Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson PR Deont NC I negate.

Ought implies a moral obligation thus I value morality. Moral arguments are placed within a meta-ethical framework. Meta-ethics conditions what words we can use to meaningfully describe moral claims. Meta-ethical debate functions on a higher level than debates about particular ethical theories, because metaethics literally determines what counts as a warrant for an ethical theory. First, the ultimate source of value in any and everything exists dependent on them being valued by it being valued by humans. Down even to the level of pleasure and happiness exist only in their dependence on human desire. In order for any value to be conferred, the conferrer of value has to have a value independent of any other. Otherwise no value would exist at all. If the conferrers, or humans dont matter, then their own ends and all other contingent ideals are completely worthless. This human capacity for value stems from practical reasonthe ability to distance oneself from desires and consider whether they present reasons for actionso respecting peoples' capacity to value things requires treating humanity as an end in itself. This is only metaethic that avoids begging the question because asking why we value reasons implicitly concedes the power of reasons. Second, proper understanding of the world around us first requires a unified conception of the world, which only practical reason allows. Korsgaard:1
The parallel point about theoretical reason comes in two steps. First of all, unity is needed for our conception of the world, because the business, the

In order to conceive the world as the sort of place in which you can find your way around and act effectively, you have to conceive it as a unified place. What that means is that [so that] the relations between the various things in the world can be traced and established. If we can say nothing about how two things or events or regions of space-time are related to each other, we cannot think of them as parts of a single unified world. If we cannot trace causal relations, in particular, we cannot act effectively, since we cannot take means to our ends. So it is the business of a conception of the world to establish these various relations. Further argument is required, of course, but I suppose that we may think
function, of a conception of the world is to enable you to find your way around in it and to act effectively in it. of the relations in question as logical, spatiotemporal, and causal. Speaking very roughly, these are the relations established by the principles of logic and what Kant

But and this is the second step - in unifying our conception of the world, we are also unifying our minds themselves, and unifying them in a way that makes us the agents of that conception that is, in a way that makes us active knowers. This is because the unity of the mind and the unity of its object are interdependent. Unless we conform our beliefs to logical and rational principles, our minds themselves are a mere heap of unrelated ideas that cannot really qualify as beliefs. A mere heap of unrelated ideas is not about anything, and therefore cannot count itself as thinking about anything or knowing anything. Practical reason controls the internal link to every moral system. Hence, in a system other then one that follows from practical reason all morality devolves into nihilism.
thought of as the a priori principles of the understanding.

The criterion for the round is respecting human worth. Practical reason requires that we respect human worth because if we dont respect the worth of each human being we cant respect their capacity to reason and thus disregards the only realistic viable ethical principle in the round. If human worth isnt respected than value cant be conferred by humans and consequently no value exists and because of that value doesnt exist and rehabilitation ought not be valued over retribution because there is no value.

Christine Korsgaard. The Normative Constitution of Agency. Harvard University. 1

Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson 2 PR Deont NC I contend that retribution is required within any moral system to respect human worth. Retribution is morally good because A. It respects the agency of the victims of crimes. By choosing to assault an agent with inviolable worth, they will the destruction of all agents including themselves. To not punish them would not respect what they will. B. Punishment restores moral equality Ripstein2: the legitimacy of any particular coercive act not in terms of its effects [is judged] but against the background idea of a system of equal freedom. That is, unlike Bentham, he beings with the concept of a rule, but the rules in question govern the legitimate use of force in terms of reciprocal limits on freedom. Coercion is objectionable where it is a hindrance to a persons right to freedom, but legitimate when it takes the form of hindering a hindrance to freedom. To stop you from interfering with another person upholds the others freedom. Using force
Second, Kants conception of coercion judges to get the victim out of the kidnappers clutches involves coercion against the kidnapper, because it touches or threatens to touch him in order to advance a purpose, the freeing of the victim, to which he has not agreed. The use of force is rightful because an incident of the victims antecedent right to be free. The kidnapper hinders the victims freedom; forcibly freeing the victim hinders that hindrance, and in so doing upholds the victims freedom. In so doing, it also makes the kidnapper do what he should have done, that is, let the victim go, but its rationale is that it upholds the victims right to be free, not that it enforces the kidnappers obligation to release the victim. The use of force in this instance is an instance of the victims right to independence, and so is a consistent application of a system of equal freedom. If coercion is understood as justified if and only if it restricts a restriction on freedom, it does not need to be identified with a sanction. Aggression is coercive; defensive force is also coercive. The latter is not a further wrong that requires a special justification; it is just the protection of the defenders freedom. The person using defensive force is neither sanctioning the aggressor nor carrying out a threat that was supposed to deter aggression. Kants claim that it is legitimate to use force to hinder hindrances to freedom thus incorporates his more general idea of a system of equal freedom. He does not start with the idea that it is always wrong to restrict the choice of another person, and then struggle to show that doing so is sometimes outweighed on balance, in the way that Bentham, for example, thinks that causing

the initial hindrance of freedom is wrongful because [it is] inconsistent with a system of equal freedom; the act that cancels it is not a second wrong that mysteriously makes a right, because the use of force is only wrongful if inconsistent with reciprocal limits on freedom. So force that restores freedom is just the restoration of the original right.
pain is always bad but legitimate when outweighed by a greater good produced. Instead,

Moreover, rehabilitation is either impossible or immoral when respecting human worth. Salahub A deontologist [one who respects human worth] would not be concerned with rehabilitation either, but would focus on punishment. This is a tough point, but think about it. The notion of rehabilitation, to some degree anyway, is based on the idea that people can be trained (like animals). You can take a violent killer and by forcing him to attend therapy sessions, behavior modification classes, and such, and turn him into a more peaceful person. Because Deontology [you] respects the inherent dignity, rationality, and free will of all humans (including criminals), it considers rehabilitation either impossible or wrong. If people really have free will, then no classes or therapy can force them to change; they chose to become criminals and do immoral things and they can choose to stop if they want. Even if therapy could force a person to change (by brainwashing them or something) we should not do it since such actions would necessarily be using the person as a means to an end. Further, Kant3 also explains how punishment has to be solely retributive, any other objective to punishment, for example bettering society through rehabilitating criminals, is using people as means to an end and is immoral. Punishment by a court (poena forensis) this is distinct from natural punishment (poena naturalis), in which vice punishes itself and which the legislator does not take into account can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It must always be inflicted upon him only because he has committed a crime. For a man can never be treated merely as a means to the purposes of another or be put among the objects of rights to things: His innate personality protects him from this, even though he can be condemned to lose his civil
2 Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom: Kants Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press. 2009. Pg. 54-55. 3 Metaphysics of Moral. Emanuel Kant

Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson 3 PR Deont NC personality. He must previously have been found punishable before any thought can be given to drawing from his punishment something of use for himself or
his fellow citizens.