Small Group Research

http://sgr.sagepub.com Motivations Underlying Power Dynamics in Hierarchically Structured Groups

Marius van Dijke and Matthijs Poppe Small Group Research 2007; 38; 643 DOI: 10.1177/1046496407304339 The online version of this article can be found at: http://sgr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/6/643

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Motivations Underlying Power Dynamics in Hierarchically Structured Groups

Marius van Dijke
Open University

Small Group Research Volume 38 Number 6 December 2007 643-669 2007 Sage Publications 10.1177/1046496407304339 http://sgr.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com

Matthijs Poppe
Tilburg University

The authors studied tendencies to change power differences with others in hierarchically structured groups. Specifically, they contrasted predictions from two theories based on a power motive approach that have recently inspired power dynamics research. Social comparison theory predicts that people want to be somewhat more powerful than comparison others. A competing prediction from power distance theory is that people are more inclined to further increase their power, the more power they have already. In an experiment, 79 students participated in a decision-making task in a hierarchical group. They advised their subordinates and received advice from their superiors. Subsequently, they indicated their preferred changes in power differences. Social comparison theory was mostly supported: Participants mainly wanted slight power superiority over comparison others. The discussion focuses on implications for various theories in the field, such as expectation states theory, and on understanding behavior aimed at improving or securing power positions in hierarchical groups. Keywords: power; power dynamics; social comparison; power distance

ower hierarchies are often unstable (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). As a result of this, high-power individuals are frequently engaged in monitoring their position, whereas low-power individuals attempt to improve their power position (Georgesen & Harris, 2006). To understand such processes, different types of theories have been put forward. Expectations states theory explains how power hierarchies are initially formed. Research

Authors Note: Correspondence can be addressed to Marius van Dijke, Department of Psychology, Open University, P.O. Box 2960, 6401 DL, Heerlen, Netherlands; e-mail: Marius.vanDijke@OU.nl. 643
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based on this theory has highlighted that support from other group members is vital to improve or secure ones position (Berger, Ridgeway, Fisek, & Norman, 1998; Ridgeway, 1986). Dominance theories (e.g., Mazur, 1985) explain how individuals improve their positions in power hierarchies by engaging in dominance behaviors, such as loud talking (e.g., Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keation, 1988). Research on power motives (e.g., McClelland, 1975; Winter, 1988) considers how such motives affect power differentiations (Bruins & Wilke, 1992, 1993, 1996; Mulder, 1977; Ng, 1977; Poppe, 2003; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2003, 2004, 2006). Very little work has considered the factors that determine how power motives are derived. Our research attempts to do this by developing and testing competing predictions regarding peoples motivations to change power differences between themselves and others. These predictions are based on two theories that have recently inspired power dynamics research. The first, social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), has a long history in a variety of research programs in social psychology (Wood, 1996). One prediction from this theory is that people attempt to stay or become slightly superior on valued attributes, relative to comparison others (Rijsman, 1974, 1983). If people value having power (e.g., McClelland, 1975; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006; Winter, 1988), the same processes may play a role in power dynamics (Poppe, 2003; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2003, 2004). The second theory, power distance theory, predicts that people are more inclined to increase their power, relative to others, the more power they already have over these others (Bruins & Wilke, 1992; Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Bruins, & De Gilder, 1998; Haslam, 2001; Mulder, 1977; Ng, 1980). We thus aim to extend the power motive approach to the study of power dynamics. However, as we will argue below, this also has clear implications for our understanding of how people actually attempt to improve or secure their power position, as is the focus of expectation states theory and dominance theories. We consider power a characteristic of interactions that gives power holders the opportunity to realize their goals through others. Broadly, there can be two reasons why people comply with power holders. First, they can be dependent on them for outcomes, such as salary, avoidance of punishment, or expertise (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1998; Emerson, 1964; Fiske, 2001; Ng, 1980). Second, there can be a role division between power holders and subordinates that is accepted by both parties. Then, power is grounded in a shared reality (legitimate power; Raven, 2001; see also, e.g., Berger et al., 1998; Kelman, 1974, 2001; Ridgeway, 2001). Often, both power bases operate simultaneously. For instance, in the workplace, subordinates can view their managers power as legitimate, but they are also dependent on

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the organization (as represented by their manager) for money, status, or other outcomes. Power thus differs, in our view, from status. Status is attributed worth and competence (Ridgeway, 2001, pp. 257; see also Kemper, 1984). But status can be an important source of power: It increases peoples influence in group decisions (e.g., Ridgeway, 1986). An important framework that has generated much research addressing how people gain and keep status and power in groups is expectation states theory (Berger et al., 1998; Ridgeway, 1986). A core prediction of this theory is that someone is more influential in group decisions (or, in other words, has more power) and more likely to receive higher status, the more this person is considered to contribute to the groups goals. Group members thus receive their position from the group in exchange for services; they do not just seize it without having to consider group needs (Ridgeway, 1986). Much research inspired by expectation states theory has focused on support from fellow group members that people receive in their efforts to improve their position. For example, people are more likely to be supported in their efforts to achieve positions of power if they are perceived to have the capabilities needed to direct the group toward its goals. This does not necessarily imply that those who achieve such positions actually possess the needed capabilities, because perceptions can be based on diffuse status characteristics, such as membership of high-status groups in society as a whole (e.g., White men), and such characteristics are not likely to predict group-relevant performance very well (Ridgeway, Johnson, & Diekema, 1994). For this study, it is important to note that expectation states theory (and research) is relatively silent about peoples motivations to increase their own power. Although it is assumed that group members, including the actor, believe that status is gained because it is deserved (Ridgeway & Erikson, 2000), the only study that we know of that directly tested whether more capable people are themselves more strongly motivated to improve their power position found no support for this prediction (Bruins & Wilke, 1993). Dominance theories are also relevant for our understanding of power dynamics. In dominance theories, it is argued that people may gain power and status at least in part by expressing and earning their dominance over others in social interactions (Lee & Ofshe, 1981; Mazur, 1985; Strayer, 1995). In support of this prediction, it has been found, for instance, that people who talk more and louder and who start more social interactions often receive higher status even when they do not actually contribute more to reaching the groups goals (Dovidio et al., 1988; Mullen, Salas, & Driskell, 1989). Such dominance behaviors, and the resulting hierarchies, are ubiquitous and certainly not restricted to organizational life; they can even be found in groups of young

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children playing together (Hay, Payne, & Chadwick, 2004). Another important emphasis in dominance theories, which we will not address here, is the biological basis of dominance behavior (e.g., Mazur & Booth, 1998). The most direct approach to the study of why people want to change power differentiations to their advantage can be found in power motives research. Although power motives are often viewed as individual difference variables (e.g., Frieze & Boneva, 2001; McClelland, 1975; Winter, 1988), power dynamics research has generally started from the assumption that people value having power and thus want to increase it (Bruins & Wilke, 1992, 1993) because it is valued as an end in itself (Mulder, 1977), because it is instrumental in obtaining desired outcomes such as status or wealth (e.g., Kipnis, 1974), or because it increases peoples self-control (Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006). This self-control notion is already reflected in Emersons (1964) important work on balancing mechanisms. Emerson proposed that imbalances in power make subordinates vulnerable to exploitation. He therefore expected subordinates to try to equalize power differences with their superiors. Regrettably, Emersons approach has several limitations. First, it is silent about the power holders wishes and behavior toward their subordinates. Second, the legitimate nature of power in many organizations (e.g., managers are often expected to treat their subordinates fairly) makes exploitation of subordinates less likely, but people often want to improve their power position in such situations as well (e.g., Bruins & Wilke, 1992, 1993; Poppe, 2003; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2003, 2004). To arrive at a more complete picture of motivations involved in power dynamics, this study contrasts predictions from power distance theory and social comparison theory. Both theories can be used to predict peoples motivations and tendencies to change power differences between themselves and others, superiors as well as subordinates. Moreover, both theories have recently stimulated research aimed at enhancing our understanding of power dynamics in groups. It seems therefore timely and necessary to gain a more definite insight into the relative validity of the theories.

Power Distance Theory

In power distance theory (Bruins & Wilke, 1992; Ellemers et al., 1998; Haslam, 2001; Mulder, 1977; Ng, 1980), it is proposed that merely exercising power gives satisfaction, and thus, people want to increase their power. In other words, people are expected to value exercising power in itself rather than (or in addition to) as a means to achieve other desirable outcomes, such

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as money or independence (Mulder, 1977). A second proposition in power distance theory is that power is addictive. One important effect of the addictive nature of power is that people are expected to be more strongly motivated to increase their power, the more power they have already. Based on the two propositions described above, Mulder (1977) argued that power holders want to increase the power difference with their subordinates (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, power holders are more inclined to increase the power difference with a subordinate when it is larger (Hypothesis 2), because a larger power difference means that superiors have more power over their subordinates already (and are thus more strongly addicted to power). Although superiors have power over their subordinates, subordinates can also have some power over their superiors. Therefore, Mulder expected that subordinates want to decrease the power difference with their superiors (Hypothesis 3). He also expected subordinates to be more inclined to decrease the power difference with their superior when it is smaller (Hypothesis 4), because a smaller power difference implies that subordinates have more power over their superiors already.1 Mulder proposed that, in addition to actually changing power differences, people also attempt to change such differences on a cognitive level. He therefore expected subordinates to identify with their superiors, sympathize with their superiors, and consider themselves capable to do their superiors tasks. As with actual attempts to reduce power differences, subordinates are more inclined toward identification, liking, and feeling they are able to do their superiors tasks when the power difference is smaller. A number of studies claimed support for power distance theory (e.g., Bruins & Wilke, 1992, 1993; Mulder, Veen, Hartsuiker, & Westerduin, 1971; Mulder, Veen, Hijzen, & Jansen, 1973; Mulder, Veen, Rodenburg, Frenken, & Tielens, 1973; Ng, 1977). However, the empirical status of the theory has also been disputed (Bruins, 1994; Poppe, 2003). A study by Bruins and Wilke (1992, Experiment 2) is illustrative of this discussion. They had participants perform a decision-making task and advise others on this task in a simulated six-layer hierarchical organization (positions labeled from the highest, A, to the lowest, F). Allegedly, each hierarchical layer contained one group member. Actually, all communication was preprogrammed, and participants functioned in position B, C, D, or E only. The participants received advice on their decisions from their superiors (regarding how many stocks to buy or sell for the organizations customers); they themselves advised their subordinates (regarding how many stocks to buy or sell). The participants power was determined by their hierarchical position and not associated with other valued outcomes, such as money. An important finding that

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emerged from this study was that participants were more satisfied with their power position, the higher they were in the hierarchy. Thus, people apparently value power even when it is unrelated to other valued outcomes such as money (see also Bruins & Wilke, 1993). Another core prediction from power distance theory is that group members are more inclined to increase their power, the more power they already have. This prediction was also tested by Bruins and Wilke (1992): After completing the task, the participants learned that they had to perform a similar task and that the top or the bottom rank had become vacant. Then they were asked whether they wanted to take over the vacant position. Participants in higher positions (i.e., B) were more inclined to take over the highest position than participants in lower positions (i.e., E) were. This was considered support for the prediction that subordinates are more inclined to decrease the power difference with a power holder (i.e., the person in position A), the more power they have. Moreover, participants in lower positions (i.e., E) more often took over the lowest position than participants in higher positions (i.e., B) did. Bruins and Wilke considered this support for the prediction from power distance theory that superiors are less inclined to increase the power difference with their subordinates (i.e., the person in position F), the less power they have over these subordinates. Although Bruins and Wilke (1992, 1993) convincingly showed that merely exercising power gives satisfaction, they were arguably less convincing in showing that power is addictive (i.e., that more power leads to stronger tendencies to further increase power): Because the person in the lowest position was not advising others, and the highest in the hierarchy was not receiving advice from others, these positions were obviously different from the other positions. This makes it difficult to understand why participants in adjacent positions were particularly inclined to take over this position. An alternative explanation is, for instance, that the difference in tasks was particularly salient to participants who occupied an adjacent position. Such limitations of the research procedure (and indeed, all previous studies that tested predictions from power distance theory used the hierarchical group situation and similar dependent measures) make it difficult to decide on the validity of power distance theory (see also Bruins, 1994; Poppe, 2003).

Social Comparison of Power

In social comparison theory, it is proposed that people compare their opinions and abilities with other people (Festinger, 1954). Research has

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shown that, as a result of ability comparison, people attempt to become or stay slightly superior, relative to comparison others, for instance by trying to improve their performance, for instance (Rijsman, 1974, 1983; Rijsman & Poppe, 1977; see also Huguet, Monteil, Dumas, & Galvaing, 1999; Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Seta, 1982; Seta, Seta, & Donaldson, 1991). Rijsman (1983) noted that because people aim for the position of slight superiority over comparison others, the strength of their effort to change their position on the comparison dimension depends on the difference between their actual position and the position of slight superiority: The further away people are from slight superiority, the stronger their effort to achieve the desired position. Specifically, attempts to (further) move up on the comparison dimension are weaker, the more superior people already are to a comparison other.2 Conversely, when one is inferior to a comparison other, attempts to move up on the comparison dimension are stronger, the more inferior one is to this other, because the more inferior one is, the larger the difference with the desired position of slight superiority. As was noted above, research has shown that people value having power (e.g., Bruins & Wilke, 1992, 1993). And people compare their standing on valued attributes with others (e.g., Wood, 1996). Therefore, we expect power differences in groups and organizations to result in efforts to stay or become slightly superior in power, relative to comparison others. We thus predict that superiors want to increase the power difference with their subordinates (Hypothesis 1; similar to Hypothesis 1 from power distance theory). This tendency is weaker when the power difference is larger (Hypothesis 2alt, opposite to Hypothesis 2 from power distance theory) because then the desired position of slight power superiority is already closer. Subordinates want to decrease the power difference with their superiors (Hypothesis 3; similar to Hypothesis 3 from power distance theory). This tendency is stronger when the power difference is larger (Hypothesis 4alt, opposite to Hypothesis 4 from power distance theory) because then the desired position of slight power superiority is further away. To study motivations to change power differences in a social comparison context, Poppe (2003) asked participants to imagine themselves as members of a three-person organization unit. As a result of procedures and communication patterns, the unit members differed in power. The power of each group member was presented as a score on a scale that supposedly assessed organizational power. Subsequently, the participants indicated their preferred changes in the power of each group member in terms of changes in power scores. The results supported social comparison theory: The highest in the hierarchy maintained the power difference with the lowest

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but wanted to increase the power difference with the middle position. The lowest in the hierarchy was more inclined than the one in the middle position to decrease the power difference with the highest position. Van Dijke and Poppe (2003) used a comparable method and found support for predictions from social comparison theory in situations in which group members have equal power. However, these studies cannot be taken as a fair test of power distance theory because a crucial assumption of this theory is that because power is addictive, people are more inclined to increase their power the more power they already have: It seems unrealistic to assume that people necessarily become addicted to power just by imagining a situation.

The Present Study

This study aims to increase our understanding of peoples motivations to improve their power position, relative to different group members, by testing contrasting predictions from two theories that have both generated new studies in the field of power dynamics. To give social comparison theory and power distance theory a fair chance, we avoided the weaknesses but made use of the strengths of Bruins and Wilkes (1992) and Poppes (2003) studies. Because power distance theory assumes that power is addictive, participants have to experience real power and real power differences instead of just imagining them (like in Poppe, 2003, and Van Dijke & Poppe, 2003). Therefore, our participants functioned in a real hierarchy, like in Bruins and Wilke (1992). In line with power distance theory (Mulder, 1977), this power manipulation does not associate power with other valued outcomes, such as status or money. However, this manipulation has been shown to result in feelings of dependence on superiors, which is an important precondition for power (Van Dijke & Poppe, 2004). Bruins and Wilkes measures of behavioral tendencies to change power differences cannot be used because, as noted above, they suffer from the limitation of inherent incomparability of the positions they refer to. They are also not optimal to test predictions from social comparison theory because they require some group members to leave the group (the vacant position had to be filled), which ends comparison possibilities. Therefore, we employed the dependent measures developed by Poppe, which allow participants to increase and decrease their own power and the power of others. Finally, in some ways, the theories may not be mutually exclusive and may even complement each other. One reason for this is that power distance theory predicts tendencies to decrease power differences with superiors on a

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cognitive level, such as identification with superiors. Social comparison theory does not offer such predictions. To have a credible test of the relative validity of social comparison theory and power distance theory, we used a real group procedure and applied Bruins and Wilkes cognitive measures as well as Poppes measures of actual tendencies to change power differences.

Method
Participants
The participants were 71 female and 8 male first-year psychology students from Tilburg University who received credits toward a research requirement in their introductory year in psychology. They were randomly assigned to the conditions.

Procedure
On arrival, the participants were placed in separate rooms where they worked on personal computers. They were told that they would work in a group consisting of five persons. Actually, they received preprogrammed bogus information from simulated group members. On-screen messages explained that the group members were to buy or sell stocks and advise each other on these decisions in a hierarchically structured group. They had to give and receive advice about buying or selling by means of a computer network. Every group member received a budget of EUR 10,000 and, on every trial, a number of stocks to start with (equal for all group members). The participants were explicitly randomly assigned to a hierarchical position. There were 10 trials. In each, the participants were shown a chart of the value of a stock during the past 10 weeks. The flow of advice went from the highest rank to the lowest. First, the person in position A (person A) advised the four group members lower in the hierarchy. Then, person B advised the remaining three group members. Then C advised D and E, and finally D advised E. Five different kinds of advice were possible: (1) buy, (2) consider buying, (3) buy or sell, (4) consider selling, and (5) sell. After having given advice, group members could buy or sell stocks themselves. The participants occupied the positions B, C, or D only. The positions A and E had been added to make the tasks of the participants in positions B, C, or D fully comparable. To convince the participants that they were advised by real others and that they themselves were advising real others,

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and to make the hierarchy as salient as possible, the structure of the hierarchy was made visible on screen during the trials, and the participants saw the preprogrammed advice and the buy and sell decisions of all group members during the handling of a certain stock. On completion of the task, they were told that the network connection was terminated. Then, several questions were asked to check the induction of the independent variable and to measure the dependent variables that were taken from Bruins and Wilke (1992). Subsequently, it was explained to the participants that the power of the group members had been assessed. Every group member received a score on a scale ranging from 0 (minimal power) to 100 (maximal power). Person A had 75 power points, person B had 65 points, person C had 55 points, person D had 45 points, and person E had 35 points. Larger differences in points meant larger differences in power. The participants were told that the experimenter was interested whether (and how) they wanted to change the power of some of the group members. The experimenter had selected 12 different alternatives, each representing a change in the power of the persons in positions B, C, and D at the same time. These 12 alternatives were to be presented to the participants in 66 pairs. The experimenters were interested in the participants preferences for one alternative over the other. The preferences would not be told to the other group members. All items, manipulation checks, and dependent measures were presented on the computer screen. On completion of the task, the experimenter asked some questions to check whether the participants were suspicious of the fact that they had not really interacted. Then they were fully debriefed. The importance of not speaking about the procedure to others was emphasized.

Design
The between-subjects factor was position: Participants occupied position B, C, or D. Depending on the analysis, a different within-subjects factor was included. The principal interest was whether the size of the power difference had any effect on tendencies to change this difference (e.g., the power difference between B and C is smaller than between B and D). Therefore, in the analyses of tendencies to change power differences, a three-level within-subjects factor, Change Intention, was included. It represented tendencies to change power differences between pairs of persons in three positions (B-C, B-D, and C-D). We also applied items from Bruins and Wilke (1992) to measure cognitive tendencies to change power differences. In these analyses, a four-level

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within-subjects factor, Target, was included. An example is, How much did you like the person in position [A to E, except the participants own position]?

Manipulation Checks
Questions were asked about each participants own position, the number of ranks above the participants position, and the number of ranks below the participants position. Then, the participants indicated on what basis they believed they had been assigned to their positions on a 20-points rating scale (1 = randomly, 20 = based on performance). Four separate items measured the four other group members influence on the participant (1 = not strong, 20 = very strong). Finally, four separate items measured the participants influence on the four other group members (1 = not strong, 20 = very strong).

Dependent Variables
Because Bruins and Wilkes (1992) dependent measures cannot be used to test our predictions from social comparison theory, we applied a method adapted from the assessment of social value orientations (Grzelak, Poppe, Czwartosz, & Nowak, 1988). A social value orientation is a motive when allocating outcomes to oneself and one or more others, for example maximizing the difference between own and others outcomes. Importantly, in this study, the outcomes were changes in the power scores of three group members B, C, and D. Hence, they referred to changes in power of these persons B, C, and D. Social value orientations can be measured by having participants rank order alternatives that represent different outcomes (here, changes in power) for themselves and others (e.g., Schulz & May, 1989). The ranking of a participant is then compared to perfect rankings that would be obtained if a certain social value orientation were effective. For instance, the extent to which the ranking of a participant resembles the perfect ranking for maximizing the difference in power between person B and C is an index of the extent to which that participant wanted to change that particular power difference. We used the alternatives developed by Grzelak, Bobrowski, Ossewska, and Wyszogrodzki (1994) and first applied to power difference settings by Poppe (2003; see also Van Dijke & Poppe, 2003, 2004). Twelve different alternatives for changes in the power of each of the three persons in the positions B, C, and D (see Table 1) were presented to the participants in 66 pairs. For example, in one situation, the participants had to choose

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Table 1 Alternatives and Perfect Rankings for Changing Power Differences

Power Change for B +4 +4 0 +4 0 +2 2 +2 2 0 4 4 C 4 0 4 +2 2 +2 2 +4 0 +4 0 +4 D 0 4 +4 +2 2 +4 0 +2 2 4 +4 0 Max B-C 1.0 2.5 2.5 4.5 4.5 6.5 6.5 8.5 8.5 10.5 10.5 12.0 Perfect Ranking According to Max B-D 2.5 1.0 10.5 4.5 4.5 8.5 8.5 6.5 6.5 2.5 12.0 10.5 Max C-D 10.5 2.5 12.0 6.5 6.5 8.5 8.5 4.5 4.5 1.0 10.5 2.5

Note: In columns 1 to 3, each row represents an alternative to change the power of the three group members at the same time (e.g., +4 4 0 means Bs power is increased with 4 points, Cs power is decreased with 2 points, Ds power is not increased or decreased). Participants ranked these 12 alternatives according to their preferences. The ranking of each participant was compared (correlated) with the three ideal rankings presented in columns 4 to 6. In these columns, a cell value denotes the rank of an alternative according to that perfect ranking. For instance, B +4 C -4 D 0 is ranked 1 in the perfect ranking Max B-C because this alternative represents the largest difference (+8) between the power of B and C.

between B 4, C 0, D +4 and B 4, C +4, D 0. Choosing the first alternative would result in person B loosing 4 points on the power scale, person C would not gain or loose power, and person D would gain 4 power points. Choosing the second alternative would result in person B loosing 4 power points, person C gaining four power points, and person D not gaining or loosing power points. For each participant, the rank order of each alternative was computed by counting the number of times it was preferred by this participant. The most frequently preferred alternative was ranked 1, the second most frequently preferred was ranked 2, and so on. As an index of correspondence between a participants ranking and a perfect ranking, we used a correlation coefficient. The ranking of each participant was correlated with three perfect rankings that represented changes in power differences of the three relations (BC, BD, and CD). The three perfect rankings are shown in Table 1.

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If the ranking of a participant is correlated negatively with a perfect ranking, this means that the participant wanted to decrease this power difference. This method yielded for each participant indices of the strength of tendencies to change three different power differences. For use in further analyses, Fischer z transformations of the correlations were computed. The values ranged from 1.94 to 1.40. This may strike the reader as a convoluted measure, compared to just asking participants for their preferences to change a power difference. However, participants express their 66 preferences in about 2 minutes, and it yielded a very reliable preference measure.3 The measures from Bruins and Wilke (1992) were used to test the additional predictions from power distance theory. The items concerned every other group member individually but not the participants themselves (e.g., for person B, these were A, C, D, and E). Four items stated, Do you think, as to qualities that are relevant for this organization, that you match with person [A to E, except the participant him- or herself]? (1 = not at all, 20 = strongly). Four items stated, Do you think person [A to E, except self] performs better or worse than you do in this organization? (1 = much worse, 20 = much better). Four items asked, How would you describe person [A to E, except self], as pleasant or unpleasant? (1 = very pleasant, 20 = very unpleasant).

Results
Because of the low number of male participants, analyses were performed both with and without the data of the men. The results were the same whether or not they were included. Therefore, data of the male participants were included in subsequent analyses, and no further mention of this will be made.

Manipulation Checks
On the questions What was the position you were assigned to? and How many persons were below your position in the hierarchy? all participants gave the correct answer. Two participants gave a wrong answer to How many persons were above your position in the hierarchy? Their data were removed from further analyses. We asked whether participants believed they had been assigned randomly to their positions (1 = completely random, 20 = completely based on performance). The mean was 3.00. No significant differences were found between the conditions, F(2, 74) < 1.

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The rating scales intended to measure the other four group members influence on the participant (1 = not strong, 20 = very strong) and the participants influence on each of the other four group members (1 = not strong, 20 = very strong) cannot be analyzed by means of a normal ANOVA because of the systematic missing data arising from the fact that the participants did not rate themselves. A mixed model (Croon, 1999) was used to analyze these data. This model has a 2 as the test statistic.4 The analysis of the items measuring influence exerted by the group members on the participant yielded a significant interaction effect (increase in 2(5) = 21.25, p < .001) of Position (B, C, or D) and Target (A to E, except the participants own position). The participants differentiated between the ranks above and below their own ranks (see the top section of Table 2). The analysis of the items measuring the influence exerted by the participant on the four other group members also yielded a significant interaction effect of Position and Target (increase in 2(5) = 60.51 p < .001). Again, the participants differentiated between the ranks above and below their own ranks (see the bottom section of Table 2).

Tendencies to Change Power Differences

The hypotheses derived from social comparison theory and power distance theory were tested by analyzing the participants tendencies to change three power differences. The three-level within-subjects factor Change Intention represented tendencies to change these differences (Max B-C, Max B-D, and Max C-D). Position (B, C, or D) was a between-subjects factor. Participants, on average, tended to decrease the power differences: The overall mean was significantly below zero, F(1, 74) = 18.72, p < .001. They did not want to change all power differences to the same extent: A main effect of Change Intention was found, F(2, 73) = 5.88, p < .01. The participants were more inclined to decrease the power difference between B and D than the two other differences. This main effect of Change Intention was qualified by a significant interaction between Position and Change Intention, F(4, 146) = 17.25, p < .001. The means of the tendencies to change power differences in the three positions are shown in Table 3. Two hypotheses concerned superiors tendencies to change power differences with their subordinates. Social comparison theory predicts that superiors want to increase the power difference with their subordinates (Hypothesis 1). This effect is weaker when the power difference is larger (Hypothesis 2alt). Post hoc tests showed that B wanted to increase the power difference between B and C but did not want

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Table 2 Mean Influence Exerted by and on the Participant

A SD M SD M SD M SD M SD B C D E Mean M SD

Participants Position

3.29 3.11 2.79 3.06 3.69 2.60 3.23 2.63 3.41 4.17

2.59 3.53 2.44 3.12

3.39 2.79 3.09

11.10 2.89 7.00

3.74

11.62 8.86 10.24

3.69 5.05

11.00 8.75 11.11 10.29

4.66 4.53 4.78 4.60

9.23 6.03 4.90 6.72

5.37 4.88 2.89 4.13

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Participants influence on four other group members B C D Mean Other group members influence on participant B C D Mean 4.48 3.85 5.05 4.67 4.86 4.69 4.83 4.32 3.18 6.79 9.57 8.18 4.05 9.96 7.01 2.91 3.48 2.89 6.37 2.91 3.45 3.25 3.76 1.93 3.96 3.22

8.48 6.18 9.61 8.09

3.55 2.36 4.92 3.84

4.94 4.45 8.28 5.89

3.45 3.76 4.67 3.98

Note: Higher means denote more influence. In both sections, the means below the main diagonal are not significantly different from each other, and the means above the main diagonal are not significantly different from each other. The two groups of means are significantly different from each other in both tables (p < .05).

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Table 3 Mean Tendencies to Change Power Differences

Position of Participant B Relation Max B-C Max B-D Max C-D Mean M .18a .01ay .16by .01a
x

C SD .45 .70 .33 .43 M .64b .25ay .33ax .19ab

z

D SD .57 .53 .48 .37 M .00a .53by .53cy .35b

x

M SD .30 .46 .47 .29 M .19 .28y .12x .20

x

SD .57 .59 .57 .38

Note: Positive = increase of a power difference; negative = decrease of a power difference. Means with different subscripts (a, b, c) differ significantly by row (p < .05). Means with different superscripts (x, y, z) differ significantly by column (p < .05). Italic means are not significantly different from zero.

to change the power difference between B and D. When comparing the tendencies of the persons in position B and C with respect to position D, the result was that B did not want to change the power difference between B and D; C wanted to increase the difference between C and D; the difference between Max B-D for B and Max C-D for C was t(47) = 2.01, p < 05. Power distance theory predicts the opposite (Hypothesis 2), and hence, it is not supported. Social comparison theory predicts that subordinates want to decrease power differences with their superiors (Hypothesis 3). The participants in the lowest position (D) indeed wanted to decrease the power difference with the middle and the highest positions; participants in the middle position in the hierarchy (C) wanted to decrease the power difference with the highest. Hypotheses 4 and 4alt were not supported: Tendencies for the lowest and the middle in the hierarchy to decrease the power difference toward the group members in the highest position were not significantly different.

Dependent Variables: Rating Scale Items

Besides tendencies to change ones own power, power distance theory predicts that subordinates identify with their superiors, that they feel able to do their superiors tasks, and that they like their superiors. They should be more inclined to do so when the power difference is smaller. Social comparison theory does not predict these effects. Each variable was measured by means of four items, one for every position that the participant did not occupy. Because of the pattern of missing data (participants did not rate

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themselves), the items were analyzed by means of the same mixed model that was used for some of the manipulation checks. A significant effect was found only in the analysis of the items stating, Do you think, as to qualities that are relevant for this organization, that you match with person [A to E, except the participant him- or herself] (1 = not at all, 20 = strongly). A significant difference was found between the model containing Target and between the model containing the overall mean only, with an increase in 2(4) = 18.29, p < .001. The mean referring to person E (M = 9.27) was significantly lower (p < .05) than all other means (means ranging from 10.74 to 12.42). An explanation for this result is that E is the only person who did not advise, because E was the lowest in the hierarchy. Note that this effect cannot be taken as support for power distance theory. The main conclusion from these analyses is that we found no support for predictions from power distance theory on the cognitive level.

Discussion
Taken together, the results of this study clearly support social comparison theory rather than power distance theory. Superiors wanted to increase power differences with others lower in the hierarchy (Hypothesis 1), and they were more inclined to do this when a power difference with a subordinate was smaller (Hypothesis 2alt). Subordinates wanted to decrease power differences with their superiors, although the size of these differences did not affect the strength of their tendencies. This reflects a pattern of tendencies to change power differences with comparison others aimed at achieving or protecting a position of slight power superiority. The support for Hypothesis 2alt from social comparison theory means that the contrasting prediction from power distance theory was contradicted. Power distance theory also predicts that tendencies to change power differences can be expressed on a cognitive level as identification with superiors, sympathy for superiors, and considering oneself capable to do ones superiors task. Such tendencies are also expected to be stronger when power differences are smaller. However, none of these predictions was supported. Therefore, not only is social comparison theory more attractive because it is a more general framework, but when the two theories make conflicting predictions, the evidence supports social comparison theory and contradicts power distance theory. At this point, we wish to highlight an important qualification of these results. We claim that people want to be slightly superior in power, relative

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to comparison others, not to all others. Thus, our results can be expected to hold in small interacting groups. However, we do not expect that mail workers, for instance, are more inclined to change power differences with the companys CEO than with their direct superiors, because the difference on the comparison dimension between the CEO and the mail worker is simply too large (see Rijsman, 1974, for empirical support that people do not compare when ability differences are very large). Research also suggests another reason why people may not compare their power with that of others: when this other is a member of a meaningfully different category or group (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). In such situations, people may not compare their own power with that of other individuals, but their groups power with that of the other group, and this may result in group-level efforts to stay or become slightly more powerful than the outgroup (for a rationale, see Spears, Jetten, & Scheepers, 2002). On the other hand, there may be reasons for people to engage in power comparison, even when power differences are large, because of similarity on attributes that are actually or stereotypically related to power, such as status or gender (cf. Martin, Suls, & Wheeler, 2002). It seems that exploring when people compare their power with others, or cease comparison, is an important avenue for future research. To be able to contrast social comparison theory and power distance theory fairly, we put much effort into ensuring that the participants believed they actually worked together with others in a hierarchically structured group. Nevertheless, this study is obviously not without limitations: It is an experimental study, framed as a decision-making task, using 1st-year psychology students as participants. However, it should be noted that the aim of this study was not to generalize our results to different populations in real-life situations, such as managers in organizations or teenagers in their peer groups. We wanted to test causal hypotheses to allow us to make generalized statements about the relative validity of two theories that make conflicting predictions concerning the motives underlying power dynamics. To answer such research questions, an experimental design is most appropriate (Anderson & Bushman, 1997). It should be noted that individual differences exist in the size of power differences that people find acceptable. They differ, for instance, in the value they place on having power (Schultheiss, Campbell, & McClelland, 1999; Winter, 1988) and on being dominant (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Moreover, the size of power differences that is found acceptable varies between sexes (Bruins et al., 1993) and between cultures (Hofstede, 1980), strongly suggesting that peoples values may play a role in this process (cf. Tetlock, 2000). Such

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differences between individuals and populations may translate into tendencies to change power differences with others of different strength. We believe, however, that this does not limit the validity of our results because none of the above-noted differences between individuals and populations refers to the process for which we have provided evidence: People want a position of slight power superiority, relative to comparison others, and not maximum power superiority, as predicted by power distance theory. The above-noted differences between individuals and cultures probably only affect the size of the power difference that is viewed as an acceptable position of slight power superiority. From the perspective of power distance theory, one could argue that our participants do not accurately represent people who are used to (or, in terms of power distance theory, addicted to) power. Managers in organizations may be much more used to having power than our 1st-year psychology students and, as such, may behave more in line with power distance theory. Our choice of participants, psychology students who are presumably used to being relatively powerless, may thus have stacked the deck in favor of social comparison theory. This would imply that our experimental manipulation was sufficient to induce power differences between group members but not sufficient to induce a power addiction. It should be noted that there is nothing in the formulation of power distance theory (for an extensive account, see Mulder, 1977) that even hints of a minimum amount of power necessary to induce a power addiction. Moreover, there is evidence that power distance theory does not apply to people who are used to having power and to long-term interactions: It is well known that power holders tend to devalue their subordinates performance, among other reasons to defend their power position (Fiske, 2001; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Kipnis, 1972). If being chronically used to having power would induce people to maximize their power, or in other words, if power distance theory would be valid for people who are chronically used to having power, one would expect stronger subordinate devaluation in field studies with actual managers who are used to having power than in laboratory studies, which mostly use students as respondents. However, a meta-analysis did not show any differences in subordinate devaluation between laboratory and field studies (Georgesen & Harris, 1998). Support for power distance theory would also have had clear implications for our understanding of the stability of power hierarchies. Specifically, from power distance theory, one would expect an evolution of power differentiations toward a stable situation in which power holders have maximum power and subordinates are completely dependent: Power holders want to

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increase their power, and they are more inclined to do this when the power difference is already larger. Although subordinates are also inclined to improve their power position, one would expect less strong tendencies because they have less power than power holders and are thus less addicted. Moreover, power holders can often be expected to have more means available to further improve their position. However, these results show that people attempt to become or stay slightly superior in power after comparing their own power with that of comparison others. This means that many power differentiations, such as in small groups, are inherently unstable: Everyone is engaged in a struggle for positive distinctiveness in power. The permanent instability of many power differentiations that is implied by social comparison theory also has implications for our understanding of two theories in the field of power dynamics that were described in the introduction: Emersons balancing mechanisms and expectation states theory. Emerson (1964) expected that subordinates want to restore the power balance with power holders because a power disadvantage leaves them vulnerable to exploitation. The present results clearly show that a motive to equalize power is insufficient to understand why people change power differences: It was difficult for group members to exploit their subordinates in this study. Nevertheless, subordinates wanted to change power differences with their superiors to their advantage. Moreover, superiors changed the power difference as well: They wanted to increase the power difference with their direct subordinates. Expectation states theory recognizes that actors can have expectations of their deserved group status that differ from other group members views of such actors deserved status. This will result in a status struggle (Ridgeway, 1986). The present results show that different status expectations are not a necessary precondition for status struggles to occur: Although group members were explicitly randomly assigned to hierarchical positions, giving them no reason to expect that they were more competent than other group members, they wanted a position of slight power superiority. These results also indicate who will be likely targets of dominance behaviors in groups (i.e., loud talking and firm gaze; Dovidio et al., 1988): People want to be slightly superior to comparison others, and dominance behaviors are one way of staying or becoming superior in power. We thus expect that people direct dominance behaviors especially at others compared to whom they are not (yet) slightly superior in power. It should, however, be noted that we do not expect that people engage in dominance behaviors toward others who are themselves superior in power, because in such cases, dominant behavior may backfire (e.g., lead to resistance; Willer,

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Lovaglia, & Markovsky, 1997). Toward superiors in power, coalition formation is more likely to be a successful way to increase ones power (Wilke, 1985). The group setting was presented to the participants as a decision-making task, as such, resembling a work setting. One might argue that other settings, such as informal peer groups, are characterized by different power dynamics. In the field of distributive justice, it has been proposed (e.g., Deutsch, 1975; for related empirical work, see Greenberg, 1983) that in groups that focus on productivity (like the present experimental situation), valued outcomes are likely to be distributed via an equity principle (resembling deservingness of status in expectation states theory). When enjoyable social relations are the groups goal, equality is the prevalent norm in distributing valued outcomes. When personal development is the groups goal, outcome distribution is based on needs. We believe, however, that equity, equality, or need-based distribution rules have limited value in understanding peoples motivations to change power differences between themselves and others: It is well known that even in peer groups, which have at least to some extent enjoyable social relations as a goal, dominance struggles occur, and resulting dominance hierarchies arise (Hay et al., 2004). Moreover, as already noted, Bruins and Wilke (1992) showed that perceived own competence does not affect the strength of peoples motivation to improve their own power position in situations resembling productivity-aimed groups. And in the present study, which also resembled a productivity-aimed group, no support was found for an equity or equality motivation either: Superiors wanted to increase power differences to their advantage, although they knew all group members had been assigned to their positions on a random basis. Obviously, people may feel unjustly treated when, for instance, they do not get a promotion they think they deserve. This may result in a host of negative reactions, such as decreased commitment and decreased acceptance of authority decisions (Van den Bos, Bruins, Wilke, & Dronkert, 1999), but there is, at least as far as we know, no evidence that unfair power distributions affect the strength of peoples motivation to improve their power position. One reason for this may be that people value distributive justice because it increases predictability and thereby control over situations (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). Power superiority increases control over situations as well but much more directly (Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006). Comparing our controlled experimental setting with interacting groups does highlight a possible application of notions from distributive justice and expectation states theory to peoples motivations to improve their power position. In other words, we believe that in real groups, not only

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does deservingness of higher status (such as resulting from competence) increase support from other group members, but support from others can, in turn, affect the strength of peoples own motivation to improve their power position. This is because group members may consider support from others as helping them reach their goal of improving their status or their hierarchical position. From goal-setting research, we know that people become more strongly motivated to reach their goal when they see this goal as achievable rather than as impossible to achieve (Locke & Latham, 2002). It may be worthwhile for future research to investigate the link between distributive justice notions, expectation states theory, and power motives by addressing whether support from others does increase peoples motivation to improve their position. We believe that this study makes a valuable contribution to the power dynamics literature by providing evidence that people want to stay or become slightly superior in power, after social comparison of their own power with that of comparison others. We found no evidence that people want to maximize their power superiority over others. Apart from the practical implications of our results, such as highlighting which comparison others will be the target of dominance attempts, we have also noted some questions that we consider important to address in future research. We believe that, because of the scope of social comparison theory and the wide variety of research contexts in which social comparison processes have been studied, many more innovative issues can be investigated within a power dynamics context. Thus, studying power dynamics within a power motives approach and, more specifically, in the context of social comparison processes deserves to be pursued in future research.

Notes
1. It should be noted that Mulder (1977) expected that when power differences are very large, people cease to attempt to change the power difference. 2. There is suggestive evidence that people who are very superior to a comparison other, but are forced to compare with this other, decrease the difference on the comparison dimension, presumably to achieve a position of slight superiority (Van Dijke & Poppe, 2006). 3. Analogous to the reliability of a scale, a rankings consistency can be computed (David, 1988), which ranges from 0 (completely determined by chance) to 1 (completely consistent ranking). Mconsistency was .71, which is lower than Poppes (2003) .88 but strongly exceeds chance level. Position had no significant effect on consistency, F(2, 74) < 1. In analogy to the (construct) validity of a scale, fit coefficients can be computed for the three relationships (B-C, B-D, and C-D; Wieczorkowska, 1982). The mean fit was .63. An ANOVA with the three fit measures as a within-subjects factor (Fit) and Position as a between-subjects factor yielded a significant effect of Fit, F(2, 73) = 3.61. p < .05, qualified by a significant

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interaction between Fit and Position, F(4, 146) = 8.81, p < .001. The two fit indices of the relations in which a participant is included (for B: B-C and B-D) were always higher than the index of the relation in which the participant was not included (for B: C-D). 4. In this model, a between-subjects factor and a within-subjects factor are considered (with correlated errors for the within-subjects factor). To show interactions of the two factors, the model including interaction effects is compared to the model containing only main effects. If the model containing only main effects causes no significant increase in 2 (the models test statistic), there is no significant interaction between the two factors. In this case, the model containing both main effects is compared to the model containing just one main effect to determine whether two main effects are operating or just one. This is done for each main effect separately. If the model containing only one main effect does not yield a significant increase in 2 when compared to the model containing both main effects, there is no significant main effect of the factor that was left out of the model. Finally, the model containing a factor is compared to the model containing the overall mean only, to determine whether there is any significant effect of a factor.

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Marius van Dijke is an assistant professor in organizational psychology in the psychology department of the Open University of the Netherlands. He received his PhD in 2002 from Tilburg University, the Netherlands. His current research interests concern power dynamics and the intersections of power, justice, and leadership. Matthijs Poppe is an associate professor in social psychology in the psychology department of Tilburg University in the Netherlands. His research interests are social interaction, social interdependence, personal relations, social value orientations, social dilemmas, and social power.

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