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Irreparable damage to future generations - In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran (224 SCRA 792 [1993]), several minors represented by their parents, filed a complaint against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to compel him to cancel all timber license agreements in the country, as well as to stop issuing new ones. The complaint asserted that continued felling of trees in Philippine rainforests would lead to deforestation and consequent irreparable damage, not only to the complainant minors, but to future generations as well. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right they were seeking to enforce and protect. On appeal in the Supreme Court, that argument was rejected and the court ruled that a denial or violation of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology by another, who has a duty to respect or protect the same, gives rise to a cause of action. In this case, the granting of timber license agreements by the DENR, allegedly done with grave abuse of discretion, gave rise to such cause of action. Profligate waste of the country's forest resources - The Supreme Court has also been most active in the protection of the country's forest resources. In Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary (190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990]), the court took judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy resources required by the people seriously depleted. Procedural remedies - The Court has been vigilant in ensuring that procedural remedies are not used to thwart the goals of environmental protection. In Paat, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (266 SCRA 167 [1997]), it was held that replevin - a special action to recover movable property - cannot be used to recover property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, recognizing that "[t]he suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR pursuant to the authority given [to it] under [the Forestry Code]." Interpretation of facts - In the interpretation of facts, the Court has not given in to the temptation of making hair-splitting distinctions to the detriment of environmental protection. Hence, in Mustang Lumber, Inc, v. Court of Appeals, et al. (257 SCRA 430 [1996]), the Court interpreted the term "timber" to include "lumber," since exclusion of the term "lumber" from the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has denuded Philippine forests. The Court said: "insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of [the Forestry Code] makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we." Provincial body to enact urgently needed legislation to pretect the environment - The Court has affirmed the important role of the local government in environmental protection, in Tano, et al. v. Socrates, et al. (278 SCRA 154 [1997]). The Court upheld the validity of several government ordinances which, in essence, aimed to prohibit cyanide fishing. The Court commended the legislative bodies of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will in enacting urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing in the Herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. It expressed the hope that othe local government units would be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of Philippine fishery and aquatic resources, the legacy to future generations.
Developing the field of environmental protection - The Court has to keep up with the constant development of the field of environmental protection, ever attempting to interpret traditional legal concepts in light of emerging trends in environmental law. The Regalian doctrine that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of he Philippines belong to the State must be reconciled with the concept of native title and the ancestral domain claims of indigenous cultural communities. The traditional concepts or property ownership should increasingly accommodate the responsibility to

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protect the environment. Conventional notions of value must incorporate the concept of environmental costs. In the area of international conventions, the Court must find ways of recognizing and breathing life into international commitments, even, as is often the case, in the absence of implementing legislation.

[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]

PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules). In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. [1] In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition. On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed. On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-inIntervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed. The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted. Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution: (1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

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(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples; (3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands; (4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains; (5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands; (6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and (7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation. [2] Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.[3] In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. [4] These provisions are: (1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands; (2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates; (3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples; (4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and (5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples.[5] Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. [6]

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Petitioners pray for the following: (1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid; (2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules; (3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998; (4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and (5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources. [7] After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, GonzagaReyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Isagani Cruz vs DENR

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as

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minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners. ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Apex Mining vs SMGM Corp., G.R. No. 152613,November 20, 2009 Facts: Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SMGM) assails the Courts Decision dated 23 June 2006, which held that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SMGM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents. In view of this, and considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the Mining Act of1995, mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having been overtaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive Department toundertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified. Issue: Is PP No. 297, declaring the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as a mineral reservation, valid and constitutional, on the ground that it lacks the concurrence of Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution? Ruling: PP No. 297 is valid and constitutional even without concurrence from Congress. The Court recognized that the questioned proclamation came from a co-equal branch of government, which entitled it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. The presumption of its constitutionality stands inasmuch as the parties in the instant cases did not question its validity, much less present any evidence to prove that the same is unconstitutional. Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution provides that the area covered by forest lands and national parks may not been expanded or reduced, unless pursuant to a law enacted by Congress. SEM does not allege nor present any evidence that Congress had already enacted a statute determining with specific limits forest lands and national parks. Considering the absence of such law, Proclamation No. 297 could not have violated Section 4, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. In addition, there is nothing in the constitutional provision that prohibits the President from declaring a forest land as an environmentally critical area and from regulating the mining operations therein by declaring it as a mineral reservation in order to prevent the further degradation of the forest environment and to resolve the health and peace and order problems that beset thearea. **you can opt not to write the 3rd paragraph in the index card**
G.R. No. 85904 August 21, 1990 TEODORO MEDRANA, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and SUPREME AGGREGATES CORPORATION, respondents. Abelardo Albis, Jr. for petitioner.

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Benigno Ignacio for Supreme Aggregates Corporation. RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.: In this Special Civil Action for Certiorari, petitioner Teodoro Medrana asks us to set aside the decision of the Office of the President dated 20 September 1988 in O.P. Case No. 2143. In that decision, the Hon. Magdangal B. Elma, Deputy Executive Secretary, acting "by authority of the President, set aside a decision of the then Minister of Natural Resources dated 7 May 1982 and reinstated a decision of the Director of Mines dated 13 March 1981. This controversy, which began in 1979, relates to Mining Lease Contract ("MLC") No. V-754 which the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued to private respondent Supreme Aggregates Corporation ("Supreme Aggregates") on 30 June 1969. This Mining Lease Contract has a lifetime of twenty-five (25) years and covers twenty-two (22) mining claims for volcanic cinder, etc., situated in Calamba, Laguna Province and Sto. Tomas, Batangas Province. On 17 May 1974, P.D. No. 463 known as "The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974" was promulgated. Sections 100 and 101 of P.D. No. 463 provided as follows: Sec. 100. Old Valid Mining Rights May Come Under This Decree. Holders of valid and subsisting mining locations and other rights under other laws, irrespective of the areas covered, may avail of the rights and privileges granted under this Decree by making the necessary application therefor and approval thereof by the Director within a period of two (2) years from the date of approval of this Decree. Sec. 101. Recognition and Survey of Old Subsisting Mining Claims. All mining grants, patents, locations, leases and permits subsisting at the time of the approval of this Decree shall be recognized if registered pursuant to Section 100 thereof-Provided, That Spanish Royal Grants and unpatented mining claims located and registered under the Act of the United States Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, otherwise known as the 'Philippine Bill' shall be surveyed within one (1) year from the approval of this Decree: Provided, further, That no such mining rights shall be recognized if there is failure to comply with the fundamental requirements of the respective grants And provided, finally, That such grants, patents, locations, leases or permits as may be recognized by the Director after proper investigation shall comply with the applicable provisions of this Decree, more particularly with the annual work obligations, submittal of reports, fiscal provisions and other obligations. (Emphasis supplied) On 14 May 1976, within the period prescribed in Section 100 above, Supreme Aggregates filed with the Bureau of Mines an Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges under P.D. No. 463 which application was required by Sections 100 and 101, above, from all claimowners and lessees desirous of maintaining their pre-existing rights under the regime inaugurated by that decree. On 27 February 1979, the Director of the Bureau of Mines issued an order denying Supreme Aggregates' Application on the ground that Supreme Aggregates had failed to submit Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations. On 15 June 1979, the Director of Mines issued Quarry Temporary Permits ("QTPs") Nos. 85, 86 and 87 to petitioner Teodoro Medrana. These permits covered areas within the territory leased to Supreme Aggregates under MLC No. V-754. Fourteen days later, on 29 June 1979, Supreme Aggregates filed a petition with the Director of Mines praying for reinstatement of its rejected Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges and for cancellation of Medrana's QTPs Nos. 85, 86 and 87. Medrana filed an answer to this petition.

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After investigation, the Director of Mines rendered a decision dated 13 March 1981 ordering the reinstatement of Supreme Aggregates' Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges and the cancellation of Medrana's QTPs Nos. 85, 86 and 87 since these covered areas within Supreme Aggregates' valid and subsisting MLC No. V-754. On appeal by Medrana, the Ministry of Natural Resources reinstated Medrana's QTPs Nos. 85, 86 and 87, and declared that Supreme Aggregates' MLC No. V-754 had lapsed. In so deciding, former Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Q. Pea reasoned that the order of the Bureau of Mines which had rejected Supreme Aggregates' Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges had already become final when Supreme Aggregates filed its petition for reinstatement of its Application on 29 June 1979, that is, one hundred and twenty (120) days after its receipt of the Bureau of Mines order of denial. Former Minister Pena further held that the failure of Supreme Aggregates to file an Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges under P.D. No. 463 caused its Mining Lease Contract to lapse and opened the leased area to relocation. 1 Supreme Aggregates then filed an appeal with the Office of the President. The Office of the President, as already noted, in a decision dated 20 September 1988, reversed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources and in essence held that the failure to submit Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations for two (2) consecutive years did not, by itself and standing alone, result in the automatic cancellation of MLC No. V-754. In the instant Petition for Certiorari, petitioner Medrana submits that the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in reinstating Supreme Aggregates' MLC No. V-754 and cancelling petitioner's QTPs for the following reasons: 1. Private respondent Supreme Aggregates had abandoned its Mining Lease Contract by failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 27 of P.D. No. 463. 2. The Bureau of Mines had declared the quarry covered by MLC No. V-754 as open for relocation of claims by virtue of the cancellation of that MLC. Moreover, petitioner Medrana, being registered owner of much of the land covered by MLC No. V-754, claims a preferential right to exploit the said quarry under Section 67 of P.D. No. 463. 3. Even before the issuance of QTPs Nos. 85, 86 and 87 to petitioner, the order of the Director of Mines denying Supreme Aggregates' Application had already become final and executory five (5) days from receipt of that order by private respondent Supreme Aggregates. We consider below petitioner's contentions seriatim. We note, preliminarily, that under Section 5 of P.D. No. 309, from a decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources in cases involving conflicting mining claims, an appeal may be taken within five (5) days to the President "whose decision shall be final and executory". Clearly, therefore, further appeal from or review of the decision of the Office of the President is not available to petitioner. To succeed, petitioner must show that the Office of the President committed a grave abuse of discretion, or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, in rendering the decision he assails. 1. In the form it existed at the relevant time i.e., February 1979-Section 27 of P.D. No. 463, as amended by P.D. No. 1385, read as follows: Sec. 27. Proof of Annual Work Obligations. The claimowner/ lessee shall submit proof ofcompliance with the annual work obligations by filing an affidavit therefor and the statement of expenditures and technical report in the prescribed form in support thereof with the Mines Regional Officer within sixty (60) days from the end of the year in which the work obligation is required:Provided, That failure of the claimowner to comply therewith for two (2) consecutive years shall constitute automatic abandonment of the mining claims: Provided, Further, That, if it is found uponfield verification that no such work was actually done on the mining claims, the claimowner/lessee shall likewise lose all his rights thereto notwithstanding submission of the aforesaid documents. (Emphasis supplied) Careful reading of the above-quoted Section 27 shows that abandonment of a mining claim or lease results fromfailure to comply with the annual work obligations on the area covered by a mining claim or lease for two (2)

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consecutive years. The precipitating event of the lapse of a mining claim or lease contemplated in Section 27 is the failure to carry out actual work on a mining claim or lease, and not simply the failure to submit in a timely manner the Affidavit of annual Work Obligations. That Affidavit constitutes simply proof of compliance with the annual work obligations. 2 Execution and submission of an Affidavit of Annual Work Obligations creates a presumption that the work obligation was indeed carried out. This presumption is by no means a conclusive one, but is, on the contrary, merely a prima facie one since Section 27 expressly prescribes that "if it is found upon field verification that no such work was actually done on the mining claims, the claimowner/lessee shall likewise lose his rights thereto notwithstanding submission of the aforesaid documents". It follows that, conversely, failure to submit the Affidavit of Annual Work Obligations raises the presumption that no work was actually done, but that this presumption too can be overturned by affirmative proof e.g. by "field verification that the required annual work obligations had in fact been carried out on the mining claim or leased area. To hold that the mere failure to submit the Affidavits resulted in automatic abandonment of MLC No. V-754 notwithstanding the actual performance of work obligations, would not only run counter to the express language of Section 27, but would also be to exalt form over substance. In Teodoro v. Macaraeg, 3 the Court elaborated on the notion of abandonment in the following, quite definite, terms:
The word "abandon", in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root Idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on thefinality and the publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in the control of another, and hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never again to resume or claim one's rights or interests. in other words the act of abandonment constitutes actual, absolute and irrevocable desertion of one's right or property. In the case at bar, Macaraeg merely intended to vacate his leasehold possession on the condition that a certain Claus be taken as his successor. Hence, his act did not constitute desertion of his leasehold as it was a mere intended surrender of the same. And as correctly espoused by the counsel for the respondent court, it is 'only through the actual surrender of the land that tenancy relation terminates; no amount of intention to surrender severs the relationship'. Furthermore, the said act of Macaraeg was not an absolute renunciation of his leasehold possession, as it was in fact clearly conditional. 4 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, abandonment may be said to result where there is concurrence of two (2) elements: the first being the intent to abandon a right or claim and the second being the external act by which that intention is expressed and carried into effect. There must, moreover, be an actual, as distinguished from a merely projected, relinquishment of a claim or right; otherwise the right or claim is not vacated or waived so as to be susceptible of being appropriated by the next owner. These two (2) requirements are clearly lacking in the case at bar. The Director of Mines and public respondent Office of the President had found that, in point of fact, private respondent Supreme Aggregates had performed its annual work obligations. Supreme Aggregates could not therefore be said to have intended to abandon its mining claim or lease, notwithstanding the fact that it had failed to submit the normal documentary proof of performance of annual work obligations that is, the Affidavit of Annual Work Obligations. We agree, therefore, with the conclusion of the Office of the President that in the instant case, there was no abandonment, whether automatic or voluntary, of MLC No. V-754. 2. It is true that under Section 67 of P.D. No. 463, petitioner Medrana, as registered owner of the superficies of the land here involved, had a "preferential right to exploit the quarry resources found therein". That right, however, was simply a preferential right, and that right was ineffective to dissolve the pre-existing or subsisting right of private respondent Supreme Aggregates. The order of 27 February 1979 of the Director of Mines, denying Supreme Aggregates' Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges, did not have, nor did it purport to have, the effect of cancelling or declaring the automatic abandonment of MLC No. V-754; as noted above, there simply was no legal basis for so cancelling or declaring it as abandoned. It follows that the 27 February 1979 order did not produce the effect of opening up the areas leased in MLC No. V-754 to location or new acquisition of lights by petitioner Medrana, or by any other person for that matter. 5 It follows, furthermore, that petitioner's QTPs Nos. 85, 86 and 87 were not validly issued to begin with and that the express cancellation of the QTPs decreed in the Director of Mines' decision of 13 March 1981, which formally rectified his error by reinstating Supreme Aggregates' Application, was not even necessary being mere confirmatory of the juridical situation. 3. We turn to the question of whether or not Supreme Aggregates' petition dated 29 June 1979 for reinstatement of its rejected Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges and for cancellation of Medrana's QTPs Nos. 85, 86 and 87,

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had been filed seasonably. It is claimed by petitioner Medrana that that order of the Director of Mines had ipso facto cancelled Supreme Aggregates' MLC No. V-754 and that in any case, that order of the Director of Mines had already become final and executory by the time Supreme Aggregates filed its petition for reinstatement of its Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges. We have already pointed out above that the denial order of the Director of Mines did not have the effect of ipsofacto cancelling MLC No. V-754. It remains only therefore to determine whether, as petitioner contends and as the former Minister of Natural Resources held, the rejection order of the Director of Mines became final and executory upon expiration of five (5) days from receipt thereof by Supreme Aggregates, under Section 5 of P.D. No. 309. Section 5 of P.D. No. 309, entitled Establishing Rules and Procedures for the Speedy Disposition or Settlement of Conflicting Mining Claims", provides as follows: Sec. 5. Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director of Mines may, within five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who shall render his decision within five (5) days from receipt of the appeal or submission of the report of the Department panel of investigators, as the case may be. From the decision of the Secretary, an appeal may be taken within five (5) days to the President whose decision shall be final and executory. We agree with the Office of the President that Section 5 of P.D. No. 309 has no application to the case at bar. As its title clearly indicates, P.D. No. 309 applies only to cases involving conflicting mining claims, that is to say, to orders or decisions issued in adversarial or litigated proceedings involving mining claims with conflicting or overlapping boundaries. Section 3 of P.D. No. 309 makes this clear Sec. 3 . ... For the purpose of expediting the exploration and exploitation of our mineral resources, theproceedings above-described will be so conducted so that the case so heard by the Director of Mines and/or through the Panel of Investigators shall be a final adjudication of rights over miningclaim or claims subject to litigations and conflicts. including the exploration and exploitation thereof. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 of P.D. No. 309 quoted above and the five (5) days reglementary period can scarcely be made to apply to situations where there are no opposing or contending parties, as in the case of private respondent Supreme Aggregates' Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges with the Bureau of Mines. It must also be recalled that when the Director of Mines on 27 February 1979 denied Supreme Aggregates' Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges, there were as yet no conflicting claims asserted in respect of Supreme Aggregates' leased area. Petitioner Medrana's QTPs were issued only three (3) months after the Director of Mines had initially denied Supreme Aggregates' application. We conclude that petitioner has entirely failed to show that Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal Elma had committed any error in rendering the decision of the Office of the President dated 20 September 1988. But even if petitioner had succeeded in showing that the Office of the President had indeed misconstrued some provision of P.D. No. 463 as amended, or of the Rules and Regulations implementing P.D. No. 463, or of P.D. No. 309, such error would still be merely an error of law or an error of judgment and certainly not a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari must be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 20 September 1988 of the Office of the President AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.