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LARA vs. VALENCIA Facts: T h e d e c e a s e d w a s a n i n s p e c t o r o f t h e B u r e a u o f F o r e s t r y stationed in Davao.

The defendant is engaged in the business of exportinglogs from his lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said concessionupon instructions of his chief to classify the logs of defendant which wereabout to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. Lara boardedwith several others a pick-up bound for Davao and were seated at the backo n a n i m p r o v i s e d b e n c h . L a r a a c c i d e n t a l l y f e l l f r o m t h e p i c k - u p a n d a s a result he suffered serious injuries which lead to his death. Issue: W hether or not the respondent failed to exercise the ordinarydiligence required? Held: Yes. The owner and driver of a vehicle owes to accommodationpassengers or invited guests merely the duty to exercise reasonable care sothat they may be transported safely to their destination. Thus, "The rule ise s t a b l i s h e d b y w e i g h t o f a u t h o r i t y t h a t t h e o w n e r o r o p e r a t o r o f a n automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care inits operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury byincreasing the hazard of travel. The owner of the vehicle in the case at bar isonly required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to exerciseextraordinary diligence as required by our law.A passenger must observe the diligence of a father of a family to avoid injuryt o h i m s e l f w h i c h m e a n s t h a t i f t h e i n j u r y t o t h e p a s s e n g e r h a s b e e n proximately caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be held liable.

Mecenas v. CA Facts: Facts: M/T "Tacloban City," a barge-type oil tanker owned by thePhilippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and operated by the PNOC Shippingand Transport Corporation (PNOC Shipping), having unloaded its cargo, leftfor Negros Occidental when it collided with a carrier ship named Don Juan.

When the collision occurred, the sea was calm, the weather fair and visibilitygood. As a result of this collision, the M/V "Don Juan" sank and hundreds of itspassengers perished. Among the ill-fated passengers were the parents of petitioners, the spouses Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia Mecenas, whose bodieswere never found despite intensive search by petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the respondents were negligent? Held:

Yes, the behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance-playing mahjong "before and up to the time of collision constitutes behaviourthat is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whosehands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengershad been entrusted. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was "off-duty" or "on-duty" at or around the time of actual collision is quite immaterial; there is,both realistically speaking and in contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a common carrier uponwhom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence. The record shows that the "Don Juan" sank within ten (10) to fifteen (15)minutes after initial contact with the "Tacloban City. While the failure of Capt.Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew in the process of abandoningthe ship and his failure to avail of measures to prevent the too rapid sinkingof his vessel after collision, did not cause the collision by themselves, suchfailures doubtless contributed materially to the consequent loss of life and,moreover, were indicative of the kind and level of diligence exercised byCapt. Santisteban in respect of his vessel and his officers and men prior toactual contact between the two (2) vessels. The officer-on-watch in the "Don Juan" admitted that he had failed to inform Capt. Santisteban not only of the"imminent danger of collision" but even of "the actual collision itself " Thereis also evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more passengers than shehad been certified as allowed to carry.Under these circumstances, a presumption of gross negligence on the part of the vessel (her officers and crew) and of its ship-owner arises.

Mecenas vs. CA The behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance-playingmahjong "before and up to the time of collision constitutes behaviour that issimply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands thelives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers had beenentrusted. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was "off-duty" or "on-duty" at oraround the time of actual collision is quite immaterial; there is, bothrealistically speaking and in contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty"hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a common carrier upon whomthe law imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence. The record shows that the "Don Juan" sank within ten (10) to fifteen(15) minutes after initial contact with the "Tacloban City. While the failure of

Capt. Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew in the process of abandoning the ship and his failure to avail of measures to prevent the toorapid sinking of his vessel after collision, did

not cause the collision bythemselves, such failures doubtless contributed materially to the consequentloss of life and, moreover, were indicative of the kind and level of diligenceexercised by Capt. Santisteban in respect of his vessel and his officers andmen prior to actual contact between the two (2) vessels. The officer-on-watchin the "Don Juan" admitted that he had failed to inform Capt. Santisteban notonly of the "imminent danger of collision" but even of "the actual collisionitself " There is also evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying morepassen gers than she had been certified as allowed to carry.Under these circumstances, a presumption of gross negligence on thepart of the vessel (her officers and crew) and of its ship-owner arises.

Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towardsits passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should bereposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to theircommon safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with himanything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speakof his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to whicheach passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search,when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears toindicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may beverbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is notoutwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are alreadyin danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggestedby the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the passengerto submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already declaredthat the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.

Facts: A passenger boarded the respondents bus carrying a box which suchperson attested to the conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneousitems.Appellee, who was a passenger in appellant's Bus No. 120 then making a tripwithin the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as aconsequen ce of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in the box brought bythe copassenger. Issue: Did LTB Co. exercise the extraordinary diligence required? Held:

Yes, fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's dutytowards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that shouldbe reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard totheir common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take withhim anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not tospeak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy towhich each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusualsearch, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothingapp ears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquirymay be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when suchis not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries arealready in danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, assuggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling thepassenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger hadalready de clared that the box contained mere clothes and othermiscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionallyprotected domain.

BLTB & Armando Pon vs. IAC Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company & Armando Pon v. IAC, The Heirs of Paz Vda. De Pamfilo, The Heirs Of Norma Neri, and Baylon Sales And Nena Vda. De Rosales| Paras G.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988 FACTS A bus owned by petitioner BLTB and driven by petitioner Pon collided with a bus owned by Superlines, when the former tried to overtake a car just as the Superlines' Bus was coming from the opposite direction. The collision resulted in the death of Rosales, Pamfilo and Neri, as well as injuries to the wife of Rosales, and Sales. These people were passengers of the petitioner's bus. Rosales and Sales, as well as the surviving heirs of Pamfilo, Rosales and Neri instituted separate cases ih the CFI against BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers. Criminal cases against the drivers were also filed in a different CFI. CFI ruled that only BLTB and Pon should be liable, and they were ordered jointly and severally to pay damages. On appeal, the IAC affirmed the CFI's ruling. Petitioners contended that the CFI erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on culpa contractual, since if it were private respondents' intention to file an action based on culap contractual, they could have done so by merely impleading BLTB and Pon. Instead the respondents filed an action against all defendants based on culpa aquiliana or tort. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS WON erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on culpa contractual

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI IAC anchored its decision on both culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana The proximate cause of the death and injuries of the passengers was the negligence of the bus driver Pon, who recklessly overtook a car despite knowing that that the bend of highway he was negotiating on had a continuous yellow line signifying a no-overtaking zone. It is presumed that a a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In the instant case, the driver of the BLTB bus failed to act with diligence demanded by the circumstances. Pon should have remembered that when a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver has not the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car is approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. As to the liability of the petitioners, Pon is primarily liable for his negligence in driving recklessly the truck owned by BLTB. The liability of the BLTB itself is also primary, direct and immediate in view of the fact that the deat of or injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of its employee. The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based on its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination. They are presumed to have acted negligently unless they prove that they have observed extaordinary diligence. In the case at bar, the appellants acted negligently. BLTB is also solidarly liable with its driver even though the liability of the driver springs from quasi delict while that of the bus company from contract. PAL vs CA Sept 15,1993
Facts: Private respondent was among the 21 passengers of Flight 477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City. The routing of this flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato. The pilot received a radio message that Ozamiz airport was closed due to heavy rains and inclement weather and that he should proceed to Cotabato City instead. Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their options to return to Cebu on the same day and then to Ozamiz, or take the next flight to Cebu the following day, or remain at Cotabato and take the next available flight to Ozamiz City. Flight 560 bound for Manila would make a stop-over at Cebu to bring some of the diverted passengers; that there were only 6 seats available. Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not accommodated because he checked-in as passenger No. 9 on Flight 477. He was forced to stay at Cotabato City despite the local war between the military and the muslim rebels. He tried to ferry the Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel but said pick-up vehicle did not accommodate him. The personnel of PAL did not secure his accommodation in Cotabato City. He received a free ticket on a flight to Iligan, but chose to buy his own. He lost his personal belongings, including a camera.

Issue: 1. WON PAL can properly invoke the defense of fortuitous event of bad weather in Ozamiz to exempt itself from paying damages to the PR? NO 2. WON the exemplary damages was properly awarded by the appellate court? NO Held: 1.PAL remissed in its duty of extending utmost care to private respondent while being stranded in Cotabato City. PALs diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PALs contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carriers premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination. PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. Because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Since part of the failure to comply with the obligation of common carrier to deliver its passengers safely to their destination lay in the defendants failure to provide comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using extra-ordinary diligence, the cause of non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to fortuitous event, but due to something which defendant airline could have prevented, PAL becomes liable to plaintiff. 2.The award of moral damages was excessive and was reduced by the Court. There was no clear basis that PAL failed to entertain the plaintiff and answer its queries. In fact, the manager accommodated him in his office. Moral damages are not intended to enrich the private respondent. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action. The plaintiffs claim on loss of business opportunities was based only on pure speculation. It must depend on competent proof.

Abeto Vs Philippine Air Lines,Inc.July 30, 1982Relova, J. : ENTITIES INVOLVED:PAL carrier JUDGE QURICO ABATO passenger/deceased CONDRADA VDA. DE ABETO - plaintiff FACTS:

1.Judge Quirico Abato boarded the Philippine Airline' PI-C133 plane at the Mandurriao Airport, Iloilo City forManila 2. The plane did not reach its destination and there wasnews that the plane went missing.3. After 3 weeks, it was ascertained that the planecrashed at Mt. Baco, Province of Mindoro.4. All the passengers have been killed including JudgeQuirico Abeto5. Condrada Vda. de Abeto , the wife of the deceased,was appointed administratrix of the estate of JudgeAbeto.6. Condrada, together with her children filed acomplaint for damages against Philippine Airlines forthe death of Judge Abeto.7. Philippine Airlines, on the other hand, contends thatthe plane crash was das due to a fortuitous event.8. The trial court ruled in favor of Abeto and herchildren. DEFENSES: Plane Crash was beyond the control of the pilot. The plane was airworthy for the purpose of conveying passengers across the country as shownby the certificate of airworthiness issued by the CivilAeronautics Administration. There was navigational error but no negligence ormalfeasance on the part of the pilot. The plane had undergone pre-flight checks, thoroughchecks, terminating checks and after-maintenancechecks. The deviation from its prescribed route was due tobad weather condition. ISSUE: Is Philippine Airlines liable for violation of its contract of carriage? RULING: Yes The Civic Code, as the law governing the liability of common carriers, is clear and explicit: Art. 1773 - binds common carriers from the natureof their business and by reason of public policy toobserve extraordinary in vigilance for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to allthe circumstances of each case. Art. 1755

- a common carrier is required to carrythe passengers safely as far as human care andforesight can provide, using the utmost diligence of every cautious persons, with due regard for all thecircumstances. Art. 1756 - in case of death of or injuries topassengers, common carriers are presumed to havebeen at fault or to have acted negligently, unlessproved that they observed extra ordinary diligence. Art. 1757 - the responsibility of a common carrierfor the safety of passengers cannot be dispensedwith or lessened by stipulation, by posting of notices,by statements on tickets, or otherwise, PAL is liable for the death of Judge Abeto: The plane did not take the designated route whichwas Iloilo-RomblonManila or "Amber I", if it had taken this route, then the crash would have nothappened. This was even supported by the statements of Ramon Peroza (Administrative assistant of PhilippineAir Lines Inc.)and Cesar Mijares (Assistant Director of the Civil Aeronautics Administration) The weather during that time was clear and the pilotwas supposed to cross airway "Amber I"' instead hemade a straight flight to Manila in violation of airtraffic rules. Since theres no satisfactory explanation by PAL withregard to the accident, then the presumption is it is at fault.

LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, / G.R. No. 179446 / January 10, 2011
FACTS: The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822. On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date. Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the

services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City. The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Of the six (6) trucks route to Balagtas, Bulacan, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo. Later on, the said truck, was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount ofP1,903,335.39. After the investigation, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount ofP1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity. R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss." On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees against R&B Insurance. Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered that the appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters. Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the subject cargo. RULING: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. For as stated and well provided in the case of Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business. Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as

required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights. With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. For under ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse. Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing. For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable grounds. "Equity, which has been aptly described as a justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure." The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent. G.R. No. 179446 January 10, 2011LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCECORPORATION, Respondents. Facts

: On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favorof Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against AllRisks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey"from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date.Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn,engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport thecargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City. The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by itsemployed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6 )truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads forLawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbias warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks enroute to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck,loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but withoutthe copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim forinsurance indemnity in the amount ofP1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation andadjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount ofP1,896,789.62 as insur anceindemnity.

R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmastersand Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila ( RTC ), docketed as Civil CaseNo. 02-103040. It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the lossof the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of the consignee torecover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss." Issue : Whether or not Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers. Held : Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations,firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger orgoods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters

is a common carrier because it isengaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking service. It is acommon carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generallyundertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for thegeneral public. The distinction is significant in the sense that "the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations,not by the law on common carriers."In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum, it states that it "is a corporation duly organized andexisting under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and is engaged in the business of customs brokering." It cannot be considered otherwise because as held by this Co urtin Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., a customs broker isalso regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.
Baliwag Transit vs. CA (GR 116110, 15 May 1996) FACTS: On 31 July 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her 5-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver. At about 7:30 p.m., in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers saw a cargo truck, owned by A & J Trading, parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver, and his helper were then replacing a flat tire. Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiagos passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even carried animated conversations with his co-employees while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus passengers shouted Babangga tayo!. Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck killing him instantly and the trucks helper, and injury to several others among them herein respondents. Thus, a suit was filed against Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio Recontique for damages in the RTC of Bulacan. After trial, it found Baliwag Transit, Inc. liable for having failed to deliver Garcia and her son to their point of destination safely in violation of Garcias and Baliwag Transits contractual relation; and likewise found A & J and its truck driver liable for failure to provide its cargo truck with an early warning device in violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. All were ordered to pay solidarily the Garcia spouses.

On appeal, the CA modified the trial courts Decision by absolving A & J Trading from liability. ISSUE: Whether or not Baliwag should be held solely liable for the injuries. HELD: Yes. As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and sound. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willfull acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers do not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of their employees. Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code provides Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at the corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not welllighted or, is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at night at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered. x x x However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning device. This substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The law clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of the triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible 100 meters away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates. No negligence, therefore, may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique. The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV-31246) with the modification reducing the actual damages for hospitalization and medical fees to P5,017.74; without costs.

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