Tax Digest Assignment 9 (Lacks 1 Case)

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty.
Mendoza
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MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA FACTS Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) on various dates (the latest being January 19, 1983) was granted franchises by various municipalities of Laguna. On Sept. 12 1991, RA 7160 "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC) was enacted to take effect on Jan.1 1992 enjoining local goverment units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Respondent Laguna Province enacted Ordinance No. 01-92 (effective Jan. 1, 1993) providing, in part:
Sec. 2.09. Franchise Tax. There is hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized during the preceding calendar year within this province, including the territorial limits on any city located in the province
distribution and sale of electric current. Such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative on or before the twentieth day of the month following the end of each calendar quarter or month, as may be provided in the respective franchise or pertinent municipal regulation and shall, any provision of the Local Tax Code or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.
MERALCO then filed a complaint for refund with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO at the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that the Ordinance was valid, binding, reasonable and enforceable. ISSUES 1. W/N the imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 of Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, insofar as MERALCO is concerned, is violative of the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution and Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 551? NO 2. W/N the LGC, has repealed, amended or modified Presidential Decree No. 551? YES RULING (As an intro for the ruling as stated by the SC:) Local Governments do not have the inherent power to
MERALCO was then sent a demand letter to pay the corresponding tax. MERALCO paid the tax under protest (approx. Php19.5M) and later on filed a formal claim for refund. It contends that the stated Section 2.09 of the LGC contravened the provisions of Section 1 of PD 551, which provides:
Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two per cent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation,
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TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza
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tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute. Presently, Under Article X of the 1987 Constitution, a general delegation of that power has been given in favor of the Local Government Units (LGU). Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be overburdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just. 1. While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions contained in special franchises as being in the nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless, are far from being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
authority in contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing the obligations of contracts. These contractual tax exemptions, however, are not to be confused with tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. 2. The Local Government Code of 1991 explicitly authorizes provincial governments, notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, x x x (to) impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise". (Section 137 of the LGC) Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional mandate of vesting broad tax powers to local government units, LGC has effectively withdrawn under Section 193 thereof, tax exemptions or incentives theretofore enjoyed by certain entities. This law states:
Section 193 Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, nonstock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
The Code, in addition, contains a general repealing clause in its Section 534; thus:
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Section 534. Repealing Clause. x x x. (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
On June 26, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan passed Provincial Ordinance No. 3, known as "An Ordinance Enacting the Revenue Code of the Bulacan Province." Section 21 of the ordinance provides as follows:
Sec. 21 Imposition of Tax. There is hereby levied and collected a tax of 10% of the fair market value in the locality per cubic meter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources, such, but not limited to marble, granite, volcanic cinders, basalt, tuff and rock phosphate, extracted from public lands or from beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction.
3. MERALCO further contends that in a plethora of cases including Court in Province of Misamis Oriental vs. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc., the phrase "shall be in lieu of all taxes and at any time levied, established by, or collected by any authority" exempted the franchise holder from any other tax imposed by the then Internal Revenue Cod and local ordinaces. The SC holds otherwise. In the recent case of the City Government of San Pablo, etc., et al. vs. Hon. Bienvenido V. Reyes, et al., the Court has held that the phrase in lieu of all taxes have to give way to the peremptory language of the Local Government Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemptions, privileges, and that upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code all exemptions except only as provided therein can no longer be invoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability for the local tax. In fine, the Court has viewed its previous rulings as laying stress more on the legislative intent of the amendatory law whether the tax exemption privilege is to be withdrawn or not rather than on whether the law can withdraw, without violating the Constitution, the tax exemption or not. PROVINCE OF BULACAN vs. CA FACTS 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
Pursuant thereto, the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, in a letter dated November 11, 1993, assessed private respondent Republic Cement Corporation P2,524,692.13 for extracting limestone, shale and silica from several parcels of private land in the province during the third quarter of 1992 until the second quarter of 1993. Believing that the province, on the basis of above-said ordinance, had no authority to impose taxes on quarry resources extracted from private lands, Republic Cement formally contested the same on December 23, 1993 but was denied by the Provincial Treasurer on January 17, 1994. Republic Cement consequently filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Bulacan on February 14, 1994. The province filed a motion to dismiss Republic Cement's petition, which was granted by the trial court on May 13, 1993, which ruled that declaratory relief was improper, allegedly because a breach of the ordinance had been committed by Republic Cement. On July 11, 1994, Republic Cement filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking to reverse the trial
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court's dismissal of their petition. The Court, in a resolution dated July 27, 1994, referred the same to the Court of Appeals. In the interim, the Province of Bulacan issued a warrant of levy against Republic Cement, allegedly because of its unpaid tax liabilities. Negotiations between Republic Cement and petitioners resulted in an agreement and modus vivendi (temporary agreement) on December 12, 1994, whereby Republic Cement agreed to pay under protest P1,262,346.00, 50% of the tax assessed by petitioner, in exchange for the lifting of the warrant of levy. CA ruled that Province of Bulacan had no legal authority. ISSUE W/N the provincial government could impose and/or assess taxes on quarry resources extracted by Republic Cement from private lands pursuant to Section 21 of Provincial Ordinance No. 3? No, a province may not levy excise taxes on articles already taxed by the National Internal Revenue Code. RULING First, with regard to the remedial issue. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals could only rule on the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of Republic Cement's petition for declaratory relief, allegedly because that was the sole relief sought by the latter in its petition for certiorari. Petitioners claim that the appellate court overstepped its jurisdiction when it declared null and void the assessment made by the Province of Bulacan against Republic Cement. However, the SC declared that under the principle of estoppel, the
petitioners can no longer attack the modus Vivendi approved by the CA. Second and more importantly, is the issue on the validity of the ordinance. The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code are as follows:
Sec. 134. Scope of Taxing Powers. Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the province may levy only the taxes, fees, and charges as provided in this Article. Sec. 158. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources. The province may levy and collect not more than ten percent (10%) of fair market value in the locality per cubic meter of ordinary stones, sand, gravel, earth, and other quarry resources, as defined under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, extracted from public lands or from the beds of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks, and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction. xxx xxx xxx
The CA on the basis of Section 134, ruled that a province was empowered to impose taxes only on sand, gravel, and other quarry resources extracted from public lands, its authority to tax being limited by said provision only to those taxes, fees and charges provided in Article I, Chapter 2, Title 1 of Book II of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, petitioners claim that Sections 129 and 186 of the Local Government Code authorizes the province to impose taxes other than those specifically enumerated under the Local Government Code. The CA erred in ruling that a province can impose only the taxes specifically mentioned under the Local Government Code. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Section 186 allows a province to levy taxes other than those specifically enumerated under the Code, subject to the conditions specified therein.
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However, in spite of this, province of Bulacan is still prohibited from imposing taxes on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted from private lands. The tax imposed by the Province of Bulacan is an excise tax, being a tax upon the performance, carrying on, or exercise of an activity. The Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: xxx xxx xxx (h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products; xxx xxx xxx
MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES FACTS When PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City, Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The trouble arose when in 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted Ordinance No. 3353 which basically prohibits the issuance of business permits to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino.It also adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 which prohibits the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation thereof. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. The CA declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. ISSUE Whether or not the ordinances were unconstitutional and thus void RULING Yes. PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
A province may not, therefore, levy excise taxes on articles already taxed by the National Internal Revenue Code. The National Internal Revenue Code levies a tax on all quarry resources, regardless of origin, whether extracted from public or private land. Thus, a province may not ordinarily impose taxes on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources, as the same are already taxed under the National Internal Revenue Code. The province can, however, impose a tax on stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted from public land because it is expressly empowered to do so under the Local Government Code. As to stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted from private land, however, it may not do so, because of the limitation provided by Section 133 of the Code in relation to Section 151 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
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within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs. Cagayan de Oro City is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and selfreliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall: xxx xxx xxx (v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.
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The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the operation of casinos. The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply: (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned; xxx xxx xxx (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria, which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides: 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
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whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 337593 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable. We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now
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be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos. It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, Section 534, will disclose the omission of said P.D. 1869. Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Separate Opinions PADILLA, J., concurring: I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances in question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 1869.
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However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the government's own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call upon government to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the country. That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough reason for setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino moral character.It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify the means. DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring: While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however, to express my views on certain aspects of this case. I. It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and unconstitutional for, inter alia, having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with public policy the challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
City of Cagayan de Oro. The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further underscores the "declaratory relief" nature of the action. PAGCOR assails the ordinances for being contrary to the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and against the State's national policy declared in P.D. No. 1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under this Court's established policy relative to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which case the filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in order pursuant to our decisions. P&G vs. MUNICIPALITY OF JUGNA FACTS P &G is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of soap, edible oil, margarine and other similar products, and for this purpose maintains a "bodega" in defendant Municipality where it stores copra purchased in the municipality and therefrom ships the same for its manufacturing and other operations. Subsequently, the Municipal Council of Jagna enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 4 which imposes storage fees to all
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exportable copra deposited in a bodega within the jurisdiction of the Municipality. For a period of six years, from 1958 to 1963, P&G paid defendant Municipality, allegedly under protest, storage fees in the total sum of 1142,265.13. In 1964, P&G filed this suit in the CFI wherein it prayed that 1) Ordinance No. 4 be declared inapplicable to it (it claims that it is not engaged in the storage of copra for compensation and the tax pf P0.10 for 100 kilos is excessive, unreasonable and oppressive), or that it be pronounced ultra-vires and void for being beyond the power of the Municipality to enact; and 2) that defendant Municipality be ordered to refund to it the amount which it had paid under protest; and costs. However, defendant Municipality upheld its power to enact the Ordinance in question; questioned the jurisdiction of the CFI to take cognizance of the action; and pleaded prescription and laches for P&G's failure to timely question the validity of the said Ordinance. After the parties had agreed to submit the case for judgment on the pleadings, the CFI upheld its jurisdiction as well as defendant Municipality's power to enact the Ordinance in question under section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, otherwise known as the general welfare clause, and declared that P&G's right of action had prescribed under the 5-year period provided for by Article 1149 of the Civil Code. ISSUE Whether defendant Municipality was authorized to impose and collect the storage fee provided for in the challenged Ordinance 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
RULING The validity of the Ordinance must be upheld pursuant to the broad authority conferred upon municipalities by Commonwealth Act No. 472, which was the prevailing law when the Ordinance was enacted. Section 1 thereof reads:
Section 1. A municipal council or municipal district council shall have the authority to impose municipal license taxes upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising privileges in the municipality or municipal district, by requiring them to secure licenses at rates fixed by the municipal council, or municipal district council, and to collect fees and charges for services renderedxx
Under the foregoing provision, a municipality is authorized to impose three kinds of licenses: (1) a license for regulation of useful occupation or enterprises; (2) license for restriction or regulation of non-useful occupations or enterprises; and (3) license for revenue. It is thus unnecessary, to determine whether the subject storage fee is a tax for revenue purposes or a license fee to reimburse defendant Municipality for service of supervision because defendant Municipality is authorized not only to impose a license fee but also to tax for revenue purposes. Moreover, the business of buying and selling and storing copra is property the subject of regulation within the police power granted to municipalities under section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code or the "general welfare clause" P&G's argument that the imposition of P0.10 per 100 kilos of copra stored in a bodega within defendant's territory is
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beyond the cost of regulation and surveillance is not well taken. As enunciated in the case of Victorias Milling Co. vs. Municipality of Victorias, The cost of regulation cannot be taken as a gauge, if the municipality really intended to enact a revenue ordinance. Municipal corporations are allowed wide discretion in determining the rates of imposable license fees even in cases of purely police power measures. In the case at bar, P&G has not sufficiently shown that the rate imposed by the questioned Ordinance is oppressive, excessive and prohibitive. The Ordinance in question does not amount to double taxation. For double taxation to exist, the same property must be taxed twice, when it should be taxed but once. Surely, a tax on P&G's products is different from a tax on the privilege of storing copra in a bodega situated within the territorial boundary of defendant municipality. P&G's further contention that the storage fee imposed by the Ordinance is actually intended to be an export tax, which is expressly prohibited by section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code, is without merit. Said provision reads as follows:
Section 2287 ... It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods shall be void. xxx xxx xxx
copra to be exported but also upon copra sold and to be used for domestic purposes if stored in any warehouse in the Municipality and the weight thereof is 100 kilos or more. On the issue of prescription, the case of Municipality of Opon vs. Caltex Phil., is authority for the view that the period for prescription of actions to recover municipal license taxes is six years under Article 1145(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, plaintiff's action brought within six years from the time the right of action first accrued in 1958 has not yet prescribed.
VILLANUEVA vs. CITY OF ILOILO FACTS On September 30, 1946 the municipal board of Iloilo City enacted Ordinance 86, imposing license tax fees on tenement house.This Court, in City of Iloilo vs. Remedios Sian Villanueva and Eusebio Villanueva declared the ordinance ultra vires, "it not appearing that the power to tax owners of tenement houses is one among those clearly and expressly granted to the City of Iloilo by its Charter." On January 15, 1960 the municipal board of Iloilo City, believing, obviously, that with the passage of RA 2264,Local Autonomy Act, it had acquired the authority or power to enact an ordinance similar to that previously declared by this Court as ultra vires, enacted Ordinance 11 (AN ORDINANCE IMPOSING MUNICIPAL LICENSE TAX ON PERSONS ENGAGED IN THE
We have held that only where there is a clear showing that what is being taxed is an export to any foreign country would the prohibition come into play. The storage fee impugned is not a tax on export because it is imposed not only upon 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
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BUSINESS OF OPERATING TENEMENT HOUSES).By virtue of the ordinance in question, the appellant City collected from appellee Villanueva, for the years 1960-1964, the sum of P5,824.30, and from other appellees, for the same year, the sum of P1,317.00. Hence, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint, against the City of Iloilo, praying that Ordinance 11 be declared "invalid for being beyond the powers of the Municipal Council of the City of Iloilo to enact, and unconstitutional for being violative of the rule as to uniformity of taxation and for depriving said plaintiffs of the equal protection clause of the Constitution," and that the City be ordered to refund the amounts collected from them under the said ordinance. Lower court rendered judgment declaring the ordinance illegal. ISSUES 1. Is the City of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement taxes? YES. 2. Is Ordinance 11 of the City of Iloilo, illegal because it imposes double taxation? NO. 3. Is Ordinance 11 oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause? NO. 4. Does Ordinance 11 violate the rule of uniformity of taxation? NO. RULING 1. RA 2264 confer on local governments broad taxing authority which extends to almost "everything, excepting those which are mentioned therein," provided that the tax so 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
levied is "for public purposes, just and uniform," and does not transgress any constitutional provision or is not repugnant to a controlling statute.Thus, when a tax, levied under the authority of a city or municipal ordinance, is not within the exceptions and limitations aforementioned, the same comes within the ambit of the general rule, pursuant to the rules of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and exceptio firmat regulum in casibus non excepti. The appellees strongly maintain that it is a "property tax" or "real estate tax," and not a "tax on persons engaged in any occupation or business or exercising privileges," or a license tax, or a privilege tax, or an excise tax. It is our view, contrary to the appellees' contention, that the tax in question is not a real estate tax. The tax imposed by the ordinance in question does not possess the attributes of a real estate tax. It is not a tax on the land on which the tenement houses are erected, although both land and tenement houses may belong to the same owner. The tax is not a fixed proportion of the assessed value of the tenement houses, and does not require the intervention of assessors or appraisers. It is not payable at a designated time or date, and is not enforceable against the tenement houses either by sale or distraint. Clearly, therefore, the tax in question is not a real estate tax. On the contrary, it is plain from the context of the ordinance that the intention is to impose a license tax on the operation of tenement houses, which is a form of business or calling. The ordinance, in both its title and body, particularly sections 1 and 3 thereof, designates the tax imposed as a "municipal license tax" which, by itself, means an "imposition or exaction on the right to use or dispose of property, to pursue a business, occupation, or calling, or to exercise a privilege. In City of Iloilo vs. Remedios Sian Villanueva, et al., tenement
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house is defined as "any house or building, or portion thereof, which is rented, leased, or hired out to be occupied, or is occupied, as the home or residence of three families or more living independently of each other and doing their cooking in the premises or by more than two families upon any floor, so living and cooking, but having a common right in the halls, stairways, yards, water-closets, or privies, or some of them." Tenement houses, being necessarily offered for rent or lease by their very nature and essence, therefore constitute a distinct form of business or calling, similar to the hotel or motel business, or the operation of lodging houses or boarding houses. The lower court has interchangeably denominated the tax in question as a tenement tax or an apartment tax. Called by either name, it is not among the exceptions listed in section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. On the other hand, the imposition by the ordinance of a license tax on persons engaged in the business of operating tenement houses finds authority in section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act which provides that chartered cities have the authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising privileges within their respective territories, and "otherwise to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes, licenses, or fees." 2. The trial court condemned the ordinance as constituting "not only double taxation but treble at that," because "buildings pay real estate taxes and also income taxes as provided for in Sec. 182 (A) (3) (s) of the NIRC, besides the tenement tax under the said ordinance." While it is true that the plaintiffs-appellees are taxable under the aforesaid provisions of the NIRC as real estate dealers, and still taxable 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
under the ordinance in question, the argument against double taxation may not be invoked. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well as by the local government. There is nothing inherently obnoxious in the exaction of license fees or taxes with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the State and a political subdivision thereof. The contention that the plaintiffs-appellees are doubly taxed because they are paying the real estate taxes and the tenement tax imposed by the ordinance in question, is also devoid of merit. It is a well-settled rule that a license tax may be levied upon a business or occupation although the land or property used in connection therewith is subject to property tax. To constitute double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited sense the same property must be taxed twice when it should be taxed but once; both taxes must be imposed on the same property or subject-matter, for the same purpose, by the same State, Government, or taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing district, during the same taxing period, and they must be the same kind or character of tax. It has been shown that a real estate tax and the tenement tax imposed by the ordinance, although imposed by the same taxing authority, are not of the same kind or character. 3. A tax is not a debt in the sense of an obligation incurred by contract, express or implied, and therefore is not within the meaning of constitutional or statutory provisions abolishing or prohibiting imprisonment for debt, and a statute or ordinance which punishes the non-payment thereof by fine or imprisonment is not, in conflict with that prohibition. Nor is the tax in question a poll tax, for the latter is a tax of a fixed
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amount upon all persons, or upon all persons of a certain class, resident within a specified territory, without regard to their property or the occupations in which they may be engaged. Therefore, the tax in question is not oppressive in the manner the lower court puts it. On the other hand, the charter of Iloilo City empowers its municipal board to "fix penalties for violations of ordinances, which shall not exceed a fine of two hundred pesos or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for each offense. 4. The trial court brands the ordinance as violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation because while the owners of the other buildings only pay real estate tax and income taxes, the ordinance imposes aside from these two taxes an apartment or tenement tax. Appellees also argue that there is "lack of uniformity" and "relative inequality," because "only the taxpayers of the City of Iloilo are singled out to pay taxes on their tenement houses, while citizens of other cities, where their councils do not enact a similar tax ordinance, are permitted to escape such imposition." It is our view that both assertions are undeserving of extended attention. This Court has already ruled that tenement houses constitute a distinct class of property. It has likewise ruled that "taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same class or character within the taxing authority." The fact, therefore, that the owners of other classes of buildings in the City of Iloilo do not pay the taxes imposed by the ordinance in question is no argument at all against uniformity and equality of the tax imposition. Neither is the rule of equality and uniformity violated by the fact that tenement taxes are not imposed in other cities, for the same rule does not require that taxes for 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
the same purpose should be imposed in different territorial subdivisions at the same time.So long as the burden of the tax falls equally and impartially on all owners or operators of tenement houses similarly classified or situated, equality and uniformity of taxation is accomplished. The last important issue posed by the appellees is that since the ordinance in the case at bar is a mere reproduction of Ordinance 86 of the City of Iloilo which was declared by this Court as ultra vires, the decision in that case should be accorded the effect of res judicata in the present case or should constitute estoppel by judgment. To dispose of this contention, it suffices to say that there is no identity of subject-matter in that case and this case because the subject-matter in it was an ordinance which dealt not only with tenement houses but also warehouses, and the said ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of the City charter, while the ordinance in the case at bar was enacted pursuant to the provisions of the Local Autonomy Act. MUNICIPALITY OF OPON vs. CALTEX FACTS Caltex (Philippines) Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of importing, distributing and selling gasoline, kerosene and other petroleum products. For the purpose of storing its imported petroleum products it has an establishment called 'Caltex Opon Terminal' located in the Municipality of Opon, Cebu. In addition, the said 'Caltex Opon Terminal' has a tin can factory whereby plaintiff-appellant manufactures 5-gallon tin cans for its use in the sale and distribution of its petroleum products.
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Pursuant, however, to a service agreement dated August 1, 1946 and entered into between plaintiff-appellant and Tidewater Associated Oil Company, plaintiff-appellant agreed to arrange, within its ability to do so, in drum and package factories owned and operated by it, to manufacture, supply and/or fill cans and drums for Tidewater, provided the latter reimburses herein plaintiff-appellant for all cost and expense caused thereby, plus three (3%) per cent of such cost and expense. From 1950 to 1955, plaintiff-appellants9 tin can factory at its 'Caltex Opon Terminal' manufactured 8,037,775 tin cans out of which 6,883,429 were used for the sale and distribution of its own products and 1,154,346 tin cans were delivered to Tidewater by virtue of the service agreement abovementioned. Ordinance No. 9, series of 1949, of defendant-appellee Municipality of Opon, Cebu, imposes a municipal license tax on tin factory on the basis of its maximum annual output capacity, with a schedule of graduated rates. Section 1, in part, provides: "A municipal license tax on tin factory" is imposed upon "(a) Tin factory with a maximum output capacity of 30,000 tins P150.00" Pursuant to this ordinance, defendants-appellees levied and collected from plaintiff-appellant license taxes based on the production of the tin factory at its 'Caltex Opon Terminal' for the years 1950 to 1955. Plaintiff contends that respondent company is liable for the entire output of the tin can factory because profit is the 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
motivating factor in the manufacture thereof. Petitioners' view is that the tin cans whether for its own use or for Tidewater upon the contract heretofore stated, are taxable. Reason therefor, so petitioners point out, is that the license tax is based on the maximum annual output capacity of the factory. ISSUES 1. Whether or not respondent tin can factory is taxable as a separate business of respondent NO. 2. Whether or not period to claim refund has prescribed NO. RULING 1. When a person or company is already taxed on its main business, it may not be further taxed for doing something or engaging in an activity or work which is merely a part of, incidental to and is necessary to its main business. In the sale and distribution of its products in liquid form respondent uses containers. The container is a part of the product sold. By maintaining its factory for tin cans respondent is assured of continuous supply thereof. Therefore, the tin cans it manufactures for its ownership are not within the coverage of petitioner municipality's taxing power under Ordinance No. 9. The entire-output-of-factory argument advanced by petitioners needs further articulation. For petitioners insist that respondent's factory also serves the needs of another entity Tidewater. To be noted here is that of the tin cans
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produce for the period 1950-1955, 85.63% were used by respondent; 14.361% delivered to Tidewater. Jurisprudential support is not wanting for the decision of the Court of Appeals establishing a dividing line between the tin cans manufactured for respondent's own business and those for Tidewater. For the tin cans produced for Tidewater license tax was correctly assessed. But for those produced by respondent for its own use, no license tax is due, because the manufacture thereof is "incidental to" and tends "to better accomplish the principal end in view" its main business. 2. A rule which has earned acceptance is that the period for prescription of action to recover municipal license taxes is six years under Article 1145 (2) of the Civil Code. The two-year prescriptive period in Section 306 of the National Internal Revenue Code relied upon by petitioners finds no application. For, this codal provision, as we have said in one case, "clearly refers exclusively to claims for refund of `national internal revenue tax' erroneously or illegally collected" and not "to a refund of `local or municipal license fees' illegally collected." PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION vs. CA FACTS PBA received a tax assessment from the BIR for deficiency on amusement taxes PBA contested the said deficiency on amusement taxes with the CTA however was denied. The same was raised to the CA and was also denied as well as a subsequent MR. 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
PBA now raises the case to the SC ISSUES 1. Does the National government have jurisdiction to tax PBA or is it the local government as provided in SEC. 13 of the Local Tax code? NO 2. Is the Petitioner liable for the said amusement taxes? YES Petitioner contends PD 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code of 1973, transferred the power and authority to levy and collect amusement taxes from the sale of admission tickets to places of amusement from the national government to the local governments. Petitioner cited BIR Memorandum Circular No. 49-73 providing that the power to levy and collect amusement tax on admission tickets was transferred to the local governments by virtue of the Local Tax Code; and BIR Ruling No. 231-86 which held that "the jurisdiction to levy amusement tax on gross receipts from admission tickets to places of amusement was transferred to local governments under P.D. No. 231, as amended. RULING
Sec. 13. Amusement tax on admission. -The province shall impose a tax on admission to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement xxx."
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The foregoing provision of law in point indicates that the province can only impose a tax on admission from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement. The authority to tax professional basketball games is not therein included. With the reference to PD 871 by PD 1456 and PD 1959, there is a recognition under the laws of this country that the amusement tax on professional basketball games is a national, and not a local, tax. Even up to the present, the category of amusement taxes on professional basketball games as a national tax remains the same. This is so provided under Section 125 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code. Section 140 of the Local Government Code of 1992 (Republic Act 7160), meanwhile, retained the areas (theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement) where the province may levy an amusement tax without including therein professional basketball games. Last issue for resolution concerns the liability of petitioner for the payment of surcharge and interest on the deficiency amount due. Petitioner contends that it is not liable, as it acted in good faith, having relied upon the issuances of the respondent Commissioner. This issue must necessarily fail as the same has never been posed as an issue before the respondent court. Issues not raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. All things studiedly considered, the Court rules that the petitioner is liable to pay amusement tax to the national government, and not to the local government, in accordance with the rates prescribed by PD 1959. 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
HAGONOY MARKET VENDOR ASSOCIATION vs. MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY FACTS On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28, which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon approval. The subject ordinance was posted from November 4-25, 1996. In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioners members were personally given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in January, 1998. On December 8, 1997, the petitioners President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance. Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended that the ordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that the ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law. Hence, it was pointed out that petitioners appeal, made over a year later, was already time-barred. The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996, as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code. Citing the case of Taada vs. Tuvera, the Secretary of Justice held that the date of effectivity of the subject ordinance retroacted to the date of its approval in October 1996, after the required publication or posting has been complied with, pursuant to Section 3 of said ordinance.
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ISSUE Was the appeal by the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice time-barred? RULING YES. Section 187 of the Local Govt Code requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance in 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed it for being timebarred. At this point, it is apropos to state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a mere technicality that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory. Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time
limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances. YAMANE vs. BA LEPANTO FACTS Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the Corporation) is a duly organized condominium corporation constituted in accordance with the Condominium Act, which owns and holds title to the common and limited common areas of the BA-Lepanto Condominium (the Condominium), situated in Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Its membership comprises the various unit owners of the Condominium. The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its Amended ByLaws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating expenses, capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special assessments as provided for in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium. The Corporation received a Notice of Assessment signed by the City Treasurer stating that the Corporation is liable to pay the correct city business taxes, fees and charges, computed as totaling P1,601,013.77 for the years 1995 to 1997. The Notice of Assessment was silent as to the statutory basis of the business taxes assessed. The Corporation responded with a written tax protest addressed to the City Treasurer. It was evident in the protest that the Corporation was perplexed on the statutory basis of the tax assessment. Proceeding from the premise that its tax liability arose from Section 3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code, the
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Corporation proceeded to argue that under both the Makati Code and the Local Government Code, business is defined as trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit. It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the parcels of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither was the Corporation authorized, under its articles of incorporation or by-laws to engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it did collect from the unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses. The protest was rejected by the City Treasurer, insisting that the collection of dues from the unit owners was effected primarily to sustain and maintain the expenses of the common areas, with the end in view of getting full appreciative living values for the individual condominium occupants and to command better marketable prices for those occupants who would in the future sell their respective units. Thus, she concluded since the chances of getting higher prices for well-managed common areas of any condominium are better and more effective that condominiums with poor managed common areas, the corporation activity is a profit venture making. From the denial of the protest, the Corporation filed an Appeal with the RTC which dismissed the apeal for lack of merit, accepting the premise laid by the City Treasurer. From this Decision of the RTC, the Corporation filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
Procedure with the Court of Appeals. Initially, the petition was dismissed outright on the ground that only decisions of the RTC brought on appeal from a first level court could be elevated for review under the mode of review prescribed under Rule 42. However, the Corporation pointed out in its Motion for Reconsideration that under Section 195 of the Local Government Code, the remedy of the taxpayer on the denial of the protest filed with the local treasurer is to appeal the denial with the court of competent jurisdiction. The CA reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay business taxes to the City of Makati. ISSUES 1. Whether the RTC, in deciding an appeal taken from a denial of a protest by a local treasurer under Section 195 of the Local Government Code, exercises original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction. 2. Whether or not the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations. RULING 1. Original Jurisdiction. The question assumes a measure of importance to this petition, for the adoption of the position of the City Treasurer that the mode of review of the decision taken by the RTC is governed by Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure means that the decision of the RTC would have long become final and executory by reason of the failure of the Corporation to file a notice of appeal.
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Labelling the said review as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction is inappropriate, since the denial of the protest is not the judgment or order of a lower court, but of a local government official. From these premises, it is evident that the stance of the City Treasurer is correct as a matter of law, and that the proper remedy of the Corporation from the RTC judgment is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 to the Court of Appeals. However, we make this pronouncement subject to two important qualifications. First, in this particular case there are nonetheless significant reasons for the Court to overlook the procedural error and ultimately uphold the adjudication of the jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Appeals in this case. Second, the doctrinal weight of the pronouncement is confined to cases and controversies that emerged prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9282, the law which expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). 2. No. The coverage of business taxation particular to the City of Makati is provided by the Makati Revenue Code (Revenue Code), enacted through Municipal Ordinance No. 92-072. The Revenue Code remains in effect as of this writing. Article A, Chapter III of the Revenue Code governs business taxes in Makati, and it is quite specific as to the particular businesses which are covered by business taxes. At no point has the City Treasurer informed the Corporation, the RTC, the Court of Appeals, or this Court for that matter, as to what exactly is the precise statutory basis under the Makati Revenue Code for the levying of the business tax on petitioner. The notice of assessment, which stands as the first instance the taxpayer is officially made aware of the pending tax 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
liability, should be sufficiently informative to apprise the taxpayer the legal basis of the tax. Section 195 of the Local Government Code does not go as far as to expressly require that the notice of assessment specifically cite the provision of the ordinance involved but it does require that it state the nature of the tax, fee or charge, the amount of deficiency, surcharges, interests and penalties. In this case, the notice of assessment sent to the Corporation did state that the assessment was for business taxes, as well as the amount of the assessment. There may have been prima facie compliance with the requirement under Section 195. However in this case, the Revenue Code provides multiple provisions on business taxes, and at varying rates. Hence, we could appreciate the Corporations confusion, as expressed in its protest, as to the exact legal basis for the tax. Moreover, a careful examination of the Revenue Code shows that while Section 3A.02(m) seems designed as a catch-all provision, Section 3A.02(f), which provides for a different tax rate from that of the former provision, may be construed to be of similar import. While Section 3A.02(f) is quite exhaustive in enumerating the class of businesses taxed under the provision, the listing, while it does not include condominium-related enterprises, ends with the abbreviation etc., or et cetera. (m) On owners or operators of any business not specified above shall pay the tax at the rate of two percent (2%) for 1993, two and one-half percent (2 %) for 1994 and 1995, and three percent (3%) for 1996 and the years thereafter of the gross receipts during the preceding year. We do note our discomfort with the unlimited breadth and the dangerous uncertainty which are the twin hallmarks of the
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words et cetera. Certainly, we cannot be disposed to uphold any tax imposition that derives its authority from enigmatic and uncertain words such as et cetera. Yet we cannot even say with definiteness whether the tax imposed on the Corporation in this case is based on et cetera, or on Section 3A.02(m), or on any other provision of the Revenue Code. Assuming that the assessment made on the Corporation is on a provision other than Section 3A.02(m), the main legal issue takes on a different complexion. For example, if it is based on et cetera under Section 3A.02(f), we would have to examine whether the Corporation faces analogous comparison with the other businesses listed under that provision. Certainly, the City Treasurer has not been helpful in that regard, as she has been silent all through out as to the exact basis for the tax imposition which she wishes that this Court uphold. Indeed, there is only one thing that prevents this Court from ruling that there has been a due process violation on account of the City Treasurers failure to disclose on paper the statutory basis of the taxthat the Corporation itself does not allege injury arising from such failure on the part of the City Treasurer. As stated earlier, local tax on businesses is authorized under Section 143 of the Local Government Code. The word business itself is defined under Section 131(d) of the Code as trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit. This definition of business takes on importance, since Section 143 allows local government units to impose local taxes on businesses other than those specified under the provision. Moreover,
even those business activities specifically named in Section 143 are themselves susceptible to broad interpretation. It is thus imperative that in order that the Corporation may be subjected to business taxes, its activities must fall within the definition of business as provided in the Local Government Code. And to hold that they do is to ignore the very statutory nature of a condominium corporation. For orderly administration over common areas which are jointly owned by the various unit owners, the Condominium Act permits the creation of a condominium corporation, which is specially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in which the holders of separate interests shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units. In line with the authority of the condominium corporation to manage the condominium project, it may be authorized, in the deed of restrictions, to make reasonable assessments to meet authorized expenditures, each condominium unit to be assessed separately for its share of such expenses in proportion (unless otherwise provided) to its owners fractional interest in any common areas. It is the collection of these assessments from unit owners that form the basis of the City Treasurers claim that the Corporation is doing business. We can elicit from the Condominium Act that a condominium corporation is precluded by statute from engaging in corporate activities other than the holding of the common areas, the administration of the condominium project, and
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other acts necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of such purposes. Neither the maintenance of livelihood, nor the procurement of profit, fall within the scope of permissible corporate purposes of a condominium corporation under the Condominium Act. The Court has examined the particular Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the Corporation, and these documents unmistakably hew to the limitations contained in the Condominium Act. Obviously, none of these corporate purposes are geared towards obtaining of profit. Even though the Corporation is empowered to levy assessments or dues from the unit owners, these amounts collected are not intended for the incurrence of profit by the Corporation or its members, but to shoulder the multitude of necessary expenses that arise from the maintenance of the Condominium Project. Just as much is confirmed by Section 1, Article V of the Amended By-Laws, which enumerate the particular expenses to be defrayed by the regular assessments collected from the unit owners. These would include the salaries of the employees of the Corporation, and the cost of maintenance and ordinary repairs of the common areas. The City Treasurer nonetheless contends that the collection of these assessments and dues are with the end view of getting full appreciative living values for the condominium units, and as a result, profit is obtained once these units are sold at higher prices. The Court cites with approval the two counterpoints raised by the Court of Appeals in rejecting this contention. First, if any profit is obtained by the sale of the units, it accrues not to the corporation but to the unit owner. Second, if the unit owner does obtain profit from the sale of 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
the corporation, the owner is already required to pay capital gains tax on the appreciated value of the condominium unit. The City Treasurer also contends that the fact that the Corporation is engaged in business is evinced by the Articles of Incorporation, which specifically empowers the Corporation to acquire, own, hold, enjoy, lease, operate and maintain, and to convey, sell, transfer mortgage or otherwise dispose of real or personal property. What the City Treasurer fails to add is that every corporation organized under the Corporation Code is so specifically empowered. Section 36(7) of the Corporation Code states that every corporation incorporated under the Code has the power and capacity to purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease, pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with such real and personal property . . . as the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and necessarily require . . . . Without this power, corporations, as juridical persons, would be deprived of the capacity to engage in most meaningful legal relations. Again, whatever capacity the Corporation may have pursuant to its power to exercise acts of ownership over personal and real property is limited by its stated corporate purposes, which are by themselves further limited by the Condominium Act. A condominium corporation, while enjoying such powers of ownership, is prohibited by law from transacting its properties for the purpose of gainful profit. Accordingly, and with a significant degree of comfort, we hold that condominium corporations are generally exempt from local business taxation under the Local Government
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Code, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise.
SAN JUAN vs. CASTRO FACTS Romulo D. San Juan, registered owner of real properties in Marikina City conveyed, by Deed of Assignment, the properties to the Saints and Angels Realty Corporation (SARC), then under the process of incorporation, in exchange for 258,434 shares of stock therein with a total par value of P2,584,340. Mr. San Juan then paid the transfer tax based on the consideration stated in the Deed of Assignment. Marikina City Treasurer Ricardo L. Castro informed him, however, that the tax due is based on the fair market value of the property. In turn, Mr. San Juan in writing protested the basis of the tax due but on July 15, 2005, via a letter, Mr. Castro responded on the negative. Mr. San Juan thus filed before RTC a Petition for mandamus and damages against Mr. Castro in his capacity as Marikina City Treasurer praying that the latter be compelled to perform a ministerial duty, that is, to accept the payment of transfer tax based on the actual consideration of the transfer/assignment. Mr. San Juan claims that the intention of the law in Sec. 135 of the LGC is not to automatically apply the whichever is higher rule. Clearly, from reading the provision, it is only when there is a monetary consideration 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
involved and the monetary consideration is not substantial that the tax rate is based on the higher fair market value. But the RTC dismissed the case holding that [M]onetary consideration as used in Section 135 of R.A. 7160 does not only pertain to the price or money involved but likewise, as in the case of donations or barters, this refers to the value or monetary equivalent of what is received by the transferor. And in this case the fair market value of the stocks which is P7M is higher than the consideration which is only P2.58M, hence, the former amount must be used as tax base. Moreover, The subject of this Petition is the performance of a duty which is not ministerial in character. Assessment of tax liabilities or obligations and the corresponding duty to collect the same involves a degree of discretion. It is erroneous to assume that the City Treasurer is powerless to ascertain if the payment of the tax obligation is proper or correct. Mandamus cannot lie to compel the City Treasurer to accept as full compliance a tax payment which in his reasoning and assessment is deficient and incorrect. ISSUE Did the RTC err in dismissing the petition for mandamus? RULING NO. For a petition for Mandamus to lie, there must be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the said condition was not satisfied. A taxpayer who disagrees with a tax assessment made by a local treasurer may file a written protest as
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prescribed by Sec. 195 of the LGC: The taxpayer shall have thirty (30) days from the receipt of the denial of the protest or from the lapse of the sixty-day (60) period prescribed herein within which to appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction, otherwise the assessment becomes conclusive and unappealable. That Mr. San Juan protested in writing against the assessment of tax due and the basis thereof is on record as in fact it was on that account that Mr. Castro sent him the July 15, 2005 letter which operated as a denial of Mr. San Juans written protest. Mr. San Juan should thus have, in accordance with Sec. 195 of the LGC, either appealed the assessment before the court of competent jurisdiction or paid the tax and then sought a refund. He did not observe any of these remedies available to him, however. He instead opted to file a petition for mandamus to compel Mr. Castro to accept payment of transfer tax as computed by him. Mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty (one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance) but not a discretionary function (one which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment). Mr. Castros argument that [m]andamus cannot lie to compel the City Treasurer to accept as full compliance a tax payment which in his reasoning and assessment is deficient and incorrect is thus persuasive. MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT vs. MARCOS (TO FOLLOW)
Facts: Section 234 of the Local Government Code withdrew any exemption from realty tax granted to or enjoyed by all persons, natural or juridical. Thereafter, Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633, amending Bayantels original franchise. It provided that the same, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other
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persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. Within the territorial boundary of Quezon City, Bayantel owned several real properties on which it maintained various telecommunications facilities. In 1993, the government of Quezon City, pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Section 232 of the LGC, enactedCity Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC), imposing, under Section 5 thereof, a real property tax on all real properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating in its Section 6, the withdrawal of exemption from realproperty tax under Section 234 of the LGC. Furthermore, much like the LGC, the QCRC, under its Section 230, withdrew tax exemption privileges in general. Conformably with the Citys Revenue Code, new tax declarations for Bayantels real properties in Quezon City were issued by the City Assessor. Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties in the city from the roll of taxable real properties. With its request having been denied, Bayantel interposed an appeal with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA). And, evidently on its firm belief of its exempt status, Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City government. 1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia
On account thereof, the Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency , followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy against Bayantels properties preparatory to their sale at a public auction. Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties, Bayantel immediately withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and instead filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. In the eve of the public auction, the lower court issued a TRO, followed, after due hearing, by a writ of preliminary injunction. RTC: declared exempt from real estate taxation the properties of Bayantel in QC. Denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied . Petitioners elevated the case directly to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. Petitioners: Bayantel had failed to avail itself of the administrative remedies provided for under the LGC, thus the trial court erred in giving due course to Bayantels petition for prohibition. The appeal mechanics under the LGC constitute Bayantels plain and speedy remedy in this case.
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PETRON CORPORATION v. MAYOR TOBIAS M. TIANGCO and
Issue: Whether or not Bayantel's failure to appeal its case to the LBAA precludes its filing of a petition for prohibition. Held: NO. With the reality that Bayantels real properties were already levied upon on account of its nonpayment of real estate taxes thereon, an appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of the aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65. This is not to mention of the auction sale of said properties already scheduled. Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- ofadministrative remedies rule is when, as here, only legal issues are to be resolved. In fact, the Court, cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved, gave due course to the instant petition. An appeal to the LBAA, to be properly considered, required prior payment under protest of the amount of P43,878,208.18, a figure which, in the light of the then prevailing Asian financial crisis, may have been difficult to raise up. Given this reality, an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition for prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief.
MUNICIPAL TREASURER MANUEL T. ENRIQUEZ of the MUNIPALITY OF NAVOTAS, METRO MANILA G.R. 158881, 16 April 2006, Second Division, (Tinga, J.) While local government units are authorized to burden all such other class of goods with taxes, fees and charges, excepting excise taxes, a specific prohibition is imposed barring the levying of any other type of taxes with respect to petroleum products. In accordance to the New Navotas Revenue Code or Ordinance 92-03, petitioner Petron Corporation was assessed a total tax of P6,259,087.62. Petron filed a letter protest arguing that it is exempt from paying local business taxes as provided by Article 232 (h) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code. The letter-protest was denied. A Complaint for Cancellation of Assessment was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon. The RTC dismissed the Complaint and required Petron to pay the assessed tax. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but it was later denied by the court. Hence, the filing of this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not a local government unit is empowered under the Local Government Code (LGC) to impose business taxes on persons or entities
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engaged in the sale of petroleum HELD: Petition GRANTED. Section 133(h) of the LGC reads as follows: Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. - Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and Barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: xxx (h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products; Evidently, Section 133 prescribes the limitations on the capacity of local government units to exercise their taxing powers otherwise granted to them under the LGC. Apparently, paragraph (h) of the Section mentions two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by local government units, namely: excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code [(NIRC)], as amended; and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products. The power of a municipality to impose business taxes is provided for in
say, unless there is another provision of law which states otherwise, Section 143, broad in scope as it is, would undoubtedly cover the business of selling diesel fuels, or any other petroleum product for that matter. Section 133(h) provides two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by local government units: excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC, as amended; and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products. There is no doubt that among the excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC are those levied on petroleum products, per Section 148 of the NIRC. The power of a municipality to impose business taxes derives from Section 143 of the Code that specifically enumerates several types of business on which it may impose taxes, including manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, dealers of any article of commerce of whatever nature; those engaged in the export or commerce of essential commodities; retailers; contractors and other independent contractors; banks and financial institutions; and peddlers engaged in the sale of any merchandise or article of commerce. This obviously broad power is further supplemented by paragraph (h) of Section 143 which authorizes the sanggunian to impose taxes on any other businesses not otherwise specified under Section 143 which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax. This ability of local government units to impose business or other local taxes is ultimately rooted in the 1987 Constitution. Section 5, Article X assures that [e]ach local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources
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of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges, though the power is subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide. There is no doubt that following the 1987 Constitution and the Code, the fiscal autonomy of local government units has received greater affirmation than ever. Previous decisions that have been skeptical of the viability, if not the wisdom of reposing fiscal autonomy to local government units have fallen by the wayside. Section 5(a) of the Code states that [a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. But somewhat conversely, Section 5(b) then proceeds to assert that [i]n case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. And this latter qualification has to be respected as a constitutionally authorized limitation which Congress has seen fit to provide. Evidently, local fiscal autonomy should not necessarily translate into abject deference to the power of local government units to impose taxes. Section 133(h) states that local government units shall not extend to the levy of xxx taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products. Respondents assert that the phrase taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products pertains to the imposition of direct or excise taxes on petroleum products, and not business taxes. If the phrase actually pertains to excise taxes, then it would be an exercise in utter redundancy, since the preceding phrase already
sense on the part of the legislature to twice emphasize in the same sentence that excise taxes on petroleum products are beyond the pale of local government taxation. The Court concedes that a tax on a business is distinct from a tax on the article itself, or for that matter, that a business tax is distinct from an excise tax. However, such distinction is immaterial insofar as the latter part of Section 133(h) is concerned, for the phrase taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products does not qualify the kind of taxes, fees or charges that could withstand the absolute prohibition imposed by the provision. It would have been a different matter had Congress, in crafting Section 133(h), barred excise taxes or direct taxes, or any category of taxes only, for then it would be understood that only such specified taxes on petroleum products could not be imposed under the prohibition. The absence of such a qualification leads to the conclusion that all sorts of taxes on petroleum products, including business taxes, are prohibited by Section 133(h). Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. The language of Section 133(h) makes plain that the prohibition with respect to petroleum products extends not only to excise taxes thereon, but all taxes, fees and charges. The earlier reference in paragraph (h) to excise taxes comprehends a wider range of subjects of taxation: all articles already covered by excise taxation under the NIRC, such as alcohol products, tobacco products, mineral products, automobiles, and such non-essential goods as jewelry, goods made of precious metals, perfumes, and yachts and
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other vessels intended for pleasure or sports. In contrast, the later reference to taxes, fees and charges pertains only to one class of articles of the many subjects of excise taxes, specifically, petroleum products. While local government units are authorized to burden all such other class of goods with taxes, fees and charges, excepting excise taxes, a specific prohibition is imposed barring the levying of any other type of taxes with respect to petroleum products.
YES. The CTA erred in applying the provision of the Local Government Code (Section 138) since the basis of Benguet province emanates from the Revised Benguet Revenue Code itself. This notwithstanding, the provincial revenue measure still did not distinguish between commercial and noncommercial extractions.
In addition, the Petitioners argument that when a company is taxed on its main business it can no longer be taxable for engaging in an activity that is but part of, incidental to, and necessary to such main business, was held to be inapplicable. The Court said that the cases where the above principle has been applied involved business taxes and thus the incidental activities could not be treated as separate and distinct from the main business. Here the tax being imposed was an excise tax levied on the privilege of extracting gravel and sand.
Lepanto vs ambanloc 2010..
FACTS:
Lepanto Consolidated Mining had a mining lease contract for a mining claim in Benguet. They used the sand and gravel mined to construct and maintain concrete structures needed in its mining operations such as a tailings dam, access roads, and offices. The provincial treasurer of Benguet then asked Lepanto Consolidated Mining to pay sand and gravel tax for the quarry materials extracted from the mining site. The counterargument was that the said tax applied only to commercial extractions and since Lepanto did not supply other users for some profit, the tax should not apply.
ISSUE:
Is Lepanto liable for the tax imposed by Benguet on the sand and gravel that it extracted from within the area of its mining claim used exclusively in its mining operations?
HELD:

Tax Digest Assignment 9 (Lacks 1 Case)

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TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty.

1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

Code, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise.

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

PETRON CORPORATION v. MAYOR TOBIAS M. TIANGCO and

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TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia

TAX DIGEST ASSIGNMENT # 9 LOCAL GOVT TAXATION Atty. Mendoza

Lepanto vs ambanloc 2010..

1B in 3B DIGEST GROUP Ad Deum Per Excellentia

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