a

journal

of political

philosophy

volume

6/2

may 1977

page

79

pamela

k. kensen

nietzsche

and a

liberation:
of

the the

prelude

to

philosophy

future
107
clarke e. cochran

authority
ocratic
simon

and

freedom: the dem

of yves

philosophy

r.

124

kenneth

w.

thompson

niebuhr's

conception

of politics

in the
1 32 kai
nielsen

united states and

the world

the choice between

perfectionism

and rawlsian contractarianism

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interpretation
a

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79
NIETZSCHE AND LIBERATION: THE PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE*

Pamela K. Jensen

University of Colorado
Nietzsche begins Beyond Good and Evil by asserting that philosophic dogmatism has decisively obstructed the philosophic quest for truth.1 The fact that all philosophy until now has been dogmatic in some fun damental sense is, however, nothing more than a sign of the youthfulness of the philosophic enterprise (Beyond, Preface, I, n, II, 31). Nietzsche strives to bring philosophy to its maturity, thereby to pre pare the way for a philosophy of the future. Because the new philos ophy is to be distinguished from
all past

from,

or mature

transcendence of,

philosophy by its liberation dogmatism, it is actually the first

philosophic

genuine philosophy.

Never before has the authentically

to the
realm of

dedication to
to

a comprehensive examination of opinion and

faith, i.e.,

an openness which admits of an ascent

possible.2

the highest

problems, been

This essay examines the nature of the philosophic liberation which Nietzsche seeks and the means by which it is to be Nietzsche did not consider himself the first man to seek a state "beyond good
attained.3
evil"

and

for the

sake of

wisdom; the "three great

all

religion

also re

gard such a state as

the "liberation from than

illusion"

(Gen.,

III.

17).

Nietzsche distinguishes himself from his

sisting
to
upon self-glorification rather
wisdom

mystic predecessors self-effacement as

by

in

the way

and

by

replacing, as the

sign of

freedom, "the hypnotic

I wish to thank Joseph Cropsey for his helpful comments on the draft. Friedrich Nietzsche, Preface, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 2, hereafter cited as Beyond. Major divisions of Nietzsche's works are cited by Roman numeral and the aphorisms within them by Arabic numeral. 2 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), III. 10, and The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), V. 343; hereafter cited as Gen. and G.S., respectively. 3 I have relied primarily upon Beyond Good and Evil (1886) but have made considerable use of On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), which Nietzsche prepared as a clarifying supplement to Beyond Good and Evil, and of Book V of The Gay Science (1882), which Nietzsche added to the original edition in 1887 and to which he refers his readers in the third essay of the Genealogy. For the rela tionship between Beyond Good and Evil and the Genealogy to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, see Nietzsche's letters to Jakob Burckhardt (1886) and to Karl Knortz (1888) in Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Christo pher Middleton (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 255, 298, and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 310-13; the latter hereafter cited as E.H.
*

80
muting
and

Interpretation

the capacity to feel then to endure, distress.

of
argues

pain"

with

the intense desire to create,

never succeeded

Nietzsche scending the

that

philosophers

have

in tran
philo of po

realm of popular opinion

(Beyond, I. 2,
within

sophic quest has remained imprisoned litical life, which requires belief in unconditional moral opposites or dogma for its maintenance (G.S., III, 116). Nietzsche's criticism is directed toward the more tenacious, because more subtle, forms of

16, the boundaries

19).

The

dogmatism
stroyed

which remain
dogma"

influential
exoteric

after

Christianity

has been de

"as

(Beyond, Preface; Gen., III.

until now with

358).

Christian dogma is the

most

24, 27; manifestation of the

G.S., V.
ascetic

357,
28).

ideal,
the

which

has dominated human life

concerned,

(Gen., III.
the

13, 23, 25,

Nietzsche is
ascetic

however,

esoteric aspect of

ideal, i.e.,

with platonism

in both its

original and

its

modern

is equivalent to the hatred not specifically of sensuality, spirituality or philosophy (Gen., III. 12, 25, 28). The defeat of religious piety itself brings forth Nietzsche's criticism. The uncondi

form,

which

but

of

truth, upon which contemporary atheism rests, is in the further development of truthfulness, as itself a kind revealed, of piety or dogmatism (G.S., V. 343-44). Behind the theoretical oppo
tional devotion to
sition of

truth

and error or appearance

is

an unquestioned

trust in the
the

moral opposition of good and evil

(Beyond, I. 2; II. 24, thinking

the

34).
prepa

In Beyond Good
ration

and

Evil,

the

problems associated with

for

a new era

in

philosophic

are resolved almost

im

mediately into
other

problems associated with

cultivation of a new

type

of philosophic man.

The

resolution of one

type

of problem
of

into the
their men,

is

mediated

by a

demonstration in Section I
to
give an account of

the

characteristic
and of all

inability

of philosophers

themselves

activity (aphorisms 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11). The philosophers have been "fooled best on

ophers

accusation

that,

have

typically

is most serious: philos founded the belief in their superiority to nonupon

earth"

philosophic men

precisely

the

claim

that

a clear and comprehensive account of

themselves

they alone could give (Beyond, I. 5 ; II. 34)

Philosophers have

never

really

engaged activity.

in

a proper self-examina

tion; they have

matism

esoteric form of dog has obstructed the philosophic quest by preventing the fun damental question about philosophy from being raised the question not

justified their

The

of

the

value of

the

will

to truth

(Beyond, I.
never raised

III.
tion

27).

Since

philosophers

have

1, 2; Gen., Preface, 3, 6; the most important ques

able

about

themselves, they have

of

never

been

to

see

themselves

clearly.

The piety

philosophy has
the

engendered a superficial psychol

ogy
10).

which praises self-denial as

prerequisite

for

wisdom

(Gen., III.
depend

Nietzsche argues, however, that this

the

psychological misperception

obstructs cultivation of

genuine philosophic

virtues,

which

See Plato

Apology

2id, Ion 530c, 538b, Meno

96b.

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

His

Philosophy

of the Future

81

upon self-love.

analysis simultaneously liberates the potentially from inhibitive psychological errors and philosophy from its dogmatic assumptions. Exposure of the ingenuous dissembling at the root of past philosophy is the one way to banish the infectious moral taint from the philosophic quest.

philosophic man

Nietzsche's
able one.

new

psychology
about

amounts origins of

to

an attempt

to

substitute a

tenable hypothesis

the

The

"typical"

moral prejudice

philosophizing for an unten of philosophers, belief in the op

position of good and

origin of

evil, leads them to a misunderstanding about the their desire for truth. It is on the basis of this misunder

standing that philosophers have posited the independence of reason (Beyond, I. 2). Although Plato's invention of the pure mind is the
original

formulation
ego as

of

this

error

(Beyond, Preface), it
and

persists

in the
which

modern scientific quest

for

objectivity5

in any psychology
good and

posits

I. 16, 17). The judgment that the truth is absolutely

the

being (Beyond,

appearance,

ignorance is absolutely evil requires that one believe in the self-subsistent and eternally separate existence of the realm of the true and the realm of the untrue. Philosophers have therefore believed that the desire for truth originates in the wish to be free of any contact with evil. A psychological conviction ensues to the effect that the ve
error,
or

hicle for human apprehension of the Good, identified as conscious rea son, must itself be entirely independent of and in principle opposed to
everything else, everything lesser, in man specifically, his physical impulses. In so far as the bodily drives obstruct or distort the reason ing activity, they are evil. Further, the presumed harmony between the absolutely true and the independent mind has led the philosopher
to believe that through philosophy he
can

can escape

the

bodily

self; he

become good. This trust in a possible ascent from the realm of the bodily, spe to the realm of eternal being (Gen., III. cifically, from the decaying, has animated the philosopher's judgments. Until now he has ac 24) corded them a life of their own and worshiped them as the bridge be tween his own mortality and the eternal. In the end, according to

Nietzsche,

all philosophers

have

submitted

themselves to the
an

tyranny

of a perspective of

their

own making: with

"But this is

ancient, eternal,

story: what as soon as

formerly

happened

the Stoics happens

itself"

today, too,

(Beyond, I. 9). any philosophy begins to believe in for his part, intends to transfigure philosophy's relation to Nietzsche, belief and thereby to liberate the philosophic individual. He seeks to cultivate a philosophy that does not believe in itself and a philosophic
self

that does

(Gen., III.

10).

Leben,"

See Friedrich Nietzsche, "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie fiir das in Gesammelte Werke (Munich: Musarion Verlag, 1920-29), Vol. 6, pp. 273-84; Beyond, VI. 207-8; Gen., III. 12, 24.
5

82

Interpretation

Nietzsche's understanding of the origins of philosophizing is equiva lent to a skepticism about opposites. He utilizes the insight that good and evil things are interconnected and interdependent; most force impulses are derived from stated, he believes that
"good"

"evil"

fully
ones

opposed

(Beyond, I. 23). He doubts that consciousness (Beyond, I. 3; Gen., III. 7; G.S., IV. 333, V.
the
whole self and

and

instinct He
which

are

372).

studies

the

structure of

its

mode of

assertion,

is in

will

every to

case some manifestation of

power

the

comprehensive

life activity, the

chologist

bodily

(Beyond, I. 13, II. 36, IX. 259; Gen., II. 12). The psy cannot, in fact, accurately distinguish the mental from the the will describes a series of instinctive processes which are (Beyond, I.
what

themselves thoughtful

16, 19;
self

distinguish the
as

self

from

the

thoughtful;

no

independent
of

agent

G.S., III. 126) nor can he does. The will is active as well is required to do the "willing".
self and

Nietzsche's is

obliteration

the distinction between the

the

willing The assertions of the philosophic self orig lust to rule or to dominate. inate, according to Nietzsche, in the is the prideful attempt to infuse meaning and order into Philosophy the commotion of human perceptions (Beyond, I. 2, 9, VI. 211; Gen.,
self-assertion

assertions of

the

is (Gen., I.
self

self-affirming.

Life

as

means

that life

13).

"evil"

II. 13; G.S., IV. 301). The self or will is a

or affects and

complex of

obeying

and

their

respective each

thoughts.

Thinking

commanding instincts is "merely a rela

tion
352).

of

these drives to

The

affective element

erated.
cannot

basis for for (Gen., theorizing consciousness to proceed independently of instinct, the naked intel lect, its powers only bred into man at a late stage of his development, would be powerless in a confrontation with the instincts, the funda mental animators of the self. The philosophic praise of conscious reason has led philosophers to overestimate the power of conscious thinking in relation to the instincts and thus has made them susceptible to con tinual deception (Beyond, I. 3, 6, 8, 11; G.S., I. Ii, V. 354, 357).
reason alone ;

Objective or be attained by
supports

(Beyond, II. 36; G.S., IV. 333, V. in philosophy must be recognized and lib clear-sighted vision into what is (Beyond, II. 39)
rather,
a proper affective

other"

the intellect

III.

12).

If it

were possible

power

The understanding of philosophy as an destroys the belief in the opposition

expression of
of

the

will

to

instinct

and conscious

ness. Even more fundamentally, however, it weakens the basis for the belief in the opposition of truth and untruth. Philosophy does not even tuate in the discovery of unadorned nature, free of an admixture of the merely human or conventional (Beyond, I. 14, 16, 21, 22; G.S., I. 54). The philosophic quest to know, to be objective, is equivalent to the impulse to interpret or make known. Philosophic exertions of will are

the highest

which alone

ing,

all

expression of "the active and interpreting forces through seeing becomes seeing (Gen., III. 12). All know perception, by dint of its origin in willing, is ultimately intersomething"

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

Philosophy of the Future

evaluation.

83

pretive; interpretation is inseparable from

quest

for objectivity its

is, then,

moral

The philosophic I. 6, 19; G.S., III. 114). (Beyond,

implied in every philosophic perspective con it expresses the philosopher's own life, what he loves and what he needs. The psychologist addresses himself to the evaluations of the philosopher in order to infer from them what he is (Beyond, I. 6, II. 32, VI. 187, IX. 268; G.S., V. 370). Nietzsche's understanding of the character of philosophy attests to the potency of man, who, for the sake of mastery, engages in inter pretive activity. But he seeks to make us aware of man's bondage to him self as well. Man as man is barred from complete union with the text of the world outside himself, with nature (G.S., III. 109, V. 354, 374). He cannot perceive that world as it actually is, undifferentiated and continually shifting. To be sure, the development of science represents for Nietzsche an increasingly successful effort to isolate elements of natural processes which are perceived (G.S., III. 112, V. 355); how ever, scientific description of processes which exist independently of man is not explanation. The evaluative world, the world of greatest concern to man (Beyond, II. 34), appears to possess a different cog
evaluative scheme
stitutes most vital element : nitive status: man can apprehend

The

directly
the

that

which

he

makes

(G.S.,

III.

246).
"perspectivity."

Nietzsche's psychology rests Philosophy must be understood

upon

notion of

as

both

a conditioned and a condition 188).

ing
of

activity (Beyond, Preface, I. 4, V.

Liberation

of

the human

mind

apparently requires loving acknowledgment of the dependence the intellectual upon the passionate; the liberation of philosophy
conventional

from

conventional

upon an

orthodoxy requires acceptance of philosophy as a structuring of the natural. The foundation of philosophy insight into the fact of human bondage is not, however, an Just
as

structuring of the is, by its needs, so any the philosophic vision is inevitably compelled to be what it is by na ture (Beyond, I. 11, 20, 21, VII. 231, IX. 264; Gen. I. 13; G.S., V. 347).
affirmation of convention simply.

the

species

outside world

at

moment

in history;

elicited

All theorizing is

rooted

in the

unfathomable

particular, the

subrational

and unique constellation of

drives

and values represented

by

the

phi

losopher himself.
neous effusion

Philosophizing

possesses

the

character of a sponta

born

of an unperceived

192, VI. 213) ; the

genuine philosophic

thing
be

closely

akin

to

it.6

inner necessity (Beyond, V. 188, modality is inspiration, or some That theorizing has an identifiable natural or
that the
errors of past

psychological origin suggests

philosophy may

overcome

by

the

creation of a new

type

of philosophic man

(Beyond,
phi-

VI. 203; Gen., II.

24).

The

refutation of a narrow or superficial

6 Beyond, I. 5, 6, IX. 292; E.H., Ion 534a-e, Meno 99c-e, 100b.

p.

218, Section

III;

cf.

Plato

Apology

22c,

84 losophy
the
can occur

Interpretation

only

by

subduing that

which

is irrefutable in it

philosopher

himself.7

The
orders

philosophers of

the future must, according to

Nietzsche,
of

solve

the "problem

of

value";

they

must establish a system of ranks and

will

through

which all

things
things.8

be
and

understood

in terms

their

moral relations

to

other

Philosophy

the

most spiritual exercise of

justice

rightfully eventuates in hence in the highest form of

211, 213, 219; G.S., IV. 289). A new genuine philosophizing and psychology is a necessary first step toward fundamental 'Beyond, I. 23). That psy is "the path to the
command or rule

(Beyond, VII.

chology
ments

will

begin

and will proceed

by taking the value of philosophy as problematic, to liberate the instincts from inhibitive moral judg
186;

(Beyond, V.
the

Gen., Preface, 6; G.S., V.

for his
responsibility.

345).

Thus it

will

prepare

philosophic man

The
ment,

psychologist can

judge the

relative value of a philosophic per

spective

in terms

of

its

apprehension of what

is. He

makes

this

judg

himself: the vitality or health of the philosopher, says Nietzsche, appears to de termine the justice of his reflections (Gen., I. 5, 10, II. 11). While lib

however, by way

of an assessment of

the

philosopher

the instincts and, hence, of the will is crucial to the philo enterprise, instinctual freedom does not necessarily culminate in health or in philosophy. Nietzsche carefully delineates the meaning
eration of

sophic

not an advocate of

and its relationship to the philosophic task; he is instinctive liberation however understood. The liberation of philosophic willing is an exceptional liberation. Nietzsche must disentangle the proper affective basis for theorizing

of

instinctive health

from

what

he

calls

the

normal

operations

of

obstacle

to philosophy

and

the

ultimate cause of

life. The fundamental its continued inno

phrase

cence and narrowness

power means

is human life itself. His increase

life

as will

to
of

that intellectual life is the

which will

search

for that

measure

understanding VII. 230). The

alien or

power or render

it

secure

(Beyond,

act of

new,

which

into the old does not seek the truth; rather, it is satisfied with any inter pretation, however superficial, which allows it to flourish. The phi
new
spirit"

interpreting expresses the desire to overcome the in most cases means the desire to assimilate the and familiar (Beyond, V. 192). The "basic will of the

losopher's ignorance of the importance of the instincts in theorizing has inadvertently encouraged man's natural tendency to surrender to the mere feeling of increased power. Unless the impulse to know itself becomes instinctive becomes the animating impulse in a human being it will not be a reliable and resolute check upon the basic will to
power

(G.S., I.

3, 11, III. 123,

249).

alter

See both of Nietzsche's prefaces to "Die Philosophie im Tragischen Griechen," der in Gesammelte Werke, Vol. IV, pp. 151-52. Genealogy, note attached to Essay I; Gen., III. 24.

Zeit-

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

Philosophy

of the Future

85

The affective or passionate origin of all theorizing, from the highest to the lowest variety, deprives reason of its place as the natural ruler of man. However, the affects from which theorizing derives describe
a sediment

in

man which

does

not

normally
'simplest'

strive

to

express

anything
284).

other

than its
says

own settledness

(Beyond, I. 6, 8, VII.

229, IX. the the

Nietzsche
affects

that "even in the

such as

processes of sensation

the

dominate,
laziness"

fear, love, hatred, including

192).

passive af affects will

fects
that

of

(Beyond, V.
of

The

sheer power of

not assure some

that the desire for knowledge

will overmaster

ruling and ruled elements Nietzsche argues in general terms that the well-ordered self is the only truly healthy or vitalized self. He defines physio-psychological corruption as "the expression of a threatening anarchy among the instincts and of the fact that the foundation of the has been affects, which is called (Beyond, IX. 258). dispensable to
philosophy.
'life,'
shaken"

hierarchy

the others, so within the self is in

The

well-ordered self

is

fundamentally
a

aristocratic

while all

the in

ruling instinct exists which controls and coordinates the others for its own ends (Beyond, V. 190-91; Gen., I. 10). The concept of instinctual vitality is incomprehensible without
stincts are
or

firm

strong,

i.e., a kind of moder The aristocratically organized self is a mark of genuine nobility (die Vornehmheit) Nietzsche seeks to cultivate a nobility in whom the philosophic impulse for objectivity or justice has become the fundamental need or predominating instinct. Such a nobility could resist the distortions of the will's desire for
acknowledgment

that the capacity for self-rule,

ation, is its basis

(Gen., III.

7,

8,

22).

power without

Nietzsche's

attempt

corroding or repressing that desire (Gen., III. 8, 12). to liberate the philosophic impulses cannot

simply lead to praise of self-assertion; a doctrine of liberation, which is divorced from the insistence upon self-rule as its precondition, is for Nietzsche a prelude to the most slavish of submissions. The excep

deserves to be called the only Self-assertion typically inclines toward an abject surrender to the self, i.e., to the merely personal. This ten dency, which is inherent in man as a willing being, is hostile to phi
tional liberation
of

the

philosophic self self.

genuine

liberation

of

the

losophy. The fundamental human

sche

strivings

for dominion
oppose

represent

to Nietz

the primacy

of

the

search

for individual

significance and mean

ing.9

The

most powerful
express

human impulses
operation, the
self within

because flourish

they

a pervasive self-interest which

will

philosophy precisely distorts or nar

power allows

rows vision.

In its

normal

to

life to lia

by imprisoning

the

the

confines of personal need. an essential

All theorizing, as an bility to become the

9

expression of more or

life,

therefore has

less

magnificent generalization of idio-

Plato Ion 536b-c; Allan

Bloom, "An Interpretation

of

Plato's

Ion,"

Inter

pretation 1 (Summer

197)

: 58-

86
syncratic characteristics

Interpretation

(Beyond, Preface, I. 5, 6). In Nietzsche's view, intellectual life has heretofore been directed by an unperceived cal culus of utility, which has resulted in a clear surrender to the merely
the means whereby philosophy can be truly The liberation implied in the attainment of philosophic objectivity requires a radical detachment from the self a detachment that appears as selflessness or humility (Beyond, VI. 205,
personal. an ascent

Nietzsche from the

seeks self.

210, IX. 260;

Gen., Preface, i,
the
will

2, I. 2, III.

8; G.S., Preface,

2,

3).

The from the

sions

assertions of reactive

to

power which are most common

derive

affects, the

most malignant of

(Gen., I. 11, 13, III. 13, 14). has too often been merely a generalization of the personal indi phy cates its reliance upon the reactive affects (G.S., V. 370). The phi losophic exercise of moderation aims at mastery of fundamental human
strivings; it must,

the self-serving pas Nietzsche's discovery that philoso

therefore, be specifically directed toward the

most

reac

tive

affects.

The
or

famous

such

affect

discussed

by Nietzsche,
an

ressentiment,

revenge, is the

most

inhibitive

of clear-sighted vision

into
sors,

what

is. Ressentiment

signifies an

inability to

transcend

intense

preoccupation with or

oneself, e.g.,

with one's

misery,

or one's oppres

the

correctness of one's own views

Gen., I.
of men

7, 10, 11;
who,
are

(Beyond, II. 25, IX. 260; G.S., V. 359). Nietzsche calls ressentiment typical because they cannot rule themselves, require formidable

rulers.

They
which

insufficiently
(Gen., II.

powerful

to

release

themselves from the

and

bonds

both

oppress and preserve against

them. Their impotence them

as

their "senseless
pendent

raging"

their

rulers mark

beings
of

11).

In this light,

genuine

entirely de nobility indicates

that degree
affects,

also enables

vitality which, by enabling man to conquer the reactive him to rise above the merely personal (Beyond,

IX.
of
of

260).

the

will

The man who is independent of the spontaneous inclinations in this sense, and who is hence master of himself, is capable

objectivity
or

phenomenon

healthy
human

(Beyond, II. 39). True objectivity is so extraordinary a because of the pervasiveness of enervated rather than noble life (Gen., I. 11, II. 11); the power of ressentiment in
willing
expresses

perception or peculiar

the

general

ignobility
which

of man.

The

physio-psychological

deficiency

philosophers

have shared in common with "the is thus revealed as a lack of independence or autonomy (Beyond, V. 199, 202; Gen., I. 9, 16). The ignoble man, according to Nietzsche, is painfully aware of his de pendence; he despises himself because of it (Gen., III. i4). Ignoble
self-interestedness or

people"

self-love

shame

(Beyond, VI.

222;

Gen., I.

cannot revere

himself

except

is inseparable from self-contempt or 10, 14, III. 18). The ignoble man insofar as he is attached to something
than he is. Dogma is his
passion

more powerful and and

hence

more secure

solace

his

weapon against rulers.

The

Jews'

for

revenge against

Rome, for

example, culminated, according to

Nietzsche,

velopment of

Christian dogma

(Gen., I. 8, III.

11).

in the de In both its exoteric

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

Philosophy
shame

of the Future

87
The

and esoteric

forms, dogmatism
dogmatism
of

transforms the

into

self-love.

prevalence of
vidual

reveals

power of man's passion

for indi

significance,

a passion which seeks sanctification of

individual

existence

by

way

universally
will

applicable and

(Gen., III.
to

14, 22). The

to

power expresses

eternally true doctrine the human inclination

assertions of the will orig inated in the needs of a species which was not yet capable of self-love. Thus Nietzsche interprets the conventional tyranny over man implied

universalize personal need.

Heretofore the

in any willing
as an

of unconditional of natural

morality,

including

the faith in

truth,
norm of

expression

(Beyond, V. 188, 199; Gen., Genealogy, Nietzsche defends

been

necessity with reference to the II. 7). In the psychological studies

ascetic

the

morality human
117).

as a

inextricably
it has

conjoined with

the

nature of

has tyranny the human species be

which

cause

satisfied

the

passionate

longing

for

significance

(Gen., Ill,
life. It

11, 13, 16-18;

G.S., I.

1, III.

Philosophic dogmatism ultimately derives from the character of appears as a form of the distorting egoism of base or dependent men. Its implied piety is vanity; its praise of self-denial or disinter
estedness

is

subtly disguised
philosophic

expression of
exists. of

the

most

form form
of

of self-preoccupation

that

As the

most subtle

all-encompassing form of
the
most subtle

dogmatism,
of

the

love

truth

manifests

revenge; that revenge

25).

(Gen., III.

is, however, directed against life itself Philosophy, despite its own beliefs, has been intolerant
to
overcome

truth. In

order

those human inclinations

which

have

proved stronger
man's

than

philosophic

impulses, it is necessary
envisions a genuine

to

overcome
which

self-contempt.

Nietzsche

self-love

grows out of matism

the capacity for

conquered

self-rule

(Gen., II.

9).

Philosophic

dog

is to be

by

that

noble

being

who can

transcend the

merely

personal

by

means

of an authentic selfhood.
of what

Philosophizing
be
at

which emanates

from

love

is

masterful

in

oneself will

once candid and power

just to life. Moreover, mastery of the basic will to frees philosophy from its alliance, hitherto unnoticed, with the
always
realm

non-philosophic realm.

The noble man has dependence from the

been

able

to

effect some measure of

in

of

dogma. Nietzsche teaches the

the
attitude

poten of past

tially
tween

philosophic

man

to

adopt

of noble

men

times toward those

noble

who are not noble.

He

reveals

the

conjunction

be

independence

and genuine

character of anti-philosophic movements

philosophy by to historical instances

ascribing the
of

pop
con and

ular rebellion against a noble quest of

Rome,

the

attack

The original Christian ruling upon the Catholic Church by Luther,

class.

the French Revolution

of

are

three

archetypal expressions of

the

needs

the

people which succeeded at

the

expense of philosophic charac

teristics.
"original"

Nietzsche

argues

that

Christianity
the "noble

sought and

to

destroy

thriving

skepticism and

impartiality,

frivolous

toler-

88
ance"

Interpretation

cultivated by the mores of the aristocratic Romans (Beyond, III. 46; Gen., I. 10). The sense of independence and pride which in formed the aristocracy had enabled it to withstand the seductions of faith : the Romans had overwhelmed seriousness and hence, piety with laughter and arrogant skepticism. Just these characteristics must be Nietzsche. The proud recaptured to insure philosophic openness, says

disdain

of

faith

opposes

the ingenuousness

and

superficiality

of

the

common man's mode of self-assertion

through dogma

(Beyond, VIII.

252; the

Gen., III.

effects of

Luther, a man of the people, naturally interpreted found them in the church of nobility on faith, when he
14).

his day,

as corruption.

He "misunderstood the
tolerance
which

noble

skepticism, that
self-assured

luxury

of skepticism and
itself"

every triumphant
as

power permits

(G.S., V.

358).

Insofar

the

pious substitution

of revelation

for

reason eventuates

in the

creation of

nobility,

it is

not

absolutely

opposed

to

philosophy:

in fact, the
350,

skepticism of

the ruling

church encouraged a suspicion about man's nature which accommo

dated
moted

psychological realism

(G.S., V.
and

358).

Skepticism regarding faith

the

needs

that issue in faith is

pro

by

aristocratically

organized

ruling structures, among

most noble example

which

Nietzsche includes the church 61; Gen., I. 10, III. 23). The
ence of of

as

the

(Beyond, III.
the influ

aristocratic regime minimizes

the

realm of

faith

on

the higher

man.

Ultimately, the security

a new nobility depends upon a new aristocratic regime (Beyond, III. 61-62, VIII. 251, 256; G.S., IV. 283). Nietzsche's task is, then, His consideration of politics is evidently utili inherently tarian: he regards the sovereignty of the individual as the hidden
political.10

promise or goal of

aristocracy,

and as

the

sole

justification for

aris

G.S., I. 23). Of all regimes, tocracy (Beyond, IX. 257; Gen., the most hostile to philosophy. Nietzsche's analysis is democracy is thoroughly anti-democratic because he conceives democracy to be the most powerful form which the non-philosophic realm can take. Con
II. 1, 2; sidering the
species as a

whole,

democracy
the
need of

may be
average

understood as

the

most natural regime:

it

glorifies

assertions of average men

tocracy may fulfill

the very

real

life. Aris for leaders;

recognition

democracy
Gen., III.
pressed

satisfies

the fundamental desire for individual

and significance i4).

by

its

egalitarian animus expresses

(Beyond, VII.
to
power as

Because it
mass of

the

will

219, IX. 261; that will is ex

in the

imposing
the

men, democratic orthodoxy possesses a solid and foundation in the species life. The democratic order manifests
man's clear-sighted

common

grasp

of

the

conditions which

are

Aristocratic regimes are, according to Nietzsche, the effect of dangerous circumstances, a hostile external environment (Beyond, IX. 262) ; democratic
regimes are 10). of

10

born in generally peaceable circumstances (Beyond, V. 201 ; Gen. II. One can infer, therefore, that Nietzsche intended to assist the establishment that sort of environment which gives rise to aristocracy (Beyond, VI. 208).

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

Philosophy

of the Future

89
197-

favorable to his existence, i.e., his innate prudence (Beyond, V. 99, 201, VII. 221, 228; Gen., II. 15, III. 18; G.S., V. 352).

Democratic orthodoxy sanctifies the submersion into an awe-in spiring collectivity of individual men who could not otherwise respect themselves (Beyond, VI. 202-3; Gen., III. 18). Nietzsche regards the
toward which the modern democratic order is progressing, the "autonomous as the final glorification of democratic organiza tion ; it represents a loss of individuality so complete that coercion and hence government is no longer necessary (Beyond, V. 202) Democracy
goal
herd,"
.

aims at

nothing

other

than its

own organization.

An

aristocratic or

ganization of

vitality from implicit in

society is itself, however, an exceptional condition. The which it derives and which it supports, i.e., the will to inhibition
17-18).

overcome, supplant, and reconstruct, constantly resists the

organization

(Beyond, IX.

259;

Gen., II.

11, III.

Aristocracy
257, 262;

tends to foster something

greater

than itself

(Beyond, IX.

Gen., II. 10). The orthodoxy of aristocratic regimes is more precariously established than democratic orthodoxy (Beyond, V. 202). Aristocracies always possess, therefore, at least the potential (which
becomes
greater as the society approaches maturity) for philosophy. Aristocratic orthodoxy tends to overcome itself as a necessary result of its attempt to tie man irrevocably to the past and the future (Gen.,

II. 10, III.

the
and

27).
of

Initially, it links
the

past, present,
aristocratic

and

expense

individuality. The

reverence

future together at for lineage

establishment of firm institutions and mores is integrated into a whole which is supremely confident of itself, i.e., a That culture abhors novelty and strives to preserve its institutions for future generations. Eventually, the pride and self-confidence which have been cultivated by the faith

tradition

makes

possible; the individual

culture.11

in tradition, especially
the

within

the ruling class,

will no

longer

endure

oppressive weight of

tradition

aristocratic culture matures and

(Beyond, IX. 262; Gen., I. 10); the the sovereign individual emerges.

The mature aristocratic society, like that of Rome immediately be fore Christ, is skeptical and, therefore, diverse: the culture gives way to the sect (G.S., III. 149). 12 The individual experiences a tension be tween the sacred laws of the past and the freedom which might derive from their destruction. His
trained him to
good stead.
attachment

to

glorious

tradition has

a self-discipline and a self-love which now stand able

He is
262;

to

help
2).

himself ; he founded

creates new

him in laws for himself

(Beyond, IX.

Gen., II.

While democratic

regimes are

upon a similar past

disrespect for
of a masterful

tradition, they do
11

not sever man

from his

because

Thus Beyond, IX. 263, 265; Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the New Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 160.
12

Idol,"

See

also

Leo Strauss, "Restatement

on

Xenophon's
1959),

Hiero,"

in What Is

Political Philosophy? (New York: The Free

Press,

pp.

114-15.

90

Interpretation
power.13

law-giving or institution-creating
tom, but in the face
of

They break

the

spell of cus

they merely waver (Beyond, VII. 238-39). Because of its origin in enervated life, Nietzsche regards democracy as infirm, confused, and restless (Beyond, VI. 208, VII. 223-24; G.S., V. 356); as such, the democratic order
openness

the

they have

created,

provokes a pervasive

doubt

and unsureness about

life

which can

be

all-encompassing only by doxy. Democratic orthodoxy owes its immense power and durability precisely to the defects of the democratic order. Men in a democracy are inclined to submit themselves to a political ideology because they dare not recognize what they are. The cult of the state, and, thus, of
assuaged
creation of an

the

political ortho

the masses, necessarily

replaces

the

ordered

cultural

whole

and

its

successor, the specialized sect. Democratic political orthodoxy is dis tinguished from the two sorts of organization of belief found in aris

tocracies because it does to imitate the

old or

not compel men

to

aspire

by teaching

them

to

create

the
of

new.

most vigorous claims on

behalf

The regime which makes the the individual tends to obliterate

the
past

individuality ; the ignore the future. Only

admits of a

regime which

suppresses

is

compelled

to

aristocratic regimes cultivate

that

sort of

individuality

which

development into philosophy; they establish moral judg ments which are not unconditional, but which acknowledge an order of rank among men (Beyond, V. 198, VII. 221, 228). The aristocratic apportionment of higher duties and more extensive privileges accord

ing
of

to

class or rank alone within

leads to the

"craving

for

an

ever-widening

distances
257).

more

remote,

itself, the development of further-stretching, more comprehensive

the
soul

an ever

states"

higher, (Bevond,

IX.

sire and need

Without an acute awareness of one's exceptionality, the de for new problems and tasks, the impetus to

extraordinary

activity, cannot exist. Neither a skeptical attitude toward orthodoxy nor the sense of autonomy necessary to maintain it is possible without

love
that

of oneself as

occurs own

in his
of

freeing

something rare (G.S., V. 351). The pervasive leveling in democratic society impedes the rare man's confidence exceptionality (Beyond, V. 119; G.S., III. 117). For the sake philosophy from the influence of democratic political life,
to instill in the
potential philosopher a and

Nietzsche "the

seeks

awareness of

the distance between higher

distance"

penetrating

pathos of

malicious conscience

intends the standing

pathos of

lower men, what he calls (Beyond, II. 30, VI. 212; Gen., I. 2), and a (Beyond, II. 32; G.S., I. 2, 3, 19, 55). Nietzsche distance to eventuate in a passion for solitude or
atheism.14

alone which requires

The

malicious

conscience,

as

a psychologist's

weapon, is directed

at

the

tendency

of previous theo-

13

"On the New

Idol,"

p. 161.
Men,"

14

Beyond, II.

44, IX. 284;

371; "On the Famous Wise

Gen., III. 5, 7; G.S., IV. 285, V. 357, 359j 367_ in Zarathustra, pp. 214-15.

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

Philosophy

of the Future

91

rizing toward dogmatism ;15 as the ability for self-mockery, it is turned against the self (Beyond, II. 26). Nietzsche seeks to encourage a criti cal attitude toward philosophizing, a kind of self-inflicted cruelty which teaches the philosophic man to resist a seductive moralizing (Beyond, V. 192, VII. 227, 229-30). These characteristics encourage
the philosopher's independence from the thus
people and

teach

self-control

they

support

the

passion

for knowledge. Together

they

comprise

free-spiritedness. The elucidation of free-spirited independence is the theme of Section II of Beyond Good and Evil, "The Free The preconditions for
Spirit."

genuine

philosophizing

appear

to

be,

on

the

one

hand,

thorough

going atheism, and, on the other, the capacity to take lightly all that has hitherto been taken seriously (Beyond, II. 27, 28). In this section Nietzsche counsels against "the lures of dependence that He hidden in

honors,

senses,"

money, or offices, the interests of the "great

or

or enthusiasms of

the
and

i.e.,
the lures

in

majority"

(aphorism 44)

of

dependence that he hidden in the unexamined praise of philosophic pursuits (aphorisms 25, 26, 31, 33, 41, 43). In addition, he emphasizes the differences between the "higher type of the "seeker after
man,"

knowledge in the
rest of

sense"

great and exceptional

(aphorism 26),
of

and

the

men, especially the contemporary variety

"free-thinkers"

(aphs.,

26, 29, 40-44). As

rather are

men

"without

solitude,"

they
mere

are not

inde
of

pendent, but

continually
vanguard of

susceptible

to the orthodoxy

democracy; they

are

the

the masses,

levelers

(Gen.,

I.9). Nietzsche does not treat his encouragement of philosophic indepen dence from the people, however subtle their influence, as something entirely
new.

Because

of

the

age

in

which

necessary to
perience.

reaffirm what noble men of

the

he lives, he says, he finds it past have known from ex for

genuine phi of

serious examination of

the

preconditions

losophy
tual life.

cannot

ignore the decisive defects

common

contemporary intellec

Reference to the dogmatism in its

original

piety which informs both philosophic formulation and contemporary philosophy

the
modern

does not suffice to flection. Nietzsche

give a proper considers

understanding of either mode of re faith in truth to be emphat

204;

ically

anti-philosophic

(Beyond, VI.
of genuine

Gen., III. 24) ;

the

original or

classical

faith in truth, however,

more

completely

accommodated

the

philosophy its openness, its full ness, its height. Nietzsche directs his most vigorous attack in Beyond Good and Evil (Section VI) at that dogmatism which is specifically
typical
characteristics
modern.16

His

prelude

to

a new

philosophizing is
a

as much a

recovery

of

something

lost,

of which

Plato is

typical

representative

(Beyond,

15
16

Beyond, II. 27, 28, 32, 33, E.H., p. 310, Section II.

34, 35, 39, VII. 227;

G.S., Preface,

3, V. 346.

Q2

Interpretation the
remnants of

VI. 204, 213), fluence.

Nietzsche

as

it is the
a

eradication of

Plato's in

seeks

reaffirmation

of

alted character of eros

philosophy (Beyond, VI.

the venerable, secret, and ex 213). The true philosophic

is noble; it expresses a desire to be distinguished from other men (Beyond, VI. 212, IX. 270-72; Gen., III. 8; G.S., III. 123, 129). Phi losophy's abandonment of belief in its exceptional character is suffi cient to turn extraordinary men away from it (Beyond, VI. 204; G.S., IV.
294). 17

In turn, the
men

presumed

accessibility

of philosophic reflec

tion to ordinary
edness of

necessarily

causes

reflections of which

ordinary

men are capable.

itself,"

philosophy to degenerate into This abuse, "the wretch

the

most recent

philosophy

leads to

disdain for

phi

The attitude of the modern age toward philosophy losophy cultivates "unbelief in the masterly task and masterfulness of philos (Beyond, VI. 204). The noble instinct for the singular and high which Nietzsche seeks to encourage can find its proper satisfaction in made worthy again, i.e., philosophy only if philosophy itself can be can be made the expression of command or rule (Beyond, VI. 211). in
general.
ophy"

Genuine philosophy
sciences.

is, in

The contemporary

and ruled

by destroying
The
a

the first place, the legitimate ruler of the age seeks to destroy this order of ruling the distinction between scientific men and

philosophers.

philosophic exercise of command

concern with

is ultimately

su-

perordinate

to

the
a
life"

rank

of

science; the

philosopher

"demands but The

about

of

himself
and

judgement,
value of

life

the

comprehensiveness of

the

No, not about the sciences (Beyond, VI. 205; G.S., V. 381). philosophic rule over life, however, se
or

Yes

cures

the

legitimacy

of philosophic rule over scientific pursuits.

The

scientific man as such cannot approach

the fundamental

problems of

value; he

philosopher

power

orient origins

is ignoble (Beyond, VI. 206, 207, 211, 213; G.S., V. 373). The is distinguished from him by nature, "by the height and of his (Beyond, VI. 213). Classical philosophy did itself around problems of evaluation, and thus it reveals its

spirituality"

in noble rather than impoverished life (Beyond, VI. 212; cf. III. 25). It began with an intimation about the possibility of Gen., human wisdom concerning the eternal natural order or hierarchy. Nietzsche does not deny that philosophy must be based on some in sight into the possibility of wisdom, nor does he oppose classical phi

losophy by
tainment
as a

suggesting that this insight A

candid and

must

be tempered

by

a sober

reflection, derived from experience,

of wisdom. of

the probability of the at devoted attachment to philosophy

about modest claim about

way

life
to

must rest upon a

thoroughly

its

achievements.18

According
17 18

Nietzsche,
495c.

the

philosopher's

modesty bespeaks his

abil-

See Plato Republic

Strauss,

"Restatement,"

pp. ii5-r6.

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

Philosophy

of the Future

93

ity

the problematic, to desire questions and questionablethan certainty (G.S., IV. 296, 328, V. 343, 347, 374-75). Nietzsche understands philosophy as the constant, unfaltering ap
endure
ness more proach requires an exceptional

to

(G.S., V. 345, 351). Philosophizing self-sufficiency for which there is no contem porary model. It rightfully proceeds from the noble synthesis of mod esty and self-affirming pride. Nietzsche says, "It was modesty that in vented the word in Greece and left the magnificent over presumption in calling oneself wise to the actors of the spirit weening
greatest questions
'philosopher'

to the

the modesty
Plato"

of such monsters of pride and

sovereignty
7).

as

Pythago

ras,

as

(G.S., V.
upon

351;

cf.

Beyond, I.
or

Only

that

theorizing

which

is founded lesser

self-rule

trating (G.S., V.
held

359,
of

375).

autonomy is intrepid and pene The noble man's disdain for the opinions
and systain a philosophic sense of

by

men can

develop into

wonder, "the taste

reverence"

horizons of ordinary men (G.S., dogmatism truncates philosophic

dogmatism

for everything that lies beyond the V. 373; Beyond, IX. 263, 265). Modern

inquiry more

seriously than

classical

because, modesty (Beyond, III.

as a child of

the democratic order, it knows

no

58-59, IX. 263, 272;

Gen., I. 9, III. 22; G.S.,

have
obscured

V.358). Modern philosophers, meaning

of evaluation.

beginning

with

Kant,

the true

philosophy as the ascent to the task of comprehensive The philosophic attachment to truth has undergone an Nietzsche
considers

evolution,

which

belief in

an eternal

hierarchy
or

of evaluations

to have been necessary, from the to the absolute rejection

of evaluative
skepticism

of a

philosophy is a form of deprives evaluative questions which, another, way philosophic hearing (Beyond, III. 54, VI. 204, 207, 208); it is a

interpretation.
one

Contemporary
hubris
as

peculiarly
within

modern synthesis of

and shame.

Both

major

trends

contemporary philosophy, entirely

subject

Nietzsche

portrays

them, (Beyond,

I. 10)

are

to the

realm of

orthodoxy because

they

are

themselves

manifestations of of

ignobility.
or positivists

The "philosophers possibility immodest

tence
of wisdom
of all

reality"

lay

claim

not

to the

claims"

but to its possession, "the maddest and most (G.S., V. 359). They believe in the compe
to
establish replaced

of natural science

the limits

of

knowledge : the

quest
rel

for

philosophic wisdom

is

by

mathematical physics.

The

ative

reliability

of sense

data,

when examined

in light
of

of philosophic

standards of cognitive

validity, leads to an

unprecedented

inflation
that
can

of

the

value of a mechanical or conceptual

rendering
the
aid

the

operations of

be little 23-24). The scientific demand for some measure of certainty represents to Nietzsche the vanity and lack of vitality of modern man. Modern science is ignoble because it cannot tolerate openness (G.S., II. 76, IV. 296, V. 347). There is from the
nature

(Gen., III.

9).

Positivism

seeks

"'a

truth'

world of

mastered

reason"

completely and forever (G.S., V. 373; Gen., III.

with

of

our

square

qa

Interpretation

outset,

then,
is

an alliance

between

modern science and

democracy. That
will

alliance

strengthened

by

the fact that the impulse for certainty

problems to be revealed. Inquiry only permit a low order of before the question of the value of democracy, for instance, is ap compel it proached. What modern science has ignored will eventually

is

closed

to

support

the

whole

closed realm

of

orthodoxy

as opposed

to

phi

losophy.

The
ability
mind,

more radical modern skepticism, which rejects of sense

belief in the
the

reli

data, is merely
evaluation

a more extreme version of

a

modern

cowardice

about

"feast
the

of

noble
pursuit

for the
of

generated

from

a mortal

fear that the

knowledge

will end

in

a confrontation with

problems of evaluation

(Beyond,
con

VI.

208).

Radical
as an

skepticism cannot

dilute the potency

soporific

of

democratic
allays

orthodoxy;

innocently

conceived

which

fusion, it inadvertently promotes the continuance of the democratic order. Radical skepticism, like that which it claims to oppose, ex presses the lack of vitality of the democratic age, this time, however, in its character as psychic disorder or confusion. It originates in ener
vated or

"less

natural"

nature; the self is unsure,

doubtful, full

of

mistrust,"

"internal disorder intensifies

makes man unable and

and, consequently, feeble. Physiological

consider real

decay
to

or

a confusion about standards of evaluation which

to

issues. The

willingness

judge,

hence a strong will, is indispensable for an illumination of those issues (Beyond, VII. 233, 238). The pervasive shame or self-contempt tenuousof modern man, which arises from an intimation about the ness of his innermost impulses, precludes resolute inquiry while dis
guising itself as objectivity. In Nietzsche's judgment,
philosophic modern

intellectual life is
a

denial

of

truly
or

impulses

which

derives from

denial

of

true sensuality

instinctive health ; it

is, therefore, ascetic

to the highest degree

(Beyond,

III. 49; Gen., II. 23, III. 24-25). Modern asceticism, which conquered Platonic asceticism, now prevents the additional philosophic strength
acquired

in the fight

against

Plato's
attached 24).

errors

(Beyond, Preface, VI.

asceticism are a

209).

Both the hubris

and

from coming to fruition the shame of modern

values

permanently

to Christian-democratic
can

(Beyond, VI.
luation

202-3; Gen. II.

They
an

be

overcome

by

a reva

of values which

of classical asceticism
self seems

understanding of the significance for philosophy. The liberation of the philosophic

upon a successful struggle against

is based on

to

depend, then,

the time

ly (G.S.,

V. 380). Nietzsche suggests that the philosopher hostile relation to his times: he arises out
combat
what

as such of

has

necessarily

decadence in order to
philosophers see

it. As "the bad

around

time,"

conscience
not

of

their

those

them do
the

see,

i.e.,

that the honored

things,

the

virtues of

their time, have been

critique of

Nietzsche's

(Beyond, VI. 212, IX. 262). is exceptional, however, precisely timely

"outlived"

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

this
new

Philosophy

of the Future

95

because it

rests upon

insight into the

significance of all phi

losophy for its time. Thus his prelude to a new philosophy is actuated by an awareness of the unprecedented opportunity for the philosophic
man

in the contemporary
which

age.

that

typically

resists

The liberation of the philosopher from philosophy in man, or from "modern

ideas,"

is itself a prelude to the cultivation of a radically novel phi losophy. The possibility for genuine philosophy is the highest legacy of the latest age. The age must, therefore, contain within itself the potentiality for a transcendence of the limitations of its philosophy.
A genuinely
candor,
philosophic

virtue, Nietzsche's

"virtue"

peak of modern

intellectual life

Redlichkeit,

does intellectual

exist at

the
or

integrity

i.e.,

the

ruthless scientific conscience

(Beyond, V. 192, VII.

214, 227). Nietzsche concerns himself primarily with the extension of "unnatural" the scientific conscience into the sciences, psychology and

the

self-critique of consciousness

(G.S., V.
must

in

contrast

to the

natural

sciences,

in order to become profound. philosophy derive from its basis in historical psychology. The rare but timely scientific conscience must ally itself with the other timely virtue of which Nietzsche speaks in Section VII of Beyond Good and Evil, the historical sense (aphorism 224). Nietzsche owes his own insight into the relationship between philosophy and its age to the
opmental

355; Gen., III. 25), which, be made historical or devel The unique characteristics of

the

new

modern

historical

consciousness.

The historical sense is necessarily of modern, i.e., decadent, origin. It represents to Nietzsche a "submissive plebeian about the
new, exotic,
and

curiosit

alien,

which as such opposes

the

resolute

taste

and

intolerant

conventions of aristocratic cultures

sense as

(G.S., IV.

337).

Nietzsche

defines the historical

past,

with particular reference

the capacity to psychologize about the to morality as the vehicle for human
order of which a

development. It is "the capacity for quickly guessing the

rank of

the

valuations

according to

relations of these has lived; the 'divinatory valuations, for the relation of the authority of values to the authority of active (Beyond, VII. 224). Historical psychology reveals the conjunction between morality and life. It regards morality as "a sign language of the (Beyond, V. 187), and therefore leads to an various moralities for various levels of life. A analysis of the value of proper developmental psychology reveals the variety of human rela

instinct'

being

people, for the

society,

human

forces"

affects"

tions to things
186;

and

the

needs

that

govern

those

relations

(Beyond, V.
which

Gen., Preface,
the
quest

Nietzsche
underlies

suggests

3-6, I, that the

endnote). absence of a

historical awareness,

for nature, has

prevented past philosophers

from

discovering derstanding
I.
1).

the

problem of man and

of philosophy's not yet

thus from attaining a clear un function with regard to human life (Gen.,
endowed with a

Man has

been

nature; he is "the

as yet

animal"

undetermined

(Beyond, III. 62).

That

previous

moralities

96

Interpretation

have been overcome or outlived attests to the indeterminacy of the human species, its malleability. Human malleability derives from physio-psychological decay (Gen., I. 5, II. 16-18). Past philosophers discovered neither the extent of man's capacity to change himself nor
the

being inevitability of the changing for an indeterminate or (Gen., III. 13). They sought, rather, to disclose man's nature; speci
glorified

"sick"

fically, they
reason

his

reason

because

of a perceived
never

openness of ad

to the

natural

order.

Thus, philosophy

seriously

dressed itself to the

order or
whole

source of man's

variability, his instinctual dis

has

decay. In Nietzsche's understanding, then, philosophy as a evaded responsibility for man's future, which is, however,

its legitimate Because

except regular and

duty

and privilege no

(Beyond, VI.

213).

man

had

necessary"

rarely,

by

chance.19

fixed nature, i.e., no sufficiently "calculable, instinctual core, he could not turn out well, Philosophy has fostered the "gruesome
chance"

dominion
assisted men

of nonsense and overall

over

human life

and

thereby has
The higher

the

degeneration from

of man

(Beyond, VI.

203).

have

suffered most

philosophy's errors

; the exceptionally

complex calculus which must precede

the

establishment of conditions

favorable to their existence, in contrast to conditions favorable to average life, has been missing (Beyond, IX. 269, 270, 274). "The acci dental, the law of absurdity in the whole economy of mankind, mani fests itself most horribly in its destructive effects on the higher (Beyond, VI. 203). Human life, a unique instance of the will to power, expends its energy in pursuit of a goal (Gen., III. 1, 23; G.S., I. 1). That goal or ideal, however primitive, must be posited by morality. Human life needs morality because, in contrast to animal life, it as pires. The low aspirations of ordinary men, because they are far more common, are both more insistent upon satisfaction by evaluations fa vorable to them and more easily satisfied (Beyond, IX. 268). Nietzsche considered himself to be the first philosopher to have discovered the cause of the fragility of human aspiration: the highest human aspi rations have been corrupted, i.e., inhibited, by unconditional moral judgments made from the perspective of average life (Beyond, VII.
218-19).

man"

The
overall

philosophers of

the future

will accept

the responsibility for the

(Beyond, III. 61, VIII. 251). They will make man a determinate being; they will understand that the exis tence of a human nature is dependent upon human will (Beyond, VI. 203, IX. 274). Thus they will be saved from the singular defect of all
of man past philosophy its ineffectiveness against the assertions of average life to the detriment of extraordinary life. Knowledge of the lawful in

development

19

Because

of

psychology's superficiality,

the "original

problem

man"

is, in

a more comprehensive

form,

the

modem problem

regarding
man as

well

(Gen., II.

regarding

1).

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

Philosophy

of the Future

97

human development permits proper attention to be given to the needs of the higher man and thus gives rise to a new prudence (Beyond, II. 44; G.S., III. 113, V. 379). The philosophic project of determining na ture is equivalent to the attempt to secure aspiration or willing as a fundamental human need and thus to orient man permanently toward the future (Gen., II. 16; G.S. 143, V. 365). The philosophic exercise of justice must, therefore, be directed toward the cultivation of vitality or nobihty, the source of resolute, far-reaching, and high human willing (Beyond, IX. 260, 265; Gen., II. 2). The new philosophy, un like past philosophy, will not unconsciously strive to make itself un necessary by its narrowness, i.e., by its inability to comprehend and secure the higher aspirations of man or, conversely, its inability to prevent higher visions than its own from arising. The philosophic activity envisioned by Nietzsche enhances life it self. Life, understood as will to power, knows nothing higher than its own highest expressions (Beyond, VI. 207). The aspiring man cannot be taught to evaluate himself in terms of a naturally ordained hier archy; such a demand would not only be based on a falsehood but would inhibit or distort willing. Human life can only be evaluated in terms of its own highest acts of will (Gen., III. 14). Philosophy itself is justifiable only as the highest expression of life. The philosophic responsibility, that compulsion to liberate man from the vulnerability associated with his freedom to become, is fully discharged by the revaluation of values (Beyond, VI. 210-11, 213; G.S., I. 44, II. 58). If it is successful, the philosophic project will rep resent an unprecedented beneficence to life. In its concern for the higher man it will not disdain severity ; unlike the Christian expression of love for man, which underlies the modern orthodoxy (Beyond, V. 202), it will not refrain from condemning what ought to perish (Beyond, III. 62, VII. 238). Still, Nietzsche's project for the future seems to re tain a crucial relationship with his own age, i.e., an indebtedness to Christianity and democracy. Human malleability, which has a specific historical origin (Gen., II. 16-19), increases with instinctual decay: a sick organism cannot resist change. Because of the unparalleled de
gree of instinctual degeneration which modern man represents (Beyond, VI. 208), he is particularly ripe for the most comprehensive project of cultivation and education ever devised by man (Beyond, III. 61). The intensity of the modern need heightens the opportunity for the philosophic man but is no guarantee that he will in fact appear (Beyond,

VI. 203). On the contrary, the philosophic man must, by extending the historical sense, extend the disease of modernity and, in consequence, The subject himself continually to his own potential unique character of the new philosophy presents the most formidable
corruption.20

20 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967). Preface.

98

Interpretation
to its

obstacles

appearance.

The

advance of
modern

the historical

sense pre

ignoble orthodoxy resists. The historical sense, like everything that originates in degenerate life, is ineffectual: it can neither devise a remedy for the modern defects
cipitates a crisis

for

man which

the

comprehend the properly diagnose them because it cannot truly or effeminacy of the historical sense, however, past. The feebleness defends the modern age from the most extreme of physio-psycho logical decay pessimism or the weariness of life (Gen., I. 11, III. nor

Where it appears, the historical sense is most often a restless, change which is easily mastered by the coordi nate but more massive impulse of the age to remain convinced of the superiority of Christian-democratic values. The advance of the scien
14).

dispirited impulse for

tific

conscience

dernity
which

toward

is,

in its historical mode, and thus the advance of mo pessimism (Gen., III. 25), requires an untimeliness Noble affects at once permit the invigoin itself,
noble.21

ration or virilification of of

the

timely

virtues and ensure

the possibility

their

eventual destruction.22

capacity for self-rule allows man to withstand the power The necessity for self-rule is reinforced, however, by the comprehensive nature of the philosopher's candor. Self-rule sig nifies instinctual health or vitality and, as such, is applicable to all The
noble

of orthodoxy.

levels full
as a of

of

nobihty; the
which

philosophic man of calls

the future
health"

requires a novel

vitality,

Nietzsche been. The

the "great

(Gen., II.

24-25).

confrontation with man's past renders ever

philosophy

more precarious
health"

than it has

philosopher must possess

the "great
of

defense

against

the potentially corrupting influence

truth, i.e.,
The
philo

"that

existence which

is knowable

sophic exercise of will

disclosed
his life,
the

by

is threatened historical psychology. Contempt for

evidenced

by us (G.S., V. by the insights

false
moral

346).

into human life

men-

man's general

daciousness,
and

by

the

power of

judgments

over

pity for

man's

tendency

toward

self-belittlement

may lead

to turn away from man (Gen., Preface, 6, I. 11, 12). Nietzsche never denies that the training or education of the potenphilosopher

While Nietzsche ultimately prefers the aristocratic regime in order to se human aspiring, in the modern age hatred of the timely, of dissolution, appears to replace the disrespect for tradition which characterizes the late stage of the aristocracy. The modern noble man is described as a being in tension with himself; what is timely within him provides the animus for self-mastery and, thus, for noble action: something formidable exists for him to oppose (Beyond, V. 200, VI. 209, VII. 225, VIII. 242; Gen., I. 16). 22 Modern psychology has remained unhistorical and hence superficial be cause it does not possess the aristocratic reverence for lineage or age upon which the disclosure of origins or history depends (Beyond, V. 186; Gen. I. 4; I. 34). As the servant of the democratic order, modern G.S., psychology must deceive man, for the sake of his self-love, about the past (Beyond, IX. 264; Gen., II. 7). Nietzsche argues, however, that a proper genealogy of man's morai past is not shameful; it reveals the aristocratic origin of moral judgements as such and the activity or potency of man (Gen., I. 2, 4-6, II. 12, III. 4).
cure

21

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to is

a

Philosophy

of the Future

99

tially
opher

philosophic man

dangerous

enterprise

is intended to bravest to their

the capacity to

constitute

its

appeal.

courage"

frontation
.

with

(Beyond, II. 30). recover from illness; it therefore encourages a con illness, i.e., with the corruptibility of man (G.S., V.

; its risk to the philos Nietzsche's books "call the signifies The "great
health"

382) It allows the passionate seeker after knowledge to tyrannize him self for the sake of his own ideal (Beyond, VI. 220; G.S., IV. 290). The
self-love which
serve

is
of

possible

to

one who

the love

man, "of

what might yet

follows his own ideal may pre be made of (Beyond,

man"

behalf of "the whole history of the soul so (Beyond, III. 45), a task which demands that he himself undergo innumerable alterations, that he live through "the range of inner human experience reached so (Beyond, III. 45; Gen., III. 6). The new philosopher must, therefore, be versatile. He would, by ex tension, praise versatility. He would "be compelled to find the great ness of man, the concept of precisely in his range and in his wholeness in multiplicity, (Beyond, VI. 212). The prefaces which Nietzsche attached to his published works attest to the extraordinary importance of the philosopher's personal experi ences with man. They suggest as well that only a deeply felt sympa thy for human life makes an authentic experience of its various forms possible and seduces the philosopher to transform his life into an ex perimental laboratory where man in his manifoldness can be observed. Nietzsche describes his own life as an experiment devoted to knowl edge (G.S., Preface, 3, IV. 324). The principle "life as a means to knowl of man from a blinding interest in him is the great self: the goal is everything. In order to approach this goal, the phi losopher-psychologist must constantly risk his own well-being; he must experience the corruption or final illness of all higher men in the past. In order to turn the higher man's inability to find the way
of evaluation on

VI. 203), in the philosopher. In order to prepare himself for the task
man, the
philosopher must

become

aware of

far"

far"

'greatness,'

manifoldness"

edge,"

"liberator"

to his true
endanger

needs

into
and

a new

prudence, the

psychologist must

at

once own

himself

vulnerability (Beyond, III.

ment are

systematically 45). If the truths

must

observe

the

causes

of

his

about

human

be borne or to introspection (G.S., IV. 335, 337). Introspection is the only source of knowledge upon which the highest task of genuine philosophy can establish itself
to be known
psychologist. at all, they Psychology is, then, equivalent

develop suffered by the

(Beyond, VI.
Nietzsche's
ward

211).
remarks

about

the

orientation

of

the

psychologist

to

the

past serve

to distinguish the "queen

of

the

sciences"

(Beyond,

Previous philosophy saw at least a between psychology, the study of human nature, and the harmony quest for nature simply which does not exist. The historical condition of man, his variability, dictates that psychology must detach itself

I. 23) from

genuine philosophy.

ioo

Interpretation
quest for nature, being merely its precondition (Beyond, Nietzsche implies that there is no inherent harmony between which examines the past and, hence, the dormancy of
philosophic quest

from the
211).

VI.

psychology,

nature, and the genuinely

for nature,

which affects

the the

future.23

self

Notwithstanding the fact that psychology can never seek whose order best reflects the eternal order of nature and is
reason,24

wellpsychology cannot simply seek the is compelled ordered self. It cannot, therefore, define man; psychology to be radically individualistic (G.S., III. 120). Insofar as the funda mental natural phenomenon, i.e., the will to power, is visible to psy infinite variety of particulars. chology at all, it is fragmented into an about man is confined to an elucidation of actual The task of discovery

lovable for that

selves, the

unique and personal natures. an authentic experience of

The

psychologist

as such

is

limited to

historical data ; his introspection

is

circumscribed

by

the

realm of

human

history (G.S.,

IV.

337).

necessary relations, e.g., the psychology effect of physiological inhibition upon thinking (G.S., Preface, 2), it studies what is lawful and necessary for the sake of individual poten Insofar
as
reveals general

tiality.

Psychology

is

useful

to the

philosopher

because it frees

man

from that morality which has crushed the will to power by generally praising instinctual repression. It is a "critical science"; it negates (Beyond, VI. 210). 25 The new psychology counsels men to become what

they
be

are,

i.e.,

to

aspire or will

(G.S., IV.
practical

335).

Amor fati,
act of
of

which

ex

pression

Nietzsche

associates with

the highest

will,26

can also

understood as

the

tempting

dictum

the

new psycholo

is to liberate human willing. Psychology guide or secure human willing; it must contemn eval cannot, however, uation. Since psychology is confined to that which can be known about
gy, the intention
of which

man, albeit by introspection, it cannot ascend beyond itself. Moreover, the criticism of man's moral past extends the devotion to truth which

is the

"kernel"

esoteric contempt

of

the

ascetic

ideal. Psychology, therefore,

ex

tends the
sophic

loyalty

for man, whose enhancement depends upon philo to something higher than the truth, i.e., upon evaluative

interpretation

(Beyond, VI.

205, VII.

230).

Psychology

threatens the

Nietzsche does not confine the quest for nature, i.e., the quest to deter to human nature. See Leo Strauss, "Note on the Plan of Nietz sche's Beyond Good and Interpretation 2 (Winter 1973: 112-13; Karl Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, trans. David E. Green (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. iSgff., and "Nature, History, and Social Research 19 (March 1952): 91-92; Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking, trans. Fred. D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper Torchbooks, rg68), pp. 78, 91, ro4ff., and "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?, "trans. Bernd Magnus, Review of Metaphysics 20 (March 1967): 424ft.
mine nature,
Evil,"

23

Existentialism,"

24
25

Strauss,

"Restatement,"

pp. 120-21.

See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), n. 2^4. 26 Ibid., n. 617; E.H., subtitle, pp. 25S, 324; G.S., IV. 276; Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, pp. 192-94.

Nietzsche
task
of

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

and evaluation and

Philosophy
a

of the Future

101

dangerous necessity to the fundamentally be cause psychology glorifies the love of truth at the expense of the love of man. Psychology can be transcended only by a human being, whose acts of will possess the character of a leap. The only point of contact between the task of legislation, the "closed system of will, goal, and interpretation," which supports and orders human aspiration (Gen., III. 23), and psychology, which simply strives for openness, is in the
philosophic man.

definition

is

Psychology

opposes

philosophy

philosopher particular

himself. He

represents

the

union of universal vision and

knowledge,

which otherwise would remain asunder.

The

philosopher of

the future

must

be

able
ever

entirely to the
overcoming his
sophic men

cause of aversion

truth than has

untruth.

to devote himself more before been done while

to

Nietzsche tempts potentially philo

to test the possibility that philosophy can become a way of life. Philosophic dogmatism posited a theoretical harmony between

life III.

and philosophy.

Accordingly, it
life
which

established

the

quest

for knowl

edge as a principle of

no).

sistent

Science and influence of this

of

directs man toward the Good (G.S., philosophy have been promoted under the per
erroneous assumption

(Beyond, II.

24).

Here

their superficiality, they have, in fact, enhanced life. Nietzsche's psychology, on the other hand, exposes the funda
mental

tofore, because

divergence

of

truth

and

spectives,
and

or evaluations and as

the necessity of narrow per esteemings, to life. He characterizes the

lite, i.e.,

contemporary thinker
those
no).
upon

"that

being

life-preserving
of a

errors clash

in whom the impulse for truth for their first (G.S., III.
fight"

The possibility
the

actualization of a

philosophy beyond good and evil depends human being who can endure this tension.

his opportunity if he impulse for truth or if he considers the human need for narrow perspectives to be a sign of the defectiveness of human existence. Rather, he must, by means of a life experiment, test the possibility that the will to truth can itself become a human need or
philosophic man will not realize

The potentially
the

represses

philosophic

condition of

life,

and

thus

a genuine enhancement of

life, i.e.,

protec
value
ex

tive
of

of

the

will.

The

question which

Nietzsche

raises about

the

the

will

to truth

can

only be

answered

experimentally, through
endure

perience.

"To

what extent can

the truth

is the question; that is the 42; E.H., p. 218). The necessity

man

experiment"

(G.S.,

incorporation? That III. no; Beyond, II.

of

demands that this

expense of what

experiment

philosophy to the be made.

regeneration of

Heretofore,
at

the

philosophy has fostered the security of human inquiry Nietzsche calls a monstrous injustice to life;
was rooted

since

condemning untruth, the sensual,

could affirm itself only by becoming. Nietzsche asks, in favor of life, whether philosophic impulses can be cultivated without this singular devotion to truth as their basis (Beyond, I. 4). The nature of the experimentalism to which he alludes assures that, should a new

philosophy

in shame, it
and

102

Interpretation

philosophy

come

forth from
the

it,

that philosophy

would

necessarily rep
all philo

resent a conquest of

revenge on

life

which

has dominated

would be a sophizing to date. The new philosophy the genuine liberation of the philosophic self had been liberation depends upon the creation of a human being

demonstration that
attained

that

who

loves him
the

self more

than his

virtues.

The

philosopher of

the future

envisioned

by

Nietzsche

represents

first nobility founded upon candor and suffering rather than upon piety. The decisive characteristic of nobihty remains its fundamental reverence for (Beyond, certainty about itself : "The noble soul has IX. 287). Heretofore, however, such sublime self-love has been unat
itself"

tainable

without

piety

(Beyond, IX.

260, 265 ;

Gen., III.
for

10).

In

spite of

the tremendous

ennoblement or elevation of man

which

Nietzsche

believes piety in every sense to have been responsible (Beyond, III. 59, 60), his ultimate judgment is negative. Piety masks human shame and is, therefore, a disguised intolerance of human sovereignty. The pious man finds the human world lovable only insofar as it admits of
contact with a more

beautiful

realm.

Piety,

as

it has hitherto been

understood, is

no

longer necessary

or appropriate
of

for the

noble man.

Nietzsche

elucidates

the meaning

Beyond Good

and

Evil, "What Is

Noble?"

nobihty in the last section of (Vornehm). He begins by

locating

the origins of every aristocratic regime in acts of barbarous domination (aphorism 257) and proceeds to reveal the way in which nobihty can be spiritualized, i.e., made philosophic. The transition
earliest

from the

nobihty to the
men

series of aphorisms which allude

gist who studies

new nobihty is made by way of a to the vulnerability of the psycholo

higher

(aphorisms 269-82, 289,

290).

There is ap
health"

parently only one sure means by which the philosopher-psychologist can be protected from his peculiar vulnerability. The "great

includes,
signifies

as

its peak, the capacity for mockery (G.S., V.

382).

Mockery

that self-love, detached from a reliance upon tradition or piety, actually is the source of action. Further, a philosophic mockery
of man must supersede sophic eros

the hatred

of

the

timely out
of

of which

the

philo

develops (G.S., V.

379).

Because in

its

origin

the
eros

philosophic eros might culminate

akin

pessimism or

in decadence, some irenic res

Beyond

ignation
Good

to piety; mockery

rather

than hatred invigorates that

and makes

it

effective.27

The

penultimate aphorism of

and

Evil

affirms

mockery
see

as an

of philosophic

nobihty (295;

attribute, the divine attribute, 294). Apparently, the philosophic no

as the "last disciple and initiate of the Nietzsche reveals, first of all, that Dionysus philo sophizes. His intimations about Dionysus are intended to tempt others to follow "the genius of the whom Nietzsche himself has been

bihty
god

is

also pious.

Speaking

Dionysus,"

heart"

27

Writing,"

Beyond, VII. 216, 228; Gen., I. Zarathustra, p. 153.

10;

G.S., V.

379-80;

"On

Reading

and

Nietzsche

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

Philosophy

of the Future
and

103
of

tempted to follow. The

wisdom"

"daring integrity, truthfulness,

the
philosopher

love
at

which characterize

Dionysus

are equivalent
way"

to

divine

mockery.

He laughs "in

a superhuman and new

of

the

expense of all serious around which

things. He deprives

their

seriousness

the ideals

in divine

or perfect

human aspiring has been oriented. Dionysus possesses form all that is potentially philosophic in previous
the
arrogant skepticism of

manifestations of nobility:

the mocking
nius,
or

timely Machiavelh (Beyond, II.

scorn of

the

to be found in

Romans; Aristophanes, Petrothe

of

28); the disgust for the vanity

modern science present

in

Pascal;28

Plato's

contempt

for

"wise"

men

(G.S., V. 379)
Nietzsche imitates Dionysus. In Section III
Evil (aphorism 57), he presents inquiry.30 He meaning of human
cause of

Beyond Good
about

and

Dionysian
that

speculation

the

it

makes

man

deepens the become

alization of

nature of

visible

for

him."

has value be profound. The desire to know broadens and man's concerns: "ever new riddles and images Nietzsche does not despise the human ide
suggests

inquiry

wisdom; rather, he
of

mocks

the

seriousness with which

the

human profundity has hitherto been regarded: "Per haps everything on which the spirit's eye has exercised its acuteness and thoughtfulness was nothing but an occasion for this exercise, a playful matter, something for children and those who are

development

child

turns man inward and changes him ; man cannot, how ever, escape from himself through philosophy. Dionysus tempts man to apotheosize his introspectiveness and his bondage to himself. Man

Philosophizing

does
295).
man:

not return

from him "blessed

newer

goods"

and oppressed

by

alien

but

rather

himself, Philosophizing, it appears, is

it
makes man more

"richer in

to himself than

before"

to be

pursued

(Beyond, IX. for its effect upon

sense of wonder about

will

I. 7). By teaching man a himself, philosophy instills in him the intrepid

interesting (Gen.,

to

question

ever

further.31

Philosophizing

in this

sense

estab

lishes

a genuine need

for the problematic,

a need which

knows how to

psychologist"

genuine noble religious man, faced the problem of That Nietzsche to a certain extent shared this problem (G.S., V. 382) may indicate why it is the first problem to which he refers in Beyond Good and Evil (III. 45) when designating the tasks of the "born and why he expresses particular compassion for the sufferings of

28

Pascal,

who

typifies the

conscience."

"knowing

and

also Werner J. Dannhauser, Nietzsche's View of Socrates (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1974), PP- 213ft. 30 This aphorism immediately follows Nietzsche's single allusion in Beyond Good and Evil to the doctrine of the eternal return of the same (aphorism 56) precedes a series of aphorisms (58-61) which associate piety is to super Its placement suggests that man as "an eternal and that a new sede or evolve from the "most world-affirming human innocence which shares something in common with the old innocence or piety is, in the end, the intended result of the liberation from dogmatism. See also G.S., Preface, 4, V. 377. si Beyond, II. 40, 43, VII. 230, IX. 282-89; Gen., III. 9; G.S., Preface 3.

Pascal. 29 See

and

immediately

child"

and nobility.

being"

104
preserve

Interpretation

itself. If philosophy can be honored as man's opportunity to himself profound, i.e., as an opportunity to aspire to profundity, it will have overcome all aspects of its aversion to untruth. The philosopher of the future is to be a "spirit who plays naively
make

deliberately, but from overflowing power and abundance with all that was hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, (G.S., V. 382; Beyond, VII. 223). He must extend his parody of ideals
that

is,

not

divine"

test his power and self-confidence (Beyond, III. 3; G.S., V. 382). The philosopher who can I. 5, VII. 227; Gen., personalism which can parody himself is not likely to submit to the into dogma (Beyond, II. 25-26). Most important, however, develop to himself to
maintain and an

self-mockery combats the philosophic liability to shame. By means of iconoclasm distinguished by its comprehensiveness, the philosopher
undermines

deliberately

the foundation for

pious

all

instinctive health

which

has hitherto existed, the

belief in ideals

(G.S., IV.

325).

Self-

mockery generates a feeling of individual irresponsibility in the man with the weightiest responsibihty and, thereby, protects self-love. What might otherwise become an overwhelming sense of one's evilness,

i.e.,

guilt,

becomes, in
whole

importance in the
one's

the mocking emphasis of one's own un economy of the species, a joyful affirmation of
311).

necessity

(G.S., I.
is

1, 4, IV.

impulse which Dionysus possesses be Self-mockery cause he is free of shame ; he does not love his virtues more than him self. Nietzsche imitates self-mockery by parodying the truth. He does not suppose truth to be God, but a woman, who has good
a philosophic
Dionysus'

reasons

to hide herself from

man :

secretiveness seems

(Beyond, Preface, VII.

of
affect of

to intend this form

upon her Nietzsche self-mockery to liberate the will to in

her

seductiveness

depends
4).

232;

G.S., Preface,

terpret, the
becomes
an

command; if the
part
of

criticism of

the

will

to truth
come

integral

the

philosopher's

hfe, he may

to

revere man as

maintains

the evaluating being (G.S., II. 107). 32 Thus that which itself by parody is capable of becoming something other

for the self takes man beyond beyond free-spiritedness (Beyond, IV. dogmatism, 153; G.S., V. 377-78). Sovereign independence, because it rests upon reverence, endows man with a new innocence. Nietzsche associates innocence and maturity (Beyond, IV. 94; Gen.,
than
parody.

The

supreme reverence

the liberation from

II.

20).

In the very

aphorism

in

which

he

parodies
who or

the

quest

for

wis

dom, he

speaks of man as an

"eternal

child"

playfulness after he has outgrown the toys hood. Mature innocence is necessary for the

may discover ideals of his first

the
man.

a new child

solution of

problem of

value; the

philosopher must establish a new

ideal for

The

clear

sighted quest

for uniquely individual introspective wisdom (Beyond, II. 43) is neither a denial of the self nor a rejection of life; thus it
32

G.S., II.

107; "On the Thousand

and

One

Goals,"

Zarathustra,

p.

17!

Nietzsche
commits

and

Liberation: the Prelude to

philosopher quest

Philosophy
a

of the Future
which

105

the

to the future in

way in

the

ascetic noble

ideal implied in the

for

wisdom of

the

whole cannot.

The

him to approach self-knowledge (G.S., IV. 335) and to determine the future. The genuinely noble man unifies psychology and the quest for nature; he transforms historical psy chology into a mode of self-examination and self-transformation which
philosopher's self-love enables

is

not

merely

study

of

the

past.

The

genuine philosopher

is

more

than contemplative; he is active (Gen., I. 10). Philosophy becomes beneficent to hfe. It is, therefore, the singular mode of self-assertion

anything higher than self-assertion. The by serving nothing higher than himself. The noble philosopher experiences no opposition between conscious ness and instinct, between freedom and necessity, between truth and untruth. He reveres himself for his mastery of himself and has, there fore, earned the right to heed the demands of his physis (G.S., I. 39, IV. 294; Beyond, IX. 266). His self-love transfigures itself into pro jections that seek to characterize the order of things, beginning with
which need not acknowledge philosopher serves

hfe

the

characterization of

his way

of

life, his

aspirations,

as good

(G.S.,
360).

Preface,

3).

He

cannot resist self-idealization

(G.S., IV.

301, V.

He shares, therefore, in the characteristics of all noble authors of mo rality: "The noble type of man experiences itself as determining val ues; it does not need approval; it judges, 'What is harmful to me is harmful in itself; it knows itself to be that which accords honor to

things; it is
honors. Such

value-creating.

Everything

it knows

as part

of

itself it

I. 5, II.
nature.

2).

morahty is Since human sovereignty

a

self-glorifica

(Beyond,

IX. 260;

Gen.,

must

express

self-love

by

the

establishment of

morahty, the philosophic government is founded in Moreover, the foundation for the philosophic legislation of val
vitalized or

ues
will

in the

hberated

self

is

a sufficient guarantee

that it

be secure,
239).

perhaps eternal.

The

assertions of a

neither

arbitrary

nor changeable are

VII. 231,

Rather, they

by education or imperturbably solid

healthy being are by chance (Beyond,

precisely because be tran

they

are

necessary
sought

emanations

from the
on

self which cannot

scended.

Nietzsche
would

to

bring

forth

earth

supernal

being

who

deliver man, newly formed and resplendent, to the future. He envisions the actualization of that which is taught by Plato in the Republic to exist only in speech, i.e., the literal rule of philosophy
over man

(G.S., V.
for the

362,

377).

Nietzsche does

not advocate

the

philo

sophic rule

sake of non-philosophic men

but for the

sake of

life. Nonetheless, according to both Plato and Nietzsche, the non-philosophic realm does pose a problem for philosophy. It organized in such a way as to support must, without knowing it, be

justifying

the highest human aspiration; those

orthodoxy trast to Plato, Nietzsche deals
and with

who

therefore oppose philosophy

philosophy require (Beyond, III. 61). In con

the
pohtical-moral

serve

the

problem of

106

Interpretation

by circumventing that realm. That he can do this at all is evi dence that his project is a modern one (G.S., V. 377, 379). Out of a zealous devotion to the needs of the higher man, he shuns the needs of lower men, notwithstanding the fact that he wishes to found phi
realm

losophy
gard
which

upon a new prudence which

is to include
considers

a clear and

full

re

for those forces, both

threaten to

more virulent and

lower than philosophy,

the
pohtical-moral

assail or smother

it. He

realm thematically only insofar as it serves, by means of a stark con trast, to illumine that which it opposes. His neglect of the regime am plifies the one element of reahsm he claims to have inherited from religious mysticism:

for "the

man of

knowledge there
man, the

duties"

are no

(Gen., III.

17).
writes

Nietzsche

openly for the

done"

noble

supra-moral

man,

the gentleman, "taking this sense than has ever been

concept

in

a more spiritual and radical

One

can

infer, however,
and,

(E.H., p. 310; Beyond, VII. 214, 219). that he intended his books to convey to the
which

non-philosophic reader a respect

experience

hence,
are

that

for that of which he can never have he will never know.33 Since Nietz
opposite
effect,34

sche's writings
as

have

often

had the

a question arises

entirely faithful to their purpose, and whether they the dignity of philosophy might not be better preserved by giving a fuller attention to the demands of the political-moral realm. This
to
whether question would

be

no

less

urgent

if

one suspected

that Nietzsche's

victory historical consciousness, was itself a surrender to rowness. In that case, the attempt to cultivate
transcend the
untoward effects of

over

the

ultimate narrowness of

Plato, by

means of a candid
a new

form

of nar

being

who

could

historicism

and rescue

from moribundity by an act of will would be, in some It would be more than pitiable if Nietzsche himself had
most

philosophy sense, deluded.

frequently

recurring

and

perhaps

his most original one, on philosophy in the modern age: "In the
albeit not
ways

obscured his his most instructive lesson, behalf of the practice of genuine

has been,

great

things

remain

found,
rare

nuances and shudders

rare"

end it remains as it is and al for the great, abysses for the pro for the refined, and, in brief, all that is

for the

(Beyond, II.

43).

33 G.S., V. 381; see letters 145, 152, and 154 in Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche. 34 See Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 74-77, 80, 97; Henry Kariel, "Nietzsche's Preface to Constitutionalism," Journal of Politics 25 (May 1963) : 211-25.

107

AUTHORITY AND FREEDOM: THE DEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY OF YVES R. SIMON

Clarke E. Cochran
Texas Tech

University
M. Rejai

serves

In his survey of contemporary theories of that "the nexus between the classical

democracy
and

ob

contemporary theo

ries of

democracy is a tenuous
the
classical

one."1

The basic "rest

to

assumptions and prem

ises

of

theories,

which

upon a series of norms and

reality,"

ideals

have been democratic theorists in favor of the "identifica tion and isolation of observable variables in political life. The at tempt is to describe and explain rather than idealize."2 Though itself cast in the empirical-behavioral mold, this summary of the situation

lacking abandoned by

systematic

reference

pohtical

recent

is

accurate.

Contemporary theory
it
ought

seeks

to define
of

democracy

not

in

terms

of what

to be but in terms

the features democratic

in the real world. Such a definition, however, is pos only by suppressing normative judgments or, conversely, by as suming them without attempting to justify them. One of the more popular descriptive definitions of democracy iden tifies it with the control of decisionmakers by the people through
states exhibit sible elections.

According

to H. B.
extent

Mayo, for

example, "A

political system

is democratic to the
popular

that the decisionmakers

are under effective

control."

Robert A. Dahl declares that "democratic

theory is

concerned with processes

by

which

ordinary

citizens exert a

high degree
are

and his conditions defined largely in electoral terms. C. W. Cassinelli con siders "representative which depends on uncoerced, periodic elections, to be the central feature of democracy. And Joseph A. Schumpeter defines the democratic method as "that institutional of
control over
archy"

leaders,"

relatively for "poly

government,"

arrangement

acquire

the

power

the

people's

vote."3

for arriving at political decisions in which individuals to decide by means of a competitive struggle for This first postulate is then usually expanded and
deduction
and empirical evidence

developed

by

from the
rule

operation of

contemporary democratic the principles of equahty,

governments.

Mayo, for
majority

example, derives

freedom,

and

from the thesis

M. Rejai, ed., Democracy: The

1967), p47-

Contemporary

Theories (New York: Atherton

Press,
2

Ibid., p. 31; see also pp. 307-11. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, i960), p. 60; Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 195). PP- 3. 84J Cassinelli, The Politics of Freedom: An Analy sis of the Modern Democratic State (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
3

1961), passim, esp. ch. 1;

Schumpeter, in Rejai, Democracy,

p. 103.

io8

Interpretation

of

popular

control.4

And Cassinelli

argues

that "like the

.
.

'positive'

part of

of civil
used

tolerance democratic pohcy, the guaranteeing of welfare, hberties is a direct result of the periodic uncoerced elections
.

pohcy

to

select

the

officials

ultimately in
assert

charge of all public

He

even goes so

far

as

to

that "in

brief,

the dynamics
civil

of

the

democratic

electoral system make

it impossible for

liberties to be

denied to any group within the democratic This type of Schumpeterian definition of democracy has been high difficulties are nu ly influential in American political science, but its be an outgrowth of the value periodic elections may
system."5

merous.6

First, freedom, equahty, and majority converse. Second, without an examination of

placed
upon ment

rule,

rather

than the
govern

the

nature of

itself

and a

definition in
of

normative as well as

such a

definition

democracy

is

arbitrary.

descriptive terms, It may be true, as Mayo

democracy's values will find in argues, that only those who believe in them a cogent argument for democracy; yet a firm theoretical ground

ing

of

democracy

must

principles

involved.7

terms

of a process

be found in a philosophical examination of the Most important, the definition of democracy in tends to leave open the question of the goals to

be

served

ysis.

by the process, a fundamental flaw in any theoretical anal Speaking about law, Yves R. Simon postulated three questions
it
always makes sense questions

which

to

ask about positive can

law.8

There

seem

to be
tem

analogous

which

be

asked about
a

simple

de
to

scriptive

definition

of

democracy. Is Should
a

democracy
should

just
ever

or unjust sys

of government?

democratic

system

be

altered

make

it less

or more

democratic?

Why

the laws

of a

demo

cratic government

be obeyed? These questions suggest that more is needed than a descriptive definition of democracy. A consideration of democratic theory must also include an analysis of the philosophy of
government

generally

and an exploration of normative questions.

Yves R. himself to

Simon, in his Philosophy

such

of Democratic
of

Government, devoted
democratic theory.
the
same as

a philosophical
of

consideration

Simon's formal definition

4
5

democracy

is

much

that

of

Ibid.,

pp.

60-70

and chs. 5-8.

Politics of Freedom, pp. 50, 61. 6 See David M. Ricci, "Democracy Attenuated: Schumpeter, the Process Journal of Politics 32 (1970): Theory, and American Democratic 239-67. This idea of democracy has, of course, also drawn considerable criti cism. For a recent review of some of the issues, see Quentin Skinner, "The Empirical Theorists of Democracy and Their Critics: A Plague on Both Their Political Theory 1 (1973): 287-306. For a critique of certain assump tions of recent American democratic theory and citation of the relevant liter ature, see Clarke E. Cochran, "The Politics of Interest: The Eclipse of Commu (PH.D. dissertation, De nity in Contemporary American Political partment of Political Science, Duke University, 1971), ch. 4. 7 Introduction to Democratic Theory, pp. 218, 242. 8 The Tradition s Reflections, ed. Vukan Kuic of Natural Law: A (New York: Fordham University Press, 1965), pp. 111-18 (hereafter cited as TNL).
Thought,"
Houses,"

Theory"

Philosopher'

Authority and Freedom: the Democratic Philosophy of Yves R. Simon

other

109

theorists: "In direct

personnel; the

people governs

democracy there is no distinct governing by majority rule. In representative or

personnel

indirect
of

democracy the

governing

is

subjected

to the

control

the

people

through the

procedure of periodical

elections."9

The dif

ference, however, is that Simon explores the foundations of government

and attempts
sential

to distinguish those features

of government which are es

from those which are pecuhar to democracy alone. Thus an examination of Simon's democratic theory uncovers some fundamental issues in a theoretical analysis of democracy and points the way to their resolution. Specifically, it should describe the status of freedom and authority in democracy and facilitate a rigorous
all government evaluation of

to

democracy

as a

form

of government.

The before

distinguishing
the
we can

freedom,

particular

feature of democracy, according to Simon, is freedom of the people to govern itself.10 But understand the relation of freedom to democracy, we its
relation

must understand

to

authority.

Simon's development

of

the

theory

of

political

philosophy.11

authority is probably his most significant contribution to Simon recognizes that in the modern world au

thority has a bad name ; it seems to confhct with freedom. The growth of liberty is said to imply the decay of authority. Simon argues that this bad name comes from the prevaihng "deficiency theory of govern This theory holds that only the deficiencies (moral, educa
ment."12

tional
sary.

or

otherwise) in
education and

men make

government

and

authority

neces

deficiencies, authority should have less and less of a role in politics. Simon, how ever, believes that authority is not a result of accidental deficiencies,
overcome such

As

better institutions

but

rather

that it is

essential

in the ordering

of

human

affairs.

9 Philosophy of Democratic Government (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 75 (hereafter cited as PDG; all citations are from the paperback edi tion published by the University of Chicago Press in 1961). 10

Ibid.,

pp.

76,

142. of

11

Simon's

theory

consideration

here; only

authority is quite complex and cannot be given detailed a summary will be provided. I have attempted a more
Polanyi,"

detailed exploration in "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Yves American Political Science Review, Simon, Carl Friedrich, and Michael 71 (1977): Forthcoming. See also Vukan Kuic, "The Contribution of Yves R. The Political Science Reviewer, 4 (1974) : 55-104. Simon to Political Simon considered authority systematically in PDG, ch. 1 ; in The Nature and
Science,"

Functions of Authority (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1940), and in A General Theory of Authority (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, NFA and GTA, respectively). Valuable bibliographies 1962) (hereafter cited as have been compiled by Anthony O. Simon, "Yves R. Simon: A Bibliography, in Yves R. Simon, Work, Society, and Culture, ed. Vukan Kuic (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971). Appendix, pp. 189-226 and "Bi Revue Philosophique De Louvain, 73 (1975): bliographic d'Yves Rene
1923-1970,"

Simon,"

362-67. 12

PDG,

pp. 4-6 and ch. 1 passim.

no

Interpretation his theory of authority as, indeed, his entire demo philosophy in the idea of the common good and in the concept
roots

Simon
cratic of

Community and common good are intimately re lated, community being defined as a society relative to a common Society does not exist to serve individual needs alone: society
community.13 good.14

allows men

to

create and share common material

goods,

common val

ues, common experiences. It makes this sharing possible over an ex tended period of time, a span longer than the individual's life, and
more various and

diverse than
own

would

be

possible

if individuals
needs.15

were

fulfilling

only their

particular

desires

and

There are,
and

according to

Simon,

two types

of societies:

the community
of social goods.

the

partnership, and, correspondingly, two kinds

mon good of a

community

calls

forth

"common life
not.16

of

The com desire and

action."

The good of a com partnership does consists in a common life of desire and action, a munity "unity in for "the most important part of com and loving or knowing
good of a
hating,"

The

munity takes place in the heart of Community is "characterized by a high degree of personal relationship
man."17

form

of

intimacy,

emotional

depth,
use

in
on

time,"

to

moral commitment, social cohesion, and continuity the formulation of Robert A. Nisbet.18 A partnership,

the

other

hand, is

characterized

does

not

necessarily

contain

any

by ties of mutual self-interest and deep personal commitments. Its good

of

is simply a "common a sum which happen to be interdependent.

interest,"

particular,
needed

private

interests

Authority,
rangements
as

as

Simon

points
unless

out, is

not

failure

(contracts) by one of the

there is

some

in partnership ar deficiency present (such

parties
a

to fulfill his

contractual obligations).

Therefore, if society were hold.19 But, thority would

ship but
a community.

partnership, the

deficiency theory
society is

of au

for

Simon,

political

not a partner

He utterly rejects the contract theory of gov Since common action is essential to a community, authority is essential. The causation of common action in pursuit of the common good is the function of authority: "The power in charge of unifying
ernment.
common action
authority."20

through

rules

binding

for

all

is

what everyone calls

Authority

thus depends

upon

and

creates

communi-

13

Simon systematically

considered

community
pp.

and common good and

in three

places:

PDG,

pp.

48-50,

62-66; TNL,

Review of Politics 22 (i960) : Common "CGCA"). See also GTA, ch. 2, and Freedom and O'Donnell (New York: Fordham University Press, 1968), (hereafter cited as FC).
14 is 16
"CGCA,"

Action,"

86-109;

"Common Good and 202-44 (hereafter cited as Community, ed. Charles P.

pp.

103-8, 130-44

17 18
19 20

p. 210. PDG, p. 64; see also See CGCA, pp. 206-7; TNL, pp. 88-89. pp. 208-10, and FC, PDG, p. 49; see also TNL, pp. 95-96; see also GTA, pp. 125-26.
"CGCA,"

pp. 103-9.

The Sociological Tradition (New York: Basic

"CGCA,"

Books,

1966)

47

p. 209.

Ibid.,

p. 221.

A uthority and Freedom: the Democratic

Philosophy of Yves R. Simon

11 1

ty

and common good.

They

are

Authority
tions.21

has three

principal

mutually creating and reinforcing. functions in unifying common ac

First,

since men are often selfish or

particular goods
rect

before the

common good.

ignorant, they put their Authority, then, must di

"parental,"

ordering of goods and unify the community behind This function of authority Simon calls and acknowledges that it is rooted in deficiencies. The second function of authority, however, is essential and would be needed even if men had no deficiencies of intelligence, information, or virtue. Authority in
proper

the

the

common good.

this

case unifies action when

means

there is

more

than

one proper and

ficial
a
what

to the

common good.

It

selects one course of action

of

variety of worthy Simon calls its

of

possibilities.

The third function

matter of

bene from authority is

unifies

most essential of

function. Here authority

the
to be
and

action

in the determination
the

the

common good

itself,
pre

the determination

actual goods

pursued

by

the

society.

Such

served
pursuit

function is necessary if diversity for individual members of society

of

freedom

are

to be

while common action

in the

the

welfare

of

the community is

guaranteed.

Therefore,

"considered in its
evil nor a

essential

lesser

good nor a

functions authority is neither a necessary lesser evil nor the consequence of any evil
and

or

deficiency
nature

it is, hke

nature

society, unqualifiedly
not

good."22

The

of man and

human society,

their

imperfections,

re

quires authority.

II After examining authority, Simon is in a position to define its re lation to liberty and autonomy. It is important to recognize, how
ever, that the kind
of

liberty
that

which

is

"terminal"

hberty,

is, hberty

the

good alone and which consists

Simon identifies with autonomy which is the power of choosing in the interiorization of the moral
which enables a man

law. Freedom is the

choose

"superdetermination"

to

the

proper means
upon

to his

ends

from the variety

available

to him.

It depends
what

the

possession of virtue and strength of reject

which allows

him to

is
or

good and good

false ends and false means for him clearly in view. It is not
choosing
either

and

character, to keep

"initial"

hb

erty,

the

sheer power of

the

good or

the

evil.

Nor is
means,

it the

spontaneity,

lack

of

determination,

openness,

and self-expression

so exalted

in

theory.23 some recent

Initial

liberty

of choice

is

21 22
23

See

n. n above

for the

sources of

this

summary.

PDG, p. 59. See, for example, Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (Stanford: MakeUniversity Press, 1958), and "Foundations of the Liberal
Some Implications
: 213-37;
of
Theory,"

Believe:

Inquiry 14 (1971)

Contract Theory versus Freedom Henry S. Kariel, Open Systems: Arenas for Political
1969).

Action (Itasca, 111.: F. E. Peacock,

112

Interpretation

and

is

provided

by

the very fact

of man's rational nature.

must

Terminal

hberty

is

an end and a

perfection, and

be

acquired.24

The basic

idea here is the

prudent

ancient one of self-control.

man who

has

chosen well

his life's

The image is that of the goals and has achieved

temptations which would deflect mastery over the fears, desires, and him from their pursuit. The growth of terminal hberty, therefore, im plies the decay of any false authority which would attempt to keep mind and character in perpetual subjection. It implies the substitution
of persuasion

for

coercion and

the

decay

of parental authority.

The
that

progress of

liberty
of

does not,
are

essential

functions

authority.25

some obstacles

to freedom

however, imply the decay of the Indeed, Simon rightly points out internal to the person ; hence, obe

dience to authority, if it works to remove those obstacles, may pro mote freedom. Authority, even in its coercive aspects, may actually increase freedom. Moreover, the same perfections which increase free
dom
also make

the

essential

functions
to

of

creasing the variety

good.26

of possible means

to

and matter

authority necessary by in for the common

autonomy, the
sooner will

The

more persons come

achieve

the

social

deficiencies springing from their lack of autonomy appear. The removal of deficiencies opens more routes to the

dis

common

good and more possibilities nity.

for

shared

life,

experience,

and commu

liberty. Let
closely.27

Simon's contention, then, is that authority does not confhct with us examine this contention and its social dimensions more Autonomy is related to the transcendent good of an individ
person, that

ual considered as a

is,

as a

whole, and not simply as a

common good of a

member of a particular society.

Since the

society

24

FC,

passim.,

esp. ch. i and pp.

36-46, 95-101;

NFA,

"CGCA,"

pp. 43-44;

In Freedom of Choice, ed. Peter Wolff (New York: Fordham University Press, 1969), Simon provides the foundation for this conception of freedom. For an explication see Kuic, "Contribution of Yves R. pp. 64-81. 25 NFA, pp. 45-46. For a similar analysis of the nature of freedom and its relation to authority, see John H. Hallowell, The Moral Foundation of Democ racy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), PP- 112~I9', Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 137-40. Com pare Hannah Arendt, "What Is in her Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press, 1961), esp. pp. 100-106. The opposite argument, that authority and autonomy are contradictory, has one of its most effective spokes man in Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). Wolff's position has been strongly criticized by Lisa H. Perkins, "On Ethics 82 (1972): 114-23; by Harry G. Reconciling Autonomy and Political Theory 1 (1973): Frankfurt, "The Anarchism of Robert Paul 405-14; and by Jeffrey H. Reiman, In Defense of Political Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 26 See FC, pp. 41, 70, 125-30; GTA, pp. 148-56; NFA, pp. 33-34; PDG, pp.
p. 244.
Simon," Authority?" Authority," Wolff,"

32-35,
27
pp.

1 10-14.
"CGCA,"

pp. 235-43; PDG, pp. 70-71; and FC, fuller discussion of the relationship between personal and particular goods, see Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947).
a

This discussion draws on 46-60 and chs. 3-4. For

Authority and Freedom: the Democratic Philosophy of Yves R. Simon

must

113

be

a good shared

by

the

members of

the society (thus

not a good

external

to men), it to

must promote

the

personal goods

(such

as

integ

rity, virtue, relation to

personal goods

God)

of

its

members.28

In

addition

to these

which

has

particular goods

autonomy is essentially related, (such as wealth, health, interests)

related

each person which

con

tribute to his

development. Because it is
society, the

to the

personal good

of each member of

common good

takes

precedence over

the

particular goods of

any

member.

possession and use of particular

Thus authority may direct the goods toward the common good. On
individual
uses

the

other

hand,
the

the

autonomous

as means
rection

to his transcendent

(personal)
be

good.

his How

particular goods

can

internal di direction
prin

by

autonomous man

compatible with external

by
of

authority?

Simon

solves

this dilemma

by

reference accepts

to two

ciples.

First,

the

autonomous

man, because he

the

precedence

good over his particular goods, interiorizes the au directs the use of these goods. Thus, for such a man, the tax laws do not stand as external commands and sanctions, but as embodiments of his moral obligation to support the common good.

the

common
which

thority

Second,
tion

the

proper

functioning
or

of

authority
the

requires

that the

promo

of particular goods compatible with

care of

common good

the

individuals

to the

smallest associations

be left to possible. The

principle of asserts

common good of

authority and "wherever the

the community thus requires both the the principle of autonomy. The former
welfare

that

of

the community

requires

common

action,

be assured by the higher or The latter asserts that "wherever a task can be satisfactorily achieved by the initiative of the individual or that of smaller social units, the fulfillment of that task must be left to the
the unity of that gans of that
common action must
units."29

community'"

initiative of the individual or to that of small social Because both society and the individual interiorize these princi ples, authority and autonomy are compatible: "Familiar contrasts
are

transcended, authority
do

and

autonomy do

not conflict with each

other and

not restrict each other.

They

cause and guarantee one

another."30

yet

By advancing wholeheartedly his particular deferring to authority when it is determined that his
to the
common

goods,

and

goods must
common

yield

good, the free

man promotes

both the

good and plied

his

own personal good.

Moreover,

the

social plurahsm

im

in this theory of the relationship between authority and free dom is different from and more adequate than the "interest-group which is alternately praised and damned in the literature Such pluralism does, it is true, acof American political
science.31

28 29
3<>

See TNL, pp. 86-109. NFA, p. 47; see also PDG,

"CGCA,"

p. 140.

p. 243.

81 Compare, inter alia, Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W W. Norton', 1969) ; Darryl Baskin, American Pluralist Democracy : A Critique

114
knowledge
the

Interpretation

common values and

values

individual

and

common

are

most

often

simply

rules

pursuit of particular and

(private) interests,

and

group initiative. Yet for fairness in the the value of individual

terms of the promotion of group initiative is measured only in freedom. Simon's plurahsm is oriented to the common good and the personal good as well as to freedom and particular interests. It is the the heart absence of a sound notion of the common good which hes at
of

the failure

of

interest-group
the
and

liberalism.32

Because the

order of

common good

is

an order which must con notion

tain both freedom

authority, the
and order

simplistic

that democ

is transcended, for "freedom, racy must balance freedom is the most ordered thing in the world. It causes correctly understood, Thus freedom, order to descend into the depths of the human
will."33

hberty,

by autonomy thority. This holds true in any legitimate form of government, but a special relationship between freedom and authority obtains in a de
and are guaranteed

and guarantee essential au

mocracy.

Ill

Following Aristotle,
government

Simon designates
the

as a

"political

system

in

which

governed possess a

legally

defined

and

any in

stitutionally organized power of resistance to arbitrary Such a regime may be thoroughly non-democratic ; yet its citizens may still possess Democracy, however, has its own ways of
autonomy.35

government.34

preventing
the

abuse and of

pohtical condition.

guaranteeing freedom; that As Simon puts it:

is,

of

procuring

This it does or attempts to do by either of two methods or by a combination of the two. In direct democracy there is no distict governing personnel; the people
governs

by

majority
subjected

rule.

In

representative or

personnel is
elections.

to the

control

indirect democracy the governing of the people through the procedure of periodical

Democracy, however,
abuse

attempts

to

go

further than

mere prevention of

by

government :

When the
and above

political

idea assumes the democratic form, the people asserts, over its freedom from abusive power, its freedom to govern itself. Keeping

(New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971), and William E. Connolly, ed., The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton Press, 1971). 32 I have developed this argument more extensively in "Political Science and Journal of Politics 36 (1974) : 327-55. 'The Public 33 freedom and FC, p. 19; for typical examples of comments on order, see Robert Y. Fluno, The Democratic Community (New York: Dodd, Polity," Mead, 1971), esp. chs. 1-3; Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Public and the in Pool, ed., Contemporary Political Science (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Interest,' " "balancing"

Company, 1967), pp. 22-52. 34 PDG, pp. 72-73 and n.

35

1.

Ibid.,

pp. 74-75.

A uthority and Freedom: the Democratic Philosophy of Yves R Simon

.

115
; the

the government
government

confined within a certain

field is
people.

no

longer held

sufficient

the

defining

has been taken over by the feature of democracy.36

Such is democratic

freedom,

If the

people are

to

control

the

government and principle of

if, in

addition, their

freedom to
then the

govern

is the

defining

the democratic state,

authority to democracy must be considered. Au thority and coercion, Simon observes, are often confused; yet coer cion is merely an instrument of authority. Authority uses both coer
relation of
cion and

persuasion, and, in

fact,

the frequent

use of coercion signifies

weakness of authority. operation

Persuasion is

a moral process and

imphes the
"terminal"

free choice, while coercion conflicts with free choice as we have seen, (though, ultimately it may facilitate hberty). Although it is often not easy to tell them apart, especially For Simon, coer when coercion is psychic, the distinction is cion is not the essence of the state, although it results from that es
of
crucial.37

sence and presupposes

state, the

it

pursues.38

mocratic coercion

it. Coercion is only an essential property of the is the completeness of the common good Here again Simon differs from other contemporary de theorists in whose work the identification of the state with
essence of which
almost a
commonplace.39

is

Simon, democracy is no different from any other form in possessing the right to use coercion, yet democracy always strives to use the form of authority that is persuasion. Simon outlines the relation of democracy to persuasion in three principles :

According

to

of government

As
to

lawful

and political

regime,

democracy
to
extend

sion

coercion and
. .
.

endlessly

struggles

systematically the domain of

prefers persua government

by

persuasion.

2 As an elective regime, democracy rules that persuasion plays a decisive role in the designation of the governing personnel. 3 As democracy, it rules that attempts at persuading the voter take place in open and public discussion.40

This
of

requirement

for

open expression seems

in

democracy
and

implies freedom
principles of
which sur

expression, though Simon

should

to feel that the basic

society
rounds

be

exempt

from the discussion

debate

the

choice of means

to implement those

principles.41

Democ-

Ibid., pp. 75-76 (emphasis in original). Ibid., pp. 108-9. 88 Ibid., pp. 109-10, 134-3539 See, for example, Cassinelli, Politics of Freedom, pp. 6-7 ; Mayo, Introduc tion to Democratic Theory, pp. 277-78 ; and Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory,
36
37

p.

79,
4 4i

n.

16. pp. 1 18-19.

pp. 122-24.

This topic is too complex to be discussed here. Although practice deliberations over means and ends may be difficult to distinguish, he nonetheless contends that to preserve community, deliberation. For opposing arguments, see Reinhold principles must be above The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York : Charles Niebuhr, Simon
recognizes

PDG, Ibid.,

that in

116

Interpretation

govern itself, thus racy implies not only the freedom of the people to of expression; it also demands other freedoms, for requiring freedom it is an illusion that democracy will perfect the state. No internal
structure will guarantee which

the safety
of

is

a constant

temptation to

checks are needed. are

Freedom
such

society from state absolutism, in power; therefore, outside the church and freedom of the press
of men
are

the

most

important

outside

institutions. These
the
private

closely followed

by

private

institutions,

as

school, the independent

labor union, the

enterprise.42

autonomous

cooperative, private ownership, and

pluralism.

free
of

Democracy
also

demands

Since the freedom

principles of

these institutions

autonomy and authority, Simon again finds that authority and liberty do not Both democracy oppose, but rather that they support each
other.43

follows from the twin

and

authority

imply

freedom. What, then, is the relationship between

democracy

and authority?

Simon's discussion of sovereignty sheds some light on this question. Authority implies obedience, for "the primacy of the common good demands that those in charge of the particular goods should obey The theory of sovereignty is those in charge of the common designed to provide the foundation for the claim of some men to have the right to be obeyed, and to account for the obvious fact that men
good."44

which

do obey other men. Simon rejects one he terms the "Coach-Driver

popular

theory

of

sovereignty,
often called

Theory"

and which

is

"sovereignty
traces to

of

the

people."45

Rousseau,
no

resolves

This theory, whose influence Simon the paradox of free men being bound to
that it does
people not

obey

other men

by declaring
a

exist. and

It

argues people

that

officials

have

authority; only the

do,

only themselves in
the
people where of man

democratic
want
...

state.

Public
and

they
man

to

go.

According
illusion Simon

obey simply drive to this theory, the "obe

officials argues

the

dience
zen

to

is

mere

ought

to obey himself

alone."46

the violence, that this is

.

citi not

really a theory of sovereignty at all, but a theory of anarchy, for if its necessary implications were drawn, the citizen would be bound to obey only
calculated
when

he

was

in the majority

on

to do away

with obedience

threatens

any issue: "The directly the

artifice
princi-

Scribner's Sons, 1950), pp. 60-75; Thomas L. Thorson, The Logic of (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962), pp. 139-40.
42

Democracy

43 44
45

PDG, Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

pp. 135-38.
pp.

139-41.

p. 57. pp.

146-54.

For

similar

treatment

of

this subject,

see

Sartori,

Democratic Theory,

chs. 5-6.
position

46 PDG, p. 147. One might be tempted to attribute this (Anarchism), but Wolff, while accepting its basic premises,

realizes

to Wolff their im

draws the necessary conclusion. Legitimate authority, he argues, be found only in a unanimous direct democracy. His conclusion is con vincing evidence for Simon's argument that anarchy is the only position con sistent with the assumptions of the "Coach-Driver
plications and
can
Theory."

Authority and Freedom: the Democratic Philosophy of Yves R. Simon

pie of

117

authority in its
not

obey
this

other

fact,

In obeying laws we Rousseau would have it. To explain men, ourselves, Simon argues that only God can grant the power of binding
most essential
as

function."

consciences :

There is something
can. and

paradoxical about one man's

having
do

the

power

to bind the
alone

conscience of another man.

Of course,

a man cannot

such a

thing. God

This he did

by

the

creation of

the human species,

political; for the

necessity
life.47

of government and

is naturally social obedience follows from the

which

nature of

community
and

Authority

sovereignty,

then, flow from the

of

nature

of political

society, and the first

possessor

sovereignty
and

and

authority is the
seems

community, the people as

a whole.

Sovereignty, Simon
the
"transmission"

to be
of

is the sovereignty is
saying,

right what

to

exercise

authority,

correct

theory
right

Simon
which

calls

the

theory.48

The
to

transmission
exercise

theory holds

that God has

given

the

people

the

follows from the necessity of government. The people may or may not transmit this authority to distinct gov erning personnel. If they choose not to transmit it, then the form of government is a direct democracy. In this case the individual obeys
the authority
not

himself, but
puts

the community decision. The there is

: a

normal

situation, how
personnel.

ever, is for authority to be transmitted to distinct governing

As Simon
men
and

it, "whenever
. . .

have done two things

They

distinct governing personnel, have designated the ruhng person,

power given

they have

transmitted to him the

recognize

by

God to the
not

peo

ple."49

It is important to

democratic. Simon
that the

argues

necessarily that "it [the transmission theory] implies

to the
government which

that this

theory is

governed consent

is theirs, but it

does

not

imply

that this

consent

mocratic procedure of

election."50

is necessarily exercised in the de In fact, "government by the con

meanings, only
a

governed"

sent of

the to

has

at

least

seven

few

of which

are peculiar

democracy.51

The transmission theory, then, is not necessarily democratic, but it nonpromotion of democracy. It was mentioned above that means direct democracy. This fact provides transmission of authority the clue for recognizing the relationship between democracy and sov favors the
"what characterizes the democratic condition ereignty (authority), for transmitted."52 in a democracy, sovereignty is never completely is that, act of genuine transmission suspends the exercise of the people's

Any
47 48

The discussion below follows PDG, pp. 158-94. 49 Ibid., p. 158 (emphasis in original). point (Politics of Freedom, pp. 92, so Ibid., p. 178. Cassinelli makes the same interpretation differs from Simon's when he applies the theory 98-100), but his See below. of consent to democracy.
si 52

PDG,

p.

145;

also

GTA,

pp.

165, 167.

PDG, Ibid.,

pp.

igi-94-

p. 181.

118

Interpretation
that authority (though it

authority, but it does

ercised

not remove

can

be

ex

mits

the

only in extraordinary whole of the transmissible

a

situations).

But

powers.

"democracy Every democracy remains,

never powers of

trans

in varying degree,
referendum,

direct

democracy."53

The

election,

of

and of public opinion are

among the

powers retained

by

the
rect

people.

Something democracy seems

point

like this relationship between indirect and di to be what Giovanni Sartori means when he
although we are governed we are governed

says, "The

is that

democratically;
the is
democracy."54

and

this is

so

because

of

the

value

pressure, because

of a governed

democracy is molded by the ought of a governing Clearly the idea of direct democracy remains normative
and

for both Sartori

plemented

Simon,

though both

argue

that it to
a

cannot

be im

in existing
of

polities.

Simon is
takes

careful

emphasize

that the

transmission
and genuine.

authority If it is not,
Theory"

which

place

in

democracy

is

real

to

control and not

"Coach-Driver

if, for example, public opinion is designed merely to inform the governing officials, then the is implied. "Such practices mean rebellion and
the
core of political

treachery
political

established at

life.
of

They

tend to

corrupt

life into

a competitive system where all moral

idea is

absent."55

If the

circumstances

demand transmission
must

authority to distinct
transmission. "Non;

governing personnel, it
transmission
of

be

real and genuine

authority does
transmission

not

destroy

the

essence of government

but

ungenuine

does."56

IV
the relationships between au in the thought of Yves Simon. Sar democracy tori imphes that authority, by which he means power based on "per is particularly characteristic of democ suasion, prestige,

We

are now

in

a position

to

unfold

thority, freedom,

and

deference,"

racy:

Democracy is the political system which is built on the mode

that is
called

of

exercising
a vis

power

authority, in the sense that the typical feature of

power

democracy

is

that it tends to transform

into authority,

a vis coactiva

into

directiva.
par ex

Far from

being

repugnant

to

democracy, authority is its

power

formula

cellence.57

ss 54

Ibid.,
PDG,

p. 184.

Democratic
p.

Theory,

p.

85.

185-90 for the proper place of public opinion in democracy. Simon's ideas here are quite similar to those ex pressed by Edmund Burke in his well-known "Speech to the Electors of 56 Ibid., pp. 186-87. Jacques Maritain has argued that the concept of sover eignty has no place in a democracy (Man and the State [Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1951], ch. 2). Maritain, however, uses the term in a very re stricted sense, while Simon means by it the right to exercise authority. Mari tain's argument, therefore, poses no problems for Simon's discussion. 57 Democratic Theory, p. 138. Note that this understanding of authority is different from Simon's.

55

187;

see also pp.

a representative

Bristol."

Authority and Freedom: the Democratic Philosophy of Yves R. Simon

Simon
would not

119

racy, but he does

authority is characteristic of democ closely to democracy. All lawful govern ments possess authority: in fact, possession of authority is that which makes them lawful. What is unique about democracy is not authority, but the fact that not all is transmitted to the governing authority
not

disagree
tie it

that'

so

personnel.

The

people retain

the

powers of

election,

often of referen

dum,

and of

influencing

their

racy must possess in that it must possess

"fuller"

Cassinelli argues that democ authority than other kinds of government

governors.

a substantial portion of

legitimacy

or consent

(belief in the lawful

moral right

to

rule).58

Simon, however,

argues

that

all

legitimacy. Again, the only difference is that in granting consent, the people in a democ racy retain a portion of sovereignty. Simon's careful philosophic anal ysis allows him to distinguish clearly and precisely those factors which
governments possess consent, authority, and
characterize

democracy

as one

form
of

of

lawful

government. and

Democracy

is

not

the only legitimate form

government,

its

great value can

be correctly perceived when too much is claimed for it. These observations have important implications for the concept of freedom. As we have seen, Simon feels that democracy implies not
not

also

only freedom of the people from arbitrary power of government but freedom of the people to govern themselves. This follows from the
a

fact that in
which

democracy

the

people

retain

a portion of action

authority,
common of

is

by

nature an active principle

directing
"The

to the

good;
people

therefore, democratic freedom for Simon is the ability

to
choose

the

their

common good.

more

definitely

a commu

nity is directed toward its common good and protected from disunity in its common action, the more perfect and the more free it is."59 Democracy is not often considered to be an end in itself, but there

is
If

an extensive

debate

over

the

ends which or

it is to

serve.

The basic
these
ends.

question

is

over

the determinate
a means,

indeterminate

nature of

democracy
argued

is

then
are

we must

that the

ends of

democracy
the
pohtical

ask, "to indeterminate has

what?"

often

The position been taken. It

can

is

that

since

people are

to

govern

themselves, only they

determine their
this
position :

goals.

Mayo is very forceful in supporting

'end'

for man, has no to serve. It has its consuming their values; and it has the values inherent in the operating principles and character which it both presupposes and promotes. system; and it has a typical Within these limits a democracy may be used to pursue aims which change from The realm of political and social purposes in a democracy is time to time

Democracy

sets

up

no

purpose, no

Form

scientifically ascertained of the Good, no final

all-

ultimate

open and

indeterminate,
policies.60

unless

they

are

very

general and

thus

permit political

dispute

over

58
59 60

Politics of

Freedom,

pp. 108-9.

PDG,

p. I41-

introduction
similar

along

to Democratic Theory, lines (Logic of Democracy,

pp.

277-78;

also p. 309.

Thorson

argues

pp. 138-41).

120

Interpretation

The logical

upshot

of

this

perspective

is the

theory

which

identifies

democracy so long as the process meets certain ity: "Democracy is a method of taking
mising
and

as a process of compromise

between conflicting interests, standards of freedom and equal

political

decisions,
method

of compro

more im reconciling conflicting interests. The social order, than the dis portant, more formative of the resulting These theories have been effectively criticized by putes so John H. Hallowell, who asks, "How is it possible to mediate differ

is

resolved."61

ences, to
public

make

compromises,
and

without

some standards of

justice,

the

good?"

interest,

the

common

Compromises dictated

by

strength are

inherently

unstable:

rule

by
of

the majority,

not

"A minority will agree to temporary simply because the minority cherishes the

certain common someday becoming the majority, but because interests transcend partisan interests."62 Simon's philosophy of de attack on the mocracy is a reaffirmation of this principle and a strong idea of politics as confhct and resolution of private interests. As a

hope

form

of

legitimate

government

directed
the

by

authority, the end of

de
an

mocracy is determinate, that the people as a whole. The

concept game. of

is,

common good of good

the community,
than simply
purpose of of
game."

common

is

more of

agreement on some common values as

"rules

the the

Simon's
the

the

common good refers

Yet the

end

is

also

indeterminate, for
of

primarily to the the matter

common

good cannot

be

specified a

priori; it is a question for determination

by

the

authorities

in light

the

contingent

circumstances

within

which

democratic society exists. The unique feature of the democratic state is the active role taken by the people, in their public capacity and in cooperation with the distinct governing per
a particular

sonnel, in

determining
It

the

nature of

their

common goal and

the

means

to its the

realization.

must

be

remembered

that the

common good

is

an

ethical

quality

and cannot receive

any

matter which

the

people and

government wish

to determine for it. that it

of

cal reason and

the

requirement

Authority is bound by ethi try to lead by persuasion rather

reaffirms

than

by

coercion. of

Simon's theory
government

democracy, then,

the

ethical

nature

and

establishes

normative

standards

against which actual

Yet the

greatest

deficiency

democracies may be measured. in Simon's democratic

theory

concerns

61 E. F. M. Durbin, in Rejai, Democracy, p. 94. See also the selections from E. E. Schattschneider and Seymour M. Lipset in the same volume, pp. 1 16-21 and 122-23. The idea of democracy as the compromise of interests or, more broadly, as a process for resolving interest conflicts is widespread in contempo rary writings on democracy and in modern political science generally. For sub stantiation of this contention and a critique of the idea of democracy simply as a process of interest conflict, see Cochran, "The Politics of ch. 4, and "The Politics of Interest: Philosophy and the Limitations of the Science of American Journal of Political Science 17 (1973): 745-66. 62 Moral Foundation, pp. 34, 36, also pp. 27-47; Cassinelli, Politics of Free
Interest,"
Politics,"

dom,

pp. 135-38.

A uthority and Freedom: the Democratic

the

Philosophy of Yves R

Simon

121

role of the people in determining their common good. If the people in a democracy take a direct hand in this, then they must be regarded in two aspects, as private persons and as public persons. For autonomy requires that individuals have the freedom to promote their private goods (see section II above). It also follows that the citizen will have two functions corresponding to these two aspects of his citizenship. As
a private person will

he

must will

the

common good

formally
the

and must
must

his

own particular good materially.

As

a public person

he

be

concerned with

both the form

and

the

matter of

common good.

It is easy to

see

and we need not of such conflict.

that these two roles may often come into conflict, look too far in existing democracies to find examples
note of

Simon does take

roles

the difficulties

and

tensions

which

these

may

create

for the

conscientious

man, but he does

and gives go

not consider guidance

the

problem

in the

context of can

democracy
effective a

little

for

its

resolution.63

How far
not

the individual

ticular
cisions

good?

Might

too

in promoting his par promotion of it prevent de

an or subsidiary its private good, does it become a public person? If

furthering
in the
cease

the

common good?

If

individual

group

acts

political process

to

promote

thereby

to be

a private person and

so, then it

must advocate
of

the

public and not

the

private good.

Simon's
this

discussion
of

the

need

for
not

pohtical parties

to be

open

to the

public and

the

role of public opinion are not make

helpful in the

resolution of

problem, for he does

situations are

it

clear whether

the

people

in these

the

common

good.64

and of small

expressing their particular interests or their opinions of The importance of the autonomy of the individual units is the ground for Simon's idea of pluralism. Here
plural units and

again, the relationship between the

alization of

the institution
of

common

this relationship needs elaboration if the relation good to private goods is to be fully considered.65

the

The

conflict acute

between the

private and

the

common good seems par

ticularly
virtuous resolve
other

in

democracy, in

which each man must promote

both.

Ultimately,

the tension may be incapable of resolution except by the man. The problem of the common good in a democracy may
problem

itself into the

and

of

creating

virtuous with

citizenry.
which

In

words, the

problem

of

political so

education,

Plato,

Aristotle,

Tocqueville
of our

were

vitally concerned, is brought to

the foreground

attention

by

Simon's

theory

of democracy.66

63 64 65

PDG, Ibid.,

pp. 43-47pp.

104,

185-90.

Simon discusses the autonomy of small units throughout PDG and attends to some specific condiserations in chs. 4-5, but the discussion is not systematic enough to solve the problem raised. 66 Simon's notion of the functions of authority, which he does in this connection. See FC, pp. 51 and not develop in detail, is quite suggestive 23. Michael Oakeshott considers political education in 55; PDG, pp. 60-61. n. 'Politics' and "The in a University," essays "Political Study of
"perfective"
Education"

122

Interpretation

V One
cratic
still remains

question

in

our

exposition preferred

of

Simon's demo
other

theory.

Why

is

democracy

to be

to

forms

of

government

if the

conditions

The
that

answer

to this

question

allowing its is imphcit in

establishment

are present?

what

has
of

gone

before

and

needs

only to be clearly
promotes

articulated.

The first factor to be

democracy

freedom,
As
we

though not,

is because it course,
noted

does away

with authority.

sesses genuine

authority

promotes

have seen, any regime which pos freedom because freedom and au
a special role

thority

are complementary.

Democracy, however, has

in

accepted in ending promoting freedom. First, it demands that risks be all forms of paternal (substitutional) authority of the few over the "It favors over the "common many, of the
"aristocrats"
man."

the early granting of autonomy in all domains of paternal Since this process involves the dangers of misuse of autonomy, de

authority.

mocracy demands
guarantee

heroism; it is
as

not

an

easy form
of

of

government.67

Second, democracy
the

political

form

government

attempts

to

people

leaves the

people

freedom from arbitrary rule; as democracy it free to govern themselves. Recent theorists of de
much emphasis on

mocracy have
pohtical action
potential.68

placed

the benefits

which

demo

cratic participation

through voting,

public

discussion,
with

petition, and

provides

for the full development

of a citizen's

human
ac

on

While Simon undoubtedly disagrees important points, clearly he would find the
which

these theorists
of

results

these

tivities,
other

derive from the freedom

which a man

of

the

people

to

govern
adds

them

selves, important for human development.

Democracy

to the

freedoms

may have the freedom to

common good.

participate

in

determining
But how function
of

the

content of

the

is democracy in eliminating the substitutional authority, in promoting its essential functions, and in ad
effective

vancing the common good ? This is a second factor to be considered in evaluating democracy. Space does not allow a detailed examination of

Simon's
inflated

answer

to this

question.

Suffice it to say that he

of

considers an

optimism

concerning the ability

the

the

people

to

govern

them

selves and

to

promote

common good

to be dangerous. Neverthe

less,

the

people

do have may

special skills which can promote

the

common

good.

While

they

not always

be

able

to

place good men

in

posi-

both in Rationalism in Politics (New York: Basic

3367

Books,

1962), pp. 111-36,

301-

See PDG, pp. 15-18. The passage quoted is on p. 17. See, for example, Kariel, Open Systems; Wolff, Anarchism; Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); and Baskin, American Pluralist Democracy, esp. ch. 8. Of special importance is Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday, 1959).
68

A uthority and Freedom: the Democratic

tions
of

Philosophy of Yves R. Simon

123

The

they do seem to avoid placing bad men in them. have a special skill in dehberating about policy. More over, a distribution of power to the many is necessary to protect the people from the mistakes, blindnesses, or evils of elitist One of Simon's greatest virtues as a theorist of democracy is his
authority,
people also
governments.69

ability to distinguish clearly between those goods which are the re sponsibility of all just government and those which are peculiar to democracy. The refusal of many contemporary theorists, Mayo, for
example,
of and even

Cassinelli,
normative

to

some

and government

in

terms

seems

extent, to consider democracy to result in their requiring

democracy

outcomes which are

just

government.

If these

results are not

in fact the responsibility of any forthcoming, a "disillusioned

may be the result. It is dangerous to expect too much from any form of government or from imperfect men in an imperfect world. The true value of democracy can only be appreciated from the
perspective of what

optimism"

It is this kind
mocratic

of realism which

Reinhold Neibuhr has termed "political informs and elevates Yves Simon's de

realism."70

theory.

This paragraph summarizes PDG, pp. 77-99. See Niebuhr, Children of Light and "Augustine's Political James V. Downton, Jr., and David K. Hart, eds., Perspectives Philosophy, Vol. I (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), Simon discusses optimism and pessimism in FC, ch. 6.
69 7

Realism,"

on

in Political

pp. 243-57.

124 NIEBUHR'S CONCEPTION OF POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD

Kenneth W. Thompson

University

of Virginia

is not based on a compre is it a systematic approach to social systems or political behavior. Indeed, there is an air of selfmockery in his description of his approach as "bastardized He was con and, by imphcation, "bastardized political
Reinhold Niebuhr's
conception of pohtics

hensive

and coherent overall

theory,

nor

theology"

theory."

crete

political

in his thinking, intent history. His stance

was as relentless

on

was often

understanding reahty, polemical, bent

and wedded
on

to

a questionable

viewpoint, exposing

hypocrisy,

or

demohshing laying bare illusions,

as as

but he

There

was movement

in pursuing his own illusions to Niebuhr's thought and,

those

of others.

June Bingham

has shown, the abihty to change his views, yet those views were still firmly based on principles too simple for some, too illusive for others, and too provisionally stated to satisfy those who seek for "hard theo
ries."

He

was skeptical of rigid and rationalistic modes and approaches not correspond and

which

did

to historical reality,

and

his

principles

did

not

fit readily

ings

of political

simply into the conventional categories and group thought. He struggled to take hold of reahty, not to
as an

force it prematurely into any ready-made ideological mold. The New Left and the New Theologues have pictured him
establishment

thinker

and apologist

for the
and

status quo.

Does this fit

analysis,
pohtical of

the

founding
its

editor of

Radical Religion ? His

the
complexities pohtical

style of pohtical

with

emphasis said

on

ambiguities

passivity and indifference to the needs of the city. How many of his critics have run for Congress, as he did (he was a Sociahst candidate in 1930), were founders of such organizations as Americans for Democratic Action, and fought for
their goals
over

choice, is

to lead to

the

years

? Niebuhr
as an unreconstructed was

Some

conservatives condemn read

hberal.
against

Have

they

his

critique of

liberahsm ? He

for

peace

but

pacifism; for dialogue across ideological

skeptical of

and national

boundaries but

Huxley's scientific ra tionalism as a universal answer to world peace ; for war against Nazism but for accommodation with the Soviet Union; and for containment in Europe but not in Southeast Asia. How quaint and far-removed he seems from almost every one of the approaches popular in the last decade: positive thinking, problemquestioned

UNESCO because he

solving, giving the

system one more and

the war, black power, law

chance, order, the

banning the bomb,

"conquest"

of
of confhct.

ending hunger or
strove

disease,

"elimination"

"resolution"

of

waste,

He

to

Niebuhr's Conception of Politics in the United States

solve

and

the World

125

but
to

neither

problems, to root out evil, his personal nor his

and

to

extend

opportunity
allowed

and

justice,
strut sent

public

and pose as a savior of mankind.

He

never saw

philosophy himself

him to

as a

leader

eradicate

evil, for he found too

much

frailty

in

all

men,

beginning

with

himself (although his humility was never self-conscious or pomp it is with those who make a display of their limitations). His ous,
as

self-awareness and

identity-seeking
lecture
or

was a personal

matter,
show.

not some
was man's
which

thing

sold

for

a price at a

literary
not

fashion

It

predicament stimulated

and man's

possibilities,

Reinhold Niebuhr's,
books that he

the articles

and sermons and

published

in

torrents

almost until

his death.

meditation

Niebuhr's concepts and principles were based on experience, not in solitude. He moved from the pulpit of a contentious

parish to the cockpit of social and religious controversy in New York, then the world's largest city. Two forces in particular re peatedly drew him out into society and drew him away from system atic thought. He was impatient with what he considered the irrele vance of philosophical

Detroit

systems,

on one

hand,

and with society's stub

born
the

resistance

to

change and

its

sanctification of

the

status quo on

other

hand. He

could not avoid

the

pohtical

maelstrom, though

he early learned that problems were never solved once and for all. He have agreed with the words of Walt Whitman: "it is provided in the very essence of things that from any fruition of success, no matter what, shall come forth something to make a greater struggle
might
necessary."

Niebuhr
pohtical

entered

the

pohtical arena not as a pohtical actor

but his

as a

thinker,

with all

the burdens

and constraints

this

entailed. pur

If theologians
suit of

and philosophers questioned

or

the

seriousness of

theology
a

philosophy,

politicians and were right.

diplomatists doubted

that he

was one of

them,

and

they

They
of

were

his

presence

favorite I know
occurred

comment was

"I don't

understand what

uneasy in he's
ad

about."

talking
costly blunders
monition
on

of at

least two Secretaries

State
to

whose most

from their failure to

consider

Niebuhr's
gain

the limits

of power.

His

one

attempt

political

office ended
and

in failure in

1930 :

he lived in two worlds, that

of pohtics

the mind, never fully at home in either. Perhaps this is he understood inhabitants of both worlds better than they under why stood themselves, including their self-deceptions and pretensions, their

that

of

interests
tude

and

illusions,
to

although

his

skepticism

and self-critical atti cost

with respect

principles and policies

may have

him friends

and allies.
ers of

In the
social

1920s and

1930s,

when

he

was affiliated with

follow

the

gospel, he

questioned whether

Christians

were a

likely

source of social reform, given

quoted with
approval

the

religious of

the

words

complaceny of Detroit, and the Episcopal bishop Charles

Williams that
tians in

on matters of social
and

Detroit,

they

were

justice there were only two Chris both Jews. His indignation focused on

126

Interpretation
role of

the

duction
most

auto

Henry Ford industry,

and

influential

the mighty leaders of the new mass pro in challenging them he was defying the powerful people in that city. He continued along

and

and

this

path even when not

his

acceptance

by

influential leaders
of

grew and

he

did

hesitate to

challenge

the illusions
social

John Foster Dulles,

Henry

Luce
those

or

Billy

Graham. Niebuhr's

criticism,

however,
the

was criti

cism with a who

difference. To

achieve

his

ends

he

needed

support of

hands
would

and

held power, but quest for influence and power can tie the restrict the freedom of social thinkers, especially those who
and

be both thinkers
the

influencing
muckrakers

powerful

are

doers; thinkers immune, for

on

who make no pretense of all out social

critics

and

have

no

designs

decision-makers

nor are

they depen
He

dent

upon

them.
contrast, carried his
a

Niebuhr, by
numbered erful and

thinking
and

into the

marketplace.

among

few

close

friends

many

acquaintances

the the

pow mass

the mighty in government,

business,
Luce
and

education,

and

media,

yet

from his first denunciation debates

with

of social

his

rather shrill role

Henry

injustices in Detroit to John Foster Dulles over

theologian,"

in the world, he never fhnched from meeting the power ful head on. He criticized the notion of "house as he saw in the late 1960's the relationship of Billy Graham to the White House,
America's
not

only

as

an

abridgement

of

the historic American

as

separation of

church and state

subservience

but,

more of

to holders

raising, hke every form of the specter of the social observer power,

important,

abandoning his independence as critic and interpreter. He retained, however, his commitment to both thinking and doing, and thus his
conception of pohtics evolved.

THREE CONCEPTS IN A THEORY OF POLITICS

Niebuhr's
sciences, he
more open
pohtics

thinking
As

evolved

into
of

a more or

less

coherent outlook on social

pohtical problems.

an alternative

to system-building in the
which, he
evolve a

proposed

the study

history,
he did

to

empirical

data,

and

beheved, theory of ethics

remained and

which

provided a

basis for

a serious

dialogue

with ethicists

(whom he

criticized

for

being

too Utopian)

and pohtical reahsts

(whom

he

sometimes

found too

cynical).

Niebuhr's sentially
most of
on

conception of

United States These

and world politics rested es

three working

principles which

he

apphed

consistently in

his

political writings.

concepts are

power, community,

and practical morality.

Niebuhr's Conception of Politics in

the United States

and

the World

127

Power

"The
wrote:

contest of power

"To

understand

is the heart of pohtical hfe."1 Niebuhr pohtics is to recognize the elements of power
... .
.

which underlie all social structure

which

merged, but

which cannot

be

eliminated."2

may be obscured or sub Whatever the ultimate

means

goals or claims men and nations mediate ends and

never

pursue, the

to both their im

their

ultimate ends

is

power.

Indeed, "there has

not

been

a scheme of

justice in
an

history

which

did

have

balance

of power at

its foundation."3 Power for Niebuhr was both

inevitable
the

component of pohtics and and

an

inescapable
the

source of corruption.

Anxiety

insecurity

are at

the

roots of

quest

for

power and of

excuses men make

for their

aggressions on the basis of morahty every day of their lives. Man who is dependent upon God but seeks to make himself self-sufficient and independent must inevitably be anxious. To end this anxiety, he seeks

influence,

recognition,

and

power,

thereby threatening

others

and

bringing anxiety into their hves. One man's power is another man's powerlessness, one man's security another's insecurity. The existence of power and powerlessness, security and insecurity, is not openly nor plainly stated but is cloaked in the language of right and wrong, jus tice and injustice, and "reasons of Rivalries such as these among nations are also played out in microcosm, Niebuhr writes, as when "my little five-year-old boy comes to me with the tale of an at
state."

tack

made upon

him

by

his

year-old sister.

escape parental

judgment for

being

too

rough

This tale is concocted to in playing with his sis

ter. One is
sor and

reminded of similar

the

Germany's claim that Poland was the aggres Russian charge against Finland [in World War

II]."4

Community
security in their relationships, interests and common pur they poses. Community exists at almost every level, from the most intimate and enduring units such as the family to ever larger groupings of As
men

struggle

for

identity

and

also

join together

out of convergent

states.

Community

precedes

government, and
not

government cannot we

be
at

estabhshed where

community is

present, as

have

seen

in the

tempts toward world

government.

Community was approximated when

American,"

Vol
2

56.

Christian Century, "Leaves from the Notebook of a War-bound November 15, 1939, p. 1405. Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946),
p. 104.
p.

p. 123. 3 4

Ibid., Ibid.,

14.

128

Interpretation
states of western
common action

the

Europe
in

and

the United States discovered the basis

for

a convergence of pohtical and moral convergence of

following
the Cold
sensus

World War II. This

interests
and of

was

interests lacking in

War, partly because

the East did

not share

the

moral con

prevailing in Europe and the United States, (at least in Niebuhr's time) the pohtical interests
not converge.

partly because East and West

did

Community, then, involves

within which sible.

a modicum of shared values and some

minimal agreement on pohtical means and ends.

It is the framework

the

give and

take

of pohtics and accommodation on

When society is based primarily

most

on

the

tentative

and provisional

is pos huddle together basis in the face of the threat,

fear,

nations

say,
at

of a

thermonuclear holocaust.
cooperation

Community provides the cement for

among states, as the power/security di lemma leads to rivalry for influence and prestige. It may be too simple to juxtapose power and community in these terms, yet for Niebuhr
the two
were

least limited

interconnected is
at

and provide

the fulcrum

of

his thought.
of shared

American

pohtical

hfe has

gone on within a

framework

least partly the heritage of a common European tradition. The Founding Fathers wrote of forming not a pohtical union of states but a more perfect union, implying the existence of a prior
values which moral and pohtical community. sence of such a community:

World pohtics is plagued by the ab only for limited periods and in limited geographical areas is community approximated on this wider basis. Relations between nations more often resemble proceedings in the course of an armistice among contending states than they do a dis
cussion of common

interests.

Practical
A final
possible pohtical concept which reached

Morality

work was

stages of Niebuhr's morality may be the highest attainment in national and international pohtics. Moral and choices involve discrimination among many goods; they are

fruition in the later

the

argument

that

practical

concrete choices, not abstract ones. Men seek to do the right, but what is right? It is hard to perceive the correct solution for a problem or the right course to take in a given situation, but it is equally hard to perceive and

the interests
quest

and moral positions of others.

Fear, insecurity,

the

for

power as a means of

compound

the

problem.

To these

must

security and identity further be added ignorance, the un every

the
moral

certainties of

predicting the

consequences of

choice, the

hazards

of premature moral

judgments

and

self -righteousness of

individuals and groups. At the national level, Niebuhr beheved, these problems are further comphcated by the human tendency to project upon the state un-

Niebuhr's Conception of Politics in the United States fulfilled

personal ambitions
nature of and

and

the World

129

aspirations,

prime

cause

for the

crusading
national

anxious men

and contemporary feel in their personal lives, he said, the more they turn to achievements for personal satisfactions. Added to all this is

nationalism :

the

more

insecure

the fact that

moral choices are made more

difficult because

of

the

com

plexities of modern

life. The

ancient and

enduring

moral codes were

drawn up for rather simple societies and ways Barnard wrote, they come from a time of sheep
societies marked

of and

hfe (as Chester shepherds), for

who

by

a considerable all

degree
one of

of moral consensus which no

longer

exists.

Given

these

complexities and

problems, those

offer moral guidance

tend to take

five

positions.

The Moralists The

moral

practical

would make every question, however limited and (for example, whether to grant a travel visa or not), a pure issue. Confronted with the complex and ambiguous choices of morahsts

statecraft,

they defer

true

moral choice or

to the

millenium.

Morahty

becomes

goal, not a awaiting matter of making choices among lesser evils or of the least imperfect good among available moral choices. Morahsts tend to scorn those who make present choices. Niebuhr throughout his career attacked this ap proach and appears for contemporary societies at least to reject it
a matter of a perfectionist

declaring

outright.

The Cynics The

that
and opposite of moralism

moral choice

is cynicism, is impossible, that men

which cover

maintains, in effect, their acts with moral

ideological rationalizations when ambition and self-interest are in fact the true determinants. Thus cynics call for recognizing what is, not what ought to be. Niebuhr beheved that cynicism had httle to com mend it as a positive and constructive approach to moral decisions.

The Pragmatists
Pragmatism
a case-by-case appeals

to those

who are

impatient

with

broad

and gen

eral moral viewpoints.

The

pragmatist grapples with

basis :

each

decision has to be

made as

reahty solely on if it were unique

,

it in relation to criticized President Nixon for such an other decisions. James Reston for looking at every issue as if it were isolated from every approach
and

the

effective policy-maker cannot afford

to

see

other

one,

and

criticized.

In

nected,

and

Johnson have been similarly issue and problem is intercon Niebuhr, every fact, there is often a better chance of making the right moral
Presidents
says

Kennedy

and

130

Interpretation
if decisions is
are viewed

choice

in this

way.

However,

although

prag

matism

an advance over

cynicism, it

remains

for Niebuhr

a plau

sible

but inadequate

approach.

THE POLITICAL REALISTS AND PRACTICAL MORALISTS

Two

other

traditions have

respected moved

histories,
and

pohtical realism and

practical morahty.

Niebuhr

throughout his
moral choices

writings

in pohtics interests. Practical morahty is relevant because political choices which would be moral must consider competing moral claims. Both realism and prudence are essential to moral choice, the one in evaluating com
peting pohtical claims and the other in evaluating moral claims. Some may say these are distinctions without a difference, and that
what counts
with

forth between the two and speeches. Reahsm has its place because can never be made in isolation from practical
back

in

practice are

those frequent decisions

which are made

seemingly httle influence from underlying philosophies. Yet the success of our foreign pohcy over the next five or ten years may well depend
upon whether pohcy-makers substitute reahsm or prudence or cynicism.

for

pragmatism practical

Pragmatism looks to

what

is

possible and what mor

in

a single

isolated case,

while prudence seeks

to balance
at

is pohticaUy ally
values. what

possible with what

is

conceived of as

being
kind

least

right and subjects pohtical

decisions to

some

of

hierarchy
tell

of us

While

neither principles nor

circumstances alone can

is right, they do
moral

principles,

which seldom

framework for

up the fabric of moral choice. General (if ever) decide concrete cases, do provide a reasoning, and circumstances influence priorities
make

as we leave an era of plenty (one set of cir cumstances) and enter an era of scarcity (another circumstance). A nation cannot do everything; its leaders must choose. One choice

among values, especially

select methods of assuring national and international se Most of the energy of the Nixon administration (and perhaps of the Johnson administration) was dedicated to this task. If collec tive security is dead, what are we to put in its place? Because of ex cessive pragmatism, both these administrations were more effective in coping with individual crises as they developed than in deahng with must

be to

curity.

the larger

general question.

However,

pragmatists suffer most

by

com

parison with practical morahsts with respect

to the

problems of

the the

developing
answer,
nor

world.

Here

neither

charity

nor

crash

programs are

transfer of capital or people. Western pol Third World problems are likely to remain pe ripheral to the central issues of negotiating with the Russians and the Chinese for some time, and those who espouse economic and social
massive

is the

icies toward

so-called

development
minded

programs

as panaceas

for

world

peace

need

to be

re

that their

concerns are not yet at

the

center of world

atten-

Niebuhr's Conception of Politics in the United States

tion. Yet
center of

and

the World

131

somehow

future

policy-makers who would

move

be both

realistic

and prudent must

help

to

these issues

somewhat closer

to the there

the

action.

From the
while

standpoint of practical morality,

over

is something
percent of

99 worrying paying homage to a new structure of peace only once or twice a year at the United Nations when the leaders of gather in New York for the opening of the General Assembly. To be more specific, critics of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy, perpet
the time
nations'

obscene about

Great-Power

problems

by Mr. Nixon's successor, note a seeming obliviousness to the intangible aspects of foreign policy. The United States, these critics say, has been both ruthless and short-sighted in abandoning its friends Japan, India, and Taiwan. It has used its power with little magnanimity or grace. Kissinger and his allies seem to have lacked the
uated more
personal self-confidence and

security necessary to

establish and main

tain individual

relations of

intimacy

and

trust

with

Europeans

and

Asians. Their

pragmatism

has been

so relentless and cold-blooded

that

their intentions have been

one might expect peans.

suspect even

to be

most

trusting

of

Americans,

(and especially) among those namely, the Euro

The trouble
eign

with

pragmatism can

policy pattern, it

be

expanded

is that, much like every other for into a religion. Where human

plays a controlling role, limited political precepts and tactics be transformed into absolutes and there has been plenty of vani ty in the Nixon-Kissinger approach. Secrecy becomes not a means for accomplishing certain ends but an end in itself, justified not by doc trine or words but by a sense of omniscience and self-righteousness

vanity
can

is impervious to alternatives. Such pragmatism, though less of fensive than the florid public moralism of John Foster Dulles, is none theless all-pervasive in its effects. It leads to isolation from other views, ruthlessness in dealing with those who differ, and unwillingness
which

to

acknowledge

that

one

may be
though

wrong.

Those
not

whose acts speak

self-righteousness,

even

they

do

spring from in its language,

the
present-

may be the most self-righteous We can assume that Niebuhr

of all. would

have

reflected upon

day

conduct of

the thoughts the

on pragmatism

foreign pohcy in terms of practical morahty, although just outlined cannot, obviously, be at

tributed to him.
ed

Likewise, it is fair to suppose he would have

toward detente
and moral consensus
approached or

approach

Soviet-American efforts
of

with an awareness of

the

importance
also

any problem without His legacy is not that of a pundit or prophet, however, but it is rather his concepts and their usefulness in studying those issues which as a basis for study and thought remain the unfinished business of American political and in
careful consideration of

community unhkely that he would have

the

lack thereof. It is

problem of power.

ternational life.

THE CHOICE BETWEEN PERFECTIONISM

AND RAWLSIAN CONTRACTARIANISM

Kai Nielsen University It is

with of
Rawls'

of

Calgary
his
conception of

claim

that

when we compare

justice

(average utility, classical utility, and the different kinds perfectionist theories) that his theory at least appears (a) "to match

its

rivals

our

common

sense

convictions

more
unsettled

and
cases1

(b)

more

ade

While quately extrapolates to previously accounts to be his most serious rivals, I want Rawls takes utilitarian here to examine whether Rawls has demonstrated or even made con
332).

(p.

vincing 1) his
tualization
of

claim

that his
of

principles give a more adequate

concep

the basis

justice

and

morahty than does

perfection

ism

and

2) his further

and related claim

that there is "no basis for

justice"

acknowledging (P- 330). I

shall argue

a principle of perfection as a standard of social

that Rawls has

not made a

am not mistaken
struction

in the

essentials of
of

Rawls'

of

critique

compelling case here. If I my argument, and if some recon perfectionism cannot be made which
sound or at overall

will show such a critique

pelling than it

now

to be essentially appears to be, then his

part of

least

more com

theory

will

be

rather

considerably weakened, for to show that rival accounts

greater

are

its plausibility turns on his ability inadequate or at least suffer from even
own account.

difficulties than does his

Rawls begins his

fection"

examination of what out

he

calls

"the

principle of per

by

(p.

325).

pointing In the first

that there
us
call

are

two

variants of

the

principle

let
to

it "extreme
principle

perfe

the

principle
which

of

perfection

is the

sole

of

teleological

theory

directs

"society

arrange

institutions
to

and

to define the duties the

achievement of

and obhgations of

individuals

so as

maximize

human

exceUence

quotation posture: great

in art, science and from Nietzsche's Schopenhauer

culture"

(p.

325).

The

following

as

Educator illustrates this

kind must work continually to produce individual human beings this and nothing else is the task for the ques tion is this: how can your life, the individual life, retain the highest
value, the deepest significance?
of
. . .

"man-

Only by

your

living

for the

good

the

rarest

and most

valuable

specimens."2

Whether the

greatest

1 A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). References to A Theory of Justice are given in the test. There are important remarks about his appeal to considered judgments and the rationale for extra polation from them on pp. 316-320 of the book. I have critically examined this matter in my "On Phliosophic International Philosophical Quarterly,
Method,"

(September,
2

1976). p. 325.

Quoted in ibid.,

The Choice between Perfectionism

number are made

and

Rawlsian Contractarianism

133
or

happy

or

not,

whether equal

hberty

is furthered
not, the

not,

whether all men are

taken to be

of equal concern or

cul

tural

achievements of
was

humankind

must

be

preserved.

If, for

example,

slavery necessary to attain and preserve the achievements of the Greeks in philosophy, science, and art, then slavery was morally jus tified in those circumstances. A
second

form
a

of perfectionism of

tionism"

is

form

let us call it "moderate intuitionism in which the principle of

perfec perfec

tion is
tionist

accepted as

only
on

one

(though
Such
and

very

crucial

one)

of several

irre

ducible
culture.

ultimate standards.

a view can

be

more or

less

perfec

depending

the

weight given

to the

claims of excellence and

reasonably, as a kind of moral basis for conservativism, perfectionists, as a counterpoint to the egalitarian ism advocated by Rawls, could argue against the difference principle

Applied moderately

for

limit to the

redistribution of wealth and

most

income
met.

once

the

sub

sistence needs or

the

basic

needs of people

including,

of

course,

the least favored tribution

should

stratum of

society
tends to

have been
undermine

Such

a redis met and

be halted

when subsistence needs

have been
the

where such a redistribution cultural values

preservation of

a situation
ation of

; that is to say, instead of using the expenditures in such to enhace the happiness and reheve the suffering and alien
more unfortunate strata of

the

preserve and

to

add

to the

flourishing

of

society, one should the arts, sciences,

use

it to

and cul

tural

amenities of us consider

hfe.
Rawls'

Let

arguments against

this

moderate
of

form

of per of

fectionism. (In

doing

this I

shall consider some

his

criticisms

extreme perfectionism as

well, for he

believes,

and

rightly, that

they

what would position

apply to both variants.) Many of his criticisms depend on an appeal to be chosen in the original position. Persons in the original

do

not

"share

a common conception of

the

good

by

reference

to

which

the fruition

of

their
so

powers or even
can

the

satisfaction of

their

hardly "have an agreed-on cri they terion of perfection that can be used as a principle for choosing between (p. 327). Such a conception would be utterly empty and inapplicable for them. But this would not be so for rational, impartial
desires
can

be

evaluated,"

institutions"

in everyday life capable of a sense of justice, and, if the methodo logical device of the original position has the effect of excluding consid
people
eration of such a substantive

theory

simply

on

those grounds,

i.e.,

that
re

"O.P"s (people in the

such

original we

conceptions, then
or at

position) have in that very fact

cannot understand or assess

good grounds

for

least seriously questioning the use of that methodological jecting device. What we need to know is whether rational and impartial per sons in normal circumstances would have good grounds for adopting principles of justice rather than either extreme or moderate
Rawls'

perfectionism.

To say,

at

least

of extreme

perfectionism, that

a ra

tional

person would not adopt such a principle

because it

might

lead

134
to
some curtailment of
altogether

Interpretation his
own

hberties

and

indeed

even

to

loss

of

is not yet to make a non-question-begging criticism of perfectionism, for we have to be given a reason why rational, im partial human beings might not adopt the teleological ideal-regarding
freedom
principles of

perfectionism, principles

which commit

them to the

claim
per

that in

certain circumstances some personal

hberties (including,

haps,

their own) may "fall before the higher social goal of maximizing of raising or maintaining the level of culture (p. 327).

Only

if

we were

justified in claiming that

seeks

a man acts

if, but only if, he

to

maximize

that

which

rationally not is in his self-interest

to
such a conception of ratio

will such a claim undermine perfectionism.

But

such a claim about ra

tionality
of
nality.3

is

quite

arbitrary ; if Rawls is
so
much

committed

rationality, then

the

worse

for his
will

conception

If, alternatively, Rawls is saying that,

stipulate

as a

we

will

that

rational

persons

take

no

simplifying device, interest in one

another's

interests,

then

so much

the

worse

for

such simphfication. all or even most ra

There
tional
with

are no sufficient reasons

for

believing

that

and

impartial

persons

in everyday hfe

operate

in

accordance

that simphfying device. To set it up so that they must do so, and then to point out that such people will opt for the principle of greatest
rather

hberty

than the

principle of

perfection, is too

obvious a

gerry

mandering to require further comment. Where is it written or estab lished that no rational man can risk his freedom to further or protect
the
sciences and

the

arts

?
of objection

Rawls

moving to

different kind

cannot,
on

without

radically changing his own position, reject perfectionism that it is a doctrine which captures nothing which is
clear, for he
avers

the

grounds

even

tolerably

that "comparisons
as

of

intrinsic
there

value can

be

made"

and

that,

he

puts

it, "clearly
creative

are
at

obviously standards in the

within par ques

arts and sciences

for appraising
traditions
of

efforts,

least

ticular

styles and

thought.

Very

often

it is beyond

is superior to that of another. Indeed, as he points out himself, the freedom and well-being of individuals, when measured by the excellence of their activities and works, is vast different in value (p. 328). He agrees that the judgments we make ly
tion that the
work of one person

here

are not so vague

that

they

must

fail

on

that

account as a

basis

for assigning rights. To point out, as Rawls does, that justice

a well-ordered

as

fairness "allows that in

are and

society the

recogn

values

of

excellence

that "human
principle of
one

perfections are

to be

pursued within

the limits

of

the

free is not to the point, for the question is of priority. Even moderate perfectionism must generally give greater

association"

I have

argued against such a conception of

Rationality,"

Philosophical Papers 69 (1972), Studi internazionali di filosofia, (1975).

and

rationality in my "Principles in "Rationality and

of

Egoism,"

The Choice between Perfectionism

weight

and

Rawlsian Contractarianism

135

to principles of perfection than to the Rawlsian principles of justice. Rawls rightly argues that the principle of perfection provides an insecure foundation for equal hberties and would depart widely from the difference principle. A criterion of perfection will be such that rights in the basic structure are to be assigned so as to maximize the
total intrinsic
value.

And

even

the

moderate a

perfectionist
a

and

the

Rawlsian
ment

contractarian will not

find

basis for

lower-level

agree

in a mutual commitment to the indispensability of human equal for the equahty of rights does not follow from the equal capacity ity, of individuals for the higher forms of hfe. It may well not even be true
that
trine
we

have

such equal

capacities, but

even

if

we

do,
a

that

by

itself

would not commit a perfectionist who accepted of equal rights as well.

it to From the fact (if it is

themselves to

Rawlsian doc

fact)
are

that im

partial rational agents would commit

a principle of per

fection it does
committed

not

follow that

they

would

be, if they
of

to

a conception of right which would

in turn
not

commit of

consistent, them

to the
value

principle of equal

hberty. Maximization
or

the total

intrinsic
on
no

(defined in

perfectionist

with a principle of equal

particular circumstances.

terms) may may liberty. Whether it is or not will depend Thus in a perfectionist account there is
pillar of

be

compatible

secure

foundation for
against

key

justice

as

fairness,

namely, the
what?"

principle of equal

hberty.

be responded, "So Per haps it is more reasonable and, morally speaking, better to stick with a principle of perfection with different principles of justice subordinate to that principle. Why must it be the case, and indeed is it the case, that rational and impartial people with a capacity for a sense of justice must opt for the priority of a principle of equal liberty rather than the

However,

Rawls, it

could

priority far as I
even

of a principle of perfection when

the two
show

are

in

conflict

? As

can

see, Rawls has done nothing to

should.

that

they

must or

that

they

be reasonable for Rawls to respond that in arguing about in arguing morally, it should be evident that at "some (p. 320). point we cannot avoid relying upon our intuitive In the above argument we were forgetting that in comparing the ade
It
would

morals and

judgments"

quacy
to

of

these

rival moral

postures,
318).

we must at some point appeal might add

to

our considered convictions

(p.

He

that

we

need,

as

well,

need

develop more fully the to develop them in

we need

consequences of

these

detail

and see where

principles ; indeed, we they lead (p. 319). In

particular,

to

see whether

they have

consequences

that

con

Some of these considered con that we seem un victions, Rawls reminds us, "are fixed points foreseeable (p. 318). The willing to revise under any is that justice as fairness harmonizes better point, Rawls could claim, with our considered convictions, including those deepest convictions flict
with

our considered convictions.

circumsta

136

Interpretation

which are

fixed

points we are not

willing,

except

purely in theory, to
"our"

revise

(pp.

381-20).
"we"

and We must, however, be careful with the use of in drawing implications from the Rawls has not succeeded

here.

perfec

tionist
mine.
peal

principle which clash with am not

trying,
the

as

Hare

and

any such considered convictions of Singer do, to challenge such an ap

to

considered convictions

for this
to
such

discussion,
considered

only remarking (accepting at least appeal) that in appealing legitimacy convictions, Rawls has not, as far as I can see,
; I
am of such an

given us grounds

for opting for justice

Rawls'

as

fairness

over

perfectionism.4

considered convictions, It may be the case that including most fixed considered convictions, differ rather radically from mine. If that is so, and if we are both rather representative of differ account is in deep trouble. ent groups of people, then Why

his

Rawls'

should we accept as normative

for humankind the

as

considered convic
Rawls'

tions

of

his

particular group?

If,

sidered convictions and mine are not

con hkely, very different, then Rawls is also more able

I think
to

in

deep trouble,

for he has
on

not

been

achieve a reflective equi

rational

librium between, in the case and,

the

one

hand,

principles,

beliefs,

the facts

on

the other,

our considered convictions which will

register against perfectionism and

for justice

as

fairness. In

either case

he has not shown why rational, informed, impartial men with a sense of justice (a moral understanding) should opt for his two principles
rather

than the traditional teleological

that the

principles of perfectionism.

Where
claim rion

we accept a moderate perfectionism and

do

not

insist

on

any

principle of perfection provides

the

sole ultimate crite

for

what we are

to

do, Rawls is particularly

we are of perfection

vulnerable.

Moderate
princi

perfectionists argue

that

to balance fundamental
and

moral prin

ciples,
ples of

including
justice,

the

principle

Rawls's two
we should

balance what he called prima facie duties, sometimes in favor of one shifting weighting of the principles and sometimes another. Through engaging in this activity, we come to appreciate in a particular circumstance what is suitable to the situation. The moderate perfectionist, hke a
much as

W. D. Ross

argued

that

pluralist such as

eralize

beyond this.

Ross, is contending that we cannot reasonably gen (Indeed, it seems to me that such a perfectionist
of

is

a rather

distinctive kind of pluralist.) Rawls tells us that so construed the principle justice. "Criteria
principles unsettled of
and

perfection,
are

as

dis

tinct from his principles,

social as political

will not provide us with a single standard of

excellence,"

he claims,
to

too "imprecise
questions

their

application

public

is

bound to be

idiosyncratic"

and

(p.

330).

Presumably, his

R. M. Hare,

"Rawls'
'

Theory of

Justice'

144-55; Peter
490-517.

Singer,

Sidgwick

and

Philosophical Quarterly Equilibrium," Reflective Monist

I,"

28 58

(1973) :

(1974) :

The Choice between Perfectionism

remarks about
and at

and

Rawlsian Contractarianism

137

ascertainability made two pages earlier this last remark, were meant as part of some narrower tradition and community of thought. The claim is that we can, using account, determine rather more exactly than can the perfectionist what we are to do. We know on ac count rather exactly when hberty or freedom can be restricted, name ly when it violates some obligation or natural duty or interferes with the basic hberties of others. And, as the least favored stratum can be identified by its index of primary goods, we can apply the difference principle fairly precisely, for we can ascertain in a rather straightfor ward manner "what things will advance the interests of the least fa (p. 320). Indeed, as Rawls recognizes, ethical principles are, as we have known at least since Aristotle, vague, but, he continues, "they are not
pubhc

their

least seemingly in

confhct with

Rawls'

Rawls'

voured"

all

vantage

equally imprecise, and the two principles of justice have an ad in the greater clarity of their demands and in what needs to
them"

be done to satisfy are less determinate:

over such matters

(p.

321).

with

them there is less

consensus model would not work

"we

are

likely

Perfectionist principles, he claims, general agreement. The nearly as well for perfectionism, for to be influenced by subtle aesthetic
of

preferences and personal

and

feehngs

propriety;

and

individual,

class

(p. 331). group differences are often sharp and Surely, if there actually is such a comparative non-vagueness, it counts in favor of the principles of justice as fairness over the princi Yet how decisive this is is far from evident. Mat feelings of propriety can, at least in theory, be ehminated. Moreover to take a distinct consideration perhaps the Rawlsian doctrine in counterdistinction to perfectionism does not
ple of perfectionism.

irreconcilable"

ters

such as personal

leave

enough scope

for

ideal-regarding
suffers

considerations?

In

defending

perfectionism one might argue against

Rawls,
a

has,
tues,

that

Rawls'

account
virtue of

from

Stuart Hampshire one-sided emphasis in ex

as

plaining "the
as social

justice,

and even more of planned

the

other essential vir

rational

consequences

cooperation

in

a rational

setting."5

Hampshire
or of

queries whether

this is the to

rriost

funda

mental role of

justice

morality,
...

and goes on what

claim

that "to

adopt

the

moral point of view

is to think
to

and aims men should

should lead."6

have,

or

try

have,

and what

kind of character kind of life they

is among other things, but still quite centrally, to have a conception, vague though it may be, "of the wholly admirable man, and of the entirely desirable and ad hfe."7 But this is or so it seems to commit oneself mirable way of To have
a moral point of view

Stuart Hampshire, "What Is the Just 18, No. 3 (1972). P- 38. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.
5

Society

?"

New York Review of Books

138

Interpretation

to

form

of perfectionism as a still more

fundamental feature
are

of mo

rahty than anything to which Rawls appeals. Rawls admits that such perfectionist conceptions

involved in

morality but denies that they are as fundamental as are his principles of justice in thinking about the necessary bases of rational cooperation for a well-ordered society. However, as Hampshire points out, where
such a postion

is taken, it is
to the
moderate

not obvious

how the issue

can

be

ration

ally

settled

as

comparative

arianism

and as

adequacy of Rawlsian contract perfectionism. Hampshire further remarks

as

plausibly,
escapable

Nowell-Smith has
moral
"evidence"

well, that this

indecisiveness is in

in

philosophy.8

But

Hampshire, admittedly indeci

the

sively,
ations

offers as
capable of

for

perfectionism

following

"consider
of

determining
the
ones

the to

intellect"

considerations

the

same order of rigor as

which

Rawls feels that he

can

legiti

mately
ments,

appeal

(p.

125).

The

"evidence"

of reflective moral opinions and respectively.

in question is from the history from the psychology of moral senti Hampshire is appealing to
cen

The kind
ters
around

of reflective moral opinion

the claim, reflected in the moral beliefs of many intelli that it is not the justice of the prevaihng practices and insti gentsia, tutions which are at the center of moral concern but a conception of
what

kind

of person

to become
people.

and of what

ally to

obtain

among

Such

an argument virtue of and

kind of relations are ide from the psychology justice is

of more

of moral sentiments stresses ciated with

that the
of guilt of

the

conceptions
of

innocence,
in

law

and

"asso due
and

procedures of

law,

separation,

impartiality
rational

judgment,"

is

less centrally On
society."9

associated
Rawls'

"with the

own positive account could and should of moral

distribution of goods in just the opposite is the case.

respond, particularly to the
although genetic a

To this I think Rawls

point about

the psychology
an

sentiments, that
of

ally

and

historically

speaking these ideas have had understanding the basis

refers

very

considerable

role and

indeed that

their the

origins should not

rational

be

lost,
of

yet when one reconstructs

foundation
adjudi out

morality, the conceptions Rawls

without

to

and utihzes are more cen a

tral, for

basis

of rational cooperation

basis for

cating conflicting claims, aims, grounds of human cooperation

and

interests

and

for setting

the
re

the

other moral

considerations

ferred to by Hampshire justice Hampshire talks

admirable

would

have

no point.

The

considerations of

about and the possibility of finding a truly way of life, a rational and thoroughly desirable life plan, are dependent for their very possibility on the considerations Rawls concerns himself with. Thus in that obvious way they are more funda-

Ibid.,

pp.

38-39.

See

also

P. H. Nowell-Smith, "A
Society?"

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3 (1973). 9 Hampshire, "What Is the Just

Theory

Justice?"

of

p. 39.

The Choice between Perfectionism

mental
not

and

Rawlsian Contractarianism

139
are
a

than the others;

i.e.,

the

others

depend

on

them. If

they

coherently
a

set out and

rationally justified,
here
which

the

rest would

be

shambles.

There is

lot

of metaphor

may

resist more

hteral

state

ment, but, that consideration aside, even if vide the base, it does not follow that the rest
portant.

Rawls'

considerations pro of

the

edifice

My

house

would not stand without

its

foundations,

is less im and it

be the house it is without its basement, but it by no means follows that my basement is the most important room in my house. considerations give us the Perhaps, as Hampshire points out, theory of the kind of social order a theory of just institutions which provides the machinery "that makes a desirable, natural and admirable way of hfe but from that it does not follow that
would not
Rawls'
possible,"

such

considerations,
are at

rather

than

considerations about what constitutes

the
the

most

truly desirable
the

way

of

hfe

with

its

concern
an

for ideals

of

perfection

core of moral

philosophy, i.e.

inquiry

into

reasonable

foundations
as

of morahty.

What
not yet as
of

we must recognize

settled,

from the above discussion is that we have Rawls thinks we have, the issue of whether justice
the
more adequate articulation
of

fairness

or perfectionism provides

the foundations

tice.10

Perhaps
all

we

morahty or even the foundations of social jus should say something eclectic such as this : neither
the
most central aspects of

gives

the

whole or even

the

picture of what

morahty is

about, but well,

both,

perhaps with conceptions

taken from

utilitarianism as

are essential and

tary in any
effect points
all of

more adequate account of

indeed essentially complemen morality. And perhaps this in

of plurahsm

to the superiority

these

elements and

encompassing eschewing anything like priority rules.

of some

form

to his guns and respond that in much of what I have mistakenly that the standard of perfection is a principle of justice; on the contrary, though it is a moral principle and a principle con cerning which moral arguments can be made, it is not a principle of justice. This perhaps is true, but even if it is true it would not touch the essentials of my argument. Rawls acknowledges that perfectionist principles are rational moral principles. The crucial question involved in the above argument is whether Rawls has shown that his principles, rather than the perfectionist principles, should be said to be the most basic elements of morality and which principles, where they conflict, should take pride of place. Rawls claims that the princi ples of justice as fairness should take pride of place. My argument has been that he has not established this essential point, and my argument would hold here even if (a) perfectionist principles are not principles of justice and (b) the moral terrain is so complex that we should not say that either form the most basic elements of morality but that they both are indispensable parts of the moral Ethics," terrain. See here Stephen Toulmin, "Is There a Fundamental Problem in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1955) : 1-19.
said

Rawls I have

might stick assumed

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social
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AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME 43
-

NUMBER 4 A Publication of the Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research

WINTER 1976

VICO AND CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

Griorgio

Tagliacozzo,

Guest Editor Michael Donald Developmental Universal

Mooney and Phillip Verene,

Associate Guest Editors

Psychology

and

Vico's Concept

of

History Psychology,
and and

Sheldon White
Human

Vico,
Vico

Developmental

Nature
and

Augusto Blasi
Piaget: Parallels
and the

Differences
of the

George Mora

Vico's Insight Stream Vico

of

Scientific Study

Consciousness

Jerome L. Singer Amedeo Giorgi Silvano Arieti

Psychology Vico and Modern Psychiatry Vico and the Methods of Study of Our Time General Education as Unity of Knowledge: A Theory Based on Vichian Principles Vico and the Future of Anthropology
and

Humanistic

Henry Perkinson
Giorgio Tagliacozzo
Sir Edmund Leach

The Theoretical

and

Practical Relevance

of

Vico's

Sociology for Today

Vico
and

Werner Stark Werner Cahnman

Historical
of

Sociology

On the Marx Vico

History

the Human Senses in Vico and

John O'Niell
and

Critical

Theory
and

Joseph Maier

"Natural

History"

Social Evolution:
e

Reflections

on

Vico's Corsi

Ricorsi

Fred R. Dallmayr

ON THE HEROIC MIND

by Giambattista Vico
Translated

by
and

Elizabeth Sewell
Critical Writings
on

Anthony C. Cirignano
Vico in English: A
Supplement

Molly Black Verene

Robert Paul

COMMENTS ON VICO DISCUSSIONS CONTRIBUTED BY: John Michael Krois Rollo May
Michael Littleford

Craig

Benjamin Nelson Talcott Parsons