Politics of Earthquake Relief Reviewed work(s): Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Jan.

20, 1968), pp. 188-189 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4358150 . Accessed: 25/01/2013 17:33
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January 20, 1968 ostensibly revolved around Vietnam, it in fact centred upon the tactical turni that the CPI(M) leadership was makiIng. And it was on the voting on this amendment that the relative strength of the contending groups was brought to light. The extremists suffered a heavy defeat mustering 89 votes against 196. In the light of this vote it may seem strange that A K Gopalan was chosen as the new Secretary of the Kerala unit of the CPI(M). He had been identified with the extremists and was, in any event, regarded as the olnly leader who could possibly hope to challenge the Chief Minister. There had been, to start with, a fair degree of exaggeration in the stories of the ideological-political rift between these top leaders of the Marxists. Gopalan would scarcely bother much about Mao and his ideology. What he wanted was faster progress in his own State and quicker advance of his own party. He was very critical of what seemed to him to be the undue deliberatioinand circumspection with which the Namboodiripad Ministry was moving. He was also worried about the attacks and assaults upon his partymen with the police simply looking on. He felt that the volunteer force of his party needed to be resurrected so that it would be in a position to meet any eventuality. Nevertheless, this was opposition and the extrenmistsand he did start regarding each other as allies. But it is unlikely that Gopalan voted with the extremists on their crucial amendnient. Hence, to further isolate thent and to give scope for healthy discontent to function along disciplined lines lie was elected to the top position in the party. The only cause for surprise in this choice is that Gopalan has never been and is temperamentally incapable of being an organisation man. He is the mass leader par excellence, moving about everywhere and as restless as the surf of his own Malabar. But a Secretary needs to spend a minimum amount of time at the desk and have a minimum regard for organisational forms and norms. It is certainly a very big challenge he has taken on. What is even more encouraging than even the rebuff to the extremists is the response of the CPI leadership in the State to the tactical turn c f their Marxist counterparts. It was T V Thomas, himself so often denounced as 188

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKL-y the high priest of revisionism in Kerala, who declh-redthat immense possibilities had opened out. He suggested a round table conference of the leaders of the two parties so as to initiate fresh steps for greater unity. He rightly pointed ouLtthat the differences between the two wings of the Communist movement had very significantly narrowed in the past six months. It was difficult to know what divided the two parties, he said. It is to be expected that this suggcstion for a fresh intia. tive to evolve closer unity would be taken up by the all-India leadership of the CPI. In the present dangerous situatio;n, especially after the decisive turn to the Right taken by the Congress at its Hyderabad session, it is imperative that for sheer survival the two CPs should close their ranks. It is better to unite in the field of mass struggle than to unite behind the bars.

MAHARASHTRA

Politics of Earthquake Relief

CONSIDERING that the earthquake of December 11 in the Koyna region affected most of all two taluikas in which are situated the constituencies of three important leaders of the Maharashtra State Congress, it was to be expected that politics would play some part in the organisation of relief operations. Karad, onQ of the two talukas, is the constituency of Union Home Minister' Y B Chavan as it is that of Y J Mohite, the Minister of Housing and Transport in the State Governlment. Patan, the otlher taluka, is the hometown and constituency of D S Desai, the State Revenue Minister and Depirty Leader of the Maharashtra Congress Legislature Party. Yet it does appear in retrospect that the political possibilities of the earthquakewere exaggerated and that one of those who committed this error was D S Desai. SITUATIONS SOMEPIQUANT As Revenue Minister, rehabilitation of the earthquake-affected people is D S Desai's responsibility. But from the intensity and demonstrativeness with which he has thrown himself into the relief operations it would appear that he is attempting more than merely to discharge his official responsibilities He has been continuously camping in the Koyna area since the day of the earthquake. At the same time there has been an attempt to publicise the apparently casual attitude of the Chief from Minister, V P Naik, who is Vidarbha, to the suffering wrought by the earthquake and the tasks of relief and rehabilitation. The Chief Minister did reach Koynanagar within hours of the earthquake but after a few hoours' stay there he left on a tour of his constituency in Vidarbha according to a previously arranged schedule. He did not return to the State capital till four days after the disaster and no cabinet meeting was held to discuss the calamity for a further four days. This did lead to some piquant situations. Thle State Governor, for instance, had not issued the customary message of sympathy to those affected by the earthhad received no quake because he advice to that effect from the Chief Minister. Y J Mohite, the other State Minister whose constituency suffered from the earthquake, has also been active in organising relief. In the circumstances of only a few months ago, it is conceivable that D S Desai and he might have joined forces to make an issue of the Chief Minister's lack of concern for the earthquake-affected and, by powerful Weste-rn mobilising the Maharashtra group in the State Congress, posed a serious threat to the leadership of V P Naik. Desai and Mohitc had come together at the time of the General Elections and the lattei, it will bc recalled, had been instrumental in securing the unopposed election of Desai to the Assembly. The uncontested return, the only one in the whole State, had boosted Desai's political stock making it impossible for Chavan and Naik to carry through their alleged scheme to drop him from the State Cabinet altogether - they had to be content with stripping him of the Home portfolio. However, there is evidence to suggest that Mohite and

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Desai have drawn apart in the last few months and that Desai cannot now count on Mohite's support against the Chief Minister. It has been suggested that Mohite, who was disappointed with the allocation of the relatively innocuous Housing and Transport portfolio to him, has more recently been given hopes of better things to come by both Chavan and Naik. It is his inability to bring together the different Congress leaders from) Western Maharashtra that has blunted D S Desai's thrust against the Chief Minister. Like Mohite, P K Sawant, another prominent Congressman from the area, who was Home Minister under the late M S Kannamwar and was tipped to succeed him, will not niake common cause with Desai. The other hurdle in Desai's way is the attin-main tude of Y B Chavan who also hails from Western Maharashtra. Chavan seems to be convinced that the only real challenge to his present overlord ship of the Maharashtra Congress can come from a Maratha leader who can unite the Western Maharashtra region behind Vim. So he has consistently kept down leaders from the region. It was he who was responsible for downgrading P K Sawant after he had held the State Home Ministership with widely-acknowledged competence. It was Chavan, again, who put the brake on D S Desai's meteoric rise to the top as a popular mass leader. By contrast, Chavan has not hesitated to promote V P Naik. He has not! looked askance at Naik's slow emergence as a leader in his own right after beginning purely as his protege. He has now further raised Naik's stature by securing his election to the AICC Working Committee.
UNENVIABLE POSITION

January 20, 1968 Administerpin-pricks. Thus the Karad Taluka Congress Committee recently organised an all-party 'morcha' against Desai accusing him of favouring Patan taluka in the allocation of relief funds to the neglect of the other areas.

farmers in the State for raising resources for earthquake relief was turned down. On the other hand, his (lifferences with other Congress leaders from Western Maharashtra will be exploited to create problems and

BRUSSELS

Banking on Epic Crisis

THE new year dawned for the EEC just as it usually does in these latitudes - cold and gray but with a promise of sunnier weather in three or four months' time. For the moment a thick fog blankets the landscape, natural as well as political, so that both physical objects and recent events seem blurred and indistinct. Even the French veto on negotiations with the U K has lost much of its impact, largely as a result of the euphoria induced by the long Christmas and New Year weekends. straightforward forecasts of earlier years. The prevailing note this year is likely to be one of uncertainty, therefore, with at least five of the six member countries in search of a policy towards Britain and the other three applicants for membership, on the one hand, and the EEC itself on the other. The instinct of self-preservation probably will work in favour of the EEC; the possibility of a prolonged bout of non-cooperation by France's partners is discounted in Common Market circles here. With the customs union stage virtually completed, it is unlikely that even the Dutch will push resentment against General de Gaulle to the point of paralysing the Community.

In the circumstances D S Desai is unlikely to be able to make much political capital out of his work for the relief of the earthquake-affected.On the contrary, as Revenue Minister, and therefore officially responsible for the relief operations, he is in an unenviable position. While much of his political future depends on his ability to organise efficiently the rehabilitation of the earthquake-affectedpeople, it is unlikely that he will have a free hand with regard to resources for the task. It is known, for instance, that a suggestion to impose a levy on rich cash crop

Trying to peer into the future through the haze of goodwill and optimism generated by the year-end festi vities is always a difficult task, but thl difficulties have been compounded this STOPPING AT CUSTOMS UNION year by the fact that 1967 ended very It is possible, however, that the differently from its predecessors. Uintil last year, December invariably was progress towards full economic integragoal under the Treaty of marked by a marathon session of the tion -the Common Market Council of Ministers, Rome - will stop with the customs during which the six foreign ministers union. The fact is that the most diffiwould work feverishly to settle in two cult tasks - harmonisation of policies days all the problems they had been, in such different fields as foreign trade, Loyingwith for a year. These sessions taxation, transportation, company law, lie ahead. To carry them out would invariably end at dawn with the etc -still ministers visibly tired but triumphant. successfully will require a stronger poliIt only remained for the Common tical will than the Six have shown so Market chroniclers to declare that the far. Rather than make the effort now future of the EEC had never looked some member countries may prefer to wait. (The Dutch, for example, maintain brighter. that the Common Market should not The old cliches will not work this be completed before the UK and other year for the Six did not follow the EFTA countries have joined.) scenario last December: the meeting But there are others who argue that of the Coun'cil ended on a note of the Six cannot stop at a customs union. confusion, with France's five partners They must adopt a common commercial trying at one and the same time to policy at the very least if their cuscondemn her and yet not isolate her toms union is to operate smoothly. (they managed to square this particular According to this view, the member circle by adopting many of her views). states have no alternative but to carry Although the dread words "crisis" and on with the construction of an econo"veto" were used fairly liberally (es- mic union. The process could have pecially in the British press), in the been brought to a halt had Britain's end it looked as if there had been entry into the EEC appeared immiinent; neither crisis nor veto, onily a hopelessly but as this is unlikely for another confused situation which ruled out the three to five years, the Six must con189

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