royal house of Achemenids -. Cyrus the Second conquered in 550 B.C. the capital-city of the Med Empire, Ecbatana. Later, the imperial territory was extended gradually, as a material base of domination for the Persian empire, as an effect of the important victories of this king (Cyrus the Second being proclaimed as King of Persia in 546 B.C.): the conquest of Med Empire; the conquest of the Lydian kingdom(together with the Greek colonies annexed to it; the fall of capital Sardes in 546 B.C.); the conquest of Babylon (and the defeat of king Balthazar in 539 B.C., followed by the crowning of the new Persian king as King of Babylon, in 538 B.C.). Distinguishing from this method of creating the Persian empire (manu militari, specific to old types of empires), EU is becoming an empire using a peaceful, soft method of expansion (through diplomatic negotiations with candidate states, the fulfillment by the candidate states of an entire package of conditions for their adhesion, through political dialogue with candidate states and monitorization of the internal reforms
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Clment Huart - La Perse antique et la civilization iranienne; Bibliothque de synthse historique, coll. Levolution de lhumanit, XXIV, La Renaissance du livre, 1925, pg. 52-53. 2 In Iran it is consecrated the cult of the State and of its political independence, two basic notions strongly connected with the notion of country (la patrie), defended by the Great Achemenid King with the accept of the divinity ( see Ali- Asghar Khachayar, op. cit., pg. 30, 39, 47).

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these states have to accomplish as part of their obligations), and also, an empire building progressively an area of peace around its external borders (by formulating and implementing policies of strategic partnership, policies of good neighborhood, by introducing new non-reimbursable financial instruments for aiding a category of states never destined to become candidate states; by formulating a policy devoted to the construction of a ring of friend around its borders). By defeating three empires, Cyrus becomes the hero-founder of the Achemenid Empire, a superstructure with a new composition, with a specific mix of culture and unique, vast territorial dimensions (covering almost all the Middle and Near Orient), subsequently extending the empire to other regions as: Egypt, India, Thracia, Macedonia, by using the policy of war practiced by other Persian emperors (Cambyses the Second and Darius I the Great). The new superstructure received the appellative of The first world empire. Due to the fact that Persian empire represents the largest antique state (until the end of VI century), it becomes a real manifestation of exceptional power for other great conquerors as Alexander Macedon to include this immense empire into a bigger political ensemble. These evolutions seem to form a genuine globalizationof the ancient world, where economy, trade, culture, policy or religion are representing a mix ensemble, artificially formed (manu militari), sometime by using propagandistic arguments (the reception of Alexander the Great by the Egyptians as a liberator of Egypt from the Persian oppression). Distinguishing from the Assyrian Empire (which was governed by the policy of pure force, of deported persons, of systematic terror and oppression against conquered populations, of destructing and displacing other populations, also characterized through a controlled violence directed equally against its own population), the Persian empire is starting from a new ideological and political fundament, by introducing the policy of pacifism and tolerance as imperial values (and influencing, in this way, another empires as the Macedonian one, as a preliminary step for the cultural and social fusion between Macedonians and Persians). Persian empire brought a humanistic breath (because the Persians have not destroyed the vanquished cities, in contrast with Assyrians policy of deportation, of demolishing the cities, of forbidding national/regional gods of the vanquished peoples and imposing the official Assyrian pantheon). On a contrary, the policy of Persian kings concerning the defeated was based on the idea of a sustainable political unity of his empire, as a result of the religious tolerance (by returning to the subdued peoples their gods) and also, by assuming a political limit in the imperial policy concerning the fate of the defeated (reduction of deportation only at rebellion cases)1. The Persian yoke mentioned by Alexander Macedon political propaganda was initially a large movement of freedom, organized and directed by the Persian tribe against suffocating guardianship of Babylon and Assyrian empires. Even in its times of glory, Persian Empire was never been comparable (under the aspect of its policy regarding the defeated and subdue populations) with these empires. European Union, as postmodern empire, is a superstructure interested in giving special attention (in its relations with the candidate and member states) to the spread and consolidation of democracy and free market, to consecration of rule of law in the territories newly included in its empire (the religious tolerance, the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms are not forming the legal regime only of the European citizens
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but also, are incident in the case of all persons living within the EU borders). This is the greater ambition of the EU, to assume this essential function of spreading the democracy in the Europe, particularly around its external borders, in order to become a superstructure based on rule of law and on a foreign policy guided by these legal principles. In the EU case, as postmodern empire, in comparison with old types of empires, it doesnt exist a problem regarding the ancient practice of destroying, subduing violently and refusing elementary rights for the submitted or incorporated peoples; neither, the EU, as empire based on rule of law, cannot tolerate or encourage imperial old- fashioned types of policies oriented to deportation of submitted peoples, to destruction of conquered cities as in the past. Such illegal and obsolete methods to deal with defeated peoples, used in the old empires are fundamentally opposed to the peaceful and democratic practices, assumed by post modern empires as EU. However, within the unique market, one can note a certain discrimination between European citizens and immigrants, or citizens coming from tiers states or even from candidate states that are not enjoying the same rights as the EU citizens. This is rather a matter of juridical treatment of persons that is established within the EU institutions by the member states, through their free and sovereign will, at the intersection of international private law and communitarian law. A concrete policy is regarding the Visa, asylum and freedom of circulation of the persons from tiers states, incorporated in the first EU pillar, as a policy destined to reduce the migratory fluxes from the other non-member states to the Union. The inclusion of the state entities (not only regions) into an imperial superstructure is rather practiced in postmodern empire than in old, heterogeneous empires (EU being composed only of sovereign states). On a contrary, the Persian Empire have started its imperial evolution not from an originary state (six states, in the EU case), but from two tribes claiming their Indo-European origins (the Meds and the Persians), and forming gradually, imperial successive identities, depending on the type of royal dynasty (Partes and Arsacides; The Achemenids; the Sassanids) which have became the political symbols of a process of cohesion between different types of territories, with various status. Thus, within the Persian Empire are included some independent citiesstates as Macedonia; also, within the Persian Empire it happens the new foundation of the Jewish state, by the Persians, after the return of Jewish people from Babylonian captivity. At such mixed superstructure as the Persian empire, it must be added an administrative-territorial organization of the whole empire into provinces, directly dependent of the imperial metropolis, as the Egyptian or Indian satrapies, as the Lydian satrapy which was a former powerful kingdom; as the independent Phoenician cities with their colonies (inclusively Carthaginian people); as the Mesopotamian region, the center of the Persian empire; as the Babylonian kingdom, conquered by Persians in 536 B.C., and one of the capitals of the new founded Persian state; as the Urartu state, in Northern Assyria, subdued in VI century B.C.; as the conquest of Assyrian imperial kingdom and the Med Empire; as the temporary conquest of Thracia, a region transformed into a Persian satrapy. From war to economic rivalries, the imperial political structure is developing itself during the history, into a competition world. The ancient military imperialism is characterized by progressive territorial inclusions, thus provoking the appearance of new series of militarized empires (the conquest of Assyrian empire by the Meds; the conquest of Meds by the Persians; the conquest of Neo-Babylonian empire by Persians; the conquest of Persian empire by Alexander Macedon; the conquest of Macedonian empire by the Romans etc.), which are all reflecting an imperial spectacular evolution. In contrast with this situation, empires of the future will take various shapes,

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frequently accomplishing commercial functions (the private empires) or a protectiveecological function (transnational green empires) or a humanitarian function (empires specialized in insuring and organizing the protection of refugees and displaced persons, as effect of local conflicts or natural disasters, at a transitional scale; a kind of transnational network, mixing the existence of a little bureaucracy with a large body of volunteers) or academic function (empires specialized in forming transitional networks of universities and research centers under a non-political direction). Empires will go, during the XXI century, to the private field, taking a specialized form: entertainment, media, social and assistance sector; trade; energy; infrastructure field, military defense; ecology; space exploration etc. Empires of the future will be either administrative empires (specialized on the management and organization of legal status of territories in conflict); empires specialized in offering military expertise, assistance and protection in different kind of operations; judiciary empires (holding the control of the main international organizations with judiciary functions at international level); empires of energy (specialized in providing the access to the primary sources of energy, inclusively non- conventional sources); conveyer-empires (specialized in protecting the routes of energetic transport from the provider states to the consumer states, as empires holding the monopoly of energy transport at transnational level); spatial empires (specialized in doing activities of exploration in the cosmic space). This specialization of the future empire can remove the obsolete and destructive political rivalries between empires during the history, leading towards a zone of non-policy or alter-policy (where the rules of imperial organization and their way of working will be no longer dependent of the rules of political governance). The Persian Empire, founded by Cyrus had, in some way, a nomad core (gradually formed, through territorial conquests); thus, the political initial center of this superstructure is not anymore the little kingdom of Anzan, initially ruled by Cyrus as vassal of the Meds. To such a new and vast empire, only a famous political core is appropriate: the capitals of defeated kingdoms (Ecbatana of the Med Empire; Babylon; the Lydian Sardes and Susa of Kingdom of Elam). The cumulative titles taken by the sovereign are revealing the political cohesion of the entire imperial construction, as well as the religious type of legitimacy (Great King, King of all the Kings; King of Persians and Meds: King of Babylon; Representative of the Marduk God). The double imperial legitimacy of the King (divine and warrior legitimacy) is reflecting thus, the modality of creation of an old type of empire (through military conquest; through setting-up of a divine official cult in the empire, by giving preeminent position to the king). The Sovereign of all the people must also be the Sovereign of each individual: thus, the local and regional traditions and customs are not things that can be neglected, not even by the king himself. The official identity of the new born empire cannot omit regional identities, it cannot annulated the political-urban identities of the defeated empires with a city - state as core (Ecbatana, Babylon), that are becoming luxurious accessories of new imperial civilizational order. The great cities (even metropolis) of Orient are carrying a royal sacrality, due to their former imperial splendor and central political position; such cities with great symbolic power (the centers of glamorous civilizations) are taken over by the conqueror, by the imperial newborn power (the case of Persian or Macedonian superstructures) or, on a contrary, they are destroyed especially for the reason that are representing a rival political and civilizational centre of power even after the destruction of their empires (these capitals were destroyed by Assyrians, Babylonians, Macedonians). Preserved or 50

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robbed, it is always a very courageous act to attack it: these cities are representing the apogees of pre- Roman antiquity, genuine centers of civilization, inspiring fear, fascination, obsession, admiration, desire of conquest. Such cities that are borrowing their names to the empire itself (the Babylon case), having the same legitimacy as the royal dynasties, regions or tribes, are representing marks of the nomad itinerary of the imperial political core (for example, the capital of the Persian empire is established at Susa, but in the winter season the sovereign is moving to Babylon with his court, while Ecbatana remains the capital for the summer season). As the Persian Empire is achieving a well - articulated political imperial identity, other capitals are appearing (Pasargadai, founded by Darius I). This characteristic feature can be observed equally in the EU case (as neo-imperial superstructure having its institutions spread in different towns (at Luxembourg, there are the Court of Justice and the Court of Accounts; at Brussels, there are the European Commission and the Council of Ministers; at Strasbourg, it is the headquarter of the European Parliament; at Brussels, there are the Committee of Regions and the Economic and Social Committee; Europol is placed at Hague, while the European Central Bank is in Frankfurt; the European Bank of Investments is in Luxembourg). If we are taking into consideration the fact that, according to the Protocol establishing the EU institutions headquarters, the plenary monthly sessions of the European Parliament (inclusively the budgetary session) are holding in Strasbourg; the additional sessions of European Parliament are holding in Brussels, while its General Secretariat is in Luxembourg. Some services of the European Commission are in Luxembourg; some sessions of the European Council are holding in Luxembourg, equally - it is impossible not to look to the reality of this EU imperial core, spread in different western towns. But, while the core of the Persian Empire is including the defeated metropolis (lately transformed into imperial regions), we cannot say that the modality of formation of this core needs a permanent conquest of new capitals, with the abandon of the old ones. On a contrary, the EU core is preserving its capitals and is accumulating them. It is an absorbing core rather than a nomad core (because, for the Persian empire, this would suppose a continuous renewal, the abandon of Ecbatana and its decay in favor of Babylon; because it supposes an evolving chain, marking the migration of a single centre of imperial power, as the extension of the empire is absorbing new territories). In such a situation, the nomad imperial core is tempting to remain for a time in the last political conquered centre that is considered another important political trophy, suitable to express its new political identity as empire. The empire is advancing in new territories or is loosing its conquered lands and as consequence, its political core is moving, following the victorious imperial army. The political and civilizational identity of the core in this case, is becoming either the identity of the last important conquest of the empire, either, in case of defeat of the empire, the identity of the initial city (which has founded the empire). A nomad core is moving constantly and is transforming itself often (either by taking the identity of the defeated city, if this city had more symbolic power, either by imprinting its imperial characteristic to the conquered city - in some cases, the core is initiating even a fusion between conquering elements and the defeated -). Consequently, it seems that neither the core of the Persian empire, neither the EU core (despite some similarities between these cores) wouldnt be genuine nomad cores (because the cities-institutional centers of EU institutions are not moving in each capital of the EU member states; they are not searching for a an

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establishment of an EU headquarter in some Balkan capital, despite the fact that EU expansion in Balkans was already a fact); the EU core is not confounded with the identity of the great European metropolis of the member states (Rome, London, Paris, Berlin). EU is not holding exotic subsidiaries of the EU institutional headquarters, placed in out sea territories and having a special juridical regime that should impose the suitable modifications in the communitarian treaties. The EU institutional centralism is one of medium spread (scattering the EU institutions in a little number of Western cities, as Brussels, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Hague, Frankfurt, which are permanent capitals for the EU institutional headquarters (these cities are not abandoned definitively by the EU officials in favor of another capitals that would reflect another configuration of its power). Due to its length and to its dynasties that have marked its apogee, the Persian Empire (lato sensu) is tending to delineate itself from its beginnings (the annexation of Med Empire) and it reaches its apogee under the dynasty of Achemenids and Sassanids. This resistance and perpetuation of the Persian superstructure, under different denomination and shapes, can also be met in the EU case (the stage of the three Economic European Communities, which, after the Maastricht treaty/1993, were integrated into the first pillar of EU). This process is proving a special and well developed capacity of adaptation that any imperial superstructure holds, as response to the different challenges of the regional political context. From the initial Med core (the med tribe, the one that has invaded the imperial Assyria, besieging Ninive, its capital and which gave a mortal blow in 606 B.C. to the Assyrian imperial power by destroying Ninive) as a warrior kingdom, including Assyria (inclusively through a policy of matrimonial alliances with Assyria), subsequently extended through Persian conquests (a tribe initially being vassal of Assyrians and Meds), than stabilized (and sometimes, re-conquered by the Persian kings from the hands of rebel local governors), by the Achemenids and by the Sassanids, the Persian empire becomes a superstructure absorbing the defeated empires. This is quite an ordinary practice in antiquity, the conqueror himself ending within the belly of another Leviathan, of another greater empire (the Macedonian empire which included the Persian Empire, for example). By covering the territories of 27 member states, EU is opening to the Balkan area, renewing an expansionist itinerary, followed by the implementation of a policy of stability in that region through negotiations of adhesion with candidate states; through policies of strategic partnership with tiers states; through a policy of common neighborhood etc.. What is surprising for us, if we are choosing the EU perspectives is the fact that EU, as post-modern empire, can be regarded as an unique case of Mega Empire in the history, precisely for its composition. Thus, EU is including the greatest number of former empires and of present great powers that have influenced the history: Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Greece, that have formed in the past, many types of empires, a reality creating a special situation for the EU imperial nature, for the imperial history and also, for the contemporary international relations. Once with Cyrus from Anzan, affiliated to the Achemenid dynasty (as a foreign dynasty, ruling in the Anzanit kingdom, taking over the conquests made by the natives and influencing the policy of Persian empire until a complete domination of this superstructure during the Achemenid age), once with the warrior expeditions of his son, Cambyses (the conqueror of Memphis, who has included Egypt in the Persian empire, 52

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as a strategic province, and also, as a base of military operations for the conquest of Occident in 525 B.C.), once with the re-conquest of the empire under the rule of Darius (who eliminated the local chiefs with royal claims or with royal affiliations), once with the reorganization of the empire in satrapies (the power of the satrap being limited, controlled or counterbalanced through the attributions of royal administration as the Secretary of States or the Military Commander -, an aspect that limits the local powers, more efficiently subordinated from now on, to the central, supreme power of the king), once with the expansion of the empire to Indus (by conquering Punjab, in 512 B.C.) and to the Macedonia (493 B.C.), once with the reformatory dynasties of Xerxes, Artaxerxes, Darius III Condoman, the Achemenid dynasty is becoming illustrative for the whole imperial Persian superstructure political identity. In the EU case, as type of post-modern empire, we cannot admit the existence of some founder power (a royal dynasty, as in old type of empires with monarchic absolutist political regime and statalized type of organization), the EU having hybrid features, characteristic both to international organizations as well as to a state. Hardly can we take into consideration the term (with a different meaning, in the EU case) of founders, as founders fathers, those political personalities whose way of thinking and whose projects have been materialized in the elaboration of the main treaties concerning the European Communities and European Union. Nevertheless, the issue of finding a concrete civilizational identity to the EU, one distinct from the identities of members states, is remaining unsolved; thus, we are not in the presence of a true adult empire). Characterized through some elements of cohesion for the empire as: the absolutist, centralized monarchy; the symbolic sacred halo surrounding the person of sovereign and legitimating its absolute sacred power ; the imperial bureaucracy and the unitary way of organizing the territory (in satrapies), without eliminate the local specificity (religion, customs, social and political organization; the maintenance of the local chief in the imperial provinces), and realizing, as each empire, the idea of unity in diversity, the antique Persian empire is representing a developed, mature empire, multiethnic and based on the idea of a divine type of legitimacy hold by a sacralized monarch. Both superstructures (EU and Persian empire) are multiethnic and multinational (moreover, within EU treaties, it is mentioned the obligation of loyal cooperation, meaning that EU and the member states are compelled to respect and to counterbalance in a mutual way, any tendency of domination; secondly, EU has the specific obligation to respect the national identities of the member states and their common constitutional democratic traditions. As a personalized empire (a superstructure founded and depending on the exclusive will of its founders, of its ruling dynasty identified to the will of empire), we are noting the breaking-up of the Persian empire, as soon as its king is deceasing; the anarchy (with centrifuge origins) has its source from the Persian satraps, enough powerful and independent in comparison with monarchic centralism. The satrap, as vice-king1, is becoming a political imperial institution maintained under the Macedonian governance. If, in the EU case, it is forbidden to put into question the national identity of member states, the issue of the EU centralization (that would give, in the sense of old empires, specific powers to the governors of the new provinces) is not present in the
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The dualism, as a major concept in mazdeism is presupposing the existence of two contrary principles (Ormuzd, the Supreme Good, Ahriman- the Evil); in Avesta- Zoroastre et le mazdeisme, by Abel Hovelaque; coll. Les literatures de l Orient (IV), Paris, Maisonneuve et C, 1880, pg. 152.

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debates regarding the EU imperial model next model (an aspect having as effect the limitation and the weakening of the national states main prerogatives). Some capacity of influence, but without surpassing the role of the Persian satraps1 (in a modern sense that are more than a prefect, being real governors of the imperial provinces) can be recognized to the EU Representatives in the territories of member and of candidate states (thought the Representatives or the Delegations of the European Commission, with legal statute of Embassies), but with the condition to respect the principle of international law regarding the non- interference in the internal affairs of member states. In the case of the candidate states (prepared, in the process of negotiations of their access to the EU, to give concrete content to the transfer of sovereignty towards EU institutional level of decision, in determinate areas) and of member states, also (which have already realized this transfer in the favor of EU institutions), taking into consideration the integrationist nature of the EU political entity, it is hard to reject the obligation of these states to respect the communitarian aquis, the general lines of the EU evolution or the general guiding principles emitted by the European Council, by appealing to the argument of the respect of non-inference in the internal affairs of one member state (as a principle of international law, opposed to the integrationist principle of EU construction). On the other hand, it must be said that EU is mixing elements of economic integration (constantly augmented, inclusively by the treaty of Nice) with classic, intergovernmental cooperation (CFSP, ESDP) where the principles of international law must be respected (inclusively the non-inference into the direction and the elaboration of foreign policy of one state, despite its EU membership). EU member states are still remaining sovereign states, especially in the foreign policy field, where the transfer of sovereignty towards EU has not happened; those states cannot be assimilated with some ordinary conquered provinces, as in the case of old empires, neither with autonomous territories included into an empire. It is true that, according to the present communitarian treaties, EU member states have no right to unilateral retreat from the Union, expressly recognized by those treaties. As an effect, this transfer of sovereignty, in some determinate fields, is definitive and irreversible (the integrationist EU dimension being, in our opinion, destined to maintain the internal cohesion of the empire). The satraps rebellion (from 371 B.C.) but equally, the domino effect provoked by the disappearance of the king (as factor of imperial unity) are causing the decay and the split of Persian empire (once again, the same difference between EU, which has no such royal symbol destined to maintain the internal cohesion of the empire). EU, on a contrary, due to the de-personalization of its decisional direction can avoid some of specific cases of separation, characteristic to the old empires). The Sassanid dynasty is following to the Achemenid dynasty at the direction of the Persian empire, after an obscure stage of transition; this dynasty gave a new shape to the empire (by using the Achemenid superstructure, as base for the new empire), once with the consolidation of the concept of Persian nation. The policy of Sassanid dynasty (based on the maintenance of the Achemenid autocratic political model) knows also, the dimension2 of a foreign policy based on the idea of revenge
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The pillars of the prestige and imperial force were the army, the administration and the religion (see Ovidiu Drmba- op.cit., pg. 284). It must be noted the defensive character of the Achemenid peace (as imperial peace), seen by Persian kings as a form of resistance and stability for the state against the Oriental kings aggressions (Ali - Asghar Khachayar, op. cit., pg. 29).

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(against Romans) as well as the Macedonian expansion has started from the reason of Greek revenge against Persians. This imperial vendetta with hegemonic finalities is acquiring sometimes, defensive dimensions (as the protection of borders by Sassanid king Yezdeguerd I against White Huns invasions; as the protection of borders against Arabian threat, in 636 A.C.). From the battles for regional influence, with Romans and their territorial expansions (Edesc, Damascus, Antiohia, Jerusalem, Egypt) to the attempts of resistance against Arabian expansion (battles of Qadissiyya, Djaloula, Nehawed - 642 A.C.), having as consequence the disappearance of Persia as a state, the Persian empire is entering progressively into a decline stage1 (and the national religion doesnt exist anymore), being separated into little independent dynastic kingdoms, while the rest of vast territories is exploited by the conquerors. The inclusion of the Sassanid Empire into the Arab Caliphate is proving once again the continual battle for supremacy and for survival between imperial entities. The absolutist and divine monarchic model seems to facilitate the inclusion into the triumphant empire, of a different kind of political model (for example, the autonomous cities-states forming the Greek empire, were included by Alexander Macedon in his empire, under the form of an imperial league). In other different conditions, this is difficult to be achieved, constituting almost always a factor of risk for the stability of the absorbing empire (the included political entity is trying to compete with the absorbing empire, is trying to undermine it, in order to prepare a subsequent scission and a possible precedent for other composites of the empire). Thus, for example, USSR, though its supranational totalitarism (the concept of the Soviet people) was been destroyed as empire through internal constant and uniform pressures (through implosion) but had never been included as such into another greater empire (it never happened a conquest of Soviet empire by another political entity, in the sense of old empires evolution ), because in contemporary world this method of including an entire empire as such, into the triumphant empire, is considered an ancient method, costly, vain, primitive. Rather, it is preferred by the great powers from today global world, to use soft polity, informal control. In conclusion, one can say that EU is differentiating through its nature, its methods of expansion, from the Persian Empire, that is an old type of empire formed and destroyed only through violence, manu militari. Nevertheless, one can not omit that empires of ancient Persia were capable to build an original civilization, starting from an imperial core, while EU has still a long way until the identification of those elements able to create a common European identity or to build a distinct EU civilization, able to confer individuality to this postmodern empire, during history.

Among the causes of the Persian empire decay, there are: the absence of an imperial constitution creating stable legal institutions; the rivalries between princes, that is weakening the state in front of foreign aggression; the intimate identification of the state with the person of sovereign (the king is the law; the Cult of the personified state), that is provoking an extreme vulnerability of the empire in obscure periods of war (Ali - Asghar Khachayar - idem, pg. 55, 59). We have to add at all these, the defeats supported by the empire in the Medic wars.

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ANALYZING PROPERTY - ROMANIAN QUESTIONS, PERSIAN ANSWERS Marius VCRELU For every country is necessary to go forward in its social existence, but this wish is for many of them more consumptive in energy then apply a strategy for strength economic power. What means more consumptive? It means that all purposes are not so clear - first, or, if they are clear, there are able to find (purposes) strong enemies, and those enemies are very decided to stop a strategy created for 10 year of application (or maybe more) who want to destroy them. In fact, this is Asias history - and, especially, for that part with oil. A state is created, neighbors are not satisfied with its existence, and attack it - lonely or in a states alliance. A strategic position means a continue war, but not always alliances, treaties, more often big oaths. During last centuries it was very often seen in diplomatic speaking and in a lot of treaties - expressions like democracy, respect for people, sovereignty, independence, non-intervention in internal affaires of states. In centre of Asiatic continent we dont find only a monument that show this place - we find countries, because some of them are a continent themselves. So, in this place we will find a countries more then monuments - and in out text we shall consider central countries former Islamic soviet states, Afghanistan and Iran. Controlling all those states it means a strong administrative power, but in the same time daily political surprises are guaranteed. But those big words, in fact, in Central Asia were not so realistic. Worse, all people understood this very quickly, so, the straight result was states political power growth, because people had forced to trust in skills of every one which was able to create a good army to protect local or nations interest. In law theory, countries from Central Asia are analyzed as an example of necessity: necessity for strong leaders, necessity to big public works, necessity to accept a lot of prohibitions for realize big purposes1. Unfortunately, for many populations on this area more important was to defend themselves against neighbors attacks. All that problems appears - in fact, not always geographical position is key because God dont give to those peoples the most important element for their life: water2. In the same time water missing is compensate by another elements, indispensable for modern economy: oil and natural gas. Water is more important in Central Asia then in Europe, for example. Their subsoil has a lot of oil, gas and other precious metals, but not so much water. For every ruler is important to control waters issues, after that land is coming without violent actions. Consequence: applying Sun Tzu lessons, trying to control oil and natural gas deposits it must not attack those places - long time, strong opposition - it must attack water issues. For all those states administration protecting water sources has same importance as oil deposits.
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C. St. Tomulescu - Drept privat roman / Private Roman law , Bucureti , 1935 , pp. 275 - 276 About water problem few references in Gh. Brtianu: Marea neagr: de la origini la cucerirea otoman / Black Sea, from origins to ottoman conquer, ed. Meridiane, Bucureti, 1988, pp. 167 - 168
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In Central Asia we find some former soviet countries - Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Azerbaijan - and another two countries, with a basic strategic role for Asia: Iran and Afghanistan. Most of them dont have a communication way to whole world; Caspian Sea is an internal Euro-Asiatic lake. Only Iran is able to participle by sea on the big economic circuit of good - by Shat el Arab channel. For al those countries, land is place that can hide their prosperity or their poorness: they have (most of them) a lot of oil, but they cannot transport it with big ships; for that purpose they must use pipe-lines, but in the same time they are easily victim when neighbors decide to have cold relations. In the same time there are a lot of connections between them: soviet policy used creates in 70 years more problems for conquered populations then in 2500 years of not Leninist experience. In Tajikistan Persian culture and language is very important; same thing is true in relations between Turkey - Azerbaijan, Turkey - Turkmenistan. On this area Iran is the most important country. It has 1,629,918 sq.km. 17th place on this world, and a population who pass 70 millions. Unfortunately, from all that area only 12,000 sq. km. are with water. Afghanistan have 28 millions too, with only 652,225 sq. km. Iran is centre of Asia from another aspect: it represent part of great road to Worlds Roof - great wall represented by Hindu-Kush - Karakorum Himalaya Mountains. In the same time for former soviet countries Iran represent the easier way to World Ocean1: Caspian Sea is more under a Christian control then an Islamic one, so, Persian Gulf is another water with importance for Central Asia. More then that, if former soviet countries want to realize a good connection with Saudi Arabia leader of Islamic world, they must choose a way by Turkey or Iran - there is no strait road - by land or by sea between them. In fact, both countries, Turkey and Iran are not satisfied by few of propagandist actions belonging to Saudi Arabia - one of them is a laic state, the other is Shiite. In the same time, Iran has a larger border with those states, and they must to understand that Persian control is inevitable. For Teheran authorities water problem have two aspects: internal - survival for its people, and external: possibility to control other states. For that, we must notice that for Iran is the most important thing water for its population - climate is mostly arid or semiarid, only near Caspian and Persian coast there are more precipitations (500 - 1000 mm. / year), but in Teheran, big city, with 14 million people in its area there are only 100 mm. / year. Is very important in the same time to note about rivers: not so many, the most important are Karun, Dez, Mand and Atrak (last kilometers of this river belong to Turkmenistan). Big lakes are Urmia and Namak, but are not sufficient. For agriculture in Iran state arranged a lot of installations, approximate 80,000 sq. km. are now irrigated. External aspect is given by Persian Gulf. Arabian Peninsula separate Indian Ocean - more oil is in left side of it. In the same places, British retire create more states: Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and mostly, Saudi Arabia. In the same time Asian history made basic for oil transport sea and ships: so, important is Hormuz Strait controller - if is possible to Saudi Arabia to use the Eastern part of its coast, for Qatar, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates is a life or death question a
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Persians permission: if Teheran dont accept this, they must to pay a higher price to Saudi Arabia to use its installations. For that - and for military reasons, too - is compulsory to Iranian marine to have good ships and a strong fire power. But this normal wish is in the same time a Shiite one: there are a lot of Shiites in Iraq, and for Sunnites only existence of a strong Iranian army is a factor able to create problems. In the same time water on Persian Gulf contains American military ships, element not very popular on Iranian territory. Sea water of Persian Gulf and of Arabian Sea can represent a good source for drinking water: unfortunately for this operation is need to a lot of money - not so many country can support this, and this procedure is not 100% efficient: for irrigations or for drink this water can be used only few years: is not possible to eliminate whole seas water elements. Iranian public administration was always in a strong connection with religion - is an oriental characteristic for states where bassist political movement (laical and close to socialism) was defeated. In the same time Islamic religion had some delays with modern technique: XIX-th century was decisive for some problems which are on this time starting point. XX-th century brought for Iran more problems then usual, because eternal fires present in Zoroastrian religion find their role in world economy as a great energy issues. But all that was in the same time doubled by a low level of political leaders Kajars (1779 - 1925) dynasty lost for Russia a lot of territory: Georgia, Dagestan, Northern Azerbaijan and Northern Armenia with Yerevan - all that area was conquered by Safavids dynasty (1501 - 1739). Last dynasty - Pahlavi had more problems with soviet occupation during world war II, because Stalin wanted to make that operation permanent, and only strong pressure from Western Europe forced soviet leader to retire its army. Anyway, this occupation was favored by technology: Persia - since 1935 its name was changed to Iran was not developed on this aspect. Understanding this fact, last shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi adopt an ambitious program for developing country - in the same time, shah want for Iran leader role in Islamic world. For this, he had taken action on two directions: army and economy. On first direction he created a good army, who resist on Saddam Hussein attack from 1980. In context of 60 - 70, a good army in Central Asia means stability and Persian state must adopt normal position on this area. After 1980, despite conflict with U.S.A., Iran continued its policy, and now they are a respectable force in Islamic world. On second direction, shah Pahlavi imagines a lot of measures - both in industry, and in agriculture. For recover the deficit he tried to make big steps - in reality, our wishes are not the same with fulfill. In industry he invests in oil refinery, but in agriculture he adopt a measure not very popular: to expropriate a lot of land. But country had a lot of problems - it was not easy for the people to be close to shah wishes. All that measures, based only by oil price and sell was not accompanied by educational measures, or their speed was not so fast - as expropriation or others actions - in fact, now Iran has only an alphabetization rate of 75%. His strategy brought more popular pressure, and, on 16 January 1979, shah was abdicated. New government dont had time to adopt a new strategy and to reform in its wishes sense because Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in 1980 - great war, battles continue for eight years. After this war it start a new period, when American presence start. Reason: the same Iraqi leader who invade Kuwait in 1990. Only from that moment Iranian states 58

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administration was able to adopt strategies without thinking at next Iraqi attacks. There is a continue big problem in XX-th century: dependence from oil prices, that means if another countries dont have a strong economy, low level of oil requests can be an obstacle in developing. On those times Iranian population was only close to 30 millions, and approximate 1 million sq. km. was enough for them1. Last 25 years of last century is a babyboom: now Iranian population pass 70 millions: the same area, and more problems in global ecology: reduced precipitations, tall mountains, for state first problem is now not oil - is water. If water was a problem before 1980, now it is more important. First of it, it must recognize that is very important to adopt measures for a part of population or for all people? Iran is a strong country, but is very important to understand one of the most important problem for Persian government: proportion of Persians inside their borders: the main ethnic groups are Persians (51%), Azerbaijanis (24%), Gilaki and Mazandarani (8%), Kurds (7%), Arabs (3%), Baluchi (2%), Lurs (2%), Turkmens (2%), Qashqai, Armenians, Persian Jews, Georgians, Assyrians, Circassians, Tats, Pashtuns and others (1%). From this position, is very hard to Teheran leaders to adopt the same strategy for whole country: if they want to ignore big Azerbaijani population close to Western border, there will be a lot of problems with their neighbors: Baku and Ankara will be very worried. In the same time, the most important realization will be for world an agreement between Iran and Turkey; in this case Saudi Arabia will loose its supremacy in Islamic world. We cannot ignore strong connection and influences between Farsi and Turkish language, too, a good reason for such a nice project. More people means in the same time problems with houses, because to build houses you need a lot of money. In this case, private sector is more active then public one, is easy to have children, but not always is easy to achieve a house: more children mean more financial problems, and not always economy growth with the same speed as birth rate. During last years this rate is not so high, but is the same thing as everywhere: villages mean more children and a low age for marriage then big cities. Abortion is legal only if is a danger for mother or child life. So, when states political power (party, political movement) wants to remain always leader class, it must recognize which problems are basic for society: solving that, they can adopt specific measures in others domains - protests are not easy to appear. Every political power has the right to adopt those measures who are considered necessary for societys progress - this are a royal right2 of the state and its public administration - entity who fulfill political powers wishes. Iranian power adopt a strong policy trying to develop its economy, now, a lot of economy belong to it. More then that, adopting Chinese example, Persian army has the right to realize commercial operation. For that, a good part of industry is in states ownership: oil, natural gas, machines construction, petrochemical industry. What is more specific for Iranian industry: great
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pressure for electricity - a lot of capacities are not able to use because this economys blood miss. Dependence: oil prices and electricity miss is in the same time a mortal combination for government and country. In the same time we must know that is a very important problem for government creating of new jobs: in this case, Iran has some similitude with Algeria - another country who doubled its population during last 30 years. For every political power in new century is more important to create new jobs then having a strong army - more soldiers, more food, less people to work: iron is can stop hunger, but not for always. For Iranian government it was needed to create banks: is not very Islamic, but it can help to solve unemployment problems. In last years appears private banks, they have success (Parsian Bank, ENBANK, Pasargad Bank). Last years oil price was very high, in the same time in last months gasoline consume was restricted . Iran is a big country, with a lot of good perspectives, we believe in its potential. Only analyzing briefly property we can consider such things, a deep analyze will underline more good things, were sure.

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Keyword: Natural hazards, Natural insecurity, Development, Iran.

Introduction Geographical location of Iran in the general direction of Alpeian orogenic and also arid and semi-arid belt of the northern hemisphere of the earth, has produced for it an instable conditions from viewpoint of climatic and geological bed (Ehlers, 1980). This location with natural and physical structure have made it as an insecure region in the world, and every year natural events or hazards remove the rest and tranquility of its inhabitants, and destroy their living, wealth and reserves. The plateau of Iran is one of the most earthquake-arising regions in the world, so that during the nine past decades 15 destructive earthquakes more than 7 Richter intensity have been happened (Iran newspaper, 2002:1). During the years 19891997, about 925 earthquake more than 3 Richter have been happened, and during this period 17686 people killed, 53300 injured and 275000 houses destroyed (Khabar Newspaper, 1997:4) In according to the studies, about 77 percents of the cities of Iran are situated in exposed to the high level of danger, and 20 percent in the medium level of danger. Among the natural hazards in the world, about 30 kind of them have been known and registered in Iran, which the most of them are earthquake, flood-water and drought, (Interior Ministry report. 1994:3). For gathering information and data, the libraries and documents of the Iranian organizations which are involved in the hazards and natural events were utilized, such as Interior ministry, National Committee for reducing the natural hazards, Committee of unexpected events, Red crescent, Budget and planning organization, Constructive ministry, Geo-physics institution of Tehran university, etc. The hazards potential of Iran, and its effects on the trend of national development, formed an interest for the writer to study this subject. Because there is relation between hazards and trend of development according to the following model (Hafeznia .1997):

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Abstract: The country of Iran due to its geographical location and situation has many natural hazards. More than 30 kind of these events have been known in Iran up to now, which the majority of them are related to the earthquake, flood-water, storm and drought. This article relying on the formal information and statistics have studied the situation of natural hazards in Iran, especially earthquake and flood-water and have considered the relation between the effects of such events with national development. This study shows that every year on the average about eleven percent (11%) of the constructive budget of the country expends for the influence of the natural hazards. Therefore this factor has negative effect on the national power and development.

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Mohammad Reza HAFEZNIA

NATURAL INSECURITY AND DETERRENCE OF DEVELOPMENT CASE STUDY: IRAN

Destroy o f reserve s Destroy o f human and economic resources Natu ral hazards Insecurit y Revea led compensative resources Hidden comp ensati ve resources Fear and anxiety

Dimensions of damage from hazards National and local resources which are demolished in any hazard and unexpected event can be categorized as under: 1. Human resources, in the form of death, wounded and missing. 2. Reserved resources, in private and public sections such as houses, production tools, factories, farms, live stocks, public installations, communications networks, transportation and roads, dams, tools for living in families, etc. 3. Revealed compensative resources, which are in the form of private, governmental and nongovernmental assistances for reconstruction of the past situation. These assistances mostly utilized for preparation of food, dress, emergency aids, houses, tools for employment, production activities, and reconstruction of destroyed installations and roads, etc. 4. Hidden compensative resources. These resources apparently not to be seen and not reveal, but they are expenses which not taken into account. These are as under: a. Expenses for the health of injured and wounded people, and damages to the trend of production resulted from absence of such people as manpower of production process. b. Damages resulted from pollution of environment, after event. c. Damages resulted from stop or delay in activity of productive units (agricultural, industrial, Commercial, etc.) d. Damages resulted from involvement of private section in the process of assistance to the people. e. Damages arising from involvement of governmental institutions in the process of assistance and reconstruction. f. Damages arising from involvement of state crafts and high level officials of the country and the state to the event. g. Damages arising from allocation of some resources and tools which are involved in the process of assistance and aid to the damaged places and people, such as aircrafts, helicopter, machinery, etc. A looking to the above mentioned resources show that: Firstly, a portion of national resources which can be used in the process of national and local development, utilized for reconstruction of the conditions which were before the event.

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Slowness and Delay in Deve lopment Tren d (Nati onal and loca l level)

Table no. 1 Number of Earthquakes in Iran during 1900-1970 A.D. Region North-west North West East No. 83

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South

Central part Total

Source : Shafiqee & Madani, 1996:443

The famous and destructive earthquakes which have been happened from 1960 A.D. in the vast scale and culminated to the much destruction of buildings and death of people are as under: 1. Bueen Zahra, with 6.2 Richter intensity and 12.200 killed in 1962. 2. Dasht-e-Biaz and Ferdoos, with 7.4 Richter intensity and 2.500 killed in 1968. 3. Tabas, with 7.8 Richter and 18.220 killed in 1978. (Hazards management, 1994:13) 4. Golbaf-e-kerman, with 7.1 Richter, in 1981 (Report No.30, 1994:15) 5. Menjil in Gilan, with 7.3 Richter and 40.000 killed in 1990 (www.bbc%20
*

Situated in south of Qazvin and west of Tehran

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Cities or Areas Tabriz, Zanjan, Salmas, 251 252 169 Khozestan, Hamadan, 205 Shiraz, Boshehr, Persian Gulf, 228 1188

Earthquake in Iran Archaeological studies show that the oldest earthquake in Iran has been happened in Bueen Zahra region*, in the third millennium B.C. (Ambraseys & Melville, 1991:126) The first registered earthquake in Iran related to the forth century B.C., that destroyed the region of Ray, in south of Tehran (Ambraseys & Melville, 1991:128). According to the historical, geographical and archaeological sources, the number of destructive earthquakes in Iran during 628-1898 A.D. have been 260. Also between the years 1900-1979 A.D. about 145 destructive earthquakes have been happened in Iran (Ibid; 422,423) Geographical distribution of earthquakes shows that all region of Iran are exposed to the danger and are insecure, but the most of them are belong to the margin of Iran.

Caspian sea, Shahrood, Tehran, Rasht,

Zanjan, Saravan, Birjand, Torbat, Zabul, Quen, Bam,

Isafehan, Yazd, Kerman, Ardekan,

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Secondly, a portion of national wealth resources (private or public) totally destroy and go out from access. Thirdly, hazards have a negative role and effect on the structure of manpower, employment, production of goods and services as well as the system of offer and demand in the society. Fourthly, a portion of the time and energy of the managers in the national, regional and local levels to be allocated to the affairs of hazards. Therefore it seems that in general hazards destroy the national resources and make stop and delay on the trend of development.

Name of Province

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Fars

2 -

14 -

17 1 -

35 3 2 14 8 17 2 6 17 11 2 3 13 16 3 10

1 13 14 5 10 3 14 11 3 7 14 13 6 4 13 8

Kerman

Kordestan

1 3

1 7

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Mazandaran

Chaharmahal va Bakhtiari Khorasan

1 3 2 2 5 1 1 2 1 4 1 -

2 5 1 2 4 1 2 6 2

2 6 2 9 3 1 7 2 1 4

3 3 1 1 3 3 4 1 4

West Azarbaijan East Azarbaijan Semnan Bousher Hamadan Kermanshahan

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Kohgiluye va Boyer Ahmad Gilan Ardebil Ilam

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Rank

no.

Grand Total (No. of Seismic)

No. of Seismic 1991

No. of Seismic 1992

No. of Seismic 1993

No. of Seismic 1994

Ser

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Table no. 2 Province Distribution of Seismic with more than 4 Richter intensity in Iran (1991-94)

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persian.htm-kahkashn, 1990:1), which has been the most destructive earthquake in the century (Study of damage from Menjil earthquake, 1994: a). 6. Birjand and Qaen, with 7.1 and 6.2 Richter (two times in the year), and 1.560 killed, in 1997. 7. Bueen Zahra, with 6.3 Richter and 263 killed in 2002. Furthermore, every day many earthquakes in different scales are happened throughout Iran. For example during 1991-1996 the Number 599 earthquakes more than 3 Richter were happened (In average 100 per year). During 1991-1994 the earthquake more than 4 Richter have been 209 in Iran (The Report of unexpected events committee, 1991-1994). In Iran especially in the rural areas, the Richter 4 is the threshold of destruction. Geographical distribution of these earthquakes show that 17% of these have been happened in Fars province, therefore it has the first rank in the country especially the township of Firoozabad. After Fars situated Khozestan and then Khorasan Province.

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Lorestan Isfahan Hormozgan Sistan va Baluchestan Tehran Khozestan Yazd Grand Total

1 9 39

2 1 1 6 47

2 2 2 1 5 2 66

3 6 1 4 -

3 5 9 3 2

13 12 9 13 14 2

Source: Report of unexpected events committee 1991-1994

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Regional distribution of those shows that about one-third of them have been happened in the southern part of Iran. Therefore this region that compare with the southern part of Zagrous mountains range and also situated under the press of Arabian Peninsula plate, is vulnerable from this viewpoint. According to this information, the second region in Iran is the northern part of Iran especially in the pivot of Albourze mountains range, which has 15% of the earthquakes. In the east, especially south of Khorasan the Number of earthquakes is low, but the most of them have been destructive.

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2 14 57 209

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Flood water in Iran Situation of Iran in the desert belt of northern hemisphere have caused an instable conditions for it that affect on the production of flood water in Iran, especially in the winter and spring seasons (Bigdelee, 1995:4). Information and statistics show that during the years 1992-1996 the number of 394 flood water were happened (Annually 65 in average), and 70858 houses, 35485 kanats, 8601 bridges, 9704 kilometer roads destroyed and 338 people were killed. Geographical distribution of flood water during 1950-1991 show, which about 280 cities in Iran are vulnerable, and are exposed to the flood water, especially in the east and central part of Iran which have arid and semiarid climate. (Report on flood water, 1992).
Table no. 3 Destruction information from flood water in Iran (1992-1996) Year No. of Flood Water 89 75 33 117 54 368 House Kanat 23716 197 10166 1406 105 35590 Bridge 8047 188 321 45 133 8734 Farm Road (hectare) (Km) 418755 38256 146233 21484 50000 674728 9442 0 137 125 0 9704 Killed 231 34 42 31 69 407 Injured 75 5 3 38 22 143

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Total

Source: Archive of flood water, Constructing Ministry, 1997

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49889 3393 15683 1893 1857 72715

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Table no. 4 Comparison between constructive budget and expenses of hazards in Iran (1991-1995) Subject Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total

Constructive Budget (1) 1949168112 2542496094 7863299600 9104122962

Expenses of Hazards (2) 340203000

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930333000 755781000 994361000 627500000 12593766932 34052853700 3648178000

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Source: Report of unexpected events committee (1993,1994,1997) Constructive projects credits (1992,1993,1994,1997)

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Information of the table no.4, compare the expenses of hazards with the constructive budget of Iran in a five years period (1991-1995). According to this table, during this period, the ratio of hazards expenses to the constructive budget has been 10.7 percent in average. But it should be noted, that these expenses are revealed, not hidden expenses. Secondly in those years the condition of the country have been normal, not such 1990. Thirdly it shows that every year about 11 percent of national constructive budget to be utilized for reconstruction of natural hazard ruins. Therefore it has a negative role on the trend of development and national power. Conclusion and proposal Studies show that Iran due to its geographical location and situation as well as natural structure and bed, has instable conditions and is exposed to the natural hazards, especially earthquake, floodwater and drought. This issue causes that in addition to the destroyed properties and killed people as well as hidden damage and expenses, every year a portion of national constructive budget to be allocated for reconstruction and meet the emergency needs of damaged people. The experience of five years period (1991-1995), which have in reality been the period of pacific and without dangerous hazards, show that annually about 11 percent of the constructive budget of the country have been allocated to the damages which resulted from hazards. Therefore it can be expected that in the normal condition, a portion of national 67

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(Amount in 1000 Rls.)

The expenses of natural hazards in Iran In addition to the reserved properties and capitals which are destroyed in shadow of hazards, a portion of annually constructive budget of the country to be used for reconstruction of ruined places, but in some years it is much high. For example in the year 1990 two big natural hazards were happened in Iran: Menjil earthquake and Sistan flood water. Damages of these events were estimated totally 1399.6 billion rials ($US 20582352940) (Report No.36, 1994: 2684), whereas, the total constructive budget of Iran was 1631.3 billion rials ($US 23989705880) (Budget book of 1990, 1990). Namely damages have been equal to the 85.7 percent of constructive budget in the year 1990.

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Ratio 2/1 17.4% 36.6% 9.6% 10.9% 4.9% 10.7%

References: 1. Ambraseys, N& Melville,C. (1982). A History of Persian Earthquakes. Britain: Cambridge University 2. Bigdelee, M. (1997). Flood water Annually Report- 1996. Tehran: Constructing Ministry 3. Budget law(1992). Constructive Projects Credits 1992. Tehran : Budget and planning organization 4. Budget law(1994). Constructive Projects Credits 1994. Tehran : Budget and planning organization 5. Budget law(1997). Constructive Projects Credits 1997. Tehran : Budget and planning organization 6. Economics Survey office- First and Second Quarterly, (1995). Exchange rate of Foreign Currency, Tehran: Central bank of Iran 7. Ehler, Echart. (1980). Iran: Grundzuge e.geograph.Darmstadt: wissenschaftliche 8. Flood water Department. (1992). Report on flood water (1951-1991). Tehran: Constructing Ministry 9. Flood water Department. (1997). Database and Archive. Tehran: Constructing Ministry. 10. Hafeznia, M .(1997). Natural insecurity and Deterrence of Development. (proceeding). Tehran: Tehran University 11. Kahkashan Journal, (1990). Vol 1. Tehran 12. Madani, H. (1998) Constructive Geology and Techtonics. Tehran: Jihad-e-Daneshgahi. 13. Newspaper of Iran. (2002). No.2163. Tehran: Iran News Agency 14. Newspaper of Keyhan.(1997). No.15955 Tehran: Keyhan Institute 15. Newspaper of Khabar-International. (1997). No.22 June 1997 16. Shaphiqee, S & Madani, H. (1996). General Geology. Tehran: Amirkabir University. 17. Unexpected events committee. (1992). Report of 1991, Tehran: Interior Ministry. 18. Unexpected events committee. (1993). Report of 1992, Tehran: Interior Ministry. 19. Unexpected events committee. (1995). Report of 1993-4, Tehran: Interior Ministry. 20. Unexpected events committee (1997). Archive. Tehran: Interior Ministry. 21. *** (1990). Budget Bill of 1990. Tehran: Budget and Planning organization. 22. *** (1994). Hazards Management. Tehran: Paramilitary studies centre. 23. *** (1994). Report No.30 on Reconstruction of Stricken earthquake regions Tehran: Natural hazards studies centre. 24. *** (1994). Report No.36 on Reconstruction of Stricken earthquake regions. Tehran: Natural hazards studies centre. 25. *** (1994). Study of damages from Menjil earthquake. Tehran: Bonyad-e-Maskan. 26. *** (1996). Suitable pattern for Earthquake Insurance. Tehran: Bonyad-e-Maskan.

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wealth to be destroyed any year, and this has negative effect on the national development. Now there are some suggestions for reduction of natural hazards effects, as under: 1. With due attention to the past experiences about hazards in Iran, it is necessary to be estimated an especial budget for it every year in the national budget. 2. Concentration of all responsibilities, capabilities and efforts about hazards in one organization under presidency. Unfortunately, in spite of existence the National Committee for reduction of hazards effects (Suitable pattern for earthquake insurance, 1996), there are many organizations and institutions (about 15) which are involved to the hazards, and for this their efficiency are low. (Hafeznia, 1997) 3. Improvement of the models for buildings and settlements, and also designing the secure and firm models for different regions of the country. 4. Doing territorial studies and define the dangerous region and determination of their risk degrees, and making some security recommendations for them. 5. Designing an especial instructive plan for people, and performance of it via schools, universities, mass media, press, etc.

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UNELE ASPECTE COLATERALE IMPLICAIILOR DOSARULUI NUCLEAR IRANIAN

Stan PETRESCU 1. Parcursul teocratic al Iranului Reprezentnd una dintre rile bogate n resurse energetice din Orientului Mijlociu, Iranul resimte de mai mult vreme efectele manifestrii intereselor strategice ale marilor puteri n zon, n special ale Statelor Unite ale Americii. Implicaiile SUA att n cadrul vieii politice, ct i n cadrul vieii economice ale acestei ri au generat, n cele din urm, atitudini ostile ale populaiei iraniene care au avut drept rezultat constituirea Republicii Islamice a Iranului. ntr-o bun msur, SUA au fost acelea care au contribuit la crearea unei realiti, deloc de neglijat care, n prezent, constituie un motiv puternic de ngrijorare pentru ntreg Orientul Apropiat Extins, coroborat cu ambiiile nucleare ale Iranului i cu faptul c aceast republic este identificat, alturi de alte ri din zona Orientului Mijlociu, drept stat care sponsorizeaz terorismul. Anul 1953 constituie prima implicare direct a Statelor Unite n Iran, cnd, prin intermediul CIA, guvernul premierului Mossadegh - a crui politic naionalist i de apropiere fa de Moscova lovea n interesele americane - este nlturat. n viziunea american de atunci, Iranul trebuia s constituie unul dintre jandarmii regionali, care s stopeze infiltrarea comunismului n regiunea Orientului Mijlociu. n deceniile urmtoare, Iranul i-a ndeplinit cu contiiciozitate sarcina ncredinat. Astfel, n anul 1971, trupele iraniene vin n ajutorul sultanului din Oman, ameninat de o rebeliune comunist. De altfel, regimul ahului Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Arzamehr se baza exclusiv pe sprijinul Statelor Unite: n schimbul contractelor petroliere, americanii i furnizau arme i i instruiau armata, iar CIA participase activ la nfiinarea nspimnttoarei poliii secrete de la Teheran, Savak. Conflictul militar din octombrie 1973 dintre Israel, pe de o parte i Egipt i Siria, pe de alt parte, precum i reacia ulterioar a Organizaiei rilor Arabe Exportatoare de Petrol, trezesc n suveranul iranian veleiti de desprindere de sub tutela american. nzestrat de francezi i de germani cu centrale atomice, asigurat de Henry Kissinger c Statele Unite i vor livra reactoarele i consolidat de admiterea n Eurodif (consoriul european de mbogire a uraniului), ahul consider c a venit momentul s-i fac intrarea n salonul marilor puteri ale lumii. Ca urmare, se erijeaz n lider al Organizaiei rilor Exportatoare de Petrol i impune creterea preului barilului. Embargoul petrolier i-a afectat puternic pe americani i l-a compromis pe preedintele Nixon. Sigur pe poziia sa, liderul de la Teheran nu se sfiete s declare c, n cinci sau ase ani, Iranul va fi a cincea putere militar a lumii. Firete c SUA se simt lovite n orgoliul lor de superputerea a lumii de ctre un Iran unde ncepea s se vad absena flagrant a libertilor ceteneti, cretrea numrului de crime comise de Savak i, nu n ultimul rnd, corupia casei regale. n ar, capitalul de simpatie pe care monarhia l deinuse iniial se deteriorase masiv: dintr-un restaurator al unitii rii mpotriva puterilor coloniale, un aprtor al drepturilor omului n faa clasei feudale i un campion al progresului, ahul devenise, treptat, un dictator nepopular. Aa-numita revoluie alb ntreprins de regimul autoritar al lui Mohammad Reza Pahlavi - industrializarea forat, reforma agrar, acordarea de drepturi egale femeilor, laicizarea sistemului de nvmnt - facilitase modernizarea

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rii i dezvoltarea economic, dar destabilizase societatea i rsturnase valorile tradiionale ale societii islamice, declannd micri de protest. Nemulumirea crete odat cu abolirea bipartitismului i intensificarea presiunii asupra stngii i liberalilor. Campania declanat, n 1976, de mass-media occidental i iranienii aflai n exil, n numele democraiei i al drepturilor omului, tempereaz oarecum regimul poliienesc din plan intern. SUA ncearc s salveze legturile strategice dintre cele dou state, pe fondul zgomotelor produse de tot mai multe voci critice aprute n presa american. n ianuarie 1978, ahul autorizeaz publicarea unui articol vehement la adresa liderului religios, ayatollahul Ruhollah Khomeiny, aflat n exil n Irak. A doua zi, mollahii organizeaz o manifestaie n oraul sfnt Quom, reprimat de poliie cu brutalitate. Din acest moment, islamitii preiau conducerea micrilor contestatare, iar manifestaiile se succed i cuprind ntreaga ar. Revendicrile se limiteaz la cele ale naionalitilor liberali: libertate, alegeri libere, independen, aplicarea Constituiei din 1906 - 1907 - care conferea clerului drept de veto asupra deciziilor Parlamentului - i eliberarea prizonierilor politici. Regimul monarhic i dominaia american nu sunt nc atacate, n schimb se cere abdicarea ahului, vndut strintii. Puterea este total dezarmat n faa acestor forme protestatare, defilrile religioase fiind, n fapt, o form de manifestare popular tradiional. Suveranul nu reuete s calmeze situaia. Pe data de 3 septembrie 1978 tensiunea se amplific, iar la uriaa manifestaie care traverseaz capitala ncepe s se scandeze numele lui Khomeiny. Revoltele i luptele de strad cresc n amploare, grevele se generalizeaz, ntrerupnd exporturile petroliere. Pe 16 ianuarie 1979, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi prsete ara, iar cteva zile mai trziu, Khomeiny se rentoarce la Teheran unde este primit de o mulime n delir. Pe 2 aprilie 1979 este proclamat republica islamic, opus att Washingtonului, ct i Moscovei. Ayatollahul refuz s abandoneze programul nuclear al Iranului, nu renun la Eurodif, care i ofer acces la uraniu i cere reluarea livrrilor de armament american, promise regimului anterior. Permisul acordat ahului de a intra n Statele Unite pentru a urma un tratament mpotriva cancerului, i ofer liderului religios de la Teheran pretextul pentru a fora nota, avnd n vedere faptul c islamitii solicitau extrdarea fostului monarh pentru a-i intenta un proces public. n 4 noiembrie 1979, o mulime furioas de iraniei radicali, susinut de militanii lui Khomeiny, ocup Ambasada Statelor Unite, lund 69 de ostatici: diplomai, membrii ai personalului i ai serviciului de paz. Situaia este cu att mai grav cu ct n timpul ocuprii sunt capturate documente cu privire la operaiunile i obiectivele prioritare ale americanilor n regiune, precum i dovezi c trei dintre ostatici erau ageni ai CIA. Dup cteva zile, 16 femei i negri sunt eliberai. Ceilali 53 de americani rmn s ndure, timp de 444 de zile, o detenie umilitoare. Lovitura primit de Statele Unite este extrem de puternic: pentru prima dat, cea mai mare putere militar a lumii este sfidat, printr-o aciune terorist de stat, de o ar cu mult mai slab din punct de vedere militar. 2. Miza petrolului n zona Orientului Mijlociu Experiena celui de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial a confirmat c stabilirea unui control militar efectiv asupra surselor de petrol i a rutelor de transport sau a zonelor ce le separ de adversar sau numai ameninarea lor reprezint o latur important a strategiei politico-militare a marilor puteri.

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Un mod de analiz adaptat schimbrilor profunde pe care miza petrolului, ca materie prim indispensabil, le-a adus n politica marilor actori de securitate ai lumii, inclusiv prioritatea acordat considerentelor strategice generale asupra celor economice propriu-zise, ar fi fost, poate, de natur s sesizeze, nc din ultima parte a celui de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial, noua importan a Orientului Mijlociu. n afar de amplasarea sa geografic la intersecia a trei continente, Orientul Mijlociu, acum Lrgit, este important, din punct de vedere strategic, datorit rezervelor de petrol descoperite i exploatate n zon. Controlul asupra lor este un factor important n distribuirea puterii, n sensul c oricine este n msur s i le adauge la celelalte surse de materii prime pe care le deine, i sporete mult puterea i i priveaz proporional pe competitori. Acesta a fost motivul pentru care, nc din prima partea secolului al XX-lea, Marea Britanie, SUA i, pentru o perioad, Frana s-au angajat n Orientul Mijlociu n demersuri i politici ce au fost, pe drept cuvnt, denumite diplomaia petrolului, adic stabilirea de sfere de influen care s le permit accesul exclusiv la rezervele regiunii. Ulterior, aceast diplomaie a petrolului a cptat o dimensiune i un grad de complexitate fr precedent, care a condus la noi distribuiri a crilor de joc n regiune. La 17 octombrie 1973, n Kuweit, statele arabe membre ale Organizaiei rilor Exportatoare de Petrol (OPEC) decid s reduc producia de petrol progresiv, cu 5% pe lun, pn n momentul n care va surveni retragerea israelian din teritoriile arabe ocupate. Cu aceeai ocazie, procedeaz i la mrirea preului barilului. Transformnd petrolul ntr-o arm politic, rile arabe respective pun embargo asupra tuturor livrrilor destinate statelor aliate cu Israelul, crend o adevrat situaie catastrofal pentru rile occidentale, determinnd, ceea ce avea s fie numit ulterior, primul oc petrolier n lume. Acest fenomen cu impact deosebit, inndu-se cont i de contextul internaional n care a survenit, a fost determinat de rile puternic industrializate care au preferat s foloseasc cu prioritate aceast resurs de energie abundent, ieftin, uor de transportat care era petrolul. Astfel, n perioada 1950 - 1973 rile occidentale au permis creterea consumului de petrol de la 530 la 2.773 milioane de tone, n condiiile n care producia intern a Europei Occidentale, principala pia de consum, nu se ridica n anul 1973 dect la 19 milioane de tone anual, pentru un consum de 738 milioane de tone anual. n momentul n care consumatorii occidentali acceptau aceast uria risip, rile arabe decid s transforme petrolul ntr-o arm de lupt. Este de remarcat, de asemenea, faptul c, pn n acel moment, n timp ce celelalte produse industriale i majoraser cu regularitate costul, singur petrolul a fcut excepie. ns, din luna octombrie 1973 pn n luna decembrie 1974 petrolul i mrete preul de mai multe ori. Impactul psihologic nsemnat pe care aceste evoluii l-au avut asupra opiniei publice va fi acela care va permite guvernelor s adopte o politic de economisire sever a energiei, fapt ce va determina o reducere spectaculoas a consumului de produse petroliere. n paralel, ocul petrolier va avea i alte consecine pe termen mediu. Faptul c preul petrolului brut crete necontenit genereaz o serie ntreag de disensiuni ntre rile consumatoare, distruge solidaritatea, ncercnd s acioneze pe cont propriu cu scopul de a ajunge la acorduri bilaterale, privilegiate cu rile membre OPEC. Ca urmare a msurilor impuse de OPEC n domeniul resurselor petroliere, n data de 6 noiembrie 1973 cei nou minitri de externe ai rilor din Piaa Comun se altur Rezoluiei 242 a ONU prin care se cere Israelului evacuarea teritoriilor ocupate. Organizaia Unitii Africane i marea majoritate a rilor africane procedeaz n acelai mod. Pe 22 noiembrie Japonia, urmat de Filipine, adopt aceeai poziie, declarndu-se n favoarea cauzei rilor arabe.

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Din acest moment, fiecare nou conferin a OPEC va nsemna o mrire a preului barilului, n timp ce rile productoare care nu adoptaser nc aceast politic, naionalizeaz n ntregime producia de petrol. Rzboiul israeliano-arab de Yom Kippur ia sfrit n data de 11 noiembrie 1973, la sfritul primului trimestru din anul 1974 embargoul arab fiind ridicat. Israelul a ctigat pe plan militar, dar rile arabe au nregistrat o victorie politic mult mai nsemnat. Al doilea oc petrolier se produce n perioada decembrie 1978 - mai 1980, interval de timp n care preul petrolului scap de sub control. Criza a fost acutizat de decizia Iranului de a vinde o mare parte din petrolul su brut pe piaa liber, n consecin, celelalte ri procednd de aceeai manier. n aceste condiii, att profiturile acestor productori, ct i cele ale intermediarilor lor sunt spectaculoase n raport cu cele deja considerabile rezultate pe piaa oficial. Vnzrile la liber ajung s reprezinte 40% din totalul exporturilor, preul barilului urmnd un curs ascendent galopant. Situaia se complic i mai mult ca urmare a atacrii Iranului de ctre Irak n anul 1980. Aadar, arma petrolului a fost testat cu succes, dac avem n vedere constatrile efectelor deosebite pe care le poate produce, ea fiind susceptibil de a fi utilizat n continuare ca un mijloc sigur de sancionare a statelor considerate a fi ostile regimurilor naionale. Iranul a avertizat c n cazul n care Consiliului de Securitate al ONU va dispune aplicarea de sanciuni economice mpotriva sa, republica islamic va ntreprinde msuri n vederea scumpirii preului petrolului sau chiar sistarea livrrii acestei resurse ctre statele membre ONU. Iranul este al patrulea exportator de petrol din lume i ocup locul secund din punct de vedere al importanei n cadrul Organizaiei rilor Exportatoare de Petrol. Situaia este extrem de delicat avnd n vedere faptul c statele occidentale i SUA sunt dependente de petrol, din care o parte important provine din zona amintit. Perspectiva epuizrii acestei resurse energetice importante, precum i dependena de petrolul arab motiveaz tot mai mult comunitatea internaional s descopere ct mai rapid resurse alternative de energie. n acest sens, preedintele american George W. Bush a declarat n cadrul unui discurs cu referire la starea naiunii, c Statele Unite vor reui s scape de dependena petrolier fa de rile instabile din Orientul Mijlociu ntr-un timp record. De asemenea, SUA i vor lua un angajament internaional ofensiv i, pn n 2025, vor reduce cu peste 75% importurile de petrol provenite din Orientul Mijlociu. Preedintele american a mai apreciat c lupta mpotriva dependenei poate fi ctigat cu ajutorul noilor tehnologii alternative, iar petrolul va fi nlocuit cu alte substane energetice. Cele dou crize ale petrolului au marcat evoluiile ulterioare din domeniul resurselor energetice, ridicnd noi i noi semne de ntrebare la care comunitatea internaional urmeaz s rspund mai devreme sau mai trziu. Este vorba n special de miza strategic a petrolului i de existena unei agende secrete a petrolului n fundamentarea anumitor decizii politice i/sau militare, precum i problema dependenei statelor de resursele petroliere, n general i de resursele petroliere ale statelor arabe din Orientul Mijlociu, n particular. Contientiznd de timpuriu interdependena dintre accesul / aprovizionarea cu resurse de acest tip i puterea politic instaurate n zonele respective, statele importatoare de petrol au nceput s manifeste interes pentru evoluiile interne din aceste state, n special dac aceste evoluii pot avea implicaii internaionale. Pe aceast schem se nscrie i problema att de actual a Iranului i a programului su nuclear. 3. Iranul dup rzboiul rece Dup 1990 - 1991, Iranul i-a dezvoltat legturile cu populaiile musulmane din fostul spaiu sovietic, contrapunnd civilizaiei slave n curs de occidentalizare i un 72

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model musulman modern, fundamentalismul islamic iit. Interesul economic crescut al Iranului s-a concentrat, cu prioritate, asupra cmpurilor petrolifere de la Marea Caspic, spaiu n care se manifest o serioas stare de ostilitate ntre Iran, Azerbaidjan, F. Rus, Kazahstan i Turkmenistan. Rivalitatea cu Azerbaidjanul este stimulat i de prezena compact a importantei minoriti azere n nord-vestul Iranului, cu certe veleiti autonomiste. n pofida contradiciilor tradiionale ruso-iraniene, n ultimii ani se remarc o apropiere rapid ntre cele dou state, pe fundalul permanentizrii prezenei politico militare i economice occidentale (preponderent nord-americane) n Asia Central i n Orientul Apropiat i Mijlociu. n acest context, Iranul i-a amplificat raporturile cu Armenia i se intenioneaz construirea n comun a unei conducte petroliere cu punctul terminal n Marea Neagr (tranzitnd Georgia). Pe fundalul legturilor solide dintre Turcia i Azerbaidjan, anumii diplomai apreciaz c o ax Teheran - Erevan Moscova ar echilibra raporturile de putere n Caucaz. Realizarea acestui echilibru ar depinde de poziia favorabil sau nefavorabil a Georgiei, ara care nregistreaz o apropiere tot mai vizibil fa de Occident, ceea ce pune la ncercare o msurare de fore ntre interesele regionale ale Moscovei i SUA. Astzi, Iranul poate fi considerat un fel de protector istoric al Asiei Centrale prin afinitile etnice, i religioase cu popoarele din regiune i prin tradiiile istorice de hegemon al fostului Imperiu Persan. n acelai timp, Iranul deine o poziie cheie pe rutele exporturilor de petrol i gaze naturale din Turkmenistan i Uzbekistan, prin proiectele de oleoducte i gazoducte spre Golf. Rival al fundamentalitilor talibani sunnii din Kabul, Teheranul iit a ncurajat rezistena afgan, dup 1996, i a sprijinit din umbr campania Alianei Internaionale Antiteroriste din 2001 - 2002. Instalarea de baze militare SUA i NATO n Asia Central i aezarea Iranului pe Axa Rului, au determinat apropierea iranienilor fa de rui, precum i fa de UE. De asemenea, a fost lsat mai la urm i chiar estompat, dezacordul iraniano - chinez pe temele exercitrii influenei majore a celui dinti n Asia Central, cu toate c China suspecteaz nc Teheranul de solidarizare cu gruprile fundamentaliste din vestul i nord-vestul Chinei, unde se gsesc populaii care au mbriat religia islamic. Teama Chinei fa de o micare de populaii islamice pe teritoriul ei o determin s duc o politic mai moderat fa de Iran. Pe de alt parte, SUA au acuzat Iranul de amestec n problemele interne ale Afganistanului, de tolerare a activitilor Al-Qaeda i de apropiere de politica antiamerican a Irakului. Dup cderea regimului dictatorial de la Bagdad, americanii i-au intensificat presiunea asupra Iranului, pentru reformarea puterii politice i chiar n vederea slbirii sistemului fundamentalist, ameninat i de minoritile (kurd, arab, turkmen etc.). Autoritile de la Teheran evideniaz faptul c americanii urmresc, n prezent, ncercuirea i dezmembrarea Iranului, prin fie prin evoluii democratice fie printr-un fenomen de implozie. Cu toate acestea, Iranul se preocup de ntrirea controlului asupra unor zone din proximitatea Mrii Caspice, dezvoltarea relaiilor cu statele din Asia Central, intensificarea cooperrii n domeniul petrolier cu India, Pakistanul, China sau Japonia. F. Rus i China consider Iranul drept un partener credibil n relaiile lor comerciale, nentorcnd spatele dorinei Iranului de a intra n Organizaia de la Shanghai. Totodat cele dou mari puteri ar dori ca Iranul s devin un vrf de lance n sistemul internaional antihegemonist din Orientul Apropiat, cel Mijlociu i Asia Central, cea a ce strnete grave nemulumiri din partea SUA. 4. Raiunile geopolitice i geostrategice ale rzboaielor SUA Iranul ca i Irakul, rmne o variabil n ecuaia securitii zonale. 73

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Potrivit unor analiti rui, atacul mpotriva regimului de la Teheran este iminent. Conflictul cu Iranul ar fi pregatit de americani de mai mult vreme i a devenit inevitabil dup colapsul Irakului. Problema iranian a reprezentat centrul discuiilor n cadrul Forumului Economic Mondial, reunit n localitatea elveian Davos, la 24 ianuarie 2007. Zvonurile despre iminena unui atac militar american mpotriva Iranului i ngrijoreaz pe aliaii din regiunea Orientului Mijlociu ai Statelor Unite ale Americii. Liga Arab, precum i oameni de afaceri importani din ri ca Emiratele Arabe Unite ori Bahrein, au avertizat la Davos asupra potenialelor consecine imposibil de gestionat ale unui nou rzboi n zona Golfului. Un rzboi care va avea, cum va fi de ateptat, o component nuclear. Statele Unite ale Americii vor ntrebuina muniie nuclear n scop de descurajare, deoarce vor s evite umilina din Irak. Pe de alt parte, intervenia militar american este determinat de faptul c influena Iranului n zon a crescut ngrijortor, Iranul devenind, printre altele, principalul ctigtor al implicrii americane din Irak. Rzboaiele duse n scop geostrategic anticipeaz i ncearc s previn anumite evoluii care ar putea pune, la un moment dat, n dificultate, interesele de securitate a superputerii solitare ntr-o anumit regiune - cheie a lumii. Primul rzboi din Golf (1990) a fost provocat de invazia irakian n Kuweit. Represaliile prompte ale marii Coaliii conduse de americani nu au fost, ns, motivate de grija pentru naiunea kuweitian, ct mai degrab de un calcul geopolitic i geostrategic. Era ameninat echilibrul de fore din Orientul Mijlociu, ceea ce ar fi condus la punerea n primejdie a controlului american n regiune. Iranul, ca i Irakul ar trebui s urmeze acelai destin. Nu ntmpltor, ci din raiuni geostrategice similare cu ale Irakului, SUA au nceput s planifice, nc din 2004, un atac mpotriva Iranului. O intervenie de proporii mpotriva statului islamic iranian a devenit o necesitate chiar din clipa n care regimul lui Saddam Hussein a fost mturat de la conducerea Irakului, cndva inamic de temut al iranienilor. Irakienii i iranienii se aflau ntr-o stare de confruntare timp de aproape trei decenii. Dup un rzboi care a durat opt ani i a fcut un milion de mori, echilibrul rmsese neschimbat. A supravieuit embargourilor i revoltelor iite. Chiar i dezarmat i n condiii de monitorizare din partea ONU, regimul de la Bagdad rmsese destul de puternic pentru a-i ine la respect pe fundamentalitii iranieni. Situaia a luat o turnur dramatic atunci cnd americanii au decis s aduc democraia de tip occidental n Irak. Aceast micare a condus, n mod neateptat la resurgena micrii iiilor - comunitate care formeaz 60 la sut din populaie. Aceast ntmplare, neprevzut de strategii americani, a condus la alegerea ctigtorului invaziei americane din Irak. Nimeni altul dect Iranul. Controlnd n mare parte sudul iit (extrem de bogat n resurse), iranienii influeneaz, n cea mai mare parte, politica din Irak. Totodat, pe fondul divizrii intereselor de securitate ale marilor actori de securitate ai lumii, Iranul amenin s devin cea mai mare putere din Orientul Mijlociu. De data aceasta, nimeni din regiune nu i se mai poate opune. Cu alte cuvinte, Statele Unite nu mai pot spera s scoat castanele din foc cu mna altora, aa cum a procedat n 1980, imediat dup revoluia islamic de la Teheran, ci i vor ncerca rezistena la focul castanelor nucleare cu propriile lor mini. Israelul ar putea, cel mult, s obin rolul lui Grivei i s dea semnalul de atac pentru cinii de vntoare americani, declannd o lovitur preventiv pe contul i riscurile proprii. Fr ndoial, c americanii vor interveni imediat. ntrebarea care se pune: va putea fi controlat desfurarea ulterioar a evenimentelor n condiiile ntrebuinrii loviturilor nucleare n 74

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zon? Eu prognozez c nu, bazndu-m pe zicerea lui Clausevitz care sun cam aa: tim cnd ncepe un rzboi dar nu tim cnd se termin. 5. O cutie a Pandorei cu arme nucleare Exist posibilitatea ca Iranul s fie atacat nuclear i comunitatea internaional s nu intervin. Ar fi una din cele mai catastrofice laiti din istoria lumii. Generalul Leonid Ivaov vicepreedinte al Academiei de Studii Geopolitice a Rusiei, fost secretar al Consiliului de Minitri al Comunitii Statelor Independente, i apoi ef al Statului Major General al Federaiei Ruse susine c Israelul a confirmat oficial posibilitatea unui atac nuclear contra Iranului, n octombrie 2006, i l-a prezentat atunci ca fiind singura soluie pentru a bloca accesul Teheranului la arma nuclear. O perspectiv care, pe bun dreptate, ngrozete. Un Iran nuclear ar schimba definitiv echilibrul de fore din spaiul Orientului Mijlociu, asigurandu-i supremaia regional, ceea ce pentru americani ar fi inacceptabil. i totui, nelepii strategi ai SUA trebuie s priceap c n Asia Central exist, n prezent, cinci ri deintoare de arme nucleare: Federaia Rus, Corea de Nord, China, India i Pakistanul. Cine poate infirma c Iranul nu ar fi cea de asea ar din zon, deintoare de arm nuclear. Noi credem c ameninarea iranian cu arma nuclear la adresa Israelului nu este fcut ntmpltor. Chiar i ipotetic vorbind, consecinele sunt nspimnttoare. Avndu-se n vedere o asemenea densitate de arme nucleare i inndu-se cont de faptul c o mare parte a lumii islamice este concentrat n aceast zon, eu nu m-a juca cu nucleara cutie a Pandorei. i pot permite Statele Unite s deschid nou front, dup aproape patru ani dezastruoi n Irak? Generalul Ivaov exclude ipoteza unei invazii terestre. n opinia sa, americanii vor prefera atacurile aeriene masive cu componenta nuclear. Numai aa se justific prezena a dou port-avioane lang Coasta Iranului. Iranul va fi atacat nuclear, n mod sigur, crede Ivaov. Tocmai pentru a se evita trimiterea trupelor americane la sol, i pierderile umane foarte mari, cu ecou imens n comunitatea SUA, spune acelai Ivaov. Potrivit unor analiti de specialitate, posibilitile de auto-aparare ale Iranului sunt considerabile. Iranul, spre deosebire de Irak, poate rspunde cu rachetele Shahab-3 pe o raz de 3000 de km. Iranul mai are i 29 de sisteme ruseti ultramoderne TOR, care vor constitui un mare obstacol n calea raidurilor aviaiei americane. Iranul nu deine n mod oficial arme nucleare. n toamna anului 2003 a recunoscut c, timp de dou decenii, a ascuns inspectorilor ONU faptul c dezvolt un program de mbogire a uraniului. Lansat spre mijlocul anilor '70, programul nuclear iranian a fost ntrerupt de revoluia islamic din anul 1979. n 1984, Teheranul a ncercat s fabrice arme nucleare cu ajutorul URSS i al Chinei. Fotografiile realizate prin satelit, fcute publice n 2002, arat antiere de construcie care, conform experilor, au ca destinaie producerea de uraniu mbogit i alte componente militare. Iranul afirm, ns, c programul su este unul exclusiv civil. De asemenea, programul nuclear iranian a beneficiat i de sprijinul Rusiei i al Pakistanului. Drept puncte n care se desfoar activiti circumscrise programului nuclear, pe teritoriul Iranului exist urmtoarele locaii: la Bonab i Ramsar - reactoare de cercetare nuclear n scopuri civile, inspectate pentru prima oar de ctre Agenia Internaional pentru Energie Atomic n august 1997. n cazul acestor dou obiective nu au fost gsite

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6. Politica conducerii de la Teheran i impasul discuiilor n dosarul nuclear Posibilitatea producerii n viitor a bombei nucleare, asociat cu regimul teocratic instaurat la Teheran (n condiiile n care sentimentele antiamericane sunt mai puternice ca niciodat), cu faptul c Iranul a fost denumit cel mai important stat ce sponsorizeaz terorismul i alturi de extremismul islamic manifestat n zon, constituie o combinaie exploziv, motiv pentru care evoluia situaiei interne suscit un interes tot mai sporit. n vara anului 2005, alegerile prezideniale desfurate n Iran au reinut atenia ntregii comunitii internaionale, persoana ce urma a fi aleas, moderatul Rafsanjani sau ultra-conservatorul Mahmud Ahmadinejad urmnd s influeneze modalitatea de abordare a dosarului nuclear iranian. Imediat dup anunarea victoriei n alegeri, candidatul ultraconservator s-a grbit s comunice arenei politice internaionale faptul c ara sa va ncerca s colaboreze i s negocieze cu Uniunea European, dar nu are nevoie de relaii cu SUA. Mahmud Ahmadinejad, a inut s sublinieze c alegerea sa ca preedinte va semnifica o nou Revoluie islamic, al crei val va atinge n curnd ntreaga lume. Odat, ns, cu alegerea sa n funcia suprem, Mahmud Ahmadinejad se confrunt cu un scandal de proporii, care l nfieaz drept un terorist cu tate vechi. Numele su este legat de celebra operaiune de luare de ostatici, ntreprins n Ambasada american de la Teheran, n 1979. Printre entuziatii paznici ai captivilor se numra i un tnr student, n vrsta de 23 de ani. Cinci dintre fotii ostatici l-au recunoscut pe fostul student-gardian n persoana preedintelui ales de iranieni, acetia identificndu-l din imaginile electorale difuzate la tiri i din fotografiile publicate n pres. Referitor la acest scandal, s-a afirmat faptul c actualul preedinte aparinea atunci grupului care a preluat controlul ambasadei americane, ns nu s-a implicat nici n capturarea i nici n reinerea ostaticilor americani. Totui, contrar acestor declaraii, fotii ostatici care l-au recunoscut susin c acesta a luat parte la evenimente, din comportamentul su detandu-se chiar faptul c ar ocupa un loc de frunte n ierarhia grupului respectiv. Noul preedinte iranian se exprim i n problema spinoas a instaurrii democraiei n statele din Orientul Mijlociu, proiect promovat de ctre preedintele american George W. Bush, afirmnd faptul c "revoluia islamic nu a fost fcut pentru a aduce democraia". n continuare, declaraiile incriminatoare att la adresa Israelului ct i la adresa puterilor occidentale i a SUA se vor amplifica pe parcurs, strnind n repetate rnduri 76

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dovezi ale derulrii de activiti nucleare militare clandestine sau nedeclarate; Universitatea din Teheran - dotat de ctre SUA, n cadrul ei funcionnd un reactor n scopuri de cercetare pe baz de combustibil furnizat de Argentina, inspectat de ctre Agenia Internaional pentru Energie Atomic; Universitatea Tehnologic Sharif din Teheran - deine o centrifug experimental de mbogire a uraniului, este posibil s fie derulate i activiti de cercetare a separrii plutoniului; Centrul de cercetare nuclear de la Isfahan - aici funcioneaz reactoare de cercetare furnizate de ctre China (o posibil locaie de cercetare a producerii armelor nucleare); n provincia Yazd sunt localizate diverse depozite de uraniu; n Bushehr se afl reactoarele de generare a energiei parial construite Bushehr 1 i Bushehr 2 (avariat n timpul rzboiului din Iran i Irak, reconstruirea reactorul Bushehr 1 se realizeaz cu asisten din partea Rusiei).

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reacii negative la adresa persoanei preedintelui i a opticii impuse de acesta politicii Iranului, cu reverberaii asupra problemei dosarului nuclear iranian. n octombrie 2005, vicepremierul israelian, Shimon Peres, a cerut excluderea Iranului din Organizaia Naiunilor Unite, la cteva ore dup ce preedintele ultraconservator iranian, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a lansat un apel deschis pentru distrugerea statului evreu. n faa a 4.000 de studeni radicali mbrcai n negru i care scandau Moarte Israelului, preedintele Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a declarat c aa cum a spus imamul Khomeiny, Israelul trebuie ters de pe hart. A fost prima dat n ultimii ani cnd un lider iranian cu o funcie att de important s-a exprimat n termeni att de duri mpotriva statului evreu. Aceste declaraii au fost fcute cu prilejul zilei internaionale a luptei contra Israelului i pentru eliberarea Palestinei. Data acestei zile a fost fixat nc din anul 1979, de ctre ayatollahul Khomeiny, n ultima vineri a srbtorii Ramadanului. n ianuarie 2006, liderul ultraconservator iranian a lansat un nou atac la adresa Israelului, acuznd europenii c au creat mitul masacrrii evreilor. ntr-un discurs transmis n direct de televiziunea naional, Mahmud Ahmadinejad a propus crearea unui stat israelian n Europa, SUA ori Canada, susinnd c occidentalii au inventat un mit numit Holocaust, pe care l-au plasat deasupra lui Dumnezeu, a religiilor i a profeilor. Dac, n ara sa, cineva l pune n cauz pe Dumnezeu, nu i se reproeaz nimic, ns, dac neag mitul masacrrii evreilor, purttorii de cuvnt sioniti i guvernele aflate n solda sionismului ncep imediat s vocifereze. Ahmadinejad a sugerat occidentalilor c statul evreu ar trebui transferat din Palestina pe teritoriul Europei, Statelor Unite sau Canadei sau chiar n Alaska. Dac spunei c ntr-adevr ai masacrat ase milioane de evrei () de ce trebuie ca opresata naiune palestinian s plteasc un pre att de mare? de ce ai venit n inima Palestinei i a lumii islamice? de ce ai creat un regim sionist artificial?, s-a ntrebat, retoric, Ahmadinejad. Noile declaraii ale radicalului lider de la Teheran vin pe un fundal deja cunoscut opiniei internaionale. Recent, Ahmadinejad propusese Germaniei i Austriei s ofere Israelului pmnt din propriile teritorii, pentru ca acesta s se transfere n Europa, dac cele dou ri se simt vinovate de masacrarea a milioane de evrei n timpul celui de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial. n aceeai perioad, preedintele Iranului, a lansat o nou diatrib mpotriva Israelului, afirmnd c acest stat este prin natura sa antiislamic i c este rezultatul curirii etnice din Europa. De fapt, conform afirmaiilor sale, europenii au practicat curirea etnic a evreilor, expulzndu-i din toate rile europene. Astfel, ei au realizat dou lucruri concomitent: au ntemeiat un stat evreu n mijlocul naiunilor islamice i au rezolvat problema evreilor din toat Europa. Preedintele iranian a declarat c regimul sionist este o parte a Europei, de care s-a detaat i este antiislamic prin natura sa. Ahmadinejad s-a mai ntrebat de ce palestinienii, care nu au jucat nici un rol n Holocaust, au fost obligai s accepte statul evreiesc. Declaraiile sale, fcute n cadrul conferinei Lumea fr sionism, au confirmat schimbarea de direcie a diplomaiei iraniene care, n 2002, lua n calcul posibilitatea coabitrii ntre statul israelian i un stat palestinian. eful statului iranian a denunat Israelul ca pe creaia forelor de opresiune mondiale, termen aproape oficial cu care sunt desemnate SUA i Occidentul, i a vorbit despre un rzboi istoric de mai multe secole ntre opresor i lumea islamic. Apelul lui Ahmadinejad contravine Cartei Naiunilor Unite i echivaleaz cu o crim mpotriva umanitii, a afirmat vicepremierul israelian, ntr-o scrisoare deschis adresat primului-ministru Ariel Sharon. Premierul israelian a apreciat ca ara sa trebuie s cear clar i hotrt secretarului general al ONU i Consiliului de Securitate expulzarea Iranului din ONU, apelul fiind apreciat cu

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Bibliografie 1. ACHAR, G., Noul Rzboi Rece. Lumea dup Kosovo,Corint, Bucureti, 2002. 2. ART, R. J., JERVIS, R., International Politics, Pearson, Longman, 2005. 3. BRZEZINSKI, Z., Marea tabl de ah, Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 1999. 4. BUJASKI, J., Pacea Rece. Noul imperialism al Rusiei, Casa Radio, Bucureti, 2005. 5. CALVOCORESSI, Peter - Politica mondial dup 1945, ALLFA, Bucureti, 2000; 6. CARROL, Anne; GARRIGUES, Jean; IVERNEL, Martin - Dicionar de istorie a secolului XX, All Educational, Bucureti, 2000; 7. CHIFU, I., Spaiul post - sovietic n cutarea identitii, Politeia, SNSPA, 2005. 8. CLAVAL, P., Geopolitic i geostrategie, Corint, Bucureti, 2001. 9. CONSIDINE, J. I., KERR, W. A., The Russian Oil Economy, Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2002. 10. DE LAUNAY, Jacques; CHARLIER, JEAN-Michel - Istoria secret a petrolului (1859-1984), Editura Politic, Bucureti, 1989; 11. DOBRESCU, Paul - Geopolitica, Comunicare.ro, Bucureti, 2003; 12. DUFOUR, Jean-Louis - Crizele internaionale. De la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999), CORINT, Bucureti, 2002; 13. Enciclopaedia Britannica. 14. FUKUYAMA, F., Construcia statelor. Ordinea mondial n secolul XXI, Antet, Bucureti, 2004. 15. Gl. lt. dr. BDLAN, E., Fore i tendine n mediul European de securitate, Sibiu, 2003. 16. HELD, D., MC GREW, A.,GOLDBLATT, D., PERRATON, J., Transformri globale, Polirom, 2004. 17. IONESCU, Crciun - Zile fierbini n Orient, Editura Politic, Bucureti, 1988; 18. IONESCU, M. E., Dup hegemonie, Scripta, Bucureti, 1993. 19. JOHNSON, Paul - O istorie a lumii moderne (1920-2000), Humanitas, Bucureti, 2003; 20. LAnne stratgique 2005, IRIS, Armand Colin, Paris, 2005. 21. MASSOULI, Franois - Conflictele din Orientul Mijlociu, BIC ALL, Bucureti, 2003; 22. POLLAK, K. M., Arabs at War, Lincoln University of Nebraska Press, 2002. 23. PREDA, Eugen - Miza petrolului n vltoarea rzboiului, Editura Militar, Bucureti, 1983; 24. SPENCER, William - The Middle East, The Dushkin Publishing Group Inc., Connecticut, Third Edition, 1990; 25. WALLERSTEIN, I., CLESSE, A., The world we are entering, 2000 - 2050, Dutch University Press, 2002. 26. Ziarul Ziua din 28 ianuarie 2006 i Nr. 3852 din 10 februarie 2007 27. www.washingtoninstitute.org; 28. www.foreignaffairs.org; 29. www.cfr.org; 30. www.lumeam.ro; 31. www.bbc.co.uk; 32. www.altermedia.info.

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att mai grav cu ct Iranul ncearc s dezvolte un program nuclear i s achiziioneze rachete cu raz lung de aciune. Afirmaiile liderului iranian, care nu au luat totui prin surprindere conducerea israelian, au atras reacii ferme din partea rilor occidentale, ntr-un moment n care relaiile dintre Iran i Occident erau oricum tensionate. Casa Alb a apreciat c apelul lui Ahmadinejad subliniaz i reconfirm ngrijorarea Washingtonului n privina ambiiilor nucleare ale regimului iranian. ngrijorarea SUA poate fi considerat marea ngrijorare a lumii de astzi?

THE NEW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR IRAN

Tiberiu TRONCOT
Abstract: Situated at the crossroads of the Middle East and Central Asia, Iran is strategic terrain. Oil, Islam, terrorism and nuclear proliferation only underscore Iran's importance in the international calculus. Unfortunately, the bilateral relationship has not moved beyond the shadows cast by the 1979 revolution. Vital security and economic interests are tied to the regions vast oil reserves. The Middle East is fibrillating with simultaneous crises. Crisis in Iran could invite greater regional fragility. Because United States authored a new global order, nations read Americans actions to determine the parameters of that system. The world sympathized with U.S. in Afghanistan but opposed the Iraqi invasion. Most nations think America too heavily inclines toward military power. They fear U.S. Iran policy has been shaped to go the route of forced regime change. Use of force would generate a global vehemence carrying heavy political costs.

Since the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the failed rescue attempt of the U.S. Embassy hostages in 1980, U.S. foreign policy on Iran has focused on containment as a way of preventing that country from threatening vital U.S. national interests in the Persian Gulf region. Concerned about Irans suspected nuclear weapons program, continuing support for pro-Palestinian terrorist groups, and opposition to the Middle East peace process, the Bush Administration continued a policy that became known as Dual Containment.1 The objectives of the policy were to prevent Iran and Iraq from threatening U.S. interests in the region, isolate and weaken the two rogue states politically and economically, and maintain the balance of power in the region by playing each country off against the other. U.S. national interests at risk in the region include: a nuclear free Middle East, an end to transnational terrorism, regional security, open markets, and secure energy supplies. Although U.S. economic sanctions had a negative effect on Irans economy, it is clear that the overall strategy of Dual Containment did not achieve its broader political objectives of isolating and weakening Iran to the point that it no longer threatened vital U.S. interests. In Moving Past Dual Containment, Saltiel and Purcell argue In addition to being inconsistent and ineffective, Dual Containment has, since its inception, proven injurious to other U.S. national interests.2 Since becoming official U.S. policy, Dual Containment has accomplished little more than maintain the status quo. Iran continues to oppose U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region and has neither ended its support for international terrorism nor given up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Persian Gulf region is no more stable or secure than before a decade of Dual Containment. It is time for a thoughtful reconsideration of U.S. strategy toward Iran. The objectives of the strategy are to normalize relations with Iran and provide incentives to halt its nuclear weapons program and end its support for pro-Palestinian 3 terrorist groups.

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Martin Indyk, Approach to the Middle East, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, no. 4, 1993, p. 159. David H. Saltiel, Jason S. Purcell, Moving Past Dual Containment - Iran, Iraq, and the Future of U.S. Policy in the Gulf, The Atlantic Council Bulletin, Vol. XIII, no. 1, 2002. 3 Kenneth Katzman, Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, June 2005, Summary.
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The Iranian Nuclear Program The United States has two overriding national security interests with respect to Iran. The first of these relates to Irans nuclear program. Iranian denials notwithstanding, the U.S. believes that Iran has developed an extensive nuclear infrastructure and is attempting to develop the capability to build nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian nuclear energy program. For years, U.S. intelligence agencies have expressed concerns that the huge nuclear complex in Bushehr, located on the outskirts of Tehran, is evidence that Iran is attempting to develop a nuclear weapons program.1 The IAEA recently inspected this facility under the auspices of the NPT protocols, and discovered disturbing signs that the facility is more than the Iranians claim it to be. According to an analysis of the IAEA Iran may be poised to clear one of the biggest hurdles in a nuclear weapons program - production of fissile material (enriched uranium in this case). In June 2004, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), by its Director General El Baradei, issued a report stating that Iran did not meet all of its obligations under its nuclear safeguards agreement pursuant to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but stopped short of reporting non-compliance.2 Recent press reports also allege the discovery of an extensive nuclear facility in Natanz, approximately 200 kilometers south of Tehran.3. The facility reportedly contains centrifuges needed for converting nuclear fuel into weapons-grade enriched uranium. With additional centrifuges under construction, Iran may be well on the way to developing the capability to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapons program. In February 2005, U.S. officials also discovered another facility at Arak, in central Iran, that is designed for producing heavy water, a key ingredient used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.4 Together, these discoveries indicate that Irans nuclear program may be much further along than previous estimates and that Iran may be within three to five years of developing a nuclear weapon. While these recent developments are troubling to U.S. policy makers, it is not a foregone conclusion that Iran has already made the decision to build nuclear bombs. According to Ray Takeyh, of the National Defense University, there appears to be an ongoing debate in Iran between hardliners and reformers over the wisdom of attempting to join the nuclear club. Hardliners believe that Israels possession of nuclear weapons and the massive U.S. military presence in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan are more than sufficient justification for Iran to want to develop its own nuclear deterrent. Reformers, however, believe that developing nuclear weapons will not improve Irans security, but rather will increase the countrys vulnerability by further antagonizing the U.S. and isolating Iran from its neighbors and major trading partners. Takeyh argues: What the Islamic Republic decides to do in this respect will depend to a great extent on the nature of its evolving relationship with the United States and the security architecture of the Persian Gulf. An imaginative U.S. policy can still influence the outcome of Iran's deliberations, stacking the scales in favor of those within Iran who seek to remain
Energy Information Administration, Iran: Country Analysis Brief, Washington, D.C., April 2003. http://www.eia. doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html 2 Iran - Nuclear Weapons, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/background/iran_nuclear.php. 3 Sharon Squassoni, Irans Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington, D.C., 2005. 4 David Ensor, U.S. has Photos of Secret Iran Nuclear Sites, CNN, 13 December 2004, http://www.cnn. com/2002 /WORLD/meast/12/12/iran.nuclear.
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within the confines of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory.1 Irans Support for Terrorism The second key U.S. national security interest is Irans continuing support for pro-Palestinian terrorist groups, specifically Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iranian military and financial support for these groups is well documented and has earned Iran a top spot on the State Departments annual list of state sponsors of terrorism. According to the most recent State Department global terrorism report, Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism during 2002 - 2004. It has provided funding, training, and weapons to Central Asian and anti-Israeli terrorist groups. In addition, some members of these groups, as well as Al-Qaida, have found 2 safe haven in Iran. Irans support for groups that conduct terrorist attacks against Israel has been a constant source of tension with the U.S. and has become the lens that colors how the U.S. sees all other issues related to Iran. It is clear that the U.S. and Iran view things very differently when it comes to Israel and Palestine. The U.S. sees Irans support for these groups as state sponsorship of terrorism. Iran, on the other hand, regards these groups as legitimate national resistance movements fighting illegal Israeli occupation of their lands. The divergence of views on this issue is at the heart of the troubled U.S. - Iran relationship. In a recent article in the Washington Quarterly, Gary Sick writes the more immediate problem for the United States and the international community is how to deal with Irans proxy support for pro-Palestinian groups that oppose Israel and the peace process and who resort to terrorist attacks against civilian targets. At least since Khatamis election seven years ago, this proxy support has been the focus of virtually all accusations about Irans role as a state sponsor of terrorism.3 Although professing to genuinely favor peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, Iran maintains that the current U.S.-brokered peace process does not address core Palestinian demands and is unfairly biased by U.S. military and economic support for Israel. Complicating the matter is the fact that Irans role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is inextricably linked to charges of Iranian support for international terrorism. Regardless of whether the actions of Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are viewed as terrorism or freedom fighting, they are symptoms of a larger disease. Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the key to curing the disease and ending Irans support for alleged terrorist groups. Creating an independent Palestinian state with secure borders; removing Israeli settlements in disputed West Bank territory; allowing freedom of movement between Palestinian-controlled territories; and establishing a viable Palestinian government, police force, and economy will eliminate the motivation for pro-Palestinian groups to conduct terrorist attacks against Israel.

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The New Dynamic of the Middle East With the stunning U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in April 2003, the geopolitical environment in the Middle East fundamentally changed. Saddam Husseins regime was removed from power and the U.S. military now occupies Iraq. The threat
Ray Takeyh, Irans Nuclear Calculations, World Policy Journal, no. 20, Summer 2004. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2004, U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, Washington, D.C., 2004. 3 ]Gary Sick, Iran: Confronting Terrorism, Washington Quarterly, August 2004.
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posed by the Iraqi regime to U.S. allies and interests in the Persian Gulf was removed and along with it, the underlying premise of dual containment. As a result of the new balance of power in the region a new strategy toward Iran is necessary. This new strategy should be based on two complimentary approaches, both emphasizing 1 engagement as the primary means of achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. The first approach is based on diplomatic engagement, designed to normalize relations with Iran, reduce tensions in the volatile Persian Gulf region, and enlist Iranian support on a range of regional security issues. These issues should include: transnational terrorism, peacekeeping in Iraq and Afghanistan, ensuring the free flow of oil in the Persian Gulf, and building international consensus to help resolve the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. The second approach is based on economic engagement, designed to reward Iran for positive behavior by setting conditions for the lifting of economic sanctions, unfreezing Iranian assets in the U.S. and Europe, and reintegrating Iran into the global economic community.2 On the diplomatic side, U.S. strategy should be based on the recognition that both the U.S. and Iran have legitimate national interests in the region. Iran and the U.S. should recognize that their respective interests in the region include both competing and common interests. Both countries should emphasize common interests as a basis for cooperating on regional issues and acknowledge competing interests as potential sources of conflict in the region. As an example, both the U.S. and Iran have a common interest in maintaining peace and security in the Persian Gulf region in order to ensure international access to the regions oil wealth. The Iranian economy depends on oil sales for 80 percent of total export earnings. Likewise, the U.S. is highly dependent on oil imports for its economic livelihood, importing an estimated 25 percent of its daily needs from countries bordering the Persian Gulf.3 As a result, both the U.S. and Iran see a convergence or national interests on the issue of security of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf region. Additionally, both the U.S. and Iran have a common interest in the stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan and the establishment of representative governments in both countries that do not threaten their neighbors. Irans primary national security interest is to protect its territorial integrity by promoting security and stability on its eastern and western borders.4 The U.S. also has an interest in stable governments in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to promote regional security, consistent with other U.S. goals of promoting regional cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts and security of oil supplies. Finally, both states also have a common interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, perhaps more than any other single issue, one of the primary causes of instability in the region and the reason most often cited for Arab resentment of the U.S. In these common interests lies the foundation for understanding and cooperation on a wide range of issues that are critically important for the U.S., the Middle East, and the world. On the economic side, the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions, including the repeal of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), should be linked to specific Iranian actions that open its nuclear program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and
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Lawrence F. Kaplan, Iranamok, New Republic 228, no. 22 (2003), p. 14. Chatal de Jonge Oudraat, Making Economic Sanctions Work, Survival 42, no. 3 (2000), p. 87. www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html., 04 November 2004. 4 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, Differentiated Containment, Foreign Affairs 76, no. 3 (1997), p. 20.
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end its support for international terrorism. Iranian acceptance of a comprehensive nuclear inspection regime as part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would be a major step toward easing tensions with the U.S. and establishing a basis for cooperation on other issues. Iranian actions should also include an explicit renunciation of terrorism as a means of accomplishing national objectives and termination of Iranian support for international terrorist groups. In addition to the lifting of economic sanctions, the U.S. should provide assurances that it will respect Irans territorial integrity and not attempt to undermine the Iranian government or interfere in the governments internal affairs.1 The U.S. should offer to include Iran in peacekeeping and nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and pledge to work with Iran and other Arab states in the Middle East toward a just settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Cultural exchanges, lifting travel restrictions, and allowing Iranian students to once again enroll in American colleges and universities could all be included as part of a comprehensive program to restore U.S.-Iranian political, economic, and cultural relations.2 A New Road Map Moving away from the inherently negative policies of isolation and containment toward a more constructive policy of diplomatic and economic engagement will require most of the tools of American statecraft. First and foremost, it will require a fundamental change in perceptions and political rhetoric. It should be obvious that phrases such as Axis of Evil and The Great Satan do not serve to establish trust between states. On the contrary, such rhetoric simply fans the flames of mistrust on both sides and eliminates any chance for dialogue.3 Second, a significant diplomatic effort will be necessary to establish a constructive relationship after more than twenty years of hostility. The road map for improving U.S. Iranian relations should begin with a series of confidence-building measures designed to establish basic trust and dialogue between the two states. These measures need not be significant to have the desired effect. Simple steps such as opening up a channel of communication between Washington and Tehran, eliminating travel restrictions, or sponsoring cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries could go a long way toward improving communication and understanding between the two nations. Third, both states should extend diplomatic recognition to each other and establish a regular venue for official dialogue in order to set an agenda for addressing some of the more complex issues. Normalization of relations between the U.S. and Iran must be based on dialogue and mutual respect. The U.S. must provide assurances that it will respect Irans territorial sovereignty and pledge to resolve conflict through diplomacy and dialogue rather than military force. The U.S. should accept Irans right to develop nuclear power and offer to work with Iran, Russia, and the IAEA to ensure that Irans nuclear program conforms to NPT protocols and is built in accordance with international safety standards. In exchange for lifting U.S. economic sanctions, Iran should open its nuclear program to comprehensive IAEA inspections in order to reassure the International Community that the program is strictly for peaceful purposes. The inspection regime should include, as a fundamental component, a provision for special inspections to allow IAEA personnel to inspect all nuclear facilities in Iran, including both declared and undeclared sites.
Kenneth M. Pollack, Securing the Gulf, Foreign Affairs, July 2003, p. 6. Flawed Approaches on Iran, Moscow Times, 1 September 2003, p. 1. 3 Virginia I. Foran and Leonard S. Spector, The Application of Incentives to Nuclear Proliferation, The Price of Peace (Lanham: Rowman and Littfield Publishers, 1997), p. 33.
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Conclusion With the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the strategic environment in the Persian Gulf has fundamentally changed. The U.S. has a unique opportunity to move the relationship with Iran in a positive direction by engaging Iran as a partner in resolving regional issues. Dual containment is no longer a viable foreign policy and must be replaced with a strategy that focuses on normalizing relations and resolving conflict in the region by diplomacy rather than military force. The U.S. strategy should include both diplomatic and economic engagement as the preferred ways of normalizing relations with Iran, reducing tensions in the Persian Gulf, and providing incentives for Iran to end its nuclear weapons program and support for international terrorism. Enlisting Iranian assistance in peacekeeping efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan would help to achieve U.S. objectives in the region and reduce Iranian security concerns on its borders. Linking the removal of economic sanctions and restrictions on U.S. investment in Irans oil and gas sectors to expanded IAEA inspections of Irans nuclear program would be a major step toward normalizing relations and fostering dialogue on regional security issues. Offering to include Iran in international efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict would remove incentives to support pro-Palestinian terrorist groups, commit Iran to becoming a constructive partner in the Middle East peace process, and improve Irans stature in the international community. Together, these efforts comprise a new road map to peace in the Middle East.
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J.W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1993, p. 109. 2 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Principles for Influencing Terrorists, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), p. 15.

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If Iran agrees to additional inspections of its nuclear program, the U.S. must be prepared to reciprocate by lifting economic sanctions, repatriating Iranian assets in the U.S., and restoring Irans access to international financial markets. The U.S. should also repeal the Iran - Libya Sanctions Act and allow U.S. companies to 1 invest in Iran once again. All of these steps could be linked is such a way that specific Iranian actions on the nuclear issue are rewarded by specific removal of sanctions and restoration of economic ties. Another key issue on the road map to normalizing relations with Iran is the terrorism issue. In light of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Iran must understand that this is a particularly sensitive issue for the U.S. Irans continuing support for terrorist groups is a major impediment to normalizing relations with the U.S. and will prevent progress on any other issue. To remove this impediment, Iran must renounce terrorism as a means of achieving its political objectives and pledge to work with the International Community to bring international terrorists to justice. Recognizing that it is precisely Irans support for pro-Palestinian terrorist groups that has caused its international isolation and earned it the reputation of being the worlds most active state-supporter of terrorism, Iran must pledge to end its military and financial support for these groups. In return, the U.S. should offer to include Iran in its efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and bring all of its political and economic power to bear on the Israelis and the Palestinians to resolve the conflict.2

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WAR AGAINST TERRORISM OR OIL QUEST

Darius George STAN Global assessment of oil resource Oil reserves have a non-equable repartition. Middle East holds two thirds of the world reserves, South America 12.8%, and the countries with the biggest oil reserves are: the Saudi Arabia 25.7%, Iraq 9.8%, Kuwait 9.5%, Iran 9.3% and Venezuela 6.6%. Oil exploitations include two very rich regions named "oil poles". One pole is situated in the South and South-Eastern part of Eurasia platform in the region between Caucasus, Persic Bay and North Africa. The second pole is in the South of North American platform, Mexico Bay, Caribbean Sea, and the North of South America. Saudi Arabia extracts 13% of the world oil quantity (in the vicinity and on the shore of the Persic Bay). US hold the second place in the world (with 12%). The extraction is made in the region of Mexico Bay, Middlecontinent area, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, on the South-Western Pacific shore and Alaska. In the European part of Russia, the biggest deposits can be found on the superior course of Kama, but the main extraction region is in the Western Siberia (Ust Balik, Saim) and the latest prospecting showed oil structures in Lena river area, Sakhalin Island, Kamchatka Peninsula. Big oil quantities are extracted in Kazakhstan (on the shore of Caspik Sea, in Emba and Ural Valleys), Azerbaijan (Baku, Artem), Iran (near Qom city, in the South of Isfahan), China (Manchuria, continental platform of Bohai Bay, area of Huang He Delta, in the West of the country at Karamai, Yumen, Kuchasi in the East of Chengdu city), Norway (North Sea), Great Britain (North Sea), Mexico (on the shore of the Campeche Bay, Chiapas and Tabasco states, Yucatn Peninsula), Venezuela (Maracaibo Lagoon, continental platform at the West of Orinoco Delta). The end of Oil Age As Paul Hirst noticed, every stage of the economic world closes culminating with a period of new confrontations in which, powerful states stop the time in order to rewrite the geopolitical maps. An important subject of the moment reappears after approximately 100 years of massive exploitation of the oil energetic resource. A first indicator - the increase of the oil barrel price - is eloquent. This way, the current map is being rewritten through this culminating moment of an age getting to its end. The culminating moment of the oil represents a dramatic change. Oil represented, in the last century, the basic source of economic growth and technological development. Together with this development, oil demand became bigger and bigger and it was covered by a continuous growth of oil extraction. It is no longer possible for this thing to be done after this apogee stage ends as it will certainly lead to prices rise for conventional fuel. The implications of these changes are not only forecasted at the level of transports. All products will be more expensive. Food will be the first on the list of elements affected in respect to costs. Lets not forget that agriculture supposes certain operations made with agricultural machineries which use fuels. Also, petrochemical industry is dependent on oil. Therefore, oil apogee will affect every aspect of the industry that uses energy or oil as basic material. There are several opinions on this issue. Credible sources speak about a growth stop in the next 5 years. We can easily conclude that between 2000 and 2005, the world is in the period of 85

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oil age ending, according to the notes made during the International Economic Congresses. Now is the Oil Age apogee and the world hurries to designate another resource for the next period of time. This moment is highly likely to take place in 2008. Important changes indicators During "Civilisation or Barbary" Conference in 2004 at Serpa (Portugal), Jorge Figueiredo, a famous expert in energy field, argued that an oil crisis will certainly appear in the following years and it will have one of the deepest impacts on human civilization. The exhaustion of oil as resource, the lack of a commercial energetic alternative will draw our civilisation into a post-oil "transition age". Beyond the accentuation of economic and political conflicts which will be inevitably generated by world exhaustion of fossil fuels resources, he makes some estimations regarding the changes that oil crisis will impose on long and medium term. Figueiredo argues that the disappearance of oil energetic resource will have as certain effect the destruction of intensive agriculture, which is at the basis of world food. Fertilisers, pesticides, fungicides, agricultural machineries, all that is based on oil will gradually disappear. The disappearance of intensive agriculture will lead to a food crisis at world level. According to Figueiredo, oil crisis will cause a gradual reduction of soil productivity and of the agricultural profitableness. The lack of soil chemification will be mainly felt in the case of exhausted lands where the process was accelerated by the use of chemical stimuli, lands that gave harvests generation after generation and that can be maintained for agriculture only by fertilization. Decades will be necessary for the natural recovery of exhausted lands. In the meantime, starvation will make ravages. In Figueiredos opinion, global starvation will transform food in a new and unexpected weapon in the hands of overdeveloped states. On demographic plan well assist a much firmer control of the population, doubled by a counter-urbanisation and a return of mankind towards rural environment. Current proportion in which 10% of the population feeds the other 90% will no longer be possible to be maintained under the circumstances of oil death. This will determine a big part of the population to work in agriculture, obtaining food on its own. Considering that industry too, especially energy-based branches will be affected by oil apogee period, oil death will impose other energy forms, which unfortunately are now either in the stage of research, or very little used, or extremely expensive. Solar, photovoltaic, Aeolian, waves, hydroelectric, biogas, biomass energies are only in the phase of current alternative. Another alternative leads to the use of nuclear energies which prove to be much more risky. It remains hydrogen variant which could be obtained from water. Nevertheless, technologies are non-economical for the moment. Global crisis of post-oil world If for 2006 the barrel price is estimated at approx. 125$, the prognosis for 2008 is at least three times bigger. These estimations belong to Ali Bakhtiar, the author of "World Oil Production Capacity", and most of the experts share them. Therefore, if in 2006 well pay approx. 100-125$ for barrel, towards the end of 2008 well pay almost 180-200$ for barrel. This is an absolutely huge price compared to the conventional resources profitableness. Besides the spectacular increase of oil barrel price, there are also consequences at geopolitical level in respect to which the governments don't say a word. Under the circumstances of progressive diminution of oil resources, the confrontation between 86

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The practice of XXI century: the servitude cult Governments consider that oil resource exhaustion is one of the most delicate subjects taking into account the huge consequences on mankind. Nowadays big powers dont hesitate to raise this subject to discussion presenting it under different justificative forms. Unjustified attacks in the last period in Middle East or bringing the war theatre at the border of the interest area seem to describe the new techniques of those who dictate. Professor PhD Dumitru Mazilu, nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize specifies that the only rule in this oil quest is: the one who has the supremacy, that one dictates. In such a world, the glory of centuries of human thinking that established a rule of general cohabitation is transformed into a chaos that only some will survive, while others will be destined to modern slavery; as the one who will have the access to resources that one will dictate oppressing this way all those who come to ask for them. And the number of those to die in such a frail equilibrium created by unfettered human being will be, most probably, unprecedented. Violent attacks in the last period in Middle East have at the basis the interest to hold monopoly on oil resource. The big stake of the winner is the position of a cartel leader. By US campaign in Middle East area it can be outlined the wish to take effective control of 90% of global oil resources and production. Preferential access to this resource confers supremacy by the 70% from the economic influences point of view. Lets not forget that the influence of black gold is not reflected only in fuel consumption. Oil dependence shows with precision the connections between development and oil. Food will be the first to suffer changes at costs level. Petrochemical industry also depends on oil. The interest for oil is outlined in every aspect of the industry that uses energy or oil as raw material. The control over this resource market is a favourable opportunity to re-sketch directive lines of world policy. The time of the war when combatants looked into each others eyes on the battle field is over. International political stage changed into a conceptual war of power. It is the concept of monopoly market control. Keeping the adversary at a distance by holding total control of necessary resources, by the intermediary of threats with a possible violent recourse or by bringing war theatre at the border of the interest subject make the weapons of any possible counter-candidates turn pale. Nowadays, the strategic concept of pre-emptive war launched by the security doctrine of US Administration creates difficulties in identifying the new attack zones. Possible raids in such a future framework can be anticipated in Columbia and Middle Asia, countries that still hold important reserves of fossil fuels.

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America and Europe will accentuate in order to have priority access to this resource. Confrontations theatre moves to the areas of states still holding significant oil resources. Besides wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, present big powers, forced by oil crisis, will get involved in new conflicts in Iran, Columbia, and Central Asia - countries that still hold important resources of fossil fuels. Therefore, starting the war against terrorism becomes a taboo subject for those who can speak about the global war for resources. The protection of millions of people through the setting up of modern democracies have as a motivation these profound processes and the informative environment is forced to abstain from offering exact data regarding this situation in order not to stir up general panic.

A discourse of intentions In the annual discourse on nations state, presented on January 31, 2006 in Washington, American President, George W. Bush stated that US must reduce their dependence on foreign oil by developing alternative energy sources. President, George W. Bush argued American dependence on foreign oil is a serious problem and announced measures to reduce oil imports from the Middle East by 75% until 2025. In the situation that specialists in this field draw the attention on the necessity to hurry universal transition to an alternative for oil, which is US interest to control a cartel with an obsolescent future? Could this be a wrong card chosen by the present administration of the big power? We have a serious problem, President Bush continued. America is too dependent on oil, which often comes from instable areas of the world. But, technical progresses and new technologies will help US to surpass the current stage of economy based on oil and will make dependence on the Middle East remain in the past, the leader from the White House explained. Bush mentioned he will ask a funds rise for researches in the field of nonpolluting energy, referring to solar and Aeolian energy, non-polluting fuels, nuclear power and the development of electric vehicles. Beyond the nature of present disputes, it is important to find out the factors that could determine their maintaining or accentuation as well as their possible effects on international security. While Europeans regional policy heads towards a world ordered by laws, regulations, negotiations and international cooperation, in which classical power mechanisms are in a secondary plan, US continue to exercise power in an anarchical international system where rules are nonviable and security and liberal order continue to be the result of holding and exerting military power. That is why, Robert Kagan is sceptical and appreciates that future belongs to a world with rising tensions.

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Another indicator States with tradition in the field of colonial wars joined US concept, although, at diplomatic level, Iraq crisis raises suspicions on the fairness of the military intervention in the area. Nobody can say whether this alliance was just a circumstantial one. Nevertheless, the stake is obvious: the benefits participants expect in the future. This proves once again that states have nothing but interests in their actions. Iraq crisis also brought the apogee of the vehement anti-American fight of many European states and, in the same time, it constituted the occasion to burst out the inferiority complex of previous centuries former colonial powers in front of a XXIst century superpower. The observations of the famous American analyst from The Washington Post, Robert Kagan: US will win the war against Iraq bring to present interest, once again, which is nowadays remarkable power, who divides states security by taking over absolute command of political leadership in the next decades. And it is not less relevant for us, if this superpower aims at re-sketching world map. We must understand that some powers wait to get out of a relative quiet relation alongside the single world force to be able to restore a profitable order just for their exclusive club. It is a new order in which world states must stand and obey only to power dictate.

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During the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah of Qajar Dynasty (1848 - 1896), the Ministry of Science was established by E'tezad al-Saltaneh. He was appointed the first minister of science in 1858. Between 1925 and 1934, when the University of Tehran was founded, many schools, institutes of higher education, colleges and other similar institutions were set up and started operating. In 1935, women began to be admitted to centers of higher learning. During the reign of Reza Shah the first king of Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-1941), Iran witnessed one of the most eventful epochs in its history. World developments and the need to secure the interests of the great powers, coupled with the strategic location of Iran, brought about a need for a transformation in the social structure. The first steps were taken during the Qajar period, but these were not comprehensive measures. Thus, the "modernization" or the "modernist" program was launched in Iran. Promoting higher education inside the country and the need for establishing institutions for this purpose, were considered a primary objective, especially since specialists in science and technology were required for various projects. In the beginning, schools from the Qajar period, in addition to a number of newly established ones, carried on with their activities in the field of education. Later on, some of these schools merged to form the University of Tehran. Subsequently, other centers of advanced learning began operating, some of which were also absorbed into the University of Tehran after August 1941. The `Vezarat-e Ulum' (the Ministry of Science) was organized by Ali-qoli Mirza (E'tezad al-Saltaneh) during the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah. He was appointed the minister of science in 1858. The Ministry of Science was responsible for overseeing the activities of all institutions of learning in the country. In 1868, it was renamed the "Vezarat-e Ma'aref va O'ghaf va Sana'yeh-e Mostazrafeh" (the Ministry of Science, Endowments and Fine Arts), keeping this name until the last years of the reign of Reza Shah, when it was started to be called the 'Vezarat-e Farhang' (Ministry of Culture). From the onset of the Pahlavi dynasty until the downfall of Reza Shah in August 1941, seven succeeded each other as minister of science. The first post was held by Mirza Yusef Khan Mushar-e A'zam in the 1925 cabinet headed by Furooghi. His title was "Kafil-e Vezarat-e Ma'aref" (the acting head of the Ministry of Science), eventually becoming the minister of science in 1926. In the Ministry of Science's yearbook, two schools are listed as being for higher education; namely, "Tebbi" (Medical School), and "Hughoogh"' (e Law School). In addition, two other schools with the names "Ulum-e Siasi" (School of Political Science) and "Dar al-Mu'allemin-e Markazi" (Central School for Teachers' Training) are mentioned. But as classes of the School of Education had not started during the preceding three years, and the School of Political Science was run by the Foreign Ministry, they were not counted among the state institutions for higher education.

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Radu tefan VERGATTI

UNIVERSITIES IN IRAN - BEGINNINGS -

Sa'eed Nafissi wrote: "In the period from 1925 until the establishment of the University of Tehran, there existed in Iran one medical school, one school of law and political science, one school of education, one for agriculture, and one for business. These conferred knowledge to the Iranian youth at a higher level than that which could be gained from the high schools." But it must be mentioned that apart from these institutions, there other centers for higher learning, such as the Officers' College, the State School of Art, the School of Engineering, the Higher School of Midwifery, and the Alborz College, which was established by the Americans and after the banning of foreign schools in 1940, came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture. In general, until 1923, only men were admitted to the higher educational levels, with the schools located in Tehran. Some centers of learning though were not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture as they were formed to satisfy the personnel needs of some ministries. In particular, the School of Political Science was initially run by the Foreign Ministry, the School of Law was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, and the School of Business was run by the Ministry of Economy ("Vezarat-e Favayed-e'Ammeh"). These were later turned over to the Ministry of Culture. In these schools, the expertise and knowledge of foreign instructors were also availed of for the purpose of reforming and updating the curricula. It should be mentioned that the establishment of many of these schools, including the School of Medicine and Pharmacy, the School of Political Science, and the School of Law, went back to the Qajar period, and during the reign of the first Pahlavi, they expanded and developed further. Another factor that characterized these schools was that they charged fees: in 1920 at the suggestion of the Ministry of Science, all state -run high schools and centers for higher learning started collecting a specified amount from students, with some exceptions allowed for special cases. The practice of sending of Iranian youth abroad for education purposes goes back to the Qajar period and the reign of Fat'h-Ali Shah, when some statesmen and, at the top, Crown Prince Abbas Mirza, decided to sponsor some students to Europe to be acquainted with new sciences and technology. During the Pahlavi period, the idea of transforming social, economic, military, and cultural institutions in the country on the one hand, and, the shortage of an expert workforce to effect these changes, made it necessary for young people to go to other countries to pursue their education. As the first steps for effecting necessary changes had already been taken and only the required personnel was lacking, action was taken: inside the country, schools were expanded at all levels, including higher education. The academic curricula were reformed and foreign experts were invited to teach in Iran, alongside Iranians. Nevertheless, Iranian statesmen still considered sending students to Europe a necessity due to the lack of advanced teaching facilities and the limited number of qualified instructors in specialized fields. Eventually, a law was passed in Parliament for sending 100 students abroad each year, at the expense of the state. Some historians mentioned the following reasons for the need to send students to Europe: to train specialists in science and technology at various levels; to satisfy the personnel requirements of various high schools and centers for higher learning; the need to train a work force of specialists within the political establishment; to meet the needs of a new army as well as the prerequisites for industrial development and the development of new services. When Reza Khan was Minister of War, it was for military reasons that the first group of students were sent abroad. In order to re-organize the army, 60 students were sent to France in April 1922, to learn about military techniques. But starting in 1928, with the passage of the law on sending students abroad, a group was sent every year to 90

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study modern sciences and technology. The first batch of 110 students left for France on the 15th of October, 1928, under the supervision of Esma'il Mer'at and Faradjollah Bahrami. Their chief supervisor was actually Hossein Alla', who was then Iranian ambassador to France. The second group was sent in August 1929. The fifth group, consisting of 100 students, went in 1932, while the sixth group of 82 students traveled in 1924. Up to 1924, the total number of students sent abroad to enroll in various advanced scientific and technical disciplines totaled 640. In addition, others were sent by the Ministries of Science, War, Justice, Finance, Roads and the Post and Telegraph, as well as by the Bureau of Agriculture and the Industrial Bureau. Some youngsters were also sent and supported by their affluent families to study in other countries. All the affairs of students sponsored by the government, including their fields of study, lodgings, food and financial requirements, fell under the jurisdiction of the Bureau for the Supervision of Students Abroad, located in Paris. It should be noted that in this period, some students were also sent to England, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and the United States. As mentioned earlier, before the formation of a university in Iran and according to the law, 100 students were sent abroad annually at the expense of the Ministry of Science and that in addition, some governmental institutions also sponsored some students to enroll in foreign lands in order to beef up their roster of experts. The establishment of the University of Tehran provided the necessary foundation for higher education within the country. Nevertheless, it should be noted that while part of the national income was spent to send students abroad for advanced training, studying for several years a particular discipline decided for them by the Ministry of Science, however, efforts toward modernization and restructuring in Iran were unorganized and were not carried out systematically. Hence, on returning to the country, the graduates faced many problems. In this respect, Peter Averi noted that Iranian state officials have made the strange assumption that anyone educated abroad can be appointed to any job regardless of their specialization. Since the administrative system and the social structure of the country were incapable of absorbing these new occupations, the simple solution was to hire them for service in government. Their education and what they learned corresponded to the social and political environment of the country where they were educated, and the influential officials of the country could not understand them. The founding of the University of Tehran was a turning point in the contemporary cultural history of Iran. The main achievements are on the one hand, the teaching of the modern sciences and the training of specialists within the country (in humanities, natural and technical sciences) and on the other, there was a decline in the number of students sent abroad and the familiarity with Western science and technology, as well as lesser reliance on non-Iranian specialists. The trends toward modernization made it a necessity to form such a center for advanced education where various scientific and technical disciplines could be taught. The idea of setting up a university was around for many years before the plan was actually carried out, but the lack of the necessary infrastructure delayed efforts in this direction. Finally, the need to train specialists to pursue various developmental activities that were already initiated, as well as the qualitative and quantitative limitations of then existing schools of higher education, and the return of Iranian graduates who were sent abroad between 1928 and 1933, provided the necessary impetus for the establishment of a center for higher learning. The University of Tehran was formed by virtue of a law passed by the Parliament on May 29th, 1934. It contained

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21 articles, through which the Parliament authorized the Ministry of Science to create an institution called "daaneshgah" (university) in Tehran, for the purpose of disseminating advanced knowledge in relation to the sciences, technology, literature and philosophy. The legislation divided the university into several departments or faculties ("daaneshkadeh"), as follows: Contemplative and Narrated Sciences (theology), Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Literature, Philosophy and Educational Sciences, Medicine and its various branches, Law, Political Science and Economics, Engineering. The legislation further stipulated that the School of Education and Fine Arts may be considered as affiliates of the university. A constitution was drawn up for each faculty that was approved by the Supreme Council of Science. With the passage of the law, the first step was to construct the university's physical facilities, so a property was sought, beginning from the time when the bill was still being debated. Three days before its passage into law, the land deal was finalized. Ali Asghar Hekmat wrote in his memoirs: "Most of March 1934, I was looking for the land where the university could be erected. I looked around and finally found the Djalalieh Gardens, which measured some 200,000 square meters and were most appropriate for this purpose. The owner, Hadj Rahim Agha Tabrizi, agreed to sell at five rials per square meter. The Finance Minister reduced this price by 10 shahi per square meter (100 shahis = 1 rial). The deed was signed and the land was handed over to the Ministry of Science." Due to the acute need for the School of Medicine, the first to be built was the Anatomy Hall, the construction of which commenced in June 1934, and inauguration was in February 1935. The acting Minister of Science was to be the president of the university from the date of founding to February 5th, 1943. Therefore, Ali Asghar Hekmat, then minister of science, served as the first president and held the post until 1938. He was followed by Esma'il Mer'at, who was the last person to head the university during the reign of the first Pahlavi. The various departments initially operated in 1934 under the helm of the following: Ali Akbar Dehkhoda, head of the Faculty of Law, Dr. Loghmanoddoleh, head of the Faculty of Medicine, Dr. Mahmood Hessabi, head of the Faculty of Engineering, Dr. Issa Sadigh-A'lam, head of the Faculties of Literature and Science, Seyyed Nasrollah Taghavi, head of the Faculty of Theology. The economic, social, administrative and cultural developments already in progress required medical doctors, legal and industrial experts, as well as the educational authorities required to provide for these needs. This was more acute in higher education and the University of Tehran, being the appropriate institution for directing the course of advanced learning within this social system, should have been run by Iranian professors. But such professors could be found in sufficient numbers only in the fields of literature and the Islamic sciences. There were a few, such as Dr. Mahmood Hessabi (civil engineer and Ph.D. in physics), Gholam-Hossein Rahnama (mathematics), Dr. Ghassem Ghani (medicine), Dr. Issa Sadigh (mathematics), Dr. Loghman Adham (medicine), Dr. Ali Akbar Siasi (education), who studied abroad prior to the modernization movement. Also, some of those sent to Europe and graduated during the years 1928 - 1933, taught in various fields at the University of Tehran. Yet, the limited number of these experts did not fill the need, so the Ministry of Science hired some foreign professors from Germany, France and the United States to complement the teaching staff. Construction of the main buildings on the Djalalieh lands for the stipulated departments required some time. The inauguration ceremonies took place at the site for the Faculty of Law, Political Science and Economics in the presence of the Cabinet and important 92

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cultural figures. At the outset, each department conducted classes in separate locations, but gradually, with the progress of the construction work, they were transferred to the main campus. The Faculties of Literature and Science were initially located at Negarestan, the Faculty of Medicine started classes in a rented building, while the Faculty of Law was housed in the School of Law and Political Science in Atabak Alley. The Faculty of Engineering was in the northern section of Dar al-Fonoon in Nasser Khosrow St. and the Faculty of Theology was in the Sepah-Salar School. One of the fundamental developments in this era was a change in the image of women, a manifestation of which was their admission into the university and in other centers of advanced education. While the primarily goal of these institutions was the dissemination of modern science and technology, until 1935, the privilege of gaining expertise in such fields was limited to men. Women only reached high school, except for admissions in the Higher School of Midwifery. In line with the drive initiated many years back toward modernization and European culture, the situation of women had to be altered in step with other social developments. Thus, the doors of the university and other centers of higher learning were opened to women in 1935, Islamic cover was abolished and a Western dress code was enforced. Women's associations were also established and the female members of the society began to be allowed to take part in public ceremonies, etc. Tradition limited Iranian women to the family environment and did not allow them to show themselves independently outside the home. Not surprisingly, new moves, such as the discarding of the Islamic cover in public, the co-mingling of men and women and the lather's admission into higher educational institutions, were phenomena that could not be easily accepted by the people, as they went against their system of beliefs and traditional Iranian social ethics. Badr al-Mulook Bamdad, one of the officials responsible for carrying out the government's policies, wrote: "For a long time the families did not have the courage to send their daughters out to an environment where they could freely mingle with men. Everyone was waiting for the others to take the first step." The first to accept women were the Faculties of Literature and Science and the School of Education. But in addition to opportunities inside the country, some families, mostly the wealthy ones, sent their daughters to study abroad but no woman was sponsored for foreign study by the government. In 1934, nine females were studying in Germany, France, Belgium and Beirut, and in 1935, 10 were enrolled in the said countries, as well as in England. While the government encouraged women to study, the number of male students outstripped females three-fold. Without doubt, though co-education was a novel phenomenon that also had negative repercussions, it opened a new vista in the cultural horizon of women. Following the establishment of the Tehran University, the need for experts in various disciplines still existed. Therefore, other government organizations, as the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Post and Telegraph, as well as the Ministry of Professions and Art (Commerce) and the Ministry of War established their own centers for advanced training. Gradually and due to some further development, some of these centers, i.e. the School of Veterinary Medicine, the School of Agriculture, and the School of Fine Arts, were transformed into faculties. Other centers of higher learning were also sprouted in the period between 1924 to 1941, including the Higher Class of Finance for the purpose of training accountants, the College of Post and Telegraph for the purpose of training technicians and the War University for high-ranking officers of the army. Mashhad's School of Health, which laid the groundwork for the School of Medicine in that area, and the Schools of Music and Architecture were also set up.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION IN IRAN

Mohammad Reza HAFEZNIA Zahra AHMADIPOR
Abstract: Political history of Iran in the past shows that the people of Iran have been deprived from the opportunities in participation and political decision making, and the kings and rulers basically were not believer on such right for the people. The first experience of the Iranian people in political participation and decision making on their fate back to the constitutional revolution in 1906 (Mashroteh revolution), and this revolution expanded the culture of democracy in the Iranian society. But this was transient and short, and the past political culture reconstructed quickly, and the people of Iran came deprived from their democratic rights by the kings. This event caused another social revolution in 1979 as the Islamic revolution, which was the reflective of the democratic desires and wishes of the Iranian people. Such desires have been considered in the constitution more perfect than the Mashroteh revolution. This paper on the basis of political culture of the Iranian society in the geographical and historical perspective, and also with consideration of the constitution and experience, studies the dimensions of the political and social participation of the Iranian people from the viewpoint of the theory and practice in both national and local scales. Keywords: Political participation, Council, Democracy, Iran, Constitutional revolution, Islamic revolution.

Introduction Iran with 1648195 Km2 area and about 63 millions of population situated in the south-west of Asia (Bakhteiari, 2001:80), and the majority of its area have been formed by desert. From cultural and civilizational point of view, Iran situated between Turk, Arab and Subcontinent civilizations, and in its historical line, has had interaction with them. At the same time the geographical framework of Iran, S plateau has affected to form a unique culture and civilization which is named Iranian culture. According to the historical and archaeological theories, Iranian people are from Aryan race, that have immigrated to Iran from central Asia in the mid of second millennium B.C. (Hafeznia, 1999:58). The name of IRAN has been taken from this subject (Khairandish & Shaian, 1999:11). Although fixation of the name of Iran in formal back to the year 1935 (Eftekhari & others, 1992:3), but Iran with old culture and history has being known for foreigners as Pars or Persia. In spite of the fact that, many attacks have been happened to Iran during its history by Turks, Arabs, Moguls and recently by Russia, English, United States of America, etc. but the nation of Iran could protect from its culture as well as political independence (Digard, J. & Hourcade, B., 1999:1). From the view of political history, Iran is an old state with at least 2700 years antecedent. The first regional state in the west and south west of Iran was Ilam that was over thrown by the Assyrians in 645 B.C. The integrated and national state in Iran was formed under the name of Media or Medes by a democratic manner in 708 B.C. (Sayx, 1998: 158). In reality this was the first territoriality state in Iran (about 2700 years back). After that, the Achamenian state was established by the Cyrus the great in 550 B.C. (Sayx, 1998:187) which at that time it became as a super power and its domain was vast and included some parts of Asia, Africa and Europe. Meanwhile this state from the view of governance manner and territorial management pattern was being known as the best in the world. Later on some other states such as the Greeks, Romans and Morians were inspired from it. (Lucas, 1990).

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The nature of government in Iran In a historical perspective, the governmental patterns in Iran have been absolute monarchy, and in Iranian political culture, the Shah as the ruler in such government, was being known as the holder of absolute power that can take any decision about the people and state. In this view, there was not democracy, and people not seen as the player in the politics, but were being known as the obedients and peasants of the king (Shah). For the first time the people of Iran have played an effective political role in the process of constitutional revolution, and they established the government in 1906 A.D. In this period the democratic elements such as parliaments (assembly), liberation of thoughts, local councils, press and also modern state with secular nature came into existence, but the Shah (king) was retained in the head of the state with limited power and authorities. After a short time the monarchy dictatorship reconstructed, and the political role of the people and their participations in the social and political affairs weakened. This reality (internal dictatorship), along with the marginal position of Iran in the geopolitical system and structure of the world, as well as the interventions and penetrations of the superpowers especially U.S.A in the internal affairs of Iran during 20th century, directed the mind and opinion of the some elites as well as the people to the 95

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In the history of Iran the apparatus of state has constantly been existed, but by the early part of 20th century it has been in the form of monarchy, that the king as the Shah had absolute authorities and power. After 1906 A.D. which constitutional revolution took place, the authority of king was limited. After the Islamic revolution in 1979 A.D. for the first time the monarchy regime came to an end, and the republic regime was established and came into existence. The long time continuation of monarchy regime has affected on the forming of a political culture in Iran, that its main characteristic is living with an absolute power and ruler (Fuller, 1991: 27). These regime and governments was not believer to the right of the people for participation in appointment of the rulers, as well as taking decision about their fate. Throughout the history, the state of Iran has sometimes been as a superpower or regional power, and this reality has affected on the forming a kind of pride and self-respect in the opinion of Iranian people. From the centuries 17th and 18th, with transition of world power from Asia to Europe, the geopolitical power of Iran was gradually reduced, and then Iran came under the influence of new powers such as Russia, English, France, Germany and U.S.A. Also its geographical boundaries came smaller than the past, and limited in the present situation at the end of 19th century with 8731 Km boundary (jaafari, 1995:3). During the 19th and 20th century Iran was under the influence of European powers especially Russia, England and U.S.A, and this situation was in opposite of the Iranian pride, which rely on their feeling about their rich civilization and history as a power in the world. Therefore this reality formed the opinion of fighting against strangers and aggressive power among the people of Iran. Then the desire of independence and exit from foreign hegemony came as the political discourse among the majority of elites and enlightened peoples of Iran especially the religious leaders. We can see this reality to some extent in the process of constitutional revolution, and more in the Islamic revolution, which has been reflected in the constitution (The constitution of I.R. Iran: 1998).

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political potential of the religion especially Shiite, which the majority of Iranian people were/are believer and follower of it. Appearance and development of religious political discourse in this period, caused to appear a new politico-religious class among some social elites, especially the clergy, religious leaders and enlightened, and a new political thought as the Islamic government (Hokomat Isalmi) came under the evolution, which was developed by the Ayatullahe-Khumayni as the Velayat-e-faqih (Kadivar, 1997:24). This thought as the political desire penetrated inside the society and motivated the political potential of the people under the leadership of, Ayatullah Khumayni, who was the founder of Velayat-e-faqihs theory, as well as exiled leader to Iraq by the Shah (King). In this manner the Islamic revolution was formed and came into the victory in 1979 A.D. With this event for the first time in the history of Iran, the monarchy regime over thrown and came to an end, and then the Republic regime came in existence, but with the nature of Islamic. In the political system of the Islamic revolution, the situation of democracy and participation of the people was better than the political system of Constitutional revolution (Mashroteh revolution). Recently the high level political officials of the government, such as leadership and president explain it as the religious democracy which in Persian language to be named as Mardom Salari-e-Dinee. In the theoretical debates about the role of the people in the government, some scholars emphasize on the pivotal role of the people in the governmental affairs, and Ayatullah-Khumayni himself had the same thought and the constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran approved on the basis of such idea, and also the government was named the Islamic Republic. Some scholars believe to the Islamic Government no republic, and say that the government is the right of the God and religious scholars are competent to take laws and rules from the Islamic literature and texts and explain them. So the people should obey from such rules and laws. From the view of political geography and spatial distribution of political power, the government of Iran during its history has been as under: - From the Medes dynasty by 1906 A.D. (during 2600 years back), the king (Shah) was the ruler and the holder of absolute political power, and the country was being divided into some parts or regions, and each part or region was being headed by the representative of the king, who was much authorized on the internal affairs of the region. So there was no any political or social role for the people, and they were only obedient of the ruler. - In the process of constitutional revolution, the western pattern of government and state came under the consideration of the elites of the Revolution, and then a new pattern of government was defined for the state (Foran, 1999:288). This pattern was unitary, which the political power was being retained in the hand of the central government, but the people were authorized for decision about local affairs (Kasravi, 1997:214-5). In the constitution, establishment of regional and local council had been approved (Supplementary of Constitution, 1906:32). After two decades the king Reza Pahlavi took the political power of the state. He adopted a centralized policy in the state, and the pattern of unitary system became much centralized. Under the pretext of this policy the democratic rights of the people as well as their regional authorities were taken away for sometimes. 96

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Dimensions of Political and Social Participation in Iran In spite of the unitary system in the state of Iran, democracy and participation of the people in the political affairs, has been anticipated in the constitutions, but only in the national level. Among the political system of both revolutions, democracy in the Islamic revolution system (1979 A.D.) is more than the constitutional system (1906 A.D.), because social transformations and the growth of information of the people after seven decades necessitated such alteration. In both constitutions, participation of the people in their affairs, in the local as well as national level, differs with each other. Participation in the local level is naturally social. Namely the people can participate and take decision on the constructive, economic, cultural and social affairs in the local level via local councils which they elect them, but they can not participate in the political local affairs, due to the nature of unitary system. The local participation rights of the people cancelled for some times by the king Reza Pahlavi when he came on the power in 1925 A.D. But later on the necessities, enforced the central government, to approve the law of urban councils in 1955, after 50 years (Hojjattee, 1997:1-33). After that law of rural councils approved in 1963. The existence of the local councils have been accepted in the articles 100-106 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Badamchi, 1999:13-15). But they are not authorized in the local political affairs. Social and political necessities caused a decision that taken by the AyatullahKhumayni as the leader of the Islamic revolution in 1979. According to this decision, at once the local councils in urban and rural places established (Ghaneezadeh, 1999:1). From that time councils in the rural areas have continuously been existed, but in the urban areas they were not existed during the years 1981-1998, and the interior ministry cancelled the local elections in the cities for 17 years. The point which should be mentioned is this, that according to the articles of the constitution, the other local councils were formed in Iran after the Islamic Revolution such as: labour Islamic councils, Islamic councils in the organizations either in the governmental section or private section, councils in the factories, hospitals, schools, universities, etc. but there is necessary an evaluation about their role, functions and outputs. In 1996 the law of local council, after some amendments, approved by the parliament (Madani, 1998: 134-167). In 1997 that president Khatami came into the

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- In the period of the Islamic revolution, due to continuation of such culture among political and legal elites, as well as may be the existence of combinated nation from the ethnicity point of view, the pattern of unitary system was accepted, and such pattern has been reflected in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this pattern the store and main source of political power to be retained on the hand of central government via national elections, and the people in the local level can participate in the economic, cultural and social affairs via local councils. As the governmental patterns show, we cannot see the pattern of Federal and regional state in the history of Iran, and always the political power has been on the hand of central government either in the form of absolute monarchy at the past th or centralized unitary system in the 20 century. (Hafeznia, 2002).

Conclusion Historical perspective of the governments in Iran show that the political power has been polarized and centralized on the hand of the king (Shah). Therefore there was no role or right for political and social participation of the people either in local or national level. The continuation of this period for about 2600 years, affected on the forming of fear and obedience culture in the people from the governments and kings. Some factors affected on the political role of the people of Iran in 20th century as under: 1. Connection of some Iranians with Europe after 19th century and acquaintance of them with new political thoughts as well as the modern state and government. 2. Geopolitical competition of European powers and its effects on their intervention in Iran. 3. Inefficiency of traditional political structure of Iran. Along with these factors, the political role of religion especially Shiite reconstructed, and politico-religious discourses developed in the society even as the alternative for the western patterns. In both revolutions, Islamic and Western political thoughts were in competition with each other for control of political power as well as to make an impression on the nature and political structure of the government. 98

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power, and he adopted the policy of advancement of civil society, the government decided to form the local councils in the rural and urban places. Therefore the local elections took place in the March 1998 throughout the country, and 32677 rural councils, as well as 741 urban councils elected by the people (Social affairs office, 2000). With establishment of the new round of the local councils that is along with the discourse of the civil society and development of the claims of the people from the government, some disputes have emerged between the governmental apparatus and local councils about the local authorities and functions. The studies show that such situation to be seen in Tehran and big cities especially centre of the provinces. According to the constitution, people of Iran participate in the national election for elect of the high rank officials and main political bodies of the state. In the constitutional revolution people had only the right for election of the members of parliament, but in the constitution of the Islamic revolution, the rights of the people are more, namely alongside of the parliament they elect, direct or indirect, some other political officials and bodies. In the direct manner, the people elect 284 members of parliament from 201 electorates (Administrative divisions office, 2000). Also they elect the President and the members of Experts Assembly for leadership, and also they can participate in the Referendum. About the leader, the people elect him for unlimited term, but indirect, via the Expert Assembly which mentioned above. This Assembly is competent and authorized for appointment as well as depose of the leader, according to the article 107 and 111 of the constitution (Amin, 2001: 67,70). The study of constitutions of both revolutions in the 20th century show that the participation patterns of the people of Iran in the local level is naturally social, and in the national level is naturally political. But there is a difference between them, namely, in the constitutional revolution, people did not any role for elect of the head of the state as king (shah), whereas in the Islamic revolution they have the right for elect of the head of the state as leader (Rahbar), but indirect manner.

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In the process of constitutional revolution (1906), the Western and secular thoughts prevailed over the Islamic thoughts. But secular system with reconstruction of absolute political culture, and not to be the suitable mechanism for political and social participation of the people from one side, and suppression of the religious desires of the people from another side, prepared the background for development of politicoreligious discourses and thoughts in the society of Iran, as well as the protest of the people against the government. The political force of religion, in the second experience of revolution which took place in 1979, prevailed over the Western thoughts and established a new political structure with Islamic nature. The new Islamic political system tried to adjust itself with the modern state, but no complete. The new political system, as the Islamic Republic of Iran, acknowledged the right of the people for participation in their affairs in local and national level. But due to the nature of the state which is unitary system, people can participate in the local level only in the social affairs, no political. In the national level people can participate in the political affairs via election of the political officials and bodies, some direct and some indirect. In addition to this, the Islamic Republic of Iran has tried to enjoy from cooperation and sympathy of the majority of the Iranian people with consideration of the following mechanisms: 1. Respect to the religious values and interests of the people, and to some extent reconstruction of them. 2. Utilization of the negative feeling of the people with respect to the intervener states and powers like, England, Russia, U.S.A, Iraq, Israel, etc. and development of such feelings. 3. Establishment and development of social, cultural, military, economic and scientific functional organizations which have revolutionary identity, like; Islamic Revolution Guards corps (Sepah Pasdaran), Para-military organization (Basij), Holy action for constructing (Jihad-e-Sazandagi), Holy action for university (Jahad-e-daneshgahi), Foundations, Islamic associations, Islamic parties, Islamic councils, Religious groups and boards, Friday prayers, etc.. These organizations, Firstly have had a much capacity of attraction and a kind of participation for the people in the governmental affairs. Secondly they have a kind of sympathy and support to the Islamic Revolution and its political system. Because there is a combination between religion and politics, since political system to be founded on the religious ideology of Islam. It seems that the people of Iran support from the government on the basis of religious stimulations. The last point is this that in spite of relative stability of religious constructive elements in the society of Iran, it seems that the society, especially among young people, is under the transition, because of development of the communications and information technology, as well as generative changing, that they have different desires and ideals than the past generations. Moreover, a part of the society, emphasizes on the development of their claims in the cultural, social, economic and political fields, with a modern approach. It seems that the increasing trend of transition will challenge those political thoughts (religious or nonreligious) which resist in front of social and political participation of the people.

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References: 1. Administrative divisions office. (2000). Electorates. Tehran: Interior Ministry 2. Amin, M. (2001). The constitution of the I.R. Iran. Tehran: Khorshid Pub. 3. Badamchi, A. (1999). Digest of laws on Islamic councils, Tehran: Dadgostar Pub. 4. Bakhteiari, S. (2001). Complete Atlas of Gitashenasi. Tehran: Gitashenasi institute th 5. Digard, J, & Hourcade, B. (1999). Iran in 20 century. Translated to Persian by mahdavi, A. Tehran: Alborz Pub. 6. Eftekhari, R. & others. (1992). Economy of Iran. Tehran: Institute of commercial Research. nd 7. Elahi, H. (1986). Importance of Iran in 2 world war. Tehran: Nashr-e-daneshgahi. 8. Foran,J. (1999). The history of social transitions in Iran. Translated to Persian by Tadayyon, A. Tehran: Rasa cultural institute. 9. Fuller,G. (1994). The center of universe - The Geopolitics of Iran, Translated to Persian by Mokhber, A. Tehran: Markaz Pub. 10. Ghanizadeh, M. (1999). A Guide for the Islamic Councils. Tehran Ayandegan Pub. 11. Hafeznia, M. (1999). Cultural relations between Iran and India before the Islam. New Delhi. Qand-e-parsi Quarterly, Vol.12 12. Hafeznia, M. (2002). Political Geography of Iran. Tehran: SAMT. 13. Hojjati, Q. (1997). Digest of Laws on municipalities and Islamic Councils. Tehran: Ganj-e-Danesh. 14. Jaafari, A. (1995). Physical Geography of Iran. Tehran: Gitashenasi institute 15. Kadivar, M. (1997). The Theories of government in Shiite fiqh, Tehran: Nay Pub. 16. Kasravi, A. (1997). The history of Mashrotah in Iran. Tehran: Amir Kabir. 17. Khairandish, R & Shayan, S. (1991). Seeking root of the name and flag of the countries. Tehran: Kavir Pub. 18. Kia, A.(2001). Media and Politics in Irans Constitutional Revolution. Tehran: Sayeh Roshan Pub. 19. Lucas.H. (1990). The History of Civilization. Vol.1 .Translated to Persian by Azarang, A. Tehran: Keyhan 20. Madani, J. (1998). The rights and functions of the Islamic councils. Tehran. Paydar Pub. 21. Sayx, P. (1998). History of Iran, Vol.1 . Translated to Persian. Tehran: Doniay-e-Ketab. 22. Social Affairs office. (2000). Islamic councils elections. Tehran: Interior Ministry. 23. Supplement of the constitution. (1906). Digest of the first Assembly laws. Tehran: Parliament Pub. 24. The complete text of the constitution of the I.R. Iran. (1993). Tehran, Alami Pub.

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LE CHIISME IRAKIEN DANS LE CONTEXTE DE LA RIVALITE GEOPOLITIQUE IRAK - IRAN - 1920 - 1990 Marius LAZR La spcificit du chiisme irakien Les chiites reprsentent environ 15% de la population musulmane, et ils sont majoritaires proximit du Golfe Persique. Plus de 70% de la population musulmane riveraine du Golfe est chiite, nanmoins elle est rpandue, lexception de lIran, dans des pays aux gouvernements sunnites o elle a souvent un statut secondaire, tant dans 1 la plupart des cas expose aux rpressions. Le pays avec la deuxime population chiite du monde, lIrak a une configuration ethno religieuse complexe, ce qui a eu des rpercussions fondamentales sur son lhistoire. Du point de vue ethnique la population arabe est majoritaire (75% - 80%); les Kurdes comptent 15% - 20%, et le reste de 5% est reprsent des Turkmnes, des Assyriens, des Iraniens, etc. Suivant la structure religieuse, les chiites sont majoritaires (60% - 65%); ils sont suivis par des sunnites (32% -37%) et des chrtiens (3%)2. Les chiites se trouvent autant dans le milieu urbain que dans celui rural. Ainsi, ils sont prsents en important nombre Bagdad (2 millions), surtout dans le quartier surpeupl de lest, Saddam City (Sadr City), compos des migrants arrivs aprs la cinquime dcennie du ct mridional du pays, et qui y conservent les anciens rapports de solidarit et les anciennes traditions tribales. Basra, deuxime ville dIrak, avec une ancienne tradition chiite, mais qui, grce sa sortie sur le Golfe, conserve depuis des sicles une attitude plus cosmopolite: une importante partie de llite commerciale y fut forme par des chiites. Les chiites sont soit majoritaires soit en nombre significatif dans toutes les grandes villes au sud du pays: al-Zubayr, Samawah, Nasiriyya, Amara, Kut. Ensuite viennent les villes saintes, qui demeurent au centre de la dvotion de tous les chiites (en Iran uniquement le Machhad est un lieu saint, car le huitime Imam Ali Reza y est enterr, et, dans une moindre mesure, le Qom). Il y a dabord Nadjaf et Kerbala, suivis par Kufa, Samarra et Baquba, qui sont peu prs entirement chiites. Kufa fut un espace chiite depuis les premires annes dIslam; Ali et ses partisans sy tablirent, et ce fut aussi l quil se fit tuer en 661. La tombe dAli se trouve Nadjaf, celui dHusayn Karbala, tandis que Samarra abrite les tombes de derniers Imams. En outre, Nadjaf abrite llite religieuse chiite et lacadmie thologique (Hawza), la plus importante du monde chiite, quoique les rpressions pendant les dernires annes du rgime batthiste aient conduit une diminution de sa influence, que lacadmie de Qom a essaye dassumer en son comte. Enfin, il y a les chiites issus de petites localits et des rgions rurales, minoritaires nanmoins par rapport ceux du milieu urbain. Dhabitude, ils sy trouvent organiss dans des tribus, qui observent les anciennes coutumes sociales, comportementales et relationnelles; ils pratiquent une variante plutt populaire de chiisme en accordant aux cheiks tribaux une autorit non seulement politique mais aussi religieuse, en quelque sorte linstar des marabouts sunnites. Une catgorie part y est reprsente par les Arabes des marais , cest-1 2

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dire les chiites qui peuplrent les zones marcageuses au sud du pays1. Une importante partie deux a migr vers les grandes villes, notamment en raison de la politique dasschement des marais mene par le pouvoir irakien, en rponse aux meutes rptes et aux infiltrations iraniennes2. Le chiisme irakien est form de niveaux multiples de reprsentations identitaires, qui simposent premirement ses membres comme tel, et ensuite tout gard thorique qui le concerne: lidentit religieuse (islamique, chiite, sub-confessionnelle), lidentit politique (nationale irakienne, rgionale, les diffrentes fidlits particulaires envers certaines structures de pouvoir spcifiques), lidentit culturelle, sociale, conomique, doctrinaire, etc. La combinaison, transversale ou verticale, de ces facettes identitaires, va engendrer, durant lhistoire du chiisme, une complexit de formes particulires dattitudes gopolitiques. A cela sajoute les influences permanentes excites par les autres acteurs gopolitiques de lespace irakien, et par les facteurs rgionaux et internationaux, tout cela construisant une configuration complexe des rapports de forces qui se constituent lintrieur et autour du chiisme irakien, durant sont volution historique. Malgr le fait que lIrak a reprsent, ds le dbut de lIslam, lespace par excellence de lapparition du chiisme et de ses premires concrtisations doctrinaires, la situation de la communaut chiite dici, au dbut de lhistoire moderne de lIrak, tait beaucoup plus infrieure que celle de lIran. Hormis des viles saintes, en grande partie, dailleurs, amassant une population non irakienne, la situation du chiisme irakien stait dgrad, aux derniers sicles, la cause de son intgration dans lempire ottoman et par la dcadence dmographique et conomique des territoires irakiennes de cette priode. En fait, la communaut chiite irakienne commence acqurir une poids importante dans le cadre de la population dIrak peine au moment du dplacement des tribus du nord de la presqule arabe, au XIXme sicle, en partie la suite des pressions excites par le dveloppement du wahhabisme, qui vont stablir au sud de lIrak et, progressivement, qui vont devenir sdentaires. A la suite de la propagande des missionnaires envoys par le clerg de Nadjaf et Karbala, une grande partie de ces tribus vont se convertir lIslam chiite, mais leur religiosit est plutt rituelle, sans trop de lien avec le chiisme intellectuel vhicul dans les milieux clricaux3. Concernant le clerg, il constitue maintenant la principale lite de la communaut, mais sa situation est aussi complexe. Mme cet gard, il y a une diffrence envers la situation de lIran. On a parl dun chiisme iranien, qui a acquis, grce aux safavides, un fort caractre institutionnel, dans la mesure o la doctrine chiite devient officielle dans lEtat et un instrument de lgitimit politique du gouvernement. Lun de principaux effets a t la croissance de linfluence du clerg, qui fonctionne maintenant comme interface entre le pouvoir politique et la population. Mme il ny en avait quune seule partie qui tait impliqus effectivement pour soutenir le pouvoir, les facilits offertes aux mollahs a favoris la crotre de leur rle dans la vie de la communaut iranienne, tous les niveaux4. A ce chiisme iranien on oppose le chiisme de Irak, o les clercs nont jamais russi dobtenir une telle autorit directe sur la population, ce rle tant surtout lapanage des leaders tribaux, des cheikhs.
Thesiger Wilfred, Les arabes des marais. Tigre et Euphrat, Plon, 2005. Emma Nicholson, Destruction et gnocide dans les marais du sud de lIrak, dans Chris Kutschera (dir.), Le livre noir de Saddam Hussein, Oh! Editions, 2005, p. 279-298. 3 Sur la conversion des tribus au chiisme, dans Nakash Yitzhak, The Shiis of Iraq, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 25-42. 4 Algar Hamid, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period, University of California Press, 1969, Shahrough, Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporany Iran. Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period, State University of New York Press, 1980.
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Linfluence de clercs des centres saints tait plutt religieuse, dans la mesure ils adoptaient eux aussi la position de non engagement politique. On arrive ici un thme central qui gouverne toute la problmatique gopolitique du chiisme. Il sagit de lexistence des deux tendances lintrieur de la classe clricale chiite, qui sont connues gnriquement sous le nom de lattitude pitiste et celle activiste. Sans tre visiblement dmarques, adoptes les deux parfois, en fonction des circonstances historiques, elles visent, en fait, les limites de limplication du clerg dans la vie politique1. Evidemment, le plus souvent, existant lintrieur de certaines entits politiques sunnites, le chiisme a t oblig, pour survivre, de modrer ses ambitions politiques et de mettre laccent plutt sur la conservation culturelle et doctrinaire de ses thmes. Cest aussi le cas du chiisme irakien, lintrieur de lempire ottoman. Mme si les rgions chiites du sud, et surtout les villes saintes ont joui dune certain libert pendant la priode de la domination ottomane, cela rsultait aussi du fait que llite thologique dici ntait pas entrane en divers ambitions politiques. Nadjaf et Karbala se dfinissaient tout dabord comme de principaux centres thologiques et des territoires sacrs vers lesquelles se dirigeait tout lespace chiite. Ltablissement, pendant la priode danarchie politique qui a gouvern lIran entre la chute des safavides et linstallation des qajars (1732 - 1786), dun grand nombre de grands clercs iraniens dans les acadmies thologiques de Irak, a eu une influence sur lvolution du chiisme dici. Premirement, il a acclr la principale mutation thologique de lhistoire moderne du chiisme, cest--dire le succs des thses osulites sur les akhbarites. Il sagit de plus dune simple dispute thologique, car elle a eu des consquences profondes sur les rapports entre les clercs et les fidles, et elle met les bases doctrinaires de limplication de llite hirarchique chiite dans les problmes concernant le gouvernement de la communaut, mme jusquau niveau dassumer un leadership politique inclusif. Autour de lentente des limites prsupposes par le dogme osulite se produit le glissement entre ce quon appelle lattitude pitiste et celle activiste2. A part les polarisations en fonction de lattitude envers limplication politique, la structure htrogne du clerg chiite irakien rsulte autant du cosmopolitisme ethnique, que de la formation de vraies dynasties clricales, reprsentes par les divers familles qui arrivent se disputer, plus ou moins discrtement, le pouvoir lintrieur de la communaut chiite. Les acadmies thologiques de Nadjaf, Karbala, Kufa, se sont caractriss comme des centres par excellence dun chiisme international, attirant des tudiants et des clercs de toutes les rgions chiites, spcialement de Iran3. Cela a confr une identit part ces villes, non problmatique dans un empire ottoman lui mme cosmopolite, mais qui va saffronter, du moment de la formation de lIrak indpendant, avec les pressions dun milieu politique pour lequel le repre tait devenu ce moment-l la prise en charge dune identit irakienne. Les suspicions qui ont entour en permanence la loyaut irakienne des chiites a son origine justement dans la nouvelle idologie national arabe qui fonde le nouveau Etat, vhicule surtout par les lments sunnites qui sempare du pouvoir, et pour laquelle le caractre tranger des lites religieuses chiites devient ainsi un argument pour exclure leur ventuelle participation au pouvoir. Les rapports de pouvoir dans la classe des clercs dpendent notamment du prestige thologique, le principal facteur dinfluence sur la communaut chiite. Le systme
Marcinkowski, Ismail, Religion And Politics in Iraq: Shiite Clerics Between Quietism and Resistance, Pustaka Nasional Pte Ltd., 2004. 2 Cole Juan, Shii Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722 - 1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict Reconsidered, Iranian Studies, N 28, 1985, p. 3 - 33. 3 Meir Litvak, Shii scholars of nineteenth-century Iraq. The Ulama of Najaf and Karbala, Cambridge Univesity Press, 1998.
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chiite traditionnel est fond sur lide dune fidlit intgrale du fidle envers les enseignements (religieux, comportementaux, juridique ou mme politiques) promus par lun des grands mujtahides, quil prend comme source (marja). Marja, en vertu de ses qualits minentes et de son prestige thologique, est conu comme le seul en mesure de prendre des dcisions concrtes, en conformit avec les enseignements de 1 lIslam et des Imams, aux divers aspects concernant la vie du fidle . Cest pourquoi les grands clercs arrivent dtenir un immense pouvoir, que ce soit symbolique ou explicite, sur la communaut, et par cette raison linstitution marjaiya a t vue par la majorit des leaders de lIrak moderne comme une permanente menace leur dsir daccaparation intgrale de tout le champ des manifestations communautaires irakiennes. Les clercs peuvent reprsenter un facteur de mobilisation intense, et cela fait peur. En 1920, les grands mujtahids de Nadjaf et Karbala ont t lorigine de la grande meute des tribus arabes du sud de lIrak contre les britanniques. En 1979, Khomeyni a russi confisquer lenthousiasme rvolutionnaire iranien en valorisant justement le prestige thologique de son rang. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr a essay la mme chose, et ce nest que lampleur du systme rpressif bathiste qui a fait chouer la mobilisation populaire irakienne, forme autour de sa personne. Aujourdhui, malgr sa position rserve et pitiste, Sistani reprsente le principal facteur dinfluence sur la communaut chiite irakienne, et ses fatwas, quelque discrtes quils soient en amplitude politique, ont contribu dcisivement lacceptation dun systme pluraliste en Irak, et aussi au forcement de la commission constitutionnelle dintroduire des lments islamiques dans la nouvelle constitution provisoire adopte en 2004. Il faut aussi mentionner ici les diverses dynasties clricales, rsultes du choix de la carrire ecclsiastique par des gnrations successives de membres de certaines familles minentes de mujtahides. Il y en a par exemple al-Hakim, al-Sadr, Bahr al-Ulum, al-Khalisi, al-Shirazi2. Cest de ces familles que les grands clercs sont souvent issus, sans que leur simple appartenance gnalogique en soit une raison dcisive; cela doit tre obligatoirement doubl dun prestige thologique. Marjaiya est en soi une institution librale, au sens de lacceptation de plusieurs instances dcisionnelles et noyaux de pouvoir religieux: chaque marja a ses propres imitateurs et sa propre recette qui gre les rapports avec les fidles. Cela a favoris lapparition dune certaine comptition lintrieur de linstitution ecclsiastique, plus ou moins visible, o sont mlangs des intrts de clan, des envies personnelles, des disputes idologiques etc. Certaines familles clricales arrivent dominer les lespace communautaire et conomique des divers centres thologiques: al-Shirazi en Karbala, al-Khalisi en Khadimiya, al-Sadr en Samarra. Chacun cultive sa propre recette de clients, intrts et institutions, et des branches des familles sont prsentes dans tout lespace chiite, jusquen Afghanistan et Pakistan, ensuite mme en Europe et aux Etats Unis. Sans aucun doute, la principale tension gopolitique qui affecte la communaut chiite irakienne est-elle reprsente par les rapports entretenus par cette communaut avec les pouvoirs politiques qui staient succds la tte de lIrak, partir du moment de sa proclamation en tant qutat, en 1920. LEmpire ottoman tait une structure politique construite daprs lancien modle oriental de la gouvernance de certaine communauts identifies dabord par des critres religieux et non pas nationaux. Le concept de nation et celui de nationalisme font leur apparition en Orient seulement partir de la seconde
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moiti du XIXme sicle, en mme temps avec laccroissement de linfluence politique et culturelle europenne et de celle des mouvements propres dmancipation nationale activant en Europe. Mais la cration de lIrak, comme celle des autres tats rcemment crs dans le Moyen-Orient, a reprsent plutt un acte colonial, et non pas lexpression effective dun nationalisme irakien autochtone. Ce dernier avait t reprsent justement par lopposition des milieux clricaux chiites, dont la rvolte anti-britannique de 1920 avait t mene au nom de lindpendance dun espace irakien qui ntait pas encore structur en tant que nouvelle identit tatique mais qui tait prsum de ltre1. C'est ce moment prcis, une fois la rvolte arabe vaincue, que les britanniques exileront en Iran les marja qui avaient t lorigine de ce mouvement, et quils installeront un systme politique qui gardait la plupart des anciennes lites ayant fonctionn 2 dans ladministration ottomane, et qui taient presque intgralement sunnites . La formation de ltat irakien a oblig donc la communaut chiite entrer dans la logique dune identit nationale et de repenser son statut compte tenu de la perspective des rapports quelle tait force dentretenir avec les autres communauts. Ce que lon appelle le problme irakien est d justement lchec de la cration dun sentiment de cohsion entre les trois grands groupes ethno-religieux qui sont actuellement tisss dans la toile de ltat irakien (chiites, sunnites, kurdes) et de transcendance effective des sgrgations existant au sein de la socit. Le mandat britannique a install en Irak un systme politique et social de type moderne, mais le fond sur lequel celui-ci tait appel agir est rest tributaire la propre tradition et surtout des mentalits insuffisamment prpares pour pouvoir fonctionner rapidement dans un tel paradigme. Lexclusion des acteurs chiites du jeu politique irakien ou des institutions commence ds la formation de ltat ; bien quil existe une certaine reprsentation politique chiite pendant la priode de la monarchie, celle-ci est beaucoup au-dessous du niveau reprsent par le poids de la population chiite dans la socit irakienne. En grande partie, cette lite qui participe au pouvoir est forme par les grands propritaires des terres ou par divers leaders tribaux, dont la fidlit est achete en les accaparant au pouvoir ou en leur offrant diffrents privilges3. En fait, les rgimes actuels essaient de dissimuler le caractre sectaire vident de ltat, qui tait fond sur la promotion des lments sunnites, tout en vhiculant une srie didologies arabes, dans lide de la cration dune abstraite identit gnrique capable dattnuer le glissage confessionnel dans le cadre de la socit. Mais le concept dune socit galitaire, spcifique la culture politique occidentale, fond sur la catgorie de citoyennet et de droits universels, a peu dapplicabilit dans une tradition o prime assabiya et les rapports lintrieur de la communaut se fondent en termes de domination et de soumission, de dtenue exclusive du pouvoir. La persistance avec laquelle les lites politiques irakiennes ont promu un systme privilgiant les sunnites, a engendr une fracture confessionnelle dans le cadre de la socit irakienne et a oblig les deux communauts rflchir leurs rapports en termes de concurrence et de rivalit pour le pouvoir. La position des chiites, aux dbuts de ltat irakien, tait affaiblie aussi bien par le fait que ceux-ci ne dtenaient ni une tradition de la participation politique, ni des lites
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Pierre-Jean Luizard, La formation de lIrak contemporain. Le rle politique des ulmas chiites la fin de la domination ottomane et au moment de la cration de ltat irakien, Editions de CNRS, 1991. 2 Reeva Spector Simon, Eleanor H. Tejirian (eds.), The creation of Iraq 1914-1921, Columbia University Press, 2004. 3 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq: A Study of Iraqs Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Bathists, and Free Officers, Princeton University Press, 1978; .

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dans ce sens-l. Llite traditionnelle de la communaut, le clerg des villes saintes, assumait un leadership religieux, mais non pas politique; mme le jihad de 1920 avait t men au nom de certains principes religieux dinterprtation du territoire irakien. Llite politique qui allait se former durant la monarchie avait peu de reprsentativit populaire, et lidentit communautaire tait fortement attnue, en faveur des intrts personnels ou de ceux des propres clients. Ctait un des facteurs qui ont contribu au succs du mouvement communiste parmi les chiites, au dbut des annes 1950, particulirement dans le milieu du nouveau proltariat urbain, qui trouvait pour la premire fois une idologie et une modalit alternative aux structures traditionnelles du pouvoir en Irak, tout en tant en mme temps une forme de contestation de lexclusivisme sunnite 1 ou de la tyrannie des cheiks, qui rsonnait avec la thorie chiite de justice sociale . Le renversement de lancien ordre monarchique, au moment de la rvolution de 1958, la participation du Parti Communiste Irakien au pouvoir, durant les deux premires annes, ladoption de certaines rformes et programmes sociaux ayant apport des bnfices tout dabord aux milieux dfavoriss chiites, ont offert lillusion que, finalement, des membres de la communaut chiite peuvent accder la gouvernance et que les intrts des chiites seront pris en considration. Mais le processus rvolutionnaire irakien a eu comme rsultat, comme dailleurs dans dautres pays arabes aussi, lapparition dun nouvel acteur politique, larme, au sein de laquelle les nouveaux leaders seront recruts dornavant. Dans la mesure o le corps des officiers tait presque exclusivement form par des sunnites, les rapports de force dans le cadre de la socit irakienne continuent dtre dsquilibrs en faveur de la minorit sunnite, do lon recrute les cadres, surtout en vertu des diffrents rseaux de solidarit rgionale, tribale, familiale, etc. Lchec du socialisme de Kassem dans sa dmarche de construire une socit irakienne sur des principes galitaires se fonde aussi bien sur lopposition que les structures sunnites manifestent envers lide dune mancipation politique chiite, ce qui aurait entran la perte dune partie importante des privilges dtenus. Cest le moment o apparat le mouvement islamiste chiite, qui se propose aussi bien la prservation des valeurs chiites face la modernit et aux nouvelles idologies laques, quun programme daction politique, visant installer un gouvernement en conformit avec les principes de lIslam. Comme tous les mouvements islamistes apparus ce moment prcis dans le monde musulman, lislamisme chiite irakien, reprsent surtout par le mouvement Dawa, a eu, au dbut, plutt une projection spatiale lchelle transnationale, et il ralise une lecture de la ralit dans le cadre et avec lappareil conceptuel de la thologie. Des idologues tel Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr sintressent la renaissance des principes islamiques et linstallation dune utopique socit musulmane gouverne par Sharia2. Ce nest quavec linstauration de lautoritarisme des frres Arif, que le parti Dawa commence nationaliser son discours et ses stratgies daction, ce qui fait que le problme gnrique de la rsurrection du chiisme soit li celui de lmancipation de la communaut chiite irakienne. Avec larrive du parti Bath au pouvoir, toute ambition politique chiite dy participer au nom des intrts de la communaut est exclue. Bien quil se revendique dune doctrine
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Martin, Pierre, Les chiites dIrak: une majorit domine la recherche de son destin, Peuples mditerranens, n 40, 1987, p. 127-169. 2 T. M. Aziz, The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shia Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2. 1993.

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panarabe, le parti Bath reprsente toujours un avatar de lapplication du tribalisme dans la politique et de la persistance dune vision de patrimoine sur les institutions de ltat1. Le Bath daprs 1968 est centr autour dun noyau form par des membres unis par la solidarit qui leur est confr par les rapports de parent, lappartenance la mme zone tribale et lidentit sunnite. Tout en apprenant des leons antrieures de lhistoire irakienne, et surtout de celles de la nouvelle rpublique, ils sont convaincus du fait que la seule modalit efficace de garder le pouvoir consiste, dun ct, capter ladhsion dune grande partie de la population, et dun autre ct, liminer tout possible comptiteur. Comme dautres pays arabes daprs la priode post-coloniale, lIrak a chou lui aussi dans un systme autocrate, bas sur la suprmatie dune lite qui sempare de toutes les fonctions dEtat et qui entretient une clientle dont la position sociale et prosprit dpendent justement du maintien du pouvoir; ensuite, le plus important contestataire de lordre idologique social et politique devient, aprs la septime dcennie, le mouvement islamiste2. Il existe actuellement cinq grandes zones de conflit: a) la premire est politique, fonde sur le blocage de tout projet politique propre de la communaut chiite ; il est permis au maximum une participation partielle, dans les limites imposes par le pouvoir bathiste, et qui a un caractre formel, non dcisionnel; b) le conflit conomique, entre la tendance tatiste de Bagdad et les classe commerciales chiites. Aprs la rforme agraire de 1959, qui a dsintgr la classe des propritaires agricoles, les nationalisations de 1964, 1970, 1977 ont affect les lites commerciales et industrielles chiites, ce qui a entran la disparition de la classe moyenne, qui, en partie, sera dporte en Iran, se convertira vers des activits intellectuelles ou prendra la voie de lexile; c) la rupture culturelle, entre le discours bathiste, qui met laccent sur lidentit nationale ou sur le caractre arabe, et les valeurs vhicules par les leaders chiites, qui sont par excellence, religieuses ; encore plus, les institutions clricales sont fortement restrictionnes, en tant perues comme un rival dans laccaparation totale de la fidlit de la population; d) le problme des droits publics de la population chiite, qui est souvent discrimine et soumise des reprsailles justement cause de laltrit confessionnelle (la dportation massive des chiites, sous laccusation dtre sujets iraniens et non pas irakiens); e) la politique de scularisation, qui non seulement affecte linfluence sociale du discours religieux chiite, mais celle-ci a aussi bien dtruit le systme de contrle dont le clerg bnficiait dans ladministration de ses rapports avec les fidles (justice, ducation, collectage des taxes religieuses, disparition des classes moyennes chiites qui assuraient le soutien financier des programmes Hawza, etc.)3. Les politiques restrictives bathistes contre les instances traditionnelles de la communaut chiite laissent maintenant le mouvement islamiste comme seul acteur organis et dispos une raction de contestation. Ds la priode Arif, Dawa avait visiblement nationalis son discours et ses stratgies et avait augment son influence 4 surtout au sein de la population urbaine, proltariat et intellectuels . Pendant la septime
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Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: from Revolution to Dictatorship, I. B. Tauris, 2001, p. 215-254, Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq: a Study in Iraqi Politics since 1968, Washington Middle East Institut, 1978. 2 Pierre Bonte, douard Conte, Paul Dresch (coord.), mirs et prsidents. Figures de la parent et du politique dans le monde arabe, CNRS ditions, 2001. 3 Graham Fuller, Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shia. The Forgotten Muslims, St. Martin Press, 1999, p. 98-99. 4 Hanna Batatu, Shii Organisations in Iraq: al-Dawah al-Islamiah and al-Mujahidin, dans Juan Cole, Nikkie Keddie (eds.), Shiism and Social Protest, Yale University Press, 1986; Abdul-Halim al-Ruhaimi "The Da'wa Islamic Party: Origins, Actors and Ideology," in Faleh Abdul-Jabar (ed.), Ayatollah, Sufis and Ideologues: State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq, Saqi Books, 2003.

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Le chiisme irakien et la rivalit Irak-Iran jusqu la rvolution islamique La cration de ltat irakien, en 1920, sera perue comme une menace directe pour lIran. Marqu encore par limpacte des tendances expansionnistes britanniques et russes, le Thran voit lIrak comme une nouvelle forme de colonialisme britannique, ainsi quun danger pour le destin du chiisme de la rgion, et mme de la nation persane, dans la mesure o les nouvelles lites politiques de Bagdad se revendiquent du sunnisme et proclament lIrak gardien de la nation arabe contre la Perse1. Cest justement pour cette raison que lIran soutiendra la rvolte irakienne contre la prsence britannique en 1920, lorsque les leaders chiites irakiens seront soutenus par le clerg et les officialits de lIran. La perception iranienne sur lIrak - Etat colonial - sest maintenue jusqu la rvolution irakienne de 1958, et ni mme le fait que les deux pays ont fait partie du Pacte de Bagdad, entre 1955-1958, na conduit une attnuation des mfiances et disputes territoriales, lies surtout Chatt al-Arab. Aprs 1958, lIran et en gnral les monarchies de la rgion (Jordanie, Arabie Saoudite) se sentent menacs par la vague rvolutionnaire du Moyen-Orient, axe sur les valeurs du socialisme et du nationalisme arabe. Les tentatives dunion arabe de la fin de la sixime dcennie (la Rpublique Arabe Unie, les diffrents projets dunion tripartite Egypte-Syrie-Irak, ou seulement SyrieIrak) contribuent lintensification de langoisse du Shah; il essayera de briser lunit arabe en Irak aidant les principales forces anti-unionistes: le clerg chiite et le mouvement kurde irakienne. La situation empirera de plus en plus, une fois acheve lascension politique de Bath, en 1968. Les disputes sont multiples. En premier lieu, idologiques: le nationalisme agressif panarabe vhicul par les nouveaux leaders irakiens se heurte violemment du nationalisme persan du Shah. LIrak assume de plus en plus le rle de dfenseur du monde arabe dans le Golf: il aide les mouvements rvolutionnaires antimonarchistes de Oman, soppose loccupation des trois les du dfil Ormuz, en 1971, par lIran au dtriment des mirats Arabes Unis, rcemment crs, revendiquent priodiquement la province iranienne Khouzistan (Arabistan). Les deux voisins doublent leur rivalit par sa projection au niveau de la guerre froide globale: tandis que lIran semble assumer, en accord avec les intrts amricains le devoir de gendarme du Golfe et agent de limitation sovitique, lIrak signe en 1972 un trait damiti et collaboration avec URSS, qui permet aux sovitiques lutilisation du port Oum Qasr - action perue Thran comme une menace directe ladresse de sa scurit au Golf2. La principale dispute se droule autour du canal Chatt al-Arab, enjeu majeur pour le dveloppement commercial de deux pays, surtout pour lIrak, pour lequel le canal constitue la seule voie daccs maritime de grand tonnage vers le Golf Persique. En 1847, le trait dErzouroum plaait le cours de leau sous suzerainet ottomane
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Jean-Pierre Luizard, La question irakienne, Fayard, 2004, p. 237. Haim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968-1988: In the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, p. 70-75.
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dcennie, lopposition islamiste se trouvera derrire plusieurs mouvements de protestation, loccasion des grandes mobilisations populaires des rituels de plerinage chiites, qui reoivent une note vidente de protestation politique. La rpression violente de ces plerinages et des groupes islamistes annonce linstauration dun systme totalitaire, qui nhsite pas faire recours des purgations en masse, pour dfendre ses privilges. Les rapports entre linstitution clricale, pitistes et militants, et le pouvoir bathiste deviennent ce moment-ci radicalement antagoniques.

tandis que lle Abadan, situe la sortie du Golf, tait mise sous lautorit de la Perse. Suite la signature dun nouveau trait, en 1937 sous les auspices de la Socit des Nations, la frontire tait tablie sur talweg six kilomtres et demie devant lIle Abadan1. En avril 1969, lIran abroge ce trait, annonant la suspension de la taxe douanire pour lIrak et la navigation dans les eaux du canal seulement sous pavillon irakien. Il sagit videmment dune position de force de Thran, base sur lide de la fragilit du nouveau rgime install Bagdad; elle a provoqu pourtant une mobilisation militaire immdiate de lIrak dans la rgion du canal, ainsi que ladoption dune virulente propagande anti-iranienne. Lune des consquences majeures de cette tension a t la position politique du rgime irakien vis--vis de la communaut chiite. Car, en signe de reprsailles contre la menace de Thran, les leaders Bath ont dcid dexpulser de lIrak tous les citoyens iraniens, dcision qui masquait en fait, lintention de compromettre lautorit du clerg chiite et du soutien reu par lintermdiaire des rseaux internationaux de fidles, lis aux institutions religieuses de lIran. Mais ce que le gouvernement irakien appelait iraniens , en considrant tre entre cinq cent milles et deux millions dindividus (bien que, daprs les statistiques officielles leur nombre ne dpassait pas 25.000) taient en ralit membres de la communaut chiite, majoritairement arabes, mais dont le statut civil supportait les consquences des politiques discriminatoires anti-chiite, mene les premires annes de la monarchie. Il sagit principalement de la Loi sur la nationalit, promulgue en 1924, par laquelle lon accordait aux habitants du territoire irakien le titre de citoyens; son application supposait en revanche la considration dune situation antrieure, de la domination ottomane, lorsquil y avait deux catgories, celle de citoyen ottoman et dhabitant iranien de lempire. Il est vrai que le sud de lIran a t pendant des sicles, un espace extrmement cosmopolite, o le voisinage avec lempire persan et lexistence des centres religieux chiites a provoqu dimportantes migrations de population. Surtout aprs linstallation de la dynastie qajare en Iran, au dbut du XIXme sicle, et le dclin du pouvoir ottoman, entre les deux tats diminue la rivalit et disparat la dimension religieuse du conflit, ce qui a signifi plus de permissivit frontalire et ltablissement dun grand nombre diraniens sur le territoire irakien. Beaucoup dentre eux y restent pour des considrants religieux, tant intgrs dans le vaste rseau thologique et socioconomique qui gravitait autour des villes saintes. Ainsi, au dbut du XXme sicle le nombre diraniens tablis en Irak dpassait le chiffre 80.000; Karbala, par exemple, leur nombre tait de 75% du total de la population2. Lempire ottoman les prenait pour sujets persans, ceux-ci ne devant plus payer les taxes et tant accepts comme dpendant de la juridiction iranienne. Le problme essentiel est quune partie de la population effectivement arabe, du sud de lIrak, adeptes du chiisme et trangers au systme dorigine sunnite de ltat ottoman, refusa daccepter leur appartenance ottomane prfrant plutt tre considrs des sujets soumis la lgislation iranienne. Les raisons sont la fois religieuses, dans la mesure o la Perse sidentifiait au chiisme institutionnalis, et conomiques car cette position changeait le statut financier des adeptes qui ne devaient plus payer les impts lEtat ottoman et de plus, on leur pargnait le service militaire; dans une autre perspective, cette option prsentait aussi des dsavantages tant un obstacle pour lventuelle ascension administrative ou politique dans le systme ottoman.
Lawrence G. Potter, The Evolution of the Iran-Iraq Boundary, in Reeva Spector Simon, Eleanor H. Tejirian (eds.), The creation of Iraq 1914 - 1921, p. 71-74. 2 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shiis of Iraq,, p. 14-17.
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La loi sur la nationalit, malgr son caractre progressiste, continuait de maintenir la distinction antrieure entre irakiens dorigine ottomane et ceux dorigine persane , chose signale dans le certificat de nationalit reu par chaque habitant de lIrak. De plus, cette dualit entre irakiens dorigine ottomane (tabaiya uthmaniya) et ceux dorigine iranienne (tabaiya iraniya) perptuait les anciens privilges des vieux citoyens ottomans, compte tenu du fait que, y compris aprs linstallation de la monarchie, seuls les premiers taient reconnus citoyens pleins pouvoirs1. cho du milieu sunnite gravitant autour des nouveaux leaders irakiens recruts eux aussi parmi la vieille bureaucratie et lite ottomane, solidaires grce la confession sunnite et doubls par lvidente rticence anti-chiite des mandataires britanniques aprs la rvolte de 1920, cette loi avait un fort caractre discriminatoire. Elle prvoyait que les habitants arabes de lIrak, provenus en grande partie des tribus arabes tablies au sud du pays suite me me aux migrations des XIX - XX sicles, adhrents du chiisme, acquirent un statut secondaire, si lon pense leur refus lors de recensements ottomans de se dclarer des sujets dpendant de ltat ottoman, lorsque beaucoup dtrangers, turcs ou dautres ethnies de lespace irakien, membres de ladministration impriale ou tout simplement des habitants, arrivent tre reconnus comme citoyens irakiens pleins pouvoirs2. Cest une situation complexe, dont les ambiguts nont pas tardes de se faire spcules par les officiels sunnites dsireux dinstituer un systme qui prserve leurs droits de la priode ottomane ou provenus de la rcente volution de ltat irakien. Cest par cette discrimination de nature confessionnelle que le nouveau gouvernement irakien, install par les britanniques en 1920, justifie la dcision dexpulser les grands clercs chiites, considrs tre des ressortissants non-irakiens3. Continuant cette politique, le rgime Bath essaye de profiter de la prsence iranienne sur le territoire irakien pour trouver un cible vulnrable aux pousses arabes vhicules par les nouveaux leaders, ainsi que pour exercer de la pression sur lIran. Ainsi, au moment de lescalade du conflit frontalier de Chatt el-Arab, le raction de Bagdad est de dcider la dportation des iraniens de lIrak ; cette dcision visait un double aspect: induire lIran le devoir dintgrer les nouveaux expulss ce qui aurait eu des consquences au niveau conomique et social, et confisquer les biens des expulss, ce qui aurait apport beaucoup de bnfices ltat irakien. Cest ce quon pourrait appeler un vaste projet dingnierie sociale dont on assiste aux dbuts et qui sera dvelopp plus largement les annes qui suivent, aux communauts kurde et chiite; cette politique dpuration ethnoreligieuse ou de vastes mouvements de population dans des buts stratgiques, internes ou rgionaux, sera lune des caractristiques du rgimes rpressif irakien de lpoque. Elle est inaugure comme une raction immdiate la position iranienne ; ds le 7 mai 1969, deux jours avant le traditionnel plerinage dArbain de Karbala, milles iraniens tablis en Irak se font arrts et dports la frontire iranienne4. Cette action violente et provocatrice marque le dbut du conflit entre le rgime Bath et la communaut chiite, vise dans larrire-plan par ce scnario des leaders de Bagdad, ainsi que le dbut des efforts faits pour attirer Hawza dans les jeux politiques irakiens et rgionaux. La dmarche na t quune partie dune stratgie plus large visant
Ali Babakhan, The Deportation of Shiis During the Iraq-Iran War: Causes and Consequences, in Faleh Abdul-Jabar (ed.), Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues. State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq, Saqi Books, 2002, p. 189-190. 2 Ali Babakhan, Les kurdes dIrak, Liban, 1994, p. 178-179. 3 Yitzhak Nakash, op. cit., p. 101-104. 4 Jens-Uwe Rahe, La dportation des chiites en Iran, dans Chris Kutschera (dir.), Le livre noir de Saddam Hussein, Oh! Editions, 2005, p. 260.
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le dsengagement de la position de lIran dans la zone du canal et gnralement de loffensive de subversion anti-iranienne, stratgie comprenant aussi le scnario de manipulation de limmense influence exerce par linstitution clricale sur lentier espace chiite, y compris iranien. Le pouvoir irakien exerce de la pression sur linstitution marjaiyya, plus prcisment sur Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, pour quil joue le rle de mdiateur avec lIran, pensant que le prestige de ce personnage, doubl par la politique dexpulsion de lIrak des ressortissants, plus ou moins iraniens, aurait des effets sur les dcisions prises Thran. Le refus catgorique de Al-Hakim de sassumer une telle responsabilit reprsente une attitude fidle sa position de non-engagement politique spcifique pour son entire activit, mais aussi un signe de proteste contre toute politique Bath, dont il refuse dtre son reprsentant mme dans le cas dune possible amlioration de la situation des fidles iraniens ou chiites. Son attitude prompte, ct de la bndiction accorde une grande procession de protestation des clercs et commerants de Nadjaf vers Bagdad1, dcoule du dsir traditionnel des grands clercs de ne pas compromettre leur rle religieux, ainsi que dune sagesse diplomatique de non-implication dans une situation politique sensible qui aurait pu compromettre les rapports entre les villes saintes et lIran, y compris linstitution du plerinage et tous les bnfices financiers et religieux obtenus grce la proximit des croyants et institutions chiites iraniens. Pourtant, linsistance du pouvoir bathiste auprs al-Hakim ne manquait pas de raisons, puisque son ascension dans la position de marja mutlaq, aprs la mort de Borujerdi, en 1962, tait aussi due dans une certaine mesure linfluence exerce par le Shah. Comme maintes fois aprs la disparition dun marja suprme, il y a pendant la priode qui suit un intervalle o la direction est collgiale, chacun des marja attendant le moment de la reconnaissance de lun parmi eux comme prochaine source suprme. Maintenant, au moment de la disparition de Borujerdi, les ayatollahs majeurs taient surtout Milani (Machhad), Khunsari (Thran), Shariat Madari (Qom), et al-Hakim, en Nadjaf - qui tait aussi le seul arabe parmi eux. Ce moment intermdiaire, o chacun parmi les grands clercs se trouve dans une comptition tacite pour la reconnaissance de son statut suprme dans sa communaut shiite, sera spcul par le Shah, qui est proccup par la limitation du pouvoir de linstitution clricale en Iran. Intervenant en faveur de la reconnaissance de Hakim comme marja mutlaq, le Shah contribue ainsi laffaiblissement de la position du Qom, loigne de Iran le titre de marja suprme et surtout, grce la position pitiste structurale de Hakim, il espre empcher linfluence de Khomeyni et, en gnral, de tout lactivisme islamiste dvelopp autour de celui-ci dans cette priode2. Le refus catgorique de Hakim de se mler la ngociation avec lIran renforce la dcision de Bagdad dintensifier ses politiques discriminatoires anti-chiites; pour la majorit des leaders irakiens, les grands clercs, spcialement la vaste famille al-Hakim, reprsentent sinon des agents de lIran, au moins des promoteurs de certaines positions antipatriotiques, anti-irakienne. Dailleurs, aprs la rpression brutale de plusieurs dmonstrations chiites Nadjaf et Bagdad, suivies darrestations, tortures, confiscations de biens religieux des villes saintes, linterdiction de lenseignement religieux et des missions religieuses publiques. Muhsin al-Hakim ragira en promulguant une fatwa qui interdit lentre des croyants chiites dans le parti Bath. Le rgime de Bagdad recourt, au vieux scnario de dcouverte dun complot anti-irakien, instrument par les services
Joyce N. Wiley, The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shias, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, p. 45. Pierre-Jean Luizard, The Nature of the Confrontation Between the State and Marjaism: Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim and the Bath, in Faleh Abdul-Jabar (ed.), Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues. State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq, p. 92.
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secrets trangers iraniens et amricains. Fait public le 20 janvier 1970, il a conduit larrestation des dizaines de leaders chiites, membres de la Dawa, officiels des diffrentes institutions y compris des clercs, commenant avec Mahdi al-Hakim, fils de Muhsin, 1 accus davoir t agent CIA . Tous ces vnements dbutant avec le refus de Muhsin al-Hakim, et de linstitution clricale en gnral de se laisser entraner dans les jeux politiques irakiens auront des consquences ngatives sur Hawza et sur la position de la communaut chiite dans la socit irakienne. Parmi les plus importantes consquences: 1) Le prolongement, une dimension plus tendue de la politique dexpulsion des iraniens. En septembre 1971, plus de 40.000 kurdes faylis se font arrter et dporter. La population kurde convertie au chiisme, elle stait tabli lest de Bagdad, vers la frontire iranienne, une partie venue du Kurdistan irakien, lautre venue, le long des sicles, des zones iraniennes, mais tablis en Irak o staient mlangs aux populations locales2. La majorit dentre eux faisait partie de llite commerciale de Bagdad tant bien intgre dans la structure socioconomique de la capitale. Mais, avec ce double handicap dtre la fois kurdes et chiites et cause de leur nombre rduit et surtout de leur position fragile dans la socit irakienne, ils deviennent un milieu vulnrable aux politiques discriminatoires du rgime Bath. En novembre 1971, lemprise iranienne des trois les qui contrlent laccs au Golf Perse (Grand Tomb, Petit Tomb, Abou Moussa), et qui avaient appartenues jusqualors aux rcemment apparus mirats Arabes Unis, dont limportance conomique et gostratgique est fondamentale pour le trafic entre le Golf et lOcan Indien3, dclenche la dcision de Bagdad dexpulser encore 60.000 iraniens. Seulement une partie provenait des familles persanes tablies en Irak ; la majorit sont effectivement des habitants dorigine arabe, de foi chiite, peuplant en particulier les rgions situes dans la proximit des villes saintes4. Dports la frontire iranienne, ils vont se heurter de relles difficults concernant lintgration dans la socit iranienne, surtout cause de la langue farsi quils ne matrisaient pas ; ils se rfugient dans les camps de Syrie, la frontire avec lIrak ou prs de Damas. La motivation de toutes ces actions du rgime Bath, orientes vers la population irakienne, est trs complexe ; cest un mlange de raisonnements lis la nouvelle logique totalitaire du rgime, lintention de provoquer des difficults conomiques lIran qui se voit obliger dintgrer les expulss, au projet de modification de la carte ethnique du pays, larabisation accentue du centre de lIrak et de la rgion proche de la capitale. Lon peut ajouter des justifications de nature, autre que politique ou stratgique: lexpulsion de la population indsirable, reprsente par des commerants ou diffrents entrepreneurs chiites kurdes, iraniens ou arabes - apportait au rgime Bath llimination dun
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Mallat Chibli, The Renewal of Islamic Law, Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr, Nadjaf and the Shii International, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 17-18. 2 Jens-Uwe Rahe, La dportation des kurdes faylis, dans Chris Kutschera (dir.), Le livre noir de Saddam Hussein, Oh! Editions, 2005, p. 423-429, Ali Babakhan, LIraq: 1970-1990, Dportations des chiites, s.e., 1994, p. 46-49. 3 Mohamad Abdullah Al Roken, Dimensions of the UAE-Iran Dispute Over Three Islands, n United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1999, p. 179. 4 Joyce N. Wiley, op. cit., p. 48.

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concurrent de ses politiques tatistes, mais surtout laugmentation du capital financier ou matriel par la confiscation des biens des dports. 2) Le gouvernement irakien impose une srie de restrictions lenseignement thologique des villes saintes ; rduisant la dure de sjour contrle par les visas, le nombre dtudiants trangers diminue considrablement. De plus, annulant lacte par lequel les tudiants en thologie taient exempts du service militaire, le pouvoir de Bagdad fait que lintrt pour une carrire thologique diminue lui aussi. A cela sajoute linterdiction de transgresser la frontire de lIran, jusquau relchement de 1975, chose ayant des effets dramatiques sur le plerinage vers les centres religieux irakiens et qui seront ressenties financirement au niveau de linfluence religieuse de Hawza 1 sur les croyants chiites iraniens. . 3) La situation conflictuelle offre le cadre propice pour le dveloppement de la politique conomique tatiste assume par Bath ds son installation au pouvoir. Le commerce interne et externe est nationalis, tant accapar progressivement par ltat ou ses clients privs, au dtriment des classes traditionnelles, reprsentes dans une grande mesure par les chiites. Si en 1968, ltat contrlait 42% du commerce externe, en 1973 lon arrive un pourcentage de 82% et en 1975 90%2. Aprs la disparition du Muhsin al-Hakim, le 2 juin 1970, ses anciens adeptes pour qui il avait t source dmulation vont transfrer leur fidlit, compte tenu de leur prdisposition, vers lun de deux successeurs marja: layatollah Abu al-Qasim alKhoi, et le nouveau titulaire de la fonction de grand ayatollah et source, Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr. Le premier continue la direction pitiste de ses prdcesseurs se ddiant principalement la prservation de linfluence de Hawza de Nadjaf dans le monde chiite, prenant en considration la situation difficile de linstitution clricale et du chiisme en Irak ; il le fait laide dune prodigieuse activit didactique et dorganisation, crant de nombreuses institutions de charit, pdagogiques, culturelles, de propagation du message chiite, devenant matre de plus de deux tiers des grands clercs chiites contemporains. En revanche, al-Sadr, bien que retir ds 1962 de lintrieur de la mouvement Dawa, reste le reprsentant du jeune clerg et des milieux islamistes penchs vers une solution politique de redressement et ascension de la communaut chiite en Irak, conforme la position dmographique et socioconomique de celleci, en mme temps avec une renaissance religieuse et culturelle chiite. De plus, AlSadr est parmi les peux marja arabes qui restent, ce qui attire un grand nombre de chiites, impressionns aussi par les discours nationalistes vhiculs en Irak depuis des dcennies. Lancien chiisme avec des horizons transnationaux subit maintenant les effets dun processus d irakisation , sidentifiant avec une logique nationale et profondment patriotique ; ce chiisme arabe est plus appropri limage dun leader issu dune famille clricale arabe, qu celle des marja majoritairement iraniens, pakistanais ou afghans. La situation empire lors de lamplification de la tension entre lIran et lIrak; au dbut de lan 1974, Thran commence soutenir militairement la rvolte kurde de lIrak, conduite par Mustafa Barzani. Le conflit qui a impliqu lenvoi des troupes massives irakiennes (parmi lesquelles un grand nombre de recrutes provenant des
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Mallat Chibli, op. cit., p. 17. Faleh A. Jabar, The Shiite Movement in Iraq, Saqi Books, 2003, p. 204-205.

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Lchec dune rvolution chiite irakienne liranienne La rvolution iranienne de 1979 a boulevers le statu quo rgional, et surtout la partielle stabilit installe entre lIran et lIrak suite laccord dAlger. Linstauration de la rpublique islamique non seulement na rien chang dans les rapports traditionnellement ngatifs dentre les deux pays, mais, tout au contraire, elle y ajoute une essentielle tension idologique, Islam vs. lacit, qui compte parmi les autres sujets de dispute. En tant que pays possdant la deuxime communaut chiite de lespace musulman, et en vertu de sa proximit immdiate avec lIran, lIrak a reprsent une cible privilgie de la stratgie dstabilisatrice du nouveau rgime iranien. Lintrt de Khomeyni pour entraner la communaut chiite irakienne dans le mme processus rvolutionnaire, qui ait comme rsultat lenlvement du pouvoir bathiste et linstauration dun rgime islamique fidle ses intrts, semble avoir t une des constantes de la politique extrieure iranienne pendant les premires annes daprs la rvolution. Il rencontre lenthousiasme de la population chiite irakienne, mobilise dornavant par lexemple russi de linsurrection du pays voisin, insurrection qui avait dmontr quune importante masse populaire, suffisamment motive et ouverte aux sacrifices, mais surtout fonde sur des idaux religieux, peut rendre possible llimination dun rgime autoritaire, dfendu par un systme scuritaire tout-puissant, possesseur de la plus performante arme de la rgion du Golfe et soutenu par les grands pouvoirs occidentaux. Cette ide dune rcurrence de la rvolution iranienne dans lespace irakien aussi avait affronter certaines difficults, surtout celles rsultes des diffrences qui sparent la configuration politique, sociale et humaine des deux pays. a) Premirement, la diffrence de lIran, dont la population tait compose
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Joyce N. Wiley, op. cit., p. 49. Ali Babakhan, Les kurdes dIrak, p. 217-219.

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zones chiites du sud) dans le nord et qui sest sold avec plus de 10.000 morts, a eu des effets sur la communaut chiite. Le nombre important de victimes et lopposition devant un conflit avec lequel les chiites ne sidentifiaient pas, contre une minorit irakienne qui luttait presque pour les mmes droits de reconnaissance politique et culturelle que les chiites, a provoqu plusieurs protestations auxquelles prennent part quelques oulmas des villes saintes et les membres des mouvements islamistes. Anticipant les grands mouvements de rvolte populaire des annes suivantes, les dmonstrations religieuses occasionnes par la fte dAshura, en janvier 1974 et 1975, acquerront une colorature contestataire ladresse de la guerre et du rgime Bath1. En change, en juillet 1974, le pouvoir arrte trente leaders chiites, des clercs, notables, membres du mouvement islamiste: cinq des leaders Dawa (parmi lesquels trois taient quand mme des clercs) seront excuts la mme anne, au mois de dcembre. Le conflit avec lIran sachve une fois sign laccord dAlger, en mars 1975, par lequel Bagdad accepte un compromis concernant le canal Chatt el-Arab, dont les limites stablissent dsormais sur thalweg. En consquence, Thran met fin laide accorde la rsistance irakienne, brise dans deux semaines. Une anne plus tard, plus de 200.000 kurdes sont dports vers les zones du sud du pays (Diwaniya, al-Samawa, Nassiriya, Basra)2, pour affaiblir dun ct, la force communautaire de la population des rgions kurdes, de lautre ct pour mlanger la composition ethnique-religieuse du territoire irakien dans le but dattnuer les diffrences entre les trois grands segments gographiques du pays: le nord kurde, le centre sunnite et le sud chiite.

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pour la plupart (85 - 90%) par des chiites, la communaut chiite irakienne reprsente un peu plus de la moiti de la population du pays. La forte sgrgation ethno religieuse irakienne est un des facteurs qui empchent toujours tout possible essai de constitution dun systme politique qui soit lexpression exclusive dune des communauts. b) Ensuite, le chiisme iranien a connu une officialisation et une participation aux problmes politiques ds linstauration du pouvoir des safavides, au Moyen ge. Le clerg iranien a domin durant des sicles la vie communautaire de la population, aussi bien de point de vue juridique, que de point de vue conomique ; son influence a mis une empreinte dcisive sur la mentalit des fidles, difficilement effaable mme pendant la priode des modifications modernistes apportes par Pahlavi. Les rformes de la nouvelle dynastie, mme si celle-ci a limin une partie des anciens privilges et fonctions de la classe ecclsiale chiite, nont pas russi dtruire intgralement le support social et linfluence des membres du clerg. Et pendant toute cette priode, lIran na jamais renonc affirmer son caractre chiite. En Irak, en change, le chiisme a t toujours domin par des pouvoirs sunnites, qui nont jamais permis laffirmation intgrale des projets politiques des leaders chiites, quils soient laques ou islamistes. c) Mme si les rapports entre les membres du clerg et le Shah ont t tendus, linstitution ecclsiale iranienne na jamais connu les mmes politiques systmatiques de rpression et de destruction de linfrastructure sociale et humaine, comme ctait le cas de lIrak bathiste. Les dcennies de discrimination et de contrle scuritaire augment sur les leaders et sur la population chiite irakienne ont contribu laffaiblissement du potentiel rvolutionnaire de ceux-ci. Encore plus, dans leur essai de dstabiliser et de stimuler une insurrection irakienne anti-bathiste, les dirigeants iraniens surestiment lunit de la communaut chiite irakienne et ignorent le fait que lidentit collective de la population irakienne tait fortement fragmente, en faveur des loyauts locales, rurales ou urbaines. Limage que les ayatollahs de Thran ont sur le chiisme irakien est lie surtout au milieu cosmopolite des villes saintes et ils exagrent linfluence dtenue encore par le haut clerg ; en fait, la grande majorit de la communaut, surtout de celle rurale, accorde leurs attitudes en fonction de la position adopte par les leaders tribaux, qui servent encore de mdiateurs entre la population et les officialits. En mme temps, lmergence dune classe moyenne ou proltaire chiite, dpendante des aides offertes par ltat, intgre dans les diffrentes structures sociales urbaines caractrises par une accentue mixit avec la population sunnite, laquelle on ajoute la stricte surveillance de la part des institutions bathiste, du parti ou de multiples services de scurit, ont attnu les sentiments de sgrgation sectaire et ont stimul chez beaucoup dentre eux une motivation de lassimilation. d) Le succs mme de la rvolution dIran est d certains facteurs spcifiques la scne iranienne, tout comme des circonstances favorables: les dmonstrations (manifestations) ont eu au dbut un caractre de pure contestation conomique, et elles ont surtout mobilis toutes les catgories sociales; linaction des services de scurit et de ceux de larme, due en partie lopposition du Shah aussi lgard de lide dune rprimande violente ; labsence de limplication

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des grands pouvoirs, surtout des Etats-Unis, rcemment secous par la fbrilit thique du prsident Carter manifeste sur le plan international ; le dpart inopin du Shah, ce qui a affaibli lopposition des milieux politiques et militaires devant les leaders des manifestations ; et finalement, un aspect dune importance dcisive, la personnalit charismatique de Khomeyni, celui qui a russi confrer une dimension religieuse au champ des reprsentations publiques contestataires et lidentit de masse des manifestants, mais surtout dominer la nouvelle scne politique iranienne, jusqu linstallation dun systme capable de reproduire sa vision sur le rle suprme des membres du clerg dans les problmes de la gouvernance terrestre. Les vnements dIran ont eu des consquences immdiates aussi bien sur lattitude de la population et des leaders chiites de lIrak, que sur le milieu politique bathiste. Tout en anticipant les effets dstabilisateurs que le modle iranien peut exercer sur la stabilit interne irakienne, le pouvoir de Bagdad a augment le systme de surveillance des leaders chiites et il a dvelopp une intense propagande nationaliste, dans le but dactiver les sentiments didentit irakienne de la population. Car, comme Saddam Hussein dclarait en fvrier 1980, Si les habitants de lIrak ne dmontrent pas leur loyaut envers ltat irakien comme tel, le pays sera divis en trois mini-tats: un arabe sunnite, un arabe chiite et un kurde1. Dailleurs, si pendant la priode du gouvernement Bazargan, lattitude du pouvoir de Bagdad est suffisamment optimiste par rapport au changement de rgime du pays voisin, elle se modifie de faon substantielle avec la prise du pouvoir par le noyau islamiste qui tait autour de Khomeyni et avec lintensification de la propagande anti-irakienne. La rhtorique iranienne officielle est remplie de messages qui vhiculent des thmes anti-bathistes: Nous avons dcid denlever le rgime bathiste de lIrak, affirmait le ministre des affaires extrieures, tandis que Khomeyni poussait constamment la population irakienne enlever le mal reprsent par les leaders bathistes2. Le succs de la rvolution iranienne a affect surtout lattitude et les stratgies des leaders chiites dIrak, membres du clerg ou bien islamistes, qui ont vu dans celle-ci lexemple et loccasion de raliser, leur tout, un changement de rgime, en utilisant le mme scnario, cest--dire organiser des manifestations populaires et trouver un leader charismatique, qui mobilise lnergie et lenthousiasme religieux des masses chiites. Ce leader a t considr, par tous les adeptes dune rsurrection chiite, layatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, et cela en vertu de plusieurs raisons. Dabord, parce que son nom est li la cration du parti Dawa, pour lequel il a toujours t la source dinspiration idologique et le cerveau, mme aprs son dpart du parti, au dbut des annes 1960. Ensuite, par sa haute position thologique, de marja, qui lui confrait une lgitimit maximale sur les fidles chiites et qui apportait un statut dinfaillibilit thologique ses dcisions, y compris celles ayant dventuelles sens politiques. Son caractre arabe vient sajouter tout cela, cela veut dire quil mnageait les sensibilits nationalistes de la population irakienne en gnral, et sopposait aux thses de la propagande officielle xnophobe, dveloppe contre les membres du haut clerg de Nadjaf i Karbala, qui taient accuss dtre non-irakiens. Dailleurs, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr lui-mme quitte sa position rserve et contrle quil avait adopte au moment de son dpart du parti Dawa et de son entre dans la carrire ecclsiastique,
Cit dans Faleh A. Jabar, The Shiite Movement in Iraq, p. 226. Cits dans Philips Robins, Iraq: Revolutionary Threats and Regime Responses, in John Esposito, The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, Florida International University Press, 1990, p. 88.
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et il semble tre conquis par la vision dassumer un destin politique par rapport aux attentes de la communaut chiite, selon le modle de Khomeyni. Cest le moment o il crira, gagn par la frnsie provoque par le succs de la rvolution iranienne, les six brochures publies plus tard sous le titre al-Islam yaqud al-hayat (Guides pour une vie islamique), o il expose sa conception sur ltat et la socit islamique gouverns par les membres du clerg, son texte tant mis la base de la future Constitution de lIran. Par toutes ses dclarations et ses actions, il manifeste son enthousiasme lgard des vnements dIran1. Les hostilits recommence entre les membres du clerg militants et le mouvement islamiste, dun ct, et le systme bathiste, de lautre, et ils sont marques par une nouvelle rpression des leaders chiites mais aussi par lapparition de certains groupements radicaux, pour lesquels linstrument daction nest plus la propagande, mais la lutte arme. Lactivisme visiblement assum par al-Sadr par ses dclarations, ses actions et le soutien public officiel quil accorde la rvolution iranienne et la personne de Khomeyni, auquel il reconnat un statut de marja suprme2, sont un signe pour le mouvement islamiste, Dawa ou autres groupes, que le moment est arriv de passer de ltape de la propagande religieuse et de lactivit ducationnelle, la lutte politique de masse. Faisant de Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr le leader religieux de la projete rvolution irakienne, le parti Dawa se propose maintenant de reproduire en Irak aussi le mme scnario iranien, par de grandes mobilisations des masses et par la lutte contre les institutions du pouvoir bathiste3. Pendant les mois qui suivi la rvolution iranienne, le parti Dawa interprte les prises de position de Sadr comme des impratifs religieux (taklif shari) pour le passage laction militante: ds le mois de fvrier, le mouvement fait des plans prcis pour dclencher des manifestations Bagdad. Pourtant, les intentions effectives de Sadr sont peu dcelables, et il existe encore de nos jours plusieurs ambiguts concernant ses projets datant de cette priode-ci. Les rapports mme avec Dawa sont obscurs, et leur interprtation, en labsence de tout document, reste en grande mesure tributaire aux diffrentes variantes personnelles vhicules par ceux qui se trouvaient dans lentourage de layatollah ou bien par les leaders du parti. Car, sil a accept et il a essay dtre reconnu en tant que symbole dune rsurrection chiite daprs un modle iranien, Sadr semble ne pas avoir t totalement intgr dans un scnario commun daction avec le mouvement islamiste; ses actions sont pour la plupart le rsultat de son option individuelle, sans connivence pralable avec les leaders Dawa. En fait, il apparat un vritable redoublement (ithnainiya) des rseaux daction, dun ct il y a le parti islamiste, avec ses membres et ses fidles, de lautre ct il y a la propre structure institutionnelle que la condition de marja de Sadr supposait, celle-ci tant forme partir de la structure traditionnelle des reprsentants (wukala), qui remplissaient la fonction de mdiateurs entre la source et les fidles, ralisant le collectage des taxes religieuses (khums), et organisant les diffrents rituels chiites. Le rseau de Sadr comprenait plus dune centaines de tels wukala, forms des membres du clerg et des cheiks de rang infrieur, des sayyids ou des laques dvous, impliqu dans le fait de servir linstitution marjaiyya. La superposition mais non pas la totale consonance des actions des deux groupements des fidles devient vidente
Baram Amatzia, The Impact of Khomeinis Revolution on the Radical Shii Movement of Iraq, in David Menashri (ed.), The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World, Westview Press, 1990, p. 141. 2 Mallat Chibli, The Renewal of Islamic Law, Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr, Nadjaf and the Shii International, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 52. 3 Faleh A. Jabar, The Shiite Movement in Iraq, p. 227.
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surtout partir de ce que lon appelle le mouvement de soumission (Mubayaa), qui a dbut le 22 mai 1979. Ce mouvement a reprsent la mobilisation de grandes masses (il y avait des milliers de participants) de fidles et dadeptes de Sadr ou du mouvement islamiste, qui pendant plusieurs jours se dirigent vers Nadjaf en venant de toutes les rgions chiites, dans le but de manifester leur dvouement et leur soumission envers le membre du haut clerg. Mubayaa a t une raction de mobilisation des fidles de Sadr, rsulte en grande partie de linsistance de la propagande radio iranienne, qui prsentait celui-ci comme le futur Khomeyni de lIrak, et ralise pratiquement aussi bien par les activistes du parti Dawa que par le rseau de wukala du membre du clerg. Au bout de quelques jours de surveillance informative des milliers de personnes qui visitaient layatollah, mais surtout de ceux qui semblaient diriger cette mobilisation, le pouvoir de Bagdad prend dabord la dcision darrter al-Sadr: le 12 juin 1979 celui-ci est captur dans sa demeure et il est envoy au sige de la scurit de Bagdad. La consquence immdiate a t le dclenchement de grandes manifestations de la population dans toutes les rgions chiites dIrak, particulirement Nadjaf et Karbala, mais aussi dans les quartiers chiites de Bagdad, al-Thawra et Kazimayin, ces dmonstrations tant violemment rprimes par le pouvoir. Connue sous le nom de 17 Rajab Intifada, cette manifestation a t le premier mouvement populaire organis, ayant une si grande ampleur, droule pendant les dernires dcennies1. Toutes ces actions sont redoubles par des manifestations et des oppositions dans le plan externe, organises surtout dans des pays o vivaient des exils du parti Dawa: la rgion du Golfe, le Liban, mais aussi la Grande Bretagne et la France2. Comme dans le cas de la rvolte populaire chiite de 1977, lIntifada de juin 1979 a aussi entran une srie de changements lintrieur mme de la hirarchie politique irakienne. Tout premirement, elle constitue un des multiples facteurs ayant conduit lenlvement du prsident Muhammad al-Bakr de la tte de ltat, la fin du mois de juin, et son remplacement par Saddam Hussein3. En obligeant Bakr dmissionner, en sassumant la fonction de prsident de lIrak, en installant un gouvernement form par des membres fidles et obissants, en contrlant les services de scurit et le bureau militaire de larme, Saddam arrive au bout de son ascension constante vers lemprise du pouvoir, qui a dbut en 1968. Linauguration de sa nouvelle fonction se fait travers la rsolution des deux grands dfis internes du moment: lopposition au sein du parti Bath et la menace dune insurrection chiite selon un modle iranien. Le premier problme est rsolu laide du scnario classique du complot: en juillet, vingt-deux leaders du Conseil du Commandement de la Rvolution sont excuts sous laccusation davoir t des agents de la Syrie. Au second problme, Saddam offrira la mme solution que celle adopte dans le cas de la rvolte de 1977: par la double politique des tarhib et targhib (terreur et tentation), de la rpression violente de toute contestation du leadership Bath et, simultanment, de lessai dattirer ladhsion de la population chiite par le biais de certains programmes de dveloppement conomique et social dans les rgions dfavorises ou par une propagande qui reprend les symboles de la foi chiite. Le changement de rgime et dattitude de Bagdad a eu des consquences sur linsurrection chiite. Al-Sadr est dlivr et arrt domicile, Nadjaf, mais les actions
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Faleh A. Jabar, The Shiite Movement in Iraq, p. 232. Mallat Chibli, Religious Militancy in Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia Paradigm, Third World Quarterly, no. 10, 1988, p. 728. 3 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 222.

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rpressives du pouvoir se dirigent maintenant vers les membres des organisations islamistes, les leaders des manifestations populaires ou les adeptes ayant manifest leur soutien lgard de layatollah. La rpression des mouvements et la stricte surveillance de Sadr marquent lchec du scnario dune rvolution irakienne daprs un modle iranien ; les islamiste radicaux eux-mmes ralisent maintenant que il y a des diffrences entre les conditions dIran et celles dIrak1. Lanantissement de linfrastructure Dawa et des wukala a eu des consquences aussi bien sur lattitude adopte par al-Sadr, que sur la destine mme des mouvements islamistes irakiens. Al-Sadr tait dpourvu lheure du soutien des masses, il se trouvait sous stricte surveillance, et pourtant il refuse les essais des officialits dobtenir une interdiction religieuse du parti Dawa et un appui affirm lgard du rgime bathiste. En suivant le modle de Khomeyni, il enregistre plusieurs messages sur des cassettes audio, quil diffuse ensuite clandestinement au sein des adeptes et de la population en gnral. Tout en ayant une note mobilisatrice accentue, ces messages vhiculent diffrents thmes de sa rflexion, partir de lide de lunit du monde musulman et de lgalit entre sunnites et chiites, jusqu limpratif explicitement formul, celui dassumer une lutte concrte contre le pouvoir bathiste2. La seconde consquence majeure de la disparition dune grande partie des leaders et des adeptes Dawa, qui se trouvaient maintenant, part les personnes qui avaient t excutes, exiles, emprisonnes ou dans une conspiration encore plus accentue, a t reprsente par le changement de stratgie du mouvement islamiste pour assumer une politique de la violence contre les autorits bathistes. Rsultant du mme scnario qui caractrise le destin de plusieurs mouvements islamistes soumis la rpression de ltat, la radicalisation irakienne est son tour plutt lexpression dun groupe restreint, qui adopte des mthodes violentes comme raction la violence du pouvoir. Beaucoup de ces groupes adeptes dune option militaire sont forms par des membres radicaux de Dawa ou par des partisans combattants des autres mouvements islamistes, groups sur le principe des cellules terroristes, et qui accordent plus de crdit lefficacit des actions de gurilla et aux attentats contre les leaders bathistes que les stratgies classiques de propagande ou de mobilisation politique3. La finalit claire de toutes ces actions violentes des islamistes irakiens a t la continuation de leur rpression constante venue de la part du pouvoir bathiste. Install srement la direction de lIrak, ayant le soutien dune partie du monde arabe (lgypte, les monarchies du Golfe, la Jordanie) voire mme des pays occidentaux, tous marqus par langoisse de linstauration dun dsquilibre rgional suite lintensification des politiques iraniennes visant lexportation de la rvolution, Saddam se sent maintenant protg et libre de rsoudre dfinitivement le problme de lopposition chiite. Le 31 mars 1980, CCR met la Rsolution 461, effet rtroactif, qui punissait avec la peine capitale lappartenance au parti Dawa. Le mme mois, 96 membres du mouvement ont t excuts. Le 4 avril, layatollah al-Sadr et sa soeur, Bint al-Huda, sont arrts encore une fois et emmens en grand secret Bagdad. Ils mourront en prison, et le 9 avril le corps de Sadr est port Nadjaf et enterr dans le cimetire Wadi al-Salam. Ctait pour la premire fois quun rgime politique du mode musulman osait excuter la personne dun marja. Lacte en soi est motiv sans doute par la dcision ferme de Saddam
Cit dans Baram Amatzia, The Impact of Khomeinis Revolution on the Radical Shii Movement of Iraq, p. 146. T. M. Aziz, The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shia Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980. 3 Joyce Wiley, op. cit., p. 54.
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de liquider le symbole de linsurrection chiite1, surtout dans la mesure o, pendant la dernire partie de sa vie, al-Sadr a continu de dfier le rgime irakien, par des messages audio qui interdisaient aux chiites dentrer dans le parti Bath et qui les poussaient la rsistance arme. En fait, lassassinat de Sadr a montr le fait que le pouvoir de Bagdad tait dispos porter atteinte mme un grand ayatollah lorsque son leadership est disput. La guerre Iran-Irak: les chiites irakiens entre nationalisme et identit religieuse La guerre entre lIran et lIrak, clate le 22 septembre 1980, est tant une consquence des modifications provoques par la rvolution iranienne sur le plan des relations rgionales, que le rsultat du contexte gopolitique tendu, caractristique de longue date 2 des rapports entre les deux voisins . Ds le dbut, linstauration de la Rpublique islamique a dmantel lensemble de la stratgie de containment prvue par les amricains au Moyen-Orient contre ce que lon considrait comme de lexpansion sovitique. Tout de suite aprs la rvolution islamique, Thran assumera sa propre position tiers mondiste , essayant de sriger en nouveau leader rgional, non dans le sillage des Etats-Unis ou de lURSS, mais comme noyau dune rsurrection du monde musulman au nom des valeurs religieuses et politiques islamiques3. La prservation de lancien principe de lquilibre (tavazon), qui a gouvern lattitude iranienne sur le plan des relations rgionales, partir de la seconde moiti du XIXme sicle est redouble maintenant par linitiation dun nouveau principe idologique et daction gopolitique, celui de lexportation de rvolution (sodour-e enquelab)4. Cette situation caractrisera la politique extrieure de la rpublique islamique aprs la deuxime rvolution, cest--dire partir du moment de lappropriation dfinitive du pouvoir par Khomeyni et de llimination des libraux, qui a suivi loccupation de lAmbassade des Etats-Unis, le 4 novembre 1979, quand ceux qui font la politique extrieure mettent en discussion la lgitimit du systme international existent ; ils cherchent protger et promouvoir les intrts de lIran islamique tout en rejetant la dominance des deux superpouvoirs dans le champ du systme international et tout en exportant la rvolution partout dans le monde5. La crise des otages, de mme que lintense propagande anti-amricaine, mene par les leaders iraniens, produiront une fracture radicale dans les relations entre les Etats-Unis et lIran, avec des consquences sur lensemble du contexte politique rgional. Ceci affectera, entre autres, la situation de la communaut chiite dans son ensemble, car elle induira lopinion publique et mme certains fors dcisionnels occidentaux, limage ngative dun chiisme par excellence rvolutionnaire, dstabilisateur de lordre rgional, la trane du pouvoir de Thran et essentiellement anti-amricain. Ainsi que, la persistance de ce pattern se manifestera dans lattitude rticente affiche par les officialits amricaines
Conformment lopinion de certains membres du mouvement islamiste, Saddam lui-mme, de son propre pistolet, aurait tir une balle dans la tte de Sadr, cf. Marcinkowski Ismail, Religion And Politics in Iraq: Shiite Clerics Between Quietism and Resistance, Pustaka Nasional Pte Ltd., 2004, p. 62. 2 Efraim Karsh, Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of Iran-Iraq War, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2, 1990, p. 256-268. 3 Mohammad Reza Djalili, Diplomatie islamique: stratgie internationale du khomeinism, Presses Universitaires de France, 1989. 4 Farhang Rajaee, Iranian Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of Revolution, in John Esposito, The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, Florida International University Press, 1990, p. 72-76 5 Ramazani R. K., Irans Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means, in John Esposito, The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, p. 44.
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vis--vis de la plupart des acteurs politiques et religieux du chiisme irakien, notamment lors de linsurrection de 1991. CENTO ayant perdu lIran et le processus rvolutionnaire menaant de contaminer les autres pays du Moyen Orient, et surtout la zone du Golfe, espace central de lintrt ptrolier et de scurit des puissances occidentales, elles reconsidreront leurs alliances rgionales. Par consquent, les Etats-Unis se rapprocheront progressivement de lIrak, pays quils avaient, jusqualors, considr comme indsirable cause de sa position pro sovitique manifeste aux annes 70. Les officialits amricaines, par le biais de lArabie Saoudite, ont laiss entendre Saddam quune ventuelle action militaire irakienne ne gnerait point les Etats-Unis, qui - au contraire - les appuieraient1. La rvolution iranienne a non seulement provoqu lanantissement de la stratgie de scurit rgionale labore par les Etats-Unis, mais a aussi entran des regroupements gopolitiques majeurs dans la zone du Golfe. Thran tait peru par les monarchies ptrolires comme un agent violent de dstabilisation rgionale. Notamment lArabie Saoudite et le Bahren craignaient la monte du mouvement chiite, mais le scnario dune reprise de la r-islamisation den haut - en gnral - processus rvolutionnaire calqu sur le modle iranien, suscit par les courants islamistes, a constitu une proccupation constante des rgimes arabes de la rgion. La menace iranienne a justifi le rapprochement entre les monarchies du Golfe et lIrak, malgr le froid, voire parfois la tension, dans les relations avec le rgime lac et rpublicain de Bagdad, entre le Kuweit et lIrak tout particulirement. Pendant toute la guerre, surtout aprs loffensive iranienne de 1982, et sa transformation dans un conflit dusure, marqu par de massives confrontations militaires ncessitant le recrutement dun nombre considrable de soldats parmi la population chiite, le pouvoir irakien est oblig concevoir des stratgies pour contrecarrer une ventuelle dstabilisation du rgime par les troupes mmes, qui auraient pu rejoindre larme iranienne pour tenter de changer le pouvoir en place Bagdad. Les amples actions de propagande menes par Bagdad eurent une importance dcisive: elles visaient capter la bienveillance de la population, notamment des chiites, soutenir le rgime bathiste et leffort de guerre. Pour atteindre leur but, les leaders irakiens ont labor une stratgie de renforcement de lidentit nationale et de la cohsion interne de la socit par la diffusion de trois raisons identitaires: irakiennes, arabes et islamiques2. Pendant les annes de guerre, la dimension nationaliste du discours mobilisateur est constamment augment et largie, en faisant appel des thmes divers inspirs de la tradition arabe et islamique, ayant pour but de crer une conscience collective unitaire et de forger une identit contours bien spcifis, qui puisse facilement tre mise en opposition avec laltrit reprsente par le rival iranien. En fin de compte, le conflit accuse une importante dimension religieuse, ayant comme public cible surtout la population chiite irakienne. Le rgime irakien cherche prsent acqurir une lgitimit islamique, afin de proposer sa propre version de discours musulman, quil oppose lintense propagande mene par le rgime de Thran. Mais, dans lintention de mnager la sensibilit chiite de la communaut irakienne, Bagdad prfre cette fois une stratgie qui attnue le caractre sunnite, pour promouvoir plutt les impratifs dun panislamisme abstrait, doubl de thses panarabes, en
Andreas Rieck, Iraq and Saudi Arabia: from Rivalry to Confrontation, in Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow, Thomas Koszinowski (eds.), Iraq: Power and Society, St. Anthonys College, Oxford, Ithaca Press, 1993, p. 327. 2 Baram Amatzia, Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Bathist Iraq, 1968-1989, St. Martins Press, 1991.
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quelque sorte dans la ligne vhicule par Michel Aflak pendant lentre-deux-guerres1. Ce qui plus est, Saddam Hussein conteste lauthenticit mme du chiisme iranien, lui opposant le vritable chiisme , expression de la nation arabe et de certains Imams dont il se revendique comme descendant, dans la filiation de Hussain, le martyr de Karbala. Mais, dun autre ct, le rgime irakien a continu sa politique de stricte surveillance de llite du clerg dans les villes sacres et de reprsailles du mouvement islamiste. Dailleurs, la campagne de reprsailles de 1980 a oblig les membres de Dawa, de lOrganisation de lAction Islamique ou dautres factions, encore en libert, soit dadopter la clandestinit soit de quitter le pays. Plus encore, la dportation des chiites sest poursuivie durant toutes les annes de guerre, dans un rythme moins systmatique cest vrai -, mais en 1985 le Haut Commissariat pour les Rfugis auprs ONU, Thran, apprciait que le nombre total des personnes rfugies et dportes slevait plus de 400.000 mille2. Labsence dun leadership efficient, linactivit du haut clerg, limpossibilit de mobiliser les masses, le mouvement islamiste condamn la clandestinit ont fait que la communaut chiite irakienne na en rien dstabilis le rgime, comme lavaient anticip autant Bagdad que Thran. Le patriotisme qui dfinit la position gnrale de la communaut chiite dIrak au moment du conflit, est la consquence de plusieurs facteurs. Sans aucun doute, les efforts du rgime de se montrer plus tolrant face aux besoins de la population chiite, de mme que la rhtorique soutenue accents identitaires arabes, nationaux irakiens, et dadversit historique contre les persans, ont jou leur rle dans cette attitude. Mais la guerre en elle-mme, les violentes confrontations militaires soldes avec des centaines de milliers de morts et de blesss, la plupart chiites, les destructions provoques par les offensives iraniennes ariennes et terrestres, la cration dun sentiment communautaire et dune profonde identit irakienne au sein des soldats, chiites et sunnites, partageant les mmes tranches, ont constitu autant de facteurs favorables limiter la sympathie envers lIran. Pigs dans le dilemme dune option entre servir le rgime irakien et accepter une ventuelle domination iranienne, les militaires chiites ont plutt choisi dassumer lidentit irakienne que de faire valoir de manire militante ou contestataire le caractre confessionnel commun qui les reliait lIran: Les chiites irakiens se considrent eux-mmes, sans aucun doute, irakiens tout dabord et ensuite chiites 3. Mais ce patriotisme de la population chiite vise plutt le territoire et le concept de nation comme telle, que le rgime bathiste. A cette relative passivit politique interne correspondra - lextrieur de lIrak lmergence de mouvements dopposition actifs, caractriss par une consistance organisatrice accrue, mais dont le principal handicap sera leur dtachement de lhabitat politique irakien et de sa communaut chiite. Par la suite, ils vont dvelopper une stratgie plus militaire afin de renverser le rgime ; prenant leurs distances par rapport aux projets labors par Dawa, datant des annes antrieures, qui consistaient mobiliser les masses populaires et les entraner dans un processus rvolutionnaire suivant le modle iranien. La capacit rpressive du pouvoir bathiste a fait comprendre aux mouvements irakiens dopposition que le choix dun renversement populaire du
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Charles Tripp, The Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi State, in Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow, Thomas Koszinowski (eds.), Iraq: Power and Society, St. Anthonys College, Oxford, Ithaca Press, 1993, p. 109-110. Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: from Revolution to Dictatorship, I. B. Tauris, 2001, p. 355. 3 Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett, and Joe Stork, Not Quite Armageddon: Impact of the War on Iraq, MERIP Reports, vol. 14, no. 6/7, 1984, p. 26.
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Linstrumentalisation de lopposition islamiste irakienne par lIran Aprs avoir rprim le parti Dawa et les autres factions chiites contestataires du pouvoir de Bagdad, une partie de leurs leaders et membres, ayant chapp aux arrestations, se rfugieront ltranger, la plupart dans les pays proximit de lIrak (au Liban, en Syrie, dans la zone du Golfe), mais surtout en Iran, o le rgime islamique de Thran manifeste sa disponibilit instrumenter une opposition irakienne, comme arme supplmentaire contre le rgime de Bagdad. Mais la difficult majeure rside dans le fait que, tablis hors du pays, les chiites irakiens emporteront avec eux les anciennes rivalits qui les opposaient, en vertu des diffrences idologiques, politiques, de clans, familiales ou rgionales ; cela va dans le sens de ladage irakien: deux irakiens, trois partis . Dawa, Mouvement de lAction Islamique (MAI), le mouvement des Mujahedins ou les diverses associations des Ulmas restent encore fortement ancrs dans une fidlit spcifique, qui dfinit aussi leur identit, soit face aux instances clricales de Nadjaf (Dawa conoit difficilement une structure politique qui ne respecte pas la dualit traditionnelle entre marja et les fidles), soit face aux familles de llite clricale (al-Shirazi - dans le cas MAI, al-Hakim), soit face aux noyaux politiques. Aux anciennes diffrences idologiques (la vision panislamique, panchiiste, nationaliste irakienne ; accepter ou refuser le principe velayet-e faqih), aux principes daction (la mobilisation des masses, la lutte arme, la subversion et les attentats contre les leaders bathistes), sajoutent prsent: la comptition pour le rle de leadership du camp de lopposition chiite de lexil et les positions diffrentes concernant les limites acceptables de linfluence iranienne dans lactivit interne du camp politique irakien. Le dbut de la guerre entre lIran et lIrak, la possibilit de dstabiliser le pouvoir en place de Bagdad ont stimul le transfert des quartiers gnraux et des ressources humaines des factions chiites dopposition en exil vers le territoire iranien, o la masse des dports, des rfugis ou des prisonniers de guerre irakiens offrait une source importante de recrutement dadeptes et de militants. Depuis avril 1980, aprs lassassinat de layatollah al-Sadr et la rpression des mouvements islamistes lintrieur de lIrak, le projet de constituer une opposition irakienne unie, qui rassemble les diffrents groupes disparates ou les individus influents, et qui soit utilise comme agent dstabilisateur du rgime de Bagdad, fut une constante des stratges iraniens. Avant la cration de al-Majlis al-Ala lil Thawra al-Islamiya fil Irak (lAssemble Suprme de la Rvolution Islamique en Irak - ASRII), le 17 novembre 1982, les leaders de Thran avaient dj soutenu et financ quelques tentatives de constitution dun front chiite de lexil, choues, cause des rivalits ou du manque de cohsion: i) Majlis al-Ulama Lil Thawra al-Islamiya fil Irak (lAssemble des Ulmas pour une Rvolution Islamique en Irak) ; ii) al-Jaish al-Islami Li Tahrir al-Irak (lArme Rvolutionnaire pour la Libration de lIrak) ; iii) Jamaat al-Ulama al-Mujahidin fil Irak (la Socit des Ulmas Militants dIrak), qui a t la premire organisation o les iraniens dsignent comme leader Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. N en 1944, Nadjaf, il est le

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rgime tait peu probable. Par contre, loption militaire dans le changement du rgime politique est dans la logique des choses, facilite par la guerre dclenche entre lIran et lIrak. Contrairement loption - bnvole ou force - des chiites du pays assumer une position nationaliste et anti-iranienne, les leaders chiites en exil peroivent le conflit entre les deux pays voisins comme une occasion permettant de provoquer le changement du pouvoir Bagdad et linstauration dun rgime politique qui respecte le poids de la communaut chiite ou qui soit fond sur la suprmatie du clerg, selon le principe velayet-e faqih.

sixime des dix fils de layatollah Muhsin al-Hakim et il dtenait, lpoque, du seul titre religieux de Hojjat. Mais, tout comme les autres groupe, celui-ci succomba suite aux disputes entre les groupuscules organiss autour dun leader ecclsiastique et aux mcontentements des exclus du pouvoir ; sans tre dissoute, la Socit un rle mineur 1 dans les annes venir, sur la scne de lactivisme de lexil irakien . A lhtrognit des visions politiques, dintrts des clans et dorgueils sajoute notamment laversion quune partie du grand clerg manifeste envers la puissante famille al-Hakim, dont le leadership sera en permanence contest, durant toutes les prochaines annes. Ce qui importe cest surtout la diffrence de vision sur lexercice du pouvoir: la diffrence des milieux islamistes lacs prsentes surtout dans lintrieur de Dawa, qui ont acquis une perspective plutt institutionnalise du pouvoir, sur le modle de fonctionnement dun parti moderne, base sur le principe de llectivit et de la rpartition des responsabilits, les milieux clricaux sont encore tributaires la tradition religieuse, qui conditionne strictement la position de force du statut de lminence thologique de son dtenteur. A cette conception patriarcale sajoute la forte mondialisation des centres dautorit au sein du clerg, o le systme marjaiya a permis le dveloppement de multiples rseaux de solidarit et de fidlit, runis autour de diverses personnalits religieuses ou de familles prestigieuses, places, dans leur majorit, dans une comptition non dclare dacqurir de nouveaux adeptes et de linfluence, et dfendant jalousement leurs frontires et espace daction. Linefficacit de Jamaat al-Ulama al-Mujahidin a conduit Thran une autre alternative, place toujours sous la direction de al-Hakim, Maktab al-Thawra al-Islamiya fil Irak (le Bureau de la Rvolution Islamique en Irak). Maktab a eu un rle plutt pratique, dinterface entre les rfugis irakiens et les autorits iraniennes ; par son biais se sont ralises tant des actions de soutien logistique et militaire des premires units de volontaires irakiens dsigns participer ct des troupes iraniennes au conflit avec lIrak, que la mise en uvre de divers programmes dintgration des dports dans la socit iranienne. Conu pragmatiquement, comme une association qui amortisse les diffrentes tendances centrifuges au sein de lopposition irakienne, et rconcilier tant les visions transnationales des idologues islamistes, mais aussi la perspective nationaliste et les diverses identits particulires sub-nationales qui fragmentaient incessamment lunit du mouvement islamiste, le Bureau a adopt la conception iranienne sur le pouvoir et les masses politiques. Cette conception tait fonde sur le refus des partis politiques, dans la mesure o la prsence dun mdiateur entre le peuple et les leaders nest plus utile, cest--dire le grand clerg, dont lautorit et pouvoir dcoulent spontanment tant de la nature de leur position de lieutenants de lImam Cach que du charisme propre eux, qui leur permettent de mobiliser les foules, sur le modle de Khomeyni. En effet, il semble que les disputes doctrinaires sur le caractre du pouvoir politique ont eu un rle dominant aprs 1980, minant la cohsion de lopposition chiite. Trois options taient vhicules. La premire avait ses origines dans la thorie de Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr: installer un rgime islamique fond sur le principe dun gouvernement collectif (al-qiyada al-naiba) du grand clerg. Accepte en grande lignes par les membres Dawa, cette perspective affirmait aussi que al-Sadr mme aurait dsign,
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quelques jours avant son arrestation, ceux qui devaient occuper cette position: Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, Kazim al-Hairi, Mahmud al-Hashimi, en premier lieu. La deuxime option accordait un statut particulier Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, privilgiant lide dun gouvernement unique , sur le modle iranien du Guide Suprme , en quelque sorte ; cette perspective, manant surtout des fidles de la famille al-Hakim, tait en opposition avec les autres factions chiites qui soutenaient, elles, la position de leurs propres leaders. Enfin, comme alternative neutre aux rivalits internes au sein de lopposition chiite, on proposait que celle-ci soit directement subordonne Khomeyni ; option que lui-mme repoussa, considrant quil sagissait dun problme irakien qui 1 rgler par les irakiens . Essentiellement, lintention de Thran a t de contrler le mouvement islamiste et de le manipuler dans son propre intrt national. Maktab a t la dernire tape avant la constitution de lASRII, o Hojjat Ali Khamenei a jou un rle dcisif, en tant que membre - lpoque - du Conseil Suprieur Iranien de Scurit et superviseur dans le Conseil Suprme Iranien pour les Problmes Irakiennes, institution charge de dtablir des contacts avec les factions irakiennes et leurs organisateurs. Khamenei soutenait Hakim, et lavait nomm la tte de Maktab. A ses dbuts, ASRII tait moins une faction distincte quune titulature gnrique, qui se proposait le rassemblement (majlis) du maximum de groupes et personnalits chiites, afin de crer une structure commune daction politique, de coordination de lactivit des dports et des rfugis irakiens dIran, etc. Ainsi, la premire direction centrale (Majlis Shura), entre 1982-1986, est-elle forme: des leaders des partis et groupes islamistes traditionnels (Dawa - cinq membres, MAI - un membre) ; de membres et clients de la famille Hakim - qui sidentifient prsent avec la nouvelle structure mme ; mais aussi dindpendants, parmi lesquels la majorit sont soit des adeptes explicites de la famille Hakim, soit simplement impliqus dans le soutien de lASRII comme telle.2 Le noyau de Majlis al-Shura augmentera dans les annes venir ; en 1986 dj, la limite sera de 50 membres. Cette anne aura dailleurs marquer la reconnaissance officielle de la position de al-Hakim comme dirigent de facto de lASRII car il assure la fonction de prsident3. Dans sa nouvelle structure, Majlis al-Shura reflte la tendance de al-Hakim daccaparer le pouvoir au sein de lASRII, de mme que lautonomie croissante des stratgies labores par les partis Dawa et MAI, qui ne se retrouvent plus dans leur intgralit dans lidologie et la politique assumes actuellement par le groupe - tuteur4. Le succs de la dure et du fonctionnement de lASRII est d, dune part - au soutien iranien constant, financier et logistique et - dautre part - justement sa flexibilit, qui lui a permis, en mme temps, la coexistence dun organisme centralis et bureaucratique charg dexcuter des dcisions titre gnral, mais aussi de la multiplicit de groupements htrognes, qui conservent leur individualit doctrinaire ou leurs propres rseaux de fidles. Nanmoins, dans le temps, ASRII finit par tre identifie avec la personne de al-Hakim et de son groupe dadeptes qui, aprs 1986 grent effectivement le pouvoir lintrieur du mouvement. Vers la fin de la guerre irano - irakienne, lorsque le scnario du renversement du rgime irakien par une intervention arme iranienne
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Faleh A. Jabar, The Shiite Movement in Iraq, p. 237. Faleh A. Jabar, The Shiite Movement in Iraq, p. 239-240. Baram Amatzia, Two Roads to Revolutionary Shiite Fundamentalism in Iraq, p. 548. 4 CARDI (Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq), Saddams Iraq : Revolution or Reaction ?, Zed Books Ltd, 1990, p. 167.
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savre de plus en plus improbable, lappartenance de Dawa et MAI lASRII devient plutt lexpression dun attachement formel et symbolique, car chacun des trois groupes poursuit, le plus souvent, ses propres stratgies politiques et daction. Ces stratgies sont conditionnes par les possibilits humaines et logistiques de chaque groupement, par la typologie des mthodes daction utiliser, mais aussi par la permanente implication des institutions iraniennes, qui tentent dexploiter le potentiel de lopposition irakienne dans le cadre de ses propres projets gopolitiques envers lIrak. En gnral, les discussions et les controverses gnres par le choix de la meilleure stratgie daction ont abouti plusieurs modles thoriques, certains au stade de simple concept, dautres - instrumentaliss en pratique: i) la thse favorite de Khomeyni et Montazeri, connue sous le nom de muzaharat milioniya (des millions de manifestants), base sur lide de lefficacit politique mobiliser dimportantes masses populaires, places sous la direction de leaders clricaux charismatiques et orientes contre le pouvoir en exercice. Vhicule jusque vers 1982, cette conception, fonde sur lextrapolation du modle de la rvolution iranienne, a constitu le point central du projet dexport rvolutionnaire labor par Thran, livr tous les mouvements militants chiites de par le monde comme la modalit la plus sre de prendre le pouvoir politique. ii) Le projet dun activisme politique par une mobilisation spontane des masses, vivement critiqu par les leaders de MAI, et notamment par Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarisi. Il conteste lefficacit dune telle option dans le cas prcis de lIrak, dont le rgime est bien plus rpressif que celui de lancien Shah1. Selon al-Mudarisi la formule optimale daction contre le rgime irakien serait une vritable rvolution populaire, en aucun cas spontane, mais le rsultat dun processus antrieur labor, dorganisation et de formation des masses, par des activits clandestines de recrutement dadhrents et de planification dtaille de chaque action. Tout cet ensemble doit converger vers le moment final du dclenchement bien prpar dune insurrection gnralise, contenant tant des protestations collectives de la population que des oprations militaires, violentes, qui conduiraient au blocage de tout le systme social et conomique irakien et, en fin de compte, la chute du rgime. iii) Layatollah Shirazi, lui aussi membre de MAI, reprend la stratgie fonde sur la rvolte du clerg chiite irakien contre la prsence britannique, en 1920, savoir utiliser les tribus chiites du sud de lIrak, ayant, par tradition, une mentalit guerrire et une organisation sociale capable dassumer la prise de force. Il propose de les armer massivement et dunifier leurs efforts afin de crer un front dopposition militante apte dtruire le systme rpressif qui 2 protge le pouvoir bathiste . iiii) Enfin, la thse de la guerre populaire , que propose Muhammad al-Hakim, en manire maoste, quil appelle prsent jihad musallah (guerre arme sainte). Elle suppose un ensemble dactions concertes: constituer des cellules secrtes de rsistance populaire lintrieur de lIrak ; mobiliser les irakiens de ltranger et les instruire la guerre; crer une force arme destine combattre

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le rgime bathiste1. En dernire instance, sa perspective rejoindra lintention des leaders militaires iraniens dintgrer tout le potentiel militant de lopposition irakienne dans les forces armes officielles du pays et de lutiliser dans la guerre contre lIrak. Ce projet fut utilis la cration, en 1983, du Rgiment Badr. Les premires tentatives dorganisation militaire et dentranement des irakiens rfugis ou dports sur le territoire iranien date de 1979, lorsque quelque 200 volontaires sont groups dans une unit spciale, appele Les Forces de lImam alSadr . Dans les annes suivantes, grce aux efforts concerts des groupes chiites irakiens, qui venaient dinstaller leurs bases en Iran, et de la nouvelle Garde Rvolutionnaire Iranienne, de plus en plus de volontaires, de lordre des milliers, passeront par les bases dentranement de cette unit, et plus de mille seront intgrs dans larme iranienne, la frontire ou sur la ligne du front de Dahleran, Ilam, Bakhtaran, dans les rgions kurde irakiennes. Gre par la toute rcente ASRII, lunit est appele en 1982 Le Rgiment al-Sadr (Liwa al-Sadr), pour devenir ensuite le Rgiment Badr Neuf. En 1987, sur le fond des luttes intenses avec lIrak, les leaders militaires iraniens intensifieront les capacits militaires de Badr, qui deviendra une division, intgre effectivement dans le dispositif de larme iranienne. A cette poque, son potentiel slevait environ 10 000 combattants, recruts soit parmi la population irakienne dporte par le rgime bathiste, soit parmi les prisonniers de guerre. Mme si appartenant officiellement lASRII, le rgiment Badr dpendait quasi exclusivement de la Garde Rvolutionnaire Iranienne. Malgr la prsence dofficiers irakiens dans sa structure dirigeante, le commandant des troupes Badr tait iranien et linstruction se faisait dans le cadre des units militaires des pasdarans2. Tout comme dans les camps dentranement des mujahedins afghans de la mme poque ou des troupes iraniennes de Bassidj, la formation militaire des membres de Badr tait double dun important endoctrinement religieux et idologique, souvent dans une rhtorique chiite du martyrisme. Linstruction de Badr dans le systme dun conflit militaire conventionnel, bas sur lemploi de larmement lourd et des confrontations directes, tait, sans doute, dans le bnfice de larme iranienne, mais ne servait point lintention initiale de sa cration, savoir une ventuelle guerre de subversion, ou des combats de guerrilla sur le territoire irakien. Cela sera visible au moment de la rvolte chiite de mars 1991: infiltres au sud de lIrak, les troupes Badr seront rapidement battues par larme irakienne La collaboration des mouvements islamistes irakiens avec lIran, pendant la guerre, a eu tant des effets positifs que ngatifs. En tout premier lieu, profitant de lappui financier, logistique et militaire de Thran, lopposition chiite irakienne groupe au sein de lASRII, a t capable de crer une structure politique institutionnalise dune ampleur impossible organiser sur le territoire de lIrak bathiste. Mais, dun autre ct, cette mme collaboration avec l ennemi traditionnel, lIran, sest reflt ngativement sur limage de lopposition irakienne, acqurant un caractre anti-national, surtout aprs 1982, lorsque lIran, son tour, avait envahi le territoire irakien. Le rgime Bath na pas tard spculer, pendant toute la dure de la guerre, cet alignement ; intensment vhicul par la propagande irakienne, il se peut quil ait dtermin la population chiite, dans une certaine mesure, prendre ses distances par rapport au mouvement islamiste. A la fin du conflit entre lIran et lIrak, il y a une fragmentation des mouvements chiites de rsistance et une lmigration vers dautres capitales. La cause en est surtout
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le nouveau contexte gopolitique la fin de la guerre, lorsque lIran adopte une ligne plus pragmatique sur le plan rgional, et que loption dun renversement du rgime de Bagdad laide de lIran, ne semble plus possible. Lchec de lalternative iranienne conduit des polarisations au sein des divers mouvements islamistes, suivant - en gnral, la ligne des disputes sur les stratgies dactions adaptes au moment. La fragmentation affecte aussi les divers noyaux de solidarit, surtout dans le milieu clrical de lopposition chiite, o linfluence exerce par les grandes familles religieuses: al-Sadr, al-Hakim, Shirazi, Khalisi, Bahr al-Ulum, sest bien conserve. Lchec dune rvolution islamique en Irak ou du changement du rgime provoqu par le conflit avec lIran ont dtruit la relative unit de lopposition chiite pendant la guerre et ont accentu les tendances centrifuges lintrieur, suivant la mme logique des clivages familiaux, rgionaux, idologiques. A lexception du parti Dawa, les groupes majeurs islamistes taient, en fait, des organisations base sur la fidlit voue une famille religieuse et un territoire dfini: ASRII relies avait au centre la famille Hakim et elle tait lexpression du milieu clrical de Nadjaf ; MAI avait sa tte les familles Shirazi et Mudarisi, reprsentant le milieu clrical et ses clients de Karbala. Le processus de fragmentation touche tout ce milieu, dj htrogne, en multiplie et diversifie les groupes, institutions, fondations, rpandues tant dans la rgion du Moyen Orient que dans lespace europen, surtout Londres, grce la permissivit politique et la libert dexpression. La crise du Golfe de 1991, et tous les changements quelle a produit dans les rapports de force de la rgion, eut aussi des consquences sur les stratgies et les politiques des diffrents mouvements chiites. La disparition de lIrak comme acteur de premier ordre au Moyen Orient, les limites de linfluence iranienne dans le problme irakien, lapparition des Etats Unis comme la nouvelle puissance dominante dans les jeux politiques rgionaux ont tous t des facteurs dterminants pour que dans les annes 90 lopposition chiite discutt nouveau ses fondements doctrinaux et ses projets daction. En gnral, on peut dire qu lpoque les factions militantes chiites continurent leur procs de particularisation, qui avait dbut aprs la guerre contre lIran, mme si elles gardrent toutes un but commun - celui de chasser du pouvoir le rgime bathiste. Nanmoins, cette particularisation des factions chiites contribua affaiblir leur efficacit. La perte didentit des diffrents groupements chiites fut galement amplifie par le grand nombre de nouveaux acteurs - internationaux, tatiques ou sous-tatiques - qui se mlrent activement au problme irakien. Compte tenu de la persistance du rgime irakien, et simultanment, des divers projets amricains visant lenlvement de Saddam, aprs 1998, une partie du mouvement islamiste chiite rejoindra le front plus large de lopposition irakienne de lexile, concrtise surtout par lexistence du Congrs National Irakien. Au moment de la chute du rgime de Saddam, en 2003, la rsurrection politique et communautaire du chiisme irakien, avec sa complexit dacteurs, de doctrines et de stratgies, revient au centre des enjeux gopolitiques irakiens et rgionaux. Ce qui fait ractualises la question essentielle de ses rapports avec le voisin iranien et surtout la question controverse de linfluence de la rpublique islamique sur le paysage gopolitique interne de lIrak.

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I. Historical Background and Evolution Political organizing of the space in Iran, has a deep root in history. According to historical studies, the first experience back to the Achamenian Period (7-5 centuries B.C) Darius the great, the king of the Achamenian, expanded his domination on the nations of Greece, Egypt, Turkey, Caucasia, Mezopetamia, Central Asia, Punjub, and etc. For better administration of the large space, he divided it to the smaller units that were named as Satrapy, which was administered by a ruler, named as Khashthrapavan or shahrban. This was one of the best methods of administration. For this some scholars know the Iranians as the founder of this method for administration of the space and country. In this system each unit had comparative independence in language, religion and economy. The number of satrapies has been mentioned 20 by some people, and 26 by the others, but Darius himself has mentioned them 30, in the Naghsh-eRostam. Darius had been established some mechanisms for prevention of integrity of the country, as well as internal comparative independence in the economic, cultural and social affairs, these mechanisms are as under: 1- Appointment of governor or ruler by the king. 2- Appointment of the Commander of Army by the king under himself. 3- Appointment of the secretary of the political unit. 4- An efficient connectional network. 5- Intelligent agents as the eye and ear of the king. After the collapse of Achamenian, Alexander the great conquered Iranian plateau, and continued the divisions of Darius period. But his descendants divided their Jurisdiction into 72 units, as satrapi, and each of them was being divided to smaller units, as named Eparechi. In the Parthian period, the country was divided into two kind of unit, dependant states and kingdom states. The number of dependent states was 18, and on the head of each one was a ruler, which named Vitaxa. The number of kingdom states was about 8, which had a kind of independence in their internal affairs. In this period, there was a kind of hierarchy in the political divisions, as under: States Hiparchi Setatem rural settelments. In the Sassanied period, the old organization of space deeply changed. Many factors affected on it, consist of; Centralism by ruler; feeling of threat from the border areas, so preference army and security; at last feudalism. Khosro Anoshiravan the king of the Sassanied divided the country into four big parts, which named Pazgous. In the head of each Pazgous was a ruler, as regent or viceroy, named Pazgousban.

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Mohammad HAFEZNIA

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF SPACE IN IRAN (POLITICAL DIVISIONS IN IRAN)

Beside the Pazgousban, the king was appointing a commander of army for each Pazgous, named Sepahbod. We said the country was divided into four parts, their name were, Khorasan, Khorbaran, Bakhtar and Nimrouz. Each of these parts was being divided into smaller units, and their hierarchy was as under: Pazgous yallat (state) Shahr Rostagh Tasooj Deh (village). The governor of Eyallat was being named as Marzban, and for the Shahr was being named Shahrig. After the collapse of Sassanied dynasty, Islam came to Iran, then the first dynasty which took power and founded government in Iran, was abbasied. In this period, Haroon-al-Rashid, the king of the Abassied, (A.D. 786 - 809) divided his Jurisdiction in to 31 units, was being named Eyalat. After this period there is no exact information about the political organization of space in Iran. But it seems, the same divisions with some changes have been continued. In the period of Safavid (A.D early 16th century), the political divisions have been under changing, and have been more or less near to the Sassanied pattern. Some historians have claimed that Safavid is the first Iranian dynasty in Islamic Period, which took power in Iran. In the Safavid Period sometimes, Iran has been divided to four parts as, Iraq, Fars, Azarbijan and Khorasan; sometimes it divided into Eyalat (state), or Biglarbaigi. For example in the period of Shah Abbas (A.D 1586 - 1629) the country had been divided into 19-22 Eyalat, and in the last of safavid it divided into 10 Eyalat and 13 Biglarbaigi. The hierarchy of political divisions in this period was as under: Eyalat Velayat Block Qasaba This pattern continued in the next periods up to the Mashrota Revolution, in the last of Qajars dynasty. With the Mashrota Revolution (A.D 1906) the first nation - state was established in Iran, and for the first time political organizing of the space came under the law, passed from the assembly (parliament). On the basis of the act (A.D 1906) the country was divided into 4 Eyalat, 12 Velayat and Tehran as center of the government. In this pattern Eyalat was much authorized than Velayat from internal affairs of view. With setting up the Pahlavi dynasty (A.D 1925-1979), Reza shah (founder of dynasty), changed the pattern. He was much centralist and he tried to defeat the local political forces, and established an integrated state. In the year A.D 1937 on the basis of an act he divided the country into ten Ostan (provinces) and 49 Shahrestan (township), and named them on the series of number (1-10). With this action, in reality, he wanted elimination of their geographical identity in the first level of divisions. But after 23 years (A.D 1960), the parliament approved an act, that on the basis of which (article 13), the name of provinces changed into their historical names. The hierarchy of this pattern was as under: Ostan (province) Shahrestan (township) Bakhsh (district) Qasaba or Dehestan village. On the basis of this pattern in the year 1979, there were 24 Ostan or provinces, 165 townships and 474 districts. In the year 1983, the government revised the law of administrative divisions and the assembly approved the new act for it.

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III. Discussion about the political divisions of Iran 1- Some historians believe that the first country in the world which has been organized from the view of political divisions is Iran, in the period of Achamenian. (5 centuries B.C) 2- The pattern of political divisions, in the next times up to present period has been changed and has become better. 3- Political divisions in the history of Iran have had some turning-points, which have been taken place under the influence of administration of the regions, defence affairs, social and cultural affairs, etc. The main turning - points are consisting of: a. In Achamenian Period (7-5 centuries) b. In Sassanied Period (A.D 226) before the appearance of Islam c. In Abassied Period (A.D 750) early of Islamic Period d. In Safavid Period (A.D 1502) e. In the Period of Mashrota Revolution (A.D 1906) f. In the Period of Pahlavi (A.D 1937) g. In the Period of Islamic Revolution 4- Before the Pahlavi dynasty especially Reza Shah, the government and the state was unitary and decentralized. Namely, the country was being divided into some parts (eyalat) then Shah as the head of the country was appointing the ruler of each part (eyalat), then he was obeying the Shah, but in the 131

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II. The present situation of political divisions At the present, in according to the law, there are five levels of divisions, as under: 1-Ostan (province) 2- Shahrestan (township) 3- Bakhsh (district) 4- Dehestan (rural district) 5- Rosta (village) Shahr (city-town) The number of each of them, in according to the last official report at 1998 - 9 are: Ostan 28, Shahrestan 282, Bakhsh 741, Dehestan 2258, Shahr (city) 705, Rosta (village) 39.224. In the law, the criteria of population have the main role for determination of identity and limitation of each of them. For example; Rosta or village should have had, minimum population 100 or 20 family. Dehestan has a range, low density 4.000 population, medium 6.000 and high 8.000. For the knowing a place as a city it should have had at least 10.000 population. Bakhsh or district has three degrees, low density with 12.000, medium with 20.000, and high density with 30.000 population. The population of Shahrestan (township) in three degrees should be as under, low density 50.000, medium 80.000 and high density 120.000 population. For coming into existence of an Ostan there is needy at least one million population, and the assembly must approves it; but about the others, Cabinet decides. On the basis of article 14 of the act, administrative divisions of country should be according to the political divisions, except military forces, railway and banks. At the head of each level of divisions, is appointed a person by the government as its representative, he is responsible for public policy of government, security of the region, development of the region, economic, social and cultural affairs and activities of the region in collaboration with the local council.

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Name and the number of political divisions of Iran-1998 Sec. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Name of Ostan E. Azarbijan No. of Township 16 14 9 19 7 8 12 5 24 16 7 7 7

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No. of District 38 35 46 24 21 39 17 17 27 15 77 36 15 12 29 17 71 15 16 38 19 60 35 13 16 16

internal affairs, in much extent he was authorized. Reza Shah established a new government which was much centralized; therefore, the apparatus of the government became severely bureaucratic. 5- In a historical perspective, the pattern of political divisions of Iran has been influenced from historical and geographical factors. For example factors such as Topography, distance, area, climate, the structure of human and ethnic groups, external threats, historical traditions, feudalism, political influence of some groups and persons, etc. 6- The present pattern of political divisions as well as its law have some problems, such as under: a. Distribution of the provinces and their limitations and area are not comparatively equal. The majority of them situated in the north, west and north-west of the country, and minority of them situated in the east and south. In this pattern indices of political divisions, and human development, between vast and large provinces (in the east of country) with small provinces (in the west and north) are different. For example some indices in Khorasan province (the largest in Iran) are lower than the average of the country. b. The basis of dividing of the space in the law, is population, whereas it is insufficient, because Iran is a complicated country in the physical features and human characteristics. There is needy for making a multivariable model, so that attainment to symmetrical pattern becomes possible.

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No. of City

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Isfahan Ilam

Boshehr Tehran

Ch. M. Bakhtiari Khorasan Khozestan Zanjan Semnan Sistan, Blochestan

10. 11. 12. 13.

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No. of R. district 135 109 63 117 36 36 71 35 225 112 46 28 92

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

Fars Qazvin Qom Kordestan Kerman Kermanshah K-Bovair Ahmad Golestan Gilan Lorestan Mazandaran Markazi

18 3 1 8 11 11 3 7 16 9 15 8

61 13 4 23 33 25 12 16 40

54 12 3 12 46 20 8

184 43 6 79

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17 8 8 8 21 20 15 282 741

Hormozgan Hamadan Yazd Total

Source: Office of administration division - 1998

References (in Persian) 1 Azimi, Naser, Administration divisions of Iran, Keyhan Elmi, Fifth years, No.12 2 Biat, Azizulah, Physical and historical geography of Iran, Amir Kabir, Tehran, 1994 3 Geography of Iran, Vol.1, Ministry of Education, Tehran, 1987 4 Hafeznia, M., Political geography of Iran, Imam Husain University, (book let), Tehran, 1993 5 Information, Statistics, Office of Administration divisions, Tehran, 1998 6 Locus, Henry, Civilization history, Vol.1, Translation by Azarang, Keyhan, Tehran, 1998 7 Papuli, M.H., Internal divisions of Iranian cities, Geographical research journal, Second year, No.5, Mashhad, 1987 8 Pourkamal, M, Administrative divisions of Iran, Budjet and planning organization, Tehran, 1977 9 Pirnia, H., Iran-e-Bastan, Vol.3, Doniai-e-Ketab, Tehran, 1991 10 Pakistan, Stacy International, London, 1977 (English) 11 Qanoon-e-Taqsimat Keshvary, Official Newspaper, No.11200, Tehran, 1983 12 The sensus results of population, 1996, Sensus Bureau, Tehran, 1997 13 The sensus results of population, 1986, Sensus Bureau, Tehran, 1987 14 The sensus results of population, 1976, Sensus Bureau, Tehran, 1980 15 The sensus results of population, 1966, Sensus Bureau, Tehran, 1967 16 The sensus results of population of Khorasan , 1996, Sensus Bureau, Tehran, 1997 17 Taqsimat Keshvary Iran, Office of administrative divisions, Tehran, 1992 18 W. Dorant, History of civilization, Translated by a group of translators, Entesharat Enqlab-e-Islami, Tehran, 1988

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16 45 106 81 104 61 69 70 40 2258

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THE SPATIAL EFFECTS OF THE REOPENING OF THE BORDER CASE STUDY: JOLFA BORDER BETWEEN IRAN AND AZERBAIJAN / FORMER USSR

Keywords: Boundary, Border; Border function; Jolfa; Azerbaijan; Spatial analysis

1. Introduction According to the Association of American Geographers, the nature of political geography is: "The study of the interaction of geographical area and political process". Pacione believes that: "Political geographers are concerned with the geographical consequences of political decisions and actions". Cohen and Rosenthal say: "Political geography is concerned with the spatial attributes of Political process" (Glassner, 1993: 3). Drysdale and Blake have a definition for political geography. They believe that political geography more spatial analysis on political phenomenon and studies spatial attributes and effects of Political process or decision (Drysdale & Blake, 1990: 9). The political borders are a main factor in the recognition and separation of an organized political unit from other ones (Mirheydar, 2002: 41). Borderlines also indicate utmost level of exerting the political resolution of government and the spatial contact level of two political neighbouring systems (Hafeznia, 2000: 134). According to Peter Taylor, the border is a concept with inner tendency and is a marked line which indicator separation (Taylor, 1989: 145). Martin Glassner also believes that the border is not a line, rather it is a surface, a vertical surface cutting the neighbor governments through space, ground and under ground. This surface seems as a line on the earth (Glassner, 1993: 75). Generally, border is a marked line separating two political units and this line acts as obstacle and is drawn as a surface in space and under ground. Although the border contains a function and effect, and it delimits a region in which a kind of power is exerted, existing a border region or a border line can not only influence the natural landscape which is a part of it but also does reconstruction and policy of the neighbors (Prescott, 1979: 61). Studying the function of borders as a phenomenon of political geography and its influence on the geographic space of its transcoast, concerning the recent concept of political geography is a new work which can help the literary reinforcement of 134

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Abstract: On the fifteenth of February 1990, an understanding memorandum was signed between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the U.S.S.R. Following this, the northern boundaries of Iran in Caucasia region and Turkmenistan were reopened after many years and communication between two sides restarted. At that time Jolfa boundary, in Eastern Azerbaijan province in Iran, was one of the reopening boundary regions. The present research is to find out the spatial influence of the policy of reopening of the mentioned boundary on the region of Jolfa Township in the north western of Iran. The research adopted an analytical descriptive method, using information from a variety of sources such as library, documents and field works (questionnaire, observation and interview), then the research achieved to the followings: Reopening of Jolfa border is the cause of physical and spatial development of the city of Jolfa, development of communication and transportation systems, change of political structure of space, development of economic structures, people s cultural approach to the transborder and the change of the function of police forces and border guards in Jolfa Township.

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Mohammad Reza HAFEZNIA Zahra AHMADYPUR Hassan RAHIMI

the subject in political geography; therefore studying spatial responses of political decision after cold war, based on reopening of the borders and development of spatial interactions between Iran and northern neighbors - specially Azerbaijan Republic in Nakhichevan and Jolfa border - is a new subject which can help review the mentioned policy and its optimization apart from reinforcing the literature of political geography. With the collapse of Berlin wall on November 9, 1989, the cold war was ended and the system of bipolar practically in the world as well. Liberation of all eastern Europe began and the pact of Warsaw dissolved simultaneously with the unified procedure of two Germanies, and not only the sovereignty of the soviet government was removed from the shoulder of East - European governments but the procedure of freedom influenced the Soviet empire (Naghibzadeh, 1999: 288). The protesting movements of Azerbaijan Republic Moslem people against the soviet government began in 1989 (Amir Ahmadian, 1997: 5) and resulted in eliminating the physical obstacles on border communication between two republics of Azerbaijan and Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus the people in two sides of border began their exchange. To lead this unauthorized travels to authorized, I.R.I and U.S.S.R signed an understanding memorandum on February 15, 1990 and provided facilities for traveling border citizens, so that in habitants of border regions of two countries could receive a new passport by which they could travel 4 times during a year until 45 km transborder (Saiedan, 1992: 15 - 21). Following the understanding memorandum the northern borders of Iran in Caucasia and Turkmenistan - including Jolfa border in Eastern Azerbaijan province - reopened and border communications began, this communications that at first had social aspects found gradually economic aspect and then was reinforced. The aim of this research is the influence of this communications on Jolfa township. The border land Township of Jolfa is located in the north west of Iran between 45 17' to 46 32' Eastern longitudes and 38 38' to 39 northern latitude. The border city of Jolfa as a center of this town ship is located on 45 38' eastern longitude and 38 56' 30" northern latitude and is located in the height of 720 m from sea level (Jafari, 1989, 8). Based on housing and population statistics in 1996, the population of this town ship was 54583 persons (the detailed results of overall statistics of population and housing, 1996: 16). The border of Iran with Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nakhichevan was formed by the agreements of Golestan (1813) and Torkmanchay (1828). According to the third chapter of Golestan agreement, All regions of Gharabagh, Ganjeh, Khanat, Shaki, Shirvan, Gobe, Darband, Baku, Talesh and all of Daghestan and Gorjestan were given to Russia (Takmil Homayun, 2001: 29) and 15 years later, after failure of Iran in the second war between Iran and Russia, Torkamanchay agreement was written and signed within 16 chapters. According to the third chapter of this agreement, other part of Irans land was given to Russia; His majesty the Shah of Iran on behalf of himself and his heirs gives Iravan located in two sides of Aras River and also Nakhichevan to the ownership of Russia government absolutely (Takmil Homayun, 2001: 32). Also in the fourteenth chapter of this agreement the north - west which Aras River determined border of Iran with Russia formed most part of this borderline. Now, the common border of the I.R of Iran and Republic of Azerbaijan begins from confluence Point of Aras River and Gharasu (confluence point of three, countries of Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan), and continues to the mouth of Astarachay River in Caspian sea (Rahmatirad, 1995: 83). But apart of this line belong to the common border of Iran and Armenia.

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After holding Torkamanchay agreement and determining Aras River as a border line of Iran and Russia the border communications continued and ever many people of Irans Azerbaijan went transborder to get job for several months or years and returned. This communication continued with no concern until October Revolution of Russia (1917), but after Revolution the trend changed (Hafezzadeh, 1995: 332 - 8). Through October Revolution of 1917 and forming U.S.S.R, the communication between Iran and Azerbaijan Republic reduced in Jolfa border and in the second decade of 1930 was reduced as far as possible. During World War II and through occupying Iran by allied forces, Jolfa was converted into an important and strategic district in the world, because some communication between allied forces (U.K, U.S.A and U.S.S.R) accomplished through this border point. During one-year government of Democrat faction in Azerbaijan, Jolfa was the most important channel for the relationships between this government with Azerbaijan Republic and U.S.S.R (the commercial office of Eastern Azerbaijan, 1993: 68 - 9). What caused the strained relations between Iran and U.S.S.R was the occupation of north of Iran by U. S. S. R forces on Aug 1941 and after wards the event of Azerbaijan and forming Democrat sect supported by U.S.S.R forces. In fact that was the utmost tension between Iran and U.S.S.R (Mollazadeh, 1994: 90). Although this situation was unstable and Seyed Jafar Pishevari, Gholam Yahya and the authorities of Democrat sect escaped towards Jolfa and entered U.S.S.R passing border river of Aras (Hafezzadeh, 1995: 225), after this event the security borders of two countries were cared severely. At last beginning changes in U.S.S.R in 1985 and development of economical political communications between Iran and Azerbaijan Republic, Jolfa recovered its previous importance as a center of communication and after reopening of the borders and beginning communications between Iran and Nakhichevan through Jolfa, the importance of this border city increased. Although the reopening of this border and communicating between Iran and Nakhichevan is a turning - point in the history of Jolfa city. The railway of Iran - Moscow which was passing from Jolfa because of the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Gharabagh closed (1992). Customs of Jolfa almost suspended. This resulted in a great unemployment in Jolfa and its suburbs, which at last so many people left that region and immigrated to other towns (Interview with the previous governor of Jolfa, summer; 2002). 2. Method This research is to find out the spatial influence of reopening of the mentioned boundary on the region of Jolfa Township and answering to the main question. Referring to this question the relationship between reopening of Jolfa border with physical and political structures of space, economic structures, social and cultural structures and security approach of police forces and border guards are studied. Hence, the following hypothesis was taken into account: Reopening of Jolfa border led to the structural development of the city of Jolfa, development of communication and transportation systems, the change of political space structure, development of economic structures (industry, agriculture and services), cultural approach of the people to the transborder and change in the functions of police forces and border guards. The present research is carried out by analytical descriptive method using information from a variety of sources such as library, documents and field works 137

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Table 1. The trend of constructions in Jolfa within two cases of before and after border reopening

Before reopening of the border

The constructions lasted to customs, rail station and housing assemblies belong to their employees.

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3.1.2. Communication and transportation systems Before constitutional government and during 1905 - 1917, Russia based an its interest in Azerbaijan and for fascinating its access to Tabriz, surfaced and established the ingot road of Jolfa - Marand - Tabriz. The motor vehicles of red-army used it during World War II and it was the communicating factor of the allied process in war against Nazi Germany. The construction of main road of Jolfa - Marand was regarded during years after 1971, which its cause was creasing the imports of country (Jalali Aziziyan, 1999:76-7). After closing rail and roadway of Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan Republic because of Gharabagh crisis, joining Nakhichevan with Azerbaijan (the original country) through Iran was posed and connecting road system of Jolfa to Khodaafarin was initiated. Now this border road allows the connection of Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan and even Azerbaijan accomplishes much of its exports through the same axis. Other connection axis at township level is the axis of Jolfa - Ivoghlu in Western Azerbaijan. This plan allows connection between two provinces of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan in the northern point of Iran and facilitates the access to Turkey and Azerbaijan (Azer payam issue, 2/8/2002:5) After sovereignty of Armenia, this country needed land tie with I. R. I, so the construction of the great border bridge of Noordooz was exploited with the expense 138

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3. Research findings 3.1. Physical and political structure of Jolfa Township 3.1.1. Construction in Jolfa city Considering the reopening of Jolfa border and the daily traffic of nearly 3000 people from this border (interview with the assistant of border terminal of Jolfa, summer, 2002) commercial part of this city have developed, new established passages like Valiasser, Shamsetabrizy, Amir, Niloofar, Aby, Sadaf and some passages which they are going to build and also servicing commercial units in two sides of the central boulevard of the city and Russian market all together have 500 servicing commercial units. The new established border terminal of Jolfa and some avenues of the city indicate the growth and physical development of the city after its reopening (field work, summer 2002).

After reopening of the border

The commercial - servicing constructions related to the passengers entered in Jolfa from autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan and other regions of Eastern Azerbaijan and other provinces.

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(questionnaire, observation and interview). In this research, statistical society and the samples in field studies are: 1. Political, economical, social, cultural and security authorities of Jolfa Township. 2. The authorities of Islamic councils in the central district countries of Jolfa Township. 3. %10 the trained people of central district of Jolfa township (100 people). Apart from questionnaire data, some part of data compiled through documents and interviews with informed people and some related authorities.

3.2. Economic structure of Jolfa Township Following the necessities caused by reopening of the border, Jolfa was approved as a special economic zone in 1997 and this is regarded as the most important economic project of Jolfa. This special zone with an area about 1035 hectares, containing 135 hectares of the land and customs establishments of Jolfa and about 900 hectares of eastern lands out of customs assembled, is located in Jolfa and in the path of rail and road highways (Brochure of Jolfa special economic zone). One of the most important economic processes in agriculture is the great water supply project from Aras River to Gordian plain based on 10m3/s right of water, which hastens the developmental procedure of the township. In the second and third phase of water supply plan; the plains of Golfaraj and Afshar are processed (Eastern Azerbaijan Governor Generals, 1999: 84). Following reopening of Jolfa border and beginning border traveling, the commercial and service body of the city and in general the region have been enjoyed growth and development, so that Jolfa has become a special economic zone, establishing border market and various commercial - service units including hundreds stores in the city and trafficking travelers from the further points of Iran to Jolfa has caused development in transportation. 3.3. The cultural construction of Jolfa Township The situation of people in Jolfa is not different from province population culturally. The people of this township are Turk of Azeri and 99.84% of them believe in Islam and are Shiites. Based on the census accomplished in 1996, the ratio of literacy in the township level has been 78.32% which indicates a high figure (The detailed result of population and housing 1996). The reopening of border and communication of people in two sides of border has influenced cultural issues in the regional level and the prominent culture in

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of two countries on 9/1/1995. The bridge has been built with three mouths of 63.5m and total length and width of it is 200 and 14.5m, respectively. Apart from the mentioned connection axis, other plans including the demand of Azerbaijan Republic based on establishing the rail way of Minjevan - Ordobad rail - station through Iran which connects Azerbaijan and Nakhichvan (Eastern Azerbaijan commercial office, 1993: 56). The border terminal of Jolfa inside the city, in the southern coast of Aras River with the area of 26500m2 established in 1996 (interview with the deputy of Jolfa border terminal, summer, 2002). 3.1.3. Political structure of space in Jolfa In administrative divisions of 1937, Jolfa was located in the subset of Marand district. Through converting Marand into a township, Jolfa became a district in subset of Marand (Seyedzonoozi, 1979: 17). And after reopening of Jolfa - Nakhichevan border and its communicational and political necessities caused by it on 4/12/1994, interior Ministry of Iran, through a letter requested the vice president of Iran to establish Jolfa Township (administrative division office of interior ministry, 1.4.42.9333 / 4.12.1994). Following this request the vice president, through a letter to the interior ministry, declared the approval of promoting the level of Jolfa from district to township (Eastern Azerbaijan Governor Generals, 14505.6354 / 14.7.1995).

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Nakhichevan has penetrated in the township. 3.4. The security construction of Jolfa Township The border line length of Jolfa township which is from Farhadi sentry post in west to Haras sentry post in east is 128km. 83km of it is the border of Nakhichevan and 45km is the border with Armenia Republic. The border of Jolfa Township starts from the main border rod number 20 in west and ended in the main border rod of number 34 in east. They are several sides - tracks between any main rods. The distance between main rods is 4-10km (Eastern Azerbaijan Governor Generals, 1999: 12). Regarding Jolfa as a border township, the police force is active in the region. There are 21 sentry posts during border line of the township which from west to east are: the sentry posts of Farhadi, Abbasi, Wooden bridge, Iron bridge, Ryahi, Marazad, Ahmad Abad, Manjin Abad, Alizadeh, Alishahid, Siahrood, Custom, Azari, Jorjan, Noordooz, Kordasht, Duzal, Sedaghat, Golun, Messian and Haras. In average the distance between two sentry stations is 6.4km and are much new established and old sentry posts changes in to new ones gradually (Eastern Azerbaijan Governor Generals, 1999: 56). Before collapsing the borders lines of Iran and U.S.S.R are as closed border lines and Red-Army was active in transborder. They control borders severely and there has been no security problem in border. The frontier controllers of U.S.S.R always hindered unauthorized traffic installing alarm-system barbed wire and had made the border impenetrable. Regarding the mentioned transborder circumstances there have not been physical limitations for traffic in the border of Iran and there were only some watchman in Irans border and because of U.S.S.R observers, Irans watchmen had no problem. Because of the reopening of borders, the obstacles of border communication removed by transborder Azeries and the Russian frontier controllers were obliged to leave the border and Nakhichevan army could not supervise frontiers because it did not have specialized frontier controllers. On the other hand the war of Armenia and Azerbaijan on Gharabagh accompanied by other factors caused the border becomes insecure. By removing frontier obstacles in transborder the superficial and physical form of the border became similar, consequently unauthorized traffic and smuggling goods gradually increased. After reopening border, smuggling of goods became a main problem in Jolfa and this resulted in various disorders in this region. On the other hand, increasing unauthorized traffic in the borders, the war of Armenia and Azerbaijan on Gharabagh, military contracts of Azerbaijan Republic and the presence of transborder alien forces caused insecurity in Jolfa township frontier. I.R.I has taken some actions including establishing new sentry posts and repairing old sentry posts, establishing new observation towers increasing the number of frontier sentry posts, increasing inspection centers and converting military terminal into military garrison and establishment of some army forces in it, to confront insecurity and promote security coefficient (interview with local authorities, summer 2002). 4. Analyzing findings 4.1. The effects of reopening Jolfa border on the construction of city Regarding facilities signed in understanding memorandum on communication of border (1990. 2. 15) inhabitants traveling of the travelers of Jolfa Township and Nakhichevan (3000 persons daily) developed the commercial and service body of the city. 140

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4.2. The effects of reopening on communication and transportation systems After reopening, much change occurred in communication and transportation, which are: 1. Changing frontier road projects of Jolfa - Khodaafarin and Jolfa road - Ivoghlu from provincial into national projects. 2. Establishing, completing and securing Jolfa - Khodaafarin axis along frontier band to connect Azerbaijan Republic to Nakhichevan after closing road and rail way of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan by Armenia. 3. Planning and establishing the road of Jolfa - Ivoghlu to the provinces of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan easily and also accessing Azerbaijan and Turkey. 141

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Comparing maps no. 3 with no. 2 indicates changes formed, so that this development has a direct relation with reopening. The main factors caused the city to be developed are: 1. Approval and establishment of Jolfa economic zone on 135 hectare ground. 2 2. Establishing border terminal (26.500 m ) in Jolfa. 3. Establishing common border market (10.000 m2) in Jolfa. 4. Building hundreds of commercial, service and business units. 5. Establishing office buildings after promoting Jolfa from district to township. 6. Setting up an academy for confronting with culture invasion. 7. Establishing 7 hotels and many rooms. 8. Establishing Resalat Boulevard and some avenues. 9. Issuing about 220 building - license in housing unit. Regarding above and comparing maps no. 3 and no. 2 we conclude that reopening of the border has developed the city.

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Map designing by: Dr.M.R.Hafeznia - H.Rahimi (2002)

4.3. The effects of frontier reopening on political structure of space in Jolfa Regarding the promotion of Jolfa from district to a township in administrative division (16. 8. 1995), the previous Governor of Jolfa, and previous and present Governors of district of central district believed that the reopening of border has been effective in accelerating the promotion procedure from district to township, although the citizens of the district had requested it previously. Following interview with the local authorities, we studied the main text of approval plan of interior ministry on level promotion, which a part of the plan is: ... Regarding political, economic situation and the ties with the mentioned republics (Armenia and Nakhichevan), it is recognized that the existence of an official 142

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4. Asphalting and improving the border road of Jolfa - Poldasht (Western Azerbaijan), 22km in length. 5. Optimizing, securing and asphalting road surface and roadsides of Jolfa Marand (for increasing traffic after reopening). 6. Stablishing frontier bridge of Noordooz between Jolfa Township and Armenia in 1995. 7. Repairing and improving Wooden Bridge into two phases after reopening. 8. Under standing memorandum between Iran and Azerbaijan to establish Minjevan - Ordobad railway from Iran. 9. Studying to establish a new frontier bridge near Wooden Bridge. 10. Discussion on establishing a bridge in Siahrood (Jolfa Township) and Ordobad (self-rule Republic of Nakhichevan) suburbs. Regarding the above and map (4), we conclude reopening of Jolfa border has caused the development of communication and transportation systems in Jolfa township.

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and governmental management higher than district Governors is necessary... . According to the views of authorities on the effect of reopening in accelerating the promotion of Jolfa in administrative divisions and relying on the decree of interior ministry which hints the frontier ties of Jolfa with the Republics of Armenia and Nakhichevan, it is concluded that the reopening of Jolfa border has changed the political construction of space in the zone and this has caused its promotion. 4.4. The effects of Jolfa border reopening on industry Because of special and appropriate situation of Jolfa in connective routes of Iran, Caucasia, Europe, Russia and Turkey and also because of customs facilities, the existence of railway and appropriate connection ways, and so many advantages for investment and goodness attention of high - counseling of commercial and industrial free zones, Jolfa was approved as a special economic zone in 1997.
Table 2. Related to public installations and servicing to the countries of Jolfa within two case of before and after border reopening Row 1 2

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Post and post box Guidance school Car repair shop Primary school Hygienic room Coffee shop High school Hospital Bakery Library

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

The type of service and installations

Public transportation

Hygienic water Hygienic and public bathroom Telephone

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14

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15

13 15 19

After border reopening (The number of villages)

19 15

17

13

16 11

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13 19 19 12

10

The production of sport facilities now accomplished in special economic zone (including billiard tables), the production of solar water - heaters, bicycle production and so on are industrial activities. Also, the production of Amico motorcycles near Jolfa is the most important industrial change in Jolfa (field studies, 2002).

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According to the above - mentioned objects and the situation of the industry in the zone, it is concluded that the reopening of border in developing industry has been effective. 4.5. The effect of Jolfa border reopening on servicing Following reopening of the border and communication of travelers to this township (especially Jolfa city) servicing develops as following: 1- Establishing border common market in Jolfa. 2- Establishing special economic zone in which apart from industrial activities, commercial and service activities are regarded. 3- Developing commercial - service body of Jolfa (establishing various passages and markets). 4- Establishing hotels and restaurants (7 hotels). 5- Developing transportation on the region and specially Jolfa city (the activity of cars, minibus, and bus to transport the passengers from Jolfa to other regions). According to the objects mentioned and the employment of thousands people in this district, it is concluded that the reopening of Jolfa border is effective in developing servicing district in Jolfa. 4.6. The effect of border reopening on culture According to the results of questionnaire related to cultural effects of reopening change has occurred in cultural issues in the region and the prevailing transborder culture has penetrated in the region and has revealed its effects as following: 4.6.1. The effect of border reopening on education The passing percent of high school students in examinations indicated a high reduction, so that in 1988 - 1989 (before reopening of the border) the passing percent of students was 77.88% which in 1990 - 1991 (after reopening of border) this figure reduced to 61.47% (Nooshirvanzadeh, 1994: 45). Also according to the results of questionnaire, the passing percent of Concur volunteers has decreased, whereas the rate of education - abandoned students has increased. On the other hand the motivation of teachers for teaching has been decreased. 4.6.2. The effect of border reopening on people motivation for watching the TV programs of neighbor countries After reopening of the border, the television nets of four countries of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey and Russia were clearly receivable, whereas the Iranian provincial net is not receivable in township. Interrupting and connecting of interior nets on the one hand and the attraction of the television programs of mentioned countries on the other hand has increased for watching television programs of these countries. 4.6.3. The effect of border reopening on customs and entertainments After reopening of Jolfa border and developed communications between two nations, much of transborder customs and entertainments has penetrated in the region and develops gradually. Now peoples customs and associations, the manner of weddings and even the kind of entertainments (like Domino play) have got attractive quality of Nakhichevan.

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Table No. 3 - The results of questionnaire related to cultural effects

Row 1

Subjects The amount of students' interest to education: The amount of students who half-finished their education:

Effects after border reopening A) It has been increased. B) It has been decreased. C) There has been no difference. A) It has been increased. B) It has been decreased. C) There has been no difference. A) It has been increased. B) It has been decreased. C) There has been no difference. A) It has had positive effect. B) It has had negative effect. C) It has had no effect.

Percentage 0 88 12

The amount of people's interest for listening to Azeri music:

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The amount of students accepted to Concur:

A) It has been increased. B) It has been decreased. C) There has been no difference. A) It has been increased. B) It has been decreased. C) There has been no difference. A) It has been easier. B) It has been harder. C) There has been no difference. A) It has been increased. B) It has been decreased. C) There has been no difference.

The amount of people's interest for watching transborder TV programs: The availability of sex films and pictures:

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4.7. The effect of reopening Jolfa border on security efficiency of police forces and frontier control department of Jolfa Township About security dimension before reopening of borders, by presence of U.S.S.R frontier controllers and their observation, the police forces and the department of frontier control did not have any problem in observation. U.S.S.R forces had taken action the following objects to prevent any unauthorized communication and possible security events along frontier band: 1- Establishment of the red - army along the frontier line as frontier controller. 2- Setting up barbed wires equipped with alarming systems. 3- Utilizing the smooth faced dusty roads to recognize any unauthorized communication along barbed wires. After reopening the border and collapse of the U.S.S.R, observing Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan borders was delivered to the Azerbaijan forces, whereas this country focused on 766 km border lands with Armenia, there fore they pay less attention to their border with Iran. On the other hand, about reopening of the frontiers, frontier obstacles (barbed 145

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wires) were removed and secure borders converted to insecure ones, and unauthorized travel links and goods-smuggling were increased, so that now goods smuggling is the most important security problem of Jolfa border line. The factors made the police and the frontier departments of Iran in Jolfa sensitive to frontier line are: 1- Goods smuggling, specially unauthorized goods (such as alcoholic liquors, forbidden films and photos, etc...) from autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan to Jolfa. 2- Smuggling some unauthorized goods (such as fuel and scarce goods, etc...) from Iran to the inside of Nakhichevan. 3- Increasing unauthorized frontier communications by the nations of both countries and the problems caused by these communications. 4- The war of Armenia and Azerbaijan on Gharabagh and irresponsibility of none of them about the problems caused by this war along the border. 5- The proved but untouched presence of alien forces and their activities in transborder. 6- Attempts of Azerbaijan Republic to join NATO. 7- Reduction of frontier observation by the frontier controllers of the Nakhichevan autonomous Republic and consequently reduction of security along frontier. The government of Iran in Jolfa Township has taken actions as follows to confront the factors weaken border security: 1- Establishing new sentry posts and repairing old sentry posts along frontier length. 2- Establishing new observation towers among frontier sentry post to control the border better. 3- Converting military terminal of Jolfa into military garrison and establishing some forces in it. 4- Increasing the ability of frontier sentry posts qualifiedly and quantatively. 5- Increasing inspection centers especially in Iron - bridge and Marazad. 6- Increasing observation of the borders by the police force and frontier control Department of Jolfa Township. According the objects mentioned, it is concluded that reopening of Jolfa border has changed the efficiency of security forces and frontier control department in Jolfa Township. 5. Conclusion Following the reopening of the borders between Iran and U.S.S.R on 15.2.1990 and starting communication and interactions between autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan Republic and Jolfa township in Iran, the vast changes have occurred in structural, economic, social, cultural and security sections of this township, so that after reopening of the border: 1- The frontier city Jolfa has developed structurally. 2- Communicative and transportation systems on the regional level have enjoyed notable growth and development. 3- The political structure of space has changed in Jolfa and has resulted in the promotion of Jolfa from district to township. 4- Industry on the regional level has enjoyed a notable growth and development. 5- Servicing on the regional level has enjoyed a considerable development. 6- The transborder cultural approach of the people is increased gradually. 7- The efficiency of security forces and frontier control department of Iran in Jolfa Township has changed and by establishing and developing control equipments, border line is observed more.

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6. Acknowledgment This research has been in Tarbiat Modarres University (Tehran), and by its financial support. So we want to thank the officials of the University especially in the faculty of humanities.
References 1. Amir Ahmadian, Bahram. (1997). Caucasian Geography; Tehran: The Publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2. Drysdale, A & Blake, G. (1990).The Middle East and North Africa: Apolitical Geography; Translated by: Dr. D. Mirheydar.Tehran: The Institute for Political & International Studies. 3. Eastern Azerbaijan Governor - Generals, The Office of Administrative Divisions, Decree no 14505.6354 / 14.7.1995. 4. Eastern Azerbaijan Governor - Generals. (1999). Province Bibliography, Jolfa Township; 5. Glassner, Martin I. (1992). Political Geography; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 6. Hafeznia, Mohammad Reza. (2000). The Bases of Social-Political Studies; QOM: Abroad Howzeh and Schools Organization. 7. Hafezzadeh, Mohammad. (1995). Aras in History Passage; Tabriz: Nia Publications. 8. Jafari, Abbus. (1999). The Certification of Natural Geography of Iran; Tehran: Gitashenasi Publications. 9. Jalali Azizian, Hassan. (1999). The History of Marand; Tabriz: Gohar Saiah Publications. 10. Jolfa Special Economic Zone; Brochure. (2002). 11. Ministry of Interior, the Office of Administrative Divisions, Letter no 1.4.42.9333 / 4.12.1994. 12. Mirheydar, Dorreh. (2002). The Bases of Political Geography; Tehran: SAMT Publications. 13. Mollazadeh, Hamid. (1994). Azerbaijan Republic, Look on the Future; Tabriz: Ark Publications. 14. Naghibzadeh, Ahmad. (1999). The Changes of International Connections (From Wien Congress to Today); Tehran: Goomas Publications. 15. Nooshirvanzadeh Mohammad Ibrahim. (1994). Jolfa Economic Stagnancy and Its Effects on Social and Cultural Factors; Tabriz University (Unpublished) 16. Payam Issue of Jolfa, Azerpayam Issue; (2. 9.2002). Appendix no 22, Magazine of Government Week.Tabriz. 17. Prescott J.R.V. (1979). New Attitudes in Political Geography; Translated by Dorreh Mirheydar.Tehran: Tehran University Publication, 18. Rahmatirad, Mohammad Hossein. (1995). Frontier Control Department, Passport and Alien Nations; Tehran: NAJA Education Deputy. 19. Saiedan, Mahmood. (1992). Studying the Situation of Commercial Exchange in Eastern Azerbaijan Province with the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia; Tabriz: the Organization of Plan and Budget of Eastern Azerbaijan Province. 20. Seyedzonozi, Amir Hooshang. (1979). Marand; Tabriz: Arash Publications. 21. Takmil Homayon, Naser. (2002). The Contemporary Borders of Iran; Tehran: The Office of Cultural Studies. 22. Taylor, j. Peter. (1989). Political Geography; London 23. The Detailed Results of Population and Housing Census; (1996). Jolfa Township: Iran Statistical Center. 24. The General Office of Eastern Azerbaijan, Commercial and Economic Ties with Azerbaijan Republic. (1998). 25. Using the Results of Field Studies Questionnaires. 26. Using the Fieldwork Methods in the Region Such as Observations and taking Views of Authorities and Local Offices by Interview.

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Cuvinte cheie: poziie geografic favorabil, ax transcontinental, hidrocarburi, negociere, investiii, Romnia, Iran.

Romania in the new architecture of Europe Romania, a Central - European country, lies at the crossing of Parallel 46o N latitude and Meridian 25o E longitude. Its historical and geopolitical destiny was shaped by three major geographical landmarks, the Carpathian Mountains, the River Danube and the Black Sea. The Carpathian Mountains feature relative low altitudes, numerous depressions and transversal valleys which account for old-standing settlement. The Carpathians in Romania represent two-thirds of the whole chain, and along with the Subcarpathians and the Transylvanian Tableland cover 107,740 km2 (45.2% of Romanias surfacearea) gathering about 40% of the countrys population. The River Danube is not simply a collector of Romanias inland waters, but also the main navigation avenue of the Continent, linking Central Europe to the Black Sea, through its Danube - Maine - Rhine and the Danube - Black Sea canals, and turning the river into a transcontinental navigable axis that connects the Black Sea port of Constana with Rotterdam harbour at the North Sea. The most important section of the river, with the highest flow rate and traffic, is the lower sector (38% of the total length of the Danube) on Romanian territory. The Carpathians and the Danube Basin make Romania a Central European country, a reality sustained also by the relatively equal distances to the northern, eastern and western outposts of the Continent (the North Cape - 2,800 km; the Ural Mountains in the east - 2,600 km, and the Roca Cape in the west - 2,700 km) but closer to the Mediterranean Sea - 1,050 km. So, the Romanian territory is a crossing of the four large climatic and biogeographical domains of Europe:

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Rezumat: Romnia - o destinaie favorabil pentru investitorii iranieni. Situat la rscrucea dintre Occident i Orient, dintre Europa central i Europa sudic i estic, la gurile Dunrii i n vestul Mrii Negre, Romnia se afl totodat pe drumul strategic transcontinental ce leag statele din vestul Uniunii Europene de imensele resurse de hidrocarburi ale Asiei Centrale i Golfului Persic. Avantajele poziiei geografice sunt amplificate de statutul Romniei n context regional: este unul dintre statele mari, att ca suprafa ct i ca mrime demografic, membru a Uniunii Europene i NATO, care s-a afirmat de-a lungul timpului ca un promotor constant al stabilitii i cooperrii regionale i internaionale. Grefate pe fondul bunelor relaii romno - iraniene statornicite de-a lungul timpului (relaiile diplomatice dintre cele dou ri dateaz din 1902), favorabilitile induse de potenialul de transport al petrolului iranian ctre rile vest-europene pot fi amplificate prin investiii iraniene n Romnia, existnd un mare potenial n acest sens. Apartenena Romniei la spaiul Europei Latine favorizeaz procesul de negociere, iar infrastructura de transport i programele de dezvoltare pe termen mediu i lung pot transforma Romnia, printr-o mai bun cunoatere de ctre investitorii iranieni, ntr-o bun destinaie pentru acetia.

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Radu SGEAT

ROMANIA - A FAVOURABLE DESTINATION FOR IRANIAN INVESTMENTS

- Western Europe, oceanic climate, with frequent oceanic air advections penetrating especially in the Banat and Criana Plain and on the western side of the Apuseni Mountains; - Eastern Europe, temperate-continental climate, often with excessive shades in the Moldavian Plateau and the east of the Romanian Plain; - Southern (Balkan) Europe, the climate of which influences mainly the south of Romania as illustrated by the plant and animal species found as far as the southern side of the Carpathians and especially in South Dobrogea; - Northern Europe (Scandinavian-Baltic) whose climatic influence is much attenuated by the Forested Carpathians in Ukraine; nonetheless, this influence is frequently felt in the Carpathians of Maramure and Bucovina and the Suceava Plateau. The Black Sea represents a gateway to the Planetary Ocean, and has greater geostrategical importance in the present international context, as a route to the huge oil and gas resources of the Caspian Basin. The establishment of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation at the Black Sea (1992) was aimed at stimulating economic development on the basis of friendly and good neighbourly relations within a framework of regional stability and security. The countrys geographical position, as well as historical events and geopolitical circumstances account for three great cultural and geostrategic influences of the Orthodox Eastern Europe (Russia and Ukraine), of the Catholic Central-Europe and the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and of the Balkan territories, representing the SouthDanubian Slavs (Bulgarians and Serbs) and Muslim influences during the Ottoman expansion north-westwards and the annexation of those territories to the Empire. In addition, Romanias location at the crossing of the major traffic axes that link Western Europe to Eastern Europe, Asia Minor and the Middle East, confers it a geoeconomic position which is even more important today, when some fresh geoeconomic axes are emerging: the axis of the seas (the Caspian Sea - the Black Sea - the Mediterranean Sea) and the axis of rivers and canals (Rhine - Maine - Danube). For over 40 years, Central Europe and the term of Europe itself were monopolised by the geopolitical structure situated west of the Iron Curtain. Europe used to be associated with a free space, while communist Europe, or Eastern Europe which gravitated towards the Soviet Union, was mainly an ideological category, having no precise territorial basis (Fourcher, 2000). The West-Europeans held an increasingly vague idea about the geometry of this territorial space; whether it was Poland and Romania or Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary, states that belong to different geographical areas and have distinct cultures, they were all placed in opposition to Greece, Spain, Great Britain and Germany, states that formed part of the same economic and political-military blocs, but were so very different in terms of geographical location and culture. As a result, the northern limit of the Balkan Peninsula was pushed up to the Soviet borders, while a subjective approach made East Germany, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary be recognised as Central-European countries. The fundamental changes that took place at the end of the 1980s led to a reconsideration of the geopolitical relations in the Central and East-European space, some old geostrategic alliances being renewed and new ones developed. The area between the former USSR borders and the former Iron Courtain tends towards the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, while the buffer zone between Europe and 150

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Romania, a part of Latin Europe 2 Latin Europe, which covers over 1.7 million km (16.18% of the total Continental area) and has a population of nearly 200 million inhabitants (28% of the total population of Europe), extends over the entire territory of ten states: France, Italy, Spain, Romania, Portugal, the Republic of Moldova, Andorra, San Marino, Monacco and the Vatican, and partly over the territory of another three countries: Belgium, Switzerland and Luxemburg. It should be remembered that Europes southern flank from the Atlantic to the Dniester is bordered by some Latin countries and a Greek-Slav enclave that discontinues this stretch of Latinity. The building of a Latin Europe, of a Latin Arc between the Iberian Peninsula to the Dniester might bring more dynamism to the whole construction of the Continent. It should be understood that building a united Europe in which the group of Latin countries assumes greater responsibilities is not feasible if the Romanian space, which for nearly two thousand years has belonged to the Latin space, is overlooked. A Latin Europe will not be able to use its whole potential, including also the geostrategic one, without that island of Latinity situated in the south-east of the central part of the Continent. Latin negotiation style explains why some French or Italian transnational companies could better adapt themselves to the specificity of Islamic culture than their American or British counterparts. Their elaborated discourse, rich in contextual elements, artistic undertones and hedonistic tendencies, long talks characteristic of French negotiators, and divagation and exuberance of the Italian ones are more to the heart of an Islamic manager. Mediterraneans and Arabs assign a significant role to personal relationships, being rather slow in adjusting themselves to American, British or German rigour and pragmatism. If there is something in an Arab to your liking, he feels himself obliged to serve you. The American approach to business spells out in efficiency and pragmatism, concrete results being paramount. Contextual communication, long and elaborated discussions, rationality combined with affectivity, characteristic of Latin, Japanese and Chinese negotiators, are also much appreciated by Islamic partners (Table 1).
Table 1 - Islamic negotiation style. Compatibilities and adversities

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COMPATIBILITIES Style Latin Romanian Causes respect for traditions (religious and lay) respect for Islamic honour and culture; highlight Style American

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Causes pride, awareness of values on both sides conflictual states; cultural discrepancies

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Russia is shifted eastwards, towards Ukraine and Belarus. As a consequence, the old Eastern Europe is still erroneously perceived as a homogeneous geographical category, often designated as Middle Europe or New Europe, a geostrategic space transitional between the East and the West (Fourcher, 1993; Brunet & Rey, 1996). From a geographical, ethnic, historical and socio-economic viewpoint, Romania lies undoubtedly in Central-Europe, an area corresponding to de Martonnes delimitation, who adds Slovenia and Croatia to the region, countries thats geographical and geostrategic position, historical past, and cultural and economic affinities entitle them to the list.

Chinese Japanese

on personal relationships new acquaintances, business opportunities; elaborated discourse, affectivity, warmth, flexibility, creativity; avoiding conflict, pursuing harmony

British German

make Islamic perceive British humour as bantering; pragmatism, efficiency and direct American style approach conflicting with emotional manifestations of the Islamic style

Romania, a factor of regional stability With a surface-area of 238,390 km2 and a population of 21,698,000, Romania is one of the relatively large states in Central Europe, coming third after Germany and Poland; as regards its neighbours, it comes second after Ukraine. The country lays in-between two conflict foci, the former Yugoslav space and the former Soviet Union, where the Transnistrian conflict has a direct bearing on the Romanian population of the Republic of Moldova. Both conflicts have been triggered by ethnic tensions augmented by the fall of the communist regime and the assertion of national identity. Within this geostrategic context, Romania is an island of stability, with a broad political openness to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures of cooperation, it participating in potential crisis situations in terms of EU and NATO demands. There are voices advocating the countrys ethnic-based fragmentation, but they have no solid arguments for their case because all of Romanias historical provinces are homogeneous from an ethnic, linguistic and cultural point of view. There is no distinction between the language and culture of Moldavia, Oltenia, or Banat such as it is in the case of the Catalonian or Basque languages and cultures, which are different from that of the Spanish majority population, or of the Scottish language and culture which are alien to the Welsh, the English or the Irish languages and cultures. Historical and political circumstances account for certain differences in Romanias ethnic structure at regional and sub-regional level. The colonisation of ethnic foreign elements, especially in the eastern and southern parts of Transylvania and Banat, was the result of a policy of denationalisation of the native Romanians persistently promoted by the Austro-Hungarian and the Habsburg imperial authorities. The Hungarian population in Romania represents 6.6%, with the exception of two counties (Harghita and Covasna) situated in the east of Transylvania where it makes over 50% of the total population. Next come the Gypsy (Rroma) nationals, spread diffusely throughout the country, but more numerous in some Transylvanian counties (Mure, Sibiu) and in the surroundings of Bucharest. The Germans - Swabians and Transylvanian Saxons, a population reduced numerically in the wake of massive emigrations, are found especially in Banat and the south of Transylvania, respectively. There is a small number of Ukrainians and they live in the northern counties of Romania; Lipovan-Russians, Turks and Tartars are settled in Dobrogea. Banat is a province with an ethnic mix - Serbs, Croats, Slovaks and Bulgarians alongside Hungarians, Germans and Gypsies. Since historical circumstances left Romanias historical regions under various foreign administrations and their different cultural and behavioural influences, the social - economic development level, the culture, customs and traditions of these regions are somehow different.

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Romanias favourable geostrategic position The importance of the Transcontinental strategic line links the EU to the oil and gas reserves of Central Asia which, after the dissolution of the COMECOM economic cooperation system, opened up to the West-European market, has been described by various syntagms. The stake is high and the fulfilment of this project would push the Caspian Basin into the position of world leader, surpassing the Middle East in the production and export of oil and gas. At present, there are two pipe-lines starting from the same point - Baku, and running across the isthmus which separates the Caspian Sea from the Black Sea: an old pipe-line (5 million t/year) which reaches the Russian port of Novorossiisk, and a newer line whose terminal is the Georgian port of Supsa (9 million t/year). But the transport capacity of these pipe-lines falls short of oil demand. Several new routes have been suggested and three options are worth considering: - the Nordic corridor: Baku-Novorossiisk, transporting the Russian oil provided the existing pipe-line is enlarged; - the Central corridor with two variants: Baku-Supsa to the Black Sea, and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, to the Mediterranean Sea; - the Southern corridor: from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf passing through Iranian territory. Each of these options also takes into account the Kazakhstan oil, which is to hold the major share, due to the Tenghiz deposit which is one of the biggest deposits in the world. In this situation Romania is interested in crude-oil transport through the north of the Black Sea towards Hungary, Slovenia and Italy, or on the Black Sea to Nvodari (Constana) refinery, the biggest and most updated one in the whole Black Sea Basin. Besides, compared to the Mediterranean refineries, the transport and processing of crude would be at the lowest costs. To this end, studies have in view the construction of an oil-pipe for the Caspian crude transport between Constana and Trieste crossing Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia, Romania charging only transit taxes. In addition the construction of a pipe-line linking Piteti (Romania) to Panchevo (Serbia) and connected to the Adria oil-pipe which links the Mediterranean Basin to Central and Western Europe would be very advantageous. This project might thwart the pressure of western Siberian oil transport to Central and Western Europe through a dense network of oil-pipes over a much longer distance. The southern option could face serious reservations on the part of the United States, because of the political situation in Iran and the risks posed by Islamic fundamentalism; besides, the very rough terrain the line is to run through makes it unattractive.

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However, they are all part and parcel of the Romanian cultural values, and there is no question about the existence of a Moldavian, Oltenian, Transylvanian or Banatian people and culture. The most numerous ethnic minority, the Hungarians, are homogeneously settled in the counties of Harghita, Covasna, Mure and Braov in proportion of 25%, some one million more being intermingled among the Romanian population over large areas of Transylvania, Banat, Criana and Maramure. Romanias external policy won it a place among the NATO-member states and prospectively membership to the European Union. This is the result of the countrys progress on the way of democracy, and of the geostrategic advantages of its geographical position at the crossroads between the east and the west of the Continent, ever more interdependent and interrelated.

At a first analysis, Romania might be excluded from the first two variants because the oil tanks could be shipped directly from Novorossiisk or Supsa to the Mediterranean ports through the Bosphorus or the Dardanelle straits. However, the straits being overcrowded, the traffic could not meet the oil demand of European users. Intense traffic on this route might cause accidents with severe ecological and economic consequences. Besides, one country alone - Turkey, would control the transit of this important raw material. Also the other variants have their drawbacks, thus the Novorossiisk or Supsa route to Burgas (Bulgaria) and farther on through pipe-lines either to Alexandropolis (Greece) at the Aegean Sea, or to Vlor (Albania) at the Adriatic Sea, is unprofitable because these two ports have low-capacity terminals, besides the route being rough, pumping stations must be built on the way. Therefore Romania has obvious geostrategic advantages (Negu, 2004): - It is the largest country in the region, has political stability and lies at the crossing of the east-west and north-south economic and commercial corridors; - It is a part of three major Paneuropean transport corridors: Corridor IV: Berlin - Prague - Bratislava - Gyr - Budapest - Arad Bucureti - Giurgiu - Sofia - Istanbul; Corridor VI: the Danube - Maine - Rhine transcontinental navigable route which links the Black Sea with the North Sea Corridor IX: Helsinky - Skt. Petersburg - Pskov - Vitebsk Ljubasivka - Chiinu - Bucureti - Plovdiv; - Romania is the only country in the region included in the two EU programmes (Traceca and Inogate) targeting the Caspian oil and gas reserves and their transport towards Central and Western Europe; - The pipe-line was supposed to cross lowland regions, especially plain areas, which offer greater technical advantages than the variants naming Burgas as point of departure, to say nothing of the routes across Turkey, in which case the pipe-line would have to be built at altitudes of up to 2,000 metres; - Romanias offer is not simply to transit crude-oil from the Caspian Sea, but also to process it, because it has a fairly well-developed pipe-line system both for the transport of crude oil (around 4,500 km) and oil products (around 2,500 km). With minimum investments, the system can easily be connected to the Central and West-European transport route; - The Romanian port of Constana is the largest and most active one at the Black Sea, having all the special terminals operational both for crude-oil (24 million t/year) and oil products (12 million t/year), as well as the respective reservoirs (1.7 billion m3). Prospectively, ongoing works will turn this harbour into the second largest port in Europe (after Rotterdam); - Romanias oil-refining capacity (about 35 million t/year) is far greater than its own oil production capacity (little over 6 million t/year) and internal demand for oil products. So, it has an excess oil processing capacity. The biggest and the most modern unit - the Midia - Nvodari Petrochemistry Combine is situated near Constana harbour; - Transiting oil across Romania would cover a much wider market than other variants, by adding about 40 million tons along the route to the Adriatic Sea (Trieste, Italy), of which 7 million tons for Romania; 17.5 million tons for Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia (FYROM) and Serbia; 15 million tons for Austria, Czechia, Slovakia and Germany. 154

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Transport infrastructure Situated on the transit corridor between Western Europe and the Middle East and at the cross-roads of Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East transport poles, Romania, also a riparian country of the Black Sea and the Danube River (1,075 km) (Europes major navigable waterway) enjoys a favourable geostrategic position. The building of the Danube - Black Sea Canal (commissioned in 1948) and of the Rhine - Main - Danube navigable waterway (1992) have turned Romania into the terminus of the main Transeuropean water route which links the North Sea (Rotterdam) to the Black Sea (Constana). Roads, railways, sea and river harbours and airports connect localities to the national and international networks. The rehabilitation and modernisation of infrastructure in line with European standards is underway. In 2004, the network of public roads covered over 79,400 km (15,712 km of national highways and 63,742 km of county and communal roads), town and countryside streets extending over some 80,000 km. Romanias railway network had 11,053 km of lines in operation (10,914 normal gauge - 1,435 mm, 78 km narrow gauge and 61 km wide gauge) 36 % of which were electric lines and 27 % double lines, 996 stations and flag stations. That same year passenger trains carried about 100 million people of which 520 thousand on international routes; goods represented 28 % of the overall railway transport volume. The Danube River in Romania (1,075 km) is navigable throughout for two draught of ship categories of vessels: up to 7 m sea ships downstream of Brila port-town and up to 2 m river barges upstream of Brila. As a result, there are also two categories of Danube harbours: fluvial-maritime and fluvial. The biggest fluvial-maritime harbour in Romania is Galai with four port locations: for minerals, situated in the proximity of Ispat-Sidex S.A. Steel Works, with 162,200 m-long wharfs for up to 25,000 tdw sea ships and up to 3,000 tdw river barges; the old commercial harbour Docuri and the new port Bazinul Nou are situated in the eastern industrial zone close to the ship-yard, and have 4,889 m-long docking fronts and 50 wharfs. There are three more harbours: Brila specialised in reshipping goods from sea ships to river barges; Tulcea with three distinct sectors (industrial, commercial and ocean fishing) and Sulina. The main Danube harbours, many of them dating from Roman times, and used by small tonnage vessels, are Orova, Drobeta-Turnu Severin, Turnu Mgurele, Giurgiu, Oltenia, Clrai and Cernavod. The Danube-Black Sea Canal (64.4 km) was commissioned in 1984 and four years later the Danube-Main-Rhine Canal (171 km) was opened to navigation linking

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An important element in opting for one or another crude-oil transport corridor is the political risk. The transport route through Russia crosses conflictual regions: Chechnya and Daghestan. The Turkish route runs across the Kurdish region, a hotbed of tension. The Bulgaria - Albania variant is not appealing because of the Kosovo events in which Albania is involved. Romanias hopes to be a successful candidate are based on economic considerations, because the companies interested in the project wish to take maximum profit with minimum risk. At the same time, it is important to secure the support of some countries such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaidjan and Georgia, which have a serious say in this matter even though they are not some of the worlds great military powers.

the Black Sea Basin to the North Atlantic ports. Thus, the opening of a second navigable thoroughfare shortened the Near East (port Said) to Rotterdam route from 11 days (through the Mediterranean and the Gibraltar, 3,375 miles, by skirting the Black Sea) to only 3 days and 8 hours (on the Dardanelles-Bosphorus-Danube-Main-Rhine route). Similarly, connecting the Danube-Black Sea Canal to Europes inland network of canals reduced the distance between Rotterdam and Constana from 6,000 km on the old maritime line to 3,000 km, again from 11 days to 3 days and 8 hours. In this way, the importance of the Danube (2,588 km) has considerably increased. Moreover, 34 of its 120 tributaries are accessible to Europes river traffic. The geostrategic importance of the two canals as transport routes was confirmed at the Paneuropean Transport Conference, Helsinki 1997, when the Danube - Black Sea Canal was put on the Transeuropean transport list and Corridor 7 (North Sea-Black Sea) was extended to Constana. Behind that decision lay ecological considerations (the fragility of the Danube Delta natural ecosystem), the risks posed to navigation security by the Sulina Canal (the grounding of a vessel imposing sailing restrictions), geopolitical reasons (connected with Ukraines intention to continue with the building of the Bstroe Canal in the North of the Danube Delta) and more recently the measures taken to contain the spread of bird flue (leading to restrictions of circulation). The economic and geostrategic potential of Bucharest and Timioara, planned to become port-cities, has made the European Union designate them as continental development poles to be connected to the Paneuropean river transport system. At the same time, building works at the Bucharest-Danube Canal, abandoned after 1990, will be resumed, and 44 km of Timioaras Bega Canal are scheduled to become a navigable river route (along the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal) in the direction of Rotterdam and of Bazia-Sulina-Constana. As the main consumer of hydrocarbons, Europe has lately become interested in integrating oil transport routes into its short-and-medium-term development programmes and besides, to include the whole of the Black Sea region into medium-and-long-term programmes. Viewed within a global integrating perspective, the Black Sea might play a major role in the future cohesion and stability of a rather complex geopolitical area. Ever since the 7th decade, Romania has endeavoured to enlarge the geopolitical area of its external trade exchanges, developing Constana harbour as the main gateway of international maritime traffic. At the same time, also a port at the Danube Black Sea Canal, Constana can become a transit destination between remoter and economically complementary geographical regions. In the post-war period, mainly in 1964, works began to extend the harbour to the south and enlarge the port itself and the length of its three wharfs. The water depth was also increased to 13.5-14.5 m to enable the entry of up to 150,000 tdw ships. In the seventh and eighth decades, port capacities were extended along the shoreline by the construction of two harbours: Midia-Nvodari in the north for oil and oil products and Constana Sud-Agigea, a Danube-Black Sea Canal terminal. Midia Nvodari, built to serve exclusively the homonymous refinery, is also a river port connected to the Danube-Black Sea Canal through the Poarta Alb-Midia-Nvodari Canal (26.6 km). It is also a basic point of submarine pipe lines flowing in the oil from the Black Sea Continental Shelf drilling platform. These extension and modernisation works increased Constana harbours traffic capacity from 60 to 85 million tons / year, establishing it as the biggest Black Sea 156

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The fundamental political mutations experienced by the Black Sea riparian countries after 1990 have led to radical changes in the volume and structure of the maritime traffic in the area; with the exception of the Turkish ports, all the others, and more especially those located on the western coast of the basin, were in some cases faced suddenly with massive decreases of volume. From 62 million tons passing through Constana in 1988-1989, values dropped to 42.4, 28.4 and 26.8 million tons in 1990, 1991 and 1992, respectively with a slight increase in 1995 (30 mill. tons / year). Beside difficulties in volume and structure due to processes of economic restructuring in the riverside countries, radical changes also occurred in what concerns the geographical area and the direction of transported goods. So, traffic through the ex-Soviet harbours decreased in favour of the southern and eastern Black Sea ports. The level at which the Black Sea port capacities are used at present is distinctively different. Some harbours (e.g. Constana and Odessa) have excess capacities; others are in deficit (Caucasian ports). In these conditions Constana can become a competitive actor at the Black Sea: it has a complex transport system - maritime, fluvial, railway and international airport.

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port and the fourth in Europe after Rotterdam, Antwerp and Marseille. The total area of port installations and equipments covers 3,600 hectares; there are 133 fully equipped 28.5 km-long wharfs; the ship-yard has the capacity to build up to 150,000 tdw oil tanks, and the free zone can provide the whole range of specific operations. However, the traffic unfolds only at one-third of capacity volume, the main goods being crudeoil and oil products, ores and coal, general commodities, cement, cereals and chemicals, although any type of commodity can be operated in the harbours specialised terminals. Prospectively, the sea wall will be rehabilitated and new port facilities will be created.

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Ship entry to the Danube - Black Sea Canal being placed in the south of the harbour, direct reshipping from sea vessels to barges is facilitated; it has a vast hinterland which includes both the Black Sea and the Danube basins; it has the biggest and modern most operation capacities in the region, receiving all types of vessels transiting the Suez Canal; it converges river and sea transport, and has important strategic facilities (ship-yard and free-zone regime). Works to upgrade port equipments diversify services and integrate regional, European and global transport systems more efficiently are underway or scheduled to begin. In this way, Constana will strengthen its position of Europes eastern maritime gateway and principal Black Sea harbour. Romanians second sea harbour, Mangalia, is by far less important than Constana. It has only 400 m-long operational wharfs, 4 cranes, maximum water depth at wharf 8 m, and operational capacity about 150,000 t / year (old iron and bitumen). Although Romania holds pride of place in the history of world aviation due to remarkable personalities such as Traian Vuia, Aurel Vlaicu, Henry Coand, Gheorghe Fernic or Gheorghe Botezatu, yet the lack of investments made air transport evolve at a slow pace. Over the 1945-1990 period, despite extremely difficult conditions, the country succeeded in developing its own air transport system and integrate it into the world economic circuit. But for all the modernizations made after 1990 to bring this sector closer to international standards, numerous difficulties continue to exist. Romania has now 17 airports (8 on international routes) which provide optimal operation conditions to 30 air companies. The main airports are located in Bucharest (Otopeni and Bneasa), Timioara, Constana (Mihail Koglniceanu), Iai and ClujNapoca, Oradea and Sibiu, all for international flights, and Arad, Bacu, Baia Mare, Caransebe, Craiova, Satu Mare, Suceava, Trgu Mure and Tulcea for domestic flights. Bucharest, a hypertrophic city, also registers hypertrophic annual values in the transport of goods and passengers compared to Timioara, Oradea and Cluj-Napoca airports. Henry Coand - Otopeni International Airport, situated outside Bucharest, near Otopeni town, is the main gateway of Romanias air traffic. It is one of the largest modern structures in Eastern Europe, with a runaway of 3,500 m long, and a processing capacity of 35-40 flights and 1,000-1,200 passengers / hour.

Romania and the foreign investments in Europe Romania stands out before other countries through some advantages like the statute a country member of EU and NATO, which gives stability. On the other side, there is a problem coming from the fact that there is a much too long period of political instability which gives birth to a strong anxiety for the investors. There is, of course, a certain anxiety, because predictability is one of the most important guarantees for a big long term investment. Taking into consideration the European context of Romania, we think that on medium and long term the economy should mind its businesses, and the political environment should be a positive element and catalyst. The latest events are not doing any good, thinks Emilian Radu, associate to Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC). According to his opinion, there is a paradox which can be commented and observed by the international analysts concerning the political environment from Central and East Europe. The paradox is that the economy follows its way, despite the tensions and the political instabilities. According to a study made by Pricewaterhouse Coopers, the Romanian mergers and acquisitions market was estimated in 2006 for 5.2 billion dollars, which means 158

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that there was registered a slow decrease in comparison with the anterior year. The decrease was strongly influenced by the significant impact of Vodafone-Mobifon / Connex merge from 2005, which represented approximately half of the total value of the mergers and acquisitions market. From the total value of mergers and acquisitions market point of view Romania occupies the fifth place in the area of Central and East Europe after Russia, Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. Last year, the medium transaction was about 45 million dollars, in a slowdown comparing with 2005, when there were registered 65 million dollars. The involvement of foreign investors (92% of Romanian transactions value) was more intense in 2005 and bigger than the average of the region, indicating the competitive potential of Romanian economy which attracts more and more investors. When it comes about the most numerous foreign investors, Austria occupies the first place - 868 million dollars; the capitals from Great Britain and USA occupy the next places, being followed by the Indian investments (Ranbaxy - 324 million dollars) and by the Romanian one (8 % of the total). In Romania of the last four years there have been made acquisitions and mergers having a total value of 13 billion dollars. In comparison with its population, the value is equal 600 dollars per person, which places our country as the last one from the nine countries which have been studied. Although, the analysts approximate that in Romania the mergers and acquisitions market has an ascendant trend. The value of foreign investments in Romania may rise above 10 billion euro in 2006 - including the privatisation of the Savings House (CEC) and the Erste Bank payment for its Romanian privatisation target, the Romanian Commercial Bank (BCR). The total value of foreign investments exceeded 1.7 billion euro in the first quarter of the year alone. But it is expected that the investment volume decrease in the years that follow Romanias accession in the EU. As the budget deficit is covered partly with the investment flows in the country, the issue for Romanian authorities is to find a strategy to counter-balance the trend. According to statistical figures, about 150 countries have investors in Romania. Several hierarchies have been established: by volume of invested capital (Holland, Germany, USA, Cyprus, France, Italy, Austria, Great Britain, South Korea and Turkey); by number of joint ventures (Italy, Germany, China, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Hungary, USA, Lebanon and Jordan); and by value of invested capital/society. The conclusions read as follows: - the biggest capital comes from Europe (80%), followed at great distance by North America (10%) and Asia (8%); - most companies are European (55%) and Asian (36%) origin; - largest investments (over $ 1 million) originate from Italy, Korea, Holland, USA, France etc. Foreign direct investment structure by domain of activity: - the biggest capital was put in trade (61%), mainly in wholesale (39.9%); - next in line stands industry (19%), especially the extractive and machinebuilding branches (8.7%); - the service sector also proved attractive - 14.2% out of the investment total, but even more so the professional services, mainly the banking and insurance systems (7.9%); The macro-territorial section concludes with a complex analysis of FDI distribution/locality of overall and above $ 1 million investment throughout Romania. The findings led to the assessment of some FDI space options motivated by specific

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References 1. Dnil, Alice (2006), Romania - the new star for foreign investments in Europe, www. prezentonline.ro. 2. Guran-Nica, Liliana (2002), Investiii strine directe i dezvoltarea sistemului de aezri din Romnia, Ed. Tehnic, Bucureti. 3. Negu, S., Cucu, V., Vlad, L. B. (2004), Geopolitica Romniei, Ed. Transversal, Trgovite. 4. Negu, S., Sgeat, R. (2006), Romania in the new architecture of Europe, in Romania - space, society, environment, The Publishing of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, pp.19-26. 5. Sgeat, Marcela (2006), Lumea islamic - o reea dinamic de sisteme, Ed. Top Form, Bucureti. 6. Sgeat, R. (2006), Deciziile politico-administrative i organizarea teritoriului. Studiu geografic cu aplicare la Romnia, Ed. Universitii Naionale de Aprare Carol I, Ed. Top Form, Bucureti. 7. Sgeat, R., Nancu, Daniela (2006), Transport, in Romania - space, society, environment, The Publishing of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, pp. 257-264.

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traits of the Romanian territory such as: distance from the principal source of investment correlated with infrastructural features, attractive outlets and labour offer. These criteria concentrate and correlate mostly in towns. In view of it, the diffusion of the overall invested foreign capital at national level is rather unbalanced, some areas concentrating numerous joint ventures, others barely recording them. The analysis of the situation in the big historical provinces has shown that Transylvania and the Banat - Criana Region drew in most of the capital. Here are the most numerous location to small, medium and large investments in big centres, but also in minor ones. Moldavia, Muntenia and Oltenia proved to be less attractive, dominated by small and medium investments, the larger ones being scarce. There are small investments also in Dobrogea.

Semnal editorial
Eghbali Zarch ALIBEMAN
Editura Argus, ISBN 973-99132-2-9

Dac relaiile diplomatice dintre cele dou ri sunt de dat relativ recent, datnd de la nceputul secolului XX (11/24.07.1902, cnd au fost stabilite relaiile diplomatice la nivel de legaie), legturile economice i culturale dintre cele dou popoare au profunde rdcini n istorie. n acest sens, lucrarea elaborat de dr. Alibeman Eghbali Zarch, ambasadorul Republicii Islamice Iran n Romnia aduce n peisajul publicistic romnesc un subiect pe ct de inedit pe att de actual, dat fiind pe de o parte conjunctura geoeconomic n care se prefigureaz o nou criz petrolier, iar pe de alt parte datorit poziiei geostrategice a Romniei de-a lungul marilor axe de transport a petrolului din Orientul Mijlociu i Marea Caspic ctre marii consumatori vest europeni. Realizat bilingv, n romn i persan, cartea reprezint o ampl monografie a relaiilor multilaterale statornicite de-a lungul timpului ntre cele dou ri i popoare. n deschidere, se face o scurt prezentare, absolut necesar pentru publicul romnesc, a Iranului n date i cifre, dup care autorul realizeaz o incursiune n antichitate evideniind mrturiile arheologice i documentare ce atest legturile dintre daci i peri. Firul logic al prezentrii continu cu evidenierea principalelor caracteristici ale civilizaiei persane, una dintre cele mai puternice din sud-vestul Asiei, dar i ale statului iranian contemporan, cldit pe baza acesteia (din 1935 Persia adopt denumirea statal de Iran). Istoricul relaiilor romno-iraniene este analizat pe trei paliere: relaii politice, economice, respectiv culturale i literare, fiind evideniate lucrrile publicate n Romnia despre cultura persan i statul iranian, respectiv n Iran despre Romnia. O atenie deosebit a fost acordat interaciunilor la nivelul fondului lexical, prin enumerarea cuvintelor de origine persan din limba romn. Comunitatea iranian din Romnia, veritabil punte de legtur dintre cele dou state i popoare, face obiectul unei seciuni distincte. n concluzie, merit subliniat unitatea unei astfel de lucrri, aceasta oferind informaii documentare att mediilor specializate, studenilor, elevilor, ct i investitorilor i publicului larg n general.

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STRVECHILE LEGTURI DINTRE POPORUL ROMN I IRANIAN

OMAR KHAYYAM RUBAIATE

Versiune n limbile romn i francez Casa de Producie i Editur Corifeu, Bucureti, 2005 Omar Khayyam, filozof, astronom, matematician, autor al unui celebru tratat de algebr, reformator al calendarului persan, poet a crui oper a circulat secole de-a rndul mai mult oral, s-a nscut i a trit ntre anii 1050 - 1123 la Nishapr, n Persia - Iranul de astzi. Abia n secolul al XIX-lea, prin traducerea fcut de E. Fitzgerald n englez, rubaiatele sale au cunoscut consacrarea universal. Preluat astzi n aproape toate limbile pmntului, poezia lui Omar Khayyam l face pe autor contemporanul nostru. *** Omar Khayym, philosophe, astronome, mathmaticien, auteur dun clbre trat dalgbre, rformateur du calendrier persan, pote dont la cration circula le long des sicles surtout oralement, naquit et vcut de ~ 1050 a ~ 1132 Nishapr en Perse - lIran daujourdhui. Au XIXe s., par la traduction en anglais dE. Fitzgerald, ses robaates connurent une conscration universelle. Depuis, traduite dans presque toutes les langues du monde, la posie d Omar Khayym fit de son auteur notre contemporain.

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Cei mai de seam nelepi, savanii - adevrate tore vremii lor S-au perindat prin bezna lumilor, Au biguit cteva fraze, fcnd nenelesul mai cumplit, Apoi au adormit.

Am nvat destule lucruri , destule lucruri am uitat, n mintea mea totul prea ornduit i aezat. Dar ntr-o zi am aruncat acest balast purtat n gnd Lsnd ca umbra i lumina s m cuprind rnd pe rnd. Javais appris mille choses, jen mille oubli Dans ma tte cet amas paraissait bien rang, Mais un jour jai jet ce ballast en laissant Lombre et la lumire me suivre incessamment.

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Les sages les plus illustres, les savants Ont travers la nuit noire du temps, Flambeaux de leur poque, puis, aprs quelques phrases bien choisies Qui firent le malentendu plus grand, ils se sont endormis.

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HAFEZ SAADI RUMI KHAYYAM ANTOLOGIE DE POEZIE PERSAN

Editura Kriterion, Bucureti, 2004 Cultura i civilizaia iranian se numr printre cele mai vechi i cu cele mai adnci rdcini dintre culturile i civilizaiile lumii. Iranul nu este doar numele unui teritoriu, este numele unui mod de gndire, al unei istorii i culturi care de-a lungul anilor i secolelor a influenat puternic lumea civilizat, astfel nct chiar i astzi amprenta monumentelor literale ale unor celebri autori iranieni precum Omar Khayyam Nishabouri, Hafez, Saadi, Rumi, Aviccena i alii este vizibil n gndirea i formaia cultural a civilizaiilor orientale i occidentale. Poezia persan, avnd ca fundament marea civilizaie i cultur iranian, se numr printre cele mai vaste i remarcabile creaii culturale ale omenirii, fiind mereu elogiat de cei care cunosc i iubesc literatura persan. n ceea ce privete ideile i semnificaiile pe care le exprim, poezia persan are trsturi care se remarc i n poezia altor naiuni, ns n ceea ce privete forma i structura, are caracteristici care fie nu se regsesc n alte literaturi ale lumii, fie exist doar o asemnare parial. Cu alte cuvinte, poezia persan trebuie privit din dou perspective diferite: prima este cea a coninutului i sensurilor, iar cea de-a doua a formei i structurii. Firete, poeii fiecrei epoci au dat propria form mesajului lor n funcie de normele impuse de acea epoc, oferind un coninut profund uman. Astfel, Hafez a ales forma gazelului pentru a-i exprima nalta sa gndire mitic, Rumi a preferat forma masnavi-ului, Saadi a abordat ejazul, scriind att n versuri ct i n proz, iar Khayyam, n catrenele sale, a cuprins cele mai complexe idei filozofice existenialiste n cele mai simple cuvinte. Lsnd la o parte forma i compoziia, ceea ce se regsete n coninutul tuturor creaiilor poetice sunt gndirea etic i parabolele moralizatoare, care se refer la diferitele dimensiuni ale existenei umane. Tocmai din acest motiv, poezia persan a depit teritoriul Iranului, devenind universal. Cu alte cuvinte, secretul durabilitii poeziei persane este mesajul su universal i uman. Oamenii de cultur romni cunosc de mult timp cultura persan. Poezii aparinnd lui Hafez, Rumi, Khayyam, Saadi i chiar ale unor poei contemporani iranieni, au fost traduse de mai multe ori n limba romn i s-au bucurat de mult apreciere. Acum, prin strduinele onoratei edituri Kriterion s-a realizat antologarea i publicarea unei culegeri din poeziile lui Hafez, Saadi, Rumi, Khayyam. La rndul meu, mi exprim recunotina pentru eforturile depuse de aceast editur pentru publicarea acestui preios volum, i sunt convins c, citind aceste poezii, cititorii romni, fini cunosctori de poezie i receptivi, vor percepe toat strlucirea, frumuseea i dulceaa poeziilor persane, i mai cu seam mesajul lor etern uman, dei acestea sunt doar o pictur din vastul ocean de nelepciune al poeziei persane; dup cum spune Rumi: De nu poi sorbi toat apa mrii, mcar s bei ct s-i stingi setea.

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Mulumim persoanelor care au contribuit nemijlocit la apariia acestui numr al revistei GeoPolitica
Imman Hossein University,, Teheran, Iran Facultatea de Geografie, Universitatea Bucureti Tarbiat Modarres University, Teheran, Iran Profesor universitar, Universitatea Naional de Aprare Carol I Cercettor, Institutul de Prognoz Economic al Academiei Romne Institutul Diplomatic Romn Diplomat, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe Lector universitar, Academia Naional de Informaii Prof. universitar, Facultatea de Geografie, Universitatea Bucureti Profesor universitar, Universitatea Ovidius, Constana Ambasador, Fundaia European Titulescu Profesor univeristar - Universitatea din Djibouti, Djibouti Prorector - Universitatea Romno-American Conf. universitar, Facultatea de Sociologie, Universitatea Bucureti Prof. universitar, Facultatea de Geografie, Universitatea Bucureti Preedinte, Asociaia de Geopolitic Ion Conea dr. Iulian FOTA Director, Colegiul Naional de Aprare drd. Nicolae GEANT Facultatea de Geografie, Universitatea Bucureti dr. Mohammad Reza HAFEZNIA Tarbiat Modarres University, Teheran, Iran drd. Igbal HACIEV Universitatea OVIDIUS Mihai HOTEA Diplomat, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe dr. Faxri KARIMLI Jurnalist, Baku, Azerbaidjan drd. Marius LAZR lector universitar, Centrul de Studii Euroasitice, Paris, Frana drd. Cosmin LOTREANU Diplomat, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe dr. George MAIOR Profesor universitar, SNSPA Bucureti dr. Gheorghe MARIN Profesor universitar, Academia Forelor Navale dr. Vasile MARIN Profesor universitar, Rector, Academia Forelor Aeriene dr. Vasile NAZARE Profesor universitar, Academia Forelor Navale, Constana dr. Silviu NEGU Prodecan, Facultatea de Relaii Economice Internaionale - ASE dr. Mihail OPRIESCU Prof. universitar, Facultatea de Relaii Economice Internaionale dr. Stan PETRESCU Confereniar universitar, Academia Naional de Informaii dr. Florin PINTESCU Confereniar universitar, Universitatea tefan cel Mare dr. Nicolae POPA Profesor universitar, Universitatea de Vest, Timioara dr. Hassan RAMINI Tarbiat Modarres University, Teheran, Iran dr. Dnu Radu SGEAT Cercettor, Institutul de Geografie al Academiei Romne drd. Vasile SIMILEANU Director, Revista GeoPolitica drd. Darius STAN Academia de Poliie Alexandru Ioan Cuza dr. Cristian TRONCOT Prodecan, Academia Naional de Informaii dr. Iolanda IGHILIU Confereniar universitar, Universitatea OVIDIUS dr. Gheorghe VDUVA Cercettor, CSSAS, Universitatea Naional de AprareCAROL I dr. Radu tefan VERGATTI Profesor universitar, Universitatea VALAHIA, Trgovite Membru al Academiei Oamenilor de tiin din Romnia drd. Marius VCRELU Lect. univ., coala Naional de Studii Politice i Administrative dr. Mohammad AKHBARI drd. Seyed AKBAR dr. Zahra AHMANDIPOUR dr. Traian ANASTASIEI dr. Daniela ANTONESCU drd. Mdlina ANTONESCU Florentina BADEA dr. Cristian BARNA dr. Cristian BRAGHIN dr. Anna Eva BUDURA dr. Romulus Ioan BUDURA dr. Nicholas DIMA dr. Mihaela DINU dr. Dan DUNGACIU dr. George ERDELI

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Traian Anastasiei, Cristian Braghin, Daniel Broasc, Aurel Cazacu, Dumitru Codi, Irina Cucu, Petre Deic, Costin Diaconescu, Nicholas Dima, Remus Dogaru, George Erdeli, Constantin Hlihor, Mihai Hotea, Mihai Guranda, Cristian Jura, Cosmin Lotreanu, Vasile Marin, Nicolae Mitu, Alexandra Mateescu, Vasile Nazare, Silviu Negu, Anca Oneiu, Mihail Opriescu, Dominu Pdureanu, Ion Petrescu, Stan Petrescu, Florin Pintescu, DnuRadu Sgeat, Marcela Sgeat, Vasile Simileanu, Cristian Tlng, Loredana Tifiniuc, Tiberiu Troncot, Drago Zaharia

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Asociaia de Geopolitic ION CONEA

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Mulumim celor care au sprijinit apariia acestei reviste:

His Excellency Hamid Reza ASHRADI

Ambassador of Islamic Republic of Iran
acad. Dan BERINDEI acad. Dan BLTEANU dr. Ioan IANO dr. Nicholas DIMA dr. Mohammad Reza HAFEZNIA dr. Mohammad AKHBARI

dr. Bogdan COCORA Adrian LOCUTEANU Bogdan LEARSCHI Daniel BROASC ing. Clin P. PANTEA

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APARIII EDITORIALE

Colecia Geografie Politic Nicholas Dima Jurnal etiopian Silviu Costachie Evreii din Romnia. Aspecte geografice Silviu Costachie Evreii din Romnia. Aspecte etnogeografice Dnu-Radu Sgeat Modele de regionare politico-administrativ Dnu-Radu Sgeat Deciziile politico-administrative i organizarea teritorial

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Colecia Art Militar Ion Blceanu, Daniel Dumitru, Ion Ioana Potenialul de lupt al forelor terestre n context NATO

Proceedings *** Gestionarea imaginii de ar *** Gestionarea crizelor politico - militare i umanitare *** Terorism i protecie antiterorist *** Terorismul - cauze i implicaii de ordin geopolitic *** Prioriti n domeniul comunicrii inter-instituionale dintre structurile de aprare, ordine public i siguran naional, n perioada post-aderare

Colecia Sociologie Irena Chirru Imaginea Romniei n lume Ioana Veturia Ciuperc Nicolae Titulesco - Leuropen avant lheure

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Colecia GeoPolitic Cristian Barna Cruciada Islamului? Cristian Barna Terorismul, ultima soluie? Anna Eva Budura Triumful dragonului Maria Cristina Chiru, Irena Chiru Femei Kamikaze - terorism la genul feminin Mihai Hotea Geopolitica conflictelor rasiale Nicolae Niu, Iulian Niu Destrmarea Iugoslaviei Igbal Hajiyev Reviving the Great Silk Road - The Case of Azerbaijan Marcela Sgeat Lumea islamic - o reea dinamic de sisteme Vasile Simileanu Asimetria fenomenului terorist Vasile Simileanu Romnia - Tensiuni geopolitice Vasile Simileanu Radiografia terorismului

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Ecoturism Spectacolul din culise

Colecia Juridic Corina Andreea Baciu Beletristic Ioana Veturia Ciuperc Sava Lioiu Sava Lioiu Victor Lotreanu

Rezerva proprietii n dreptul internaional privat

Colecia Academica Nicolae N. Puca Lasere Victor Lotreanu Actualiti n imunologie Radu tefan Vergatti Din problematica umanismului romnesc cursuri editate n colaborare cu Editura Universitii de Aprare Gheorghe Nicolaescu, Vasile Simileanu Rzboiul informaional Gheorghe Nicolaescu, Vasile Simileanu Comunicarea n cadrul sistemelor informaionale Gheorghe Nicolaescu, Vasile Simileanu Sistemul informaional Gheorghe Nicolaescu, Vasile Simileanu Lupta informaional Gheorghe Nicolaescu, Vasile Simileanu Restructurarea sistemelor informaionale Gheorghe Nicolaescu, Vasile Simileanu Sisteme de management Gheorghe Nicolaescu, Vasile Simileanu Globalizarea informaiei Gheorghe Nicolaescu Sisteme de management Gheorghe Nicolaescu Globalizarea informaiei Gheorghe Nicolaescu Informaii i reele Gheorghe Nicolaescu Aspecte metodologice ale rzboiului informaional

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Le triptyque de lamour Eu sunt cel condamnat la moarte Nu tragei, v rog, n poet Confesiuni n alb

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Colecia Geografie Elena Matei Loredana Tifiniuc

Colecia GeoStrategie Gheorghe Nicolaescu, Gestionarea crizelor politico - militare Gheorghe Nicolaescu, Vasile Simileanu Informaii. Management. Putere............................................................................ I Managementul sistemelor informaionale ........................................................... II Rzboiul informaional Gheorghe Iliescu Informaii. Management. Putere............................................................................ III. Conexiuni ntre procesele socializante i securitatea naiunii

nr. 20 nr. 21 nr. 22

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Regiuni de cooperare transfrontalier - surse de conflict sau de stabilitate? Provocarea dragonilor miracolul chinez The Iranian Geopolitical Perspectives

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nr. 13 nr. 14-15 nr. 16-17 nr. 18 nr. 19

Uniunea European..., ncotro? Marea Neagr - confluene geopolitice Spaiul ex-sovietic - provocri incertitudini Romnia - Terra Daciae Falii i axe geopolitice

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Revista GeoPolitica nr. 1 Integrarea Romniei n NATO nr. 2 - 3 Integrare Euro-atlantic nr. 4 - 5 Geopolitica minoritilor nr. 6 Geopolitica spaiului ponto-danubian nr. 7 - 8 Geopolitica conflictelor sfritului de mileniu nr. 9 - 10 Incursiune n Islam nr. 11 Tensiuni geopolitice induse de inuturile istorice nr. 12 Terorism i mass-media

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