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Philippine Bill provides that ". . . no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Issue: WON the defendants' rights against self-incrimination were violated.

Complainant-Appellee: The United States Defendants-Appellants: Baldomero Navarro et al. January 11, 1904 McDonough, J. Facts: The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano are convicted of the crime of illegal detention under Article 481 and of 483 of the Penal Code. They were sentenced to life imprisonment. Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the penalty of prision mayor. The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one who illegally detains another and fails to give information concerning his whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment. The punishment for the crime mentioned in article 483 of the Penal Code is the penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to cadena perpetua, or in other words one convicted of simply depriving a person of his liberty may be imprisoned for a term of from six to twelve years and one convicted of depriving a person of his liberty and who shall not state his whereabouts or prove that he had set said person at liberty may be punished by imprisonment for a term of seventeen years four months and one day, to life, as in this case. In other words, for failure on the part of the defendant to testify regarding the whereabouts of the person deprived of his liberty, or to prove that he was set at liberty, the punishment may be increased from imprisonment for a term of six years to life imprisonment. On appeal, counsel for the defendants argued that the provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of incriminating himself, for the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained the person. So the evidence necessary to clear the defendant, under article 483 of the Penal Code, would have the effect of convincing him under article 481. It is claimed that such practice is illegal, since section 5 of the Held: Yes. The right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity - of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress. Under the present system, the information must charge the accused with acts committed by him prior to the filing of the information and which of themselves constitute an offense against the law. The Government can not charge a man with one of the necessary elements of an offense and trust to his making out the rest by availing himself of his right to leave the entire burden of prosecuting on the prosecution from beginning to end. If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against him as a confession of crime, or an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of an offense, such disclosure would be an accusation against himself. In the present case, if the defendant disclosed the whereabouts of the person taken, or shows that he was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used to obtain a conviction under article 481 of the Penal Code. It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused cannot be called upon either by express words or acts to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged. On Self-Incrimination: The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself is older than the Government of the United States. At an early day it became a part of the common law of England. It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to

commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress. It had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person, which had long obtained in the continental system. In other words, the very object of adopting this provision of law was to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to get testimony regarding the offense with which they were charged.

The Philippine SC also said that the limitation is a prohibition against legal process to extract an admission of his guilt. Under the due process of law, every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. HOWEVER, superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the inherent characteristic which the public has to properly administer justice.

BELTRAN vs. SAMSON and JOSE Date: September 23, 1929 VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS Ponente: Romualdez, J. Sept. 8, 1920 Parties: Malcolm, J. Plaintiff: Francisco Beltran Facts: EmetriaVillaflor was charged with adultery. She was then asked to submit to a physical examination to determine is she was pregnant or not. She challenged the order on the ground that it was violating the constitutional provision to self-incrimination. Respondents: Felix Samson (Judge of the Second Judicial District) and Francisco Jose (Provincial Fiscal of Isabela) Facts: Fiscal Francisco Jose petitioned to have Francisco Beltran to appear before the provincial fiscal to write in his own handwriting what will be dictated to him. o WON Villaflor can be compelled to permit her body to be examined is a violation of the Bill of Rights and the Code of Criminal Procedure. No. It does not violate both. Prayer for writ of habeas corpus is denied. People vs McCoy: court deemed it a violation of the Constitution to compel the defendant to submit her body to examination State vs Height, J. McClain said that a defendant can be compelled to disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered. Court looked for more progressive decisions. Holt vs US, J. Holmes said that the prohibition is to the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication. The body is excluded from it as evidence. for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.


Held: -

Judge Felix Samson granted the motion. Petitioner Beltran refused to perform what was demanded and appealed the order of the lower court. Fiscal Jose and Judge Samson contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the lower court is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative Code and on jurisprudence o the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor.

In refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, Beltran seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58 which provides: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

Compelling one to produce a specimen of his handwriting is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. THUS, the respondents are enjoined fromcompelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

Issue/s: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional prohibition?

CABAL vs. CAPUNAN 1962 Held/Ratio per Issue: J. Concepcion YES. Facts: As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. In Bradford vs. People, it was held that whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open court. Of similar tenor is the ruling in Sprouse v. Com The said rulings however does not apply to the instant case since the instant case is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it and the defendant performed the act voluntarily. In People v. Molineux, the court declared that a defendant has the right to decline to write. In First National Bank vs. Robert, the court declared that a defendant could not be compelled to write his name. Writing something is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession and, with regard to producing document or chattels, Professor Wigmore wrote: the production of documents or chattels by a person... may be refused under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded. For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. On or about August 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts" The President of the Philippines then created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible At the beginning of the investigation, the Committee, upon request of complainant Col. Maristela, ordered the petitioner Cabal to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth Cabal objected, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper

The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a charge of contempt for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. It prayed that respondent be summarily adjudged guilty of contempt of the Presidential Committee and accordingly disciplined as in contempt of court imprisonment until such time as he shall obey the subject order of said committee Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand. In this case, respondents allege that the investigation being conducted by the Committee above referred to is administrative, not criminal, in nature and because of this, under the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner may only refuse to answer incriminatory questions BUT cannot refuse to take the witness stand. In this case, the issue is whether the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character

Where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby enjoined permanently from proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 60111 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. It is so ordered.



ISSUE: WON the proceedings before the Committee is civil or criminal, and in turn, WON Cabal may invoke his right against self-incrimination Held: Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense

FACTS: July 30, 1987: the Phil. Represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Governance [PCGG] filed a complaint with he Sandiganbayan against the petitioners. PCGG allege that Petitioners Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of forms Pres. Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino People. o Among these strategemsare : 1] control of some big business enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, 2] manipulation of the formation of Erectors Holding Inc., to appeard viable and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more than P2 billion, 3] collaboration with lawyers (petitioners therin) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corps, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25M and in hiding behind the veil of corporate entity.

Sept 13, 1988: Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Inc. by Ricardo Lopa [died during pendency of the case] and called upon the Senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee [SBRC] started its investigation through a hearing on May 23, 1989. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez",but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzons plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence, this petition.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation isnt, therefore, absolute or unlimited. With regard to the rights that shall be respected, it should be considered to refer to the Bill of Rights, particularly to the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against ones self. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of Pres. Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corps of KokoyRomualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears no intended legislation involved. The inquiry also isnt conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution 212, as the committee alleges. The inquiry under SR212 is to look into the charges against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Sec. 26 ART 18 of the Consti. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners arent connected with the govt and did their acts as private citizens, hence, such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction of the courts---not the SBRC. In fact, the Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.

ISSUE(S): 1. 2. 3. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case. YES WON the SBRCs inquiry has a valid legislative purpose. NO WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdezcorp is a purely private transaction which is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into. YES WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process. NO


HELD/RATIO (per issue): 1. As the Court held in Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Consti provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the depts. of the thegovt, and it is the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine the scope, nature, and extent of such powers

4. One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Consti is the right against selfincrimination. This right, construed as the right to remain completely silent, may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them. This extends also to respondents in administrative investigation, but only if they partake of the nature of a crim proceeding. This isnt so in this case. But since the court already held that the inquiry isnt in aid of legislation, the petitioners therein cant be compelled to testify.

2 & 3. Sec. 21, ART 6 of the Consti provides The Senate may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Petition is GRANTED. The SBRC is enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.


Cuevas, JR, J. Parties: Petitioner: Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman Respondents: Hon. Justice Manuel Pamaran, Associate justices Amores, Vera Cruz of Sandiganbayan, Hon. Fernandez, Tanodbayan, etc. ISSUE:

Their testimonies cannot be used against them because of Sec. 5 of PD 1886 (granting them immunity) and because of their constitutional right against self incrimination

WON the testimonies given by the 8 respondents who did not invoke their rights against selfincrimination before the Agrava board are admissible as evidence? NO! FACTS: The case is essential about the events that occurred on august 21, 1983, when Ninoy Aquino was assassinated. Due to popular demand, a fact finding board was created (PD 1886), aka Agrava Board. Its duties and powers were to conduct hearings and gather witnesses and evidence. Some of those who were asked to appear before the board were General Ver, Major Olivas, etc. After the reports were submitted to the President and eventually the TanodBayan, two criminal cases were instigated with the private respondents charged as principals and accessories, and one accomplice. All pleaded not guilty. The Tanodbayan offered as part of its evidence the individual testimonies of the private respondents before the Agrava board. The Respondents objected to the use of their admissions because it would violate of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of the immunity granted to them by PD 1886. The Tanodbayan claimed that such immunity was not available to them because they did not invoke their right against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board. On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailed in these two (2) petitions, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. 13 Hence, these two petitions assailing the resolution. Arguments of the Petitioner: o Did not invoke the immunity before the Agrava Board, hence the immunity did not attach and such failure to claim said privilege amounts to a waiver Arguments of the Respondent: The right against self-incrimination is to avoid the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. Based on the facts, it is not far-fetched to conclude that the respondents were called to stand to determine their probably involvement in the crime being investigated. Yet they have not been informed or at the very least even warned HELD: The testimonies cannot be used. Case is dismissed. Agrava Board was created to find out the facts of the killing and to determine the persons criminally responsible. PD sec. 12: board may initiate the filing of proper complaint before the appropriate government agency. Furthermore, the PD guarantees that persons called to testify have the right to counsel at any stage proceeding. Hence, it was clear that not only witnesses but also suspects to the killing were called to testify before the board. PD 1886 actually denied all the respondents the right to remain silent. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 left them with no choice since they had to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. Furthermore, the right to remain silent is available to all persons under investigation and for all confessions or admissions (Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain and to counsel, and to be informed of such right).

while so testifying even at that particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them may be used against them It is true that if such right is waived, then the evidence could be used. However, in the light of PD 1886 sec. 5 and the awesome contempt power of the board to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence, We are not persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right to remain silent. We believe that they were compelled (pressured to commit an act disabled him from making a free and rational choice) to comply and testify before the board. Whether or not the case is a criminal one or not, it is the nature of the proceedings that control and not the character of the suit. The privilege (right against selfincrimination/sec. 20 art. IV) has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. Therefore, the rights of the respondents should still be honored. By using the testimonies which violates the exclusionary rule (art. III sec. 20), the right to due process was also denied to the respondents. Now, considering the immunity granted to the respondents through the PD sec. 5 (transactional immunity which grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates): his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled. Hence, due to this immunity, he is not immune from prosecution but he is saved from the use of his testimony against him. Hence, for due process, it demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. Hence, because of this, we cannot agree with the view of the petitioner that the right against self-incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Art. III Sec. 20: Renders inadmissible any confession (and admission) obtained in violation thereof.

Hence, because of the powers (giving out harsh penalties when not testifying) that the PD grants the board, it is only understandable and fair that the PD grants the respondents immunity for their testimonies, so as to safeguard his constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law.

II. UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO 1967.06.19 Concepcion Topic: Unlawful Search and Seizure Parties: Petitioners Harry S. Stonehill(Prominent Businessman in the 60s) Respondents Jose W. Diokno (Secretary of Justice)

Background on the Parties: (optional reading hehehe) Harry Stonehill was one of the most prominent businessmen in the 1960s. He was a former US military man who struck gold in the Philippines. He started his business with a tobacco company which soon paved the way for other businesses like newspaper, insurance, cotton, glass, oil etc He became infamous for allegedly bribing officials in the government, which included low ranking officials to senators. Stonehills wheeling and dealing piqued the interest of then DOJ Secretary Diokno because of his alleged corrupt practices. Stonehill was known to have a certain

bluebook, which contained a list of government officials who were under his payroll. Secretary Diokno was an up and rising lawyer who topped the bar and was known for his integrity. After his stint in the DOJ, Macapagal allegedly fired him for his raids of Stonehills warehouses. He then became a lauded Senator of the Republic. During the Martial Law years, he along with Ninoy Aquino, were some of the most vocal enemies of the state. It was the Stonehill v. Diokno case, which propelled the young lawyer to greater heights.

Ratio: The documents and papers seized are split into two categories: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. (a) As regards the first group, the petitioners cannot validly assail the legality of the warrants because the corporations are distinct from the petitioners. The party whose rights have been impaired can only contest the legality of the seizure. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. (b) Regarding the second group, two important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. As regards to the warrants, none of the requirements have been complied with. No specific offense had been alleged in the said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. Dispositive: We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)

Facts: (eto hindi na optional) 42 search warrants were issued against the petitioners and their corporations to search and seize the following properties: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). The subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Petitioners: search warrants are null and void, contravened the constitution and the rules of court. They aver that the warrants (1) do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Respondents:(1) the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

Issue: WON the searches and seizures were illegal and the items inadmissible in court. YES -

residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Following the charges, warrants were issued for their arrest, but upon the petitioners filing for a P10,000 surety bond and a P10,000 cash bond, they were released.

Petitioners filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges against them, for the reason that the charges raised by the Deportation Board do not constitute legal grounds for the deportation of aliens from the country, and that the Deportation Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. This motion was denied. Petitioners then filed for a writ of habeas corpus and/or prohibition. The petition was given due course but made returnable to the CFI. A writ of preliminary injunction was then granted by the lower court, restraining the Deportation Board from hearing the charges against them, pending final termination of the habeas corpus/prohibition proceedings.

III. WHO ARE ENTITLED TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION QUA CHEE GAN vs. DEPORTATION BOARD Sept. 30, 1963 Ponente: Barrera, J. Petitioners-appellants: Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Cua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King Respondent-appellee: The Deportation Board Relevant Law: EO 398 (After the filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Deportation Board, the Deportation Board is authorized to issue warrants of arrest of the aliens complained of, and to hold them under detention during investigation unless they file bonds for provisional release.) Facts:

The Deportation Board then filed its answer to the original petition and held that the Board, as an agent of the President has jurisdiction over the charges against the petitioners, and the authority to order their arrest. Trial Court: Upheld the validity of the delegation of the President to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations to determine whether the stay of aliens in the country will be injurious to public safety, and the security or welfare of the State. The Boards power to issue warrants of arrest and fix bonds for the aliens temporary release was also sustained. (Deemed a power that necessarily flows from the power to deport aliens.) Petition was dismissed, hence this present appeal. Petitioners contest the power of the President to deport aliens, and also the delegation of the power to investigate to the Deportation Board, which the petitioners believe is vested in the Legislature. (In short: They believe that the power to deport aliens can only be exercised when there is legislation authorizing it.)

May 12, 1952: Petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board, for having purchased $130,000 without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and having remitted the money to Hong Kong. (This crime is also understood as hoarding or black-marketing US Dollars, which is considered an economic sabotage.) Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao, and Basilio King were also charged for attempting to bribe officers of the Philippine government, and US government. They offered the Chief of the Intelligence Division of Central Bank and Capt. A.P. Charak of the US Air Force, P25,000 in order that they may evade prosecution. (He was acquitted on this charge, but it was found that he indeed did attempt to bribe Charak, who was not a public official, but a member of the US Air Force.)

Issue: 1) WON the President has the power to deport undesirable aliens and delegate these powers to the Deportation Board (which was authorized by EO 398, to issue warrants of arrest of aliens during investigation) Held:

The President has to power to order deportation, but may not order arrest and detention of the alien during investigation. And the power of delegation may not be delegated.

EO 398 is declared illegal insofar as it allows the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against the alien, and requires the fixing of a bond for temporary release of the alien.

Presidents authorized agent. The Deportation Board has been conducting investigations as the authorized agent of the President.

Ratio: 1)

Commonwealth Act No. 613 expressly grants the Commissioner of Immigration the power to make arrests. However, Act No. 2711 is silent as to whether the President has the power to order the arrest an alien.

Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940) authorized the Commissioner of Immigration to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of grounds for such charges. But with the enactment of this Act however, the Legislature did not intend to concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone. In Sec. 52 of the Act, it is stated that the Act supersedes any previous law relating to the entry of aliens and their deportation, EXCEPT Sec. 69 of Act No. 2711, which will continue in effect. Sec. 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administration Code), states that an alien residing in the country shall not be deported by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation conducted by said Executive, or by his authorized agent. Sec. 69 of Act 2711 did not expressly confer authority to deport aliens upon the President, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration in Commonwealth Act No. 613. But, the said provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of Commonwealth Act No. 613. This clearly indicates the Legislatures ratification of the Chief Executives power to deport. Moreover, that power has been sanctioned by the Courts in many cases. Deportation of an undesirable alien may therefore be effected in 2 ways: 1) By order of the President after due investigation (pursuant to Sec. 69 of Act No. 2711); 2) By the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners (pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 613)

Solution to this: President Quirino issued EO No. 398 on Jan. 5, 1951, which reorganized the Deportation Board. It provided that upon the filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, the Deportation Board was authorized to issue warrants of arrest of the aliens complained of, and to hold them under detention during investigation unless they file bonds for temporary release.


However, the court notes that EO 398 is incompatible with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Bill of Rights, which provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Justice Laurel stated in his concurring opinion of Rodriguez, et. al. v. Villamiel, that this right is not the same as the guarantee afforded to the accused under the Jones Law. Instead, this is a right equally afforded to all people, meaning to citizens and also to aliens in our country. Moreover, the provision of the Bill of Rights explicitly mentions that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. Therefore warrants will be issued by the authority according to his discretion and discernment on whether probable cause exists or not. Moreover, the issuance of warrants must be viewed with care, as their order will curtail a persons liberty, and is dependent on the conditions determined by the discretion of the authorized person issuing the warrant.


Pursuant to EO No. 33 of President Quezon, the Deportation Board was created. Under Sec. 69 of Act No. 2711, the power to deport may be delegated to the

It is followed as a rule that ministerial duties may be delegated, but not those which require the exercise of discretion and judgment, such as in this case. Thus, an

implied grant of power to curtail a persons liberty and fundamental rights of a person must also be viewed with caution. The guarantees of human rights and freedom cannot be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation. Dispositive: EO 398 series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens, and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. The order of arrest issued by the Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.

Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latters proclamation as Mayor be annulled. ISSUES:*The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines), and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice.

Issues: Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship? Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines? If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replacehim?

LABO, JR. vs, COMELEC Aug 1, 1989 Cruz

Held: Facts: Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul),Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3)subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct actor Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.- Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest.- The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically

ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.- The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo

ISSUE: WON the petition was timely filed. WON the respondent is not a Filipino citizen. HELD: First Issue The petition was filed out of time. A petition can be filed before election, pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

A petition can be filed after election, pursuant to Section 253. AZNAR vs. COMELEC May 25, 1990 FACTS: On November 19, 1987, respondent Emilio Lito Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMLEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 elections. On January 22, 1988, Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States. January 27, 1988 petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation and presented evidence that respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 133911. On January 28, 1988 the COMELEC resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation. On March 3, 1988 the COMELEC directed the Board to proclaim the winning candidate and the respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. On June 11, 1988 COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

Evidence shows that respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed his petition for disqualification on January 222, 1988. It went past the 25-day period; clearly the petition was filed out of time. The petition may be considered as a petition for quo warranto under section 253. However, the respondent was proclaimed only on March 3, 1988 and the petition was filed on January 22, 1988. Clearly, the petition was premature. Second Issue In the proceedings, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that respondent has lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided. 1. 2. 3. By naturalization in a foreign country By express renunciation of citizenship By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country.

The prosecution relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and being an American, the respondent must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws. Whether or not the respondent is an American citizen does not concern us here. In the instant case, respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. The mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, our country already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted. WHEREFORE, petition DISMISSED.

founder members who originally joined the organization and have signed the preincorporation papers with the exclusive right to vote and be voted for ; (b) participating members with "no right to vote or be voted for" to which category all other members belong; except (c) honorary members, so made by the board of trustees, "at the exclusive discretion" thereof due to "assistance, honor, prestige or help extended in the propagation" of the objectives of the Organization without any pecuniary expenses on the part of said honorary members. Feb 14, 1962 - the legal department of the Central Bank of the Philippines rendered an opinion to the effect that First Mutual Saving and others of similar nature are banking institutions, falling within the purview of the Central Bank Act. April 1 & 3, 1963 - the Bank had an announcement published in the newspaper, stating that all "savings and loan associations" now in operation and other organizations using different corporate names, but engaged in operations similar in nature to said "associations" HAVE NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE PUBLIC NOR TO ENGAGE IN THE BANKING BUSINESS NOR TO PERFORM ANY BANKING ACTIVITY OR FUNCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES., and that such institutions were in violation of Section. 2 of the General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they engage in the "lending of funds obtained from the public through the receipts of deposits or the sale of bonds, securities or obligations of any kind" without authority from the Monetary Board. April 23, 1962 - The Governor of Central Bank ordered for "the investigation and gathering of evidence on the activities of the savings and loan associations which are operating contrary to law." c. May 18, 1962 - a member of the intelligence division of the Bank filed a verified application for a search warrant against the First Mutual, alleging that the premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila" (where First Mutual held office) "are being used unlawfully," because said Organization is illegally engaged in banking activities. . . without having first complied with the provisions of Republic Act No. 337" and that the articles, papers, or effects enumerated in a list attached to said application, (various journals, cash books, ledgers, other accounting records and financial statements) are kept in said premises, and "being used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony, to wit: violation of Sections 2 and 6 of Republic Act No. 337."

CENTRAL BANK vs. MORFE Date: June 30, 1967 Ponente: Concepcion, CJ. Parties: Pet: Central Bank of the Philippines Res: Hon. Judge Jesus P. Morfe and First Mutual Savings and Loan Nature: Original action for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with preliminary injunction. Relevant Law: RA 337 Facts: First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. is a registered non-stock corporation, the main purpose of which, according to its Articles of Incorporation is "to encourage . . . and implement savings and thrift among its members, and to extend financial assistance in the form of loans," to them. The Organization has three (3) classes of "members,"1 namely: (a)

Upon the filing of said application, Hon. Roman Cancino, issued the warrant, commanding the search of the aforesaid premises and the seizure of the foregoing articles, there being "good and sufficient reasons to believe" that the Organization has under its control, in the address given, the aforementioned articles, which are the subject of the offense adverted to above or intended to be used as means for the commission of said off offense.

First Mutual Savings then filed for an original action for "certiorari, prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction," to annul the search warrant, upon the ground that, the municipal court had acted "with grave abuse of discretion, without jurisdiction and/or in excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said search warrant is a roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the word 'and others' in the search warrant . . . permits the unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no relation whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and (c) "no court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a criminal case against a corporation . . ." First Mutual also prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the aforementioned search and seizure, as well as for the immediate return of the documents and papers so far seized from them. Hon. Jesus P. Morfe, Judge, who presided over the branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the order complained of. Central Bank moved for a reconsideration thereof, which was denied. Accordingly, the Bank commenced, in the Supreme Court, the present action, against Judge Morfe and the Organization, alleging that respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order in question. Issues: 1. Did the respondent judge err in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction? YES 2. Did the respondent judge commit a grave abuse of discretion? NO Held: The order of respondent Judge and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in compliance therewith are hereby annulled, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on August 14, 1962, is accordingly, made permanent. Ratio: 1. The action taken by the Bank, in causing the aforementioned search to be made and the articles above listed to be seized, was predicated upon the theory that the Organization was illegally engaged in banking by receiving money for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or otherwise, or transacting the business of a savings and mortgage bank and/or building and loan association, without first complying with the provisions of R.A. No. 337, and that the order complained of assumes that the Organization had violated sections 2 and 6 of said Act. Yet respondent Judge found the searches and, seizures in question to be unreasonable because the deponent ". . . could have, if he really knew of actual violation of the law, applied for a warrant to search and seize only books" or records: covering the specific purportedly illegal banking transactions of the petitioner with specific persons who are the supposed victims of said illegal banking transactions according to his knowledge. To authorize and seize all the records without reference to specific alleged

victims of the purported illegal banking transactions, would be to harass the petitioner, and its officers with a roving commission or fishing expedition for evidence which could be discovered by normal intelligence operations or inspections (not seizure) of books and records It cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures seeks to forestall, not purely abstract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones. A mere disagreement with Judge Cancino, who issued the warrant, on the credibility of said statement, would not justify the conclusion that said municipal Judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction. The failure of the witness to mention particular individuals does not necessarily prove that he had no personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the Organization, for the witness might be acquainted with specific transactions, even if the names of the individuals concerned were unknown to him.

The records suggest clearly that the transactions objected to by the Bank constitute the general pattern of the business of the Organization. Indeed, the main purpose thereof, according to its By-laws, is "to extend financial assistance, in the form of loans, to its members," with funds deposited by them. It is true, that such funds are referred to in the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws as their "savings." and that the depositors thereof are designated as "members," but, even a cursory examination of said documents will readily show that anybody can be a depositor and thus be a "participating member." In other words, the Organization is, in effect, open to the "public" for deposit accounts, and the funds so raised may be lent by the Organization. Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds is placed under the exclusive authority of the "founder members," and "participating members" are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted for, their "privileges and benefits," if any, being limited to those which the board of trustees may, in its discretion, determine from time to time. As a consequence, the "membership" of the "participating members" is purely nominal in nature. This situation is fraught, precisely, with the very dangers or evils which Republic Act No. 337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance with the requirements of said Act, before the transactions in question could be undertaken. 2. The Organization does not seriously contest the main facts, upon which the action of the Bank is based. The principal issue raised by the Organization is predicated upon the theory that the aforementioned transactions of the Organization do not amount to " banking," as the term is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are satisfied, however, in the light of the circumstance obtaining in this case, that the Municipal Judge did not commit a grave abuse

of discretion and that, the search and seizure complained of have not been proven to be unreasonable. IV. WHO ARE SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARTI Date: Jan. 18, 1991

allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside which were later discovered to be marijuana. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425. Issues:

Ponente: Bidin Parties: Petitioner: Respondent: Relevant Laws: Art 4 Sec 21(b), Art 11 Sec 4, Art 1 Sec 2(e)(i) of RA 6425 aka Dangerous Drugs Act VS Sec 2 aka Right against Illegal Searches and Seizures, and Sec 3 aka Privacy of Communication and Correspondence of Art 3, 1987 Constitution Facts: The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" with four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract for the transaction, writing his name, passport number, date of shipment as well as the name and address of the consignee; "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles Held: People of the Philippines Andre Marti

WON the evidence admitted by the lower court was obtained through unreasonable search and seizure and thus inadmissible (NO) WON the evidence was protected by the constitutional right of privacy of communication and correspondence (NO)

Following the exclusionary rule laid down in various US cases, the Court declared that any evidence obtained in a defective search and seizure warrant is inadmissible. It must be noted that in all those cases, the evidence obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. The case at bar assumes a particular character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. So can the accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure has been violated? The court held in the negative. In absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. This constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by the government, included in which is his residence papers, and other possessions... According to past jurisprudence where a parking attendant who searched an automobile to ascertain the owner and found drugs instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of drugs.

The contraband in the present case having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court does not see why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The factual considerations of the case readily foreclose the proposition that the NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure. Mr. Reyes conducted a reasonable search since it was the SOP on his part as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Ports. The mere presence of NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure prohibited by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is NOT a search. The Constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed against the government and its agencies tasked with law enforcement. For law enforcers to conduct a search, a warrant must be issued first. However, if the search is made at the initiative of a private establishment, there is no need for a warrant. Appellant argues that the illegal search and seizure meant by the statute is not only limited to government authorities, but also to private individuals conducting such. The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Appellees are high school students who sought to solicit support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against "Zionism." On a Saturday afternoon they set up a card table in a corner of PruneYard's central courtyard. They distributed pamphlets and asked passersby to sign petitions, which were to be sent to the President and Members of Congress. Their activity was peaceful and orderly and so far as the record indicates was not objected to by PruneYard's patrons. Soon after appellees had begun soliciting signatures, a security guard informed them that they would have to leave because their activity violated PruneYard regulations Appellees immediately left the premises and later filed this lawsuit in the California Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They sought to enjoin appellants from denying them access to the PruneYard for the purpose of circulating their petitions The Superior Court held that appellees were not entitled under either the Federal or California Constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center property The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California Constitution protects "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned." Before this Court, appellants PruneYard contend that their constitutionally established rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude appellees from adverse use of appellants' private property cannot be denied by invocation of a state constitutional provision or by judicial reconstruction of a State's laws of private property

PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER vs. ROBINS 1980 J. Rehnquist Facts: Appellant Prune Yard is a privately owned shopping center in the city of Campbell, California It has a policy not to permit any visitor or tenant to engage in any publicly expressive activity, including the circulation of petitions, that is not directly related to its commercial purposes Issue:

WON state constitutional provisions,construed to permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center, to which the public is invited, violate the centers property rights and his free speech right therefore constituting a taking


NO. When regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. In this case, though, there is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center The decision of the California Supreme Court makes it clear that the PruneYard may restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions. Appellees were orderly, and they limited their activity to the common areas of the shopping center. In these circumstances, the fact that they may have "physically invaded" appellants' property cannot be viewed as determinative Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the "right to exclude others" is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the stateauthorized limitation of it amounted to a "taking" Appellants also argue that their First Amendment rights(free speech) have been infringed but in this case, they are not being compelled to affirm their belief in any governmentally prescribed position or view, and they are free to publicly dissociate themselves from the views of the speakers or handbillers We conclude that neither appellants' federally recognized property rights nor their First Amendment rights have been infringed by the California Supreme Court's decision recognizing a right of appellees to exercise state-protected rights of expression and petition on appellants' property. Judgment of the Supreme Court of California is therefore affirmed

for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioners Contention: 1. ELA was same to the Contract of Lease. 2. It is still violative of PCSOs charter. 3. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. 4. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution5. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondents reply:

1. ELA is different from the Contract of Lease 2. There is no bidding required 3. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO 4. PCSO does not have funds 5. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade 6. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract ISSUES:

KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO 1. (July 17, 1995) Mendoza, J. Petition for prohibition, review and/or Injunction FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leasedonline lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or atleast P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is adeparture from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues wereactually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the lawof this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon anddetermined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any WON the petitioners have standing? NO

future action between the sameparties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least whensubstantially unrelated claims are involved.When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a formseparable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding tomake an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioners standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved.The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST. o Standing: maybe brought by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who sue in public interest- Whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy Valmonte v. PCSO: 1) direct and personal interest; 2) has sustained or is in immediate dangerof sustained some direct injury and 3) has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege. In the case at bar, there is no showing of particularized interest or an allegation of public fundsbeing misspent to make the action of public interest.

2. WON ELA is valid?YES Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not inclined toreview. In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioner states that thiswould allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the claim isspeculative. In any case, in the construction of statutes, the presumption is that in making contracts, thegovernment has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason fordenying power. It is also claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement. The Court held that is also based onspeculation. Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and itspersonnel in prohibited association with the PGMC. Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction is dismissed.

Note:Its important to also mention that the SC, through this case, reversed its Decision in Kilosbayan, IncvsGuingona. It has to do with the Courts application/interpretation of theexceptionclausein par B, Sec1 of the PCSO Charter (RA 1169, as amended by BP 442) and the locus standiof thepetitioners. Recall that Davide justified, inKilosbayanvsGuingona, the locus standi of the petitioners by saying thatthe issue is of public interest. These issues affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of thepeople and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned online lottery are asstaggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise. Justice Feliciano also further strengthens the locus standi of the petitioners through the ff: the public character of the funds involved in the lease PCSOs disregard of the Constitutional provision lack of other parties in raising the questions that Kilosbayan has raised wide range impact of the lease

Real party in interest: Whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit Petitioners invoke Sec. 5, 7 and 12 of the Constitution. But they do not embody judiciallyenforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. They cannot give rise to a causeof action in the courts.

QUESTION of CONTRACT LAW: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement orarebound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of thecontracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract. Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of publiccontracts maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman.


Date: March 19, 1974 Ponente: Justice Brennan

to a request for injunctive relief against threatened, as well as pending, state court criminal prosecution; and that it followed from the reasoning of Samuels v. Mackell that the same test of bad-faith harassment is a prerequisite for declaratory relief with respect to a threatened prosecution. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied. Thus, the present case.

FACTS: October 8, 1970: Petitioner and other individuals were distributing handbills protesting American involvement in Vietnam on an exterior sidewalk of the North De Kalb Shopping Center. o The shopping center employees asked them to stop handbilling and leave. They declined so police officers were summoned and were told that they would be arrested if they wouldnt stop. The group then left to avoid arrest. 2 days later, petitioner and a companion returned to the shopping center and began handbilling. They were again told by the police, called by the manager, to stop and would be arrested if they do not. Petitioner left but his companion stayed. His companion was arrested and arraigned on a charge of criminal trespass in violation of 26-1503 (a Georgia criminal trespass law). Petitioner alleged in his complaint (action for injunctive and declaratory relief in the District Court)that he desired to return also but did not because of his concern that he would be arrested too. The parties stipulated that if petitioner returned and refused upon request to stop handbilling, a warrant would be sworn out and he might be arrested and charged with a violation of the Georgia statute. Petitioner also alleged that the respondents (solicitor of the Civil and Criminal Court of DeKalb County, chief of police, owner of the shopping center, manager of the shopping center) should restrain from enforcing the statute so as to interfere with petitioners constitutionally protected activities (specifically relating to the First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights).

ISSUE: WON declaratory relief is precluded when a state prosecution has been threatened but is not pending, and a showing of bad-faith enforcement or other special circumstances has not been made.

HELD: NO. CA reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Petitioner can avail of a judgment for declaratory relief. The court held that, regardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate, federal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute, whether an attack is made on the constitutionality of the statute on its face or as applied.


This case presents an "actual controversy" under Art. III of the Constitution and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the alleged threats of prosecution in the circumstances alleged not being "imaginary or speculative" and it being unnecessary for petitioner to expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to make his constitutional challenge. Whether the controversy remains substantial and continuing in the light of the effect of the recent reduction of the Nation's involvement in Vietnam on petitioner's desire to engage in the handbilling at the shopping center must be resolved by the District Court on remand.

District Court: dismissed the action, finding that "no meaningful contention can be made that the state has [acted] or will . . . act in bad faith," and therefore "the rudiments of an active controversy between the parties . . . [are] lacking." CA: affirmed, being of the view that Younger v. Harris made it clear that irreparable injury must be measured by bad-faith harassment and such a test must be applied


Federal declaratory relief is not precluded when a prosecution based upon an assertedly unconstitutional state statute has been threatened, but is not pending, even if a showing of bad-faith enforcement or other special circumstances has not been made.

(a) When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, considerations of equity, comity, and federalism on which Younger v. Harris, and Samuels v. Mackell, both supra, were based, have little vitality: federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state courts' ability to enforce constitutional principles. (b) Even if the Court of Appeals correctly viewed injunctive relief as inappropriate (a question not reached here, petitioner having abandoned his request for that remedy), the court erred in treating the requests for injunctive and declaratory relief as a single issue and in holding that a failure to demonstrate irreparable injury precluded the granting of declaratory relief. Congress plainly intended that a declaratory judgment be available as a milder alternative than the injunction to test the constitutionality of state criminal statutes.


In determining whether it is appropriate to grant declaratory relief when no state criminal proceeding is pending, it is immaterial whether the attack is made on the constitutionality of a state criminal statute on its face or as applied. While the federal interest may be greater when a state statute is attacked on its face, since there exists the potential for eliminating any broadranging deterrent effect on would-be actors, we do not find this consideration controlling. The solitary individual who suffers a deprivation of his constitutional rights is no less deserving of redress than one who suffers together with others.


LegMeth Group Note: Before looking at the facts of the case, it may first be helpful to familiarize yourself with Section 16 and 17 of the Rules of Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th Congress: Rule V Bar against Initiatiation of Impeachment Proceedings against the Same Official Section 16 - Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated In cases where a member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the findings of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, at least 1/3 of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time if the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General. Section 17 - Bar against Initiation of Impeachment Proceedings Within a period of one year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initatiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings as such, can be initiated against the same official]

FACTS 22 July 2002 HOR adopted Rep. Fuentebella's resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund 2 June 2003 Former Pres, Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (1st) against then CJ Davide and 7 Associate Justices for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes" 22 Oct 2003

29 Oct 2003 Senate asserted that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the HOR ISSUES 1. WON the filing of the second impeachment complaint against CJ Davide with the HOR falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution WON the resolution thereof is a political question WON the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings WON the essential prerequisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled

2. 3. House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the impeachment complaint for being insufficient in substance 4.

23 Oct 2003 [4 mos. and 3 wks. after the filing of the 1st impeachment complaint] Reps. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed a 2nd impeachment complaint against CJ Davide founded on the results of the legislative inquiry by abovementioned HOR resolution 28 Oct 2003 - A motion was put forth in the HOR that the 2nd impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate but it was not carried because the HOR adjourned for lack of quorum - SC resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions, (b) require respondent HOR and the Senate plus the Solicitor General to comment on the petitions not later than 430pm on 3 Nov 2003, (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on 5 Nov 2003 at 10am, and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae - HOR asserted that the SC has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the HOR, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to inititate impeachment cases

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional -Second Impeachment complaint filed by Reps. Teodoro and Fuentebella is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution

RATIO Respondents Argument # 1 SC (sided with petitioner most of the time)

Respondents argued (and for the most part relied on American jurisprudence)...

SC asserted that we should not rely so much on foreign jurisprudence given

*The Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review *Impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character, hence, any question, issue, incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review *The exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary

different constitutional settings and needs):

impeachment proceedings US HOR - sole power without limitation

* American jurisprudence cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3 (6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of the judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings

PHL HOR - With limitations as seen in Sections 3(2), (3), (4), and (5) of Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution re: manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official

Argument # 2 Judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary; asserted that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively" The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of the Congress. Instead it provided for "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discion, through the power of judicial review.

* Major difference between the judicial power of US and PHL Supreme Courts: US SC - judicial review is only impliedly granted and is discretionary in nature PHL SC - judicial review is... - expressly provided for in the Constitution - also a duty besides being a power - given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality * Glaring distinctions between the US an PHL constitutions re: HOR's power over

Argument # 3 Contends the exercise of judicial review There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."


of its power to determine the lAw, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution A. Discussion of JUDICIAL REVIEW - Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch in Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution - "Judicial Power" includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving the rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the art of any branch or instrumentality of the government *Consequence of judicial power--- the determination of the proper allocation of powers of the diff. branches of government and the direction of the course of government along constitutional channels is inherent in all courts - "Judicial Supremacy"--- when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligations assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them - Power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota (cause of the suit or action) presented - The judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation - Court accords the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments because: *legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution *The judiciary must reflect (in the determination of actual cases and controversies) the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the other branches of government Requisite # 1: STANDING - The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of government. And the judiciary in turn, with the SC as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise Respondents: petitioners do not have standing since only the CJ has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury 3. Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat - no one provision is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument

- How does the Judiciary determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions? Through the Principles of Constitutional Construction: 1. Verba Legis - whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning 2. Ratio Legis Est Anima - when there is an ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers

B. Discussion of ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW Requisites of Judicial Review: 1. An actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power 2. The person challenging the act must have legal "standing" (locus standi) to challenge i.e. he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged 3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity 4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case [Note: the following has been arranged as how it was discussed in the case]

Petitioners: assert standing since the SC has accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest and transcendental importance

examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

Requisite # 4: LIS MOTA The Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

*procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine WON the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them

JUDICIAL RESTRAINT Respondents: There is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the ipeachment because all of its Members thereof are subject to impeachment SC: this however is very much like saying the legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the HOR are subject to them


For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture." Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done; if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. In the case at hand, the questioned acts having been carried out i.e. ,the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the HOR and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit has been complied with.

The Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS ADOPTED BY THE 12th CONGRESS Respondents: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 5 of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Article XI of our present Constitution, contending the term "initiate" does not mean "to file"

Requisite # 3: JUSTICIABILITY Judicial power include the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable. It refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority or had abused its authority to the extentof lacking jrisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore the court has the duty to decide. The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to HOR concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against CJ Davide and 7 associate justices had not been initiated as the HOR, acting as a collective body, has yet acted on it SC: The framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. (The SC also explained that "impeachment case" is different from "impeachment proceeding")

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referreal to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution.

Puno: I prefer to take the contextual approach of the coordinacy theory -We are right in the ruling we have jurisdiction but wrong in timing of the exercise of our jurisdiction -The Court should defer the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction until after the House and the Senate exhaust all remedies against impeachment. *Taken from the LegMeth digest last year. This case is not part of the actual syllabus, but just in case we will tackle it, I will gladly provide an edited digest Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Ponente: Tinga, J. Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. They complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. The abovementioned acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: o SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWAVS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against CJ Davide along with seven associate justices of this Court, on 2 June 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 Aug 2003' the second impeachment complaint filed by Reps. Teodoro and Fuentebella against the CJ on 23 Oct 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION Puno, J. Issue 1: Locus standi Puno: Petitioners have standing considering the transcendental constitutional issues presented Issue 2: Can Court define division of powers of the branches of government? Puno: Court should strive to work out a constitutional equilibrium where each branch of government cannot dominate each other, an equilibrium where each branch in the exercise of its distinct power should be left alone yet bereft of a license to abuse It is in the Courts hands to cobble up the constitutional equilibrium Issue 3: Alleged violation of Article XI section 3 (impeachment proceedings of same official within one year) justiciable? Puno: It is justiciable and is up to the court to decide BUT! Issue 4: Constitutional interpretation theory

Digest from Adapt: Block B

requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. o Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. Pimentelv. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.


No, her actions did not amount to the exercise of martial law powers. The President was merely exercising her calling-out powers, pursuant to Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution:

Issues: 1. 2. 3. WON petitioners have locus standi WON the lifting of the declaration rendered the petitions moot WON the Presidents actions amounted to an exercise of martial law powers, as argued by all petitioners

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within fortyeight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. a. A declaration of a state of rebellion was not necessary to exercise her calling-out power, as Commander-in-Chief. Furthermore, it does not prohibit thePresident from declaring a state of rebellion in the first place. The Constitution vested the President not only with Commander-in-Chiefpowers but also Executive powers as well. a. The evolution of the United States Presidents power to call out armed forces and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without prior legislative approval in case of invasion/insurrection/rebellion shows how the concept of Presidential prerogative would inspire the expanded presidential powers in the Philippines, particularly in the Philippine Bill of 1902, and the grant of that power in the 1935 Constitution. Justice Cortes proposition that the Philippine President was vested with residual power was vindicated in Marcos v. Manglapus (1989): unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power, powers necessary for the President to comply with her duties under the Constitution.


Held/Ratio: 1. Only Rep. Suplico and Sen. Pimentel have locus standi. a. Sanlakas does not have standing because the petition it brought was not in the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or infringed, nor under imminent threat of the same. The action could have been considered as an action for declaratory relief as peoples organizations, under the claim of its freedom of expression and association being affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion. SJS officers and members do not have standing as taxpayers because there was no illegal disbursement of public funds, nor could they have standing as citizens because they failed to prove that they suffered personal injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the government.




Yes, the lifting of the declaration has rendered the petition moot. However, the Court can pass upon the issues if it is capable of repetition yet evading review, such as the ones in the case at bar.


It is within the Presidents powers to proclaim a state of rebellion as it is provided in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, in Book III, Chapter 2, Section 4. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot violate constitutionally-protected rights, as the dissenters in Lacson contended.

The Presidential issuances in question also explicitly mentioned due regard to Constitutional rights. d. Even if a state of rebellion was not declared, it is still possible for persons to be arrested without a warrant, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. There has been no specific instance cited as an example of this point in action during the state of rebellion. There has there been no indication shown that military tribunals had taken the place of civil courts.


Petition Dismissed. Dissenting Opinion: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.: 1. Two incidents, particularly the search of the residences of a Ramon Cardenas and a Laarni Enriquez were not taken cognizance of by the Court in its ponencia. These occurred after the occupation of Oakwood. Nowhere in the Constitution is found a provision granting the President the authority to declare a state of rebellion or exercise powers which may be legally allowed only under a state of martial law. As opposed to the humps the Constitution places on the use of martial law, particularly 1) the need for public safety, 2) the time-limit of sixty (60) days, 3) a written/personal report to Congress by the President, and 4) the Congress voting on the matter of revoking such a proclamation or suspension. Several arrests took place during a similar situation in early May of 2001. A state of rebellion was also proclaimed, but those arrested did not participate in the events, some of them even being at home. And surely, they were not in the presence of Gen. Berroya, so he could not have possibly seen the commission, or attempt of the crime of rebellion by those arrested. A long time had also passed between the arrests and the events of May 1, 2001.