Report

February 2013

From Crisis to Recovery: Lost in Transition

For more information, please contact: Lynn Yoshikawa Sr. Program Manager InterAction lyoshikawa@interaction.org

Introduction
For decades, aid actors have widely acknowledged the importance of facilitating effective transitions from relief to development and grappled with the operational and policy challenges of rebuilding devastated communities and societies to lay the foundation for development. Despite some effective programming, weak governance and political will in affected countries and weak aid coordination to support multi-layered approaches to transitions continue to hamper effective implementation. While some progress has been made over the past decades, gaps still remain, leaving millions of people vulnerable, with few solutions in sight. The global pressures on international aid, coupled with increasingly complex humanitarian crises, will likely widen the gap as limited humanitarian and development budgets are further stretched.

Background on Transition Project and Methodology

In 2011, InterAction and the U.S. State Departments Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) developed a project to review programming and policy in the transition from relief to development in displacement settings. Over the course of 2012, InterAction staff conducted three field assessments to develop country case studies examining policy and practice in the transition from relief to development. This paper is a summary of findings and recommendations from the three case studies. For this project, transition is defined as "the period between the immediate humanitarian response to a complex emergency and when long-term development processes are underway; where conflict or disasters may recur; in which basic services provision often transitions from direct delivery by humanitarian agencies to self-sufficient and resilient communities; and a time in which there is much need and attention to strengthening capacity among civil society, and national and sub-national governments. PRM funded the InterAction Transition Program, however, the views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. State Department or PRM.
www.InterAction.org 1400 16th Street, NW Suite 210 Washington, DC 20036 202.667.8227

The country case studies included Liberia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The country selection criteria were developed in consultation with InterAction members and PRM, and included: the engagement of PRM, USAID, and at least five InterAction members; one experience of a major return of refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs); and one protracted refugee situation. InterAction staff used semi-structured, qualitative interviews with representatives of international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society, UN agen-

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cies, donors, think tanks, and the World Bank at the field level and offices in Geneva, New York, and Washington, DC. Displaced and host communities were interviewed in all case studies, but with varying degrees of access. Thirty-four InterAction member organizations directly participated through interviews or group consultations.

Liberia: Return and Reintegration in a Statebuilding and Reconstruction Context

Liberia has made tangible political and development progress since the end of its devastating civil and regional wars in 2003. The 14-year conflict, which was characterized by the extensive use of child soldiers and rampant sexual violence against women and girls, took its toll on the civilian population. Despite advances in rebuilding state institutions and the formulation of progressive policies under President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, concerns with the government of Liberias capacity to independently administer and deliver basic services persist. The transition from relief to development in Liberia has been relatively successful due to the following factors: Strong political will from the government of Liberia to address poverty, reconstruction, and peacebuilding, which overlapped with and supported the reintegration needs of returning refugees and IDPs. Strong donor support in the development phase focused on both statebuilding and communitybased recovery. There was no gap in funding between the transition and development phases and development funding was significantly greater than emergency funding levels during the conflict. Positive relationships between the international community, NGOs, UN agencies, and host government allowed for effective partnerships. Interviewees appeared to have limited institutional memory of past transition programming and therefore were not able to identify many concrete program examples during the field assessment. Nevertheless, based on the interviews, InterAction found the following program approaches to be effective in the Liberia context: Building program partnerships among key stakeholders, including international and national NGOs and government ministries, in support of common strategies, implementation, and capacity building. Investments in long-term commitments, which were often made by NGOs with sector-specific mandates and private funding, led to programs that bridged the transition period between humanitarian and development programs. Intensive, market-driven vocational training for ex-combatants, youth, women, and other vulnerable groups.
Example 1: Human Resource Transfers

In post-conflict settings, NGOs often aim to transfer their staff, particularly teachers and health workers, to government ministries. As illustrated in the examples below, intensive planning, investment, and longterm commitment are required for a sustainable transfer of human resources. One NGO managing Monrovias largest hospital since the beginning of the war was unwilling to withdraw due to weak capacity and resources in the Ministry of Health (MoH) and alarmingly high rates of gender-based violence (GBV), which persisted following the war. The MoHs roll-out of its national health plan in 2008 signaled the beginning of the transition process, but it took 18 months for staff and equipment to be handed over to another international NGO which had been contracted by the government to manage the facility. The NGO

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stayed for an additional three months after the handover to monitor services. Similarly, an NGO invested core funding to build policy and program systems and staff capacity within the MoH to directly manage nutrition programs, which were then to be transferred by the NGO to the MoH. This handover process is expected to take four years.
Example 2: Livelihoods for Ex-Combatants

Liberias disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs targeted over 100,000 combatants and those associated with armed groups. However, the assistance was primarily focused on the short-term aspects of disarmament and demobilization, leaving few funds available for reintegration activities. Weak reintegration efforts left a major gap; one which interviewees said has had serious consequences for criminal activity, including GBV, in Liberia society today. NGOs found some success through long-term (four to six months), comprehensive programs, which allowed adequate time for re-building social skills, achieving basic literacy and numeracy, addressing psycho-social issues, as well as undertaking livelihood and business trainings. While this approach was relatively resource-intensive at an average cost of $1250 per beneficiary, it demonstrated impact by reducing beneficiaries interest in armed activities by one-third and improving their wealth assets.

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: A Protracted Refugee Situation

Transitioning from relief to development in protracted refugee situations, like that of Afghan refugees in 1 Pakistan, is challenging due to political deadlock, continued conflict in the country of origin, and restrictive refugee policies by overburdened host countries. These factors often prevent refugees from being integrated into national development programs and services. Pakistan hosts the largest refugee population, and arguably the most complex and protracted displacement situation, in the world. Over 1.7 million Afghans are registered as refugees in Pakistan and one million more are believed to be living in Pakistan without documentation. Despite major disasters and armed conflict in Pakistan, 83 percent of registered Afghans residing there have no plans to return to their country, due to the lack of jobs and an uncertain 2 security situation. The Pakistan context did not provide a suitable environment for transition programs to succeed for the following reasons: Significant operational and security challenges faced by aid agencies. Lack of policy frameworks that support development actors to engage with Afghan refugee communities. U.S. development assistance is primarily focused on stabilization and counter-terrorism objectives and not conducive to coordination on refugee assistance. Weak coordination among stakeholders, particularly UNHCR, to address some of these chal3 lenges. These macro challenges limited the availability of sustainable partners for an effective transition to take place. Nonetheless, some programs have had relative success in increasing ownership by the government of Pakistan and other development actors and increasing refugees self-sufficiency, but the overall impact was limited due to weak coordination. The following approaches were effective in bridging the transition gap:

UNHCR defines protracted refugee situations as those where refugees have been living in exile for five years or longer with no foreseeable implementation of a durable solutions. 2 SAFRON/CCAR and UNHCR, survey of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, unpublished manuscript, 2012. 3 Since the Pakistan case study was published in September 2012, UNHCR instituted regular strategic meetings with NGOs to discuss policies and programs regarding Afghan refugees.

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Embedding NGO staff and programs within existing service structures to address the needs of refugees strengthened the ownership of local actors and provided the foundation for longer-term development. In Pakistan today, this approach to transition will only succeed if there are available funding and approval by the government of Pakistan, given the extremely fragile state of public services. Providing legal aid for refugees to support self-reliance and shape a protective environment by improving access to basic services and raising awareness of refugee rights among law enforcement officials and other local authorities. Joint capacity-building of host and refugee communities to implement community-based projects and other social cohesion activities among refugee and host communities. Assessing whether the implementation of voluntary or user fees in care and maintenance programs is appropriate in order to increase their financial sustainability and reduce dependency. International assistance has largely focused on non-emergency health, education, and livelihood assistance in the refugee camps with ongoing capacity-building efforts to facilitate a gradual handover of services to communities and local NGO management. Most NGOs long-term achievements are not well documented, particularly in short-term humanitarian project cycles, which are primarily focused on outputs and activities rather than impact.
Example 3: Capacity-Building

Throughout the decades-long response to Afghan refugees, NGOs have been engaging in capacitybuilding of their own staff, who are primarily Pakistani, as well as staff of their local partners, many of whom are refugees themselves. One refugee said, Its because of this assistance that we have among our community educated people like doctors, teachers and engineers. This has played a major role in our lives. One NGO estimated that in the last decade it has worked with refugee communities, it had trained 3,000 health workers, the vast majority of whom are Afghan. One of its refugee staff members had returned to Afghanistan in 2002 to start his own NGO, which is now one of the largest public health organizations in the country. A local NGO sampled and interviewed 348 teachers who had received training in Pakistan and repatriated to Afghanistan. The survey found that 77% of those who returned to Afghanistan 4 had found gainful employment working as teachers for the Ministry of Education. Many NGOs do not monitor and evaluate their capacity-building efforts in programs classified as humanitarian due to the short-term nature of humanitarian project cycles.
Examples 4 and 5: Urban Services

Although an estimated 60 percent of registered refugees now live in urban areas, UNHCR and NGO assistance has largely remained focused on the refugee camps because UNHCR did not shift its priorities in line with the massive urbanization of refugees in the mid-1990s. Afghans, both those living in refugee camps and urban areas, cite police harassment and extortion as one of their biggest challenges, yet only 5 30 percent have access to the legal or police support they need. One NGO has operated legal aid centers and conducted community outreach with a local partner for the past 10 years in Balochistan province to provide information and legal advice to both registered and unregistered refugees on issues ranging from access to government schools to the right to fair rent. NGO and partner staff conduct sensitization trainings with police, judges, and jail authorities to ensure that refugees rights are respected. The NGO also set up a protection network of Pakistani volunteers who monitor detention of both registered and unregistered Afghans and are trained to advocate for the release of registered refugees and identify trafficking victims and other vulnerable individuals from local jails. The volunteers undertake jail visits, and as a
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BEFARe, "Survey Report on Follow-up of BEFARe Teachers in Afghanistan. SAFRON/CCAR and UNHCR, survey of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, unpublished manuscript. 2012.

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result of their efforts nearly all detained registered refugees they identify are released without a fine or punishment. While legal assistance programs lack development partners given the weak rule of law in Pakistan, the nature of assistance is designed to facilitate a more protective environment, allowing refugees to be more self-sufficient in exercising their rights to livelihoods and existing public services, rather than relying on parallel service structures. The use of legal aid is an essential and cost-effective tool in urban settings, where refugees are widely dispersed and where there is often a higher risk of arrest and an increased availability of public services than in rural areas. One NGO has been successful in handing over several of its health projects in urban areas, which target both refugees and Pakistanis, to the Peoples Public Health Initiative (PPHI), a quasi-governmental organization. As a development partner, PPHI has been a much more effective health provider than the government and has been supported by international donors. According to NGO staff, the handover to PPHI was successful largely because the NGO had already shifted from running stand-alone clinics to filling specific service gaps including the provision of birthing stations, staff, medicines and administrative systems within PPHIs facilities over the course of the past decade. This shift in service delivery came about as the refugee population had become increasingly urbanized and integrated with the local population. The long-standing working relationship between the NGO and health facility staff, along with PPHIs willingness to expand its services to the majority Pakistani caseload, allowed the NGO to gradually hand over services. In contrast, NGOs operating stand-alone facilities in refugee camps in rural Balochistan were prevented by both the provincial Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, the Pakistani governments agency for Afghan refugees, and UNHCR offices from discussing a service handover to PPHI and were instructed to continue operating.
Example 6: Social Cohesion

Following the initial wave of refugee returns and the closure of several refugee camps, UN agencies agreed to pilot the Refugee-Affected Host Areas (RAHA) initiative in 2005 to respond to some of the development needs in neglected host communities. UNDP structured its RAHA component on the comparable strengths and needs of government actors and communities. UNDP funded the provincial planning and development departments to administer and oversee the overall program, while UNDP staff, who were co-located in government offices, provided technical assistance to mobilize and support community organizations made up of both Pakistanis and Afghans to select and implement projects, such as strengthening livelihoods or constructing flood protection walls. To increase the sustainability of the projects, UNDP assisted local organizations to register with the National Rural Support Program and Poverty Alleviation Fund, which are supported by the government of Pakistan and other donors.

Sri Lanka: Return and Reintegration in the Absence of a Political Settlement

Sri Lanka is recovering from a devastating 26-year civil war which ended in May 2009 with the defeat of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the government. The rapid reconstruction of major roads, power lines, and public buildings by the government is an impressive achievement. The return of 300,000 people displaced at the end of the war was also swift, but an estimated 100,000 IDPs remain in camps, host communities, and transit centers. Sri Lankas transition from relief to development has been unique from other post-conflict situations because the government maintained basic services throughout much of the conflict, which limited staff turnover and the need to significantly change systems or standards in the recovery and reconstruction period. Paradoxically, as the government is trying to move the country beyond the conflict, it is doing so in a manner that exacerbates the drivers of the conflict, particularly through the heavy military presence in Tamil communities, the continued centralization of power, and weak reconciliation efforts. Furthermore, unlike other countries emerging from protracted conflict, the Sri Lankan state is neither weak nor suffers a shortage of capacity, so the lack of engagement on

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key issues is perceived as a deliberate effort to marginalize the Tamil population. As one civil society activist said, The war was against the LTTE, but now we feel it is against the people. Despite major challenges in working with the government and declining assistance for conflict-affected communities, programs which transitioned from relief to development were generally successful for the following reasons: A strong human resource base exists, although the role of national actors is curtailed by intimidation and threats to those who oppose the current governments policies. Development infrastructure such as roads, electricity, and private sector markets are already present at the national level and have been rapidly expanded to devastated areas of the Northern and Eastern provinces. The primary recovery need of conflict-affected communities is to link them to basic services and other development opportunities in an equitable, conflict-sensitive manner. Relatively strong coordination among the U.S. government and other major donors humanitarian and development agencies, as well as with NGOs, allowed for a more comprehensive transition focused on the recovery of conflict-affected communities. International NGOs invested private funds to support recovery efforts and explored new approaches with the private sector. The following program approaches were effective in transitioning from relief to development in Sri Lanka: Establishing and strengthening market linkages between small-scale producers and the private sector including but not limited to, regional businesses and both national and international corporations to improve livelihoods. Strong facilitation, monitoring, and a do no harm assessment should be applied in the program design. Establishing village-based revolving funds, which build social cohesion and support livelihood projects and small enterprise at the local level. Developing joint guidelines among humanitarian actors to ensure that the government of Sri Lanka meets its obligations to facilitate the safe, voluntary, and dignified returns of IDPs, and that the humanitarian community provides appropriate support. Conducting protection and legal aid workshops with affected communities and civilian representatives of the government of Sri Lanka. Establishing long-term partnerships between national and international NGOs to build national NGOs management, technical, and fundraising capacities; some of these NGOs are now able to directly access U.S. government funding.
Example 7: NGO Management Structures

Despite a significant decline in the number of NGOs operating in Sri Lanka, a couple agencies are making concerted long-term recovery and development plans, primarily through private funding sources which are essential for planning and gap-filling when institutional funding is unavailable or inappropriate. One NGO worker said, We have 15-year development plans for communities but without private funding sources, we would have to leave next year. These agencies have re-constructed their program management models and tools to bridge the gap between emergency and development programs by establishing community-defined benchmarks to measure progress and trigger the use of different approaches, expertise, and funding types, as well as define when a program phase out is appropriate. This resultsbased approach to programming aims to increase the effect of short-term, output-based projects by building on previous staff expertise and program experiences and monitoring impact over the long-term. Few NGOs have the resources to take on this resource-intensive approach, but these agencies attempts to

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bridge the gap between relief and development programs are illustrative of the required capacities, planning, and transactional costs of doing so effectively.
Examples 8 and 9: Livelihoods

Aid agencies provided significant livelihood inputs for IDPs upon their return and rehabilitated community infrastructure such as irrigation tanks and feeder roads. Several NGOs went a step further to pilot projects linking small farmers to supermarket chains and major food corporations. In these pilots, the physical inputs from the NGOs were minimal as they were able to negotiate for the companies to provide seeds, fertilizer, and training. An independent evaluation of one such program found that strong facilitation and monitoring by the NGO was key to ensuring that farmers were getting the maximum benefits, as few have any experience with large companies. In one program, farmers were trained to cultivate jalapeno chilies, which are not native to Sri Lanka, for export to Thailand, while another NGO is marketing organic food products to high-end tourist restaurants and hotels within Sri Lanka. Organic farming was found to be appropriate to farmers in former conflict areas as they had never used genetically modified seeds and fertilizers. While NGOs engaged in these activities report success, more time and independent evaluation are needed to determine the sustainability of the impact. The establishment of revolving funds among livelihood groups is scaleable and effective in preparing conflict-affected communities for longer-term development programs. One NGO provided bank accounts and basic business training to each participant, who were then responsible for drafting a business concept paper to be approved by the livelihood group and NGO technical staff before receiving a loan of 35,000 rupees (approximately $270). The groups met on a weekly basis to discuss their progress and submit savings to their personal accounts, but they were also designed to provide a forum for people to gather and discuss their problems. Proposals included the purchase of a cow and veterinary services, and were generally successful in providing income for their families food, education, and transportation costs and also allow for some savings. Participants were required to pay back 25% of the first loan into the groups revolving fund. They could then submit new proposals for loans to build on their existing businesses or start a different venture with the approval of the group. This two-year livelihood project was started in one of the most devastated districts, where residents had returned six months prior. Although it is not necessarily an emergency program and was funded through the NGOs private funds, it provided a firm foundation for people to gain the skills, experience, income and links to markets to begin planning for their future.

Summary Findings of the Case Studies

Despite the different contextual factors, all three country case studies demonstrate that transitioning from relief to development is challenging and requires a significant amount of time, flexibility of funding, and effective coordination. Effective programs described in the case studies were generally developmental in nature (even when they were funded by humanitarian donors) and adjusted to the specific needs arising from protracted conflict and displacement, such as the destruction of livelihoods, institutions, property, and the social fabric among communities. These program approaches warrant further evaluation and expansion by NGOs, UNHCR, and donors. The findings also demonstrate that some good practice, such as services in urban settings, remain limited despite high-level interest from NGOs, UNHCR, and PRM and the fact that the majority of refugees live in urban setting. While PRM has called for proposals in urban areas in a number of contexts, including Pakistan, the number of such NGO projects funded directly by PRM remains limited. The program examples noted in this study can be categorized into two approaches to bridge the relief to development divide. One approach seeks to increase the self-sufficiency of beneficiaries so that they can meet their own basic needs. While self-sufficiency of beneficiaries and communities is a desired outcome across contexts and types of assistance, the expectations of such programs should be modest due to

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dynamic contextual factors and often recurring emergencies. In addition, resource poor environments with weak economic markets and infrastructure may not realistically support sustainable livelihoods. Camp settings, in particular, are often defined by limited freedom of movement and lack of access to livelihoods, which inhibit self-sufficiency and integration. The second programmatic approach is to link programs or beneficiaries to development processes and programs so that they are absorbed into existing public services or other development programs. This approach is most effective when there is a shift in both the local capacities and responsibilities of state or local institutions, such as in contexts of return and reintegration or (ideally, de jure) local integration. Countries with a very low human resource base, such as Liberia or South Sudan, often require technical assistance over extended periods of time (often spanning generations) in order to build the capacity and systems to administer and deliver services. While UNHCR often provides technical assistance to host government offices responsible for displacement issues, these offices often lack political clout within the government and do not significantly influence other ministries which are responsible for basic service provision. Although this study did not find such examples, UNHCR should consider more creative ways of integrating its displacement experts into key service delivery ministries (such as those involved in health, education, justice, and rural development), particularly in statebuilding contexts during key policy development periods. Such an approach should ensure that the particular needs of IDPs and/or returnees are recognized early on and addressed during planning and implementation.
Figure 1: Approaches to Transition

Beneficiary Self-Sufficiency Goal To build capacity of beneficiaries and affected communities to meet their own needs and support an enabling environment for them to do so -Displaced and host communities -Private sector -Local government actors, including police, judiciary, legal associations, municipalities, etc. -Local service providers, including private clinics and schools -Community-based organizations -Legal aid (example 4) -Livelihoods (examples 2, 8, and 9) -Rights-based programming (example 4)

Transitioning Services to Development Actors To facilitate the transition from short-term, life-saving relief to longer-term recovery and development assistance -Displaced and host communities -National and local government entities -Development donors -Dual-mandated and development NGOs -Local NGOs and civil society

Key Stakeholders

Program Examples

-Joint programs between host and refugee communities (example 6) -Transfer of NGO staff to local institutions (example 1) -Capacity-building (examples 1 and 3) -Inclusion in public services or national programs (example 5)

In the case studies, the type and flexibility of funding proved to be more important than the amount of 6 funding available. For example, while Pakistan is the third largest recipient of U.S. assistance, there were no joint programs or concrete examples of effective coordination between USAID and PRM regarding refugee assistance. PRM has taken steps to address some of the obstacles, in particular by instituting a multi-year funding option for up to three years to its NGO partners, which would allow for more planning
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Congressional Research Services, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2013 Budget and Appropriations, July 23, 2012.

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and flexibility. This mechanism, however, has not been widely used by NGOs due to a low level of under7 standing of its purpose and risk aversion to different approaches at the expense of traditional programs. While PRMs use of multi-year proposals has significant potential to support strong transitional programs, success should be defined and focused on meeting transitional indicators and objectives, rather than timelines. The case studies demonstrate that a three-year program cycle may not always adequate to support the full handover of programs to development partners. UNDPs RAHA program took four years 8 from the initial concept to begin implementation, while in Liberia, the transfer of NGO staff to the MoH required two to four years. Donors should also curb expectations of the impact of transitional programs since crises often recur and a multitude of external factors will affect a vulnerable individuals or communitys capacity to recover and be self-sufficient. An individual NGO or a single project will have a very limited impact unless it is well-coordinated and situated within a comprehensive, multi-pronged transition strategy. For example, humanitarian NGOs in Liberia were able to successfully transfer staff to MoH management structures after extensive institutionbuilding efforts by donors and development actors. In Sri Lanka, aid agencies were able to take on a number of innovations in the transition from relief to early recovery, largely due to the generally unified focus of major donors on the recovery of conflict-affected populations. On the other hand, the full transition will depend on the government of Sri Lankas willingness to address issues of governance and security sector reform. While there were positive program examples in Pakistan, the lack of coordination among key stakeholders meant that they remained limited in scope. Donors and aid agencies should ensure that they and their partners are contributing to effective coordination and sharing of information and best practices.

The Transition Policy Gap

Think tanks, academics, donors, NGOs, and UN entities have studied and written extensively on the challenges and solutions to addressing the transition from relief to development for decades, with modifications in the framework to adapt to global trends in disasters and international aid. Beginning in the 1970s, when Cold War proxy conflicts led to protracted refugee situations in developing countries, the transition discussion focused on implementing a broad development approach in countries of asylum to assist refugees, host communities, and host governments. As the Cold War and associated proxy conflicts came to an end in the 1990s, donors then focused on post-conflict reconstruction and major return operations, which marked UNHCRs early aid efforts in countries of origin. Post-9/11 aid policies, in which donor governments sought to integrate aid and security objectives, added a new dimension to the humanitarian9 development nexus. In response to the most recent food crises combined with international financial austerity, the resilience agenda has become the latest priority for USAID and other donors, although the concept remains ill-defined. Despite high level efforts to improve coordination and disseminate best practice on strengthening the links between relief and development over the past four decades, many if not all of the previously identified problems of weak leadership and coordination, lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities, and lack of flexible funding mechanisms continue to inhibit successful transitional programming.
A Challenge of Definitions

While both humanitarian and development actors aim to improve the lives of vulnerable people, there are inherent differences in approach that partially account for the difficulties in organizing an effective response to transition challenges. Humanitarian action is guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence, while development assistance is guided by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which emphasizes the principles of alignment with government priorities and systems to ensure
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Based on group and bilateral discussions with InterAction members. The RAHA concept was initiated in 2005 following the Brussels Consultation. RAHA program implementation began in 2009. 9 ODI-HPG, Beyond the continuum: The changing role of aid policy in protracted crises, 2004.

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sustainability. Humanitarian actors seek to be independent and impartial to gain acceptance from all parties to the conflict in order to carry out their work. On the other hand, development assistance is often 11 a political endeavor in support of a state, which may be a party to a conflict. Humanitarian action focuses assistance efforts on the most vulnerable individuals while development assistance engages societies and states to address its long-term problems in a sustainable manner. Furthermore, development approaches traditionally target secure, stable areas, as well as individuals or geographical regions that may be most viable for economic growth, rather than targeting those most in need. The term transition lacks substantive meaning and is subject to confusion among aid practitioners and policymakers. Similar to early recovery, it has traditionally been used to define types of programs under a variety of sectors, but it is often defined by what it is not - i.e. not lifesaving assistance and not sustainable development. The program examples above utilize development tools, however, rigid systems and funding streams among development donors often limit their own engagement in transition programs. InterAction developed a working definition for the purposes of the project, noted above, but it too remains broad due to vast differences in contextual factors. The UN-led cluster coordination system originally included a stand-alone early recovery cluster, but given its lack of effectiveness and multi-sectoral nature, it 12 has been integrated within all the clusters. Figure 2 below illustrates the multiple, overlapping approaches that could fall within the scope of a transitional program. The lack of a concrete definition has led to wide interpretations among different institutions and individuals, and the lack of clear objectives and indicators to measure the effectiveness of transitional programming.
Figure 2: Approaches to Responding to Conflict and Promoting Peace and Recovery

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Source: ODI-HPG, Early Recovery: An Overview of Policy Debates and Operational Challenges, November 2009.
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OECD, Paris Declarations on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 originally focused primarily on poverty reduction, but legislation was later added to strengthen bilateral relationships with friendly governments, as well as engage in counter-terrorism and counter-narcotic activities. 12 IASC, Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at the Country Level, October 2012.

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NGO Programs and Policies

Due to the influence of contextual factors, it is challenging to develop policies, guidelines, or tools that are flexible yet specific enough to adequately support transitional programs. No InterAction member interviewed for this study has a specific policy for transitional programs, although many have tools and guidance on specific sectors, such as health systems strengthening and capacity-building of local partners, which are transitional by nature. The vast majority of InterAction member organizations involved in this study are dual, if not multi-mandated, and representatives note that transitioning from relief to development is embedded within their mandates and missions. InterAction members widely cited the lack of funding as the main limitation to implementing transitional programs - an issue which has generally worsened with global austerity measures and decreases in private funding (from foundations, private citizens, etc). Private, unearmarked funding allows NGOs to invest in innovations, implement programs in geographical areas or sectors neglected by institutional donors, and fill specific, time-bound gaps between project cycles. Many NGOs that rely primarily on government donor funding noted that their exit strategies were determined by the availability of funds to keep basic operations and staff in place to plan and implement transitional programs. While U.S. humanitarian donors have generally given their partners flexibility to engage in transitional programs some NGOs reported that they were restricted from including more developmental components, such as capacity-building, in some instances. To cope with the unpredictable nature of funding, one NGO representative said, Recovery starts from day one and we begin planning immediately when funding is still available. Other agencies noted the use of multiple funding sources to support broader transitional programs, such as complementing an OFDA-funded humanitarian project with a peacebuilding component funded by the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. As detailed above in the Sri Lanka case study (example 7), one NGO is piloting the re-structuring of several of its country programs in situations of protracted conflict in order to shift from relying on project funding to long-term, strategic planning. This approach, however, was only possible due to the NGOs unique access to significant private funding sources to fill the gaps between projects and phases.
U.S. Government Policies

The U.S. government has no strategy or lead office with a mandate or dedicated resources for managing transitions from relief to development, but various offices and bureaus within USAID, the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Agriculture have played roles in both transition contexts and programs. Although the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) aims to foster security and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict as a central national security objective 13 and as a core State mission that must be closely supported by USAID, it has not been consistently implemented largely due to a lack of flexible resources and inability to influence successful transitions. The variety of actors, coupled with weak inter-agency coordination and the lack of dedicated resources to support transitional programming and strategies, means that many displaced and conflict-affected populations remain vulnerable and lack solutions for many years after the initial emergency. OFDA is responsible for coordinating U.S. government efforts to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of disasters. The latter objective provides the basis for OFDAs involvement in transitions. PRM has the mandate within the U.S. government to address and re14 solve conflict-induced displacement by achieving durable solutions for IDPs and refugees. Over two-

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QDDR Leading Through Civilian Power, 2011. Options for durable solutions for refugees include: local integration in host country; resettlement in a third country; or return and reintegration in country of origin. For IDPs, durable solutions include: local integration in host community; resettlement to a third location within the country; or return to area of origin.

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thirds of all refugees have been in exile for more than five years with no solution in sight and many are no longer in a state of acute crisis. The establishment of camps, particularly in refugee settings, often means that peoples movements are restricted, as well as their access to livelihoods, which render them dependent on humanitarian assistance. Some aid groups note that camp-based responses are not cost16 effective, limit the rights of displaced, and rarely contribute to achieving a durable solution. PRM recognized the need for developmental approaches in situations of protracted displacement and return and reintegration and in 2012 developed a draft policy on the transition from relief to development. However, the draft policy only applies to PRM and not to other U.S. government offices engaged in development. In addition, transitioning refugee assistance to development actors is doubly challenging in refugee contexts because host governments are often resource-poor and rarely prioritize or include refugees and other non-citizens in its national development plans. Many host governments perceive refugees as security threats or undocumented migrants and actively exclude them from public services and devel17 opment programs, such as in Bangladesh and Kenya. Within the U.S. government, there are no examples from USAIDs Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS), (which guide country-level planning, programs, and resource allocation over a three to five year period) of development assistance 18 targeting refugees, outside of situations of return. A number of USAID missions, however, have incor19 porated IDPs into their development planning. Prioritizing marginalized IDPs and returnees, as well as other minority communities, within a countrys development framework, however, can be challenged by governments which are not inclusive, as illustrated in the Sri Lanka case study. Within the U.S. government, USAID is largely responsible for long-term development programs on poverty alleviation, economic development, and health. However, as widely noted by aid experts, U.S. foreign assistance mechanisms are cumbersome and uncoordinated, with up to 26 different U.S. government 20 agencies involved in its provision. Furthermore, much of USAIDs funding is heavily earmarked by Congress or siloed into flagship programs, which limits its flexibility and available resources to support country ownership and national priorities at the mission-level. USAIDs development programs take much longer to plan and lack the flexibility in funding mechanisms that humanitarian donors have, which inhibits its ability to respond quickly or invest limited funds in situations which are fragile or in crisis. On the other 21 hand, the growing instrumentalization of aid to meet U.S. security objectives has obligated USAID to implement development programs in contested spaces such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, where counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are high U.S. government priorities. The lack of evidence for the role of development aid in enhancing security has largely predetermined the failure to support sustainable development in these contexts. The QDDR stated that in the recovery phase, it is particularly important for development professionals to design short-term projects and programs in ways that will make it easier to transition to longer-term sus22 tainable development. Yet, USAID lacks the flexibility and resources to practically implement this approach because there is no U.S. government-wide strategy to transition from humanitarian funding streams to development to meet the longer-term needs of crisis-affected people. While USAID plays a significant role in transitional programs in Liberia and Sri Lanka, this approach is not consistently imple15

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According to UNHCR Global Trends 2011, 7.1 million out of a total of 10.4 million refugees under UNHCRs protection mandate are in a protracted refugee situation. 16 Smith, Merrill, Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity, 2004. 17 In 2011, the government of Bangladesh rejected $33 million in development assistance to areas hosting unregistered refugees, who are recognized by UNHCR. In December 2012, the government of Kenya announced that all urban refugees should report to camps and that NGOs should no longer provide refugee assistance in urban areas. 18 Out of 15 finalized USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategies, which included three countries with large protracted refugee populations, no strategy included or acknowledged the presence of refugees. 19 Of the 15 CDCSs available to the public, Georgia, South Sudan, and Sri Lanka CDCSs include explicit plans to assist IDPs. 20 Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations, July 28, 2009. 21 In the administrations FY2013, 19% of all foreign assistance is directed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. 22 QDDR, p. 130

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mented in large-scale natural disasters or situations of protracted crises or displacement. One tool availa23 ble to USAID missions is the application of the crisis modifier in the strategic planning process, as well as within programs, to allow for development funding to be re-directed in dynamic or crisis-prone countries. In some critical sectors, such as housing, USAID has very limited development expertise and resources, which limits the ability to transition these activities within the U.S. governments aid agencies. Given the structural gap within the U.S. government, OFDA and PRM have, by default, often led efforts to support transitional programs but have received limited cooperation from USAID as its development resources are often allocated years in advance or bureaucratically restricted. The major challenge for humanitarian actors lies in determining when and how recovery or, in cases of displacement, a durable solution has been achieved. In the current environment of shrinking budgets and new complex emergencies, humanitarian funding for transitional programs will likely be further limited. PRM and OFDA have allowed flexibility in transitional programming, but the end of their engagement in the transition period is more often determined by the availability of funding rather than a handover to development actors. Humanitarian tools and funds are not designed to address long-term issues required to address recovery or support durable solutions to displacement, such as access to justice and institutionbuilding. While humanitarian efforts can be helpful to lay some groundwork, development actors need to be involved early on and resourced to do so to ensure ownership.

Conclusion
Transitional programs have often been taken on by humanitarian actors due to the bureaucratic processes and lack of flexibility and funding among development actors. To break this cycle, humanitarian and development donors should establish program linkages by improving inter-agency coordination through joint assessments and planning. While funding will always be a significant challenge, aid agencies must also go beyond the refrain of financial limitations and ensure that good practice is institutionalized across its staff and partners, particularly in urban services and livelihoods to improve outcomes for crisisaffected, vulnerable people. Without consistent efforts to transform the dialogue and practice on the nexus between emergency and development aid, these efforts will continue to fail. Key recommendations for humanitarian agencies and donors to consider when developing and reviewing proposals which aim to strengthen linkages between humanitarian and development programs and policies: General Approaches 1. Clearly define transition and if possible, its objectives within the specified context in consultation with beneficiaries and partners. For donors, clarify whether transition is intended to mainstream or hand over services to development actors, strengthen beneficiary self-sufficiency, or phase out programs completely. 2. Ensure that the development of policies on IDPs and humanitarian assistance are U.S. government-wide and give clear responsibilities to development actors in resolving displacement, as well as in care and maintenance programs. 3. Recognize that the transition from relief to development occurs in multiple phases and often at different rates in different areas, even within the same country; analyze and plan accordingly. 4. Define success by the achievement of transitional objectives rather than meeting timelines, and allow flexibility. Aid agencies should detail external factors which may have an impact on meeting any of the objectives.
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USAID, Automated Directive System 201.4.2.s on Post Crisis Planning and Implementation USAID Policies and Regulations, 2001.

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5. Ensure that strategies to transition from relief to development are well-coordinated and have general consensus among stakeholders, particularly beneficiary communities, local and national authorities, key UN agencies, donors, and NGOs. 6. Ensure that transitional programs and strategies are supported by U.S. diplomatic and aid efforts, as well as host government policies and, in refugee contexts, with the government of the country of origin. 7. Timing is essential. Effective collaboration and cooperation between humanitarian and development actors must begin as early as possible. Development planning and processes take more time and are difficult to change once implementation begins. 8. In annual program plans and appeals, encourage agencies such as UNHCR and OCHA to develop concrete indicators for transition and/or the achievement of durable solutions in partnership with national and local governments, beneficiaries, NGOs, and donors. This could include a mix of quantitative and qualitative elements, such as food security indicators, school attendance, confidence in national or local administration to address basic needs, etc. 9. For multi-mandated NGOs, proactively review whether development approaches and innovations are appropriate in displacement and recovery contexts and pilot implementation. 10. Humanitarian agencies and donors should invite NGO, USAID, and UN development personnel to participate in field assessments and monitoring visits to gain different perspectives and approaches. 11. Donors should request input from relevant USAID and UN development personnel when designing programs and reviewing project proposals. Program Design 12. Ensure that the needs and perspectives of beneficiaries and affected communities are always at the center of program design and implementation by instituting regular assessments and community consultations and incorporating beneficiary feedback into the monitoring and evaluation process. Include donor participation. 13. Ensure that programs are based on a thorough context analysis with stakeholder mapping to identify links between existing and potential humanitarian and development programs. 14. Aid agencies should develop appropriate indicators or benchmarks for transition within all projects in consultation with beneficiaries, local authorities, UNHCR, and other relevant NGOs. Ensure that these indicators are regularly monitored and adjusted as needed with beneficiary input. 15. Aid agencies should ensure that their respective monitoring and evaluations systems, particularly in protracted crises, track capacity-building and other transitional elements over time and that meeting specific benchmarks triggers an operational shift from relief to recovery or developmental approaches. 16. Aid agencies should develop an exit strategy for each project based on local contextual factors and scenario planning. Include the identification and assessment of local actors and other development actors capacities to takeover services. 17. If partnering with local NGOs or authorities to hand over service provision, aid agencies should include a capacity assessment to identify their current capacity and needs and outline a strategy to close the gaps. The strategy should include a post-handover monitoring period of at least six months to ensure that programs continue to run as planned. 18. Donors should only fund livelihood projects which are based on market assessments. 19. If a proposed project includes setting up stand alone services or facilities, aid agencies should outline the specific obstacles to operating within or strengthening existing facilities.

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Key recommendations for development actors, particularly USAID, to strengthen linkages between humanitarian and development programs and policies: 20. Ensure that the needs and capacities of populations affected and prone to crises, including displacement, are accounted for in long-term development objectives and planning, such as USAIDs Country Development Cooperation Strategy and the UN Development Assistance Framework. 21. For development programs targeting volatile areas or those prone to crises, build in mechanisms which increase flexibility, such as USAIDs crisis modifier to respond early and effectively to new or recurring disasters. 22. For development programs targeting volatile areas or those prone to crises, solicit input on program design from OFDA, PRM, and UN humanitarian agencies, such as OCHA and UNHCR. 23. For development programs implemented in volatile countries or those prone to crises, particularly those involving basic service provision and access to justice, identify the obstacles to addressing and accounting for the needs of displaced and disaster-affected populations. Share these with key humanitarian agencies and donors to identify long-term solutions and program approaches.

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