Heartland - 2006 01 The Atomic Rush

THE ATOMIC RUSH
1 •2006
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THE ATOMIC RUSH
THE ATOMIC RUSH

THE ATOMIC RUSH A GLANCE INTO PANDORA’S BOX
A GLANCE INTO PANDORA’S BOX by Rajesh M. BASRUR
Home to the “rising Asian powers”, South Asia also hosts the largest concentration of
existing nuclear-armed states as well as potential ones, in a context made unstable by
a shift in power structure, increasing nuclearization, ethnic strife and fast economic
growth. The India-Pakistan-China triangle. Interests and role of the United States.
I f South Asia today is not quite “the most
dangerous place in the world,” as US President Bill Clinton once famously described it,
its nuclear politics is certainly a critical issue in global politics. The subcontinent is
also a key emerging market for trade and investment. It represents a major part of
“rising Asia,” which consists of a surging China, the awakened elephant that is India,
and a Japan showing signs that it will inevitably recover and bloom again. Rising Asia
is also a region marked by the presence of the largest concentration of existing
nuclear-armed states – Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea – as
well as potential ones: Iran, a unified Korea, and Japan.1 In addition, the Asian
continent is rife with terrorist activity, a substantial portion of which is centred in
South Asia. The shifting power structure, the increasing nuclearization of the region,
the instabilities wrought by ethnic strife and terrorist violence, and the accelerating
pace of economic growth and exchange together make a complex picture of
simultaneous conflict and cooperation. Because the world is closely interconnected,
this complexity inevitably extends to the rest of the world and the nuclear politics of
the subcontinent has ramifications well beyond its immediate geography. Four of
South Asia’s relationships are particularly relevant to this politics: India-Pakistan,
China-South Asia, West Asia-South Asia, and United States-South Asia.
1. The India-Pakistan relationship, widely viewed with alarm following their

matching nuclear tests of 1998, follows a pattern common to nuclear rivalries before it.
The Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and the
hostile relationship between China and the Soviet Union were marked by power rivalry,
ideological differences, angry rhetoric, confrontation, crises, and eventually,
stabilization measures. Though there were armed hostilities, such as the shooting down
of American aircraft by Soviet forces in 1960 and 1962, and a series of clashes
between Chinese and Soviet troops in 1969, the rivals always stopped well short of
full-scale conventional war. Indeed, the imminent risk of such a war, which could
escalate into nuclear conflict, brought them to the negotiating table in efforts to
1
Though the Middle East is often treated as distinct from the continent, Asia here is viewed as
extending from what many in the region prefer to call “West Asia” to the Far East and Australasia.
3
manage their conflicts. The India-Pakistan relationship, marked by a bitter dispute over
Kashmir and a series of wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971, followed a similar course.
Confrontations and crises (1986-87, 1990) began with the covert nuclearization of both
in the 1980s and, after the 1998 tests, became intense (1999, 2001-02). After each
crisis came a period of negotiations and relative stability. The current composite
dialogue, which began in 2004, has been more wide-ranging and sustained than earlier
efforts, and includes a series of discussions that have brought agreement on nuclear
confidence building measures (CBMs). In August 2005, two CBMs were established:
the setting up of a hotline between the foreign secretaries of the two countries, and an
agreement to pre-notify each other of impending ballistic missile tests.
But there are important differences between the India-Pakistan relationship and the
other two mentioned above. First and most remarkable, despite the high levels of
tension between them, neither has sought to deploy its nuclear weapons. Available
evidence indicates that both have stored their nuclear weapons in unassembled
condition (as the United States did initially when it was the sole nuclear power).
Second, both believe that deterrence is already in place with a relatively small
arsenal, which inhibits runaway arms racing. Third, both have carried out just a
handful of tests and believe that credible deterrence does not require more. And fourth,
they have succeeded early in their nuclear-strategic relationship in nuclear stabilization
through CBMs. The process began when they signed an agreement not to attack each
other’s nuclear facilities in 1988, a decade before they officially went nuclear. Part of
the reason for this early start lies in their previous record of signing a range of
non-nuclear CBMs.2
Though India and Pakistan have been like other nuclear rivals in going through
cycles of crises and stabilization, they have been different in terms of crisis stability
because they have not come as close to nuclear conflict as the other pairs have. The
prospects for stabilization are also stronger than in the other two cases because of their
long and persistent history of negotiating stability-inducing measures. On the negative
side, their deep rift over the disputed territory of Kashmir and the related issue of
Pakistani support for terrorist groups operating in India remains, and has the potential
to engender more crises.3 The terrorists themselves constitute a wild card with the
potential to destabilize the India-Pakistan relationship, as they did when they attacked
the Indian Parliament in December 2001, an act which set in motion the crisis of
2001-02.
Ground for optimism exists, however, because the two countries appear to have
learned that crises do not bring benefits, but create fresh dangers. Another source of
optimism is the multilateral South Asian Free Trade Agreement (January 2006), to
which India and Pakistan have acceded, in response to the pressures of globalization
2 Michael KREPON, Khurshid KHOJA, Michael NEWBILL, and Jenny S. DREZIN, eds., A Handbook
of Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security, 3rd edn., (Washington, DC: Henry L.
Stimson Center, 1998), pp. 189-210.
3 On Pakistani backing of terrorists targeting India, see Peter CHALK, “Pakistan’s Role in the
Kashmir Insurgency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1, 2001, reproduced on the web site of
the RAND Corporation <http://www.rand.org/hot/op-eds/090101JIR.html>.
4
and the need for expanding markets. This may lead to greater convergence of interests
between India and Pakistan over time. India’s growing closeness to the United States,
cemented by their July 2005 agreement on nuclear cooperation and President Bush’s
successful visit to India in March 2006, also puts Pakistan under pressure to come to
terms with India. Nonetheless, the potential for instability remains. The key issue is
whether the India-Pakistan relationship can emulate the India-China one in setting
aside a contentious dispute in order to attain mutual benefit through economic
cooperation.
Finally, Pakistan has the potential to cause serious security problems with respect
to nuclear proliferation. It is known to have been a major conduit for a proliferation
ring extending from North Korea and China to Iran and Libya.4 Second, it is a hotbed
of “jihadi” activities that could destabilize the India-Pakistan relationship and generate
further crises between the nuclear rival. It is widely feared that Pakistani technology
and material could find its way into the hands of terrorist groups and enable them to
acquire a nuclear weapon or “dirty bomb” for use anywhere in the world. 5
Stabilization of India-Pakistan relations could go some way toward curbing this
potential.
2. Recognizing India’s emergence as a major economic and military power in the

making, Chinese leaders have sought to play a mixed game of cooperation and
containment with it. They have targeted India militarily with nuclear weapons, but at
the same time rapidly developed trade relations with it.6 Though China reacted angrily
to India’s citing it as a justification for the 1998 nuclear tests, trade between the two
countries expanded briskly in the same period, growing from $1.1 billion in 1995 to
nearly $3.5 billion in 2001.7 That figure leapt to $13.6 billion in 2004.8 China and
India have also made common cause on global trade negotiations and have made some
efforts to cooperate rather than compete with respect to their hunger for energy
resources.
But while there is now a basic stability in their relationship, there have been
differences as well, especially on nuclear issues. Over the past several decades, China
has developed a close strategic partnership with Pakistan with a view to containing
India. India has long worried about the transfer of Chinese missile and nuclear
4 Chaim BRAUN and Christopher S. CHYBA, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, 29, 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 5-49.
5 On Islamic militancy in Pakistan and the Pakistani state’s failure to control it, see S. V. R. NASR,
“The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulema in Society
and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies, 34, 1 (January 2000), pp. 139-180; and Unfulfilled Promises:
Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 73,
Islamabad & Brussels, January 16, 2004 http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2472&l=1
6 On the Chinese nuclear threat to India, see Ashley J. TELLIS, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture:
Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 59-67.
7 India, Ministry of External Affairs, “India-China Trade Statistics, Table 1: India-China Trade
(1995-2001)” www.meadev.nic.in/foreign/ind-china.htm
8 Howard W. FRENCH, “India and China Take on the World and Each Other,” New York Times,
November 8, 2005 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/business/worldbusiness/08infosys.html

5
technology to Pakistan.9 China has been wary of India’s nuclearization.10 But it has
refused to talk to India on nuclear issues, asserting that India should sign the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-weapons state. This position was restated in
the wake of the recent Indo-US nuclear agreement. So long as this continues, the
possibility of CBMs or more serious arms control between India and China is ruled out.
This in turn places limits on the extent to which India will be willing to negotiate
nuclear risk reduction with Pakistan. China may prevent the full realization of the
Indo-US nuclear agreement, assuming it clears the next hurdle when it comes before
the US Congress, by blocking a consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This will
bring fresh tensions between India and China, perhaps pushing India into a closer
defence relationship with the United States. On the other hand, if China acquiesces, the
nuclear deal will strengthen India’s hand and facilitate the stabilization of both the
India-China and India-Pakistan relationships.
3. West Asia is of course vital to South Asia’s energy needs. This aspect is entangled
with the nuclear politics of both regions. The potential for nuclear proliferation in West
Asia has negative implications for South Asia (and indeed the rest of the world) since
it may generate tensions in the region and possibly dislocate oil supplies. The
overthrow of Saddam Hussain averted one such eventuality. Iran’s nuclear
entrepreneurship has revived regional anxieties. The growing confrontation between
Iran and the United States has the potential to disrupt oil supplies and other east-west
trade in the Indian Ocean region.
Another problem arising out of the Iran-US confrontation is its possible fallout on
South Asia’s long-term energy arrangements. While both India and Pakistan have
affirmed their commitment to the planned Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, that project
could be scuttled if the situation worsens. Iran-India relations have become somewhat
tenuous after India voted against Iran in September 2005 on an International Atomic
Energy Agency resolution recommending that the Iran issue be referred to the Security
Council. Pakistan too appears to be hedging its bets, with President Musharraf stating
in January 2006 that he was open to changing his mind if Pakistan was adequately
compensated.11 President Bush has indicated that the United States may not oppose
the pipeline, but a serious US-Iran crisis would almost certainly be problematic.
The nuclear linkage between West and South Asia has other dimensions. In the
mid-1980s, Pakistan worried about the possibility of an Israeli-Indian preventive strike
on its fledgling nuclear establishment.12 After the terrorist attacks of September 2001,
there was again apprehension that Israel or the United States might intervene and take
control of Pakistani nuclear facilities. Though such fears have subsided, they remain
9 John W. GARVER, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle
and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 324-331.
10 Jing-dong YUAN, “India’s Rise after Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments,” Asian
Survey, 41, 6 (November-December 2000), pp. 978-1001.

11 “Musharraf Wants Incentive to Abandon Iran Gas Pipeline,” Daily Times, January 27, 2006
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\01\27\story_27-1-2006_pg1_2
12 Sumit GANGULY and Devin T. HAGERTY, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the
Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 44-67.
6
alive in Pakistani strategic consciousness. Pakistan has another problem. If Iran were
to go nuclear, it would be uncomfortably sandwiched between two nuclear powers. As
one senior Pakistani official told this author in an informal conversation in 2005,
Pakistan has had its share of tensions with Iran, and a nuclear Iran is not a prospect
that his country looks forward to.13
4. The United States has played an active role in South Asia’s nuclear politics.
India-Pakistan crises since the 1990s have invariably involved American efforts to
defuse tensions. Following the end of the Cold War, the US attempted to roll back
India’s nuclear program, assuming Pakistan would have to follow suit. But the strategy
failed, and instead contributed significantly to India’s decision to test in 1998.
Sanctions were then imposed on both India and Pakistan, but these were
withdrawn after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. President Bush has launched
a major effort to “de-hyphenate” India and Pakistan. The latter is important to the US
in its immediate quest to hunt down members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. But
stabilizing it is also a long-term concern. The United States sees Pakistan as a
proliferation-prone and risk-taking nuclear weapons power, a breeding ground for
Islamic terrorism, and, putting the two together, potentially a major source of
nuclear/radiological terrorism. Hence American interest in Pakistan, contrary to the
suspicions of many Pakistanis, is likely to be sustained even if its counter-terrorist
campaign there is successful.
With India, President Bush is clearly trying to build an alliance-like relationship.
His basic objective is to give the United States a strong position in a continent which
has the maximum potential in terms of both military (including nuclear) and economic
power. It would be simplistic to treat the Bush initiative only as a balancing strategy
against China, for the United States has extensive trade and investment relations with
that country. But given its uncertain relations with China, US policy certainly involves
hedging against the possibility that Sino-American relations will deteriorate. However,
the move to draw closer to India has more to it.
Though the United States and India too have their differences, there is a strong
convergence of basic interests on counter-terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation (aside
from the NPT problem), and general stability of global markets and societies. On
nuclear issues, President Bush is seeking a major restructuring of the global regime
against nuclear proliferation: a shift from the leaky, relatively mild, and formal
NPT-based system to a more proactive one based on the identification of nuclear
threats. This is part of a larger restructuring that encompasses abrogation of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the embrace of missile defence, and the intensification of
counter-proliferation efforts through projects like the Proliferation Security Initiative.
As a hegemonic power, the United States has an interest above all in maintaining
global stability. But it understands the limitations on the unilateral exercise of power in
a world characterized by increasing interdependence. The Indo-US deal should be seen
13 See also “Iran’s Nuclear Stand-off and Pakistan,” Editorial, Daily Times, March 10, 2006
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\03\10\story_10-3-2006_pg3_1
7
in this light as a major American effort to accommodate and ally with a like-minded,
liberal-democratic state with which its basic interests converge.
5. South Asia is in the throes of change. With India rising as a major regional power,
the gap between it and Pakistan is likely to widen, as many Pakistani commentators
are beginning to recognize. The Kashmir dispute and attendant tensions over terrorism
and nuclear weapons are not likely to disappear overnight, but they will gradually
diminish under the pressure of change. Nuclear tensions can still be triggered by
recurring crises, but experience has taught Indians and Pakistanis that there is nothing
to be gained and much to be lost by repeated confrontations which raise the risk of war.
The world remains one in which military power is a currency and nuclear power is
highly valued as the ultimate defender of national survival. Nations will continue to
seek nuclear power or seek to deny it to others. Over time, the tension between
interdependence, which breeds cooperation, and conflict is slowly but steadily shifting
in favour of the former. Nuclear weapons will be less and less meaningful in years to
come, but for the time being, the complex game of cooperation and conflict will
continue to be played in the ways outlined here.
8
THE ATOMIC RUSH GOOD BOMBS, BAD BOMBS
GOOD BOMBS
BAD BOMBS by Maurizio MARTELLINI and Andrea PLEBANI
The Indo-US nuclear agreement changes the rules of Asia’s atomic game. With this
deal the Bush administration introduces the distinction between tolerable and
non-tolerable nuclear powers. The consequences for the non-proliferation regime.
T he joint India-US statement of 18 July 2005
represents a dramatic turning point for the international nuclear non-proliferation

regime. In fact, the agreement announced by President Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh foresees a reprisal of the transfer of American civilian nuclear
technology to India. This marks a significant turn-about after twenty-five years of a
US policy of isolating nations, which have not signed the NPT, and preventing to give
assistance to them in the field of civilian use of atomic energy.
This article will outline the possible consequences of the agreement and
implications for the international political scenario and for our nation.
In the first section we will examine the reasons underlying the US administration’s
decision to alter its policy in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. We will then
analyse the internal and international obstacles which could prevent the US from
fulfilling the commitments undertaken on the 18 July 2005 and possible threats to
stability in Asia. In the final section we will outline the principal effects that this
agreement will have on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for Italy.
1. India was one of the first countries to start a nuclear cooperation programme with
the United States. Its decision not to sign the NPT and, above all, the first nuclear test
carried out in 1974, however, led to the American assistance programme being
interrupted and clearly revealed how the transfer of nuclear technology for civilian use
could be used for the production of atomic weapons.
The testing of the India nuclear warhead marked a reversal in American policy and
caused the US administration to adopt a series of measures, on both the internal and
international level 1 , to prevent such developments recurring in the future. The
American administration actively committed itself to creating a voluntary,
international regime for controlling the transfer of nuclear technology and “dual items”,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)2. This was to become the cornerstone of the new
1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

2 The member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group undertook, in particular, to institute
cooperation programmes countries that did not possess nuclear weapons only after these latter had
adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and had agreed to sign the international safeguard
9
non-proliferation system and the main forum used by the United States for intensifying
restrictions on technology transfer and isolating those states which decided not to sign
the NPT.
The India-US agreement, therefore, represents a radical change in American policy
regarding the non-proliferation regime and highlights the deep rifts undermining the
stability of a system whose reasoning and schematisation are now largely outdated.
Before examining the consequences of the 18 July agreement, however, we must
consider the real motives behind such a revolutionary change for the US
administration. Of fundamental importance here is the realisation that nuclear
proliferation is unavoidable. Although few states have succeeded in producing a
nuclear arsenal in the last fifty years, numerous analysts believe that the next few years
will see a second wave of countries acquiring such weapons. At the present time, the
international non-proliferation regime does not appear capable of limiting the
aspirations of these future nuclear powers, nor does it provide Washington with
adequate guarantees, as shown by the cases of Iran and North Korea.
American policy cannot, therefore, aim at maintaining the status quo but must
attempt to introduce a strategy for increasing cooperation to reduce nuclear
proliferation threats with those states considered capable of rising to nuclear regional
power and favouring also national interests.
This new approach to the subject of nuclear proliferation reveals an important
ideological change within the American establishment. The prospect of an increase in
the number of states possessing nuclear weapons no longer appears as a threat to be
avoided at all costs, and Kenneth Waltz’s theories are no longer considered taboo3.
This is not to say that the new direction of American policy is based on the
Nuclear Weapons Dissemination Theory, but indicates an understanding of a
continually evolving scenario in which we witness a progressive rise of those
protagonists intent on increasing their own status by the pursuit of a military nuclear
programme. Underlying the India-US agreement, in effect, there is the awareness that
America’s historical policy in the field of nuclear non-proliferation can no longer be
applied and must, therefore, be replaced by a selective approach which distinguishes
between “good” and “bad” proliferating states. This position reflects the Bush
administration’s deeply held convictions and emphasises once more its distrust of
international institutions and organisations.
The delicate nature of this subject and the far-reaching repercussions which any
decision in this regard could have on the international scenario require, however, that
the selection process is not dominated by a single protagonists – even if this is the
major world power – but is entrusted to the only international body that enjoys the
agreements to prevent the use of transferred technologies for purposes other than providing
nuclear energy for civilian use.
3 Waltz claims that the gradual proliferation of states possessing nuclear weapons could constitute
a stabilising factor for the international political scenario. The political price of an escalation in
crisis situations would, in effect, oblige the leading powers to exercise great caution so as to avoid a
nuclear conflict.
On this subject, see Scott SAGAN, Kenneth WALTZ: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate
Renewed, New York - London, 2002
10
required consensus and credibility to perform such an important task: the United
Nations Organisation. Furthermore, the distinction between “good” and “bad”
proliferating states cannot be fixed and unchanging, but must enable individual states
to regulate their position by means of precisely defined unambiguous mechanisms.
This selective approach to the question of non-proliferation also marks the end of
the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as we know it today. Such profound
changes offer the opportunity to reconsider the structural lines of the NPT and enter
into a wider debate on the best way of adapting its principles to the current
international scenario which, no longer dictated by Cold War logic, is characterised by
the presence of a single superpower and by the progressive rise of individual regional
protagonists capable of providing their own region with atomic “cover”. Given such
possible lines of development, it is to be hoped that the NPT should evolve on a
regional basis with a stronger Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) aspect so as to
favour a controlled growth of the nuclear proliferation process.
2. The India-US agreement not only casts grave doubts on the future of the
international non-proliferation regime, but also implies a serious revision of the policy
followed by these two states up until now. Under their commitments, in fact, India and
the United States are obliged to introduce a series of measures that will remove any
obstacles in the way of establishing nuclear cooperation. The US, in particular, finds
itself facing explicit obligations in both the internal and international fields.
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA), amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
(NNPA) of 1978, regulates US policy concerning the transfer of nuclear energy
technology to states that do not have safeguard agreements with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as in the case of “de facto” nuclear states which are
not members of the NPT4. The existence of international safeguard agreements and the
renunciation of an atomic arsenal are fundamental prerequisites for establishing a
rapport of assistance in the nuclear field and, therefore, pose serious problems for the
fulfilment of the obligations involved in the India-US agreement. India is not, in fact,
tied by any international safeguard agreements relating to its nuclear activity and is,
obviously, unwilling to give up its nuclear arsenal. This impasse can be overcome only
through the direct intervention of the US President, who may enter into agreements
that do not satisfy the conditions laid down in the AEA if he considers such
prerequisites may run counter to the aims of non-proliferation or represent a threat to
the nation. In this case, however, the agreement must be approved both by Congress
and by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission5.
It is, therefore, clear that it will be particularly difficult to implement the
commitments undertaken by the US administration on 18 July 2005 as obstacles exist
also on the international front. Over the years, the United States, as a member of the
4 The nations with nuclear deterrents which, to date, have not signed or have left the NPT are
India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.
5 On the procedures provided for under US legislation for stipulating assistance agreements in the
field of nuclear power, see Sharon SQUASSONI, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for
Congress – CRS Report for Congress, 29 July 2005
11
NSG, has committed itself to furnishing assistance in the nuclear field only to countries
which have signed international safeguard agreements regarding their own nuclear
programmes.
The lack of any such undertaking by India obliges the United States to intervene
directly within the NSG so as to obtain the consensus required for implementing the 18
July declaration. The Indian case, however, risks turning into a dangerous precedent
that could impel various countries to review their commitments in relation to the NSG
and, thus, create a deep rift in the international non-proliferation regime, to which the
Nuclear Suppliers Group is fundamental.
To prevent India-US cooperation from marking the start of an irresistible
disintegration of the non-proliferation regime it is essential that India agrees to
introduce a series of measures aimed at providing this initiative with the greatest
support possible. In particular, the Indian government should:
- declare an end to all activities relating to the production of fissile material.
- promise not to conduct further atomic tests.
- strengthen controls over the exportation of technologies relating to the use of
nuclear energy.
The renewal of Indian-US collaboration – whilst sanctioning India’s entry into the
international non-proliferation regime – represents a possible source of destabilisation
for the international political scenario and, in particular, for the delicate equilibrium of
South Asia. The agreement lays the foundations for a net increase in India’s capacity
and risks widening the military gap with Islamabad, thus further worsening relations
between the two countries which, at the present time, is not to be tolerated. Given the
US administration’s refusal to offer a pact to Pakistan along the lines of this renewed
cooperation with India, it is vital for Delhi to introduce a series of measures aimed at
preventing the potential escalation of strategic asymmetries and to push for Nuclear
Confidence Building Measures similar to that created formerly between the Soviet
Union and the United States.
3. The India-US agreement of 18 July 2005 in effect marks the entrance of India as a
nuclear power into the international non-proliferation regime. Such recognition,
however, also delineates a variety of potentially destabilising scenarios and lays the
foundation for a rigorous review of the international non-proliferation system. The
renewal of cooperation with Delhi effectively runs counter to NPT guidelines which
sanction the principle that only those states which renounce the use of nuclear energy
for military purposes and agree to introduce international safeguard agreements with
the IAEA may enjoy the advantages deriving from cooperation in the field of civilian
nuclear power.
The supposedly “special” nature of the Indian case is not adequate to ensure that
other, similar situations do not occur in the future. Thus a highly destabilising
precedent is created, the repercussions from which could radically alter the very
structure of the NPT.
The possible consequences for the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the 18 July
12
agreement depend largely on the measures which India and the United States decide to
adopt within the context of the non-proliferation regime, but also raise a number of
questions that risk undermining the fundamental stability of the entire Treaty:
1) The US initiative risks having a direct impact on current negotiations with Iran and
North Korea, which could use the agreement between Washington and Delhi to
their own advantage and openly condemn the American modus operandi, which is
quite clearly biased and changes according to which country is concerned.
2) The slackening of international restrictions in the face of cooperation agreements in
the field of civilian atomic energy power could lead other nuclear powers –and, in
particular, China and Russia- to sign similar agreements with countries they
consider to be of significant strategic interest for them.
3) Developments in the Indian case could cause non-nuclear weapon NPT countries to
feel that the benefits of adhering to the Treaty have been notably reduced by the
India-US agreements and, hence, to reconsider their positions. States which had
previously acquired a nuclear arsenal and then decided to abandon such
programmes for the benefits deriving from the NPT, could re-examine their
decisions.
This last point is of particular relevance for the European scenario since it raises
once again the question of an effective European nuclear deterrent umbrella. This issue
is a serious one for the entire continent: appealing to the doctrine of deterrence
guaranteed by NATO is not a credible solution, especially in a context such as today’s,
characterised by the possibility of asymmetrical conflicts. The nuclear arsenals of
France and Great Britain could guarantee adequate cover, but there remains the
unknown factor of Paris and London’s effective willingness to place, at the disposition
of Europe, a strategic instrument that is so costly to maintain and of a geopolitical
stance.
In the “corridors” of certain European nations, therefore, the validity of adhering
to the NPT as members not possessing nuclear weapons has once more been brought
into question.
This debate is of immediate interest to our country. Without getting to the point of
developing an Italian nuclear deterrent, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that, in
the future, the international system will undoubtedly be characterised by a
dissymmetry between nations possessing nuclear weapons and those which do not, and
between countries capable of independently producing their own nuclear fuel and that
banned to do that.
Furthermore, future scenarios of energy security could lead Italy to reconsider its
position regarding the use of civilian nuclear energy, especially considering its lack of
domestic sources of hydrocarbons and the political price of depending on supplies
from the Middle East. Any choice in this sense would, however, only be considered if
a universal market for low enriched uranium, or the possibility of producing it
autonomously, were guaranteed.
13
Italy is, therefore, directly affected by the consequences of the India-US agreement,
since its will have notable repercussions on the NPT. The Italian position in relation to
the agreement between Washington and Delhi must, therefore, be based on strategic
considerations and not on abstract concepts. Italy should lend its support to the
agreement only if this does not drastically change the NPT and, in particular, the
inalienable right sanctioned in Article IV, which guarantees non-nuclear weapon states
adherents to the Treaty access to civilian nuclear technology (including enrichment
and reprocessing) for the production and independent use of nuclear fuel.
The interpretation of the NPT in the 21st century must, therefore, tend towards greater
pragmatism in relation to the nuclear states which, although not having signed the
Treaty, have a proven history of non-proliferation. This, however, on the condition that
they agree to respect the limitations observed by the nuclear members of the NPT and
that this new approach does not lead to regional strategic destabilization or ulterior
discrimination (with regard to access to, develop and use of nuclear technologies)
against the non-nuclear weapon signatory nations. Should such consequences be
unavoidable, then it will be necessary to develop and introduce a series of corrective
measures that enable the NPT, revised in the light of the “exceptional” nature of the
Indian case and similar future cases, to guarantee adequate benefits and “prizes” for
its non-nuclear weapon members.
14
THE ATOMIC RUSH UP (PAKISTANI) PATRIOTS, TO ARMS!
UP (PAKISTANI) PATRIOTS
TO ARMS! by Naeem SALIK
India’s growing nuclear capacity, coupled with the new Indo-US nuclear agreement
and its dowry of dual atomic technology for Deli, raises dramatic concerns in an
increasing alarmed Pakistan. While Islamabad takes its countermeasures, a worried
China observes.
1. A debate has been raging in South Asia and
within the US itself about the ramifications of the Indo-US nuclear deal since it was
first inked on July 18, 2005. It picked up a renewed momentum on the eve of President
Bush’s visit to South Asia, at the beginning of this month. In India, the dissenting
voices came mainly from BJP, the leftist parties and the scientific lobby. Even the
Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Anil Kakodkar jumped into the
fray, making public his opposition to placing the ‘Fast Breeder Reactors’ under
safeguards.1 This was something unusual given the strict political controls over the
civilian as well as military bureaucracies in India but more surprising was the fact that
he got away with it. In hindsight it appears that this statement was deliberately
orchestrated to strengthen India’s negotiating position in the face of ‘US pressure’ for
the inclusion of Breeder Reactors in the civilian list. In the event, the US side in its
indecent haste to sign the agreement during the Presidential visit readily agreed to
keep both the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor out of
the list of safeguarded facilities.2
Prior to the Bush visit Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a detailed statement
in the Parliament on 27th of February, reassuring the MPs that India’s strategic
interests will not be compromised in any way. While in the US the administration was
dismissive of the concerns expressed by the non-proliferation lobby arguing that we
are just trying to help India generate more nuclear power to meet its growing energy
needs and this will in no way augment India’s military nuclear capability. President
Bush himself argued that India’s ability to generate more nuclear power will reduce its
dependence on imported oil, thereby reducing the demand and lowering the prices of
petroleum world wide.3 In Pakistan, understandably, the official reaction has generally
been to play down the impact of the deal. However, Pakistan’s plea for a similar
1 Nuclear Deal with US could compromise India’s interests, The Daily Times, February 9, 2006.
2 Elisabeth BUMILIER and Somini SENGUPTA, US and India Reach Agreement on Nuclear
Cooperation, The New York Times, March 2, 2006.
3 President Addresses Asia Society, Discusses India and Pakistan, Office of the Press Secretary,
White House, February 22, 2006.

15
treatment had no takers in the Bush entourage, was a lost cause from the beginning and
only served to embarrass Pakistan further. Before getting into a discussion of the
political and diplomatic implications, and the blatant violation of the NPT through this
deal, I would focus on the technical aspects of the deal and try to highlight relevant
statistics to put it in the proper perspective.
2. The US officials have repeatedly claimed that the deal will in fact strengthen the
non-proliferation regime rather than weakening it by bringing 14 out of its 22 Indian
reactors under IAEA safeguards, which is a blatant attempt at misleading the public
opinion. The fact of the matter is that 6 of these reactors are already under safeguards
and India would actually place only 8 new reactors under safeguards. The following
statistics would hopefully help in separating fact from fiction:
• India has at the moment 16 operational nuclear power plants with a total installed
capacity of 3750 MWs. These include 2 US supplied Boiling Water Reactors at
Tarapur which run on Low Enriched Uranium. These reactors are already
safeguarded.
• The remaining reactors are Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors, commonly known as
the CANDU type reactors. Out of these 2 reactors RAPS-1 & 2, supplied by Canada,
are safeguarded.
• Currently, 6 nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 3340 MWs are under
construction. Five of these would be coming on line in 2007 and one in 2008. These
include two Pressurised Water Reactors of 1000 MW each, supplied by Russia and
safeguarded. Another 4 plants are planned to be operational between 2007-2011,
with a combined capacity of 1440 MWs.
• Currently nuclear power constitutes less than 3 percent of India’s total energy output.
79% is thermal (mainly coal fired) and 20% is hydel power.
• With the completion of under construction and planned power plants the total output
of nuclear energy would rise to 8530 MWs by 2011, which at best would constitute
around 5-6 percent of India’s total electricity production considering the fact that
other means of energy production would also be growing.
• India plans to have 20,000 MWs of nuclear energy capacity by 2020 and long term
projections suggest that nuclear power would constitute 20% of India’s total power
production by 2050. [By then the ME oil wells would have dried up].
• India’s domestic Uranium reserves are estimated to be about 78,000 tons barely
sufficient to support production of 10000 MWs of nuclear power capacity. While,
the capacity for Uranium mining and processing is little more than 300 tons annually,
which can hardly feed the existing power plants and CIRUS and Dhruva reactors. It
is apparent that India doesn’t have enough Uranium to support both its expanding
nuclear energy program as well as its ambitious nuclear weapons program.
• Access to imported fuel for nuclear power plants would free up India’s domestic
uranium resources for military purposes. In case India leaves out one of its 220 MW
CANDU reactor from the civilian list its fissile material production will be more than
doubled.
16
• Currently India has two dedicated facilities for production of fissile material i.e. 40
MW CIRUS reactor functional since 1960 and 100 MW Dhruva which became
operational in 1985. According to my estimation India has a stockpile of 775 kgs of
plutonium, enough for 130-155 weapons depending on the design of its nuclear
warheads.
• Out of this inventory 450 kgs have been produced by CIRUS, which was supplied by
Canada and US for peaceful purposes. Plutonium produced by this reactor was used
in 1974 test.
• In his statement in the Indian Parliament on 7th of March, PM Manmohan Singh
explaining the nuclear deal announced that India would shut down Dhruva in 2010,
rather than placing it under safeguards for national security reasons. This would
mean that India would be able to extract another 50 Kgs of Plutonium from Cirus (its
annual production assuming 70% efficiency is approximately 10 kgs). Once this
plant is shut down no questions are likely to be raised about the 500 kgs of
Plutonium that it would have yielded by then, which has been diverted for weapons
purposes in violation of the agreement under which this reactor was supplied only for
peaceful purposes. In any case this 50 years old reactor would be due for dismantling
by 2010.4
The details of the agreement reached at New Delhi have not been made public yet,
except that India will complete the separation of civilian and military facilities by 2014.
Now the onus is squarely on the US to steer the deal through the US Congress and the
NSG. It has also taken upon itself to help India get a safeguards agreement of its
choice from the IAEA. India has been given a certificate of good conduct, despite a
damning report recently released by ISIS, 5 highlighting India’s indiscretions and
inappropriate procurement practices especially related to its Gas Centrifuge
Enrichment Program. The report has cited numerous occasions where export controls
of various supplier countries were circumvented by importing equipment and materials
of direct relevance to the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment program under the garb of dual
use items. In some instances information about the designs and technical specifications
of various sensitive components were provided to the manufacturers resulting in the
leakage of technology.
The Indians are also alleged to have used some persons reportedly part of the AQ
Khan network to procure certain items of equipment.6 Strange though it may appear
the story has neither been taken up by the US media nor has the US Administration
4 David ALBRIGHT and Susan BASU, Separating Indian Military and Civilian Nuclear Facilities,
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Washington, D.C. December 19, 2005. Also
see Prime Minister’s Suo Motu Statement on Discussions on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation
with the US: Implementation of India’s Separation Plan, The Hindu, New Delhi, March 7, 2006.
Authors own calculation of India’s Plutonium Inventory based on the production by CIRUS and
Dhruva Reactors assuming a 70% capacity utilization.
5 David ALBRIGHT and Susan BASU, India’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Stopping Illicit
Procurement and the Leakage of Technical Centrifuge Know how, ISIS, Washington, D.C. March
10, 2006.
6 Ibid.
17
taken any notice of it. The officials continue to praise India’s ‘unblemished’ and
‘clean’ record on proliferation, despite the well known fact that India had violated its
agreement with Canada and the US in 1974 by using plutonium produced by the
CIRUS reactor, which had been given to India for peaceful purposes, for its first
nuclear test. In not too distant a past the dossier issued by the British government on
Iraq’s WMD programs had named an Indian company, NEC limited, for supplying
chemicals for Iraq’s chemical and missile programs. Two Indian nuclear scientists, Mr
Y. R.S. Prasad and Mr Surinder Chaudhry, were placed in 2004, on the US Federal list
for working in Iran to assist the Iranian nuclear program.
3. The deal is a clear violation of the Article – I obligation of the NPT7 under which
all the nuclear weapon states have committed not to assist any other country directly or
indirectly in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In this case, as pointed out earlier,
the deal will free up India’s domestic Uranium resources for weapons production by
assuring it of guaranteed supply of imported fuel from US and its allies for its civilian
power reactors. It has also allowed India to keep eight civilian power reactors out of
safeguards which, if dedicated to the production of fissile material instead of
electricity generation, would multiply India’s weapons grade materials production by
at least 4-5 times.
Secondly, the deal is also in contravention to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
guidelines which call upon the member states not to export any nuclear materials or
technology to any country which does not accept full scope IAEA safeguards on all its
nuclear activities8. It would be of interest to note here that NSG in fact was created to
control the proliferation of nuclear technology as a result of India’s nuclear test in
1974. Thirdly, it sets a dangerous precedent for others to follow. In fact, it has
encouraged Russia to supply 60 tons of Low Enriched Uranium Fuel to India ignoring
opposition by the NSG members and even the US protests. France has already signed a
memorandum of understanding for nuclear cooperation with India and it is expected
that China will now expand its civilian nuclear technology cooperation with Pakistan.
Other suppliers are likely to follow the American lead. Australia has already been
approached by India for the purchase of Australian Uranium. The process of
disintegration of the NSG has in effect already started.
Then is the question of the legal and moral grounds for opposing Iran’s nuclear
program, a country which is signatory to NPT and has signed even the IAEA’s
additional protocol besides the normal safeguards agreement, whereas a country which
possesses nuclear weapons and has neither signed the NPT nor accepted the full scope
safeguards is being rewarded. The deal would, therefore, weaken the case against Iran
and North Korea and encourage other would be proliferators.9
Battle lines are already drawn in Washington between the non-proliferationists and
the administration supported by the powerful Indian lobby and the large Indian caucus
7 http://www.armscontrol.org/treaties
8 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG.asp
9 J. CIRINCIONE, Nuclear Cave In, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.
cfm?fa=view&id=18082
18
in the US Congress. In the next few weeks the struggle will move to Capitol Hill,
where the administration has already introduced a Bill to amend existing American
laws to allow India specific exemptions. The administration is also making strenuous
efforts to convince the Congressmen of the virtues of this deal. Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice herself wrote an article in the Washington Post in which she argued
that the deal would expand the reach of non-proliferation and stated that India plans to
import 8 new power reactors by 2012, if America gets orders for even two of these it
would mean thousands of new jobs for the Americans.10
In an unusual statement the Department of Defense has also praised the deal and
has hinted that it would lead to greater defense cooperation with India, including the
sale of big ticket items such as aircraft and naval vessels.11 The big US Defense
manufacturers are already eyeing lucrative arms deals with India worth billions of
dollars. This is an argument many Congressmen –who would like new jobs to be
created in their constituency— would find irresistible in a mid term election year.
Robert Kagan, a senior analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
wrote in an op-ed article in the Washington Post that the benefits of an improved
strategic relationship with India are more valuable than the NPT.12
4. At a regional level, Pakistan is dismayed at this preferential treatment to India13

and as the perception grows about India’s acquisition of the ability to substantially
enlarge its nuclear arsenal as a result of the deal, it would be under great pressure to
respond by reviewing its Minimum Deterrence levels and increase the size of its own
nuclear arsenal. This would indeed be an undesirable development and would have
serious repercussions for the stability of an already fragile nuclear balance in South
Asia. On the other hand, since the most enthusiastic supporters of the deal in the US
argue that this would help build India as a strategic counter weight to a rising China,14
it would also have negative consequences for the India-China relations and thus
destabilize the whole region in and around South Asia.
At the end of the day it is evident that commercial interests take precedence over
all moral and legal arguments in favour of non-proliferation and other such lofty ideals.
It also highlights the fact that in the international relations the major powers do not
feel shy of applying double standards and use the rules of the game selectively to suit
their own self interests. It is quite likely that the biggest beneficiaries of the India-US
Nuclear Deal would not be the Americans but the French and the Russians, who would
soon make a bee line in New Delhi to sell their nuclear hardware and earn billions of
dollars in profits. In this kind of an environment of moral bankruptcy and utter greed
who cares about abstractions such as non-proliferation?
10 Condoleeza RICE, Our Opportunity with India, The Washington Post, March 13, 2006.
11 Steven R. WEISMAN, Dissenting on Atomic Deal, The New York Times, March 3, 2006.
12 Robert KAGAN, India is not a Precedent, The Washington Post, March 12, 2006.
13 Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, March 17, 2006.
14 WEISMAN, op.cit.
19
THE ATOMIC RUSH FRIENDS BY NECESSITY
FRIENDS BY NECESSITY by Talat MASOOD
The Indo-US 10 year defense agreement awakens Pakistan’s worst ghosts. Confronted
with a nuclear-armed India with the blessing of the United States, Islamabad must bet
on its geo-strategic importance, its nuclear capability and pivotal role in the war on
terror. But, most of all, it must increase its cooperation with China.
1. I ndia and the United States are supposed to
be natural allies, but India’s Nehruvian philosophy of non-alignment and its aspirations
to play a global role in exploiting the capitalist and communist blocks during the Cold
War, kept them apart. After the break up of the Soviet Union, that barrier was removed
and India and the United States started moving closer to each other. It was only after
the nuclear tests of May 1998 that this process met a temporary setback. But it did not
take long for the relationship to revive and in hindsight it seems that nuclear testing
was seized by Washington and New Delhi as an opportunity to optimize their
relationship and the several round of Singh Talbot talks provided that platform.
The visit of president Clinton to India in 1999 was a first manifestation of this
emerging partnership in the post-nuclear South Asia. The lifting of sanctions and
increased military to military cooperation, joint counter terrorist operations and
establishment of several committees to identify areas of mutual interest followed the
president’s visit. In Jan 2004, the US administration and Vajpayee government
announced further steps in Strategic Partner Initiative, which included cooperation on
missile defense, lifting ban on civilian space program and technology transfer from the
Unite States.
The Indo-US 10 year defense agreement and enhanced Indo-US cooperation “in the
areas of civil nuclear, civil space and high technology commerce” brings about a
qualitative change in their relationship with serious implications at the regional and
global level. These agreements will give India access to strategic weapon systems and
critical technologies provide opportunities for co-production and collaborative
research and development, including close collaboration in missile defense. It will also
foster greater intelligence sharing as well as increased trade in arms.
Although the nuclear and space cooperation is in civilian areas, India would fully
exploit the dual nature of these technologies for military advantage as has been the
case in the past. The nuclear deal combined with the defense and space cooperation
and the whole range of agreements —public health, agriculture, trade, investment and
non-nuclear energy— has catalyzed the best relations between the two countries since
independence in 1947.
In bringing the two countries close, expatriates, think–tanks, defense industrial
complex and US and Indian conglomerates have played a significant role in an
20
orchestrated and well-coordinated fashion.

US seems committed to assist India in transforming it into a world power as a
partner, on the lines of Japan, or even more, with the expectation that it will
compliment its efforts in the quest of shaping the world and particularly Asia to
advance its global designs.
The major purpose of President Bush’s recent visit to South Asia was to take its
relationship with India another leap forward toward strategic partnership.
According to American administration India’s energy needs are mounting as her
economy grows at a fast pace. At the same time India being non- signatory to the NPT
cannot have access to nuclear plants, nuclear fuel and technology. During Mr.
Manmohan Singh’s last visit to Washington in December 2005, the US agreed to give
India more or less the same privileges that are enjoyed only by the signatories of the
NPT. The other important feature of this agreement has been that the US perpetually
committed itself to supply nuclear fuel to India for its civilian nuclear plants, on the
grounds of India’s lack of Uranium. India on the other hand has to separate its nuclear
facilities into civilian and military and the former will come under IAEA safeguards.
During President Bush’ visit to India the two governments reached an agreement
according to which, over several years up to 2014, India will put 14 of its 22 nuclear
reactors under IAEA safeguards, but its two fast breeder reactors will be excluded
from the civilian category and not fall under the safeguards regime. According to the
US ambassador in Pakistan, 67% of the Indian production facilities will come under
IAEA safeguards as opposed to the present 11%. But it is evident that India is seeking
access to imported fuel for nuclear power plants in order to utilize its domestic
uranium resources for military purposes.
The US administration is working hard with the Congress to change US laws to
get this agreement approved by the Congress. It is believed that a stand-alone bill will
be negotiated with the Congress to expedite the legal process. The amount of effort
being put in by the US administration to convince key members of the Congress and
the strong corporate and other interests that are in play, it is most likely that the
legislation will get through in its entirety or with a few riders. It would be relatively
more difficult for the US to get its international partners in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) to alter their rules for India. The approving statement of the IAEA
Director, Mr. El Baradie, about the US – India nuclear deal was most disappointing
and intriguing.
The non-proliferation lobby in the US has however has become very active and is
opposing the deal.
2. There are serious implications of this deal in the global and regional context. The
US strategic objectives of moving its relations with India at such an elevated plane
appear to have three main objectives. US expects that India will collaborate with it in
dealing with a strategic challenge from China, notwithstanding that both governments
deny that Beijing is a factor in their calculations, but it cannot be denied that both
consider China as a potential rival and wary of its growing strength. Currently there is
huge trade deficit between US and China that has become a source of friction and US
21
support to Taiwan agitates Beijing. Despite these undercurrents, neither country can
afford to have bad relations with China. India has joined the Shanghai Initiative and
the trade between them is growing fast and already reached 30 billion dollars. And
United States cooperates with China on a vast range of issues. Nonetheless, China
would have to watch closely the rise of military and economic power of India in
addition to keeping its sights focused on the US.
United States also considers India as a partner in the fight against radical Islam.
India’s own Muslim population is considered a model of moderation and a robust
participant in the democratic evolution of India as opposed to the dictatorial and
autocratic regimes of the Muslim world.
India’s growing economy and emergence of a sizeable middle class of nearly two
million people is another major factor that is drawing the two countries together.
The Indo-US nuclear deal is heavily tilted in India’s favor. Deli was already a
de-facto nuclear military power and now it is being brought closer to becoming a de
jure nuclear weapons state. India will be able to get rid of all the sanctions that have
been in force since the Pokhran test of 1974 and will have access to high technology in
critical civil nuclear, space and defense and also to acquisition of latest weapons and
equipment from the US. India will be allowed to have access to modern weapon
systems and technology. It may also become a conduit of out sourcing for Indian
defense industries in low and medium technology items. United States has also invited
India in the ITER initiative on fusion energy as an important further step towards the
goal of full energy cooperation.
Hawks in India are especially pleased that they have been able to keep the fast
breeder program out of the safeguards regime.
Additionally, India’s agenda by entering into these agreements is to change its
standing in the world. The Indians want to acquire a position once held by the Soviets,
in which no major global decision is taken without their approval. Indian aspiration is
to get away from the orbit of South Asia where it is tied inextricably to Pakistan and
Kashmir.
In return for all these advantages U.S. would expect access to Indian military
capabilities. According to a respected think tank in America, “India can take on more
responsibility for low end operations in Asia, which will allow the U.S. to concentrate
its resources on high-end fighting missions”. Nonetheless, New Delhi wouldn’t like to
give the impression that it has not compromised its foreign policy or has become too
dependent on Washington. It will play the balancing act of emerging as an independent
power and yet be a U.S. strategic ally.
Despite the congruence of vital national interests between the two countries, India
would not get everything it wants from the U.S. This was manifest in Washington’s
opposition to India’ bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC, taking the plea that U.N.
reform should take priority, yet it was clearly backing Japan. Nonetheless, it is very
much possible that U.S. may support that India (and China) are brought in the G-8
grouping in the near future. It would be, however, imprudent to expect that New Delhi
will be dictated by Washington or do its bidding unless there is a total convergence of
interest. It is a different matter that it has tactically yielded to the US on the Iran
22
nuclear issue by voting once in favor of referring the matter to the IAEA Board and
then to the UNSC.
The nuclear deal virtually grants India the status of the sixth nuclear power. It
raises India’s credibility at the expense of undermining the NPT and the statutes of the
NSG.
In principle, it would become difficult for the US to deny similar concessions to
Pakistan –although for a while it could take cover under the A.Q. Khan episode.
President Bush made the point that India and Pakistan have a “different history”. It
was a loaded connotation. He was referring to AQ Khan, and much more, a different
history as related to democracy, in terms of extremism and freedom struggle or
militancy whatever you may call it. Pakistan’s proximity to China is also a factor for
the US to deny civil nuclear technology. Besides, the United States has very cleverly
used Pakistan’s current domestic difficulties and the war on terror to de-link its
policies in South Asia. Pakistan is considered both an important ally in the war on
terrorism and a battleground against terrorists. This illustrates the various
contradictions and causes of mistrust in their relationship.
The new alignment in US policy represents a highly discriminatory and tectonic
shift in the South Asian security paradigm. India and Israel have got away with their
nuclear weapons program and acquired respectability but left Pakistan in a strategic
limbo. The implications for Pakistan are therefore serious. It will further increase the
existing imbalance of power between India and Pakistan, which as it is was heavily
tilted in India’s favor giving rise to insecurities in Pakistan. It is likely to trigger a
trilateral arms race between India and Pakistan and between India and China. Beijing
would be especially concerned if the Ballistic Missile Defense agreement between US
and India were actualized. Cooperation in space and missile defense and sale of
sensitive military technologies will weaken Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence and
conventional capabilities. It would also erode and weaken Pakistan’s nuclear
deterrence both with India and with the United States.
A more appropriate approach to meet India’s and other countries growing
economic needs would have been to set up an international consortium of nuclear
energy assistance under strict IAEA safeguards and develop technologies through
international effort of production of civil nuclear energy that is non-convertible or
useable for military purposes.
3. What then are the options for Pakistan in the current emerging scenario? Despite
the Indo-U.S. alignment, Pakistan must continue to foster close and friendly relations
with the U.S. and expand them in areas of overlapping vital national interests. These
include fighting global and regional terrorism and enhancing military cooperation
including co-production of military hardware. Developing close economic and trade
links and easier access to U.S. markets. Seeking support in strengthening education
and our technological infrastructure. Having good relations with the U.S. in a unipolar
world is by itself a positive factor in international relations.
At the same time Pakistan should broaden its options by fostering closer relations
with China and European countries and opening up to Russia, as there are no
23
inhibitions or limitations of the Cold War. As excellent relations already exist with
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, Pakistan needs to build greater economic,
trade and cultural links and seek ways of cooperation in defense. Islamabad should
smoothen the tensions with Iran and Afghanistan, strengthen economic, political and
cultural ties and overcome past suspicions so that a new era of relationship based on
mutual trust and respect can be built. Similarly, ties with Afghanistan must be
deepened and their concerns, whether real or perceived, should be removed through
intense engagement at all levels. These two countries need Pakistan as much as
Pakistan needs them.
Meanwhile, despite these adverse developments and misgivings generated by
India’s military build-up, Pakistan and India are likely to continue supporting the
peace process and move toward normalization of relations as both countries are aware
that war is no more an option. The US having such close relations with both countries
should assist in finding a solution of the Kashmir dispute. Resolution of the conflict
will allow India and Pakistan to harness their energies into development, poverty
alleviation and building their societies on a stable and solid foundation.
For its energy requirements Pakistan must continue cooperation with China in civil
nuclear technology and further strengthen its indigenous capability in this area. It may
increase its industrial capacity of Uranium enrichment. China has already installed a
nuclear plant of 325 megawatt at Chasma, and is installing another plant of same
capacity. Two additional plants of 600 megawatt are planned for the future: aim is to
lift the nuclear energy capacity to 8800 megawatts.
Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance, its significant position among Muslim nations,
its nuclear capability and pivotal role in the war on terror, if accompanied by domestic
stability and economic development can counter the negative fall out of the growing
imbalance and promote regional stability.
24
THE ATOMIC RUSH
HEARTLAND PLUS
THE ATOMIC RUSH HISTORY’S REVENGE
HISTORY’S REVENGE by Lucio CARACCIOLO
The founders of the post-war European project believed they could erase history, and
in doing so, create a new Europe without geopolitics. Today’s Europeans are now
wrestling with the consequences of that belief. A survey of the regions. Conflicting
ambitions and goals, both within and beyond the continent.
1. E urope had to abolish history. Now history
has abolished Europe. It has swept away Europeanism. Jean Monnet, one of its fathers,
summarized it thusly: “Europe has never existed. Now it is a matter of truly creating
it.” Over half a century has passed, but his utopia remains just that. A world ever more
full of competitors still lacks a European subject. The Chinese superstar darkens the
prospect of a new American century, while ambitious regional powers—from India to
Brazil to South Africa—are growing. A multipolar world looms, without our pole.
The European Union exists, of course. But who could mistake it for a global player?
How can we pretend that it speaks “with a single voice” (Euro-jargon)? Nature teaches
that such an end requires a single body—which the EU is not nor wants to become. To
give itself an identity, any organism needs to mark its boundaries with respect to what
lies beyond it; an exercise which the Europeanists have always avoided. Today it
consists of 25 countries, in the next decade it could host over thirty under its tent,
including Balkans and Turks. Nor can we rule out that the Swiss, Icelanders or
Norwegians—but also Ukrainians, North Africans and Israelis—will one day join our
plethoric community. Contrary to the slogan in vogue during the Nineties, “deepening”
and “enlargement” are not parallel processes, but mutually exclusive. Any trace of the
first objective has been lost, while in fifteen years our club has more than doubled its
members.
Why does Europe not exist? At bottom it is a sin of intellectual arrogance.
Europeanism of the post-war variety was an ideology. As such it imagined that history
had an end: united Europe. Not in the imperial sense of Charlemagne or Napoleon, of
Hitler or Stalin. It was not a matter of integrating a continent around a nation or worse
a superior race. On the contrary, it sought to pacify a tormented region of the “needless
slaughter” of the first half of the twentieth century, freeing it from the aggressive
nationalisms to come to an accord based on common interests, values and institutions.
Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, De Gasperi and their followers did not deceive
themselves that European minds were ready for a similar evolution. For this, they bet
on the economy. Progressive economic integration—from an area of free trade to the
single market and currency—would plow the furrow from which one day European
politics would inevitably spring to life. A deliberately vague concept, both in the noun
(which Europe, within which borders?) and the adjective (what type of union:
26
federation, confederation, some ingenious hybrid?).

In the Europeanist dream it is the voyage not the destination that counts. The
tracks of history will take it upon themselves to direct us sooner or later—every
utopian idea abstracts from time and other miseries of human finitude—towards the
destination. Europeanism thus ends up surrogating Europe rather than making it.
It is too easy however to reduce everything to an excess of abstraction or
paternalism on the part of an elite curiously attracted to paramarxist economics. The
objective was not reached above all because it was improbable. The modern idea of
Europe which began to crystallize in the eighteenth century (Voltaire, Rousseau) in
fact became a program at a time of great weakness and disunion of our continent: after
two world wars, and more concretely after the failure of Hitlerian “Europeanism,”
based on the extermination of the Jews and on the dominion of the German race over
the rest of the continent, reduced to a colony of the Reich. The European ideal that
blossomed in the Cold War did not have to crown a victory, but mitigate a horrible
defeat. It could not united the European powers which only a few years before seemed
masters of the world, configuring almost a “global Europe.” It was a matter of
blending impotence and frustration, in the hope that out of tragedy would come the
urgency of embracing the enemy of yesterday and the day before.
It was the illusion of the “zero hour”; from the suicide of the old Europe, the sense
of shared destiny must rise. The death of national egoisms. The birth of a higher
common interest. And so began the interminable dispute over the European identity,
almost as if the continental civil war (1914-45) were a parenthesis in the great march
of the spirit of Europe. In the conviction of the superiority of European values, of the
peculiar liberal and democratic vocation of our people. A rather paradoxical hypothesis
for an area from which authoritarianism and totalitarianism had so recently sprung,
carried along by popular enthusiasm.
And in fact history was not annulled.
2. If we examine the material constitution of our continent in depth, it is not difficult

to recognize certain long-term signs. History returns, almost to make up for the
excesses of the grand ideological projects of the twentieth century, Europeanism
included. A perhaps ineluctable effect of the fall of the Soviet empire, German
reunification and the consequent “people’s spring” (if the Germanic nation could be
rejoined, why not all the rest?). Then, after the burst of ’89, came the festival of the
principal of self-determination, applied with devastating results in the Balkans.
Oppressed communities or supposed nations mobilized in the name of peoples’ right to
choose their own destiny. While nostalgia ruled and they claimed rights historically
denied, they often cultivated more prosaically economic interests. The result: beneath
the crust of national and supranational institutions, we discovered ancient geopolitical
structures. Some rose to the surface.
Here is Hapsburg Middle Europe, reconstructed around the Austro-Hungarian
nucleus. A whole that at the beginning of the last century gathered 51 million
inhabitants, about ten “historical nations” and more than twenty ethnic groups under
the imperial crown. And which today is rediscovering common traditions and interests,
27
publicly celebrated in the joint sessions of the Austrian and Magyar parliaments.
Beyond that is the Baltic macroregion, from Kiel to Danzig and Saint Petersburg,
from Copenhagen to Stockholm and Helsinki. An all-too-closed northern
Mediterranean, obliged to link up with the surrounding areas, as well as the Adriatic,
in search of new commercial outlets. In the heart of this borderline between Berlin and
Moscow, historical associations—like the Polish-Lithuanian one—form, nurtured by
Russophobia. They are attempting to dig a new anti-Russian trench on the eastern
borders of the European Union. pushing it as close as possible to Moscow. For
example, the Polish-Lithuanian management of the crisis that erupted a year ago in the
“orange” Ukraine, almost a model of the uncertain strip of frontier between the whole
Atlantic community and the vestige of Russian power, from the Baltic to the Black
Sea.
Another case study of a past that does not want to pass, is Spain’s Atlantic
projection. Zapatero looks to Ibero-America and creates his niche there as a medium
world power, favored by the anti-American turn of what was once Washington’s house
garden. A parallel is Great Britain’s Atlanticism, which instead aims north, expressing
its aim of alliance with the United States. And permanent distance from the Old
Continent.
History’s call not only reproduces geopolitical representations considered defunct,
but strains new axes, conceived to cancel out the past in the name of Europe. Such is
the case of the so-called “center of gravity” of the European Union, based around
France and Germany. The profound crisis of French identity and Berlin’s return to
neo-Bismarckian geopolitics, demands a rethinking of the Franco-German hypothesis.
So while Paris imagines an advance guard of six (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
Spain and Poland)—Nicholas Sarkozy’s warhorse—Angela Merkel does not want to
hear talk of Euronuclei. And while repairing the breach with Washington, she emerges
as the protectress of the EU’s little countries, which is to say the new members of the
club: Moscow’s former satellites, including the relatively big Poland. But Berlin’s
embrace doesn’t exclude the Balkans and potentially Ukraine, Moldova and
Byelorussia (the leader of the opposition to the Minsk regime, Alyaksandr Milinkevich,
was surprisingly received by Merkel).
Hence the tired Franco-German couple is no longer the motor much less the
steering wheel of a community too heterogeneous to respond to the commands of the
two major continental powers, moved by increasingly less convergent interests.
The geopolitical earthquake of the post-’89 era does not operate only in the
relations between states, but also within them. Regions and territories are
rediscovering roots and particular interests. From Scotland to Corsica, from the
Basque country to Catalonia, sincere independentist goals and instrumental uses of
national to divert or conserve material resources combine. Many have no intention of
integrating with the state, much less the wider community. The reform of the Catalan
statute is a good example. Barcelona wants to consolidate its unique identity, but
above all to reinforce its fiscal health. The balance between politics and economy can
easily end up beyond one’s control. Drained of sovereignty from above (EU) and
below (regions and territories), the nation-state loses itself, until it creates a gap of
28
legitimacy that is not easy to close, because cannot be replaced with a collection of
regions or a pallid superstructure. And since democracy without a state has yet to be
invented, this geopolitical blur could be reflected in the character of our institutions.
3. In the larger and poorer (the average per capita income of the twenty-five-nation
EU is 13% less than that of the fifteen ) “Greater Europe”, Delorsian federalism
(which distributes more money those with less, in order to build a true and proper
European economic policy) is on the decline. Nation and regional chauvinism prevails
over community solidarity. The old members of the club do not desire to finance the
enlargement. Rather, they aim to renationalize regional politics, designed to draw
poorer territories (eastern) close to richer ones (western). The standard-bearer of this
“sacred egoism” is Great Britain. A strategy profiled in detail during the negotiations
in the last European summit (December 15-17, 2005). According to Blair, if little
money remains in Brussels and agreeing on its equal distribution is impossible, the
individual governments may as well manage their own respective regional policies.
Also this avoids the paradox by which the majority of funds remains in the hands of
the old Fifteen, which have more territory, more citizens and greater capacity to
co-finance with national resources. To push the new contributors to help the new Ten,
London would have held back its money. Only France’s opposition, which maintains a
tight fist on its Common Agricultural Policy, has for now blocked the British project.
Germany intervened ably in the quarrel, earmarking 100 million euros to Poland to
smooth over the conflict. And to clear mark Berlin and not London as the grand
protector of Middle Europe.
In the well-off parts of Europe, some regions rebel against the costs of
enlargement and are demanding the funds from the state that they no longer receive on
account of Brussels. In Germany, the conflict between state and regions splits the
country in two. On one side, the easterners expect to claim 4 billion euros from Berlin,
which Brussels has taken from them for the 2007-2013 budged. But the rich western
Germans don’t want to deal with it. Instead, they rally around the minister-president of
Lower Saxonym Christian Wulff, who would like to extend the national solidarity fund
to all territories in need, whether East or West. Bavaria, the state-within-a-state plays
the part of magnanimous mediator.
4. The return of history and national-regional egoisms is an alarm signal for Italy.
The erosion of state sovereignty is not equal for all. It strikes weaker states foremost,
Italy in particular.
We were taught for half a century to believe in the necessary coming of a united
Europe that would sublimate our nation-state’s deficit of legitimacy and efficiency. We
deceived ourselves that for our partners, Italy was a naturally European country. And
that the status of founding country automatically accorded us special rights. It is no
longer thus. At least since the European Union embarked on the course of expansion
toward the Northeast, attracted by the void left by a Russia in retreat. For the large part
of new members we are more an anomaly than a resource. And perhaps we were for
the founders as well. But they could not allow that to slip out in times of Cold War and
29
stringent Euro-Atlantic solidarity.

Today Italy is a country without allies. We are not involved in any of the growing
macroregional conglomerations. Also because historically we have never been a part
of them. It is instructive in this regard to study the maps of the proto-federalist
Europeans. Like the New Europe of Bernard Norman (1943), where the continental
mosaic is entirely composed of federal units, with the unique exception of Italy.
Almost as if it were (is) impossible to connect the peninsula to any European subset.
Worse: if it doesn’t help to connect ourselves to the heart of the continent, history
nonetheless continues to dig inside our country. It is perhaps excessive to worry over
some “independentist” flare-up in certain regions that tend to consider themselves
nations within a (non)nation. Sicily, Sardinia, Veneto. Certainly the Padania project
(making northern Italy an autonomous country) is a pipedream. If anything, it provides
ammunition to the claims of linguistic minorities, which most Italians don’t even
realize exist, but are officially protected by the Republic (law 482, December 15, 1999,
relating to the Albanian, Catalan, German, Greek, Slovak and Croat populations, and
those speaking French, Franco-Provencal, Friuliano, Ladin, Occitan and Sardinian).
The fact is that some of these don’t consider themselves linguistic minorities, but
national ones; citizens of the Italian state, but also part of other nations. In today’s
self-service Europe, where everyone feels free to value his own “historical rights”, we
would do well not to lose sight of them.
5. This continent, heavy with small and large sub-Europes but without Europe, is an
unknown quantity. The decomposition of the community fabric and the disaffection of
Europeans—only half of which consider membership in the EU “a good thing,” this
being the ultimate Eurobarometer—has surpassed even the intentions of the British
and Americans. The great sponsors of enlargement and thus of dilution may be pleased
to have defused the risk of a power-Europe. But an area so fragmented and unstable
could in the end create more problems than it solves. A common whole that is hardly
useful to we Italians, and to whoever is aware without some form of European
subjectivity, the economic and geopolitical decline of the continent is inevitable. And it
may produce explosive combinations, especially in more fragile and disoriented
societies.
Hence we watch what remains of the larger construct from our own point of view,
not from on high in some improbable European heaven. Let us seek to induce a
possible Europe, close to our interests; not to deduce an impossible one like that
imagined by the first Europeanists and the last functionalists.
We could then enumerate a twofold objective.
On the continental scale, it is necessary to reduce geopolitical complexity: 45
states (including the European parts of Russia and Kazakhstan) in 10 million square
kilometers—without counting the territories aspiring to statehood or
semi-independence, like Kosovo and Transnistria—over a hundred regions and
territorial entities with political and fiscal ambitions are not easily brought to a some
common denominator. Reducing complexity is in fact imperative. Not to weld together
incompatible entities, but so that intra-communitary borders become bridges, not
30
barriers. There is nothing scandalous, then, in the recovering of old ties between the
ex-Hapsburg countries or between the Baltic ones, provided that they are not hostile to
their neighbors. From some of these processes of sub-European integration, real
institutional structures could mature, which do not exclude participation in the looser
space of the European Union, but rather contribute to rationalizing it.
On the scale of the areas closest to our peninsula, from central Western Europe to
the Balkans to the Mediterranean—there is only one urgency: to reconnect ourselves.
Leaving (self)isolation behind, following old and new paths of exchange, opening
ourselves to the people and cultures that surround us, and of which we have often lost
awareness. We can not disregard the Mediterranean area that our Nordic partners
ignore, or cut it off with an improbable barrier against migratory pressures from the
south. The tragic crisis stirred up by the Danish cartoons of Mohammed—which
confirms how different the perceptions of the Islamic galaxy are in Europe—bring
home to us the implicit demands of our history and geography. Italy has a
Mediterranean responsibility, even towards the rest of the continent.
Nor can we delude ourselves over “being in Europe” and reduce ourselves to a
secondary track of east-west traffic, which is rapidly supplanting us beyond the Alps.
Instead of oscillating between impotent “patriotic” indignation and eager
subordination to the northern European nucleus, let us see if and how to connect to it,
bending it at last in part to our interests. We might then discover we matter much more
than we thought. And we would contribute to reversing the drift of the Old Continent,
which some imagined to be written in the stars. One does not abolish history. But still
less can one eliminate the future.
31
THE ATOMIC RUSH FOREVER ANGLOSPHERE
FOREVER ANGLOSPHERE by Robert FOX
Blair’s era, started with the promise of a renewed British activism in Europe, leaves
behind it an Atlantic bond stronger than ever. Between the UK-US long-standing
special relationship and a Europe in full identity crisis, the choice is quite an easy one.
1. T ony Blair is on the last lap of his race as
prime minister. In Downing Street they talk of him being ‘demob happy’ the term of
old soldiers facing demobilisation and retirement. Challenged at his monthly press
briefing about Russian accusations about British spies using cameras and recorders
concealed in a fake rock, he seemed almost to laugh the problem away. “Of course I
have heard about such things,” he said with his broad cartoon animal grin, “but I could
not possibly comment.”
He lays down on his opinions and ideas on crucial domestic policies, schools,
hospitals, juvenile crime, with complete insouciance. On the new terrorism laws and
plans for selection on intelligence for schools, he has used the same mantra. Twice he
has told the world press that he thinks it is better to be right and be defeated than win
through with the wrong policies. It as is he is saying to himself and world that he will
be moving out of Downing Street soon, and be moving on to new pastures – and new
opportunities, in particular the lucrative lecture circuit across the Atlantic.
So it is with foreign adventures for British interests, and armies. He is now to send
over 4,000 British troops to Afghanistan, to take over command of the international
forces, ISAF, to ease the load there from the Americans, and extend Nato’s difficult
war against a resurgent Taliban in the southern provinces. British advisers are
dismayed at the reaction from the prime minister’s office to their warning of operation
in such dangerous terrain, where there are no roads, helicopters are frequently
grounded, and the guerrillas know every millimetre of rock, cave and mountain. “He
just doesn’t seem to be too bothered,” said one adviser. “It’s as if he is saying I won’t
be in charge for most of the time the British force is out there. I’m off.”
So where is the great vision of the new Europe and Britain’s role in it Tony Blair
announced to the European Parliament just six months ago when the United Kingdom
took over the presidency of the Council of Ministers. This was to be his legacy,
repositioning Britain in the world, and in particular in its relationship between America
and the European Union. What has happened to that vision raises big questions about
Britain, EU Europe, Nato and their relationship to the United States.
2. At the beginning of the British semester at the helm of the Council of Ministers,
Tony Blair gave the air of being Europe’s Harry Potter, the boy wizard who had the
magic formula to right the EU’s wrongs and set it on a new course. He hinted that
32
Britain would work to a new geometry of alliances, through eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean countries, gently putting aside the old Franco-German core of the EU,
the heart of Donald Rumsfeld’s “old Europe.” The of the French and Dutch voters to
endorse the new EU constitution in their referendums appeared to give him the
opportunity to push his new vision forward.
“The issue is not between a ‘free market’ Europe and a social Europe, between
those who want to retreat to a common market and those who believe in Europe as a
political project,” he declared.1[1] Even his critics, and those bitterly opposed to Blair
and Britain’s stance on the conflict in Iraq, agreed it was a good speech and a great
performance. He invited the members of the parliament and their national governments
to sing on to a new agenda, engineering a new social model to alleviate unemployment;
to draw up a budget appropriate to the changed circumstances and the times, in
particularly for a reduction of the funds devoted to the Common Agricultural Policy; to
aid education; to fight terrorism and transnational crime; to support a new common
defence and foreign policy. “It sounded great,” says Peter Riddell of the London Times,
author of a new popular biography of the prime minister, of whom he is a mild admirer.
“The trouble is that all sounded fine at the time, and then he seemed to do absolutely
nothing to follow it up.”
The Blair programme for the sis month’s presidency had a twin track approach – to
reform the budget, the social model and above all the CAP (Common Agricultural
Policy) on the inside, and looking outward was the need to encourage the new eastern
European partners with budgetary help and firmly set on course the negotiations to
bring Turkey in as a member within a reasonable time span. In addition Blair wanted,
and still wants, Britain’s plans to build third generation nuclear power plants to be
endorsed as part of a wider EU plan to go nuclear. Almost each part of this programme
has caused controversy – to put it mildly. It is still hard to say what the Blair European
legacy is, and where exactly his vision diverges from that of other British prime
ministers. Like so much of the Blair regime the European policy behaves like the
Cheshire cat in ‘Alice in Wonderland’, disappearing before your eyes until all that is
left is the grin.
For all the fine words that brought the applause even of the sceptics in the
European parliament in June, very little appeared to have been done by the British
presidency when it came to give an audit to the parliament again last October. The
agenda was much the same as before in June, though in a different order. There was to
be work on the social chapter to bring down unemployment, to improve
competitiveness especially through better universities and technical education, to
establish new energy distribution in Europe. The budget had to be fixed and the issues
of globalisation addressed. “Again it was a good speech,” says Peter Riddell of the
Times who has called his book “The unfulfilled prime minister, “but again there was
remarkably little follow-up.” By this time, however, Blair knew he had a fight on his
hands over the budget, and over plans to redraw the Common Agricultural Policy. By
October Tony Blair knew he was heading for a showdown as surely as Gary Cooper
1
Tony Blair Speech to the European Parliament 23 June 2005.
33
did in ‘High Noon.’

Blair, as even his critics would allow, had good reason to be distracted from his
European duties. In July he was to host the G8 summit at Gleneagles, where with the
backing of former rock start Bob Geldorf he launched the ‘Live 8’ ‘make poverty
history programme’ aimed particularly at the poorest nations of Africa and South East
Asia. The morning of the first full session, 7th July, four suicide bombers blew
themselves up on the underground railway and a bus in central London killing 50 people
and injuring some 700. It was the attack that Blair and his government had feared for so
long – and at least three similar bombing operations had been thwarted in the previous
eighteen months. Only two weeks later to the day four more would-be suicide bombers
attempted to blow themselves up on the London Underground. Their devices failed to
detonate and the bombers fled – and most prime suspects appear to have been arrested.
Though the bombs did not go off, and the only victim was an innocent Brazilian shot
dead by the police, the second bombing attempt had almost as much psychological
effect on the people of London as the first according to health workers.2
The response by Tony Blair to the attacks was calm and assured. He made a
statement as soon as he knew what had happened and flew from the G8 conference in
Scotland to London. He and his government knew very soon that the bombers were
British citizens, and most born and educated in England. Though the message was the
one of global jihad most of the recruiting and training had been carried out on the home
soil of Yorkshire. As sure as his touch was at first, ironically Tony Blair’s government
received its first major defeat in parliament in eight years when it tried to pass a law
allowing police to detain terrorism suspects for up to 90 days without formal indictment.
3. However, like the elephant in the front parlour, there is one big obstacle for the Blair
vision of Britain and the new Europe, and that his relationship with President George W
Bush and the war in Iraq. Peter Riddell says that stems from the advice President Clinton
gave on leaving office to his friend Tony Blair. He told him he should get as close to the
new president, George Bush, as much as he possibly could. It is advice Tony Blair has
followed assiduously and willingly. To take Britain to war in Iraq was his choice, and
despite the unprecedented sight of three million marching on the streets of Britain in
protest on February 15th 2003, it was a choice he took willingly. Blair believed that
Saddam was a menace to world peace with his arsenal of exotic weapons and had to be
removed, and he believed this as surely as Cato’s belief that Carthage must be destroyed.
The anticipatory war, the war of choice, was in the Blair political lexicon before it was in
the Bush national Security Strategy.3 The firmness with which he has continued to
support this policy has even caused some questioning of the British posture on Iraq by
close European allies to UK such as Portugal, Poland and even Berlusconi’s Italy. For
them the Iraq commitment looks ominously open-ended despite London and
2
Reported by staff of University College Hospital to a Royal United Services Conference October 2005, London.
3
Blair’s ideas on the new wars of ‘humanitarian intervention’ were first made public in his speech to the Chicago
Economic Club during the Kosovo crisis in late April 1999. n many ways it foreshadowed the Bush National
Security Strategy published in early 2002.
34
Washington’s pledges to reduce the number of their troops in Iraq later in the year of
2006.
Britain’s stance on Iraq has caused some serious questioning of plans to develop the
Common Foreign and Security Policy with a rapid deployment force of up to 60,000
personnel for every task but high intensity warfare ready for action by 2008/9. To the
chagrin of the Bush administration, Britain’s posture over operations in Afghanistan as
well as Iraq is now causing strain between European allies in Nato as well as the EU.
Britain’s plan to undertake major counter insurgency operations in southern Afghanistan
when it takes over full command of the ISAF international force in Afghanistan in May
2006 has brought a powerful negative reaction from nearly all its European allies. This
could be the most serious consequence of all for Blair’s policies towards Europe.
Britain had originally planned to go on the offensive against a resurgent Taliban in
Helmand province from next May Britain had planned fielding a battlegroup task force
of around 2,000 consisting of paratroopers, Apache helicopters, and support
helicopters – a necessity because of an almost total lack of roads in the region. The task
group was to have the backing and flank support of a large battalion group of Dutch
troops in the neighbouring province; and the Dutch were to help with the logistics and
supplies. After a reconnaissance party had reported on the dangers of the terrain and
mission the coalition government of Jan Peter Balkenende in the Hague decided that
parliament must decide whether to send the troops and what the terms of the mission
would be. The coalition did suggest, however, that it would prefer the troops not to be
involved in offensive operations under the Nato flag, and commanded by the British.
From their different perspectives both the Washington and London administrations have
voiced concerns that this questioned the viability of Nato as a viable alliance for any
serious mobilisation and operation outside Europe or even around its fringes – the places
where their forces are most likely to be needed most.
Dutch parliamentarians have told lobby correspondents that the generals are
reluctant to send their soldiers on such a dangerous mission. They say the generals
believe they could face another ‘Srebrenica’ , referring to the way lightly armed Dutch
UN soldiers were unable to defend the Bosnian Muslim enclave of Srebrenica against
a Bosnian Serb army in July 1995, which led subsequently to up to 7,000 Bosnian males
being massacred in cold blood. The military has said that is the politicians are showing
most reluctance; and the divided Balkenende coalition is saying it would prefer its
troops to be sent on a peace and reconstruction mission under the EU and not Nato flag.
At the same time the German command has expressed reluctance to commit to offensive
operations against the Taliban and Portugal has declined to send its forces.
While the reaction from the US has been at high volume, with Paul Bremer, former
representative in Iraq threatening Dutch trade relations with the US, it is the reaction
in Britain that could be of greatest consequence. Senior military advisers and
commanders under Tony Blair have warned that it is time for Britain to review its main
commitment to Nato ground forces, the head quarters and command of the Allied Rapid
Reaction Corps (ARRC) based at Rheindalen, the only international corps formation in
Nato capable of high intensity operations. The command and HQ is 80% British and the
main formation under command is the 1st UK Armoured Division. It is also supposed to
35
crime a US Corps, now largely ‘hollowed out’ with many of its units actually back in the
USA, an Italian division which is in reserve and ‘on call’, and a Dutch-German division
that hardly exists even on paper. One of Britain’s most experienced serving generals,
and a former commander of the Rapid Reaction Corps, has openly declared that Britain
should withdraw its support in personnel, money and equipment from the ARRC as it is
a virtually useless luxury. This would save a large slice of the British Army’s operational
budget. The Uk should pick and choose its allies on an ad hoc basis for each operation,
and most of any use, including those in Europe might come from outside Nato. Australia
is being asked to fill the gaps for Afghanistan left by the reluctant Dutch.
A British withdrawal from the Rapid Reaction Corps would throw a huge question
mark over the corps itself and with it the value of the alliance of anything above a
debating forum.
4. When it comes to the details of EU policy, as in a number of other things, it seems

Tony Blair’s concentration span is finite. Three weeks after his second major speech to
the EU parliament in the British presidential semester, he made his major speech on
foreign policy to the British nation at the Lord Mayor of London’s banquet on 14th
November 2005. despite all his pledges before the Strasbourg Parliament in October
and June, EU Europe had a curiously marginal role in his broad thinking about Britain’s
relations with the world.4
Here he was back on familiar territory, his joint campaign with Sir Bob Geldorf to
“Make Poverty History.” He talked of helping the poorest nations of the earth,
particularly in Africa – though with an uncharacteristic lack of rhetorical style he
referred to them by the ugly acronym LDC (Least developed Countries). He pleaded for
a better understanding of the effect of globalization on the poorer nations and peoples.
“What I am saying is that out of this great pumping up of global integration, comes the
need for stronger and more effective global, multilateral action. There is a real danger
that the institutions of global politics lag seriously behind the challenges they are called
upon to resolve.” Thisa very typical piece of Blair in full oratorical flow; high on
rhetoric, low on specific content.
In tune with his ally and senior partner, Goerge W Bush, he said that the process of
brining democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq had still to be completed. Terrorism had to
be beaten at home and abroad – and with a touch a Giulio-Claudian Emperor would
admire, said that another bombing attempt had been foiled, as had one in Australia; “We
have disrupted two planned attacks here in the UK since 7 July alone.”
Europe must, and is already, help in combating global networked terrorism. Europe,
EU Europe, must assist in the other vital area of trade and agricultural prices and
markets. He wanted Europe to reduce its subsidies on farm produce in the Doha round
and allow African nations greater access to European markets. In urging this, there is
almost a sense of wistfulness of, ‘if only’ – sensing that he was not win the radical
overhaul of the Common Agricultural Policy in the already fraught EU budget
negotiations in Brussels.
4
Address to the Lord Mayor’s banquet Guildhall London 14 November 2005.
36
The two most significant things about the Guildhall speech of last November, and
this places it above his two statements to the European Parliament, is that it appears
valedictory – the unspoken message is that it was the last from Tony Blair as prime
minister – and the opening. “Yesterday, by chance, I watched part of the MTV Music
Awards. Well, it was certainly the most relaxed part of the week I just had. I recommend
it to any person who wants to understand modern politics. Why? There was no politics
discussed. But the fusion of sounds, rhythms and musical influences from vastly
different cultures was an allegory for today’s world and the context in which politics
exists. The world is integrating at fast rate, with enormous economic cultural and
political consequences.” It sounds very much like a plea to take the politics out of
politics – at least the old fashioned idea of politics as dialectic.
4. In the end the great programme for Britain’s place in Europe launched in the Blair
presidency of the Council of Ministers came down to crude tactics. For all his claims to
be the great global visionary of the MTV generation, its as a tactician that Tony Blair
excels in politics – of getting things through by one means or another. This was the case
with the bruising round of horse-trading which finally achieved a budget for the EU for
2007 – 2013. It was not a victory for the visionaries, let alone a British visionary. The
budget set at expenditure of €862 billion from 2007. Britain would give up over €8
billion of its budget rebate in that period, in return to France agreeing for a fundamental
review of CAP in 2008 – but on the understanding that CAP subsidy would continue
unchanged until 2013.
The Economist magazine hailed this as “a budget deal which answers almost no
questions about the future.”5 For Blair it was a bloody victory with large doses of salt
being rubbed into his wounds. He had not got the concession on CAP he really wanted,
and demanded in his declarations to the Strasbourg parliament and to the British people
in November; he had been outmanoeuvred by his old foe Jacques Chirac. Success in
achieving agreement on the budget had been won largely with the help of a new friend,
and from the non-socialist end of the spectrum, Angela Merkel. Moreover he had
added roughly another €10 billion to the UK tax bill from 2007 – 2013 with out telling
his treasury minister, uneasy colleague and obvious successor, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer.
So where have we ended with Tony Blair’s vision of Britain’s new role in a new
Europe ? Like so much the Blair political radar seems to be beaming through a bit of a
fog, and a fog to some extent of his own making. At the end of the day, and by his own
admission we are near the end of Tony Blair’s prime ministerial day, Blair has not been
able to move Britain from where it has been under every prime minister since Harold
Macmillan took the keys of No 10 Downing Street in January 1957, when he replaced
Anthony Eden in the debacle of the Suez crisis of the previous year. Like all of them
Blair had set Britain to be the bridge between America and Europe, and like all of them
with the exception of Edward Heath, who actually took Britain into the European
Community, he found himself drifting inexorably towards the western shore of the
5
Economist, London, Dec 20th 2005, Dateline Brussels “Crises and Gestures” The European Union Summit.
37
Atlantic.
The verdict is cruelly obvious. After the Suez crisis Britain could never go against
the United States in a major matter of foreign policy. Blair, as Peter Riddell underlines in
the new political biography, is a victim of the post-Suez dilemma for the United
Kingdom, as much as any of his predecessors. As one influential critic told me in these
weeks at the beginning of 2006, very like his last year in office, Tony Blair is moving
Britain more to being the 51st State of the Union, than moving it to the heart of Europe.
“Instead of transforming Britain’s foreign policy, he has become a victim of its
contradictions,” Riddell concludes.6
Yet there is something intriguing in the ever youthful figure of Tony Blair, the first
head of a British, and perhaps European, government self-avowedly of the MTV
generation. He still attracts with his verve and enthusiasm, though he may be the boy
wizard Harry Potter whose spells and charms do not quite work out in the end. He is one
of the great actor-politicians of our era, a performer as Churchill and Lloyd George were
before. It makes him elusive and still a crowd-puller. In this he is like Lloyd George,
another qualified success in British and European politics, who had the personality and
charisma who outshone all the others at the Paris peace talks of 19197.
Reflecting on Lloyd George’s performance then, the economist John Maynard
Keynes wrote, “Who shall paint the chameleon ? Who can tether a broomstick ?” And
the same might be said of Tony Blair and his new visions of Britain, Europe, and the
world.
6
Peter Riddell The Unfulfilled Prime Minister – Tony Blair’s quest for a legacy (London, Politico’s 2005) p156
conclusion to chapter on foreign policy Ch 6 A Bridge Too Far.
7
See Peacemakers by Margaret Macmillan, UK and US publishers various 2001
38
THE ATOMIC RUSH OIL, BOLIVARISTS’ FUEL
OIL, BOLIVARISTS’ FUEL by Gustavo CORONEL
Under Hugo Chávez’s term the political and geopolitical use of Venezuela’s oil has
been vigorously fostered and patiently refined, in order to strengthen the regime and
build regional and world alliances. The declining performance of Petróleos de
Venezuela. Disposable managers.
1. T he first day in January 1976, when the

Venezuelan petroleum industry was effectively taken over by the state, the new
managers of Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) had ample reasons to be worried. They
were receiving an industry in pronounced decline, due to the decision of the
government to end oil concessions by 1983. Exploration drilling was at a standstill and
geologists and geophysicists engaged in looking for new oil deposits had dwindled
from some 800 in the 1950’s to no more than 40 by 1975. Oil reserves were still
adequate, some 19 billion barrels, but an increasing percentage of this oil was heavy to
very heavy, therefore of lower commercial value.
Refineries were geared to the production of fuel oils, the major product of export
of the Venezuelan industry, but world demand was changing to diesels and gasoline
due to environmental considerations. Marketing was done through the offices of the
multinational companies abroad. Plant and equipment was in urgent need of upgrading.
Oil production remained high since the multinational petroleum companies were
anxious to produce as much as they could before concessions expired. This was not
necessarily good for the nation, as many reservoirs were being exploited beyond
efficient rates of production.
In spite of initial worries, the performance of the nationalized petroleum industry
during the next twenty-five years, 1976 to 2000, was superb. The industry in full
contraction found in 1976 turned into an energy corporation of great international
prestige, run by professional managers dedicated to provide the nation with optimum
economic returns. An early emphasis in exploration activities generated new oil
findings that increased the volume of proven conventional oil reserves from 19 billion
barrels in 1976 to 75 billion barrels of oil by 2000. The less conventional but
commercially producible heavy oil resources of the Orinoco Basin, located in the
southern portions of the country, were studied and quantified. The plausible
recoverable reserves of this type of hydrocarbons stood at some 270 billion barrels,
giving Venezuela the largest volume of oil reserves in the world after those in the
Middle East.
The refining sector was significantly upgraded. Refineries which produced a 70%
of fuel oils and only 30% of light products were modified and modernized, to produce
70% or more of diesel and gasoline, in order to respond to the change in the
international demand, particularly that of the U.S. market, where environmental
39
constraints required cleaner fuels. Petroleos de Venezuela acquired important refining

assets in the U.S. and Europe that guaranteed outlets for its heavier, less marketable
crude oils.
A reliable performance helped Petroleos de Venezuela to become one of the five
most important petroleum companies in the world, according the rankings of
specialized international publications.
Progress was evident in the quality of management, in applied research and in the
capabilities to train technical and managerial staff. For 25 years Petroleos de
Venezuela was well managed and enjoyed high credibility in the international
petroleum community, maintaining the necessary distinction between professional
management and political decision-making.
2. In 1999 Hugo Chavez started his presidential term. Although he had often
mentioned Petroleos de Venezuela during his electoral campaign, claiming that it had
become “a state within the state” and that it needed to be put under the control of the
government, he chose as President of the company a well-respected professional
petroleum manager, Roberto Mandini. This created much optimism among managers
and staff of the company, as Mandini shared their values. The naming of Hector
Ciavaldini as Vice-president for Planning, however, was not equally well received,
since he was perceived as a political commissar, as Chavez’s eyes and ears in the
company. Ciavaldini did not possess the credentials for such a high-level position. In
fact, he had been dismissed from the industry in 1995 due to his mediocre performance.
At the time of his return to PDVSA he was actively involved in a legal conflict with
the company over that dismissal. This was, at best, inelegant and, at worst, a blatant
conflict of interest, that a top executive should be the plaintiff in a legal conflict with
his company.
The presidency of Roberto Mandini in PDVSA lasted less than six months since
his technocratic approach clashed with the orientation Chavez desired to give PDVSA.
This orientation required the purge of the professional managers and their replacement
by persons loyal to the so-called “bolivarian revolution”. For proud and
short-tempered Mandini, the role of Ciavaldini as political commissar and Chavez’s
contact of choice became intolerable. He decided to force a showdown and lost.
Hector Ciavaldini became the new president of PDVSA in mid-1999. He
immediately acted to oust managers who were believed to be associated with the
“anti-revolutionary”, professional management approach and brought in a group of
military officers loyal to Chavez who took control of the security and industrial
protection areas of the company, monitoring all communications. From that moment
onwards the internal environment of PDVSA became one of intrigue and increasing
struggle between different groups vying for control. The performance of Ciavaldini
was so poor that, although a Chavez’s man, he lasted less than one year in his job. He
was replaced by an active military officer, Guaicaipuro Lameda, who became
identified with the professional managers and technocrats of the company. Because of
this, Chavez angrily and summarily dismissed him in 2002. To replace him, Hugo
Chavez made his worst possible choice. He named Gaston Parra, a Marxist professor
40
at the University of Zulia, a man largely ignorant of how the industry works, parochial
in outlook and full of resentment against the petroleum industry managers. He was the
least logical choice for president of PDVSA if an efficient, international business was
to be preserved but an excellent choice if what was wanted was the conversion of
PDVSA into a political tool.
The reaction against Parra as new president of PDVSA ousted Chavez…briefly.
The naming of Gaston Parra as new president of PDVSA produced an intense
reaction from the managers, technical staff and workers of the company. They
actively protested the naming of a person who could not be effective in the job. This
protest sparked a spontaneous popular rebellion, joined by labor unions, civil society,
opposition political parties and business associations. In April 11, 2002 a gigantic
march of some 700,000 people, the largest ever in Venezuela, took the streets of
Caracas. When Chavez ordered the military to crush the march by putting tanks and
armed forces on the street the top military brass refused. Not only they refused but also
asked Chavez to step down. The top military officer announced over national TV, in
the early morning of April 12, that Chavez had resigned. Although Chavez was
brought back to power two days later by military officers having more firing power at
their disposal than the ones who ousted him, this episode illustrates how strong was
the reaction of the country against the high-handed actions of Hugo Chavez.
3. The seven years of Chavez increasingly authoritarian rule over Venezuelan society
has already produced highly negative results. Chavez has abandoned all pretenses of
leading a democratic government, to embrace a style of ruling lacking transparency,
accountability and respect for political dissidents, the essential ingredients of
democracy. In taking over political control of PDVSA, Hugo Chavez has:
• Dismissed close to 20,000 managers and technicians who were the key of PDVSA’s
success as a world class company;
• Installed top managers dedicated to finance the Hugo Chavez “revolution”;
• Named six different presidents and boards of PDVSA in the last seven years. For a
company that markets its products internationally and in competition with
international companies, this organizational instability has proven suicidal. Strategic
planning has been essentially abandoned. The current plan of PDVSA is the same
one prepared during the presidency of Luis Giusti in 1998. It has not been changed
but is not being followed. The existing reality of the company bears little
resemblance to the plan. According to the original 1998 plan, PDVSA should be
producing close to 5 million barrels per day by 2006. However, the real production
today is 2.7 million barrels per day, half the original objective.
• Named president of PDVSA the Minister of Energy and Petroleum. In doing this, he
has eliminated the autonomy of action that PDVSA always had as a commercial
enterprise, converting the company into a political appendix of the government. The
original concept of a company dedicated to give optimum economic yields to the
nation has been replaced by that of a company at the service of the personal agenda
of an authoritarian political leader.
41
• Practically closed down the Research and the Training Centers that had become
world-class institutions for applied research and for the formation of the new
generations of professional managers required by the industry.
Weakened the commercial divisions of PDVSA, to the extent that today most of the
Venezuelan oil exports are handled by traders and brokers outside the company or
result from politically generated decisions in which commercial considerations play
a secondary role.
• Eliminated the production and marketing of Orimulsion, a relatively low cost fuel
that competed with coal in the world markets. This decision has been highly
controversial, as clients in Canada, South Korea and Italy, among other countries,
feel that PDVSA is failing to honor contracts that were in advanced stages of
negotiation. The licenses for the production and marketing of Orimulsion are being
given over to China by the Venezuelan government, under unknown terms and
without national approval.
• Taken over the direct control of PDVSA’s income, to the extent that the money
required for maintenance and investments has largely been deviated to the financing
of ill-planned social programs and political propaganda, bypassing normal budgetary
procedures dictated by law.
The inevitable result of this new reality is illustrated by the negative performance
of the company during the last six years. Although very scanty information is provided
by the company on its operations and finances, they were finally forced to submit to
the U.S. Security Exchange Commission their results for 2003, a report that reveals its
tragic decline. Exploration drilling in 2003 was half of what it was in 2000. Oil
production averaged 2.6 million barrels per day in 2003 while it had been 3.2 million
barrels per day in 2000, a decline of some 600,000 barrels per day, only partially
compensated by the activity of the international companies serving as contractors to
PDVSA. Investments in the company in 2003 were only $2.9 billion, half of the
budgeted amount, demonstrating that PDVSA does not have the required execution
capacity. Oil income in 2003 was $44 billion, $5 billion less than in 2000, in spite of
much higher oil prices, obviously a result of the drastic loss of production.
Lower oil income for the nation has also been the result of the oil policy Chavez
has adopted in favor of countries with which he is ideologically aligned. The extreme
case is Cuba, a country that receives about 90,000 barrels per day of subsidized
Venezuelan oil. Subsidies to this country amount to some $1.3 billion per year.
Chavez is largely utilizing the money generated by PDVSA in consolidating his
political power. The report to the SEC mentions that $4.4 billion were taken directly
from the funds of PDVSA in 2003 and pumped into programs not previously budgeted
or approved by the legislative body. All that it takes now for PDVSA’s money to be
sent to Chavez is a telephone call from the president to his Minister of Energy and
Petroleum, who is also president of PDVSA. This mechanism lends itself to high
levels of corruption since there is no accountability.
Due to the increasing collapse of PDVSA Venezuela can no longer produce its
OPEC quota. This means that its share of the petroleum world market has diminished.
42
The combination of the loss of production capacity and subsidized supplies to

politically friendly countries has brought PDVSA’s commercial exports down to less
than 2 million barrels of oil per day. At current prices, this loss of commercial export
capacity represents almost $5 billion per year in direct loss of revenues. If we add to
this decline the losses in the domestic market, where almost 500,000 barrels per day
are sold below production costs, it is clear that the current PDVSA is far from yielding
optimum financial benefits to the country.
4. The use being made by Hugo Chavez of Venezuelan oil as a political weapon to
gain loyalties and to influence geopolitical developments poses a triple threat to the
welfare of the Venezuelan nation, to Western Hemisphere political stability and to
world peace. In a planet where poverty and ideological fundamentalisms have reached
gigantic proportions Chavez’s populist rhetoric, supported by the care free distribution
of billions of dollars to countries and groups willing to listen, is likely to have an
initial destabilizing effect of significant intensity.
This is what is happening at this point in time. Chavez has already committed
close to $20 billion to the export of his so-called “bolivarian” revolution and has
aligned himself with the main rogue governments of the world, including those of
Cuba and Iran and with irregular and terrorist groups such as the Colombian guerrillas.
He is actively intervening in the internal political processes of Bolivia, Peru,
Nicaragua and other Latin American countries. He is making global efforts to
challenge the U.S in all fronts. By abandoning democracy and by neglecting the needs
of the Venezuelan people, while exporting extremist ideologies, he has become a
negative force of change in the Latin American region.
In spite of the increasing scarcity of petroleum in the world, which will tend to add
geopolitical power to oil rich countries like Venezuela, the efforts of Chavez to gain
followers seem to be weakening.
The first reason is that he is no longer paying sufficient attention to Venezuelan
domestic problems and, as a result, his internal popularity is decreasing quite rapidly.
The second reason is that declining Venezuelan oil production, combined with
increasing financial commitments abroad, is limiting the amounts of money at his
disposal for buying and maintaining political loyalties. Therefore, he will not be able
to honor his promises beyond the short to medium term.
The third reason is that the democratic trend in Venezuela and Latin America is
proving to be a formidable obstacle to Chavez’s blend of Marxist and Fascist ideology.
Although several of the recent Latin American elected presidents and presidential
candidates in the region can be defined as left leaning, only Fidel Castro and Hugo
Chavez have abandoned democracy and embraced authoritarianism. The others, from
Uribe in Colombia to Lula in Brazil and Michellet in Chile are true and proven
democrats. As Venezuelans increasingly reject Chavez, as oil money cannot guarantee
long-term loyalties and as democracy continues to be the political system of choice in
Latin America, the influence of Hugo Chavez in the region and in the world is bound
to decrease.
43
THE ATOMIC RUSH THE AFRICAN CONNECTION
THE AFRICAN
CONNECTION by Antonio L. MAZZITELLI
Rapid demographic growth and unchecked urbanization, failing administrations and

week law enforcement, regional and worldwide diasporas make West and Central
Africa a sanctuary for transnational criminal networks. To confront the situation is
imperative for Africa’s development –even more for Western security.
The views expressed herewith are these of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
the United Nations and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
1. T he Harsh economic and social conditions,
widespread corruption, conflict and post conflict scenarios, porous borders, failing
national administrations, and a growing culture of impunity feed the development of
criminal practices in the region as well as the relevance of the West and Central
African regions in international criminal ventures. The inability by State actors to
systematically enforce the rule of law and guarantee the security of individuals and
economic stakeholders provides the most conducive environment for the development
of all sorts of criminal enterprises aimed at generating easy profits at the expense of
human beings and societal security.
Despite some certainly promising signals, West and Central Africa continue to be a
sensitive and volatile region in the world scenario. If calm reins in Sierra Leone, Liberia,
Guinea Bissau and, to a lesser extent, in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the
Central African Republic, outbursts of violence marked the development of the
internal crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, in the Delta region of Nigeria, and in the Darfur (Sudan).
Turmoil and violence were reported in Guinea, whose political future is as uncertain as
the health conditions of its current President. In Togo a quasi-military coup following
the sudden death of President Gnassingbé Eyadéma in January 2005 halted political
dialogue with the European Union (EU) towards the ending of economic sanctions, and
justified the call for additional sanctions by both the African Union (AU) and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In Mauritania, the
international community (and the AU in particular) silently welcomed the coup that on
August 2005 ousted President Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmad Taya following ordinary
Mauritanians’ jubilation for the coup and the immediate issuing by the transitional
government of a 19-month transition program.
Different according to their own ethnic situations, cultural backgrounds and
endowments in natural resources, Central and West African countries have in common
some of the lowest standards of living in the world. Eleven out of the fifteen members of
44
ECOWAS 1 and seven out the eleven members of ECCAS 2 are among the last 30
bottom-listed countries in the UNDP Human Development index of 2005 3 . Wide
inequality in the distribution of wealth, unchecked demographic growth associated to
rapid, see wild, urbanization, are all features common to West and Central African
societies and factors contributing to the increased relevance of crime and criminal
activities as individuals’ option for breaking the poverty cycle. The very structure of
many West and Central African economies, based on exploitation of natural resources
(mining or single crop export oriented agriculture), coupled with a patrimonial
conception of the State within which national natural and financial resources “belong”
to the individuals in power, contribute too in creating a conducive environment within
which disrespecting existing laws, and using institutional prerogatives for private goals
is not only justified but even considered as an indicator of power. All such factors do
also attract unscrupulous economic operators, facilitate the establishing and
development of local and transnational criminal networks, promote the rooting of a
cultural model under which money can buy everything (including impunity, political
power, social consideration and respectability).
2. West African seashores and harbors have become the hub of transatlantic cocaine
trafficking. In addition to large cocaine shipments trafficked by sea vessels, stocked in
West Africa and rerouted to final destinations in western countries, hard drugs are
smuggled by international criminal networks using “disposable” human carriers with
fake passports and forged visas. Golden crescent heroin enters the region mostly by air
couriers to be later re-exported to Europe and to a lesser extent the United States.
Several hundreds West and Central Africans languish in the prisons of Thailand,
Pakistan and Colombia (just to mention major drug markets) on long drug-related
sentences, without mentioning “mules” killed on their ways to destination markets by
broken swollen drug ovules. Hard drugs are not only trafficked out of the region but
increasingly consumed in deadly homemade cocktails: in Liberia child soldiers reported
the abuse of locally-made crack cocaine mixed with gun powder. Cannabis cultivation is
widespread for both local, regional, and to a lesser extent North European markets.
The poor security and economic situations fertilize the soil where trafficking in and
smuggling of human beings prosper unabated. Children and women from all over West
1 The Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) includes Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
2 The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) includes Angola, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, (Republic of) Congo, (Democratic Republic of) Congo,
Equatorial Guinea , Gabon , Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe.
3 2005 World Human Development Report, UNDP. The report lists 177 countries. Due to the lack
of data, the listing does not include Liberia. As for individual countries listing, it is worth singling
out: in ECOWAS: Benin (162) , Burkina Faso (175), Cape Verde (105), Cote d'Ivoire (163), The
Gambia (155), Ghana (138), Guinea (156), Guinea Bissau (172), Liberia (n.c.), Mali (174), Niger
(177), Nigeria (158), Senegal (157), Sierra Leone (176) and Togo (143) – in ECCAS: Angola (160),
Burundi (169), Cameroon (148), Central African Republic (171), Chad (173), (Republic of) Congo
(142), (Democratic Republic of) Congo (167), Equatorial Guinea (121), Gabon (123), Rwanda (159),
and Sao Tome and Principe (126).
45
and Central Africa are trafficked for both labor and sexual exploitation both within the
region and toward Europe, the Middle East, and the Arabian Peninsula. According to
newspaper reports, West African locations are emerging as attractive destinations for
sexual tourism, including its most heinous degeneration, pedophilia. UN reports that at
least 200,000 children are trafficked annually out of West and Central Africa. Drawing
from baseline studies4, the U.S. State Department estimates that 400,000 children are
involved in child labour across West Africa. Additionally, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Togo are among West and
Central African countries of high trafficking of child labourers.
As smuggling of illegal migrants is concerned, the region is both a departure and
transit point. Oil producing countries such as Gabon, Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, or
developed regional economies like South Africa and Nigeria are themselves destination
countries for fellow Sub-Saharan migrants. In addition to African nationals, illegal
Asian migrants are often smuggled to West and Central African locations on their way to
western final destinations.
The easiest mode of travel is by air directly to Europe or, alternatively, to Northern
African and Middle East countries from where the trip can be continued by boat.
Obviously traveling by air is costly and highly dependant on organized crime as it
requires the provision of falsified passport, visa and supporting documents.
The maritime route is used by large numbers of clandestine migrants. There have
been cases in which vessels from as far as Cameroon or Nigeria traveled along the West
African coast, the destination in most cases being the Spanish Canary Islands or the
Portuguese Azores. Vessels often land in different inadequately controlled ports on the
route or anchor offshore to take clandestine immigrants on board from canoes. In other
cases, ferries travel on established routes between two neighboring countries and are
used by migrants on one leg of a longer journey.
Smuggling of migrants on the maritime routes is highly dependant on organized
crime too, as it requires some initial capital investment for purchasing and
reconditioning wrecked vessels and onshore logistic basis for both refueling and picking
up of migrants from several countries on the route. Nigerian, Ghanaian, Liberian and
Senegalese crime groups are believed to be involved in such activities. Illegal migrants’
land routes run through the Sahara desert from south to north5. When it comes to land
trafficking, there seem to be two scenarios. In the first scenario, the migrant buys a "full
packet solution" from his or her place of origin. The packet can include falsified
documents, transport, accommodation, bribery of border officials, or logistic advice. In
the second scenario migrants try to get as far as they can by themselves using normal
roads and transportation. Along the routes through Sahara, local people have specialized
in servicing migrants by providing food and accommodation, forging documentation, or
offering transport and guidance through the desert thus avoiding detection.
Smuggling routes in West and Central Africa are also being used by migrants from
other continents, particularly the Far East and East Asia. Migrants from China, India and
4Mark TAYLOR, US State Department/NCM Report, Spring 20003, pages 25-28.

5In this article, the focus is on land routes to Northern Morocco and not on the routes to Tunisia
and Libya.
46
Bangladesh have been found stranded in West or North Africa. Asian migrants normally
travel by air to West Africa, from where they continue on either the maritime route or the
land routes towards Europe.
3. The same routes used for smuggling drugs and illegal migrants seem to be also
used for the flourishing trade of counterfeited and pirated items originating mostly
from Far East Asia but also, according to some reports, from Latin America. The
problem of counterfeited items seriously affects local industries, particularly the
entertainment, food, and pharmaceutical sectors. In this context, it is worth noting that,
according to the World Bank Institute6, music represents the third most important
component of annual economic growth and revenue in GDP terms in Senegal, Mali,
Ghana, and Cameron. Interpol 7 investigations uncovered connections between
organized crime gangs involved in music piracy in Ghana, Guinea (Conakry), Liberia
and Nigeria suspected to be linked to Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. Examples
of CDs and CDRs carrying propaganda messages from extremist groups have been
found in Mali, Mauritania and Nigeria.
According to several studies, four to eight million light fire-arms are available in
West Africa only, representing a major obstacle to the ending of civil conflicts in the
region. The large availability of small fire arms coupled with the inability of the State
to provide due security, control over its territory, and fair justice feeds violent
behaviors, property crimes, and eventually anarchy. The trivialization and privatization
of the use of violence coupled with impunity and corruption are, in this context, at the
root of violent strives, often ending up in open civil conflict.
Arms exports and imports are not the only concern in volatile areas of West and
Central Africa. In countries where tensions are high, weapons availability risks
re-igniting or spreading conflict and violence. In 2002, the Nigerian Customs Service
reported that it had intercepted small arms and ammunition worth more than USD 30
million at border posts in a six-month period. The Nigerian government announced
that in 2004 it had seized some 157,000 illegal firearms8.
Just as weapons are recycled from conflict to conflict in West and Central Africa,
so too are untrained civilian militias, ill disciplined fighters who move from country
to country together with their arms. The allegiance of these individuals is all too easily
bought by State and non-State actors alike with the promise of looted goods or a few
dollars as proved by the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, and Cote d’Ivoire.
Mercenary pilots from former Soviet countries have been also used in these countries
and other conflicts in West and Central Africa9, as well as trained European and
Southern African former elite soldiers for attempted coups in Central and Eastern
Africa.
6 Presentation of the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy for 30 African countries in
September 2002 in Dakar, Senegal.
7 Interpol Report on Intellectual Property Pirated Goods, May 2004, pages 35-37.
8 Thomas MADNICK, Arms Trafficking in West Africa, The University of Michigan Political
Review, March 2005, pages 21-25.

9 Human Rights Watch, Report on West Africa, April 2004 and John M. REINHOLD, The Liberal
Dilemma: West African Arms Traffickers, May 2004, Ann Arbor, page 11.
47
West and Central Africa are rich in natural resources. Oil, precious stones, gold,
platinum, timber are often the most important source of revenues for a number of West
and Central African States. Considering the overall political context within which
these resources are exploited, it goes without saying that the control of such resources
is often the cause of lasting internal conflicts, and that their exploitation is the source
of financing of private armies.
The links between organized crime, terrorist groups and both rebel groups and
rough States/kleptocracies in Africa have been shown in a number of official UN reports
including the ones on Sierra Leone and DRC. Whether or not Al Qaida invested in
Sierra Leonean diamonds, its operatives did travel and sojourned in West African
countries, as well as funds from West African diamonds supported Hezbollah’s
operations in Lebanon. In Nigeria, some 60,000 to 100,000 oil barrels a day, worth an
estimated USD 4 billion a year, are siphoned from illegally tapped pipelines and shipped
abroad by international smuggling gangs. The profits finance an arms race by criminal
gangs and tribal militias that have sustained ethnic bloodletting in the oil-rich but
impoverished Delta region.
Unemployment, little capital investment, unabated capital flow, and poor
infrastructures are also common features of many of the economies of the West and
Central African region. External financial assistance, remittance from migrants, and
buoyant informal sectors often compensate structural weaknesses opening however the
doors to all sorts of illicit and criminal business practices. Beside the
subsistence-oriented informal economies, parallel and shadow monopolies govern
consistent parts of national markets and economies, offering unexpected opportunities
to money launderers. In December 2003, the Italian police arrested one of the most
wanted men of the Sicilian mafia10 at the Dakar International airport, on his arrival from
Côte d’Ivoire. According to security sources, the man had important economic interests
in both countries. In this context, corrupt practices are not only justified as “licit” by the
general public but even “institutionalized” as the most palatable redistribution
mechanism of national wealth. The low ranking of West and Central African States in
the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index11 mirrors the growing
acknowledgement by the very governments vis-à-vis the spread of corruption at all
levels of both institutions and societies.
4. West Africa and West Africans are not only an attractive location and partners for
foreign criminal networks but are gradually building up and exporting their own
criminal network model. Besides the well-known Nigerian networks, new ones are
developing in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Molded on the Nigerian “network”
type, such criminal organizations have in common the very loose, fragmented, and
business oriented features which made them extremely successful in the global village
10 Mr. Giovanni Bonomo was sought for murder and associating with the Mafia and had been on
the run for seven years. Police say he has been involved in money laundering activities for the
Mafia in Namibia and South Africa.
11 The best performing West African country listed in the 2004 TI Corruption Perception Index
ranks 64 (Ghana) and the worst 144 (Nigeria).

48
of modern “disorganized” crime.

Traditional highly organized criminal models as the ones used by well-known
criminal organizations like the Sicilian Mafia, the American Cosa Nostra or the
Japanese Yakuza would indeed hardly fit the lawless “ hit-and-run” conditions
characterizing the overall African context where project-based, business-oriented
structures prove to be highly performing. In this sense, criminal ventures in West Africa
adopt structures, modi operandi and features typical of legitimate traders and business
people of the region where a successful entrepreneur would invite one or more junior
relatives or other dependents to join him/her 12 in the business as volume grows.
Division of tasks within these structures occur in such a way that new recruits, generally
personal acquaintances or relatives of original associates, hardly know the employers
they are really working for, as well as how their tasks relate to assignments given to
other members. Employment offered is generally limited to the project without any
expectation of stable, see permanent, links to the structure which, on the opposite, is due
to fade away upon completion of the given project. Secrecy and individuals’ total loyalty
to the group involved in the venture is further ensured by cultural pressures (belonging
to the same village, clan, ethnic group) and by the use of religious, black magic rituals
threatening supernatural punishment in case of betrayal.
As terrorism is concerned, all analysts and available reports concur on the
unlikely possible expansion of Qaeda-type branches within West and Central African
societies, with the exception of some zone in Northern Nigeria, Mauritania and the
Saharan region. On the other hand, the use of the West African territory for the
implantation of training and logistic camps, and the establishment of operational
business-oriented joint ventures between terrorist groups and local criminal networks
represent more likely scenarios. Recent developments of the situation in the Delta
region of Nigeria justify however fears about the growth of local terrorist groups using
violence for pushing forwards political and economic claims.
The response of West and Central African governments to the serious challenges
posed to the development of their economies and societies by transnational organized
crime has been, mostly, limited to the updating of national legislations and legal
frameworks so to be in line with the requirement of international UN conventions and
protocols. This approach has however yielded mixed results being the overall
enforcement of new laws dependent on numerous and variable factors, some of which
are well beyond the control capabilities of national administrations. Concrete and
courageous cleaning-up efforts like the one implemented by the government of
President Obasanjo in Nigeria against corruption will certainly produce dramatic
results if sustained long enough to ignite a virtuous cycle. Similarly, the decision of
giving political and financial priority to security and transparency matters by countries
like Cape Verde is also an obvious positive and important signal to all countries of the
region.
12Women criminal entrepreneurs seems to be predominant in the trafficking of girls for sexual
exploitation from the Delta region of Nigeria to Europe.
49
50

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THE ATOMIC RUSH

THE ATOMIC RUSH

A GLANCE INTO PANDORA’S BOX by Rajesh M. BASRUR

I f South Asia today is not quite “the most

1. The India-Pakistan relationship, widely viewed with alarm following their

2. Recognizing India’s emergence as a major economic and military power in the

November 8, 2005 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/business/worldbusiness/08infosys.html

Survey, 41, 6 (November-December 2000), pp. 978-1001.

T he joint India-US statement of 18 July 2005

represents a dramatic turning point for the international nuclear non-proliferation

1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

1. A debate has been raging in South Asia and

White House, February 22, 2006.

4. At a regional level, Pakistan is dismayed at this preferential treatment to India13

FRIENDS BY NECESSITY by Talat MASOOD

1. I ndia and the United States are supposed to

orchestrated and well-coordinated fashion.

HISTORY’S REVENGE by Lucio CARACCIOLO

1. E urope had to abolish history. Now history

federation, confederation, some ingenious hybrid?).

2. If we examine the material constitution of our continent in depth, it is not difficult

stringent Euro-Atlantic solidarity.

FOREVER ANGLOSPHERE by Robert FOX

1. T ony Blair is on the last lap of his race as

did in ‘High Noon.’

4. When it comes to the details of EU policy, as in a number of other things, it seems

OIL, BOLIVARISTS’ FUEL by Gustavo CORONEL

1. T he first day in January 1976, when the

constraints required cleaner fuels. Petroleos de Venezuela acquired important refining

The combination of the loss of production capacity and subsidized supplies to

Rapid demographic growth and unchecked urbanization, failing administrations and

1. T he Harsh economic and social conditions,

4Mark TAYLOR, US State Department/NCM Report, Spring 20003, pages 25-28.

Review, March 2005, pages 21-25.

ranks 64 (Ghana) and the worst 144 (Nigeria).

of modern “disorganized” crime.

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