"SOVIET F G i E I G N P5:ICY AND THE

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Soviet Foreign Policy and

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What's Behind Soviet Foreign Poiicy?

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&odd, e - mdt hstrung dedre to pmlong ta qdibdmm sasrcbing and w - r e h g in th* laof geaoe and t o stop wart" Tiah 4 trued o o ~ o n d e n t epidemtty c d d not bor mov%memt ia ~ltldmtmdabk aomprehd the marked CQUXem io a q u w which mIfiofe the inbma#onaI dtu&m h all ih pphanes &a Yay Day manifof the Comb+ and mplicatione: the trawitory relaternaadastaWnmtbyMetAmImsd o r Pobmkh h P d n arOiagan Em% timahip ktween the U . B $ S d the CII~W anhgonlems among world, the ern paat fo* peace. the hqdaht pwem, the eomp1sxitiee T h e c o * p % ~ ~ t h a ~ of the shggle of the Internatfonal workof ammko this whole quemtion is broaght ing dam and the oppmwd poplea. home to ua in the following mmark~ bg 19everrrl reant d d o p m e n h of p a m Roi. Edgar S. Pbmlus: T o m d d a with a capitslist shb a pact that t ua mount import b v e onla m r d e d t e h much liloe sn old+QIe milibmy dtd ~~a of this problem. T h m am: change of policy towamla the r mpmsenb a complete revam4 of &a original B o I s h ~ f d g n gollcy au det M e t Union by &e U 9. p v a m m e a ~ t . the laat of the major p m i~ drop dvad fmm &a kmab d e c r m m d w ~ ~ non~-gnitlon as a method of exprewmmmt -ow, May lM). mm, in ing fb &appropel af the B o d e Itepubthe same vein, Mrme ~ - a c b o w ~ "prim redn*'' (Trobwka) mix wgramfad menaee of an atmama with their "ad*" and #mtnck again& the W t Union thm the dwnn Soviet fomiga p o w ~ I1I 01 opcm M v e wru preparstirme of Jmp betrayal of the world mvolntfon. 0 an and tHe German-POWbloc; the remrukble proachieved by the U.8. ~ e o e n t l y c o cam ~ ~ a maalam to S o d a l - I ) m n w aa. h s o w s t coutrn&on; the conaegpentl~ emhaneed economic power snd idly bitter a g the ComlmmM M r r r i l f t a r y ~ a c y d t h e h v i ~ t a r l ! A h l g ts of the soviet Udoh (C.P.S.U*) time the w.s.i3z. skmdly ntafm klm it to plar a new role i world affaim n (emby into the League of Natiom, Eonflfct be i mt powem far -hd& pact of m u W , delnging or avoiding aggmsbn a&mt a , B e contfnued gmve dh in )and r the Soviet Union. Of cw*ee, n ating ameh mdgmut ~~, w o e w the -mi& I n a t i d emg~atrr~mthathmat&, It Q in w! 4 dhatimr that eonrrmcdve critic= of w e i h M e t diplormrey maat b d d , that ofBovietf~policyiathe~d 0ovbt foreigtl p o k y mwt ba mted. &eworlrersLmdemmhgdabe,k It i thhbdrgmand oP events t h a t h s 8ppm-b and c a d =me douo-mfnded b m & -dents of W e t &air# to w r , what ae Too m y I d u r n fore@ appe*rs to them, the iouowing para.bBttlct, dox: 'why ifl k t tbat the Bnesian Bd.Idkina-* w f t h t h a i r ~ o i ~ ~ f o r t h e ~ ~ d t l w ent period aa one o war8 rmd d o f U W , too mpnp Waeik
Why the problem of S h t f o d g n polfep ha~lbeen provoldag eo much

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mmlwdd or d * *tie& 89cb M 8pp& ' b insdwb, b

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fdm from b e g h i q to end. To

s~le-mgd~-t, tlseu. a U., snpormded by a world of Prnemies, f m m haa dwaya been only the
m ~ s ~ pd r a m e d b y f h e p r 0 P letarim dbhhmblp I j B mlations witb nC i h p d d h t and aw-Soviet comtrie~. VieWedhthlsIIghC S w i e t f o d g n poli g aaaot ba impdallat; i hvolvea t n o t l k bat the atrategy of finding the mo& &eetive m a 31 ib inter-governwent mlatfom for the p u m o f marh g the defame and strengthening of t e h M t Vmion aa a proletarian a t a h and, &Mom, the baae of the internsmovement, the haw of the wodd l W 0 1 n ~ Tbua we muat realhe m axiomatic the

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I. Due to the fact that the proletar8rb has not get won power in any cornbp h t Msh,the working c h govern. of the UB.B.& must reckon on at and having economic and M U e d relations with the capitalist dW elaese& The protraction of thia &wt~ the proletariat of some other wm-s take power i conducive ta the a m a h h m c e of pow= in the hands of t b victorio~ section of the InW n a t h d movement (the R d a n ) . . i The Soviet Union must utilim and w &a ~ ~ n c among &e imc t e a l~daliat powers i the interest d the n pmlehrh power* eapciauy because it b mmounded by a world of enemies. 8. The && form of the capitalist mlfnp elarre damhating any partic11Isr coun& a not debmine ita relations with tbe b d e t Union or the policy d the WddX it. Itds, with its Fast& fmn of capihliat dictatortship, wae d o n g tbe b t to eatabliah normal relat h e with tbe M e t Union. The BribDwwiEi9, with fts conntitutionai -Y, not among the Arst. The I . i%, t anuch-vaunted republican T with b BP- Of capftam *be pwer, wsa, m-

t o q o t h a f . Itinthetxanmicdpolw intensh, 4 6 r dm cumi that are d e d n h It i8 not improbable that the mxt war will be fought i the name oi 'lde~nwr* again& Fsedrtm-or of %acew against war. It ia f u ~ themore probable ehot amongst tke best bombins planes on the dde of capiWt democraes will be Mmeolini's 8&mas. I the w e l w o f the c o n w of n economic and political interests the exact form of the capitafist dietatomhip does not count, ia immaterial. Obvio*, the Soviet government, i ite reIat40lls n with capitalist powera, cannot fail to h e reality-.& not baae its relatiom on the non&WL 4. ~niarm~lating polieiea ~n imit. eign rehtions the Soviet government ,I m s mart to c o m b a d a p t a t i d ut jwhent and ~eadjusttnent-h the cnnmete conditiom prevailing at any par~~ moment. Capitalist pmara %endly" t the Soviet Union yestep a day sre potentially ita sworn enemies of tomorrow. And its active aemies of yearterday may become the passive and unreliable friends d today, tomorrow or the day &r tamomowl 6. The economic and military 8trength o the Soviet Union, at any particular f mmmk in comparison with the emnomJc and military 8or wearhesa of &a capitalist powem involved, determinea the character of the tr-tiear the U.S.S.B. i able to secure with its W d s friends or ita fiery fw. Measured with these gmd&ckar, it h not M t to goage accurately the change of German bourgeois policy toward8 the Soviet Union, from the friendly dam of ILapaUo to the hostile days of Hitler; the turn h American p o k y from W h n ' s military hkmenion b RoMM%elV8 -0gdti011; the reeat chaage of fmnt by ]Pr-e and CmhoSlwakh, from milihuy intemention to

a w , Soviet O P P eves to b ~ tSle BegubHc.

-~.ap-at'govermneaf

'Paw &kt nor doee t6e iorm eE 'aplwwstab & h m h e the fmign

eaal the hht~w W e t foreign policy of moy be a8 t 1 1 Firat came the era of military i . n hwantlmt laatlag appmximrbely from l $ l T to l9ea Theae u k e w h the daya of open, fmncal mohtimmy

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SOVlET FOREIGN POLICY AND W O

3EVOLUTIbN

Wetztarn h p e , had defeated the White G u d a and their foreign alties in the armiea of inkmention, The gears 192% 1928 w5hmed the xecogdtiun of the Soviets by most of the big capitaliiPt powam after prolonged negotiation& The Traty of Tartn, the basis of which was laid down by Lab, aamd rur the madd for the Bobhwik g o v e m m ~ l l t I whole Beries oi dipI~maticdjBA culties and ruptures featured the U& . S R foreign re.latiom during 1927-1982. .. The mlations with U m t BritPin, F%mce,

of rariom mlmM6a (Baltic Statw, h v hw. The-&-& f & e mfIihry pmpsmtimm waw ' b t , H~tmgarg, Italy, a). At &ia hno msjw power acmrdd da real force behind oi # m or de f & t i a zecodtim to the Soviet diplomstrr n W&m &oqra d B d e t gmmmmL Eatmrt of &aillea *b tb W k e t h e i E e b y ~ ~ e ~ ~ o f 4. Since them the U & @ hm .&, T * wltb the lovfet aepobk -aperf~obhbh-*aad Praw;esehibfQm@A&w%3eL 8. The ptiod of nepotiatha and mrole i tba 3 n a w ogaftion d b r the Budan proletwht, w d and mpid a& with tbe aid of thr labor moveinant la

Japan, Chag-tswfiin, Rommnh, ChiKaibShek were comiB~lg.bly &rained. Xn the wmmer of 1 2 fhe Soviet Union 97 was pexiloudy near war, dangewoelg. near b h g attacked by Potawl, Bwmania, and the other W e y of Fmch ~ 4British imperialism In tbePie d8m the soviat gowmment remrtad ta f d g n policy aiming to achieve for tha proletarian s h t e thru negohtiona with the p m hdhg to none o n , mn-inbwemthn, and neu.

merits aniM~ntlyto

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b t m e n the U.8.m. and otbar are agmemmta ntiligea by,

The politicat and econtlndc

the * t e g ~ employed by waion, aa 8 gwammcmt, for thefof shng&mhg ib 3nte=tb4l don against attack by a -e l wrmtry m bloc d i m p d a b t
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h v i e t Diplomacy At Worlr

and of the opcolomial maw#, Thmughont the various 0-8 of its fa* policy the U8.S.R. baa ptmned T h i a ~ d , O f C ~ b e tbnl allowing pmtjEIJ d t s , ilmfia corn-t eo in which we find certain "red thfeadsSr, a t e guiding linea. d c a n t ~ ~ . m at home and tku abklng fear and reBrMly statd t - me: h a p e c t h ~ & e l u m b d h t b ~ 1 T maintain and consolidate the p+ . o aemiea abroad. In &&I Mtbe h v e I W nnd to &end the prestige gad iet Union as an .s an iaiIwme o tbe Sod& Union m the f inrpixstian, b the hbmadonal m o haw of the international p r o l e h r h revolrrdo~ Givem the --bpek of lutionandarr~dbddoB~~ W w a r wave of prole& m01uWmi porrerona.rrorldd In Waatern Eut.ol)e, there waa but the LTbeUS.~smrhiWslancSmrr.t f o ~ c o e r s apeat0 ~ v i e t o r i ~ * t o ~ * m a x i m m a ' % m a t h e ~ l m k b g c l M c T B e ~ ~ " t w a d s d f o F ~ * a n d of the pmdga of &e 1IBA.R in the da&hedwtbed.lad* eyw OF the in-tfd warktng C h M P O d ~ ~ r r o n b S t - ~

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Union, wh* it w - m m ~ f a w i m ! d " ' t h e ~ ~L M a t foxBIpII policy 3 u n .@sh at om time or with the &innan meamre, on a m m b t I y b & a&dlatatmdm. rrnce of power and r s l s h Psrfmla capitatid c w m . Tbe S m M 4, -rue 3 the a a conflicts, Imhm Gowmnlmt ia p r a p d b 8tgn non&mad tlhe m t e aabgmim among p c b , or mutrtP1 amhktca bhb W a l i s t powem, the & d e t Untan -1 a h d d aid mmt, nt one tlnw'w paas, with U P Em porrerr, lu' 08y for ten yeare, rltb,& whue ml coma togethelr wid3 one or mors tm aignjng it, the pmIetariur gowxnm-t d there countries to 4 off attackbmws very well that theae @ may &her& 'mw, the &vie Union e m l.etor&tenmonfbeortarn&Mevham, tagetber with cmntriw er do W e t ! d i p h t s harbor m y Klua& am moment or a, common a b m d a n n a s b t h e ~ l i f e o f ~ l a b b a t n o t e o m m o n i n ~ .For-

Ithaam

bonzgaoIal:e how, through tbs Fmncuh v i e t pad dmutdapsistanOa,notmly to ba a l e t defend what they ham won a i n ~ f a B t ~ b m t ~ , i i ~ l e , p m 9 Yant the mmlrrma o the G8mtm fmf

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-. Newr dm8 sw~ ~ O l l f a n e e s a m ~ . m l l imigwd db let GoPefnm~llt,I signing n trest and limiW to d e f a T h y are k , t l l l t e r i n t a m ~ t f a ~ notflwl&edawmbeseda

o f o n e i m ~ w w e r ~ s n o t l m . mmimn inkmesh. auch non-ag&m am The present r4dadon of the &mi& U ~ b ~ , w m i n m f a r a 8 m f l i -&&xed by tbe Smkt to all i m m ~ t m y ~ Q ~ e d , ~ Q o ~i t~ b e o l l i l i t t Wbat the SQvM g5YemaUar ~~l with the rektimmhip t b merit ia trying b get out of weq hBodeit U n b once hd, ia the days of @dint power f the Inoat a e c t h I a i B rrnd lhblw, with &e Wsfmrr pledge and gttarsntm amhit attack* Rep* of kmmny. At that time math how lit& d u e much gaaf~nWs b took glace an axchange of miHmay have. Heme, the much-wted tecbddana, -em a dose W D ~ Errstern Pact ai p o n - a g ~ o n ofwarr ta@w of both geraeral daHk No one f e d to m sad amtlmq sfinrtle e t b m d o w d y questioned the great ad-7. It k h t the Emtear rea@ by the U.S.S.B in weh P a c t i a n o t a n ~ w f t b ~ 0pIMmWon wlth the i m p agd& , 8 by bhs govemm811t. Twlay, the 8ituatknl U.S.S.I1. to h k more dUcdt or to ae h a ehnaged only ia form. The whborapmvmh either or both of them hpst% ia now takixrg glace between the u i d s t pow= from-a the U . 8 . a u$R L a d the Fmmh Republic in.. J S. The & * a of M e t foreign pl& of @ Weimar &public. Today, ae icy, while uk&lw thdidaiom kbn, a h i e t Union doen not have 8 a ~ t m wthe Impb not mme obje&v#m as ib cohbomtor. h a e ~ 0 f ~ m i l i ~ U based on these dbhiom~rra definite w n ~ ~ ~ t h e W ~ R e r p u M f e t h efiaal. At any moment any i m p d a h t ~ power, regardew o whahwar treatJr it f b w d a m h t to make impomibh.an t ro to v ~ ~ i ~ ~ * g b g bmhy happen h h0 with dm U*S.S.E ~ t e m m d t b m ~ : h t f n t l l b ~ . t h e mar tnzn again& the U.SAlB. md job h a n d 8 w f t h f t a o w n ~ ~ t wtocallsU ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t h I n . ~ 1

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rddfess w r the M Exenthe o e M t h m a the Soviet Govmnmemb f v w -MY ep nt wbg and h w ~ o r of l d l d d a amonplt t e e dm h -t m u n w . H safd i part: a n "But w , tppia a t a h at any or evefg ttme or dwwa, desll*e war t t o h e t . h y , even t h e ~ i m ~ s t * t g , a t ~ g i vtOdBy tlm U.8B-R -

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emttme,maa-.~l~padi& T h i . h a p p m w h a P i t h e i h r suffered a deieat h wax, pnd, &er& fom & a be foreftcanhmadyforam*par, or when i baa ao a t n a far more powerial Shte or monp of Strtea and the polithd dto a t h b nufavoble; ox it may hapM with dd811 aad ~0nqd~acertaiu@adoftime for t amidlation of theme eonh

Y e t ~ 4 u K i c h b l l b t * d f ~ iap. Tf my m - ia ap-db w

auffid~tbelSooletUnian4bmt~ dttrnkstin~farfrom* .,' d m The hiaviet union Uda6 et,maehifisrg,fe-yb Biatanee,*nd&fdgn

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~ 0 m . BWebovethe~mBr' aon for soviet t3wamu& u q k - . hg eompleh nard, d H~wehavethe~oithegrsae e o a d HdatIom with the 0 t h emnMa niat llldntuh that any cnpbu8t vsmmmt will m a i n forever, or for a n ~ 9. ! e -gtb & d the Bmi.t U h 5 gmat length of time, for that matter, i ite htemational reI&iona, the C tige of the U d S Z in ib fordm polpadfiak Thowh FrPaee and E n p V icy, and 43metb pro; a m t o d a y l ~ ~ t b a n L ~ is due py w , d m not mean &at they are it portional to its own treonomie d W* leslr imperialid. It a b p b means that tical power. Onlp reeonddb L ths # pmstige of tbe U . 8 5 a in ia w at tha moment they (France and England) am not adow for war becaw d ~ a f r s d ~ l t O t b e ~ ~ they have their WBS % m more *OM amow the imperidht , wapat;hanona Germanyis,*tthemoItiaintheeonsiatentgPrsaitoftlme ment, mom ballicole ~ U M a h v e lineal of & a that tbe soyat hand an opportunity tO mt back some iet govemm~mt ham, from tha of the loot the other phmdersre took daye of its &&ace, followed a hornherinthelaatwar. ons peace p o w . To acblm m1 tbe 7. The S d e t fafeign diphmab sra prolehrhn republic has, a t hPd pedectly honeat when they pledge n w to make cmcedons d .s o a hhdermce, in the intamid affairs of As the Soviet power b e m e f r m countries wbich have e~tabliahed oe the conceaaions.~ ~~mpm* becams 1 I W m n wi& tbe tf.S.SP. I the pre* n smaller. h Z n t b i e ~ w w a a n o t a emt situation it ia the So* UqIm, with had r e v o l u ~ ~ he dmd tb8 a world oi ~nemie.0agsht it, that has Brmt-Wtavalr Treatp wbsn he dfd, Thb wan the SoPiet'rr momat d worst weak- . most t gain fmm wteb reciprocal pledga ness and, M m ,the fm the ap of non-inMenca in i n afiaim The M e t Union has strffered g d ib moat h ~ w d a Trotsky wes thea mot a W k d u - for years thra such interference by for~ t h m # a o f b i a ~ t i o n ~ t b e eign powere in ICB inkmid affair^; for a l g n f n p a f ~ ~ t r e a tT. he p o m p l e , tbe y e m of fomilitarp iukveutIon i h i a after the n ~ d t o 4 Waa cmdndd. OM118b i mch agreen b cmual impmwm at the *m, ments for m u w nw-itIt&eml# i ths n would w spelled d d d e foa ths 03wietgwemmmt beit&'f-t&%bR it i tha U.8.BB. r 3 . h&

W w311 enable the U.S.s.R to H M thaw& andtofa&taG#pma& h ' ~ ~ 0 1 1 a r s a f t a n . p&le wrlt out norm4 diplonmth

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m I T FOREIGN POWCY V E

~ m d b ~ a t ~ L i i w o l r c o npolicy of the &Vi& ChVmuMnt Band t l d ~ ~ t o t h e ~ i a ~ o i t b e a n w m b d subtanmy the 1 d m inhmational working c b & aam abmdmatothewhftea m i g h t a a y : ~ 8 r e ~ ~ r CartafnlyStdhknotabetter~ o C ? ~ ~ t h a n w a s ~ d o~ ~ fh * pe3 ? t~ e I B i t n a t h e t h p t i war comw, then mvoltlthn will folf not &n a l l d l d w d h g -ti= today. m m b no+ ~ % r c ge Be d m ' t k to do so. Today the hapa the prioe--thrrr acktal d ~ t i m l u.8Aa. b far mom pm&nL Lenh and o haman life and m f was compllfd b treaties g i * ~bemgreatthattheproaway, while $talin ia e y in a I d t wfll be bled white, too aaaL t o trombuigntre9ti%spl~@make tbe re~olutioa A h , i would be t paffeamtfobw. mWdfollybdmythe~tyd -! e sodat gwanlmmt a a m d l y de-m bhk& mmtion M m g W g as a rsrdt d m b k at md to appear aa the ofimperkliatwar* Ebrrmgiomd~intheeymoftbe Bowmar, them a m W a y upwid maThb ottihde fS rwtd i tlw n rorrswhythe~8ndthe~oitbs mtf-immlht of tbe prob hternational proletadst must sMye to tadan dlc&~tornldp. h U.6S.k doeadt T r m ~ I y t a I l t ~ f n t h ~eO ~ p ~ ~ n t a a 0 1 1 ~ a b t m p e r idist m Theee sre: . -r ita being differat from *corm~inpdc& Hmmtbe L 80 rcoh hove h o m e tbe amtagonU.S,S.E hm, fa tbe intemst of w , i m u Among the eapi-t m k i e o &at oftea stood for lots o provoCutiQm8d f ~dsngefoithdrmattuhglntoan IluWllbirOmiardarmWM0 expIoai~11among the f m w m a W b a r t h e g p p 3 a g e n ~ ~ f o r t h e pawem t h e m e h a csn only I c k k e d m em&watIoa of &vieit dipbrnatu by d t y amhat a common foe, O b h ~ f o m a r d w f t h t h e m o e t ~ pfoud~,aaeh a common foe orrty the t k l d wht-fo-rd p r o m for U.8.lg. d d b. IT- we tad tbs e cornemtone of Hitlsr'n strsteop. The P peat% fm P=dmw the vn aof Note ths SovN e a I ~ i a s e e k i n g w o r l d ~ iet pmpsdn for ~~t .ad its mow far German impddisrn thm pbcMmftim of sn m r , iag Germaay at th% head d a world coalition of i m p d a h t govemmemb TtdB &tie approach dmmcterh a the d t u d e of the U8P.E. toafmbt the lgovlet Union Should Eit= Xer m d i bls sr m tlte life of n ta , wanb the V d h The W t -ant will not J& a war or enthe Soviet Union woald be at stabe, tbs t s r m p ~ w I t b i m conbdktiom among &e, imprhlilt ~ ~ powem thwdw m o m e a t d y d k m d f@rB werthrow. Lhwiae, the w t s C i th9 Srpense of the ~F018-t h BUSwmnot~towarorsigntrngpaeta uiaandattbe%~rpeneeofthehbrmovp to prea%rmr the Yemillea As m a t i aIl comtxie~ Fortunately, the n a working elm government the U.IJ.8.E m h ~ i B ~ ~ n ~ e r ~ f & & h a w a y u o i g eU8.S.E. h so far bsen able, Wth *e thelp of the pmmure of tBe labor mopb lrid o mch montrow -f t i mentsr i the various capdkdht h d ~ to n , tlw re~hpmletarb meth0ntmaaePver Hitler. od# wbteh mmt to the mrap heap the Z. Thin, SGkMSt eollsmcth ill 3 r d Urn& Treaty. That ie wby the soviet Unioa haa atready madled that W t mrnment mn rdmnltPneouarS ahgeiawhiEhthedmculti6amasn nuke c d a h -enh with p w on the W a y Qf b b g o v ~ e - b u t not m% lacberk to aad opposed to the Veryetfdlyovercorn~~ ThisbavmyUmill811 pwt. That i why in #a very s cab momerat h wMeh the m t w of &a = t nego*tima with l n ~ ~ ~ n t , t h e s O v f e t U n i o of yeam COWm datmred i a war n ww able to 6 at an arrmgemmt as i owmight. At thb e b of the f mad, & thin d d v e momemt la the cmt*Gesmana~==weiohts~~ddlammditfmmtbettteofmthe p l e d o n o i t h e ~ ~ ~ d . 0 d d i . t i a ~ d ~ t h a ~ r p m m lh c t h In the U.S&E, i not only i the tnbmt of n w ~ t p w ~ t b u t i n ~ o Tdwmam&svarb~pe#a

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Debtding Some C r i t b Of The Soviets

S O h r w e h a v e ~ 'JdthefundaG menEal feattuerr dumctddng the forpolicy of the U.BS.R from the days Prlten Imh wsa ib berrt head, Tram ttlrno~~mwth,thmthepnr eat d q w h Stab is its fkmest hmA Now, let uu turn tO an examination of the caae made again& Swiet fpblcyby i a opponents. Tbia itdkhnmt t ewemtlallg mas along the i o l l d I-: 1 The &mmdat Party of the Soviet . Union is eagagcd In an ~ c o n t m h drive at horn b build soefabm m &e USSR ThbgolrcpofbddhgH~inone c u W le the m m m t m e of W e t foron D eign p o k y and speIls diafntereatedneas in and neglect of the world mmhtion. 2, fn ita &orb t achieve a this gOd the usm hm been dtivea resort to a m - u p in p r d d o n , the stimulation of competition among indiv- , idnab, and the fostering of i n q d i ~ e a 3 Soviet md-. n Woree t m that, cry h thew critics, t Soviets are therdom b bent on developing and inbrmifyhg commercial relatIona with capitdht powem. In the same breath these c a l d a t a m of the motives of Soviet foreign policy i3nd tne Bovieta mil* of what apgeara
atoogmitaarietpformmakt of the wmld mduth, a m f@ P O ~ W mr Soviet Union bar the prerrent bade&

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confessed a l t r a - m o 1 u t i ~mabWmI mema giving ap the Comhtem, pzb 811ppoms artnmnnt Maas3 to r&dw armed aid h the proletariat atd dmfal massea hhabithg ime-sf*tbe d tbe earth, The h-ta of tfme 8wid Union a in oonflict and incornpatwe with &a m la-ta of the internauonalkt, amording to the^ d -

~he-hmofd& of confadm and calumny mast M I wme to h one cmcltmion: The U& y t 83 and its foreign policy are w h o p a , 1 past cure, pad h a . " E h m , Peame B-8yI a ldW ob & Independe a t Labor Ptvty of d m np Soviet foreign policy in UIIfaMan "Ruwia d m not w w t m . !%at, r one widemtan+. Btrt spposition to i m mm~& not be budfiead even the i h aL W A" (Mew Leuder, LW&, Ztma I ; T 1 3 . Bmdmw, to &a 94) M &Inplaint. ae th9 d s for i 3 n %wfWam t o t h s m a n a b ~ t ~ inthewan ~ e of mxkhg k k m e d-mffhient. On t %Theiiriah~Nmimmaate '% '#') this limb, tbey -9, the Ifam is dwmgthaw d tie W bo be e u f f d h m 'a wertkB&ht ewt 7: ~ p a u c p i n f ~ ~ ~ i r o~ m s t b e . t . 3 e n o . i ~ t
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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

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Inothsrwordslibe~ the the wsalrer 3 n of the. USSIt, the IoserHkkhmi b between ttbe M g o r mmmemt lrhd tbe inhmatrond mmy mavhBtlt. What h b d a policy would ,& fqr the htmmtIonal labor mowme& arit ohlous: otrtripht dsoviet o*tT~n& It I*Q d m the grombd
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~ ~ ~ ~ t e - t ~ ~ ~ t h e ~ !W t i demamdthetempocdthe ~ d ~ t i o al h Vim -: d suffered by the proletariat of W & h p a * g 1019 and Ifm fnf l d t h e ~ o b o f t b e w ~ . atah and slowed d m tlW t a m p o i n I I d r r . Itioo*o-f** The-tieBofthe~ w e t g vt 0had W aKe& on all o h parties; g a d fight for emmcipatim of & *ar l i k e 6 iafinanw orrr

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iatern Enlarged E x e ~ ? u hCommittee -ions fn Febmary-Mamh 1922. At this time the French, Italian, md S p a Sah C o m m d partj6Sy delegadma den& o the adoption of tmiM h n t bt by *e C L X . m d e b a m charged b Wt meh h t i d t e d fmnt d o n s by comtmmist parties with Sdd h o matic p& and o r g d z & o - ~

fopoldictated by Wl of icy, Speaking for the French Mega~un, Momnolaseean said in part: 'Why do we n d a united froat now? 3etatm the revolution i~ srrrrounded by a world of d e ~h to, Lakd and cannot wntinne to exist farever in wch a ho* world wlthont the help of the intanmtional proletarh t Since the Eusaian nrvolutiw m t rely npon the hypomais of the world revolution nor on the effee~va foreee of the Communist Irkernationd it fa conatantlp see, Wmanta. It ia no longer b e on intarnationat nmolution bat i~ m d only with the preemation of the fruits of the Rnmbi MU-

Ltus8km Party which Is the l d h g partJr fn Comintern, wPn.mmw them for ita own,egoi&ic Tomaintainthisia~aMdm~ Omintern It iu I m w tp wnceive thmt the htemlta d . h n p o w w u e n o C ~ r r i t h ~ Interests of the entire p w u R w s h ~volution aa w d l aa the

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the mmy of &a So* d c mn e h modiPy ih aWt& hm~ ~ a t a t e ~ * wrrdsmB eapitdtat-im- bsndewey of fm tha There b the ~ m k t h e e m w t o t h e - m Trotre of 1988 a qi a ak nbt Intematrloaal h rn W d W ~ t l t m g a a g % h m t h e ~ o f p o l b h fa a parallel way* In evarg fM8l No one &odd be tempted t a o & cotuatrJr the Cammud& Partiea a m wh?tltelrharpmem~thirremtWhil8 mdamting theh p&de& InBritain lmmbrd,Po,,,,, the Commmrbt Pa* b c b d y pm+ mu* ptmbg the way for a ehangcd stKtads tow& the Labor PmQ." {New mhry doEa repeat itself. Bat how t Whnn~FrenehC.P.WyemrdmppEd L&er, November 80, 1984). f h a t-mw n t policy and made an nit i h Whm the W B wae abeped H dtra8hnwt 180 degree trrm hl the oppdt8 leftism Bmdmsy said i a e c t a r h polb directfan, many of the earphg dtha of icy was dictated by the of htheUSsRWekedthst~tUmtnarr Mfoneign go1Eey. H &'t like theme e m d e beeaorie of the needo of M t e 1 M i of the CPGB. Now, W CPGBiskghhgtocorreeti~~ Imdgn policy. They that the 3&kmb of the hvkt goYmtmat fpof a dyed-in-thenpbd the CP of Franoe wrme out wool nW0l~tioaary sodalisk h ha fattBermiWAvlnt. O f c o p r s % ~ should m d y welcotw the ttlrn for the m e m p l , only a few weeka Idom &n i CPtacth,itabreakwithultratag ttrrn by tbe &em& CP, howled that M t h . However, he &iqpa o d y o m h t h e i u ~ d m t f o r e d g n p ~ 'CThe &d&~ f0&e h.Bneh c o u u n ~ were a#abt m g , me nattonaht. ThEm forefgn tbe mi front* A thiB point, it b not r w t golici8~amtbemahaprhgoftheta+ hpgxop&b to underhe the fact th& ti- of the variom Communist partIaa a W t fdga poky taward Pkmm e H m ,mgzdlesa of what the ee of remaimed trnchanged whiIe the French t b e C o m m r m i f 4 t ~ d e s ~ ~ ~ m CP poky chmgd complekly. Thin wmng & tldr erg romm.n We might d d f t by the E h d ~ CP to d - sddthrrttbredrahalaBmcbayW t ad front tactics ma prhl&4 s be: Cmmunbt policies alweps have beEaxrw,of~pressuxeinitsranlrs been m a g , pre now wrong, and d'far united action wt the SP to B k n ih waya d l be wpng. tbe I t d d tide. Appamtly when clique Coaftlsfon d o m d d fa a g a ~ i s ~ h t e d f o r a M a d a n p + amus &hata crb d '*&p masot
mpmt

the nt&tuba of &hbmatiOnal aeewdfngto w w mww plrty, m f enongtt to

add r psragrrrph i n

ia tbe labor d t nbotrld b a ~ o n * S o v i e t ~ d fifiorefaapolfasu mzzt t z z cm for #a betber in caminpolics* The d l qm offollyfn W a podtion am reaEhsdbp Broebay. H saym: e "A furthm devdopmmt &sing m &Qi& foreign policy m ~'~ mmtbereeogmhd T b m L n o t d y

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What the opponents of kviet fomiga p o w forget ia that i all n t i a l m~ n

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~ * ~ = - t t = t b p m u d b r ~ mdamint$&-&dmydBovietgovemmatini~retati~with -nsor~@fmyWcmpitalist eoltllhien are i d e d d with ing to regmmt t b at t a a e e ~ ~ t b d a y s o f ~ E e a* U O r ~ a r t d ~ W r i t w d t b s are but a few ipcidenta of Bod& diplomother coll-wthg I m oi acy to illatrate this. mtstiveS or a d m I - md mQin 1919 Iamia m &tbe int 60- w -UPS w tbh o b daG n bmdemd by Redent W h tt a jeet the wrdmw o the f and otbera t the Soviets to hold a cono of the other e o n t e pmty.p imam at MnHpo at which ?he v u Artwe I f ( with F d d # *+: i ~ f 8 c t h a ReoaM k w~ oat hber11,1920). Uebrduf~mdeamtoanagree"Ed... I s e n k i u g l E o t ~ f ~ o m *; = a t with Lht m B e c a # ~ BoIn the or I d -port t~ etlOnr'm~ h e ~ h accepted, t Whib B U I W ~ ~ U h g ~ e t b e i r ~ b j e c t t h s ~ - d b groups r e f e d to gsrtfeipte i the eonn armed d o n against the oWm OP$famma. Jwt abut thia time (Febmtrae&g party, the .bOHtEon ob'ita arg I 1910) the l3uUttM h i o f i brought , political ar s d d regha * a d a b offer from the Soviet governB e m w e h a v e t h e S d e t ~ m a t but it w m never conaidemi by the n& k in L a h ' n days, making bourgeois- governmen&. make mvolutionarp p r o p a e d a aad W So - m o for peace was LenIn that W aid proleMan m o h t h b t a . alongaide of on May 7, Im, the W e t gov-t pledges, som 6f #a e v a w a t so far &s to conclude a treaty maummm made by the &vW ib of w i Georgia This treaty pro~ ment nowdays appeev mamh aaddb vided i part: n . t "Them shall bnCEf0rth not t 3 toln ~ k e r n e l o f W s p o ~ b ~ B erated any military operatiom found i the h s h w t h a n p on the territory of Gear& . or Lenin and T r o b k y for the iSwEet capable- o traasformhg the k r i t o r y f g&ion to the Genoa Coaimenm UB& of Georgia into r base of oprations RakowkyI until recant& an l%knz& directed sgeinat the RSFSB or Robbite, wae chairman of thb hb. aedwt its dieis, or e t the pubmtim In ite behdf, C b M d n d&dd lie order them he dab^. at W m : UBmazia undertakes not to permit UThe B~~~~ on its territory the sofmrn 4aeEhatrfnthepmmtbMdd& tivity of all gmups and organizations w h i d r p e m i b a p s d b l ~ -ding to the POL the gwernof o f t h e o l d s o d s l m d e r d ~ ~ ment of Georgia or of any of ite onebeinOh&daar well afr of all ~ P and S tion the organmatiom wlucb have aa their obi n g t h e t w o ~ d ~ q b ject the overthmw of the government WW* m of Georgian nomlc-.. - h l Givm the wnditiona then at hand, aIandelegatIonlt88emehaOtb bdtl's mahm magnifimlt and malre propfor i theombl. b d m b u t t o m t w @ ~ d a v q soon brought great d b for t&e Mats tfans with the gmmnmktl Hem rn haw an '&P &a Bob The same line of atram WM prrra m d in 1920 i the treaties with Latvia e n ahevike to provide &a a and Poland m i i g n part as foUow: v n i , d a program for *@Wt B a t i t i r r ~ 6 0 a o t e ~ w ~ Brtiele KV, &. WTreaB with Lat - h A-t , 11, 1980). t h e h v h t ~ ~ ~ a a

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A Breathing Spell For The B o w

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6OVfET FOREIGN ]POLXCP AND WOBWD EtEVOGUTION

a&lmtotheesphw at &mom, the h . iatcan liktldn, R&d8k#. B u k h w host ~ w negotia* * I n ~ w i & t b e a p o ~ o i ~ S e e

h d a

foraworkhgelaesl~frontamht 'apiwm =tion d Its d m p w q i o ~ m bomW d

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going a r e ma rew& the f#t ge m t t h a t t h a s o v i e t ~ h g a n ~ Theld#~basrWaYaddaborate ita popicy by buildh e d to it@v ddai.tbolu reading m-m-y oL the ing, on the etipalatbnn of con--n a# for acts of the Communht tiand n e u W Q , the b m $ outlftlse Ia-timL", TklviIeatenedeaof~ of a nn omymhsn, In addition to - c the eonaegtIon U.S.S.B. h w e dwap deliberatefy mgbt dmy thIa dbtklion of arg8mh blur of neatral obIigatioa fro? a pa&w one eueb aa m z k d nhtamth cenhmd oad -tion of reaponmdwitiw. tars nefltrallb h one of aa a e t h ~L~antheba5isoftMadisthat on June 4, 1028, in Trotand positive character, the Soviet government inmisted on giving and m~srmshine*,theSoPietgopernmivine rrpecitie gnamlbm oi nonIllent, P its m p o w , &-d aggreseion aud non-b-" rr tEeatp w i h Englad pmidino: The Soviet govefzrment mua only W t t r u m with fPnds ox fn O 4 about two montha old when ft firat conm other form, persona, or bodies, or agemdes, or h t i t u k w h m aim m i d the idea of b e h g In Jlf.ac% witb In to &canten& or b forneat some eapibht combha for a certain lengthof-. Ifever~waathe m x l o i anr pmt d the Britieb ldin n #Earpire, and to impmw upon ib of~ ~ t g r a f n 0 f t m t h h ~ f h m u d ~ t h e f i r l l a n d o o m - eal Ebarge that the C L was a 8ecHoa &mou obaerwmce of these candiof the Foreign Office of the Soviet gwtfoft&'# Cmnmt* that was m i the early day0 n hid, a more m@ng pledge could of&esovietar. T o m ~ b o t h p 4 a 0 mot have bean ex8ct8d. But the soviete ea, let me cb the Dectee of t BOYi b iet & December 18, 1917, deU w ~ave n UP and gained ddmg that it L n h m e d o d y b te h U a b m m t h at trade a d diplomatfc mhtiym with % come forth with all aid, inclndQreBt B P rT b Comintsrn C -i n g ~ a i d , t o t h e ~ d s ~ d ed i &Wj b wt inhatry and i ih n the 1 l a t # m a t i d wing o the f workma' movement of d countrk, b e d e w of whether them a0keem b o m b 8todcountrim are a war wlth RuuaIa, or t of batamatid & a h wuld see what in albmi, or whetheir they re* tb8 8oPiats ware W m a i these t n their nenkdw. Witk &em a h a W a # m m a M them3 foremm~f'8 of W t Pmplw' Cammhurrrs ozdain ' pmmt4iay u.s.m. maties with forthe aesigniw of million m b h e t powere. &id Professor Yalhone for tbe net& of the m v o l a ~ o m q inW. Graham, Jr. in Ma study of "The teypatiodht mw~mmt,at the dia&vlqt h d system,'' (pp. 12-18) m b positbn of the foreign w k h pubWd n September 1929: of the Commbdat fm ForeIgir Af% both these Bekr of agrwmemb, I himn as w&l aa i the now h i d t i c &lon R & Trading Agreemant, &ere This was some time bairn & formwem *d t, h wuyhg de-, Man d the Commrmlst Inhnatfonal. the pmvhm which thought Thiawaarrta~whsntheitl~ ePnantrsri to her miIitars s m r i W tional proletarian rewolatiomry farm had not yet &grad certain W~llt9. ag8irwt r m w w d of aggrednne from oertain By d i f f ~ t l y Yet Iah, author of W a BOW gomibb d u e 6 for the prol&t fn vad.0- * ,

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O f ~ w h i e b w d d p ~ m I U t = Y ~ # - - -

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hd r , h ml w w e a o m U.B.8.E h ~ d m ~~~ tbeh e s e e f f r dd m - iBt D E r rl a ldl u o fa l aa rb ymM ~ t M ~~ T ts ~ 0 r y h a o e ~ t o c m b a n a R d n o t -mmmik-umink&Left to - t h e ~ ~ o f Cmmm&W [&Nated w i t h the
Bepublie OUtEide ita borders. A pmmbot Gem- d a d a r m who, Sa tha dsgs when Tw was Comr o misser of Foreign C o r r d m i , *an a conwadon h the U.S,SX., baare wlbeaa 118 i o u m : # W e rue traitors to m c b s . We are hel* C o w Rwi& i u cnpibktic bdmiqua We are ~ m i n g a Frankemteh monater which aome day wlll devoaf onr & I thruoflt tbe M world." And Proi~ssor 80the wenknown -ti-Madat, d k u d u g 'OThe h t m e Economic Development of W & ern Emw" Mom the S o d Science Asadation in Zurich, wait campelled to go even f!urtk. Ha said: m e d&tiam oi aopItolism ia nearhg its end. A nerr eeenemk amtern la arhhg.'' On what basia do these eapiWt14 and the33 d~~nmnih anim a their c o d d o n ? t Let UIhear from Profewor Calvin B . Hoover, who haa spemt aome years ing the US.&&, = a critic. BxmMw T h e Soviet Challenge to CPpit&mn,

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d ~ d m w i t d f ~ f & W r w a y fro*l w warid Thief nustapiksof~dcqid.

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sf elwoPld W k for the U.8.SJL dthw fpm ths *Isrpoint of aoumlnea~ of'* mlUdebNo hbu r i m - labor caa take pIwa wW& d more pmlecarlan mml&bm IWiWI di+m of Wor i, s fiorog on the+ U.S.S.E. The CPAffff vary co)raetlYandvergeffeetivBxsf~m4in theilrceofmgreatobBw@ibfJtimaLatbg pmlebwilm mmdaum dmwhere by demonsbmting ia M a @&tyoftheeoalJIst~af eMnomg over the crpitdbt I U Q & ~ gzoduction and 8xchang& p 0 i n a O U ~ePen M R u t h k a a I y ~ d m af-~ l fax back as 1930 that: own fdaciolls majm p a m b , @m MaawAtthe p r e m t t h e Soviet i d nw p e r - m d u t i ~ " ,de&m that tbe % , ~ h a s ~ S a e n ~ n ~e r n t r ~ a H * w a of a tadm P O M q Ilr i ita development. For the firat n t w d l y uorrs fmm h Thdwhm time, a coddrsble part of prodnoof the C a . duw&ab Su p on i h h g carried on with mechans tryingkbdldeht8eu-m ical equipment wbhh been p m ~ e i n g i n t.h . h h a r t e a a d m i n d a ~ e M , b y a aodalist ecvnomy.. It ia ~ ~ o a s btritnow being d e m o m h h d that such a -p aormtrg, d m 3 u.s.= aocialiat economy can not & opera a d ~ ~ a b * ~ t h ate industrial equipment W t e d T r 0 ~ t a s ~ t h a t ~ k from capitabm, but ean a h o c m y o n ~befngbtriItthenrrusdme~aerthe newaaw social saving and conb3n featum o pmmbhy economic f traction mqnhd to replete and aug&tiom in the Soviet T f h To #am memt that equipmenLn a -( oppmcmb of W U.8.93. t m L an h organic commtion between what they Magazine octak, 1930). itan been able call "tbe trfertftrl @ i c i a of None of theate the Soviet govemmeatn and such '%omto comprarhd or men r e & the &p i e " feahreIl of premnt day s d e t d h n c e of the fact thak wh& capitaleconomy as cornpetMan, h&th in iarm t w m t off ill ag&dtum (* it pay, 6 m C a c y i p r o d ~ o n ,and Boln fa most prish), S&&st Enaslta i s able to d giant headway hem. Thia -I~Bowtotrsde,w* and t M k e god bargab in the world phenommm baa hwthmble import for The fomm g r p o ~ aout of t b t h e ~ c a d p o l i d c 8 0 f t h ~ w b o l e mark& l, a a y eontend. b t e world Brtt some of the bypardtical
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I

. &8Be vast majo* of -- & hh ,work in whteh thw an detwr me , whieh can rets I
,
1 -

+&

h. bsan tapped and that -pimm

-led

fabeat conclwions. Lwain v%rg aptly poha out tbjB whole dm tr i bia t ai m n &rIy addrsln, T h e Gmat m q t n b d e l i v d fn the very &at wmka d the R u a Bevolutioa H d d : e U I n o r d e r t o ~ h ~ t o Linpoffer,itSsourCBskto~ tabuah snd coneowate soddam, tbe ewnyretftion." {Olu smpimwb). T h e g d n 8 0 f ~ h ~ b ~ e v i d a a t . pmkhrht muat m h a ha-fold m rather a Wune pmblem. In the f3mt Ha d$d nut play with emptJr wm-. E e place, to with it the whole M w a s q d c k t a r e e ~ ~ t b e n e w ~ ~ of toil- and of the exgloibed by i b teat, ttte lmbetmae,, of wmpetition mmfi+mMMng herobm i a m h n der a proledm%torship. This p l tionar~rthmggla wainst capibl, b k y l a i d d o m ~ L e m i n w a a ~ d carrgthemu$withit,too~Jt, by tae N M Congrem of the CP.&U. toleadfthordarto~tbe hdd h m u follows: i *evefa Bocial u & r (s~oldhg, bourgeoisie and t put down e m a gletelg. all mdshnc~ its pnrt; awon feudal, -pi-) M ita own meth' ondly, to lead the e* m m of &a n 0th and p of e o m ~ o r y a lbi].et%and erpioiu and alao 8ll the bor d labor-hd&g B the inteape4ty b o q g w t a h t a a h g the path ata of W errploiupper clasmm of a new e~onomic-tion, w !ba Soviet order ia marely faced psthofthef%hbbhmtdanew with the b s k of dewloping its own eodaI conkact, a new labor Wptfne, d o d of action f f o r the purpose of ~ a new organhation of labor, combinthe inmdty aad apediming the btast ddewcments in seienca cy o lrbor on the bardn of a df and capithat techrdqtle with a masa iaed economy to the fntarata of the aslociation o f ED^^ workEmtire nation. em who mb krgwde intg "n adartion b the agitationat-1 eoI 'd dustry, aMilblht h d u a b Iwd inilnence on the laboring m a e e o n d m k 9 a ~ ~ mas- and &om rre far a i n thanthefirrrt,foritcunneverbm p r ew ahirkm and diaaai , kedbytheheroiamofad~outm#ankm are comamed, oompetitim btrnat of enthdasm, but r e p k a a ts s mmrfm1 force m a b g for bmost prohcted, a m& atrrblmma, U p d d v i t j o labor. h f mmt a m u o w h d m u i the d 8 y - b n GP Pf W campetitIon bore the day work amonp the, wm" of rivalry BPd led t the m o

hiism m p l e d on, m & e d and i &onsands and milliwm.. n ,'Only now I tbe posdbility for w d d a and really maw diqlay o enf campetition amd bId iaitiatlvehasated. Nowfortbe 3 h k t h e after ~ ~ n t m r i cf working os fok otlteae, of inmrlrmtarp m r far -W& it h a become p o ~ ~ & to le work f i x onaself. T w that a mchliat w u m x t mttA

*t

among the people tb&

O f t b e ~ o i J a b o r m p wm . m8 . b t w e w l f ~ , & ~ ~ d n paxbenta a d individual muat ba ma& the subject of d organhation d attentive sksdp on thepartof~trsdeonionaandeoonomic orgmw," (Our empbda). Too many eomradea b k opon tbe revoluth aa a simpIe oae-aet p m . They forget the variws 6tugea d &d o p a n t . They am not awam of tlse mew t m of work re pol^ marrt undertake after the prokt8dat h r taken power. Thin fdm to distingukh b

O n m ~ , - a m m m ~

--

tween

..

the U d ~ e t i ~ and~ * e tive" p b e of the w b l e revolutfonaw ~ p ~ h a s l e a m s n g . ~ t O f ? l g

..

aeborterkMngdayfma& I
moreculWd&hettCvalWld
advanma ete.

i*." ~ ~ t b h a r p e d o n t h e i m m c e o inmmshg l b r g m f ityintheamhtrepobucs. h u m h bbiatid be B ; an t "&& ~ ~ d t y b , h t h e ~ .aalsaiir,the#meandmoeth~mtant f a r I the triumph of the n a o d d ordsr* capitalism has -ted a degree d labor p d u & v i t ~ onlmownto8ddom. capi--be !, i l n a l t g ~ a n d w i u b a ~ ' ~ w n b ~ ~ t h f l i a o t t h a t ~ 'IRIU mate a aew and much *her W t y of labor. Thb in a vow r. Wbdt matter and it will take a b pa-. The prim& time; still, it had h m -a and t h a t L L e mainWng...." bank#, and na$uml' L C o m m d m meane a higher labor i the U.S.S& B. is aS dend d$odo. n . p d d m M d fhat & Aad PrdmlY, inr'r'wt the us.= h a w w #tmw&em 7-:'I o cspibkm, on the p8rt d volunf ~ o l u r l the ldaw dmacb of y bry, m o n 0 , d t e d wofkerrr 6mite 8CO~omy,has rn m:mY-mmt PloYbuP F r u b e i t f r o r n u ~ t o d e n y , ~ ~d t r r i a g t b e v e r g ~ g m a ~ , b n a b l a toimpmibinhat@wdp&b&b 3 the psent world^^ where the n w i B e o a t t h l ~ a P ~ b o p * g U.S.a& % a Soviet bland i a mbuI n mrMU sUrPae ta 3 apibLn lant m p i u t E%a, tha cannee* beV i E e ~ ~ ~ ~ . * r e a p l t a l tneen the sueid and ecunomic polidea ~ ~ p s r d t t o m , f h s U of the C2.S.U. i the M e t Union and n hhableto~edqandmave the fomign golicks of the U,8.8= W e ia*inite~afsad&twmhave &ad the above not to refute but ~ ~ i t 4 s & ~ t o ~ t h s g r b watirm the relakhdip. Y & the e Ietarisn gmmmmt m o t olJy hmgU.8.S.E k at present anxiow for m, nable tagahst astpcB: bg h g d n g capI-. -p vigoroudy a pmmf111W Q i ~ n ~ t ~ ~ t b e ~ t R e p i b foreign policy. Yea, h no small tlre is the & d e C Union m n to sqeh &g Ucbtltsleo~L8gahtthern&eaing csgitaltit p d d d e of tke foreign polidea h a u s e d ih great d* BdetUnion. T h e t w o v a m d h Potion to aoeiaIi ~ h l c t i o n the in tinct bnt ineepdle p b u U r n & In the 0.PS.U. 81 t h i e l i n e B t s J l n i & * I , ~ , ~o f ~ a i P 1 : t B e ~ m d n g o f & e 'b a ffllldalllmid comse M down hy U.8,M a repub180 and, I ; r e r f n , o o n i ~ w I t h r r n d n o t b ~ - themfore, rn the baee d the inkmath-

*awl ffle wnrkfm m o m f n a dona toil diapkay a mLi-m&fMw eanfor h m d n g labor prdmtiv-

UCommmrXsm~wherethe~

a m

-."

&

,wwmh-Pmmr
d
&

mb,mrrag@f --dtbe,f-bwb ef*V&ena.Wddahnawat~ ~cmmqwmwdwWmerd~ the c might grogoaa PaFham that a x ~ l a h why & m g a h a ep don't come fortRard tRith && awn pya-

*
r

. the -on
PPF.

for tnoet of tham not toeomeforwrvdwitheven~ mqwstiong i a positive aenm, T k t y . n dread the full lo& of theie aml poor thotlghtr on t b ~ t i o n l h

Soviet forefgn poIicy. Very Uk?eEg M

CBAE?I'mi Blx

C L Strategy And Soviet Foreign Policy .

Far be it from rur to main,

that

&a problem of correladng the t a c h of

'

tiom of the G L b simple. Far be it 'fmmuatodeMJfthattheve~ePdstamce of the B d e t government, m d e d by a world of h o s a gwmmenb, is not 8 ft& that we must face in the emdderaffon and adoption of our mod U v e nbahg7. Take the q d o n of dm Commdat position t o w d i m m d a h t war and ib W o n h Soviet f e policy. All Communht M e s

m e d by a Faeciat or a rnomrthkt state. a. MY, the h d or C.ach . Commtmbt Parties to make the slightest -don their bweoisie on mdt a Germany hm ~t ht reglme, ar would be gajlty of the m e e y crime & meet the came fate that the Demoeracp met wb it listeaed t o the plea of the m r and & peab w~ G en ed 2 C that the w t ~artg whea it plunged a war Tor the defence of d e m o m m n

There are two reasom fox thfs being m. These am: (1) The emergenee of German Fadam lediag G8rtnm imperialIsm headlong towards a war of ~ion-very probably st W dta U S S E Tbia givea auch b ...L o aa the French and the C w h (whoare mBlprnet~bnow have d h r y dbm%a with the U.8.S.L) demagogic d o with which to arouse and e d their working c l in the event of their ~ hving a war with Germany. 8eeondIy, the very exiatenee of the Soviet mm a t which, in the intamst of peace aad the intanurtionf working clam, haa enbred intO military a l h m a with wme capi-t co~mtries.

-~
*#

W m

I a .

.
I'

But it SB not wwh to repeat the old EsaeEially for the p r o l e a t of Eartain capitalist corntries h a the p m b h of national defassumed a new form, tho mt a new d a b
dog-

problem of Soviet-capitsltrt a l h m e ~ ~ la not new. M r a i d this mation h 1917-1928- H e deal* the P dflh ' m m m in PM& of the SovIet inta'a~trebdh c e s . At the-F d World C o of rn CJ.9 at close of Bakharfa attempted to d e the Md hpIicatione of such Soviet d l h c e a for the proletariat of t h w C O M M a mili ~ n itmy & with tha M t gapernmant. Bucharin, then, very wrongly rraid: 'n I this form of national defeme-hvokhg a k r g e a l state Bn military Jllares (with the U,S.BS..?Tfi.) iC iu the daQ of the c o m r h in a & a camtry to n

m .

&ientd q u e a t h m ldouab, have I * m t b f t . Infaet,W-Y m a n d ~ y h e I e I l l e , W v e e s

laelrdeollectfveleadeDshfgtntheC~
.*nrl*vaT-oi-

'

non-imprhlkt war. In Csdm4omF . ~ h a v e b e c l n a ~ ~ m m d b g d m ~ kin,theBeriowmenaoshing&eCmm-kn Mbr U s eaambn fato tbe ~ o i t h e h e r o d t w h l e h f u ~ a mantatmovementiede&dina~ in the C L a% ~ l f l t i o n Poap by a C.P. tieputs h whlch ha &id i i n 'proper11 dedamw "Tb Cammllni~tn luve part: % the event th8t t cmeb h no cmMeme wba-er I the w n BIomkhn army will lght p e l & y o f ~ Ib h d t h e n ~ ~ ~ f m ~ t l frettaattlPearmyfsbefasdagabt movakian C o m m ~ t a win t h m w a r k i n g ~ b R ~ r n n e a a n d t 0 0 ~ - rtmggk and mme out i froOr 4 lb u i ~ t b e a a m i d g e o P h % * a d f n d e w army. We a far pmemhg the Wtm o t t h e ~ t r t h t i t m h h t b e a s g d of the cm3cbSlmak nation whkh m *gainrrtthebietUaiom,~CQlarnd~ bemamntasdby-ad*#Wikap Psrh rrIIl wnlinm to FIGHT AGAINST myeleanesdofF~demdb~& THE rW0 YBAR PERIOD OF MIL= which the w o r h e4g d p W d l ITARY gEEWCE AND WILL EEFWSE d e a wedemad that.--3 TO v m WAR C&EDXTBXTBn the armg be praatsd ioi - While it waa 'entireIg c o m t for the frageagaia... ciai!intparttcsithegwemmm4fiidl C P of France to tounteract the d?orts .. the mamures which a ' mto of the Fmldl anti-soviet foreear to 8abbat Fasdm and t pmhW amas&. a , h g a a d pmYent tbie gact m d to bring b e a t s td the-u 2021 h h d a rappmcbmmt wi4h Hitler at the t h e of of tbe.S.S.B, Ofwnm,Ithrtlasmx&afldiwtw M e it wan abaohteb e t for the for CommmWa to M , Md d Fmlch Communbta to bring pm=cm theB~@t~~acdManfm&a to bear on the French government to ~01~60- P 1-3 &a the Eastern Pact, it w u e n h l y I m m g f o r t b e ~ C 9 . t o a b o p a t W . m t b the UmUL TIm adoption of thidl pact by the F ~ I C I I for 0-b ~thinpo3mtofvlw,it~khhgovemment eollldino w i m h r dgnsl
I,

o p l l P e a t o f t h e p m 1 ~ ~ I the WhMidmleat ab I R@% : ~ 1 t i a -p r o - w u * g n $ m e n t h d ~ a n d m l v e ~ ~ wagng a m v d u t l w war. t I , : problmm m,the rwmt mmdfatationa of d dla* in P & & d j i n d i e a t i v ~ d t h a ~ ' & a c a f. ' &e~ofthe~and-Colllr perPadingtheC.Ltoday,hwcdbthe i? mtmw P & k moat vital questions, b the f that W ,j A t b e s t , ~ d m h M g r i ~ t B e s e e &o*Up &ar W meetfng, 9%0=, t8s + f e G, I I t i ~ n s o f t h e C . L h e o f a r a a t % r i s p b - humtical leader o a h m d ~P lem b aoneerned. Thw, following theb k e out with a *tion that im e Strrb f n m , #a Fhmebelinedupon aidedP&a -tion o &a Rm& Comf U.S.sa i in war, than n awm4 mrmist Party held a mmbmp'& no longer be ImpeddM for %mh. ~ d a d o p t e d a r e s ~ l u t i o n t ~ ~ ~ && gaat mousde S t a b W h b o ~ a m t b d t ~ oable t o w ~w a mlutiontwy war, a ' i ~

bwi m d a it w r t h e ~ M ~

'

; :

S l

B O W T BOBELGN POLICY AND W O W REVOLUTION

11

1-

..

*I

AND W O W REVOLUTION

-swEH

-mwAradTheCominterm
than at ptwmt. Wi t htb k with fithonia (lw), Poland arad Lart(I9Zl), and the Treaty of Bapallo with Germany i AgTil lm. n

~befnoo-~byltheir~t

m t h e d a y s ( d ~ p a d T e 0 ~ ~ m d not the and nights of S . of comee, the f & w q o m & - m misht 8 a that the CPSU, d d a w ~

line on the 0 0 h hide; with a m h o cover, as i w e , the t aim of glvhg UP tha CommdSt I m b n l a M The ~hapac*~f~dfstortetsim~ wd%flb~rt?lefactth&ItwrsprecJaelp thep. wh* wnceived and hitiatad the ultra-Mt ~ourse. At the pe*lr d thfr W p and t e nt d h t a s . We were mm h u ia ulm-rn1flti0nism h A u m, ~ f n w e 1 ~ g ~ i n t h e B e r i 0 d o i& a l r o w k y = d ~ ~ e m ~ b h i t o mofgti~nt~~ U ItPd ~ s r eaxbd CPSU that had been a aofbesIas of m E g t i m a on all aided The C o m i n h UH (W4 m & t m wae adjusted to thfs fantastic s b ) thnt ' AlMehbr,
left, a&r
fo

U C L, dek'bemw f o r d an dm.

~~

m b

i tbia period that the ~ a g i t d h powem n t meodd mom and more mogdtfom t~ tbe USS3.
% fpolieia of & trariow bo-ia powera me h no way dekrmiaed by the W d conme of the C m rmmkrt Inkmmtiod. I t im't at all h e that Ehe leas ~korow, the ha rev~h-tbeCI,themore emesnianeand the battar the berms the bperialirrt pmon a the USSR. ~n fact, the h t eapitali8t magnition of the M t government c m e in the rrfmgw dam, the 0mt yeara, of dm CX. Fnrtbemore, it wus preeidy i them dam that the n govfet gmtmmnt had to pay the higha g t * in ita fordm rdatiolm CotmtrIea h~vingfar more fear of -011 tbaa t31e U.8. recognixed the Soviet -t long before Uncle Sam did. h d the M e t Rapnblica made fargmntercweegsiollgthanhia~to bomgedu d e a when their r e g i m ~ were f+r kua atable, far more h dm@r

C.L, vigomaely psshed and aided by the EGCI, *bd by thg W U , d o r hnately & to work on thi~ basis ia their m e c o n n ~Yet, it .was pmcidy .

~ * N ~ W a e & h e 8 p a p e r evaluation The mzhw eectione d the

in*^**^^^ d ITw basted that: T o r o be tl mztarh today is an horn for

WW$

r m I t l k l q . " And T r o w 8 parot in the U.S. not SO 1 ago uttered the follo~i- wo* of tmth,tho not of widom: " S t a h had t borrow C O P ~hrr*tbe i d d o g i d o ~ ~ Y amaml of the lRit Opposition," (P. 6 8 Tm Yemi of the Leit OgHtbn). Mom that. U them critia honedly stMhte to the go~ernm~mt and its k a d e d i p such addom d m d p h a of W@, they ~ h d dlogidly condemn U s m aa t Qmat dwagemaa type ob k anti-pmmbts a ~ c h not dl L m r g agatnst its o w a r m clam at home but a h camodagai 3beK i o m k t~ n m d e m h and @n o &a working d w m-ents tbraortt mrId Iat logic should thm impel dayMnCsof~~Iution"Cd upon the e* n j n m t l d p~colto wage a h o b war again& ogre Imowna~~ O m tMs &y the F , m w d e d the M e t government. a k y ~ ~ f o r c l v i t w a r i ~ t h e U t it^ b e mth logic. And a blood brother of &a Trotsky family, lilre the

moat pt -

F
,
I I

...,,
.'
,

Z
L >

y
.

t . . ! I I *-FPCr,.IE.IEET7

>"

-Y

>

:.-

&!,m~l- WOPLD m O L m O N muds A m

--&thstthe-~tate eraaotmalrs~inibdiphma~ mladona, i its foreign policy. Nor doen n it mean that w h a sach d a k k ~ am

~ i n d a F a I m 0 3 ~ ~ dm't,forcmma~dmmicad, h t t CP8U emmot m a h miah ~ i n t h e ~ I t w o r ~ @ t l t f o

made~theCFSUandthe~tgovemmemt which it eontpols, wa 1r8orrld dmwowreyemtothemaadnotcrl~ them. The very oppodb i s the cam, Only the most uneqtti~oEal but cm&m+

~tl1eU8#R,iathem~toput & the &

l.

+.

+I

\,'

10'

'

~tasalinedpo~cyforthe~~ Likewise, we maet condemn RadeFa mt*M b~ the J a w m e P w ammhg &e world that the Soviet Udan WW not m t to mrmed force in the r the beeaule the stah inner e m l - - and that ogi~ UbJISB (laid down ba the CPSU) n wrily me mt be f W o m of the Cbfnw p p l e b b e concern of the Chiaese nation ibeli. fn i e w ~n fiepolitice of the of d w and for #-&hcnwother of the C.L, one shodd - it ia not , Is -k p to not conelude &st there is a fundmenthat the USSR Is not conbamplaW tab nsoaasaw tfnavOm~e or lumd hhmention I C i a but the n hn, the i n of the CPSU am W leadhg party of the C.I., as the mle form of declaration im* d c t m h a party* and the other wctloll~ of tbe CL We cannot a too strongly Beddes thIa, it i also @le s for i n a t the and hh of the dividasls who e l h i and weak solely vd0118 Individual sectiaa of fie i the capadb of Soviet diplomats to n md 04 the Comhtem M a whole tow& make mirrtalrei. Ia tbis light, LIbhoo's buwe@h memmenta mrrst M p b a declaration in the h a m e of Nations, Mhg victorg i the 8apr n M y didarwt from the metbode .ad ketiEll hid down far the Soviet governplebhite, waa not m n from the point ud memt by the CPIJU. ofviewofthe~in~~taof lSwIet Whea we grant this n e c a w w M ~ R - foreign policy, To say ths least, it was a c e of bctiw in the pursuit of common d e d for and clumq,

- *
Powm
On

march

the

We fir that U88IL-h compelled to -de the find mme modtll aMfie-tdm~iwiat This modue vivwdi is extn & Emprog o t , by E-aian pro-

pwt was a e -vest oi Being the ~ymbot and d md *oat sole leader of the CI todsp,
-soviet

For i n a m , S t d h * ~o the c o - d v e n-ary and. correct

-*
d w

m hval

of

S -

made a
v

mistaloe
a

-t-hp-*inb-

.-latloand @lomaeyresombbyae CP uSBR he aame would hold far the fa the U.S.ifitweretdayap8rtyhpmar .nd fn fie bbwtl:onal podw W the UBSR now finds i . W

-*

atanda and appmes idly the natlopal defense of Fmm in kee!~hg 8rmd hem at a for -tplm T b e ~ C . P . ~ b l ~ t o o k t h t n mt m d y a# PI didlpmtic *ath

---

CHAPTl

Soviet Foreign Policy And World lbvohrtion

hnwrmrantalel8uvuge~~~
~ O f ~ m w a g o ~ d t h ~ O i t k e ~ n r d p r o l p r E a e

i?4Y

TbertrOtabhtbemEh&fbsxvrima

r i w t i # i i l e r E r o m ~ t oLad~ ~ f m r e , f r r t h a N m Y o r k ~ Port, -1 a b #emation raths* rmdalprlu--andllaieB*hMetirr-itbe akmwYlmL ie notSring. . m

ht~ls~horp~wabrpndwhat

..

yrtofwate*thtetheorgho~h a

Wraag%==b*f-islrpoHtY~

mmttlrrowafkrwei#htinthe~ Manal for peacrt--aeem for the ' ~ r m t t i m + i t ~ * ~ ~ i n

~ O t h ~ t o ~ * ~ o r

- - o s n wg v ~ -

b a aubstitnte for correct the Cominhm or any of its

mhbm as a d o l a may e a, the tactiw Lnld while
t

b y t b e ~ ~ ~ ' 1 ~ 0 ~ h s n d t b e m a n y ~ - O f o p ~ B P lomfal peapk. The hadan wdam haY9 mized polidcal gowler. T 'mw rrrla one of the earth. What &mId do with their pow%r within tbe 13BdetUmiont Thieienoabmq[rreation f l o d h h g i a wetmm. T play n o with s u power b t play with lira, t a a Clearly, the quation cannot b treated & M y . What &odd the Budan w o r k do i the SovM Unfon but bdld sodabm5 For what 0 t h PUF pone sIraIl the I h m h proleh i d e the U 8 . 8 . E 4 state- w m t t p b now wield except fox cun&m&ing midh t None oi W,dtica of the CS.S.U, haa to date d d an &ernathe t P t h e R ~ ~ t Wh&dowetgeanbythaqn&on: c a a t h e p r o ~ b t l i t d ~ ~ t h e Soviet Union? The mmh&ion of m-

I ? i a l f n m i u t h g B ~ U ~ ~ ~ m f a s o f a l l ~ u 8 t ~ t r h the U.S.=, by the 8uvM w a r m

i its relatiom with capitaln

El

le%

sbo happen that the meehanof these

.'/ tn

M doom tb.m ahon applied in ~&berwrm~es-wotddhibIfbe t h ~ &onmiof fatal ham to the Q . resort P%
h g to mch a atmtagic mum?, Xn fa&

tion,the80pfetpmlebatthaammimd in power, haa ~nsolidatedita padtion andHarrarplendMyu~its~for @ %$ . i ~mnIwlmbleprogreaskawiat W ca8hldm wheas tL?a world..*hmkh &-tm&nEeoeiaum ~ of h rn d k f n ~ ~ U n f a n L m s e h m o r e t b s n astounding ~ SeeondFhYsarPlanUindl~d . t.etiarl Wh G M. a ~ * # @ ~ Laibmrag

of the Corninabmada d l co~t1yqrrors a m ~ t h g tl lWt in the S d # t embnotnecwdymesncofiect. h tae o t l m sections of the Gomintern; *vea%wmngtaE#cahtheother o &a Combtern, do not necenf mema wrong polidem by tha CP. 8.U- Nor maat anyom atknpt to hide &-mb@he the f&i& o the h e of f fnkonatlonal at a garT t behlnd the muudnem onB' a@emmmtn a So* f foreign

R*

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r e d i m ~ ~ ~ *eJnaheS~UnionharWmm~ ~ for a *$blmy 9 tsmgtooftbhaabn8Df~a%b t i dk b t o ~ ' on the mat of tlm m ' . sumb, t k m erltdm d gt.nt rre tbpt l ItLunddh@Is~#ah*tr ~ * E a d ~ f i t t o obtheB&@tlts~tdtbeb aPoaIdhmediatelymeanaeJoeedfmnt tematBd p d e w a t am h u e p a d l 9 d -1 W Ikllsn, J p ~ a a e e 5 w sad an8 hannamforra Thsp srrpplement and dmerIean i m and a11 d & lael somplete each other. There b no auch wa 3k .t. ~ ~ S ~ n Thbha t a f wainst ~ B~tha~~ag;~e~omderhow gum f d d t a o n oi trnemies oi m inthem Sodal -atk oppomms of bmakbml-at1 of the w t fordgn policy would ham w e Sovist Unim, of the e* n world labor Tim world prolekulat h, itfitheBedArmywemtohavemar*bed o E o f n h ~ r m f a r , n o t h m d ~ p ~ a B t f m d ~ , n ~W l f l 2 9 w a tm g i h down workers m p h a an fmpekta to its v k k y , am e. . May Day dernomtmtion pxohEbIPed by meemma and aehhmentu h R w the m i a n 'c$ocu8t" m a t .No . , '%#, O the other h d , i the pmle-' m f one need havk evea the ulighted dmbt -t in the capitsliat cotmtdew hadn't that i this had ocetured the a d d Def the gwiet Union, inkmanm~~ab, the world owx, wwld have rben flon d d have come eatmibly and to W def~nee of Geman S d d De' rapidly enough and the M e t &pub& mmmm agakt B b oundm a t h k by the impmidbt powem, &hip"! waald ham been ov&hmwa ft la just them peogka, who barn If frrilure or die& were ever to be!d for gaarm thst &e M e t Union a h a 'fall the Soviet U i n it would up41 tbe no, .:' not i n in the atdm of o t k .'t batrsst deieut for the workem and 'op wrm*, that are now cr f Bmkt colonnld p~oplea mauy gesrs. for foreign polity and the u.aaa. . preswd mhodd the inhmntim BympaAgafn, ofbetrayingthI9inteQwhdthe~ thy d nu* for the U.S.8X grow, t i & working claw becaw the Sovid than, the growth of s o c i a k t eonsh-w government d m not break dip1omatic tIsn i the Soviet Union, the E&SW relatimawIthGemlmyanddM4gootlf n v b r y , m M be w d e d up kmmJitawwagtop~tanimperf~war dm&. Yf the M t Union movem fore which wodd, in every HkeIlhod, brhg ward swJftly i fts drive for S d d b t n &out a e o u c a d d drive of &e big capii -tion, th888 s o d a k t *riH -t powerm a&nd the Soviet Ee~ g o a l o n g w a y ~ s t r e m g t h - gnbua anhg the prole* podtiwa nf battle T conclude, the foreign policy of &e o a@mt hWmational c a p i t a b am d Soviet Union L primarily a weapon of It b amtrsiag to itnd tbat most o &e f the I t & d o n of the inmattonal &tiof the U.S.S.B baa0 themdm pmhtdat Jn the world a h g g I e a g a b t on tlm aaaumption that the 8o~ietpovimperialism. It ia a weapon ditlemt~t emment is not revolutionary enougb tofromthet~eaponsdbytbworlrars w a a l C8pitabt govemmenta. It im of o h c o d k k a bcaum the Rwdan these people who have, for p m l e e t had,already s e e d a higher ream prior to the present juncture of d m of claes conscloume~, haa alfakernational relations, condemned the ready won pmar. fn the oee of thIa B o a too~ revolutionary. It is m ~ weapon tbe Communist o the f the ssme people who now demand that M e t Union muat take into d d e r a the W.S.U. should have the Red Army tion the actual clam mhttomhipr prema* ttUp Germmy to avenge tbe miling i d d e the leading i m m 4 infuriea W l on the Geri w comtriea, the dfftemmcea amongst the man m1r-t by Hitbr. Them- litim t powefs, the of the t2e room for doubt that if the 3ed h n y fnkmabonal lahr moment 4 &a had mmbd, a a aome of them people economic and mW.tary f o r m at its own r r ~ l t ~ w y ~ w a n t e d i t t o t n a f e b , r n d command. !Chis ir the only sound, wacof kbmm mi& would M a y be helping tical revolutio~approach. A h m * ~ f s ~ dolls without foundatlop h fact,- 8 m ~ ~
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T b pamphlet has, we are sure, aoatributd mmethbg to yotv dtrcrtion fnlhha Marxism. T aonbfnue fmther this u h c a t h we urge yon ta d IWnm D WdWo o . bmkld T b g a We Waat To Know," tn which s a e d ~ qnwt3ma on Coermndd of tbeoty and tact& mkd an -hack& htdktd, h a a s ~ d We WaatToKnd'bl6amt-s
~ e r o t h s r ~ a r t i e l e a o n t b e ~d h k m d d W w r ~ t r a the W To Commdsmn a -4 -mine, prked at I c d a Aad to
Zhmemaa,

Geu.F.Mik,rrdmmr~redthew~ WOEEBBB AGE 6 1 W d 14th a. P 0. b x t, . New York City. - S l S far 6 m o n h W : 2 pzr $. M

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