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Jonathan Cariaga v.

CA June 6, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA affirming RTC decision convicting Jonathan Cariaga of qualified theft Facts: Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light & Power Company (DLPC). He received reports that some private electricians were involved in the sale of DLPC supplies. He initiated a covert operation to ascertain the matter and catch the perpetrators. In October 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robber Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired Florencio Siton as an undercover agent under the pseudonym Canuto Duran. Duran became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he said that his boss needs some electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold panning area. Ricardo offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can supply the same to him. Duran was able to purchase some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his cousin named Jonathan Cariaga (accused). Jonathan was the driver of a DLPC service truck. On November 1988, Duran and Jonathan were introduced to each other. After which, more transactions were made between the two. Durans undercover work came to an end when Sgt. Villasis apprehended him on February 1989. Duran then confessed in order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved to come out with the truth. Ricardo and another person came to the police station and confessed to their participation as fence for Jonathan Cariaga. The prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo as witness as the subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in Sultan Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn statement pertaining to the stealing for a labor case between Jonathan and DLPC for the latters alleged illegal dismissal. Issues: (1) WON Ricardos sworn statement is admissible as evidence (2) WON Siton is a credible witness (3) WON guilt beyond reasonable doubt proven Held / Ratio: Judgment affirmed with modifications. (1) Not admissible. The RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure both speak of admissibility of a testimony of a witness unable to testify in court. In Tan v. CA, the Court has held that unable to testify does not cover cases of witnesses subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He was neither dead nor out of the country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat which is merely 4 hours drive away from Davao. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest, but, it did not in the present case. (2) Credible. Contradictions in the affidavit and his testimony in the court do not always militate against a witnesss credibility. Affidavits, which are usuall ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate and, generally, inferior to a testimony in an open court which is subject to cross examination.

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Sitons statement on direct examination that he corrected his affidavit does not necessarily discredit him. The payment was made in exchange for his services as agent and not for concocting a story. The other alleged inaccuracies are negligible (e.g., description of Jonathans house) (3) Yes. Jonathan cited testimonies of witnesses which seem to confirm that there were no stolen goods. A more careful examination of the testimony reveals otherwise. The determination of sufficiency of evidence is based on the credibility and quality, not on the number. Witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of one, if credible, is sufficient to convict. The defenses bare denial cannot prevail over the unimpeached testimony of Ricardo. Mere circumstance that Jonathan is an employee of DLPC is insufficient to create relation of confidence which is required for the crime of qualified theft. However, access to the place where the taking took place OR access to the stolen goods changes the crime to a qualified theft. Appreciation of the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle is proper even if not alleged in the information. A generic aggravating circumstance may be proven even if not alleged. The truck was used to store & transport the materials to the place where they are sold.

CHUA BURCE VS CA Petitioner: Cristeta Chua- Burce Respondent: CA and People of the Philippines Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.:

G.R. No. 109595 April 27, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. She was found guilty by the RTC of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro and the Court of Appeals. The uncontroverted facts are as follows: On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Calapan Branch, Oriental Mindoro) requested Fructuoso Peaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos denominated bills totalling P150,000.00. The bank initiated investigations totalling four (4) in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora, the Manager. The second was by the bank's internal auditors headed by Antonio Batungbakal. Then, the bank's Department of Internal Affairs conducted an independent investigation. Thereafter, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came in to investigate. All of these investigations concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person primarily responsible was the bank's Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein accused. On November 4, 1985, unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of P150,000.00, the accused's service with the bank was terminated. To recover the missing amount, (Metrobank) filed a Civil Case for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment docketed as Civil Case No. R-3733 against petitioner and her husband, Antonio Burce. Both civil and criminal cases were raffled to the same branch of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40. Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, viz., that the resolution of the civil case was determinative of her guilt or innocence in the criminal case. The trial court granted the motion and suspended the trial of the criminal case. On petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court ruled that there was no prejudicial question. While the trial of the criminal case was suspended, the trial of the civil case continued. At the time of arraignment, the civil case was already submitted for decision. Hence, during the pre-trial conference of the criminal case, the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case as their

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respective evidence in the criminal case. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their written agreement pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. Pursuant to the pre-trial agreement, the public prosecutor filed a Motion to Adopt Evidence. Both the pre-trial agreement and said Motion were granted by the trial court. The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, contends that the guilt of petitioner has been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the following facts which were duly established during trial first, petitioner was the cash custodian who was directly responsible and accountable for the cash -invault. Second, the other persons who had access to the vault facilities never used the duplicate keys to open the safety deposit boxes and the cash safe from where the P100.00 bill denominations were located. In fact, the duplicate keys were offered in evidence still in their sealed envelopes. Third, alterations and superimposition on the cash-in-vault summary sheet were made by petitioner to cover the cash shortage.

ISSUES: 1. Whether there was a valid trial of the criminal case considering that the pre-trial agreement dispensed with the intervention of the public prosecutor in a full-blown trial of the criminal case 2. Whether the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. HELD:

1. Yes. The records show that the public prosecutor actively participated in the prosecution of the
criminal case from its inception. It was during pre-trial conference when the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. Petitioner, her counsel, and the public prosecutor signed an agreement that the evidence adduced by each party in the civil case will also be adopted as evidence by the other party in the criminal case . 2. No. The first element of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code is absent. In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees. RATIO: The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and (4) that there be demand for the return of the property. When the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487, 492 (1990). Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. People v. Bustinera June 8, 2004 Carpio Morales

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Nature: Appeal from RTC decision convicting Bustinera of qualified theft Facts: Cipriano is a taxi operator. He hired Bustinera in 1996 as a taxi driver and assigned to him a Daewoo sedan. On December 25, 1996, Bustinera reported for work and drove the taxi but failed to return the car on the same day. The following day, Cipriano went to Bustineras house but did not find the taxi nor Bustinera there. He reported the missing taxi to the police thereafter. On January 9, 1997, Bustineras wife met Cipriano and told him that the taxi was abandoned in Lagro. Cipriano was able to recover the taxi. Bustinera alleges that he failed to return the taxi because he was still short on boundary fee. He also alleges that he returned the taxi on January 5 and he signed the logbook. Moreover, he said that he was able to remit a total of P4,500 as payment for the boundary fee. He further alleges that Cipriano took his drivers license as he still had a balance. With Bustinera unable to drive and pay the debt, his wife started to work as a maid for Cipriano from February to March 1997 after which he was able to pay off the debt and the license was returned. Issues: (1) WON conviction for crime of qualified theft proper (2) WON intent to gain present Held / Ratio: Judgment set aside; Guilty of carnapping (1) No. Accused was convicted of qualified theft under Art. 310. However, said article has been modified with respect to certain vehicles by RA 6539 (Anti Carnapping Law). When statutes are in pare materia or cover the same subject matter, the rule dictates that they should be construed together that effect may be given to the provisions of each. However, when they are irreconcilable, the latter law shall prevail as it is the latter expression of legislative will. The elements of carnapping under RA 6539 are: (1) taking of vehicle of another, (2) it is without consent or by means of violence / intimidation of person or force on things, and (3) intent to gain. Essentially, carnapping is theft / robbery of a motorized vehicle. RA 6539 does not cover vehicles like trolleys, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Despite designation of qualified theft in the information, the accused may still be convicted for carnapping as the facts, not the designation, alleged in the information determine the real nature of the crime. (2) Animus lucrandi is an internal act and is presumed from the unlawful taking. Actual gain is irrelevant. Gain is not limited to financial gain. The mere use of a thing constitutes gain. Even if the taking is temporary, intent to gain is evident if he derives utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. The Court cannot believe accuseds bare assertions. He was not able to produce any documentary evidence to prove that he signed the logbook or that he remitted P4,500. The RTC erred in the penalty as RA 6539 provides for its own penalties. The RPC cannot be given suppletory effect. Penalty is reduced from reclusion perpetua to the indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) Months to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.

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People v. Sison January 19, 2000 De Leon, Jr. Nature: Appeal from RCT-Manila decision convicting Sison of Qualified Theft with penalty of reclusion perpetua Facts: Sison first joined Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) in 1977. He was promoted Assistant Manager and assigned as Branch Operation Officer in PCIB-Luneta in 1991. He has direct control over the cashier, accountant, and accounts officer and he was directly responsible over the daily operations of the branch. In 1989, Solid Electronics had a savings account with PCIB which was subsequently closed. However, it was revived and renamed as Solid Realty in 1991 without any written request from Solid Electronics. The accounts officer, who can effect the change in name, said that Sison has control over her access as it was him who provides her the password. In March 1992, the accountant noted an P8M discrepancy in the balances in the books of accounts. She traced it to two telegraphic fund transfers from PCIB-North Cotabato made in January 1992. The remittance clerk said that she processed a telegraphic advice but it was Sison who has sole access to the computer which verifies the authenticity of the advice. Sison was also the approving officer for the transaction. The PCIB-North Cotabato Branch Manager however denied that they sent any fund transfer. The cashier also testified that Sison took his key to the vault in January 1992 and reassigned him to another department. This gave Sison sole and complete access to the vault. Even when an acting cashier was assigned, Sison failed to give the other key. Finally, the bank teller testified that in January & February 1992, Sison made two back office withdrawals for Solid Realty totaling P6M. In March 1992, Sison submitted his resignation letter and disappeared until his arrest in June 1993. The initial complaint was for estafa but the prosecutor recommended that it be changed to qualified theft considering Sisons position. Though no direct evidence was adduced, the RTC convicted Sison from purely circumstantial evidence. Issue: WON circumstantial evidence presented was able to prove Sisons guilt beyond reasonable doubt Held / Ratio: Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed Yes. Circumstantial evidence is not a weaker form of evidence vis--vis direct evidence. Either way, the evidence presented must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2)facts from which inference are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of circumstances produces certainty beyond reasonable doubt. The Court is convinced that the combination of incriminating facts prove that Sison is guilty of qualified theft. Qualified theft is defined under Art. 310 of the RPC. Qualified theft is committed under the following circumstances: (1) theft by domestic servant, (2) theft through grave abuse of confidence, (3) property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter, or large cattle, (4) property stolen is coconuts taken from the plantation, (5) property stolen is fish taken from the fish pond, and (6) property was taken on occasion of calamity, accident, or civil disturbance.

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Jonathan Cariaga v. CA June 6, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA affirming RTC decision convicting Jonathan Cariaga of qualified theft Facts: Luis Aboitiz was the systems analyst of Davao Light & Power Company (DLPC). He received reports that some private electricians were involved in the sale of DLPC supplies. He initiated a covert operation to ascertain the matter and catch the perpetrators. In October 1988, he sought assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robber Section of METRODISCOM-Davao. He also hired Florencio Siton as an undercover agent under the pseudonym Canuto Duran. Duran became acquainted with Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician, and he said that his boss needs some electrical materials to be used in Diwalwal, a gold panning area. Ricardo offered to supply the materials saying that his cousin can supply the same to him. Duran was able to purchase some wires which came from, as Ricardo said, his cousin named Jonathan Cariaga (accused). Jonathan was the driver of a DLPC service truck. On November 1988, Duran and Jonathan were introduced to each other. After which, more transactions were made between the two. Durans undercover work came to an end when Sgt. Villasis apprehended him on February 1989. Duran then confessed in order to persuade Ricardo and the others involved to come out with the truth. Ricardo and another person came to the police station and confessed to their participation as fence for Jonathan Cariaga. The prosecution, however, was unable to present Ricardo as witness as the subpoena cannot be personally served to him as he was in Sultan Kudarat. Ricardo was able to give a sworn statement pertaining to the stealing for a labor case between Jonathan and DLPC for the latters alleged illegal dismissal. Issues: (4) WON Ricardos sworn statement is admissible as evidence (5) WON Siton is a credible witness (6) WON guilt beyond reasonable doubt proven Held / Ratio: Judgment affirmed with modifications. (4) Not admissible. The RTC & CA erred when it admitted the sworn statement of Ricardo as evidence in the instant case. Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence and Sec. 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure both speak of admissibility of a testimony of a witness unable to testify in court. In Tan v. CA, the Court has held that unable to testify does not cover cases of witnesses subpoenaed but did not appear. Ricardo was only subpoenaed once. He was neither dead nor out of the country. In fact he is in Sultan Kudarat which is merely 4 hours drive away from Davao. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest, but, it did not in the present case.

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(5) Credible. Contradictions in the affidavit and his testimony in the court do not always militate against a
witnesss credibility. Affidavits, which are usuall ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate and, generally, inferior to a testimony in an open court which is subject to cross examination. Sitons statement on direct examination that he corrected his affidavit does not necessarily discredit him. The payment was made in exchange for his services as agent and not for concocting a story. The other alleged inaccuracies are negligible (e.g., description of Jonathans house) (6) Yes. Jonathan cited testimonies of witnesses which seem to confirm that there were no stolen goods. A more careful examination of the testimony reveals otherwise. The determination of sufficiency of evidence is based on the credibility and quality, not on the number. Witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of one, if credible, is sufficient to convict. The defenses bare denial cannot prevail over the unimpeached testimony of Ricardo. Mere circumstance that Jonathan is an employee of DLPC is insufficient to create relation of confidence which is required for the crime of qualified theft. However, access to the place where the taking took place OR access to the stolen goods changes the crime to a qualified theft. Appreciation of the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle is proper even if not alleged in the information. A generic aggravating circumstance may be proven even if not alleged. The truck was used to store & transport the materials to the place where they are sold.

People v. Bustinera June 8, 2004 Carpio Morales Nature: Appeal from RTC decision convicting Bustinera of qualified theft Facts: Cipriano is a taxi operator. He hired Bustinera in 1996 as a taxi driver and assigned to him a Daewoo sedan. On December 25, 1996, Bustinera reported for work and drove the taxi but failed to return the car on the same day. The following day, Cipriano went to Bustineras house but did not find the taxi nor Bustinera there. He reported the missing taxi to the police thereafter. On January 9, 1997, Bustineras wife met Cipriano and told him that the taxi was abandoned in Lagro. Cipriano was able to recover the taxi. Bustinera alleges that he failed to return the taxi because he was still short on boundary fee. He also alleges that he returned the taxi on January 5 and he signed the logbook. Moreover, he said that he was able to remit a total of P4,500 as payment for the boundary fee. He further alleges that Cipriano took his drivers license as he still had a balance. With Bustinera unable to drive and pay the debt, his wife started to work as a maid for Cipriano from February to March 1997 after which he was able to pay off the debt and the license was returned. Issues: (3) WON conviction for crime of qualified theft proper (4) WON intent to gain present Held / Ratio: Judgment set aside; Guilty of carnapping

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(3) No. Accused was convicted of qualified theft under Art. 310. However, said article has been modified
with respect to certain vehicles by RA 6539 (Anti Carnapping Law). When statutes are in pare materia or cover the same subject matter, the rule dictates that they should be construed together that effect may be given to the provisions of each. However, when they are irreconcilable, the latter law shall prevail as it is the latter expression of legislative will. The elements of carnapping under RA 6539 are: (1) taking of vehicle of another, (2) it is without consent or by means of violence / intimidation of person or force on things, and (3) intent to gain. Essentially, carnapping is theft / robbery of a motorized vehicle. RA 6539 does not cover vehicles like trolleys, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Despite designation of qualified theft in the information, the accused may still be convicted for carnapping as the facts, not the designation, alleged in the information determine the real nature of the crime. (4) Animus lucrandi is an internal act and is presumed from the unlawful taking. Actual gain is irrelevant. Gain is not limited to financial gain. The mere use of a thing constitutes gain. Even if the taking is temporary, intent to gain is evident if he derives utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. The Court cannot believe accuseds bare assertions. He was not able to produce any documentary evidence to prove that he signed the logbook or that he remitted P4,500. The RTC erred in the penalty as RA 6539 provides for its own penalties. The RPC cannot be given suppletory effect. Penalty is reduced from reclusion perpetua to the indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) Months to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.

PEOPLE VS REMULLO June 6, 2002 Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Accused-appellant: NIMFA REMULLO Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.:

G.R. Nos. 124443-46

FACTS: In the trial court, accused was convicted with the crime of illegal recruitment and 3 counts of estafa. She was sentenced to life imprisonment for the crime of illegal recruitment, hence this appeal.

Private complainants JENELYN QUINSAAT, ROSARIO CADACIO, and HONORINA MEJIA testified on essentially the same facts. They averred that they went to appellants house sometime in March 1993, where appellant told them she was recruiting factory workers for Malaysia. Appellant told them to fill up application forms and to go to the office of Jamila and Co., the recruitment agency where appellant worked. Appellant also required each applicant to submit a passport, pictures, and clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and then to undergo a medical examination. Appellant told them the placement fee was P15,000 for each applicant, which private complainants gave her. Part of the fee was paid in appellants house and part was paid at the Jamila office. Appellant did not issue receipts for any of the payments. At the Jamila office, private complainants met a certain Steven Mah, the alleged broker from the company in Malaysia that was interested in hiring the women. Mah was supposed to interview private complainants but instead just looked at them and told them they were fit to work.

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Private complainants were supposed to leave for Malaysia on June 6, 1993. However, when they arrived at the airport that day, an immigration officer told them they lacked a requirement imposed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Their passports were cancelled and their boarding passes marked "offloaded". Appellant told private complainants they would be able to leave on June 20, 1993 but this, too, did not push through. Private complainant Mejia inquired from Jamila and Co. regarding their application papers. In response, Evelyn Landrito, vice president and general manager to Jamila, denied any knowledge of such papers. Landrito told Mejia that appellant did not submit any document to Jamila. She further certified that appellant was not authorized to receive payments on behalf of Jamila. She said that Remullo was a marketing consultant for Jamila. As such, her work was limited to securing job orders for the company through contacts abroad. According to Landrito, appellant went on absence without leave in late 1993. In this appeal, appellant assailed the credibility of the witnesses presented by the prosecution, while shifting by way of her defense the onus of illegal recruitment and estafa to third parties in order to create a reasonable doubt. In her defense, she denied having recruited private complainants and receiving any money from them. According to her testimony, they asked for her help in obtaining jobs abroad, so she had them fill up bio-data forms and told them to wait for job openings. She insisted that private complainants did not hand their placement fees to her but to Steven Mah and to a certain Lani Platon.She presented in evidence photocopies of receipts allegedly signed by Platon. She also presented a witness Amado Pancha who, according to him, was also an applicant at Jamila and he saw private complainants hand the money to Platon in the Jamila office. On cross-examination, appellant insisted that her job at Jamila was not limited to finding prospective employers abroad. She said that her duties included those assigned by Virginia Castro, Jamilas deputy manager, among them entertaining job applicants.

ISSUES: 1. WON the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment 2. WON the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa HELD:

3. Yes. She acted without license or lawful authority to conduct recruitment of workers for overseas
placement. The POEAs licensing branch issued a certification stating that appellant, in her personal capacity, was not authorized to engage in recruitment activities. Evelyn Landrito, general manager of the placement agency where appellant used to work, denied that the scope of appellants work included recruiting workers and receiving placement fees. Such lack of authority to recruit is also apparent from a reading of the job description of a marketing consultant, the post that appellant occupied at Jamila and Co. 4. Yes. Appellant clearly defrauded private complainants by deceiving them into believing that she had the power and authority to send them on jobs abroad. By virtue of appellants false representations, private complainants each parted with their hard-earned money. Each complainant paid P15,000 as recruitment fee to appellant, who then appropriated the money for her own use and benefit, but failed utterly to provide overseas job placements to the complainants. RATIO: For a charge of illegal recruitment to prosper, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused was engaged in recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he or she lacks the requisite license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment

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and placement of workers; and (3) he or she committed such acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. People vs. Arabia, et al., G.R. No. 138431-36, September 12, 2001, pp. 10-11. For charges of estafa to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. SALAZAR VS PEOPLE Petitioner: Jorge Salazar Respondent: People of the Philippines Ponente: PUNO J.: FACTS: The lower court convicted herein petitioner of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Aggrieved by the said rulings, petitioner filed this instant petition for review. The established facts are as follows: Skiva International, Inc. ("Skiva") is a New York-based corporation which imports clothes from the Philippines through its buying agent, Olivier (Philippines) Inc. ("Olivier"). Aurora Manufacturing & Development Corporation ("Aurora") and Uni-Group Inc. ("Uni-Group") are domestic corporations which supply finished clothes to Skiva. Mr. Werner Lettmayr is the President of both Aurora and UniGroup while the petitioner, Jorge Salazar, is the Vice-President and Treasurer of Uni-Group and a consultant of Aurora. Skiva, through its buying agent, Olivier, has been purchasing finished clothes from Aurora and UniGroup. When an order is procured for the delivery of clothes, Olivier, issues to the local supplier, Aurora/Uni-Group, a "Purchase Contract" and Olivier issues to Skiva a "Sales Contract". In these transactions, payment is usually made by way of a letter of credit wherein the supplier is paid only upon the presentation of the proper shipping documents to the designated bank. In December 1985, Skiva informed Olivier that it needs ladies jeans to be delivered sometime in January 1986. Olivier, in turn, through its Officer-in-Charge, Ms. Teresita Tujan, contacted Aurora and Uni-Group to supply the jeans. Thus, a Purchase Contract dated December 18, 1985 was issued by Olivier to Uni-Group wherein Uni-Group was to supply 700 dozens of three (3) different designs of "Ladies Basic 5 Pockets Stretch Twill Jeans" payable by means of a letter of credit at sight. On January 7, 1986, the parties agreed that Skiva will advance to Aurora/Uni-Group the amount of US$41,300.00 (then equivalent to P850,370.00 at the exchange rate of P20.59 to US$1.00) as Aurora/Uni-Group did not have sufficient funds to secure raw materials to manufacture the jeans. It was also agreed that the amount advanced by Skiva represents advance payment of its order of 700 dozens of ladies jeans. Skiva then issued a check in the said amount payable to UniGroup. However, due to the length of time needed for the check to be cleared, the parties made arrangements to remit the funds instead by way of telegraphic transfer. Thus, the check issued by Skiva was returned by Mr. Lettmayr and as agreed, the funds were remitted by Skiva from its bank in New York, the Israel Discount Bank, to the joint account of Mr. and Mrs. Jorge Salazar and Mr. and Mrs. Werner Lettmayr at Citibank N.A. On January 16, 1986, petitioner, who had possession and control of the passbook of the said joint account, withdrew the amount of US$21,675.21 and on January 22, 1986, petitioner withdrew the amount of US$20,000.00. The prosecution also presented evidence that subsequent to said withdrawals, the amounts of US$71.70 and US$63.99 were deducted from the joint account as telegraphic transfer fee and commission for the remittance of the funds to another account. In the meantime, Ms. Tujan contacted Aurora/Uni-Group to follow up on the production of the jeans. She learned that only 3,000 meters out of the 10,000 meters of Litton fabrics required for the order G.R. No. 149472 October 15, 2002

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were purchased from Litton Mills by the petitioner. 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics are enough to produce only 200 dozens of ladies jeans - an amount insufficient to satisfy the order of Skiva of 700 dozens of ladies twill jeans. Upon inquiry with Mr. Lettmayr, the latter advised Ms. Tujan that the query be directed to petitioner as petitioner is in charge of securing the materials. However, Ms. Tujan could not locate the petitioner.19 Consequently, in a letter dated March 13, 1986, demand was made upon Aurora/Uni-Group through its President, Mr. Lettmayr, to return the money advanced in the amount of US$41,300.00. For failure of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the ladies jeans or to account for the US$41,300.00 despite demand, Skiva, through its local agent represented by Ms. Tujan, filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Mr. Lettmayr and petitioner. After preliminary investigation, the Public Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Mr. Lettmayr and an information was filed against petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether the elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code have been proven beyond reasonable doubt HELD:Yes. RATIO: 1st Element - Petitioner, as an employee of Aurora/Uni-Group who was aware of the specific purpose of the remittance, upon receipt and withdrawal of the amount, had the obligation to return the funds or to account for the proceeds thereof to Aurora/Uni-Group. 2nd Element - petitioner failed to present evidence to support his defense that payment for the purchase of fabrics had been made or that the balance of the amount received by petitioner was given to Aurora. 3rd Element the finding of the trial court that Skiva, the party prejudiced, is not the owner of the sum misappropriated will not nullify the conviction of the petitioner. In estafa, the person prejudiced or the immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods misappropriated - First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned [in Article 315]" may be held liable for estafa. The use by the law of the word "another" instead of the word "owner" means that as an element of the offense, loss should have fallen upon someone other than the perpetrator of the crime. 4th Element - the element of demand was satisfied when demand was made upon Aurora/Uni-Group. In Benito Sy y Ong v. People and Court of Appeals, it was also held that in a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary when there is evidence of misappropriation.

Allied Bank Corporation vs. Ordonez (December 10, 1990; Padilla) Petitioner: Allied Banking Corporation (Allied) Respondents: Sedfrey Ordonez/Alfredo Ching Facts: Special civil action for certiorari to review the decision of the DOJ regarding the interpretation of the penal provision of PD 115. Jan 21, 1981 - Philippine Blooming Mills throughChing applied for the issuance of commercial letter of credit with Allieds Makati branch to finance the purchase of 500 M/T Magtar Branch Dolomites and one Lot High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks which would be utilized in the operation of machinery and equipment. ALLIED issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favour of Nikko Industry Co Ltd by virtue of which the latter drew 4 drafts which were accepted by PBM and paid by the bank. E2016 Digests Page 11

To secure payment of the amount covered by the drafts and in consideration of the transfer by ALLIED of the possession of the goods to PBM, Ching executed four Trust receipt Agreements acknowledging ALLIEDs ownership of the goods and its obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, if sold, or to return the same, if unsold within the stated period. Out of the said obligation resulted an overdue amount of P1,475,274.09. Despite repeated demands, PBM failed and refuse to either turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods or to return the same. ALLIED filed a criminal complaint vsChing for violation of PD 115. After preliminary investigation, the fiscal found a prima facie case for violation of PD 115 on four counts and filed the corresponding information. Ching appealed the fiscals resolution alleging that the goods subject of the trust receipt agreements were dolomites which were specifically used for patching purposes over the surface of furnaces and nozzle bricks which are insulting materials in the lower portion of the ladle which do not form part of the steel product itself. Justice Sec Ordonez reversed the resolution saying that PD 115 contemplates or covers only goods, which have, for their ultimate destination, the sale thereof or fi unsold, their surrender to the entruster, this whether the goods are in their original form or in their manufactured or processed state. Not all transactions covered by trust receipts may be considered as trust receipt transactions defined and penalized under PD 115. ALLIED filed MR of the Ordonez resolution. Issue: WON the penal provision of PD 115 apply when the goods covered by a Trust Receipt do not form part of the finished products which are ultimately sold but are instead utilized/used up in the operation of the equipment and machineries of the entrustee-manufacturer. Held and Ratio: Yes In trust receipts, there is an obligation to repay the entruster. The entrustee binds himself to sell or dispose of the entrusted goods with obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds if sold, or return the goods if unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and condition specified in the trust receipt. A violation of this undertaking constitutes estafa under Sec 13 of PD 115. The wording of Sec 13 covers failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of entrusted goods or to return said goods, unsold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts. The nonpayment of the amount covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the entrustees obligation to pay. There is no reason why the law should not apply to all transactions covered by trust receipts, except those expressly excluded. The Court takes judicial notice of customary banking and business practices where trust receipts are used for importation of heavy equipment, machineries, and supplies used in manufacturing operations. A construction should be avoided when it affords an opportunity to defeat compliance with the terms of the statute. The penal provision of PD 115 encompasses any act violative of an obligation covered by the trust receipt; it is not limited to transactions in goods which are to be sold, reshipped, stored, or processed as a component of a product ultimately sold. To uphold the Justice Departments ruling would contravene not only the letter but the spirit of PD 115. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The temporary restraining order issued on 13 April 1988 restraining the enforcement of the questioned DOJ resolutions dated 11 January 1988 and 17 February 1988 directing the provincial fiscal to move for the dismissal of the criminal case filed before the RTC of Makati, Branch 143 and the withdrawal of IS-No. 84-3140, is made permanent. Let this case be remanded to said RTC for disposition in accordance with this decision. E2016 Digests Page 12

SO ORDERED.

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