Study Guide in Criminal Law 2

I.

CRIMES and PENALTIES

THOSE UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK TWO: 1. Crimes against national security and the law of nations (Art. 114-123)

not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. The demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs. ISSUE1: Whether or not the elements of piracy exists? HELD: The SC decided that in the present case, the facts were proven and not disputed and all of the elements of the crime of piracy were present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind which can be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Therefore it does not matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184). ISSUE2: The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal Code?

Pp vs. Lol-lo and Saraw , 27 February 1922

FACTS: This case is a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas,attending rape and murder. On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left of Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland.The second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape. After Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands, they were arrested and were charged in the CFI with the crime of piracy. The counsel of record interposed a demurrer on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did

"Art. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. "If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall

be punished with the penalty or presidio mayor. "Art. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua: "1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same. "2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen. "3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of the book. "4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves. "5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates. "Art. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory. "Art. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such." HELD: SC Decided that there was no doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States. The crime falls under the first paragraph of Article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to Article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment. The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo [the accused who raped one of the women] but is not unanimous with regard to the defendant and appellant Saraw, since one member of the Court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lollo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefore to be hung until dead, at such

It is also evident that the provisions of the Penal

time and place as shall be fixed by the Judge of First Instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the cost of both instances. (http://lawspupil.blogspot.com/)

People vs. Siyoh FACTS >Julaide Siyoh and Omarkyam Kiram, together with Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder > On July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling merchants like him (Danilo Hiolen. Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman) were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell goods they received from Alberto Aurea. > They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pump boat. They took their dinner and slept thatnight in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island. Who also helped them from selling their goods to different Islands near Pilas. > Before the incident happened, Antonio, the lone survivor saw that Kiram was talking with another twopersons that he can only recognize in their faces somewhere near the house where they were selling thegoods > On July 14, 1979, When they were heading back to Pilas Island from Baluk-Baluk Island through riding apumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. > On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200meters away from their pump boat Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pump boat as it moved towards them > There were two persons on the other pump boat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. > When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pump boat towards Mataja Island. > On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram. Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to

undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. > With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the pump boat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back. But he wa sable to reach a mangrove where he stayed until nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province.> On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram ISSUE: WoN the respondent-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt? CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANTS 1.Since it was co ntested b y appellants that there guilt was not proven beyo nd reasonable doubt since the prosecution did not present evidence that the accused were also the one who killed Anastaciode Guzman because his remains are never recovered. 2.The Credibility of the Witnesssince only 1 witness was presented 3.Appellants claim (Siyoh and Kiram) that they were not the assailants but also the victim HELD: They were said to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated homicide RATIONALE 1.Number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy, not material; Piracy, a special complex crimepunishable by deathbut the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. PD532 considers qualified piracy as a special complex crime punishable by death. Therefore, the guiltof respondent were proven beyond reasonable doubt. 2.There was no other evidence presented on why should the lone survivor tell lies and fabricate storyas to apprehend the accused. 3.Appellants claim that they were not the assailants but also the victim and that the two persons theyhave identified (Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali) is

baseless as view in the proven conspiracyamong the accused. The Conspiracy was established through the testimony of the lone witness and survivor- De Guzman (http://www.scribd.com/doc/39319532/People-vsSiyoh-Digest) Crimes against the fundamental laws of the state. (Art. 124-133) ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE (Restraint resulting from fear) 2.

a.

Facts: Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias, SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Kr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian, members of DENR Regional Operations Gr oup, were sent to Western Samar to cond uct possible illegal logging activities . Upon investigatio n of the group, Mayor Benito Astorga was found to be the o wner of two (2 )boats. A heated altercation ensued and Mayor Astorga called for reinforcements. Ten armed men arrived in the scene. The o ffended parties were then brought to Mayor Asto rgas ho use where they had dinner and drinks and left at 2:30am. SPO1 Capoquian further ad mitted that it was raining during the time of their detention. Mayor Astorga was convicted of arbitrary detention by the Sandiganbayan. Issue: Whether Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention. Held: Yes.The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victims person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will. In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home.[37] This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen

"reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses.[38] Given such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquians statement that it was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders.[39] It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear. b. US vs. Braganza, 1908 (the detention is without legal grounds; detained for less than half an hour)

"Article 200 of the Penal Code reads: "The public official who, unless it be by reason of a crime, should detain a person without being authorized to do so by a law, or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines, shall incur the penalty of a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas if the detention should not have exceeded three (3) days; . . ." "At the time when the crime herein was committed the accused were municipal officials, Hilario Braganza being then a councilor of the municipality of Sagay and Martin Salibio a lieutenant of the barrio of Vito in said municipality; therefore, they were public officers . . . "There is no doubt as to the accused having detained Father Feliciano Gomez, inasmuch as, according to the evidence, they themselves seized him within the church and took him out of it, telling him that he was under arrest; they made him pass through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building and there told him that he was under arrest . . .the accused detained Father Gomez, not by reason of a crime but arbitrarily. He had committed no crime, rather on the contrary, he was the victim of coercion and other outrages. As a priest of the Roman Church, and the question herein referring also to a Roman church which he is alleged to be in possession of, he went there to say mass, but a group of Aglipayano women violently prevented him from

carrying out his purpose. No law or regulation of a general character in force authorizes the accused to commit the act which they committed . . ." c. US vs. Agravante (detention for one hour)

d.

Pp vs. Misa (Arbitrary detention through imprudence)

A complaint was filed on the 14th of March 1906, charging Sixto Chaves, Simeon Agravante, Apolinario Camacho, and Marcelino Acupan with the crimes of illegal detention, lesiones, and attempt against an agent of the authorities. The corresponding proceedings were instituted, and the judge rendered judgment on the 3d of May, 1906, sentencing Simeon Agravante, for the crime of arbitrary detention, to pay a fine of 500 pesetas and one-fourth of the costs, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of the fine; Marcelino Acupan was sentenced for maltrato de obra to the penalty of five days of arresto menor and one-fourth of the costs; Sixto Chaves and Apolinario Camacho were acquitted with the remainder of the costs de oficio. From the above judgment the accused Agravante appealed. From the evidence adduced at the trial of this case it appears that the crime of arbitrary detention, included in case No. 1 of article 200 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as, from the facts stated, it appears that on the night of January 13, 1906, Vicente Ibaez, doorkeeper at the Rizal Circus, situated at the capital of Occidental Negros, was maltreated by Marcelino Acupan, a constabulary soldier, for which reason, when Ibaez was conducted to the cuartel by another, Fortunato Vadlit, the chief of the municipal police accompanied him to the door of the cuartel when the latter, together with Ibaez, was locked up in the jail by the accused, Simeon Agravante, a corporal of Constabulary; the detention lasted for about an hour. They were then released by sergeant Leandro Garguea, when he became aware that there was no legal reason for the detention, because the chief of police, Vadlit, had taken no part in the quarrel at the gate when Ibaez was maltreated by Acupan; he merely approached the place of the incident in order to find out what had occurred, and, at the request of Ibaez, accompanied him to the cuartel for the purpose of assisting in the investigation of the matter.

The chief of police arrested a woman who had been released by means of a verbal order of the justice of peace. The accused acted without malice, but he should have verified the order of the release before proceeding to make the re-arrest. The crime committed by the chief of police is arbitrary detention through simple imprudence provided for and punished under Article 135, par. 2, of the RPC, in connection with Article 124, par. 1, of the same code. e. Medina vs Orozco

On application for habeas corpus. The facts are: At about 12:00 p.m. on November 7, 1965, petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul was arrested and thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan City jail, allegedly as one of those responsible for the death of one Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa which occurred on October 31, 1965 in said city. At about 9:00 oclock in the morning of the same day, November 7, 1965, the case against Medina and two others for Sangalangs murder was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith conducted a preliminary investigation in petitioners presence. At about 3:40 p.m. on November 10, 1965, an information for murder was filed against petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul, and Antonio Olivar y Flores and Alexander Enriquez y Raginio in the Caloocan branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-1197 of said court. By court order, they were promptly committed to jail. Arraigned, Medina and his co-accused stood trial which has not yet terminated. 1. First to be considered is the charge of arbitrary detention. Petitioner claims violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime for which petitioner is detained is murder, a capital offense. The arresting officers duty under the law1 was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not released. From the time of

petitioners arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed. But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the certainty of locating those officers and employees could very well compound declaring the that fiscals Arthur difficulties. Medina was These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.2 2. Nor could discharge from custody, by now, be justified even on the assumption that detention was originally arbitrary. Petitioner at present is jailed because of the courts order of commitment of November 10, 1965 upon a murder indictment. No bail was provided for him, because he is charged with a capital offense. Such detention remains unaffected by the alleged previous arbitrary detention. Because, detention under a valid information is one thing, arbitrary detention anterior thereto another. They are separate concepts. Simply because at the inception detention was wrong is no reason for letting petitioner go scot-free after the serious charge of murder has been clamped upon him and his detention ordered by the court. The first is illegal; but the second is not.3 Thus, the petition for habeas corpus came too late.

3. As unavailing is petitioners claim that no preliminary investigation was conducted by the fiscal before the criminal charge against him was registered in court. Other than that averment in the petition herein, petitioner has nothing whatsoever to show for it. Upon the other hand, the assertion that such investigation was made on the very day of petitioners arrest and in his presence, is confirmed by the fact that on November 12, 1965 he moved the office of the city fiscal for a reinvestigation of his case. And that reinvestigation was held on December 1, 1965. Thereafter, the case against him proceeded to trial. Add to all of these the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,5 and the question of lack of preliminary investigation is well nailed down. 4. Besides, the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived.6 These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate court. 5. The cry of deprivation of a speedy trial merits but scant consideration. The arraignment of petitioner set for December 1, 1965 was postponed to December 20, 1965, thence to February 28, 1966, to March 14, 1966, all on petition of counsel for the accused, including petitioner. Then, on April 14, 1966, petitioners counsel moved to reset the date of hearing on the merits. And again, the hearing scheduled on July 26, 1966 was transferred to September 6, 1966 on motion of defendant Alexander Enriquez with the conformity of petitioners counsel. Finally, on motion of petitioners counsel, the hearing on September 6, 1966 was recalendared for December 6, 1966. In this factual environment, we do not see denial to petitioner of the right to speedy trial.

Delay of his own making cannot be oppressive to him.7 For the reasons given, the petition herein to set petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul at liberty is hereby denied. Costs against petitioner. So ordered. f. g. Pp vs. Mabong Sayo vs. Chief of Police

an accusation or charge or filing of an information against the person arrested with the corresponding

court or judge , whereby the latter acquires

jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner , because the arresting officer cannot transfer to the judge and the latter does not assume the physical custody of the person arrested. *For the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than the time prescribed by the RPC, (1) the means of communication as well as (2) the hour of arrest and (3) other circumstances such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be considered. * If the city fiscal does not file the information within the period of six hours prescribed by law and the arresting officer continues holding the prisoner beyond the six-hour period, the fiscal will not be responsible for violation of said Art. 125, because he is not the one who arrested and illegally detained the person arrested, unless he has ordered or induced the arresting officer to hold and not release the prisoner after the expiration of said period. h. Pp vs. Acosta (Duty of the detaining officer is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaint with the judicial authority)

FACTS:Upon complaint of one Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. When the petition for habeas corpus was heard, the petitioners were still detained and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with the proper court of justice. RULING: *A police officer has no authority to arrest or detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. What the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal or directly with the justice of the peace court. The theory that police officers may arrest any person just for questioning or investigation, without any warrant of arrest, represents an ideology incompatible with human dignity. Reason revolts against it. *The delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without warrant by a peace officer, does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making

Facts: Pointed to as among those who laid hands on the two policemen, were Mamuric, Portacio, Garcia, Diego and Cruz. They were arrested and confined in the municipal jail that night. On the following morning, a complaint for assault upon agents of persons in authority was filed against them with the justice of the peace. After the filing of the complaint at 8 oclock that morning, no action for the preliminary investigation, as required by law was taken and Mamuric, Potacio, Diego and Cruz remained in jail for six days without the benefit thereof.

The entry of the police blotter showed that Mayor Acosta ordered their arrest and detention. Issue: Whether or not Mayor Acosta committed an infraction of Article 125? Held: *No. Mamuric and others who were jailed with him on the evening of June 17, 1958, were delivered to the judicial authority upon the filing of the complaint for assault against them at 8 oclock in the morning of the following day. As the duty of the detaining officer is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaint, further action rests upon the judicial authority. It is for the judicial authority to determine. xxx whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the defendant is probably guilty thereof, so as to issue a warrant of arrest and to hold him for trial. (Sec. 1, Rule 8, RoC) Justice of the Peace Abaya said that after receiving the complaint in this case, he advised the complainant, Chief of Police, to release the defendants but Mayor Acosta objected because it would be hard to locate them later if they go into hiding. Judge Abaya was mistaken. He need not give any advice at all. It was perfectly within his power, as justice of the peace with whom the complaint was filed, to release, or issue warrant of arrest against, the persons complained of after conducting the investigation as required by the rule. *Thus when the accused were arrested for direct assault, punishable by a correctional penalty, on the evening of June 17, 1953, the complaint could not normally been filed earlier than 8 oclock in the morning of June 18, because government offices open for business usually at 8 oclock in the morning and close at 5 oclock in the afternoon. i. Villavicencio vs. Lukban

petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor. Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their

Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the

attorney waived the right to be present.

Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. * The Mayor and the Chief of Police of Manila cannot force the prostitutes residing in that City to go to and live in Davao against their will, there being no law that authorizes them to do so. These women, despite there being in a sense, lepers of society, are

nevertheless not chattels, but Philippine citizens, protected by the same constitutional guarantees as are other citizens.

j.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CATALINA SILVANO, defendantappellant.

The defendant and appellant caused the death of her husband, Maximon Catalong, by hitting him with a hammer. While this fact is principally established by circumstancial evidence, this evidence is convincing and is of such a nature as to be only consistent with the theory that the wife committed the crime of parricide. We find no reason for interfering with the findings of the trial court. (U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil. Rep., 295.) Having in mind article 402 in connection with article 95 of the Penal Code, the defendant and appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs of both instances. The Attorney-General also recommends that the defendant be ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. If this was a case of first impression, the writer would hesitate to fix this sum arbitrarily in a criminal prosecution and with no basis having been laid in the trial, but having in mind the practice of the court, accedes to the request without argument. So ordered. k. Pp vs. Sane (against the will of the owner)

It will be noted that to constitute a violation of domicile, the entrance by the public officer or employee must be against the will of the owner of the dwelling, which presupposes opposition or prohibition by said owner, whether express or implied. If the entrance by the public officer or employee is only without the consent of the owner of the dwelling, the crime is not committed. Neither is

the crime committed if the owner of the dwelling consented to such entrance. When the detectives secured the previous consent of the owner of the house to search without warrant, they are not liable. l. People Vs. Gesmundo

holding a plastic bag with four other companions. They confronted the accused and insisted that the bags belonged to her. Accused denied the accusation and told them that she doesnt know anything about it. She was made to sign a prepared document. She was brought to the police station and was detained. The court renders judgment finding the accused guilty. Issue: Whether or Not the evidence was properly obtained by the police. Held: In the investigation report prepared by Luciano stated that during the search they discovered a hole at the backyard of the house of the suspect, there was a big biscuit can inside the hole and on top of the cover a flower pot was placed wherein the marijuana was kept. However, there was no mention of any marijuana obtained from a flower pot in any of their testimonies. There were inconsistencies insofar the prosecution is concerned, as to what was recovered and where, the trial court concluded that these inconsistencies are trivial. There must sufficient evidence that the marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused. As held in PP vs. Remorosa, Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the guilt of appellant and his culpability to the crime charged. The claim that the marijuana was planted was strengthen as the police violated sec 7, rule 126 rules of the court provides no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age

Facts: According to the prosecution, in the morning of Nov. 17, 1986, PO Jose Luciano gave money and instructed his civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the Cocoland Hotel. He actually saw the accused selling marijuana to his civilian informer and that same day Luciano applied for a search warrant. About 2pm that day, a police raiding team armed with a search warrant went to the Brgy captain for them to be accompanied in serving the said warrant at the residence of the accused. The police was allowed to enter the house upon the strength of the warrant shown to the accused. The accused begged the police not to search and to leave the house. The police still searched the house and was led to the kitchen. She pointed a metal basin on top of a table as the hiding place of died marijuana flowering tops contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police also recovered from a native uway cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3 pieces of komiks paper. According to the accused, when the police arrived at her house, she saw Sgt. Yte and PFC Jose Luciano. She invited Sgt. Yte to enter her house while Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near the house. While inside the house Yte showed the accused something he claimed as a search warrant, when someone coming from the kitchen uttered eto na They proceeded to the kitchen and saw Luciano

10

and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code. The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was

man). The rally was attended by persons who are not members of the sect. Acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful Remarks that those who believed that Christ is God are anti-Christ, that all the members of the Roman Catholic Church are marked by the demon, and that the Pope is the Commander of Satan are notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. n. o. US v. Balcorta

inadmissible to the court as the accused was not informed of her right not to sign the document neither was she informed that she has the right to the assistance of a counsel and the fact that it may be used as evidence against her. It was not proved that the marijuana belonged to her. Not only does the law require the presence of witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes upon the person making the search the duty to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath. Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude substitution of the items seized by interested parties. The guilt of the accused was has not been established. Judgment is reversed.

People vs. Baes A catholic priest filed a complaint against three persons for causing the funeral of a member of Church of Christ, being held in accordance with the rites of that sect, to pass through the churchyard fronting the parish church over the opposition of the Catholic priest.

Held: Said facts constitute the offense punished

in Article 133. Whether an act offends the feelings of the Catholics should be viewed or judged from the latters point of view, and not from that of the offender. Acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful The act must be directed against religious

m. People vs. Mandoriao

practice or dogma or ritual for the purpose of ridicule, as mocking or scoffing at or attempting to damage an object of religious veneration. p. Facts: CAYAO vs. DEL MUNDO

Religious ceremonies are those religious acts

performed outside of a church, such as processions and special prayers for burying dead persons. When the application of the Church of Christ was to hold the meeting at a public place and the permit expressly stated that the purpose was to hold a religious rally, what was held on that occasion was not a religious ceremony, even if a minister was then preaching (that Jesus Christ was not God but only

An administrative complain t was filed by Fernando Cayao wi t h t h e O f f i c o f t h e C o u r t Administrator charging Judge Justianiano Del Mundo with abuse of authority. Cayao, a bus driver overtook another bus. As a consequence, Cayao almo st collided head -o n with an onco ming o wner type jeepney o wned b y Judge Del Mundo.

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Cayao was brought b y the policemen in th esala of Judge Del Mundo and was compelled by Judge Del Mundo to choose from 3 alternative punishments: (a) to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide; (b)revocation of his driverslicense; or (c) to be put in jail for 3 days. Cayao chose confinement f o r 3 d a y s a n d w a s forced to sign a waiver of detention by Judge Del Mundo. Cayao was released after 3 days. Issue: Whether Judge Del Mundo is guilty of the charge of warrantless arrest and arbitrary detention. Held: Cayao was not accorded any of the basic rights to which an accused is entitled. When Judge Del Mundo insisted on punishing him without a chance to air his side, Cayao was deprived from the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right to be informed of the nature and cau se o f the accusatio n against him as well as the right to an impartial and public trial. Judge Del Mundo used an d abused his position of authority in intimidati n g t h e complainant as well as the members of the police force into submitting to his excesses. Justice Del Mundo was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. Crimes against (Art. 134-160) PP vs. Hernandez 3. pubic order

On January 20, 1951, the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) headquarters was raided. Writer (and future National Artist for Literature) Amado V. Hernandez, himself a labor leader, was arrested on January 26 for various rebellious activities with the CLO. Upon his arrest, he was charged in the criminal information of Rebellion with Murder, Arson and Robbery. Five years after his arrest, Hernandez asked for bail with the court where his case was pending, but was denied on the basis of the nature of the offense (if the crime was complexed, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed). Thus, he filed a petition to the Supreme Court. Decision: The Supreme Court, through then Associate

Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with other crimes, such as murder and arson. Rebellion in itself would include and absorb the said crimes, thus granting the accused his right to bail. Murder and arson are crimes inherent and concomitant when rebellion is taking place. Rebellion in the Revised Penal Code constitutes one single crime and that there is no reason to complex it with other crimes. As basis, the Court cited several cases convicting the defendants of simple rebellion although they killed several persons. *The word rebellion evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but also civil war on a bigger or lesser scale. *Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, then said offense becomes stripped of its common

a. Facts:

It was the height of the Government action against communists and the Hukbalahap guerillas. President Elpidio Quirino, through his Defense Secretary (and later, President) Ramon Magsaysay intensified the campaign against them, and the crackdown was on against communist organizations. Due to such government action, several communist leaders like Luis Taruc and the Lava brothers were soon in government custody.

12

complexion, inasmuch, as being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquired the political character of the latter. The petition for bail was granted. On May 30, 1964, the Supreme Court acquitted Hernandez. b. Ponce Enrile vs. Amin

guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the principles of Communism. d. People vs. Geronimo

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. c. People vs. Almazan

If the killing, robbing, etc., during the rebellion, were done for private purposes or profit, without any

political motivation, the crimes would be separately

punished. Thus, in Pp. v. Geronimo, et al., accused was convicted of rebellion and murder, two separate offenses. e. f. Dela Pea vs. Empaynado Cario v. People and CA

Four hundred (400) Sakdals after fighting the Constabulary soldiers took possession of the municipal building and proclaimed the independence of the Philippine Republic. The Constabulary forces suppressed the uprising. *There is public uprising and taking arms against the government when they fought the Constabulary soldiers. By proclaiming the Philippine Independence, they removed the locality under their control from the allegiance to the Government or its laws. *The crime of rebellion or of inciting it is by nature a crime of masses, of a multitude. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. *Persons merely agreeing and deciding among themselves to rise publicly and take arms against the Government for the purposes mentioned in Article 134, without actually rising publicly and taking arms against the Government, or those merely proposing the commission of said acts to other persons without actually performing those over acts under Article 134, are already subject to punishment. *The mere fact of giving and rendering speeches favoring communism would not make the accused

Appellant was not a member of the Hukbalahap organization which has engaged in rebellion. He did not take up arms against the Government, nor did he openly take part in the commission of the crime of rebellion or insurrection as defined in Art. 134 of the RPC. The only acts he was shown to have performed were the sending or furnishing of cigarettes and food supplies to a Huk leader, the changing of dollars into pesos for a top-level communist and the helping of the Huks in opening accounts with the bank of which he was an official.

Held: Unlike in crime of treason, the act of

giving comfort or moral aid is not criminal in the case of rebellion or insurrection, where the RPC expressly declares that there must be a public uprising and the taking up of arms. Appellant is, therefore, absolved from the charge. *In rebellion or insurrection, the RPC expressly declares that there must be a public uprising and the taking up of arms. g. Pp v. Perez

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In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 974; U. S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.) It is our course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act. No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U. S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra.) In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the

peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. h. Pp v. Cabrera

"Rarely in the history of criminality in this country has there been registered a crime so villainous as that committed by these defendants. The court is only concerned in this case with the crime of sedition. The maximum penalty prescribed by Act No. 292, imprisonment for ten years and a fine of P10,000, is not really commensurate with the enormity of the offense. Impelled by hatred, employing their knowledge of military science which is worthy of a better cause, and in disregard of the consequences to themselves and their innocent loved ones, and using the means furnished to them by the Government for the protection of life and property, they sought by force and violence and outside of legal methods to avenge a fancied wrong by an armed and tumultuous attack upon officials and agents of the government of the city of Manila." i. Lino v. Fugoso There is legal and rational support for the proposition that after the case of an arrested person has been placed in the hands of a fiscal or municipal judge, it is the right, let alone the duty, of the police to keep him in custody until he is discharged according to law regardless of the illegality of his previous detention, which by, law way, is not to be confused with the arrest. This practice is made necessary, at least in the City of Manila, by the very nature of things as well as by express enactments. The law, statutory and common, is that on officer or private individual who has made an arrest of a person without a warrant has authority to detain him in custody until a preliminary hearing against him can be had (4 Am. Jur., 49) and he

14

may then be committed to jail of held to bail (William F. Down vs. Sherlock Swann, 23 L.R.A., N. S., 739, citing Brish vs. Carten 98 MD., 445, and Edger vs. Burke, 96 MDD., 722). Supplementing and confirming this general rule the Manila Charter specifically vests on the Chief of Police the power to keep the prisoner in custody of release him on bail, although in cases of violation of any penal law, as distinguished from violations of municipal ordinances, the bail is fixed by the City Fiscal and the release must be authorized or recommended by the latter. Section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code thus stages that "the of chief police may take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the city Court of any person arrested for violation of any city ordinances: Provided, however, That he shall not exercise this power in case of violations of any penal law, except when the fiscal of the city shall so recommend and fix the bail to be required of the person arrested." In consonance with the foregoing rule and provision, the practice followed by the City Fiscal of Manila, when the person arrested without a warrant is brought before him, has been either to fix the bond and order the provisional release of the prisoner before filing a complaint or information or making an investigation, or else to file a complaint or information and leave it to the appropriate court to admit the detained person to bail. In neither case it is necessary to, nor does the court, as a matter of fact, issue an order of arrest. This is so simply because the accused is already under arrest; and the court does not issue a commitment because there is no final judgment and because the arrest has not been effected by its order. It is to be remembered that the City Fiscal himself has no authority to order, but only to recommend to the police, the release of detained persons. Neither is the City Fiscal empowered to

order the continued detention of such persons for the reason already stated, that it is upon the authority and responsibility of the Chief of Police that this functionary holds the prisoners until the court commands his discharge. The previous illegality of the detention of Montaniel and Deoduco has no relevancy to their petition for habeas corpus and it is a mistake for this Court to allow itself to be influenced thereby. There can be no serious doubt as to the intent of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3940, which says that "The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours." This provision refers solely to detention by a police officer prior to the retained person's delivery to the proper judicial officer. It does not restrict the time within which the fiscal of the city, a justice of the peace or a municipal judge should act on the case. lt. seeks to prevent abuses by the police to prevent them from keeping for an unreasonable length of time arrested persons who are not properly charged before a competent judicial officer, or whose detention has no justifiable cause. It does not force the city fiscal, justice of the peace or municipal judge to release the prisoners at or before the expiration of six hours from the time of their arrest. Nothing could have been farther from the thought of the legislature than to tie so tightly the hands of the law, and coddle and pamper lawlessness to a calamitous extreme. It requires no mental effort to see that it is beyond the ability of any person to make an investigation of a criminal case, file a complaint or information, and secure an arrest warrant or commitment in six hours, or worse still what remains, if any, of that period computed from the time of the arrest. The theory sustained by the

15

majority, if put into practice, would play havoc on the efforts of law-enforcement agencies and the administration of criminal law, certain to produce disastrous consequences, not difficult to imagine, in the maintenance of peace and order. The decision of this Court sets a precedent which will open the door to evasions of criminal prosecution. The populous conditions of Manila and other centers of population in the Philippines as they exist today, and the modern facilities of transportation and rapid transit afford easy means for avoiding re-arrest or fleeing from justice. Such evasions and such escapes would be the result of the holding that a person who has been arrested without a warrant and detained beyond the six-hour limit by the police should be discharged irrespective of the filing of a complaint after the lapse of that period, on the tendency of an appropriate criminal action against him. The situation which I have pictured will follow from the ruling that even if a crime has been committed by the person arrested and a complaint has been filed against him, he nevertheless should be released, without prejudice to his re-arrest on a formal information or complaint lodged against him. j. Espuelas v. Pp

mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his "dirty government" to the point of taking his own life, is not merely a sign of disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction against its duly constituted authorities. The mention made in said letter of the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks against the law and the duly constituted authorities, cannot but be interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the open defiance by the Hukbalahaps against the constituted government, the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the ruthless depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state of lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very much better than the maladministration of said President and his men. To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent men. The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us. 9 Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a majority of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself). and unpeaceful methods to free the

Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself (See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as seditious libels they were the subject of criminal proceedings since early times in England (V. op. cit.). "The idea of violence pervades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes of the Court of Appeals. "The

government from the administration of Roxas and his

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And such suggestion clinches the case against appellant. In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matters with several persons in a public place uttered these words: "Filipinos must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head" - referring to the then Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of the Philippine Reports. That precedent is undeniably opposite. Note that the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably the member who has been most outspoken on freedom of speech. Adopting his own words we could say, "Here the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the President of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws."

"My brothers: Nobody violates the law but he who makes it; and it is necessary that we should all united to overthrow that power. A soviet government is necessary here; Russia is the first country where the laborers have had their emancipation from oppression, imperialism and capitalism. It is necessary that all property should be delivered to the government for its administration, and from this we will see the redemption of the Filipino people." The proof submitted by the prosecution fully sustains the allegation that the sentiments contained in the foregoing paragraph were expressed by the speaker. A demurrer was interposed to the information on the ground that no offense is charged, but said demurrer was overruled. The action thus taken was correct. The words used by the accused are clearly directed to the end of inciting sedition, contrary to the provisions of article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. xxxThe language imputed to the appellant incites the auditors to the overthrowing of the lawmaking power; and as the greater includes the less, this language necessarily and involves preventing from the freely Government public officials

exercising their functions. It is claimed for the appellant that the language

k.

Pp v. Feleo It appears that on September 29, 1932, the

imputed to him was within the privilege secured by constitutional guaranties, but we have more than once held that this contention, in connection with speeches of the character of that now before us, is untenable. l. n. Reyes v. Bagatsing Pp. v. Veloso

legislative committee on labor held a public meeting in San Miguel, Bulacan, to hear the complaints and grievances of farmers. Many people were present at said meeting, and after addresses had been delivered by the official speakers, Juan Feleo made a talk in the course of which he used expressions in the Tagalog language substantially to the following effect:

m. Lopez v. de los Reyes

Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search warrant, the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to

17

name Jose M.a Veloso as the person to be seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the Organic Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus, and, in addition, contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by the appellant, to is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed is void, "except in those cases where it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose M.a Velosos, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose M.a Veloso without difficulty. The trial judge deduced from the search that the accused Veloso was sufficiently identified therein. Mention was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or information, permitting a fictitious name to be inserted in the complaint or information, in lieu of the true name. The Attorney-General adds to this the argument that the police were authorized to arrest without a warrant since a crime was being committed. We find it unnecessary to comment on this contention. John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should

particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference. o. p. q. Pp v. Ladena Pp v. Velasco? Justo v CA

The argument that the offended party, De la Cuesta, cannot claim to have been unlawfully attacked because he had accepted the accused's challenge to fight, overlooks the circumstance that as found by the Court of Appeals, the challenge was to "go out", i.e., to fight outside the building, it not being logical that the fight should be held inside the office building in the plain view of subordinate employees. Even applying the rules in dueling cases, it is manifest that an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place for the encounter would be unlawful; to hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play. In the present case, assuming that De la Cuesta accepted the challenge of the accused, the facts clearly indicate that he was merely on his way out to fight the accused when the latter violently lay hands upon him. The acceptance of the challenge did not place on the offended party the burden of preparing to meet an assault at any time even before reaching the appointed place for the agreed encounter, and any such aggression was patently illegal. Appellant's position would be plausible if the complaining official had been the one who issued the challenge to fight; but here the reverse precisely happened. r. Gallego v. People

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It is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of the rights to the freedom of speech and to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and the general welfare of the people.

person in authority. Granting that only the crime of assault upon a person in authority is charged, still the Court of First Instance would have jurisdiction over the cases. While the said section of the Judiciary Act provides that the Justice of the Peace Court and Municipal Court have original jurisdiction over cases of "assault where the intent to kill is not charged and evident upon trial", this does not include direct assaults defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. "Assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or evident upon trial" apparently refers to crimes against persons, under Title Eight of the Code. Direct assaults defined under Article 148, on the other hand, are

s.

Villanueva vs. Ortiz Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of

crimes against public order falling under Title Three of the Code. In direct assaults, the victim is a person in authority or his agent, and the attack, employment of force or intimidation is committed on the occasion of the performance of official duties or by reason of such performance. Also punishable as direct assault is the employment of force or intimidation without a public uprising for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition. The principal object of Article 148 is to penalize the commission of acts against public order as may be indicated by its classification in the Revised Penal Code. t. Pp v. Acierto

courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information (People vs. Mission, 87 Phil., 641; 48 Off. Gaz., 1330). A careful scrutiny of the allegations in the informations aforequoted shows that the accused are charged to have committed not only the crime of assault upon a person in authority defined in Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code but also that of disturbance of public order defined in Article 153 of the same Code. For it is alleged therein that the accused by laying hands upon election inspectors and watchers in public places, had caused serious disturbance and interrupted or disturbed public performances and functions. The accused are thus charged with the complex crime of assault upon a person in authority with disturbance of public order. The lower court in remanding the cases to the Municipal Court has taken the position that there is only one crime charged, that of direct assault, or, more specifically, assault upon a

In People vs. Ramos (p. 462, ante), by Justice Imperial, it was held: "From the above-quoted provisions of law we believe it may be deduced that the provincial treasurer is a person in authority within the province where he exercises his jurisdiction, and that the municipal treasurer, being his deputy ex officio, is an agent of authority, and not a person in authority, as this word is employed in the

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Penal Code under which the information against the appellant was filed." The postmaster of a municipality is an agent of the Director of Posts, and as such is in charge of the custody of the Government funds that come into his hands by virtue of the transactions with the public in postal matters, telegrams, savings bank, and so forth, and, like a municipal treasure is an agent of a person in authority in addition to being a public office, inasmuch as the Director of Posts is a person in authority who by law exercises jurisdiction of his own in postal and telegraphic matters. With regard to the physical injuries sustained by the offended party from the attack, they, being light in character, are to be considered as inherent in the assault, for it cannot be supposed that in laying hands upon a person, no harm or injury will be caused. In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That a postmaster is an agent of a person in authority; and (2) that the slight physical injuries sustained by such an agent as a result of the defendant's laying hands upon him, are inherent in the offense of assault upon an agent of a person in authority. u. v. Pp. v. Quitorio Parulan v. Dir. Of Prisons

instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place." There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case. There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation, 3 and abduction, 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another, 5 and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated from one province to another. 6 To this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however, long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6 [c] thereof, one of the instances when a person may be validly arrested without a warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. 7 Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the

Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief by habeas corpus. The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense with which he was charged - evasion of service of sentence? Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "Place where action is to be instituted.-(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be

20

escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime-evading the service of his sentence. w. Infante v. Prov. Warden of Neg. Occ. According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential element of prescription. There has been no such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one and prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of the unserved sentence, and computation could not have started earlier than the date of the order for the prisoner's rearrest. We think, however, that the condition of the pardon which the prisoner was charged with having breached was no longer operative when he committed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. Pardon is an act of grace, and there is general agreement that limitations upon its operation should be strictly construed (46 C. J. 1202); so that, where a conditional pardon is susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is to be construed most favorably to the grantee. (39 Am. Jur., 564.) Thus, in Huff vs. Dyer, 40 Ohio C. C. 595, 5. L R A, N S, Note 1064), it was held that the duration of the conditions subsequent, annexed to a pardon, would be limited to the period of the prisoner's sentence unless an intention to extend it beyond that time was manifest from the nature of the condition or the language in which it was imposed. In that case, the prisoner was discharged on habeas corpus because the term of the pardon in question did not, in the opinion of the court, imply that it was contemplated to have the condition operate beyond the term of his sentence. The herein petitioner's pardon, it will be noted, does not state the time within which the conditions thereof were to be performed or observed. In adopting, which we hereby do, the rule of strict construction, we take into account, besides the benevolent nature of the pardon, the fact that the general run of prisoners are unlettered or at least unfamiliar with the intricacies and legal implications of conditions subsequent imposed in a pardon. a. b.

Crimes against public interest (Art. 161-189) Pp vs. Tin Ching Ting Pp v. Corral

4.

The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the adult male population. For reasons of public policy, certain classes of persons are excluded from the franchise. Among the generally excluded classes are minors, idiots, paupers, and convicts. The right of the State to deprive persons of the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or those base offense indicative of moral turpitude, in unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and in not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right." (9 R. C. L., 1042.). Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his offense had already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general election held on June 5, 1934. This contention is clearly without merit. The disqualification for crime imposed under section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code having once attached on the appellant and not having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934. Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant that the disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having

21

been removed at the expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that it is imposed "for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right ." Judicial interpretation and long established administrative practice are against such a view. c. d. Pp v. Compra Ilumin v. Sandiganbayan

so when his authorship can be proved by other means. In this case, there is sufficient evidence indicating that the falsification was indeed made by the accused. e. US vs. Arceo 17 Phil 592

Petitioner's contention that the Sandiganbayan's conclusion is based only on speculation and conjecture, therefore, lacks merit. From the record, it may be gleaned that the public respondent carefully and logically discussed the evidence presented in relation to the accusations levelled against Ilumin. Besides, settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established exceptions. 21 Being a trial court, the Sandiganbayan was in a good position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. 22 The evidence for the prosecution constitutes convincing proof of petitioner Ilumin's guilt. Hence, it was not improper for public respondent to hold that: "The act of the accused in altering the true amounts of the net pays appearing on the payroll opposite his name and that of payee Arceo Castillo constitutes falsification (Article 171, par. 6, Revised Penal Code.) The falsification and the resulting misrepresentation in the falsified payroll was the means by which he obtained from the MWSS the amount of P1,000.00 over and above the amount lawfully due the employees listed in the payroll, to the damage and prejudice of MWSS. The acts committed by the accused thus constituted the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document defined under Article 171, No. 6 and Article 318, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised Penal Code." 23 Petitioner's insistence that a handwriting expert must be presented to establish that he is the author of the falsification is misplaced for it is not necessary to do

The accused was the foreman of carpenters hired by the City of Manila to reconstruct the houses torn down for reasons of sanitation and removed to the San Lazaro Estate. The city had bound itself to reconstruct gratis said houses. The wife of the accused had purchased from Severino Pelagio one of these houses, including the right to have the house rebuilt at the city's expense. The accused foreman reported that a carpenter named Castro worked for the city when in truth he worked on the reconstruction of the house which the accused had purchased. He was charged with falsification. It was held that he was not criminally liable. He believed in good faith that the city was dutybound to rebuild the house which his wife had purchased from Pelagio and that there was nothing wrong in charging against the city the time spent by Castro in rebuilding that house, just as there was nothing wrong in charging against the city and time spent by the other carpenters in rebuilding the other houses removed under the same circumstances. In the instant case, as in the Arceo case, it cannot be said that the accused perverted the truth in including Aninipo in the payroll in order to attain any felonious objective. Their honest motive was to enable Cagais to receive his compensation which he needed very badly. f. Llamoso et.al v. Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan convicted Llamoso, Guigue, Jumamoy, Cagais and Aninipo as conspirators in the crime of falsification of public documents by allegedly having made it appear in the time book, payroll and authority to hire employees (Exh. A to A-2) that Aninipo worked in the Sta. Rosa Street project when in fact he did not work therein.

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It sentenced each of them to an indeterminate penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of P2,000. They appealed. We hold that the accused are not criminally liable because they had no criminal intent. Making no concealment or evasion, they admitted that there was a false entry. They acted in good faith (12-13 tsn Nov. 16, 1982). They may be disciplined administratively for the irregularity but their inclusion of Aninipo in the payroll is outside the pale of criminal law. Apparently, the case was an isolated instance. It should not be equated with the systematic and rampant practice in some engineering districts of fabricating payrolls with fictitious laborers working on fictitious projects resulting in the defraudation of the government of considerable sums of money. There is a ruling that the accused is not guilty of falsification in the absence of proof that he maliciously perverted the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some third person (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341, 343). The instant case is similar to U.S. vs. Arceo, 17 Phil. 592. g. US v. Austero

the matter at issue has been the falsification of signatures. The case at bar has not to do with the falsification of a signature, nor is it necessary to inquire whether or not an attempt was made to imitate the signature or writing which constitutes the sign of authenticity, or reason for according credit to the document. The falsified documents in question are printed ones. The blanks that are filled out in this class of documents with the name of the taxpayer, the location of the property and certain figures, need not, nor can they be imitated, inasmuch as their authenticity lies in the issue thereof by an officer authorized by law so to do, and in the stub from which the same detached when lawfully issued. As the complain states, the documents exhibited in the case are genuine ones, the falsification consists in that the truth therein contained has been altered. h. i. j. US v. Ramps US v. Cinco and Redoa Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudsman

In the cause against Paraiso the doctrine is established that "the agent of a mercantile concern who signs false receipts with the name of a third person is not guilty of falsification under articles 300 and 304 of the Penal Code if he does not attempt to imitate the signature or mark of that person." In that against Roque: "The signing of another's name to a receipt with design to deceive does not constitute falsification unless there is an attempt to imitate the genuine signature." In that against Buenaventura: "When no attempt has been made to imitate the signature or writing of another, there can be no conviction for falsification . . ." And in that against Leyson: "Leyson did then and there counterfeit and feign the signature of J.Y. McCartey . . ." In all of the foregoing decisions

In this case, we hold that the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or in excess of its authority when it ordered the filing of informations against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e) and the Revised Penal Code, Art. 171, par. 3, despite the absence of probable cause, defined as such ground as engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, warranting the filing of the case in court.[25] First. Petitioner Arce allegedly violated 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 by including the phrase with full authority to take possession of all property/ies of said deceased in any province or provinces in which it may be situated . . . in the LOA she prepared in Special Proceeding Case No. V-6433. This provision states: SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: ....

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(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The elements of the offense are: 1. That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2. That said public officers committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; 3. That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; 4. That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5. That the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[26] These elements must all be proven.[27] In this case, there is no basis for the finding that in issuing the LOA in question petitioner acted with partiality, or bias which excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are, with bad faith, which connotes not only bad judgment or negligence but also a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing, a breach of duty amounting to fraud, nor with gross negligence, which is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned.[28] The Manual for Clerks of Court describes the clerk of court as an officer of the Court, a public officer, and an officer of the law, [although] the position is not that of a judicial officer, nor is it synonymous with the Court. . . . The office is essentially a ministerial one.[29] Petitioner performed a ministerial duty in

preparing the letter of administration based on the dispositive portions of the orders dated September 22, 1998 and October 12, 1998. She merely copied substantially the form for letters of administration prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Courts. The LOA may not be accurate for lack of reference to the lease agreement in favor of respondent Santiago B. Villaruz, but it cannot be said with certainty that she acted either with gross negligence or from some corrupt motive. The fact is that, instead of employing her own words, she used phrases in the Manual prescribed by this Court. Second. The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) found a prima facie case for falsification under Article 171, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner because she stated in the letter of administration that Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. had been appointed administrator by Judge Sergio Pestao when what the latter did was to approve the administrators bond. We disagree with the Ombudsmans findings. Art. 171, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: .... 3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them. Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification.[30] In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present. Petitioner prepared the letter of administration on the basis of the order of Judge Pestao, dated October 12, 1998, approving the administrators bond filed by Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. By the approval of his bond, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. qualified as administrator so that in a sense, therefore, the statement in the letter of administration [t]hat by order of this Court dated October 12, 1998, issued by Honorable Sergio

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Pestao, Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. has been appointed Administrator of the estate of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz, deceased is correct. There was nothing willful or felonious in petitioners act warranting her prosecution for falsification. k. US v. Capule

therein were not characteristic and constitutive of an instrument of power of attorney in his favor in order that he might represent them in a suit against Maximino Reyes. l. Enemecio vs. Office of the Ombudsman

Starting from the hypothesis that the defendant really obtained in a fraudulent and deceitful manner the consent of the married couple Maghirang and Pili to the execution of said false instrument, his counsel argues that still he was not guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document, in accordance with the finding of this court in the decision of the case against Geronimo Milla (4 Phi. Rep., 391), wherein the following principle was laid down: "The fact that one's intimidation, or fraud does not make the contract a false contract, and therefore a person who has obtained such contract by those means, whatever be the crime he may be guilty of, is not guilty of the crime of falsification either of a public or of a private document." This was the question of a contract wherein the offended parties gave their consent to the execution of the document that was later impugned as false, although this consent was obtained through intimidation which the defendants in that case, Juan Cardona and Geronimo Milla, had used upon them, and for this reason the court, in view of the fact that the contracting parties consented to the terms of the instrument, could not find that there was falsification in the statement of the facts, according to article 300 of the Penal Code, merely because the consent had been secured through intimidation. As has been seen, there was no contract in the present case, nor any consent to the contract pretended to have been stipulated in the instrument, Exhibit A, wherein the defendant entered statements ascribed to the alleged vendors, who proposed and intended to execute an instrument of commission or power of attorney in favor of the defendant, but not a deed of sale, as in bad faith and with evident perverseness the defendant did, perverting the truth in the statement of the facts and ascribing to the offended parties statement document, since the statements set forth

Enemecio asserts that this document proved that Bernante actually received and was paid the amount of P3,185.08 as a result of his falsified letter-requests and leave applications. According to Enemecio, these constituted acts of malversation. Enemecios contentions do not deserve serious consideration. Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of falsification of public documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.[24] As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing upon Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he was going to spend his leave of absence. Legal obligation means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.[25] Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by making false statements in a narration of facts absent any legal obligation to disclose where he would spend his vacation leave and forced leave. In PCGG v. Desierto,[26] the Court ruled that the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given the facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. The Ombudsman may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it insufficient in form or substance. On the other hand, he may continue with the inquiry if he finds otherwise. If, in the Ombudsmans view, the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, he may proceed with the investigation. In fact, the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint outright without going through a preliminary investigation.[27]

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Our evaluation of the records leads us to the conclusion that the Ombudsman has carefully studied the merits of the criminal complaint. Where the Ombudsman has thoroughly examined the merits of the complaint, it would not be right to subject the private respondent to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish.[28] m. Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan Petitioners have been convicted for falsification of public documents through an untruthful narration of facts under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code. For the offense to be established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. The first and third elements of the offense have not been established in this case. In approving the payment of salaries to Lenlie Lecaroz, Mayor Francisco Lecaroz signed uniformly-worded certifications thus I hereby certify on my official oath that the above payroll is correct, and that the services above stated have been duly rendered. Payment for such services is also hereby approved from the appropriations indicated. When Mayor Lecaroz certified to the correctness of the payroll, he was making not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law expressing his belief that Lenlie Lecaroz was legally holding over as member of the Sanggunian and thus entitled to the emoluments attached to the position. This is an opinion undoubtedly involving a legal matter, and any "misrepresentation" of this kind cannot constitute the crime of false pretenses.31 [22 Am. Jur. 454, cited in People v. Yanza, 107 Phil. 888 (1960)] In People v. Yanza32 [Ibid.] we ruled Now then, considering that when defendant certified she was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law which turned out to be inexact or erroneous - not entirely groundless - we are all of the opinion that she may not be declared guilty of

falsification, specially because the law which she has allegedly violated (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, in connection with other provisions), punishes the making of untruthful statements in a narration of facts - emphasis on facts x x x x Unfortunately, she made a mistake of judgment; but she could not be held thereby to have intentionally made a false statement of fact in violation of Art. 171 abovementioned. The third element requiring that the narration of facts be absolutely false is not even adequately satisfied as the belief of Mayor Francisco Lecaroz that Lenlie Lecaroz was a holdover member of the Sanggunian was not entirely bereft of basis, anchored as it was on the universally accepted doctrine of holdover. La mera inexactitude no es bastante para integrar este delito.33 [Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Bk. II, 1981 Rev. Ed., p. 222, citing Cliello Calon, Derecho Penal, 6th Ed., Vol. II, p. 216.] If the statements are not altogether false, there being some colorable 'truth in them, the crime of falsification is deemed not to have been committed. Finally, contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan, we hold that conspiracy was not proved in this case. The court a quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor certified the payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son Lenlie Lecaroz and that as a consequence thereof the latter collected his salaries. These are not legally acceptable indicia, for they are the very same acts alleged in the Informations as constituting the crime of estafa through falsification. They cannot qualify as proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent. Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together however, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design.34 [Magcusi v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101545, 3 January 1995, 240 SCRA 13.] n. Pp v. Beronilla

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The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we can not say that criminal intent has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent. of the Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. "To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea-a is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent." (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507) o. p. Pp vs. Yanza Amora,Jr, et. Al. vs. CA, et.al.

Phil. 341, 344 [1902].) Thus the learned Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino has said, "there is no falsification of a public document if the acts of the accused are consistent with good faith. Thus, it has been held that 'a conviction for falsification of a public document by a private person will not be sustained when the facts found are consistent with good faith on the part of the accused.' In other words, although the accused altered a public document or made a misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would not be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was prejudiced by the alteration or error."(II Revised Penal Code, pp. 986-987 [1976].) q. Pp v. Reodica

The evidence discloses that this municipal payroll was submitted to the appellant by the municipal president, already prepared, together with a letter (Exhibit 3) authorizing him to pay Sinforoso Cordero's salary for the second half month, and other documents showing that said sinforoso Cordero was granted a leave of eight days from July 23 to July 31. When this payroll was received by the appellant on July 23, it was already signed and payment thereof approved by the president, with the latter's certification that the services therein mentioned were rendered. This being the case, the appellant is not guilty of the falsification of this payroll, as alleged in the information, because the president and not he is the one who certifies that the services of the officers mentioned therein were in fact rendered However, in view of the leave granted to Sinforoso Cordero from July 23 to July 31, for the purposes of the payment of his salary, this amounted to his having rendered services during this period. While in the payroll that he paid Sinforoso Cordero's salary on July 31, 1931, it does not allege, however, that this was not true, and although it appears that the appellant made this payment on July 23, he was not charged with falsification in this sense. At any rate, Sinforoso Cordero having been in fact paid, it was immaterial whether this was done on July 23 or July 31. r. US v. Infante

From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman suffered no damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the boulders actually delivered was P18,285.00 but Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the additional fact that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is obvious that the falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith; there was no criminal intent. "The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent." (U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504, 507 [1911].) There can be no conviction for falsification of a public document in the absence of proof that the defendants "maliciously perverted the truth with wrongful intent of injury the complaining witness." (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1

27

The contention of counsel would seem to be that, since both these tickets were falsified at or about the same time and for the same purpose, and since both were used at the same time to procure unlawfully a certain sum of money from the pawn-broking establishment of the complaining witness, there was but one crime committed. But whatever force there might be in this contention were the accused charged in these separate informations with the embezzlement of the money advanced by the pawnshop upon presentation of the separate falsified pawn tickets, such a contention cannot be successfully maintained with relation to the two separate charges of falsification of a private document upon which the accused were tried and convicted in the court below, each of which constituted a single, consummated offense wholly separate and distinct from the other and wholly separate and distinct from the crime of embezzlement which was committed when illegal and improper use was made of these falsified pawn tickets to procure money from the pawnshop of the complaining witness. The two pawn tickets were wholly separate and distinct documents. They had no relation to each other as members of a series of instruments, so intimately related, that the falsification of one individual of the series would be, in effect, a falsification of the entire series. The crime of falsification of a private document was complete and consummated when, with intent to prejudice a third person, the first pawn ticket was actually falsified; and a wholly separate and distinct crime was initiated and consummated when the second ticket was falsified. That both documents may have been falsified to be used together in the perpetration of an embezzlement in no wise affects the case, as under the definition of the crime of falsification of private documents set out in article 304 of the Penal Code, the crime is consummated and complete at the moment when such a document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of, or with intent to prejudice a third person, it matters not to what use the document may be put thereafter, as will readily be seen from the express terms of that article, which are as follows: "Any person who, to the damage of another, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private

document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in article three hundred shall suffer the penalty of presidio correccional in its minimum and medium degrees and be fined in a sum not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas." s. Alfelor, et al. v. Hon. Intia

Lopez v. City Judge 18 points the way: "We not come to consider the question of when and where is the offense of falsification of a private document deemed consummated or committed? Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. v. Infante, . . . that the crime of falsification of a private document defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such document is actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was intended." 19 United States v. Infante 20 was decided as far back as 1917, almost sixty years ago. Less than a month later that same year, United States v. Barreto, 21 which spoke to the same effect, was promulgated. As was pointed out by Justice Carson who likewise penned the infante opinion: "It is evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is committed is the place where the document is actually falsified, and that the improper, or illegal use of the document thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of falsification of a private document; and even if it were otherwise, the charge that the crime was committed in a specific place would seem to be a sufficient allegation that all of the acts necessary to its consummation were in fact done at the place indicated." 22 There is also this opinion of Chief Justice Avancea in People v. Villanueva: 23 "The falsification of each of these six money orders committed separately by means of different acts constitutes independent crimes of falsification (U.S. v. Infante and Barreto, 36 Phil. 146), and the appropriation of the respective amounts thereof by the defendant, likewise constitutes different crimes of malversation." 24 All of the above cases explicitly ruled on the specific point at issue. It does not admit of doubt though that while no such categorical statement may be found in other decisions of this

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Court, it has always been assumed that falsification is not a continuing offense. 25 t. US v. Paraiso

The crime provided for and punished in article 304 is not committed by the mere falsification of the document. It does not suffice that the document itself be false, but there must also be proved the prejudice caused to a third person or the intention to cause it. And here we find a certain difference between this and other crimes, as, for example, the counterfeiting of money. (Art. 280.) In order to cause prejudice to a third person it is absolutely necessary to make use of the falsified document after it is written ---- that the person who executes it realizes some act which makes it effective. If a person falsifies a promissory note and keeps it in his house it can not in any manner operate to the prejudice of a third person. If an individual falsifies a promissory note and, after keeping it in his house for a time, destroys it, he does not prejudice anyone by the mere fact of having made it. It is evident that a person can not be declared guilty under the first clause of this article "to the prejudice of a third person" unless he does two things; in the first place he must have counterfeited the false document, and secondly, he must have performed an independent act which operates to the prejudice of a third person. It appears equally evident that the same rule should be applied to the second clause "with intent of causing it." In the first place he must have counterfeited the document, and secondly, he must have performed some other independent act in order to make use of it ---- an act which, while it does not result in prejudice to a third party, has been done nevertheless with the intention of causing such prejudice. The fact that no prejudice has been caused would not be due in such case to the desistance of the defendant himself but to causes absolutely independent of his will. To maintain the contrary would be equivalent to completely suppress from the article the phrase "to the prejudice of a third person," because in every case there exists undoubtedly in the mind of the falsifier at the time of uttering the document the idea or intention to make unlawful use of the same to the prejudice of a third person. Let us suppose the case in which a person falsifies a check authenticating it with the signature of another who has money on deposit in the bank. He presents the said check at the bank and the employees of the

latter, without noting the falsification, pay him the money. In this case he is guilty under the first clause, since he has caused prejudice to the bank. Suppose that he presents the check and the employees on noting the falsification refuse to deliver him the money. In this case he is guilty under the second clause, for, although nobody is prejudiced, he had the intention of causing prejudice by having performed certain acts to that end. Supposing that he falsifies the check and keeps it in the house without making use thereof, he can not be considered guilty in accordance with either of the two clauses. The law never punishes the mere intention to commit a crime. For this it is necessary that something be done in the way of putting such intention into effect. In order to class as criminal even acts of this kind they must constitute an attempted crime according to article 3 of the Penal Code prevailing. It results evidently that the acts committed by the defendant in this case do not fall within the terms of said article. u. Gigantoni vs. Pp

Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or official functions, under which the petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a) who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b) who, under pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority under which the petitioner stands charged, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions. The question before us is - did petitioner knowingly and falsely represent himself as an agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary? Petitioner admits that he received a notice of his suspension from the CIS effective June 20, 1980. This admission is supported by the record (Annex "D") which shows the letter of Lt. Col. Sabas Edades to petitioner, dated June 23, 1980, regarding said action. Said official letter was also sent to the Commissioner of the Merit Systems Board, Civil Service Commission, the Minister of

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National Defense and the Commanding General of the CIS. However, as to petitioner's alleged dismissal effective June 20, 1980, he denies having been informed thereof. The record is bereft of any evidence or proof adduced by the prosecution showing that the dismissal was actually conveyed to petitioner. That is why the court, in convicting him, relied on the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, that is, that it is presumed that he was duly notified of his dismissal. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the charge that he "knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent. The constitutional presumption of innocence can only be overturned by competent and credible proof and never by mere disputable presumptions, as what the lower and appellate courts did when they presumed that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal by applying the disputable presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed." It was not for the accused to prove a negative fact, namely, that he did not receive the order of dismissal. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution. Hence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by positive evidence the allegation that the accused falsely represented himself as a CIS agent, by presenting proof that he knew that he was no longer a CIS agent, having been duly notified of his dismissal. It is essential to present proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was already dismissed from the service. A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his dismissal would not be sufficient. The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference whether the accused was suspended or dismissed from the service, "for both imply the absence of power to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of." mphasis supplied). The observation of the Solicitor General is correct if the accused were charged with usurpation of official function (second part of Article 177), but not if he is charged merely with usurpation of authority (first part of Article 177). The information charges the accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for

"knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government." Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been shown that the information given by PAL to the accused was confidential and was given to him only because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official function. He was not charged in the information for such an offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the case that the information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was readily made available to the accused because PAL officials believed at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the only offense with which he was charged in the information, that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent. v. Pp v. Romero w. Pp vs. Maneja The sole question raised in this appeal is whether the period of prescription for the offense of false testimony which, in the instant case, is five years (art. 180, No. 4, in relation to art. 90, Revised Penal Code), should commence from the time the appellee, Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the supposed false testimony in criminal case No. 1872 on December 16, 1933, as the lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final in December, 1938, as the prosecution contends. We hold that the theory of the prosecution is the correct one. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false testimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided. (Cf. U. S. vs. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People vs. Marcos et al., G. R. No. 47388, Oct. 22, 1940.) And before an act becomes a punishable offense, it cannot

30

possibly be discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. If the period of prescription is to be computed from the date the supposed false testimony is given, it would be impossible to determine the length of such period in any particular case, depending, as it does depend, on the final outcome of the basic case. For instance, a witness testifies falsely against an accused who is charged with murder. If the accused is found guilty, the penalty prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised Penal Code), in which case the period of prescription is twenty years (art. 90, idem). On the other hand, if the accused is acquitted, the penalty prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period of prescription is only five years. Upon these hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be impossible to determine the period of prescription whether twenty years or five years as either of these two periods is fixed by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the main case. The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the offense of false testimony is the name, whether the defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter of pure co-incidence. The four cases enumerated in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code and the instant case falls on one of them uniformly presuppose a final judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a prerequisite to the action ability of the crime of false testimony. x. y. El Pueblo de Filipinas vs. Ambal (decision in Spanish) US v. Isidoro Aragon

that he had no recollection concerning those facts. The prosecuting attorney proved the existence of the facts with reference to which the defendant was questioned, but failed to prove that the statements of the defendant with reference to those facts were false. The mere fact that the defendant had to do in the year 1896 with certain facts and relations was not sufficient to prove that he stated a falsehood when he stated in December, 1904, that he had "no recollection with reference to such facts or relations." The evidence adduced during the trial fails, in our judgment, to show that the defendant testified falsely or gave false testimony as was charged in the complaint. In order that a defendant may be convicted under article 321 of the Penal Code for giving false testimony, the following facts must be shown: First. The testimony must be given a civil cause. Second. The testimony must relate to the issues presented in said cause. Third. The testimony must be false. Fourth. The false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false. Fifth. Such testimony must be malicious and given with an intent to affect the issues presented in said cause. The evidence adduced during the trial of this case is not sufficient to show that the defendant committed the crime charged in the complaint. The judgment of the inferior court is therefore reversed and the said cause is hereby ordered to be dismissed. z. US v Caet

This testimony was given in a civil cause and it was the duty of the Government to prove that it was false. Not only was it the duty of the Government to show that the testimony was false but that it was given knowing that it was false and with malicious intent. During the examination of the defendant as a witness in the cause in which it is alleged he gave false testimony he was asked certain question with reference to the existence of certain facts. His answers invariably were that he did not remember, or

Viewed in this light, the question which the case presents for determination resolves itself into an inquiry as to whether, in this jurisdiction, it is perjury to submit under oath false evidence upon a material point in issue in a judicial proceeding by means of an affidavit. Section 3 of Act No. 1697, defining and penalizing the crime of perjury in the Philippine Islands, reads as follows: "Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in

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which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall, moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed." As was said in the case of United States vs. Estraa (16 Phil. Rep., 520), "section 3 of our perjury law is practically the same as that of nearly all of the States of the Union," and, "by the common law, perjury is the willful and corrupt taking of a false oath, lawfully administered, in a judicial proceeding or the course of justice in regard to a matter material to the issue or point of inquiry. (30 Cyc., 1399, the cases cited therein.)" And further that "this definition of perjury, as modified by statute, may be more accurately defined to be the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood, under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law, in a material matter, the offense being enlarged and made to extend to other false oaths than those taken in the course of judicial proceedings. (30 Cyc., 1400, and cases cited.)" Wharton, in his work on Criminal Law (11th ed. vol. 2, sec. 1508), says: "Perjury, as the offense, modified by statute, is now generally defined, is the corrupt assertion of a falsehood, under oath, or affirmation, and by legal authority, for the purpose of influencing the course of law. Or, to give a definition drawn from the older common-law authorities, it is the willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief, or knowledge, made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his evidence, either upon oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, whether such evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such assertion being known to such witness to be false, and being intended by him to mislead the court, jury, or person holding the proceeding." It will be seen that, according to this definition, a willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion, belief,

or knowledge made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his evidence, either upon oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, and whether such evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such assertion being known to such witness to be false, and being intended by him to mislead the court holding the proceeding, constitutes the crime of perjury. In view of the definition of perjury, as modified by statute, which has been accepted and followed in numerous cases, and upon the authority of the case of the United States vs. Estraa, referred to above, we hold that it is perjury in this jurisdiction to submit false evidence in a judicial proceeding by means of an affidavit. aa. Saavedra, Jr. vs DOJ Be that as it may, the outcome of SEC Case No. 3257 is not determinative of whether or not the charge for perjury against petitioner can prosper. Even if private respondent Ramos succeeds in proving the validity of the automatic rescission of the sale before the SEC, it does not necessarily mean that the criminal prosecution has basis. There are four (4) elements of the crime of perjury to be taken into account in determining whether there is a prima facie case, to wit: (a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. 17 Clearly, mere assertion of a falsehood is not enough to amount to perjury. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. While there may have been a falsehood asserted, which we are not prepared to accept, no evidence exists to show that the same was done deliberately and willfully. On the contrary, the records tend to show that the assertion was done in good faith, in the belief that the non-payment of the last installment price was justified by the sellers' noncompliance with their warranties. Besides, petitioner alleges that he has deposited the balance in escrow, which is not disputed. Consequently, a finding of

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probable cause does not follow as a matter of course even if SEC decides adversely against petitioner, for an essential element of the crime appears to be wanting in the case before us, i.e., that the falsehood is willful and deliberate. Moreover, as a rule, pleadings need not be verified unless otherwise required by the Rules of Court, and no rule requires complaints for damages, as in the case before us, to be under oath. Since the complaint filed by petitioner against private respondent is not required to be verified, another essential element of the crime of perjury is absent, i.e., that the sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law. Consequently, petitioner cannot be prosecuted on the basis of an alleged falsehood made in a verified pleading which is not mandated by law to be verified. 18 bb. Pp v. Capinlac While the Solicitor-General agrees to the conclusions arrived at by the lower court to the effect that the facts charged do not constitute false testimony under any of the two above cited articles, he contends, for the first time in this instance, that the appealed order is not in accordance with law and that the defendant's demurrer should have been overruled on the ground that the facts alleged in the information constitute falsification of a public document. This court is of the opinion that the conclusion of the lower court is correct, but not precisely for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute any of the crimes defined in articles 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code, but because they do not constitute the crime of perjury defined and punished in section 3 of Act No. 1697. It should be taken into consideration that the acts imputed to the defendant took place on February 6, 1931, according to the allegations of the information, and the law then in force in the matter of perjury was said Act No. 1697, because the Revised Penal Code, articles 184 et seq. of which punish false testimony, took effect only on January 1, 1932. Even if this court were to consider the question under the provisions of said section 3 of Act No. 1697, the conclusion arrived at would be the same on the ground that the information do not allege facts constituting perjury. In order that this crime could exist, it was necessary that the false statements of the

defendant referred to material matter and not merely to facts pertinent to the case in connection with which they were made. The allegation contained in the information in question is to the effect that the defendant's false statements referred only to facts pertinent to the case mentioned by him without stating, however, in what said facts consist. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable to the case at bar because they are more severe and strict than those of Act No. 1697. The rule is that penal laws have a retroactive effect only is so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony (article 22, Revised Penal Code). cc. US v. Capistrano the prosecution presented no other evidence, as has been said before, than the two contradictory statements of the accused; and according to the doctrines laid down by American courts in the two decisions hereinbefore inserted, it must prove by other evidence than the two contradictory statements themselves, which of them was false or more properly speaking, that the false statement, according to the allegation in the information, was the one given by the accused before the court of first instance at the hearing of the cause for rape aforementioned and in which she testified that it was not her father who raped her but the Spaniard Juan Sol. The prosecution did not only fail to present evidence tending to prove the existence of said falsehood, but when it should have produced as a witness Juan Sol, who was in the court room and was pointed out by the accused with her finger as the author of the rape of which she had been the victim, and when it was within its power to produce said man on the witnessstand, who must be the first to protest and reject the said imputation in the presence of the court, did not avail itself of these evidence in order to contradict and belie the clear and definite statement made by the accused against the said Spaniard not only in the sense that the latter had raped her but also in that he had induced and compelled her, by threats and duress, to declare at the preliminary investigation before the fiscal that which was true according to the information, an affirmation which the prosecution was in duty bound to prove by producing the said Juan Sol as a witness. And having failed to do so, such a failure is fatal to the prosecution.

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In the judgment appealed from, the lower court did not pass upon the question whether the statement of the accused at the preliminary investigation before the fiscal of this city was given voluntarily or not. This the lower court must have done according to the doctrine laid down in People vs. McClintic (supra) mentioned in the above-inserted paragraph of 21 R. C. L., 271, and, even disregarding this doctrine, in view of what the accused has testified to relative to the threats and duress made upon her by Juan Sol, in connection with the absence of any evidence on the part of the prosecution to rebut the testimony of the accused respecting that particular. On the other hand, after considering as real and true the facts recited by the accused at the preliminary investigation before the fiscal of the city in the presence of the policeman Varsovia, the lower court in the same decision declares that later when they had possessed their right spirit, and by means of undue influence, undoubtedly the influence exercised by the father of the accused, the latter falsely took her oath at the hearing of the case for rape, saying that she was not raped by her said father but by a Spaniard called Juan Sol. The court further adds that the father of the accused induced her daughter to tell a falsehood at the hearing of the said cause in order to free himself thereof. These assertions of the trial court do not find any support or basis in the evidence for there is not a word of record expressing, or even indicating, that Alejo Capistrano, the father of the accused, had exercised upon the latter undue influence or employed means to induce her to tell a falsehood at the hearing of the case for rape aforementioned, as the judgment of the lower court speaks. The lower court's assertion in this sense is completely inaccurate and with this inaccuracy is certainly contrasted the fact that in the said judgment no mention has been made, for the just and upright appreciation of the facts submitted during the trial, concerning the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution in not presenting as witness Juan Sol in order to rebut and impugn, as has been already said, what the accused has testified to regarding the particular aforementioned. In the face of the notorious insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution and the effect of the evidence adduced by the accused, it not being, on the other hand, improbable that the accused, a young

woman 14 years of age, would have declared in the terms she did before the fiscal of the city at preliminary investigation of the cause for rape against her father Alejo Capistrano, compelled by threats alleged by her to have been made upon her by Juan Sol, nor is it also improbable that the latter was the one who had raped her and not her own father, and it not being proven that when the accused testified under oath before the court of first instance at the hearing of the said cause for rape, giving the statements which gave rise to the dismissal of said cause, she would have transgressed the truth, and there being on the contrary, sufficient reasons leading us to believe, with sufficient ground, that she (the accused) was induced or compelled by threats and duress, to state what she had stated before the fiscal of the city at the preliminary investigation of the cause for rape aforesaid - it is not proper to hold the accused guilty of the crime of perjury aforementioned nor to impose upon her any penalty for said crime. dd. US vs. Estraa Crimes against public morals (Art. 200-202, PD 1602, PD 1802, RA 9287, LOI 816, RA 7610, RA 9344) US v. Filart 5.

a.

Section 7 of Act No. 1757 provides, so far as material to the present case, as follows: "The playing at and the conducting of any game of monte, jueteng, or any form of lottery or policy . . . is hereby prohibited, and any person taking any part therein . . . shall be punished as provided in section 3 hereof. . . ." This section also provides that: "It shall be no defense to any criminal action under this section that the defendant acted as the agent of another or that he had no interest in the result." We are satisfied that the provisions of the section quoted cover the case in hand. A lottery is said to be "a species of gaming, which may be defined as a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among persons who have paid, or agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the chance

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to obtain a prize." It is also defined as "a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance;" and "a scheme by which a result is reached by some action or means taken, and in which result man's choice or will has no part, nor can human reason, foresight, sagacity, or design enable him to know or determine such result until the same has been accomplished." It has also been stated that "where a pecuniary consideration is paid, and it is determined by lot or chance, according to some scheme held out to the public, what the party who pays the money is to have for it . . . it is a lottery." It has also been held that the word lottery "embraces the elements of procuring through lot or chance, by the investment of a sum of money or something of value, some greater amount of money or thing of greater value ;" and that "where small amounts are hazarded to gain large amounts, and the result of winning or losing is determined by chance, in which neither choice nor skill can operate to influence the result there is gambling by lot, or a prohibited lottery;" and "any scheme whereby one, on paying money or other valuable thing to another, becomes entitled to receive from him such a return in value, or nothing, as some formula of chance may determine" is a lottery. It was held in the case of Equitable Loan Co. vs. Waring, 117 Ga., 599, that three elements enter into a lottery scheme: (1) A consideration; (2) chance; (3) a prize, or some advantage or inequality in amount or value which is in the nature of a prize. b. c. d. e. Caltex, Inc. v. Palomar Pp v. Koetinger Pp v. Lee Pp v. City Court of Manila

the same evidence required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper. As aptly put in People v. Doriquez: 6 "It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. (People v. Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621; People v. Capurro, 7 Phil. 24). Phrased elsewhere, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the game facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. (People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472)." 7 emphasis supplied) "As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of a case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Sec. 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 11 Crimes committed by public officers (Art. 203-245. See RA 3019) Maniego v. Pp 6.

It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. Considering these differences in elements and nature, there is no identity of the offenses here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other. 5 Evidence required to prove one offense is not

a.

The pertinent portion of article 210 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

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"Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more than three times such value, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon if the same shall have been committed. If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph. . . .." As correctly indicated by counsel for petitioner the four essential elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer within the scope of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that the accused received by himself or thru another, some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime or any act not constituting a crime; (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of the functions of the public officer. There can be no question that petitioner was a public officer within the meaning of article 203, which includes all persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class." That definition is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public servant from the highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard distinction in the law of public officers between "officer" and "employee". The law is clear, and we perceive no valid reason to deny validity to the view entertained by the Spanish Supreme Court that, for the purposes of punishing bribery, the temporary performance of public functions is sufficient to constitute a person a public official. This opinion, it must be stated, was followed

and applied by the Court of Appeals because the accused, although originally assigned to the preparation of summons and subpoenas, had been allowed in some instances to prepare motions for dismissal of traffic cases. And this Tribunal has practically concurred with the Spanish court when it opined 1 that a laborer in the Bureau of Posts temporarily detailed as filer of money orders was a public officer within the meaning of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, common sense indicates that the receipt of bribe money is just as pernicious when committed by temporary employees as when committed by permanent officials. b. Pp v. Larin

Section 5, Article III16 [Re "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse."] of RA 7610, states: "SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -- Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. "The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x x x x x x x x x "(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x." The elements of the offense penalized under this provision are as follows: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

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2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. 3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under RA 7610, children are "persons below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition."17 [Section 3 (a), RA 7610.] It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit; but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. Hence, the foregoing provision penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse of children. This is clear from the deliberations of the Senate:18 [Record of the Senate, Vol. 1, No. 7, pp. 261-263.] The defense argues that "there is no proof or allegation that complainant 'indulged in lascivious conduct' with the accused-appellant 'for money, profit or any other consideration'"; or "that she was 'coerced or influenced' by accused-appellant 'to indulge in lascivious conduct.'"19 [Brief for Appellant, p. 5; rollo, p. 81.] The argument is untenable. That appellant sexually abused Carla Lenore Calumpang, in violation of RA 7610, was duly alleged in the Information and proven during the trial. The Information clearly states: "x x x [T]he abovenamed accused, x x x, by taking advantage of his authority, influence and moral ascendancy as trainor/swimming instructor of minor CARLA LENORE CALUMPANG, and through moral compulsion, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, commit lascivious conduct against the person of said minor Carla Lenore Calumpang by shaving her pubic hair, performing the lewd act of cunnilingus on her, licking her breasts, forcing her to

hold and squeeze his penis; and forcibly kissing her on the cheeks and lips x x x."20 [Rollo, pp. 11-12.] c. Rodriguez v. Eugenio

Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity for no less than the Constitution mandates the principle that a public office is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[22] All public officers and employees, especially those in the judiciary, must at all times exercise a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, which includes optimum performance of duties. Hence, this Court shall never countenance any conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish public confidence in the judiciary. As the administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty and integrity.[23] Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion. Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.[24] Misconduct has been defined as any unlawful conduct, on the part of the person concerned with the administration of justice, prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.[25] Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior;[26] while gross has been defined as out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.[27] Respondents act of demanding and receiving money from the uncle of a party litigant constitutes grave misconduct in office. It is this kind of gross

37

and flaunting misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice quickly, which erodes the respect for law and the courts.[28] d. Agullo v. Sandiganbayan

and Letter of Demandpieces of evidence which the defense concededly admitted, but which, to our mind, do not suffice to convict the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Thus, in a string of categorical pronouncements, this Court has consistently and emphatically ruled that the presumption of conversion incarnated in Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code is by its very nature rebuttable. To put it differently, the presumption under the law is not conclusive but disputable by satisfactory evidence to the effect that the accused did not utilize the public funds or property for his personal use, gain or benefit. Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.[28] Applying the foregoing principle, the prosecution in the instant case upon whose burden, as in Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan,[29] was laden the task of establishing by proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had committed the offense charged, mainly relied on the statutory presumption aforesaid and failed to present any substantial piece of evidence to indicate that petitioner had used the funds for personal gain. Worth noting is that the Sandiganbayan, in its impugned decision, admitted that conversion or the placing of malversed government funds to personal uses has, indeed, not been proven in the case at bar.[30] Perhaps realizing such gaping hole, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless leaped into the conclusion, albeit erroneous, that herein petitioner was just the same guilty of malversation invoking the prima facie evidence stated in Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code. On this score, the rule of general application is that the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on this court. However, such rule admits

By and large, the pieces of evidence presented against petitioner in this case do not fulfill the test of moral certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to support a conviction.[25] Records reveal that evidence for the prosecution consisted solely of the Report of Cash Examination,[26] dated 14 July 1986, which was presented by the prosecution to prove the cash shortage in the amount of P26,404.26, on petitioner Agullos accountability as Disbursing Officer of the then MPWH. Likewise, the prosecution presented the Letter of Demand[27] dated 14 July 1986 signed by Auditing Examiner III Ignacio Gerez. Aside from the aforementioned documents, the prosecution opted not to present a single witness to buttress its bid for conviction and relied merely on the prima facie evidence of conversion or presumption of malversation under Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or propertyPresumption of malversation X X X The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. Stated otherwise, the evidence for the prosecution, upon which the Sandiganbayan riveted its judgment of conviction, was limited to documents to wit, the Report of Cash Examination and Letter of Demand. As could be readily gleaned from the assailed decision, the verdict adjudging herein petitioner guilty of the crime of malversation was anchored solely on the presumption provided under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, which prima facie evidence, in turn, was rooted loosely on the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, to wit; the Report of Cash Examination

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of settled exceptions, among others: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.[31] Crimes against persons (Art. 246266-A) Pp v. Remigio Cruz 7.

a.

An overall appreciation of the relevant circumstances revealed in the record has led us to reject the plea of insanity. There is more indication of the passionate nature of the appellant, his tendency to violent fits when angry. Breaking glasses and smashing dishes are simply demonstrations of an explosive temper, not clear and satisfactory proof of insanity. He was not deprived of the consciousness of his acts. He was obfuscated by the refusal of his wife to live with him. He did not turn violent with the policeman who intercepted him and inquired why he was running. He answered to the policeman responsively and allowed himself to be led to jail. b. Pp v. Abarca

It is the policy and accepted standard of jurisprudence that the allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. The law always presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is thus improper to conclude that acts were executed unconsciously. 2 In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act, that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. 3 According to Marcelo Concepcion and Anita Concepcion, father-in- law and sister-in-law, respectively, of the appellant, before the commission of the offenses and during those days when the appellant stayed with them, he was polite to them, helped in household chores, washed dishes, read magazines (like the Reader's Digest) and at every opportunity pleaded with his wife to again live with him in Manila. After the commission of the crimes, the appellant instinctively fled and, when intercepted and asked by policeman Pedro Villanueva why he was running, answered responsively that he was aggrieved. He surrendered himself to the policeman and was locked in jail. Appellant, according to the report dated October 29, 1956, of Dr. Carlos Vicente, Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital, and Dr. J. M. Clarin, Chief, Male Service Department of the same hospital, was able to recount all the important events in his life between May 2, 1948, and June 11, 1956.

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in

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convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred. Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage. This does not mean, however, that the accusedappellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12 c. Pp v. Darilay

obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for designation of the offense.[35] For one to be criminally liable for a consummated, frustrated or attempted homicide or murder, there must be, on the part of the accused, an intent to kill the victim. Intent to kill is an internal act but may be proved by evidence, inter alia, that the accused used a lethal weapon; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and by the words uttered by the malefactor before, at the time or immediately after the infliction of the injuries on the victim.[36] In this case, the prosecution proved that the appellant intended to kill the victim Ailyn because (a) he used a piece of wood; (b) he struck Ailyn twice on the back and boxed her on the face; (c) he threw her to the ground and dragged her to a grassy area; (d) he left Ailyn all by herself. There is evidence on record that the injuries sustained by Ailyn were mortal and could have caused her death. She recovered from her injuries in less than 5 days but not more than 9 days. Furthermore, the crime was qualified by treachery because Ailyn, who was only 7 years old at the time, could not defend herself against the appellants physical assault. Hence, the appellant is guilty of attempted murder. We agree with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the said crime. However, direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime charged; it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. In People v. Delim,[37] we held, thus: Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. What was once a rule of ancient practicability is now entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur: x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the

The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of March 21, 1892, declared that for overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary that their objective be known and established or such that acts be of such nature that they themselves should

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circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.[38] d. Pp v. Galang

During the trial, the court a quo observed that complainant wept while recounting her heartrending experience. Her tears were a tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of the man she hoped would take the place of her departed father. The crying of the victim during her testimony was evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity borne out of human nature and experience.[11] e. Pp v. de Castro

The rule is that when a rape victims testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid crossexamination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit.[20] It is simply too improbable for the minor victims, who are guileless and innocent in the ways of the world, to brazenly impute a crime as serious as rape to the man, they call their father, if it were not true. In any criminal prosecution, it is necessary that every essential ingredient of the crime charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. Jennys simple declaration that she was raped is not evidence but simply a conclusion. The principle that "when a woman declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped," no longer holds. This means that the prosecution must still prove the elements of the crime of rape, and it is not enough for a woman to claim she was raped without showing how the crime was specifically committed. In the earlier case of People v. Mendoza,[21] the accused was acquitted by virtue of the victims plain statement that she was "raped" on 11 August 1995 without offering further details on how the alleged incident was carried out. This Court declared therein that "(w)hether or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the court must determine based on the evidence offered. Testimony to that effect is not evidence, but simply a conclusion, the proof of which is the very purpose of the trial x x x x It is not competent for a witness [in this case Michelle] to express an opinion, conclusion or judgment thereon."

Under the circumstances and considering her tender age, the reaction of a mature or normal person could hardly be expected from her. Nor is it reasonable to demand that a greater degree of intimidation be present so as to warrant conviction. Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated or governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to the mind of the victim and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough that it produces fear - fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment. It includes the moral kind such as the fear caused by threatening the victim with a knife or pistol. Where such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, It would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victims participation in the sexual act voluntary.

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That being so, we cannot sustain appellants conviction in Crim. Case No. 10246. f. Pp v. Blancaflor

reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders ire and drive him to carry out his threats. To this Court, Jocelyns delay in charging appellant does not infirm her credibility. In People vs. Gutierrez,[24] we further held: Complainants failure to immediately report the rape does not diminish her credibility. The silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault on their virtues because of the rapists threat on their lives, more so when the offender is someone whom she knew and who was living with her. The delay in this case was sufficiently explained and, hence, did not destroy complainants credibility. Lastly, we find appellants assertion that Mylene falsely testified against him out of revenge as she resented his efforts to discipline her, not plausible. We held in People vs. Viajedor[25] that family resentment, revenge or feud had never swayed the Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a complainant for rape, especially a minor who remained steadfast in her testimony, throughout the direct and cross-examinations, that she was sexually abused. In People vs. Cariaga[26] we further observed that not a few accused convicted of rape have attributed the charges filed against them to family feuds, resentment, or revenge. However, such alleged motives have never swayed us from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant who remained steadfast throughout her direct and crossexamination. Thus, we do not believe that she would willingly go through the traumatic experience of narrating the sordid details of a rape just to vex appellant who she considered as her stepfather. It is truly inconceivable for a girl of such tender years to be able to concoct a story, provide details of a rape and ascribe such wickedness to her stepfather just because she resents being disciplined by him, since by thus charging him, she would also expose herself to extreme humiliation, even stigma. Mylenes credible

Thus, we find appellants contention that the delay of fourteen months in reporting the alleged rape clouded her credibility, to be unmeritorious. Mylene greatly feared appellant, believing him capable of carrying out his threat to kill them all. Because of this, it took her three weeks before she could muster the courage to tell her mother about the incident. But despite having been apprised of her daughters sad fate, Mylenes mother failed to take any positive act to bring appellant to justice for his evil deed. In fact, as related by Mylene, which was not refuted by the defense, her mother and appellant fought about it but after a while, they were on speaking terms again.[22] As a child of fourteen years at the time the crime was committed, Mylene could hardly be expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to authorities without the help of an adult. Verily, we see how Mylene must have felt absolutely hopeless, believing that there is nobody who could help her if her own mother would not even lift a finger to vindicate her rights or to ensure that she would not be subjected to similar atrocity in the future. It took Mylenes teachers who had enough concern for her well-being that impelled them to bring the matter to the attention of law enforcement agencies. Thus, the delay of fourteen months in reporting and filing the case against appellant has been sufficiently explained. In People vs. De Taza,[23] the accused therein likewise used the argument that the victims delay in filing the rape case against him casts doubt on the victims credibility, but we found such argument unmeritorious, and stated thus: Appellant posits that given the traumatic consequences of rape incidents, it is inconceivable for Jocelyn not to report or confide to anybody what she claims she went through, despite the fact that she was already far from his reach and was already within the secure confines of her other relatives. Many victims of rape, however, never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist for they prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain rather than

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testimony is unshaken by appellants weak claim that she was motivated by ill-will in accusing him of rape. g. Pp v Mendigurin

indicative of his guilt, that which favors the accused should be properly considered. h. Pp v. Luceriano

As clearly shown from the foregoing, complainant herself attested that no force was employed on her by appellant. The threat and intimidation, on the other hand, were claimed to have been used by appellant only after consummating the sexual act. This is not what is contemplated by Article 355 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. To convict under this mode, the accused must have used force or intimidation to compel complainant into having sexual relations with him.[35] As the prosecution failed to present evidence to substantiate the charge of rape through force, threat and intimidation, we are duty-bound to uphold appellants innocence. It is an elementary rule in criminal procedure that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.[36] If the prosecution in this case sought to convict appellant by proving that complainant was violated while in a state of unconsciousness, as provided under the 2nd paragraph of Article 355, the information should have stated so. We find, however, that the element of unconsciousness was not alleged much less specified in the information, which charged appellant for rape under the first circumstance. Hence, it cannot be made the basis of conviction without violating appellants right to due process, in particular to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.[37] We have ruled that this right is accorded by the Constitution so that the accused can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded.[38] The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the praesumptio hominis that no young Filipina would cry rape if it were not true. However, its decision totally disregarded the paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.[39] Where the evidence gives rise to two possibilities, one consistent with the accused's innocence and the other

Even the Office of the Solicitor General concedes that the trial court erroneously imposed the death penalty. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, states in part: Art. 266-B. Penalties x x x. x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. mphasis supplied) Under this provision, both circumstances of the victims minority and her relationship to the offender must be alleged in the information. Since these attendant circumstances alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty, they are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. They must be specifically and clearly alleged in the information and proven during the trial to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.[32] The prosecution proved Mysans minority during the trial by presenting in evidence Mysans birth certificate.[33] The document clearly states that Mysan was born on 13 April 1986.[34] Thus, the Information correctly alleged that at the time of the commission of the rape on 3 January 1998, Mysan was 11 years old. We find, however, that the Information did not properly allege the relationship of appellant to Mysan as required by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads: Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense

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and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. In the present case, the Information does not state that appellant is the live-in partner of Mysans mother. Even if the prosecution proved that appellant was in fact the common-law spouse of Mysans mother, the death penalty could not be imposed on appellant because the Information did not specifically allege this relationship. The relationship cannot increase the crime to qualified rape if the Information does not specifically allege the relationship. Otherwise, appellant would be deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him. Consequently, appellant is only liable for simple rape under the first paragraph of Article 266B of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes simple rape with reclusion perpetua. i. Pp v. Efreniano Balanes

the legs and shoulders of the victim of rape are guilty not merely as accomplices in the commission of the crime but as co-principals with the one who actually committed the rape (People vs. Amit, et al., L-30102, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 793)." (Rollo, p. 104). The killing of Noli Grajo was characterized by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the offenders employ means, methods, and forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specifically to ensure its execution, without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Noli Grajo, when he was subjected to attack, was entirely defenseless and his attackers were totally unexposed to any risk that might have come from him since he was not at all in a position to retaliate. Nocturnity is absorbed in treachery and cannot be separately appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to prove that it was especially sought for to facilitate the commission of the crime. Although there were four persons cooperating against Noli Grajo, we disregard this numerical superiority because it is absorbed in treachery. j. Pp v. Intong

We ruled in People v. Selfaison (1 SCRA 235) that such a defense lacks merit. This Court stated: "The absence of such spermatozoa, however, does not necessarily mean that the complainants had not in fact been raped. The very authority cited states that such absence does not necessarily mean that the girl subject of examination has not had any sexual intercourse. It need hardly be said here that in the crime of rape, the slightest penetration is enough." Resolving a similar issue in People v. Carandang (52 SCRA 259) and People v. Ytac (95 SCRA 644) this Court ruled that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina is no legal obstacle to holding that rape has been committed. As to who are liable for this crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 412, the lower court ruled: "The liability for this crime must attach both to Inocentes Balane, who actually committed it, and to Efreniano Balane who lent cooperation to the former by holding the feet of Adelina Sambajon while Inocentes was satisfying his lecherous urge. In a case directly in point it was held that the persons holding

Pitted against the victims unflinching and consistent testimony, given during both the direct examination and the cross-examination, was appellants declaration that he was at home during the material time, too drunk to move from where he slept. Apparently, in a bid to add flair to his story, appellant claimed that he could not have raped the victim due to an unnamed illness that caused him to dislike sexual intercourse[15] adding that his penis, when enlarged, would have a circumference of about six inches or the size of an 8-ounce Pepsi Cola bottle[16] or, according to his wife, the size of the gavel of the judge.[17] Indeed, appellant had clutched at the last straw in a bid for exoneration. Similarly futile is his defense of alibi. For this defense to be appreciated in favor of an accused, it would be necessary that he is able to establish his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense, and that it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the crime

44

scene.[18] Appellants house, however, where he claims to have been at the time of the incident, is only about 150 meters away. Like denial, alibi is a feeble defense not only because of its inherent weakness and unreliability but also because it is easy to fabricate.[19] Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. Rape is Committed 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. x x x xx xxx x

x x x xxx

x x x

3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity; x x x xx xxx x

Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor. Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal. The crime of rape is thus committed either (a) by carnal knowledge or (b) by the insertion of the penis into the mouth or anal orifice of the victim or by the insertion of any object or instrument into the genital or anal orifice of a person. The sexual congress and the insertion of appellants fingers into the sex organ of the victim, twice committed, have been sufficiently established. Unexplainably, appellant has not been additionally charged in the information under the second mode of committing rape. The crime of rape is penalized with reclusion perpetua; the penalty becomes reclusion perpetua to death when committed with the use of a deadly weapon and the attendance of other circumstances therein stated. When the rape is attended by the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and of her relationship with the culprit, the imposable penalty is death. The victim did not testify on the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime. It was her 9year-old brother Gino but who merely testified that appellant had or held a knife.[20] In People vs. Sagaysay,[21] the Court said: x x x What can qualify the offense under Republic Act No. 7659 so as to warrant the imposition of the death penalty would be when the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon and not just the overt act of `being armed with a weapon. Although the victim in the instant case testified about the accused being armed with a knife, the record, however, is bereft of evidence to show that he actually has used

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim:

45

it, the knife having all along been just tucked at the back of his trousers. The informations alleged that the victim was a minor, and that appellant was her step-grandfather. The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, if indeed in attendance, could elevate the penalty to one of death. The minority of the victim at the time of commission of the rape incidents was sufficiently established. The victim testified,[22] and her mother corroborated the testimony,[23] that she was born on 5 July 1987 or just a little over ten years and four months old when the crime was committed on 23 November 1997. xxx The victims relationship with appellant, however, is not among the qualifying circumstances of relationships covered by the law. Article 266-B requires that the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the victim. Conformably with the principle of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the relationship of the offender, as being just a step-grandfather of the victim, cannot be deemed embraced by the enumeration.[27] Furthermore, there is no evidence submitted that appellant is legally married to the victims grandmother. Absent one of the twin qualifying circumstances heretofore discussed, the rape committed may only be subject to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [i]n all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. Accordingly, the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling may not raise the penalty to death but it may serve as a basis for the award of exemplary damages.[28] The crime has been witnessed by the nine-year-old brother of the victim. Under Article 266-B(3), the penalty of death may be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with the qualifying circumstance of the

crime having been witnessed in full view by any of the victims relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity. While Gino is a full-blood brother of the victim, or a relative within the second degree, this qualifying circumstance, however, has not been alleged in the Information so as to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires the recital in the charge or information of aggravating circumstances. The commission of the crime prior to the effectivity of the Rules on 1 December 2000 does not deprive the appellant of its favorable consequence.[29] k. Pp v. Ramos

We have found in some cases that a supposed victim, or her relatives, resort to filing unfounded complaints for rape in an attempt to redeem the lost honor of the complainant, the latter having been caught in premarital intercourse with her alleged rapist.[19] Here, it is apparent that appellant and complainant were discovered to have engaged in pre-marital intercourse by complainants brother who disapproved of their relationship. We also do not agree with the court a quo when it premised the conviction, thus: No woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and expose herself to the stigma and humiliation of a public trial if she is not motivated by a desire to seek justice against the one who had defiled her.[20] The presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not falsely charge a person with rape and subject herself to the indignities of physical examination cannot stand in the face of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise would, therefore, prevail in this case. True, the lone testimony of the victim in the crime of rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. This is so because from the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can oftentimes be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainants testimony.[21] On the other hand, the presumption of innocence is founded upon the first principles of

46

justice and is a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion, conjecture, or a probability that the defendant committed the crime. The standard has always been proof beyond reasonable doubt. Accusation, therefore, should never be equated with guilt.[22] In the case herein, complainants testimony, considered with other relevant facts, does not suffice, to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence, if reasonable doubt exists, the accused not only has the right to be freed, but more than that, it is our constitutional duty to acquit him. l. Pp v. Silvano

his ravished relative.[70] As the father of the victim, appellant whom she called Daddy had assumed parental authority over her during her formative years. Undisputedly, he exerts strong moral influence over complainant.[71] The imputation by appellant of wrongful motive to his wife who allegedly used their daughter as an instrument in concocting the rape just to sever their marital ties is too shallow. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice especially if it will subject her to embarrassment and even stigma.[72] No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for her childs defilement[73] or if the same is not true.[74] In the same vein, a mother would not expose her daughter to such an ignominy merely to end her relationship with her husband or to retaliate against him for his transgressions as a family man.[75] And it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape at the expense of being ridiculed.[76] Accordingly, as the defense failed to prove that the principal witness was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that she was not so moved and her testimony entitled to full faith and credit.[77] The contention that he cannot be convicted on the sole testimony of his daughter with respect to the rape[78] easily crumbles in the light of the doctrine that only two people are privy to the crime of rape and the evaluation of the evidence presented ultimately resolves around the credibility of complainant.[79] The trial court, giving full faith and credence to the victims testimony found it to be logical, straightforward and candid manner, without any artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the credibility of her testimony.[80] It even observed that she shamelessly cried as she was narrating the tragic experience and her stern demeanor evinces the hatred she had for the accused.[81] Notwithstanding that the victims testimony is uncorroborated, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof so long as it meets the test of credibility,[82] and the prosecution is not bound to present witnesses other than the victim.[83]

The failure of the victim to immediately reveal his fathers incestuous acts is not indicative of fabricated charges. It should be noted that: Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against their rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk rapists making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims.[66] The victim herein is in no case different. Her shame and genuine fear of what appellant might do to her or her brothers had temporarily sealed her lips. This is why she left their home, the scene of her defilement where her appellant father resides and went to her maternal grandmothers place. Only when confronted why she would not come back to their house did she reveal the avalanche of shame and degradation that had befallen her at that tender age of 16 years from her very own father. It is not uncommon for a young girl at such age to be intimidated into silence and conceal for sometime the violation of her honor, even by the mildest threat against her life.[67] Silence is not an odd behavior of rape victims who do not always immediately go to the rooftop and denounce their assailants.[68] This natural reticence or aversion of the victims to reveal the humiliation attaching to the crime is a stigma they will have to bear indefinitely thereafter.[69] The fear of these young victims of reprisals upon them or their families easily cows them into submission and silence. Worse, in incestuous rape, that fear which compels non-revelation is further reinforced by the moral ascendancy of the rapist over

47

It is highly unlikely that the victim, a 16-year old high school student, presumably a virgin, an innocent and unsophisticated girl, unexposed to the ways of the world, would concoct a reprehensible story of defloration, no less than against her own father, allow an examination of her private parts and then subject herself to the rigors, trouble, inconvenience, ridicule and scandal of a public trial, where she has to bare her harrowing and traumatic experience, and be subjected to harassment, embarrassment and humiliation during cross-examination, unless she was in fact raped and deeply motivated by her sincere desire to do so solely to seek justice and obtain redress for the unforgivable and wicked acts committed upon her.[84] This Court has repeatedly ruled that no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished unless that is the truth for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.[85] Complainants tender age further lends to her credibility.[86] Thus: Apparent from the Courts decisions in rape cases with the offended parties being young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, x x x is (the) considerable receptivity on the part of this Tribunal to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which such a grueling experience as a court trial, where they are called upon to lay bare what perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, did expose them to. This is not to say that an uncritical acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize that skepticism should be kept under control.[87] Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Jurisprudential annals is replete with the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts[88] subject to certain exceptions,[89] none of which, however, is attendant in this case. Trial courts deal with live witnesses while appellate tribunals rely on the cold pages of the written records.[90] In this case, the lower courts findings,

conclusions and evaluation of the testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest respect,[91] the same being supported by substantial evidence on record. No cogent reason was shown that the court a quo had overlooked or disregarded material facts and circumstances which when considered would have affected the result of this case[92] or justify a departure from its assessments and findings.[93] m. Pp v. Regala The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: "1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson." The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. There are cases16 [People vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 119218, April 29, 1999; People vs. Martinez, 274 SCRA 259; People vs. Lutao, 250 SCRA 47; People vs. Precioso, 221 SCRA 748.] holding that the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will not increase the penalty. In People vs. Martinez,17 [274 SCRA 259.] accused Martinez and two (2) other unidentified persons, who remained at large, were charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape where all three raped the victim. The Court imposed the penalty of death after considering two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon. However, the Court did not consider the two (2) other rapes as aggravating holding that "(T)he special complex crime of robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on that occasion being integrated in one composite crime." There are likewise cases18 [People vs. Candelario & Legarda, G. R. No. 125550, July 28, 1999; People vs. Pulusan, 290 SCRA 353; People vs. Salvatierra, 257 SCRA 489.] which held that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be appreciated as an aggravating

48

circumstance. In People vs. Candelario19 [G. R. No. 125550, July 28, 1999.] where three (3) of the four (4) armed men who robbed the victim "alternately raped her twice for each of them", this Court, citing People vs. Obtinalia,20 [38 SCRA 651.] ruled that "(T)he characterization of the offense as robbery with rape, however, is not changed simply because there were several rapes committed. The multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into account in raising the penalty to death." It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is a specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances. It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an "anomalous situation" where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes.21 [People vs. Pedroso, 115 SCRA 599; People vs. Mabilangan, et al., 111 SCRA 398.] However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender22 [People vs. Terrado, 125 SCRA 648.] and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.23 [U.S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243.] In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper. n. Pp v. Torres

In a number of cases,[10] this Court has held that even where penetration is not fully established, a consummated rape can still be anchored on the victims testimony that she has felt pain in the attempt of penetration. Rhosella has positively and categorically identified appellant to be her assailant. She has had a fairly good look at his face, with not slightest attempt on his part to cover or shield himself at any time before, during and after the assault.[11] Most certainly, this declaration prevails over the denial and alibi of appellant, both negative and self-serving, which defenses are often considered to be undeserving of weight in the absence of clear and convincing evidence.[12] In any event, based on appellants own testimony, it would take only about thirty minutes from GMA, Cavite, to reach the San Pedro market,[13] a statement that can hardly support the defense of alibi. Robbery with rape occurs when the following elements are present: (1) Personal property is taken with violence or intimidation against persons, (2) the property taken belongs to another, (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi, and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.[14] The elements have sufficiently been established in evidence as hereinbefore so narrated. There is sufficient reason, however, to sustain appellants argument that the trial court has erred in the imposition of the penalty of death. Under Article 294[15] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, robbery with rape is penalized by reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty being a range consisting of two (2) indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty is applied when, pursuant to Article 63[16] of the Revised Penal Code, there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstance that are shown to be in attendance. The use by appellant of a knife was the means availed of to perpetrate the crime and to qualify it as being one of robbery with rape. The use of deadly weapon is here a qualifying circumstance, and not being among the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it cannot also be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.[17]

Full penetration of the victims genital organ is not required in order to sustain a conviction for rape. The act performed by appellant cannot be classified as being a mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, as so held in People vs. Campuhan,[9] but an entry of the penis, albeit slight or incomplete, into the labia of the pudendum.

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o.

Sanchez v. Demetriou

Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of the rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it is merged with rape to constitute a constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree, i.e., death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with the suspension of the application of the death penalty by the Constitution). It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that: Section 13. Duplicity of offense. -- A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various offenses. Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revise Penal Code. The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one separately killing her in raping of the seven accused is being charged for actually raping Sarmenta and later instead of merely assisting the petitioner and then slaying her. The separate

informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta. p. Pp v. Gorospe

Abduction is a persistent and continuing offense. (U.S. vs. Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154 [1912].) Hence it may be "tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." (Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 14[a].) The Municipal Court of Pulilan had jurisdiction because the abductors and their captive passed Pulilan on their way from Plaridel to Talavera. And the CFI of Bulacan (as well as the CFI of Nueva Ecija) had jurisdiction because essential elements of the offense took place in Bulacan (and also in Nueva Ecija). q. Pp v. Aloro

It is fundamental that in the review of rape cases we are guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.20 [People v. De Guzman, 265 SCRA 228, 241 [1996]; People v. Abrecinoz, 281 SCRA 59, 71 [1997]; People v. Abangin, 297 SCRA 655, 663-664 [1998].] The paramount issue in rape cases is the credibility of the witnesses. The determination thereof lies with the trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying. As a general rule, we do not disturb the finding and conclusion of the trial judge on the credibility of the witnesses unless there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been ignored or misconstrued. Thus, the trial courts

50

finding on the matter is accorded the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.21 [People v. Malunes, 247 SCRA 317, 324 [1995]; People v. Grefaldia, 273 SCRA 591, 601 [1997]; People v. Abangin, supra note 20, at 664.] In the instant case, the trial court adopted the version of the prosecution that SALEN was twice ravished by EDGARDO. It appreciated the innocent and straightforward manner by which SALEN testified. It is doctrinally settled that the lone testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient to convict if credible.22 [People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637, 650 [1995]; People v. Antido, 278 SCRA 425, 440 [1997].] Equally settled is the principle that when a woman declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof.23 [People v. Gagto, 253 SCRA 455, 467 [1996]; People v. Antido, supra note 22; People v. Abangin, supra note 20, at 664.] This is because from the nature of the crime the only evidence that can be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainants testimony. Indeed, no woman would openly admit that she was raped and consequently subject herself to an examination of her private parts, undergo the trauma and humiliation of a public trial and embarrass herself with the need to narrate in detail how she was raped, if she was not in fact raped.24 [People v. Gagto, supra, at 468; People v. Abrecinoz, supra note 20, at 72; People v. Fundano, 291 SCRA 356, 368 [1998].] This ruling especially holds true where the complainant is a minor, whose testimony deserves full credence.25 [People v. Gagto, supra note 23; People v. Leoterio, 264 SCRA 608, 617 [1996]; People v. Abangin, supra note 20, at 665.] Crimes against personal liberty and security (Art. 267-292) Pp v. Cortez 8.

SCRA 173 (1997)] However, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion..18 [People vs. Ramos, 297 SCRA 618 (1998)] In the case at bar, the deprivation of Lolita's liberty was amply established by evidence. When the appellants failed to find Lolita's cousin, they forcibly dragged her to the mountains and kept her in the house of the Torrals..19 [TSN, Lolita Mendoza, December 4, 1995, pp. 13 and 15.] Appellant Cortez even bound her hands with a belt..20 [Id., p. 10.] Although at the time of the rescue, she was found outside the house talking to Pablo Torral, she explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the appellants would make good their threats to kill her should she do so. Her fear is not baseless as the appellants knew where she resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in looking for Lolita's cousin was to kill him on sight. Certainly, fear has been known to render people immobile. Indeed, appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence.21 [People vs. Hope, 177 N.E. 402, 257 N.Y. 147.] which is one of the elements of the crime of kidnapping under Article 267 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. We come now to the charge of illegal possession of explosive. We find that the conviction of appellant Cortez is unwarranted. To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same,.22 [People vs. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637, 650 (1998), citing People vs. Orehuela, 232 SCRA 325, 332 (1994)] and (b) the negative fact that the accused had no license or permit to own or possess the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive..23 [People vs. Narvasa, supra, citing People vs. Villanueva, 275 SCRA 489, 496 (1997)]

a.

In a prosecution for kidnapping, the State has the burden of proving all the essential elements of an offense. For the crime of kidnapping to prosper, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty, in any manner, has to be established by indubitable proof..17 [People vs. De La Cruz, 277

51

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the crime, i.e, the lack of license or permit of appellant Cortez to possess the hand grenade. Although the hand grenade seized by PO2 Santos from appellant was presented in court, the records bear that PO2 Santos did not submit the grenade to the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit for verification..24 [February 12, 1996 TSN, p. 26.] This explains why no certification or testimony was adduced by the prosecution at the trial to prove that appellant Cortez was not licensed to possess the explosive. The failure of the prosecution to adduce this fact is fatal to its cause..25 [Mallari vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 456 (1996), citing People vs. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255, 261-265 (1996) and People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 (1991)] We stress that the essence of the crime penalized under P.D. 1866 is primarily the accused's lack of license or permit to carry or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive as possession by itself is not prohibited by law. In the case of an explosive, a permit or license to possess it is usually granted to mining corporations, military personnel and other legitimate users. As the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving that appellant Cortez was not authorized to possess the grenade seized from his house, his acquittal for illegal possession of explosive is inevitable. b. Batolanon v. Leorente

have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his purpose the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed. If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. c. Ong Chui Kwan v. CA

After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating the evidence thereto and exhibits thereof, this Court finds no ground to modify, reverse or alter the above-stated decision and hereby affirms the decision of the lower court in toto.[13] The Constitution requires that "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."[14] The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that "The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based."[15] Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court. The court must make a full findings of fact and conclusions of law of its own.[16] Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a nullity. Very recently, speaking of a similarly worded decision of a regional trial court, we said: It is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.[17] Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to their work must rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously take refresher courses on decision writing. We warn them of stiff sanctions for such lackadaisical performance. Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower court for compliance with the constitutional

The crime charged against the appellants is light threat. Article 283 of the Revised Penal Code provides the following: A threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be punished by arresto mayor. The article referred to is 282 which reads, as follows: Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer: 1. The penalty next lower in decree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall

52

requirement of contents of a decision. However, considering that this case has been pending for sometime, the ends of justice will be fully served if we review the evidence and decide the case. Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of complainants business establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permit or authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioners act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation. Crimes against property (Art. 293-332,PD 1613, PD 1744) Pp v. Disney 9.

maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period, from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of nighttime. 16 b. Napolis v. CA

a.

We overrule the defense contention that since the evidence shows that the weapon carried by the offender was used to intimidate the occupants in the house, this circumstance is sufficient to remove the offense from the aforecited Article 299 (Robbery in an inhabited house by the use of force upon things) and to place it within the purview of Article 294 (5) (Robbery committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons), which has a lower penalty. It is true that violence and intimidation against persons were present in the commission of the robbery. Sy Kim testified that a man holding a gun pointed it at her and ordered her to hand over her wristwatch, earrings, and ring, while he took off her bracelet and pocketed all said items, while still another person beat her husband. 14 However, as this Court had ruled in Napolis vs. Court of Appeals, 15 which is almost on all fours with the case at bar, Article 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. When the elements of both provisions are present, the crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition as provided in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which is reclusion temporal in its

". . . that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is characterized by intimidation, this factor 'supplies the controlling qualification,' so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that 'robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or intimidation against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual.' (U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.) And this view in followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty to be applied under article 294 is lighter than that which would result from the application of article 299. . . ." 3 Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. 4 Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in previous decisions, 5 if, aside from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the same Code, the imposable penalty under paragraph (5) thereof shall be much lighter. 6 To our mind, this result and the process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason. The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the "controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by

53

force upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited reduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violence or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code. c. Pp v. Sumalinog, Jr

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code,[28] the elements of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) on occasion of or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, used in the generic sense, is committed.[29] The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly that of Mrs. Adelan, prove the existence of all these elements beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant and his co-accused entered the Adelans house with the intent to loot it. In line with a wellthought plan, Galvez rummaged through the Adelans belongings while appellant remained hidden in the dark as a lookout. Mrs. Adelans testimony established that it was at this point that her daughter woke her up. Both fear and a keen presence of mind prevented her from reacting haphazardly to what she saw. Her decision was to wake up her husband who then tried to stop the only person then visible to them. Caught red-handed, appellants co-accused Galvez stabbed the victim. Then appellant used his concealed position to his advantage, emerging treacherously to also stab the victim just as the latter wrestled with Galvez near the kitchen door. Appellant and his coaccused left together after seeing the victim fall. Shortly afterwards, Mrs. Adelan discovered that the two managed to take with them the entire contents of her husbands wallet.[30] These acts before, during, and after the crime clearly indicate a joint purpose, a unity of action, and the concurrence of intent. Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the

existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators are liable as principals.[31] While it was not appellant who actually took property from the Adelans, appellant is still liable for robbery since the existence of conspiracy makes the act of one the act of all. Appellant and his co-accused killed the victim in the course of committing robbery. Consequently, even if appellant were to prove that he did not stab the victim, he would still be liable for the victims death. Whenever the commission of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is proven, all those who took part in the robbery are liable as principals even though they did not take part in the killing.[32] d. Pp v. Rugay

The well-entrenched rule is that an appellate court will generally not disturb the assessment of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses[27] considering that trial court judges would naturally be in a much better position than the appellate court to appreciate testimonial evidence.[28] Having personal opportunity to observe the witness deportment and manner of testifying,[29] the trial court judges determination deserves the highest respect, sometimes even finality. Unless there appears on record some circumstance of weight and influence which had been overlooked[30] or the significance of which had been misinterpreted by the trial court,[31] the reviewing court will not set aside the findings of the trial court. Appellant has not shown any significant fact or circumstance which the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted. All that appellant says is that the testimonies of Leonel and Said are selfserving and that the testimonies of two police characters must be taken with extreme caution, for lack of credibility and weight, but he has not demonstrated convincingly and clearly why the conclusions of the court below should be disturbed and overturned. While Leonel admitted to being a pimp[32] and Said had been a usual suspect in many incidents of robberies,[33] these circumstances do not necessarily make them or their testimonies ipso facto incredible. In People v. Cuadra,[34] we held that the determination of the character of a witness is not a prerequisite to belief in his testimony. The alleged

54

bad character of a witness, even if true, should not sway the court in the evaluation of the witness veracity. Other important factors should be considered, such as the witness manner and behavior on the witness stand, the general characteristics, tone, tenor, and inherent probability of the witness statements.[35] No rule requires that the testimony of a witness must be corroborated before evidentiary weight is assigned to it. In fact, we have consistently held that even the testimony of a single witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court, may be sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Truth is not established by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies.[36] In this case, Leonel and Said corroborated each others testimonies. Both of them positively stated that appellant placed his arm around Jaimes neck while Jaymar was trying to take the victims watch. When Jaime fought back, appellant stabbed him at the back and Jaymar stabbed him on the chest. These two stab wounds caused Jaimes death. Their testimonies are also corroborated by the physical evidence[37] and the necropsy report of Dr. Villarin. Thus the prosecution evidence has established that appellant and his co-accused had intended to rob Jaime of his wristwatch, but because Jaime resisted, they stabbed him. Jaymars testimony that he didnt know appellant and his corollary claim that he acted alone in stabbing Jaime are not persuasive. Having pleaded guilty to the crime, he could make any claim without fear of additional penalty. But considering the prosecutions evidence in detail, we entertain no doubt that appellant Harry Solidum participated as principal with his co-accused Jaymar Rugay in committing the crime of robbery with homicide. [38] e. Pp v. Hijada

Subsequently, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for Robbery with Homicide was again imposed in 1993 with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7695.[35] The provisions of Republic Act No. 7695, however, cannot be applied retroactively, for that would violate Article III, Sec. 22 of the Constitution stating that no ex post facto law shall be enacted, as well as Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code.[36] Consequently, the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on each of appellants.[37] Furthermore, there is no crime of Robbery with Multiple Homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The crime is Robbery with Homicide notwithstanding the number of homicides committed on the occasion of the robbery[38] and even if murder, physical injuries and rape were also committed on the same occasion.[39] f. Pp v. Mendoza

There can be no doubt as to appellant's participation as principal in the commission of the robbery in question, it appearing from the evidence that he was the one who led the gang to the house of the deceased spouses, was the one who informed them that they could get something from there, and was also the one who asked the inmates of the house to open the door. In addition, he was the one who watched Remedios Cordero in the dining room while his companions were ransacking the house. And being a participant in the robbery, he can not escape liability for the killing of the spouses just because he did not actually take part in the killing, there being no proof that he had made any endeavor to prevent it. (Par. 2, Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code; People vs. Morados, 40 Off. Gaz. [9th Sup.], No. 13, p. 75; U. S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil., 1; U. S. vs. Tiongco, 37 Phil., 951; People vs. Salumddin, 52 Phil., 670.). The crime committed by appellant is that of robbery with homicide and falls under the first paragraph of article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. The crime having been committed with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, band, and dwelling, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the said penalty should be imposed in its maximum degree. But, there being no sufficient votes for the imposition of the death

The crime of Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime punishable under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion perpetua to death. However, at the time the crime was committed, on September 14, 1992, the death penalty could not be imposed in view of Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution.

55

penalty, the sentence of life imprisonment meted out by the court below will have to stand together with the accessory penalties, indemnity and restitution imposed in the decision appealed from. g. US v. Celis

plead guilty, nothing was alleged in exculpation of the charge. h. i. Pp v. Yu Chai Ho Guzman v. CA

The facts which in this case appear as having fully proven are: That on a certain day in the month of September, 1905, the accused, being then employed as clerk and bookkeeper in the insurance department of the firm of Findlay & Co., received check No. 17193, "Exhibit A," issued on the 9th of the said month and year by J. Meller on behalf of the successors to Bear Senior & Co. against the Chartered bank for the sum of P201, in favor of the said Findlay & Co. or bearer, in payment of the premium on two policies of insurance, and although he entered in his own handwriting, in the book kept by him, the P201 and P80 corresponding to the two aforesaid policies, he failed to comply with his duty to deliver the check to the cashier of the firm; the result was that he collected the amount in the Chartered Bank but did not pay in the said amount of P201 by delivering it to the cashier. As the accused was the only one in charge of the collection in premiums on the policies of insurance, and the check was received by the firm according to the books, it may well be presumed that the collected the amount of it and disposed of the same, as he did in the case of other similar documents, to the prejudice of Findlay & Co., who placed confidence in him and authorized him to collect the premiums on policies already due. These facts, duly proven in this case, constitute the crime of estafa, denied in case 5 of article 535 and punished under case 2 of article 534 of the Penal Code, because it can not be denied that check No. 17193, issued by J. Meller on behalf of the successors to Bear Senior & Co. against the Chartered Bank, in favor of Findlay & Co., was delivered at the office of Findlay & Co. in payment for the premiums upon two policies, and, outside of the accused, no other clerk of the firm could have received it, since he was the only one charged with the receiving of payments on said account. He did not afterwards deliver the check to the cashier because he had converted it to his own use, and for this reason his culpability, as the author of the crime for which he is prosecuted, is unquestionable, so much so that, although he did not

Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), on the other hand, provides: "Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: xxx xxx xxx

(2) With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: xxx xxx xxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving, the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, good, or other property; Under the above definition of estafa, it is an essential element of the crime that the money or goods misappropriated or converted by the accused to the prejudice of another was received by him "in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to retain the same". No such allegation appears in the above information. Consequently, we agree with appellant that he cannot be convicted thereunder of the crime of estafa as defined by the article above.' j. k. l. m. US v. Reyes US v. Lim Pp v. Leachon Pp v. Benitez

After going over the record, we entertain no doubt that the accused has committed estafa. In the case of Tubb vs. People and the Court of Appeals (101 Phil., 114; 53 Off. Gaz. [18] 6096), this Court held that "the failure to account upon demand,

56

for funds or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation." In another case involving a prosecution for the same crime as in the present, it was held that ". . . it is the duty of the agent to return the jewelry upon demand by the owner and the failure to do so is evidence of the conversion of the property by the agent. (People vs. Zamora, 2 Phil., 382.)" (People vs. Limbo, CA, 51 Off. Gaz., 228.) In the case at bar, the accused admits having collected the amount of P540.00 as rentals from the different tenants of his employer. It is, likewise, admitted that he failed to account for and turn over said amount to his employer, upon demand therefor, without giving any reason or explanation whatsoever. These circumstances, together with the fact that the accused even obligated himself to make restitution, clearly show that the amount of P540.00, which he was duty bound to deliver to his employer, was misappropriated by him. As to the contention that the liability of the accused is civil only because of the written agreement between him and his employer, it is well-settled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party, (U. S. vs. Mendezona, 2 Phil., 353; U.S. vs. Ontengco, 4 Phil., 144; U. S. vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil., 153; People vs. Leachon, 56 Phil., 739; Javier vs. People, 70 Phil., 550.) As was said in the case of People vs. Gervacio (102 Phil., 687; 54 Off. Gaz. [9] 2898), "a criminal offense is committed against the People and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the offense." The fact, therefore, that the accused herein had, with the consent of the offended party, assumed the obligation of paying the rentals, which he collected, out of his own salary after he had committed the misappropriation, does not obliterate the criminal liability already incurred. n. o. p. Tubb v. Pp and CA Pp v. Zamora Chua-Burce v. CA and Pp

["Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: ... (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property."] In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.21 [Reyes, L., The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, 1993 ed., p. 654.] Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa with abuse of confidence, since the breach of confidence takes the place of the fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas.22 [U.S. v. Sevilla, 43 Phil. 186, 189 (1922).] The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:23 [Fontanilla vs. People, 258 SCRA 460, 470 (1996); Sy v. People, 172 SCRA 685, 692 (1989).] (1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of

Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.20

57

or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and (4) that there be demand for the return of the property. Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent. When the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received.24 [See Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487, 492 (1990).] Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.25 [See Note 19 at 680-681, citing People v. Marcelino Nicolas, et. al., C.A. 58 O.G. 472; People v. Maglaya, 30 SCRA 606, 610-612 (1969).] In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees. In People v. Locson,26 [57 Phil. 325 (1932).] the receiving teller of a bank misappropriated the money received by him for the bank. He was found liable for qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. We explained in Locson that -

In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals,28 [99 Phil. 703, 706-707 (1956).] a travelling sales agent misappropriated or failed to return to his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized to sell. He was, however, found liable for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and not qualified theft. In the Guzman case, we explained the distinction between possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability "The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in support of its theory that appellant only had the material possession of the merchandise he was selling for his principal, or their proceeds, is not in point. In said case, the receiving teller of a bank who misappropriated money received by him for the bank, was held guilty of qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction between the possession by a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault (Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code; Article 1730, old)." Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.29 [Could the present Information sustain a conviction for qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code? A perusal of the Information shows that it did not allege the essential elements of "intent to gain" and "without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things."

"The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the possession of the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft."27 [Id. at 334.]

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q.

Gonzales, Jr. v. Pp

The arson committed in the instant case involving an inhabited house or dwelling is covered by Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613.[9] In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.[10] When these are present, the only issue is the credibility of the witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate,[11] sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject.[12] In this case, the eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit who caused the fire. Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible. As a general rule, when the findings of both courts are in agreement, this Court will not reverse their findings of fact. r. Pp v. Gutierrez

The information charges appellant with "'violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying the particular provision breached. The information having failed to allege whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, 20 and not having been established that the house is situated in a populated or congested area, 21 appellant should be deemed to have only been charged with plain arson under Section 1 of the decree. Kalookan City might be a densely populated part of the metropolis but its entire territory cannot be said to be congested. Although the whole 2-storey wood and galvanized iron house has not been completely gutted by the fire, the crime committed is still consummated arson. 22 It is enough that a portion thereof is shown to have been destroyed. 23 Under Section 1 of the decree, the offense of simple arson committed is punishable by prision mayor. The Court feels that the trial court should not have appreciated the "special" aggravating circumstance, under Section 4(3) of the decree, of the offender having been "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned." The prosecution does not dispute the mauling of appellant by a son of Mario Alano just a few hours before the incident. It would appear to us to be more of impulse, heat of anger or risen temper, rather than real spite or hatred, that has impelled appellant to give vent to his wounded ego. s. Pp v. Hernandez

Proof of the corpus delicti, indeed, is indispensable in the prosecution of arson 10 as in all kinds of criminal offenses as well. Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. 11 In arson, the corpus delicti rule rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally caused. 12 Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. 13

The trial court held that the crime committed was only frustrated arson. We agree with the AttorneyGeneral that the crime was consummated. The appellant did in fact, set fire to the roof of the house, and said house was in fact partially burned. With this, the crime of arson was consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire was afterwards extinguished, for, once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does not depend upon the extent of the damage caused. This court has so held in the cases of United States vs. Go Foo Suy and Go Jancho (25 Phil., 187) and United States vs. Po Chengco (23 Phil., 487). The crime of arson having been consummated, as it appears from the facts thoroughly proved, article 549 of the Penal Code is applicable herein, with the corresponding penalty of cadena temporal to life imprisonment. And as the aggravating circumstance

59

of nighttime must be taken into consideration, as having been doubtless sought by the appellant in order to insure the commission of the crime, the penalty must be imposed in its maximum degree. t. US v. Valdes

might have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.

The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the burning of the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it. This crime is provided for and punished by Article 549, in connection with Articles 3, paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal Code, and the sole proven perpetrator of the same by direct participation is the defendant Severino Valdes, for, notwithstanding his denial and unsubstantiated exculpations, the record discloses conclusive proof that it was he who committed the said unlawful act, as it was also he who was guilty of having set the other fires that occurred in said house. In an affidavit the defendant admitted having made declarations in the police station, and though at the trial, he denied that he set fire to the sacks and the rag which were found soaked in kerosene and burning, and, without proof whatever, laid the blame unto his codefendant, the fact is that he confessed to having set fire to a pile of dry leaves whereby much smoke arose from the lower part of the house, but which, however, did not forewarn his mistress, Mrs. Lewin, though she should have noticed it, and he allowed the sack and the rag to continue burning until Mrs. Auckback, noticing a large volume of smoke in the house, gave the alarm. No proof was submitted to substantiate the accusation he made against the servant Paulino, who apparently is the same person as the driver Hugo Labarro. The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts conducive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near the partition of the entresol, the partition

a. b.

10. Crimes against chastity (Art. 333-346) Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera Donio-Teves v. Hon. Vamenta

Death of the offended party is not a ground for extinguishment of criminal liability whether total 14 or partial. 15 The participation of the offended party is essential not for the maintenance of the criminal action but soley for the initiation thereof. The term "private crimes" in reference to felonies which cannot be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the aggrieved party, is misleading. Far from what it implies, it is not only the aggrieved party who is offended in such crimes but also the State. Every violation of penal laws results in the disturbance of public order and safety which the State is committed to uphold and protect. If the law imposes the condition that private crimes like adultery shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the offended party, it is, as herein pointed earlier "out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial." Once a complaint is filed, the will of the offended party is ascertained and the action proceeds just as in any other crime. This is shown by the fact that after filing a complaint, any pardon given by the complainant to the offender would be unavailing. 16 It is true, the institution of the action in so-called private crimes is at the option of the aggrieved party. But it is equally true that once the choice is made manifest, the law will be applied in full force beyond the control of, and in spite of the complainant, his death notwithstanding. 17 c. Pp v. Zapata and Bondoc

The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously

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during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948, and "that the acts or two sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of adultery complained of in both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision that 'No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.'" Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Caln, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person - the offended husband, the same status - the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime. The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law transgressors and in many a case against the interest of society (Cuello Caln, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520). In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not

included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed. It was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that another crime of adultery was committed, if the defendants, after their provisional release during the pendency of the case in which they were later on convicted, had sexual intercourse up to the time when they were sent to prison to serve the penalty imposed upon them (S. 28 February 1906; 76 Jur. Crim. pp. 208-210). Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts (Viada [5th ed.] Vol. 5, p. 208; Groizard [2nd ed.] Vol. 5, pp. 57-58). d. US v. Casipong and Hongoy

The crime in this case is provided for and penalized by article 437 of the Penal Code, as follows: "The husband who shall keep a concubine in his home, or out of it with scandal, shall be punished with the penalty of prison correccional in its minimum and medium degrees. "The concubine shall be punished with banishment." From the text of this article it appears that it is an indispensable condition for convicting the husband of concubinage outside of his home that his conduct produce scandal and set a bad example among his

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neighbors, and, according to a principle laid down by the supreme court of Spain in applying this article of the Penal Code in that country to a case analogous to the foregoing, in a judgment of June 16, 1888, publicity of an immoral act produces scandal, for by the bad example set it gives offense and wounds the virtuous sentiments of others. This principle was reiterated in another judgment of February 25, 1896. The unlawful union of a married man with a woman not his wife, when the two live within a town and in the same house as lawful husband and wife, go together through the streets of the town, frequent places where large crowds gather, and commit acts in plain sight of the community without caution and with effrontery, is a procedure that gives rise to criticism and general protest among the neighbors and by its bad example offends the conscience and feelings of every moral person; and when these conditions attend the conduct of a married person it is indubitable that his concubinage with another woman, even though she does not live in his home, carries with it the circumstance of scandal required by the law to make his action criminal. e. US v. Bailoses

And we are therefore of opinion that, even if the facts are to viewed from a subjective as well as an objective standpoint, the offense of abusos deshonestos may properly be predicated upon them. f. Pp v. Amadore

The relationship between accused-appellant and his victim and the latter's minority are qualifying circumstances that must be correctly alleged and proved in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Apparently, the victim is not the "stepdaughter" of accused-appellant as has been so stated in the informations but is the daughter of his common-law spouse by the latter's marital relation with another. A stepdaughter is a daughter of one's legal spouse by a previous marriage. Except for the information in one of the criminal cases, the minority of the victim has, too, not been alleged. The Court has successively ruled that the circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,[23] the attendance of any of which mandates the penalty of death, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances and the absence of the proper averment thereof in the complaint negates the imposition of that extreme penalty. In Criminal Case No. 96-0473, where accusedappellant fondled the breast of private complainant and repeatedly kissed her but he did no further and there was no showing that he at the time intended to have sex with the victim, the crime for which he should have been held guilty was the offense of "acts of lasciviousness," not attempted rape, punishable under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional.[24] In Criminal Case No. 96-0474, accused-appellant may only be convicted of attempted rape, despite what appears to be the consummation of the act, as the information has merely charged accusedappellant with attempted rape. Simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and two degrees below that is prision mayor. g. BAKSH v. CA and Gonzales

It is claimed by counsel for the defendant that these facts do not show the commission of the offense of abusos deshonestos, because the defendant was actuated in what he did not by libidinous motives but by the desire to punish the prosecuting witness for not returning the peso. We need not determine the abstract question whether in a case where the sole motive of acts such as those under consideration appeared to be anger, curiosity, or the like, this particular crime of abusos deshonestos could be said to be committed. We can not so interpret the facts of the present case. It appears to have been assumed by the court below in its judgment that the defendant s purpose was to take revenge upon the prosecuting witness for her failure to pay him, and that may doubtless have been one motive, and it may even be admitted that it was the dominating motive of his conduct. Still we can not believe that there was no admixture of lasciviousness in the thoughts and purposes of a man who could devise such a method as this defendant did to exact satisfaction from a an for the nonpayment of a debt.

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that -

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'To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer' (27 Phil. 123). And in American Jurisprudence we find: 'On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery. Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by; which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit.' (47 Am. Jur. 662). xxx xxx xxx

was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint." 27 In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered: " . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . . ." h. Pp v. Teodosio

What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers, carried by their mutual desire for each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together and thus consummated the fruition of their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held liable for rape as there was none committed. It was a consensual affair. Nevertheless, based on the evidence the crime committed by appellant is simple seduction. Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "ART. 338. Simple seduction. The seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor."

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error

All the elements of the offense are present. Frankly 1. Elaine was over 12 and under 18 years of age. 2. She is single and of good reputation.

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3. The offender had sexual intercourse with her. 4. It was committed by deceit. Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully persuaded her to give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law that attended the commission of the offense. 11 i. Babanto v. Hon. Zosa

". . . And, at this juncture it is well to remember that a father exercises such strong moral and physical influence and control over his daughter that the force or violence, threat or intimidation upon her need not be of such nature and degree as would be required in other cases (People vs. Rinion, CA: 61 OG 4422, cited in Revised Edition, Reyes, The Revised Penal Code). It is not necessary that there be signs from Leonora that she put up a resistance, for a sexual act between father and daughter is so revolting that it would have submitted thereto if her will to resist had not been overpowered (People vs. Alienea, C.A. 45 OG Sept. 5, 1950). The force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other (People v. Savellano, supra.) xxx xxx xxx

Because of the physical and mental condition of Dolores, she could not have given rational consent to the carnal intercourse - as correctly ruled by the trial court. It would have required a great deal of effort for a 13-year old deafmute to resist the sexual assault of the 5'8" market vendor especially so since the same was unexpected considering the place and time of its perpetration. And only a mind fully aware of the moral and social consequences of the consummation of such sexual assault could have given intelligent consent to gather the courage to put up the resistance necessary to repel such aggression. A rational consent to an act could only be given by one who has the ability to discern the consequences of said act. And Dolores certainly did not have such mental ability not only because of lack of formal education, but also because of her physical and mental deficiencies. j. Pp v. Sabredo y Garbo

"It is a doctrine well settled by the courts that in order to consider the existence of the rape it is not necessary that the force and/or intimidation employed in accomplishing it to be so great or of such character; it is only necessary that the force and intimidation used by the culprit be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in mind. . . ." In the instant case, considering the age, mental abnormality, and deficiency of the complainant plus the fact that the accused-petitioner was at the time of the incident in uniform and with a side arm, there was sufficient intimidation to convict for rape. The fact that the complainant kicked the accused-petitioner while the latter was lifting her dress and removing her panty and that she cried afterwards negate any consent on her part to the sexual intercourse. Thus, we ruled in People v. Burgos (115 SCRA 767) a case involving the rape of a deafmute and demented girl:

Was appellant's conviction by the trial court for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape correct? The elements of forcible abduction are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that the victim was forcibly taken at knifepoint from Borbon, Cebu by appellant and through threats and intimidation brought to various towns in Masbate, where he passed her off as his "wife". That appellant was moved by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his having carnal knowledge of private complainant, against her will, on July 4, 1994 at Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. While it may appear at first blush that forcible abduction, as defined and penalized by Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code was also committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. We note that while the information sufficiently alleges the forcible taking of complainant from Cebu to Masbate, the same fails to allege "lewd designs." When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of rape.6 [People v. Angeles, 222 SCRA 451, 458 (1993).] When

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appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction.7 [People v. Mejorada, 224 SCRA 837, 852 (1993).] Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple rape only. k. Pp v. Jeffrey Garcia

Considering the foregoing findings on conspiracy with Bagatao insofar as the forcible abduction with rape is concerned and on two (2) separate counts of rape committed by appellant himself, appellant is therefore liable for one (1) forcible abduction with rape and four (4) counts of rape pursuant to our ruling in People v. Jose 34 reiterated in People v. Bohos 35 where we held that: Appellant's other point is: 'Even if we may assume purely for the sake of argument that the complaining witness was forcibly abducted and then rape thirteen times, we submit that there was only one forcible abduction, with rape and that was the one allegedly committed on the truck of jeep. Any subsequent acts of intercourse in the house against her will would be only separate acts of rape and can no longer be considered separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape.' This point is well taken. There was only one forcible abduction with rape which was the one committed in the truck. Thus in People v. Jose, et al., G.R. No. L28232, Feb. 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450, where the four accused forcibly abducted Maggie de la Riva and each of them raped her, this Court held 'that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction - in other words, they should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.' 36 n. Perez v. CA

Hence, accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. He should also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three co-accused, considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four accused helped one another in consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them mounted her, the other three held her arms and legs. They also burned her face and extremities with lighted cigarettes to stop her from warding off her aggressor. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but for the rape committed by the others as well. [41] However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape. [42] The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and, when committed by more than two persons, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Thus, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of death for forcible abduction with rape. [43] l. US v. De Virar m. Pp v. Tami

Finally, petitioner avers that the complaint for Qualified Seduction is barred by waiver and/or estoppel on the part of Yolanda Mendoza, the latter having opted to consider the case as Consented Abduction. He also alleges that her delay of more than nine (9) years before filing the second case against him is tantamount to pardon by the offended party. Petitioner's stance is unmeritorious. The complainant's filing of a subsequent case against him belies his allegation that she has waived or is

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estopped from filing the second charge against petitioner. Neither could she be deemed to have pardoned him, for the rules require that in cases of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, pardon by the offended party, to be effective, must be expressly given [Rule 110, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, Ruled 110, Sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] Moreover the length of time it took her to file the second case is of no moment considering that she filed it within the ten (10)-year prescriptive period provided by Article 90 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code for crimes punishable by a correctional penalty such as Qualified Seduction [See Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code.] o. US v. Reyes

As this Supreme Court has already held in the case of the United States vs. Reyes (20 Phil. Rep., 510), in order that the crime of abduction, with the consent of the abducted, which is punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, exist, it is not necessary that the abducted woman should have been materially removed from the house of her parents or from that of persons charged with her keeping or custody; it is sufficient that she should have left it and withdrawn herself from their control and vigilance, yielding to the cajolery and promises of her seducer, because, according to the principle laid down by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of November 30, 1875, the law provides punishment, in respect to this crime, not for the violence done to the person abducted, since it is assumed that she gave her consent, but for the disgrace to her family and the alarm caused therein by the disappearance of one of its members who, from her age and sex, is susceptible to cajolery and deceit. The place where the abduction is committed is immaterial, for the law takes no account of it. The same principle is laid down in the decisions of the same court, of October 29, 1895, and March 31, 1896. The defendant did not, in fact, materially remove Apolonia Enriquez, a maiden 17 years of age, from the house of her parents, but he did induce her to leave it. In spite of his being married, he maintained amorous relations with her for six months prior to the 10th of October, 1913, gaining her consent during all that time and seducing her; and after the girl by agreement with him had left the paternal roof on the

day aforementioned and withdrawn herself from her parents' control and vigilance, he took her away with him and derived carnal enjoyment from her during the time that he had her in his company. Those facts evidently constitute the crime of abduction, provided for and punished by the said article 446 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2298 of the Philippine Legislature, and, the defendant being criminally liable for the said crime, as the principal thereof by direct participation, its commission being unattended by any circumstance that mitigates his responsibility, the penalty specified in the said article should be imposed upon him in the medium degree, as was done in the judgment appealed from, together with that of civil liability and the others mentioned in the said judgment, which is in accordance with the law, though the defendant should also have been sentenced to suspension of the right to hold public office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence, which penalties are accessory to the principal one imposed, as provided by article 61 of the Penal Code. p. Garces v. Pp

We find otherwise. The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of the crime even before complainant was raped. He was present when Pacursa abducted complainant and when he brought her to the barn. He positioned himself outside the barn together with the other accused as a lookout. When he heard the shouts of people looking for complainant, he entered the barn and took complainant away from Pacursa. Having known of the criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout, petitioner is liable as an accomplice,[32] there being insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy,[33] and not merely as an accessory. As defined in the Revised Penal Code, accomplices are those who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.[34] The two elements necessary to hold petitioner liable as an accomplice are present: (1) community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2) performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.[35]

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The crime committed in the case at bar is simple rape, the penalty for which under the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua. Since Pacursa was a minor when the crime was committed, the penalty must be reduced by one degree, to reclusion temporal.[36] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the maximum of the penalty shall be within the medium range of reclusion temporal, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.[37] With respect to petitioner, the penalty imposed upon accomplices in a consummated crime is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the felony.[38] Since simple rape is punishable with reclusion perpetua, the penalty of reclusion temporal should also be imposed on petitioner in its medium period in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty should range from prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. 11. Crimes against the civil status of persons (Art. 347-348) Tenebro v. CA

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.[22] Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done. b. Landicho v Relova

a.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.[21] This argument is not impressed with merit. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second

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marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be declared valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed." To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza, 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal . . . The prejudicial question we further said must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy . . ." c. Milagros De la Cruz v. Ejercito

On the other hand, the Solicitor General manifested that the stand of Milagros de la Cruz should be sustained because one element of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all the requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage (People vs. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246, 248; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta vs. Montesa, 114 Phil. 1227). We hold that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage contracted by Milagros de la Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is determinative of her innocence and precludes the rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy. To try the criminal case in the face of such a finding would be unwarranted. As pointed out in the Merced case, supra, it is necessary in a prosecution for bigamy that the second marriage be declared valid if its validity was questioned in a civil action. d. Pp v. Nepomuceno

The crime of bigamy is committed when a person contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been judicially declared as presumptively dead. The facts of this case clearly show that accused Nepomuceno married Dolores Desiderio on March 20, 1969, in Balagtas, Bulacan, and that about five months later, or on August 16, 1969, he again married Norma Jimenez in Norzagaray, Bulacan. Accused undeniably contracted two marriages in the short span of five months, which he categorically admitted when he pleaded guilty. Appellant's contention that the crime of bigamy entails the joint liability of two persons who marry each other, while the previous marriage of one or the other is valid and subsisting is completely devoid of merit. Even a cursory scrutiny of Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code will disclose that the crime of bigamy can be committed by one person who contracts a subsequent marriage while the former marriage is valid and subsisting. Bigamy is not similar to the crimes of adultery and concubinage, wherein the law (Art. 344, first and third pars., Revised Penal Code,

The issue is whether the bigamy case became moot or untenable after the second marriage, on which the prosecution for bigamy is based, was annulled. The City Fiscal of Angeles City contends that the lower court acted correctly in denying the motion to dismiss the bigamy charge. He argues that the decision in the annulment case should be set up as a defense by Milagros de la Cruz during the trial and that it would not justify the outright dismissal of the criminal case.

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and Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court) specifically requires that the culprits, if both are alive, should be prosecuted or included in the information. In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a coaccused. Bigamy is a public offense and a crime against status, while adultery and concubinage are private offenses and are crimes against chastity. In adultery and concubinage, pardon by the offended party will bar the prosecution of the case, which is not so in bigamy. It is, therefore, clear that bigamy is not similar to adultery or concubinage. When the accused raised the question of defective information for non-inclusion of the second wife as an accused for the first time in a motion to quash, the lower court ruled: "The information is clear and it is only the accused Ricardo Nepomuceno, Jr. who contracted a second marriage, he being previously united in lawful marriage with one Dolores Desiderio, and without the same having been legally dissolved, and there being no showing in the recitation of facts in the information to the effect that Norma Jimenez, the second wife, had knowledge of the first marriage, and despite said knowledge she contracted the second marriage with the accused; nor is there any showing that Norma Jimenez had a previous marriage of her own, we see no reason for the inclusion of Norma Jimenez, the second wife, in the information." (Emphasis for emphasis) Whether or not the second spouse, Norma Jimenez, should be included in the information is a question of fact that was determined by the fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation in this case. That the fiscal did not include Norma Jimenez in the information simply shows absence of evidence that could make her liable for the crime. Her noninclusion in the information as a co-accused of appellant Nepomuceno in the crime of bigamy is not a defect in the information filed against Nepomuceno alone since her inclusion or not in said information depended upon available evidence against her. The

conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that the lower court committed no error when it refused to quash the information against the accused, Nepomuceno, on the mere flimsy ground that the second wife was not included therein. 12. Crimes against honor (Art. 349364) Borjal and Soliven v. CA

a.

The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind the proposition that his articles are privileged in character under the provisions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code which state Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and, 2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. Respondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the exceptions described in the above-quoted article since these were neither "private communications" nor "fair and true report x x x without any comments or remarks." But this is incorrect. A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good

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intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks." Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.19 [Art. III, Sec. 4, provides: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.] As early as 1918, in United States v. Caete,20 [38 Phil. 253, 265 (1918)] this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. As held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez21 [No. L-33615, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 448,454.] and reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals22 [G.R. No. 45031, 21 October 1991, 203 SCRA 110, 117.] To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: 'Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection of public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.'

The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. This closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-determination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of self- expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss,23 [Author of "The Irony of Free Speech," Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996.] makes its appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political culture. It is therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on the penal provision exempting from liability only private communications and fair and true report without comments or remarks defeats, rather than promotes, the objective of the rule on privileged communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the healthy effloresence of public debate and opinion as shining linchpins of truly democratic societies. To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.24 [People v. Velasco, 40 O.G., No. 18, p. 3694.] There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. b. Navarrete vs. CA and Generoso

It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings

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are absolutely privileged.17 [Deles vs. Aragona, Jr., 27 SCRA 633 (1969), p. 641 citing People vs. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555 (1966), p. 558.] This absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry.18 [Ibid.] Thus, the person making these statements such as a judge, lawyer or witness does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.19 [Ibid.]? The doctrine that statements made during the course of judicial proceedings enjoy the shield of absolute privilege was first categorically established20 [THE REVISED PENAL CODE by RAMON C. AQUINO AND CAROLINA C. GRIO-AQUINO, VOL. III, 1997 Ed., p. 568.] in the case of Sison vs. David.21 [1 SCRA 61.] In said case, the petition allegedly contained libelous allegations, implying that the complainant was incompetent to manage the affairs of a corporation and that he was converting his wifes paraphernal properties into conjugal properties.22 [Supra note 21.] This Court ruled in that case that the allegations in the pleadings were absolutely privileged and went further by saying that: "Also, sarcastic, pungent and harsh allegations in a pleading although tending to detract from the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice, are absolutely privileged, if relevant to the issues".23 [Supra note 22, p. 71, citing Hayslip vs. Wellford, 195 Tenn. 621, 263, SW 2d 136, 42 ALR 2d 820.] We have adopted the same ruling in several cases24 [Supra notes 16 and 18.] wherein statements made during judicial proceedings were sued upon for libel or damages. The lone requirement imposed to maintain the cloak of absolute privilege is the test of relevancy.25 [Ibid.] The doctrine of privileged communication has a practical purpose. As enunciated in the case of Deles vs. Aragona, Jr.26 [Supra note 18.]: "The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of public welfare, the purpose being that

members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for damages."27 [Ibid., p. 643.] In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy.28 [Supra note 21, p. 569.] In People vs. Aquino29 [18 SCRA 555 (1966).], we emphasized that "it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be liberally considered to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity".30 [Ibid., p. 560.] c. Jimenez v. Reyes

"General damages are such as the law will presume to be the natural or probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. They arise by inference of law, and need not therefore be proved by evidence. Such damages may be recovered wherever the immediate tendency of the words is to impair the plaintiff's reputation, although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. "Such general damages will only be presumed where the words are actionable per se. If any special damage has also been suffered, it should be set out on the pleadings; but, should the plaintiff fail in proving it at the trial, he may still recover general damages." How nearly this approaches the American rule may be judged from the following quotation from Fenstermaker vs. Tribune Pub. Co. (13 Utah, 532; 35 L. R. A. 611) : "If the publication was false, the plaintiff was entitled, in the absence of allegation and proof or special damage, to such general damages as the law would presume to be the natural or probable consequence of the defamatory words. These damages arise by inference of law, and need not be proved by evidence. Such damages may be recovered wherever the immediate tendency of the libelous words is to impair the party's reputation, although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. (3 Sutherland, Damages, 2d ed., pars. 1204-1206; Newell, Defamation, Slander, and Libel, p. 838 et seq.; Wilson vs. Fitch, 41 Cal., 363-386.)"

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In considering damage to reputation there must be taken into account the publicity given to the publication, the extent to which it tends to expose the plaintiffs reputation to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and the social and business standing of the parties. In estimating damages for injured feelings there should be considered the manner of the publication, that is, whether the method of publication tends to add ignominy to the natural effects of the publication. Also, those factors which enter into the assessment of damages for injury to reputation must influence the injury to plaintiff's feelings. Plaintiff feelings, in this sense, are considered to be the mental suffering, shame, and humiliation experienced by him as a result of the libel. d. Oliver and Oliver v. La Vanguardia, Inc.

threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the "orally" was effected in order to make the information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights. Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that the amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all. The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court convicting him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the commission of light threats only. The demonstration led by petitioner against Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion; that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." 2 Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by

The article in question is unquestionably libelous per se. To follow the lead of the Libel Law, it is a malicious defamation, expressed in writing, tending to impeach the reputation and to expose one to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. It affects a teacher in her profession to her disadvantage. It is injurious to her reputation. It has occasioned mental suffering. What greater humiliation, what more insistent harm could a teacher suffer than to have her name paraded in a newspaper throughout the length and breadth of the land, with the implication that she had insulted the Filipino flag? e. Reyes v. Pp

After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused

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the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats. The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo." This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said: "The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the heat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats." 13. Quasi Offenses (Art. 365) Pp vs. de los Santos II. THOSE UNDER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS 1. RA 6235- Aircraft Piracy 2. PD 532- Piracy, (RA 9372-Human Security Act of 2007) 3. PD 1619- Volatile Substance Law 4. RA 9165Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 5. RA 8249 (PD 1866)

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

RA 6539- Anti-Carnapping PD 1612- Anti-Fencing BP 22- Anti-Bouncing Check Law RA 4200- Anti-Wiretapping RA 9262- Anti-violence against women and their children RA 7877- Anti sexual-harassment Act of 1995 PD 1829- Obstruction of Justice RA 8293- Intellectual Property Code RA 8484Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998 RA 9995- Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009

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