Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
s
Anton Cheremukhin FRB of Dallas Mikhail Golosov Princeton Sergei Guriev NES Aleh Tsyvinski Yale
February 2013
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2500 0.8
2000
0.75
0.7 1500
0.65
Stalin
500 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 0.5 1890 1900 1910 1920
Stalin
1930 1940
General agreement: Stalin policies unnecessarily brutal s Critics: rapid growth may be catch-up to pre-WWI trend Supporters: Stalin policies fundamentally improved economic allocations s Main channels:
"Big Push": massive state intervention kick-starts productivity growth (Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1989)) Stalin policies "broke barriers" that existed under the tsars (Allen (2003), s Acemoglu and Robinson (2012))
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This paper
Counterfactuals: compare
Simulated Tsarist economy (with tsarist distortions) s Stalin economy (1928-1940) and simulations without WWII (1941-...) s
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Main Results
1936-1940: Moderation
all distortions lower under Stalin ("broken barriers") TFP level and growth rates lower under Stalin (no "big push")
Counterfactuals:
1928-1940:
Welfare loss of -24% consumption under Stalin
1941-onward:
Welfare gain of +8 - +16% consumption depending on TFP growth
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t =0
A log ct
A + (1
i M ) log ct , A
Producers:
manufacturing (non-agriculture)
M YtM = FM KtM , Nt
= AM KtM t
M Nt
agriculture
A YtA = FA KtA , Nt
= AA KtA t
A Nt
< 1 = 1
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Competitive equilibrium is optimal M First order conditions (pt = 1): FM ,K (t ) pA,t FA,K (t ) FL,K (t ) pA,t FL,K (t ) UC ,A (t ) UC ,M (t ) UC ,M (t )
= =
rM (t ) =1 rA (t ) wM ( t ) =1 wA ( t )
= pA,t = UC ,M (t + 1) (1 + FM ,K (t )
)
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Given these wedges, competitive equilibrium replicates data exactly. In our context: AM , AA , Gt , qt extM , extA , K0 plus t t
Inter-sector capital wedge: 1 + R (t) = Inter-sector labor wedge: 1 + W (t) = FL,K (t ) w (t ) = M pA,t FL,K (t ) w A (t ) pA,t UC ,A (t ) = pA,t pA,t UC ,M (t ) FM ,K (t ) r (t ) = M pA,t FA,K (t ) rA (t )
Price scissors: (producer faces pA,t and Consumer faces pA,t ) 1 + C (t) = Intertemporal wedge: 1 + K (t + 1) =
CGGT ()
UC ,M (t + 1) (1 + FM ,K (t + 1) UC ,M (t )
)
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Create consistent dataset for aggregate and sectoral variables Tsarist period: data reconstructed using Gregory (1982) Soviet period: data reconstructed using Moorsteen and Powell (1966)
quantities reliable, prices not measure quantities in 1913 prices
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Following tsars, WWI, Revolution, Civil War, New Economic Policy In 1928 Stalin consolidated power, two major economic reforms:
Industrialization: signicant increase in state investment in manufacturing, s especially in heavy industry Collectivization: forced organization of peasants into communes, abolishing private property on means of agricultural production (horses, cows, plows, etc.)
Price scissors: a mechanism of surplus extraction Peasants were forced to sell agricultural goods at articially low prices.
CGGT ()
February 2013
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500
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
p /p
A
-ex 0.15
/Y
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
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Calibration
Russia and Japan are quite similar before 1913
Use Hayashi-Prescott calibration of preferences and technology in Japan No intermediate goods; assign to labor in M , land in A
Other parameters:
Subsistence A
set to 28 rubles per capita in 1913 prices; 72% of agricultural consumption in 1885
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Wedges
A
1.8 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.6 6 1.2 1.4 1.2 1 Wedge Trend 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1 0.8 1890 1900 1910 1920 Wedge Trend 1930 1940 4 2 0
M
2.2 2
A
12 10 8 Wedge Trend
0.8
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
25 Wedge Trend 20
W
12 10 8 Wedge Trend
C
0.8 0.6
15
6 4 2
0.4
Wedge Trend
10
0.2
5 0 0 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 -2 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
-0.2
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
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0 1928
1930
1932
1934
1936
1938
1940
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Tsarist counterfactual:
Extrapolate average (1885-1913) tsarist wedges Actual population for the whole period
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Extrapolating Wedges
A
130 120 110 300 100 250 90 80 70 Stalin Tsar 1930 1940 1950 1960 200 150 Stalin Tsar 0.1 0.05 0 0.15
M
400 350
A
0.25 0.2
G /Y and ex /Y
M M A
M A M A
ex /Y Tsar
A A
1930
1940
1950
1960
1930
1940
1950
1960
25 20 15 10
and
W R
Stalin 12 10 8 6 4
C
0.3 0.2 Stalin Tsar 0.1 0 -0.1 -0.2
Stalin
W R
Tsar
Tsar
Stalin Tsar
5 0
1930
1940
1950
1960
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1930
1935 Y S talin
A
1940
M
1945
1950 Y Tsar
A
1955 Y Tsar
M
1960
1930
1935 K S talin
A
1940
M
1945
1950 K Tsar
A
1955 K Tsar
M
1960
Y S talin
K S talin
0.6
1935 c S talin c
1940
M
1945 c Tsar
A
1950
M
1955 c Tsar
1960
A
0.5
1930
1935
1940
A
1945
1950 N Tsar
A
1955
1960
S talin
N S talin
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Manufacturing TFP falls: large welfare losses Wedges fall: long-run welfare gains sped up transition, welfare gains
Trade collapse:
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Conclusions
Policies:
Lower barriers in the long run Lower productivity under Stalin (no "big push")
Welfare:
Large short run cost of policies Modest long run benet Short run costs outweight long run benets
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Policy
K C W AM AA Trade
Total
-24.1%
-1.0%
16.5%
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Policy
NA N
in 1945
Contribution
K C W AM AA Trade
23 % 24 % 31 % -4 % 2% 21 %
Total
-12.6 %
100 %
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Alternative Scenarios
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500
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
In vestmen t to G DP ratio
1.8 0.3 0.25 0.2 1 0.15 0.8 0.1 0.05 0 0.6 0.4 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 0.2 1890 Russia Japan 1900 Russia Japan 1.6 1.4 1.2
p /p
A
-ex
A
/Y
A
Russia
/Y
1910
1920
1930
1940
1900
CGGT ()
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Policy
K C W AM AA Trade
Total
-43.2%
-28.4%
-16.4%
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