ATSS-BAR 5 October 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THESIS

SUBJECT: Thesis Statement
1. Thesis Statement: The loss of The Battle for Moscow (October-December 1941) was of direct
result of environmental conditions, not a superior Russian Army.
a. Broad Subject: Effects of weather and terrain in combat.
b. Narrowed Topic: Battle for Moscow
c. Group Members:
AHMED HUSSEIN
ANDREW J SCHEUERMANN
BRIAN K. KINSEY
MATTHEWD. KEMPER
TABITHA L. HODGE
2. Request approval/disapproval of this Haines paper topic.
~ ' J . " ' ..LAN K. KINSEY
SGM, USA
Group Chairperson
I approve / disapprove this topic.
WILLIE BRITTON
SGM, USA
ROI Faculty Advisor
2
Haines Paper Outline
How Weather Can Effects Combat Operations
ROt
SGMBRITTON
Thesis Statement: The loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct
result of environmental conditions, not a superior Russian Anny.
I. The Soldier MSGHodge
A. Soldier Morale
B. Clothing
II. The Partisan effort SGM Hussein
A. Contributions
B. The Right to Bear Anns
III. Terrain SGMKinsey
A. Terrain Features
B. Lines of Communication
IV. Annaments SGMKemper
A. Weapons
B. Effects of Weather on Employment of Weapons
V. The Opposing View MSG Scheuermann
A. Adolph Hitler
B. The Military Decision Making Process
VI. Conclusion
3
On the night of June 22, 1941, more than 3 million German soldiers, 600,000 vehicles
and 3350 tanks were positioned along a 2000km front stretching from the Baltic to the Black
Sea. Their sites were all trained on Russia. For Hitler, the inevitable assault on Russia was to be
the culmination of a long standing obsession. He had always wanted Russia's industries and
agricultural lands as part of his living space for Germany and their Thousand Year Reich. While
the Russians were well aware of German preparations, and were tipped off to the impending
invasion by both their own intelligence, as well foreign sources, the Germans achieved total
surprise. The Germans employed three army groups North, Center, and South and planned to
destroy all Soviet resistance in swift advances on Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev. Hitler threw
183 divisions into the assault, while the Nazis faced 170 divisions, which represented 54 percent
of the Red Army's total strength.
Coupled with the element of surprise, the Germans possessed better training, more
extensive experience, and were able to obtain decisive superiority at the points selected for
attack. The Russians had large amounts of obsolete equipment, were poorly deployed to meet the
attack, and lacked defensive positions. As a result, the Russian frontier was quickly overrun and
the Germans achieved penetrations in many places. By 16 July, 1941, the Germans had captured
Smolensk, which was less than 250 miles from Moscow, and Army Group Center alone had
captured about 600,000 men and 5,000 tanks. By the end of July the Germans controlled an area
of the Soviet territory more than twice the size of France.
The failure of Typhoon almost entirely due to its lateness. According to schedule,
Moscow would be captured during the early part of the month ofAugust, long before the cold
winter could set in. In reality, the German invasion armies had been held back by variables that
Hitler and the German General Staffhad not anticipated such as supply problems, local
4
resistance, Hilter's changes in priorities and the devestating effects that the weather conditions
had on the terrain and communications. These delays would eventually prove costly as the
unprepared and poorly supplied German troops marched on towards Moscow.
The Germans also knew that the Russian roads were inferior for their vehicles and that
the Russian railway tracks were of a different size than what they were using yet, no department
or planning logistics ever took these factors into account before the invasion took place.
Another significant factor outlined by Bethell and Wright was the fact the Russian troops
were well aware of the advantages they had in their climate and rugged terrain. Bethell outlines
excellent examples of this in the dense Forests of Poland and the soggy lands of the Pripet
Marshes. No German tanks could operate in these hazardous areas and there was ample cover
for small groups. Russian infantry would superbly camouflage themselves and infiltrate the
German positions through the forests and they even displayed their resourcefulness by
communicating to each other by imitating animal cries. (Bethell 72)
Combined with the willingness to fight at any odds and the intimate knowledge of their
own terrain it is plain to see that the Russian were definitely not going to fall as easily as Hitler
had first thought. Besides the brutal tenacity ofthe resistance, Germany had another problem, the
climate. In the summer of 1941, the Ukraine has suffered a scorching summer which saw a large
amount of rainfall. In the intense heat, the German tank tracks ground the baked earth to
powdery fme dust which clogged machinery, eyes and mouths and made it hard for troops to
function. When it rained, it brought short relief to the heat but, the roads turned into axle-deep
mud paths that halted all movement while horses got stuck in mud and troops had their boots
sucked right off them only to stay in the ground. Thousands of vehicles had to be left as they
were because they ran out of fuel to get out ofthe mud and the supply paths were choked as well.
5
These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by
destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible.
While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold,
figuratively and literally, in Russia, the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh
'general winter' which froze everything to the core. As Germany pressed on towards Moscow,
the cold weather really took its toll. All too often the Germans didn't have enough supplies to
survive let alone fight.
During offensive operations, physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and
will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers. The October rains
contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers. By mid October the
combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days, causing the dirt roads
to become muddy. After days of continuous rain, the German soldiers found themselves
marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud. These rainy conditions were a strain on the
soldiers. Not only did they lose their equipment, but they also lost their boots as they tread
through the thickness of the mud. Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet, muddy
and very exhausted. Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these
conditions continued to deteriorate. Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary, "October 21,
1941. The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness".
In November the situation grew worse. The wet rain turned into snow and the
temperatures started to decline significantly. The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching
through the mud, but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger. The
soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way. However they found themselves
infected with lice and disease. The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers
6
desperately depended on. Because the supply trains were unable to get through, most of the
soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed
to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold.
At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow
the supply trains to get through. With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one
partially paved, the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains. In
order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed, they required 25 to 30 supply trains
monthly. Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November. The
leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food
for the soldiers, but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers. This decision
was made by Hitler, which coupled by the cold weather, resulted in more casualties from the
cold than from combat operations.
As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse.
Because of the lack of supplies, bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became
their main form of subsistence. Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they
could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper. Unfortunately, newspaper
was as hard to fmd as everything else. Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered
with straw. Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other
warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth. During December
it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid
while trying to keep warm.
The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost.
Initially, the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every
7
engagement. Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is
inherent in all that have fought on their own soil. Soviet determination was enough to slow
down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather, would eventually stop him.
There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the
French Soldier in 1812.
The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold. Nevertheless, not even the Soviet
soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and
horses frozen solid in the snow. Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier,
they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions. Having trained and lived
with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions, he was able to out maneuver and
eventually out fight the German army.
The failure ofthe German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the
advantage of adequate supplies. Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was
required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier. The Soviet
soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him. Their primary means of
travel was on horseback, with one or two soldiers to each horse. They sustained their horses on
the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread.
In December, a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines. These soldiers arrived from
Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood. These soldiers
proved very versatile, much to the dismay of the German soldier. Their clothing allowed them to
move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow. The arrival of
Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the
8
Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has
proven, demoralized soldiers do not win wars.
The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the
Gennan soldier. With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions,
any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale. The Soviet winter was proving to be
more dangerous then the enemy. With every passing day, the incidence of extreme cases of
frostbite increased. Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier
best when he wrote, "Despite all claims and reports, it has not been understood by those above
that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov, 179)."
The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July
1941. Twelve days after the Gennan attack, Stalin called for the establishment of an underground
movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy. During the Battle for Moscow in 1941,
the objectives ofthe Partisans were military, political, and economic in nature. The military
mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces, inflict maximum damage on military and
industrial installations, and gather intelligence. Stalin's political aim was to hold the allegiance
ofthe Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas ofthe USSR and the communist
regime. Application took the aspect of persuasion by a variety of means. Actions ranging from
propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day.
The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the
occupied areas. The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy, tactics, and
military weapons used against the Gennans. Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other
functions. They collected taxes for the Soviet government, recruited soldiers for the Red Anny,
9
and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located. They performed as the
long arm ofthe Soviet government (Zhuvov, 178).
Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to
combat enemy troops. The Partisan's fomented warfare everywhere. They destroyed bridges,
railroads, roadways, telephone lines, set fires to forests, stores and transport. In the occupied
region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices. They
were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated. Agencies
closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party, the People's
Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and the Red Army (Von Luttichau, 1963). A vast amount of
"Freedom Fighters" were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the
scheme of Russian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive. Additional tasks were
to strive and prevent, by force ifnecessary, the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty
from the Russians to the Germans. The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied
diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target. Partisans often
lived off the land . They took food and clothing as needed from the local population, either by
requisitioning or simply looting. Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large
quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields of earlier campaigns. Small
amounts of materials were attained from collaborators. The Partisans maintained a very low
standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities. For instance, simple staples such as
tobacco, soap, medical supplies, and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did
without. When the mission was complete or the training period was over, the Partisans returned
to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population. They used the same
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts.
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call ofthe
party and government for the defense of Moscow. Everyone worked day and night, people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep. Driven by a feeling of personal responsibility
for the fate of Moscow and the fate of the homeland, the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal. Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny, the
Partisans refused to surrender. The partisan's sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success. The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the region's history. Despite the conditions, the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey,
1975).
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle, the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans. The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere. The militias, when properly formed, were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms. To preserve their country,
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use. The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people.
The possession of arms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime. A well-regulated militia, composed of citizens and husbandmen, took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights. The belief ofthe day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel of a weapon. In April 11 1944, Hitler revealed his agenda of
"gun control" (Macksey, 1975). He remarked, "The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns". History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so. Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt, Partisans,
1990).
The conclusion is thus inescapable, that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and what's theirs. The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennany's downfall.
During the Battle for Moscow, it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain, swamplands, forest, and rivers. "This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow" (Curtis, 12). Therefore, the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather, not a superior Russian military force.
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941), nearly 3,000,000 soldiers
fought for the capital" (www, wnec.edu). The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow. This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army.
After several victories on the battlefield, the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow. "The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong" (Lucas,
1992).
The Battle for Moscow was "moved forward in three great sweeps; the first beginning on
the opening day of war, June 22, 1941, the second beginning on 3 October, and the last on 16
November, when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital" (Kerr,
1944). On October 3, 1941, Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow. During the
12
flrst two weeks of October, the German attack progressed without any problems. Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather. The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus, started to experience terrain
effects. "Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup, study the situation, and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16" (Kerr, 43).
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow. During every battle since
the civil war, commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield. Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands, rivers, forests, and natural
obstacles on the battlefield. Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land, they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow. The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river, the
Pripyat, that flows from west to east, provides access to the interior" (CMH 104-5).
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall. The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations. The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles. The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season. "The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subj ected to thorough training in Russian terrain"
(CMH 104-2).
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways. The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway. Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow. Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk, which was sixty-five miles from Moscow. Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk, another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz, and his last task
force towards Tula, which was south of Moscow. By extending their lines of communication, the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition. The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective. "The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear" (Kerr,
50).
On November 16, 1941, the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow. By
this phase of winter, it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen. Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising. The Soviets "initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5"
(Glantz, 97). As the Germans got closer to Moscow, the Soviet defensive lines stopped them. On
December 5, 194] , the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks. The German
battle report testified, "The soldiers' fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance of difficult tasks" (web, serpukhov.su).
The Gtrman A..lHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow, 30 September 1941. On the 6
th
of
October snow began to fall, followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December. The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance. By the 3
rd
of October,
the Nuzi b1:itzkricg "vas almost at a stand stilL [his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time. By the 7
th
ofNovember, freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter. The invasion plan did not include a winter plan, an oversight that would
1.:O.'!' l HH:: Gt:III1WIS dt:ady in the Baille [Of Moscow. On the night of 4 December, the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F. The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed. Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldier's strength, rendering them combat
ineffective.
Marshall Timoshenko stated, "The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment. We must hold out
as long and in any way possible, but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces. This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F.] below zero"
(Ziemke, Bauer 66). By 5 December, the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December, 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F, the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness. Before the October rains, they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas. The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day. Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle, only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold.
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect.
After all, how could they fight without food, clothing, and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter. All this, and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin. The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velen.!.l!S uf [ht; ussian willit'l.
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather. Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severt> conctilions.
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters, "All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts. Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing, increases the problem. The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves. For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless. The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties, but their mobile, well-equipped cavalry, ski, and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that, together with larger manpower reserves, they are now trying to
exploit operationally" ( Ziemke, Rauer, 101).
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past. Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight, they had no choice but to retreat, leaving their
useless broken equipment behind. The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter. That proved to be their undoing. Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began,
they would get no closer. On 6 December 1941, the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
end gre81 war machine' s quest for world domination. At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow, the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions, 19 Panzer
Divisions, 15 Motorized Divisions, 12 Romanian Divisions, 18 Finnish Divisions, over 3 million
':ohJiers, GOO,OOO HlOlOf vehides, 3,500 tanks awJ 1,000 aitefa[t TIle RUSS!!lll had strf'"ngth
of 5 million soldiers: 77 Divisions, 6 Armored Divisions, 6 Cavalry Divisions, 20,000 tanks, and
7,000 combat aircraft. By the end of the Battle for Moscow, the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945.
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II, Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941. The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain, but it is my
opinion that the for defeat was Adolph Hitl er and the poor military making hy
the German Military. The casualties recorded by the Germans were high, but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army. History shows us, as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground, that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat.
The German decision to invade Russia, OPERATION TYPHOON, was not popular with
all members of the German High Command. Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at. The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the MlEN KAivfPF, spell out his vision
of the Third Reich. He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years. Thomas Mann wrote of, "a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility, his
in...ner confusion with deep thinking, cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundio.!l undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germany's his own thick-headed
opinions". With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Army's
nefe::lt ::lnr! discount weather as the signific:mt
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war. The Third Reich's "Final
Solution" to the Jewish problem was especially important. The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany. There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again. Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction; it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies.
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories. Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifil:anL Vv"nen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail. Outrunning your logistical re
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for thi s particular opefation. Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler' s meuuling. Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion of Russia, Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret. When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan. This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Ann)' . Thf>, Siberi[l"<: comp!!"iF.!)'
discounted as part of the force. Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable. The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks. Jos!::'f SI :OLll, (he se [-prot:h;111"'rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia, cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany "The great patriotic war" proved to be very effective. The pride and fervor of
Victory", signifying the political feelings of the day.
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offict:r. Tht: Gt:1'Blan Miljtary'8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIl':S udcai auu uihcr u:sdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances, were also contributing factors to the defeat. The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19. This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself. Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians, they may have planned and provided for an
t:x'enut:u t:ngag!; nt:nL This would have maut: them consider exknded combat into the winter
months. The shortened days, sparse population (leaving no built shelters), and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleon's defeat in Russia. The use of military history not
'..1111)' prov.ides 1.1S '."lih inleiligence, but also valuable pictures of lessons h!arned.
Upon final review, Adolph Hitler' s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in t he German defeat at Moscow. His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner, of the German High Cornn and, stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October. The policy Hitler instituted that called for "resisting to the last man"
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place. While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable, the
knew it then or later, was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury .
In conclusion, by all historical accounts, the Russian winter, not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow, but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian \vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russian's favor. Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather, in Germany's case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred.
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men, the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow.
20
WORKS CITED
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===-=-",-===--=--.::==-=a=n= d--", S,-,w..:..::a=m=p Center for Military History, ",-",-s.
Washington, D.C. , 1986.
Washington, D.C. , 1986.
Glantz, David M. Halting of the German Juggernaut: Moscow, December 1941 . Military
Revie\v 97. D ecember 1991 .
Kerr, Walter Boardman. The Russian Army. Massachusetts: Plimpton Press, 1944.
Hitler' s rVfistakes. l'Je\v Y crk:
Macksey, Kenneth. The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War. New York: Stein and
Day, 1975.
Zhukov, Georgi K. Marshal Zhukov' s Greatest Battles. New York: Evanston, 1969.
History, 1987.