RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO SCRA Ref.39 PHIL 660 Date of Promulgation: March 7, 1919 Ponente: J.

Malcolm Facts: In 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro, headed by Gov. Juan Morente, Jr, adopted Resolution 25 providing the 800 heactares of public land in the Sitio Tigbao, Naujan, Mindoro as the permanent settlement of Mangyans. This resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior and subsequently, all Mangyans in the province were directed to take habitation in Tigbao. Refusal to comply will lead to imprisonment not exceeding 60 days. The resolution was pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 wherein a provincial governor is authorized, in the interest of law and order, to direct non-Christian tribes to take up their habitation in unoccupied public lands. Section 2759 of said Code permits imprisonment of nonChristians who will refuse to comply. Petitioners Rubi and other Mangyans were held in the reservation established in Tigbao. Dabalos was held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison of Calapan for having run away from the reservation. They filed this application for habeas corpus and alleged that they are being deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of the province. Petitioners also challenge the validity of Section 2145. Issue: WON the assailed section deprives the Mangyan of their liberty without due process of law Held/ Ratio: No! I. Background (ala CJ Puno): Before discussing the ratio, the ponente (Malcolm the great), narrated the legal history of the Philippines to prove that the assailed law is rooted from similar statutes regarding uncivilized elements since the Spanish occupation. During the three-century reign of the Spaniards, various laws were implemented that also provided for a separate settlement for the backward races or the tribes that were not yet Christianized. They were concentrated in the reducciones so that proselytizing will be easier. (see case for moooore details) When the United States occupied the Philippines, the Philippine Commission decided to adopt the course followed by the US Congress regarding North American Indians. The Bureau of NonChristian Tribes was established to supervise the public affairs of the tribes. Malcolm clarified that although the term Non-Christian has religious signification, it can also be understood in a geographical sense as to pertain to the territories occupied by Moros and other non-Christian tribes. To prove that the term is not predicated on religion, mere act of baptism will not change the status of a person tagged as non-Christian if his degree of civilization is unchanged. Citing various laws, decisions and executive pronouncements, Malcolm concluded that the term simply refers not to religious beliefs but to natives of the Philippines with a low grade of civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

Based on the Philippine Census of 1903, there were four classes of non-Christians, the Mangyans are of the third class. Numbering around 15,000, they are semi-nomadic people with no desire for community life. They are very low in culture. Malcolm next compared the Philippine laws on non-Christian tribes with the statutes and jurisprudence in the US on American Indians. Generally, laws affecting are political in nature. The government has full authority to pass measures for the full protection of the persons and property of Indians who are treated as wards of the nation. Constitutional Questions Delegation of Legislative Power to provincial authorities The Court said that the Legislature did not abdicate its authority when it delegated the power to provincial authorities thru Section 2145. The official representatives of the province are better qualified to judge which course is necessary for the protection of its inhabitants. They are fit to select the sites favourable to improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state. Religious Discrimination The term non-Christian refers to natives of a low grade of civilization and does not discriminate on account of religious differences. Liberty; Due Process; Equal Protection of Laws Malcolm discussed various definitions of Liberty (even cited Mabini) and concluded that civil liberty is that measure of freedom enjoyed in a civilized community consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. This cannot be taken away except upon due process of law. As to the pledge of equal protection of laws, this is not infringed by a statute applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and not arbitrary in nature. (discussion in F) D. E. Slavery and Involuntary Servitude (see F) C. B. II. A.

Police Power The Court held that Section 2145 is a valid exercise of police power. Police power is defined as the power of the state to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people, and to increase the industries of the state. (see F) Legislative Intent After discussing the various constitutional questions raised in the case, Malcolm analyzed the intent of the Legislature in passing this law which was the basis of the provincial boards resolution. According to the provincial board, after failed attempts to advance the Mangyans in the province, the only successful method for educating them is to require them to live in a permanent settlement. The SolGen added that the regulation is for the protection of the Mangyans, for the protection of the public forests in which they roam and the necessity of introducing civilized customs among them. According to the Secretary of Interior, a closer settlement policy will make it easier for them to access public school system and public health programs. As to the argument that the resolution deprives the Mangyans of their liberty and equal protection rights, Malcolm said that the Mangyans are not free as civilized men are free. They are not F.

the equals of their more fortunate brothers and they do not have all the rights which citizenship implies. They have a low degree of intelligencewhich will be a drag upon the progress of the State. (And the Americans, with their high degree of intelligence did boost our progress! Sorry di ko na napigilan) Because of their ignorance, the Mangyans will commit crimes and make depredations to the environment such as the destruction of forests thru illegal kaingins. Quoting the Secretary of Interior, Malcolm pointed out that due process of law does not apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of liberty!!! (for more progressive quotes pls see p. 713) There is also no involuntary servitude in this case. When they live in the settlement, everything is being done for them in order for them to better their conditions (e.g. education). They will not work for anybody but for themselves. As to the imprisonment issue, this is justifiable because the Mangyans would always long for the mountains and threat of penalty is a necessary means to ensure that they will live in the settlements. Application and Conclusion Malcolm also addressed the issue that the resolution might be prone to abuses of unscrupulous officials. He said that the presumption is that the officials will carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If they ill-treat any person, the remedy is to remove them from office. In this case, only the constitutionality of the law is questioned and not instances of oppression. Emphasizing the police power of the State, Malcolm asserts that the period of complete freedom of the individual is the thing of the past. The State has authority to restrict the liberty of citizens if it is for their own good and the good of the public. In this case, a great malady requires a drastic remedy. In order to achieve the governmental policy of unifying the people and approach an approximate equality of intelligence, the Mangyans must be confined for a time. This, according to George Malcolm, is a legitimate exercise of police power. Cielo G.

1.

Rosenthal and Osmea were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. Its main purposes are to mine, refine, market, buy, and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. 2. Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty by the RTC of violating Act 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law. This was due to the buying of stock and the subsequent selling at speculative1 and high prices (BUY = P5/share; SELL = 300/share). Also, it was alleged that they sold to individuals without securing a written permit or license from the Insular treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in violation of Secs. 2 & 5 of Act No. 2851, as follows: SEC. 2 Every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty pesos. SEC. 5. Whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this Act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to offer the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale"; that "said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit", and that "an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance." 3. On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena assailed that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on three grounds: a. Undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular treasurer b. Equal protection clause c. Vague and Ambiguous

Ito ang pinakagusto ko: If according to Justice Holmes, constitutional law has to take some chances this is what Malcolm has to say in response: If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the court must take a chance, it should be, with a view of upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy but with that broad conception which will make the courts PROGRESSIVE and effective a force as are other departments of the Government. PUBLIC INTEREST - 098 People v. Rosenthal & Osmea

Issue: WON the law is unconstitutional in all three grounds. (NO)

Held/Ratio: On Undue Delegation of Legislative Authority 1. The Act furnishes sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of the certificate or permit. The certificate or permit must recite that the person, partnership, association, or corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of the Act. This requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer

Facts:

SPECULATIVE because their value materially depended upon a promise of future promotion and development of oil business, rather than on actual tangible assets.

2. 3.

4.

5.

when the provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, the Court holds that public interest in this case is sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the Treasurer to the Sec. of Finance. Hence, it cannot be contended that the Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence. The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall over action which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the rule of law was established which narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislative alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements, he finds a great deal of confusion. The maxim delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest delegare has beenmade to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, in practically all modern governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to laydown general principles, the safest is to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved. Hall v Geiger-Jones: it is well-settled principle of law in this state that by legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain the existence of facts, upon the finding of which may depend the right to continue in the practice of a profession or a regulated business.

2.

In this light, we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith.

Justice, equity, and substantial merits of the case - 99 International Hardwood and Veneer Co v. Pangil Federation of Labor (1940)

FACTS: 1. 2 June 1939: The Secretary of Labor certified to the Court of Industrial Relations that an industrial dispute existed between Hardwood and its employee who are members of the union Pangil. The Sec. of Labor contended that this issue would be best dealt with by the CIR in light of public interest under Sec. 4 of CA 103. The industrial dispute aforementioned referred to certain demands made by the respondent on the petitioner, among which are the following: 2. Set the minimum daily wages of common laborers at one peso. 3. Devise a proper schedule of rate of wages for all laborers. 4. The rate of wages for the mountain camps should be higher by 20 percent over those given in town. 19 September 1939: DECISION ADICIONAL of Leopoldo Rovira of the CIR stated: In these circumstances, the Court finds the defendants partly justified under numbers 2 and 4 that affect the rate of wages, and accordingly ordered the company to appeal to pay their workers fair wages and reasonable as an amount not less than P1 daily for work in the mountains, and to perform their jobs in the plains a sum not less than P0.90 per day based on eight (8) hours per day, excluding the "overtime," not less than twenty-five (25) percent of their wages as is fixed. On 28 November 1939, while the MR was still pending, Hardwood filed a motion saying that CIR has no jurisdiction to decide the question relating to demands 2 and 4. The following are its grounds: (a) CIR has no authority to determine minimum wages for an individual employer in connection with a particular and specific industrial dispute under Sec. 4 of CA 103; (b) the authority would constitute an undue delegation of legislative power to the CIR and would deny Hardwood the equal protection of the laws; thus, rendering said section unconstitutional and void. On 23 December 1939, CIR denied the petitions of Hardwood. WON CIR has the power to determine minimum wages for an individual employer in connection with an industrial dispute which said court might take cognizance under Sec. 4, CA 103. (YES) If yes, WON the grant of power is unconstitutional and void. (NO)

2.

3.

On the violation of equal Protection Clause 1. 2. The alleged violation of equal protection clause is grounded on the law discriminating between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and successive transactions. Hall vs. Geiger-jones co: "prominent among such discriminations are . . . Between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in successive transactions; . . . " if a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law

4.

On Vagueness and Ambiguity 1. People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad: An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended.

5. ISSUE: 1. 2.

Held/Ratio: 1. Sec. 4 of CA103 is designed to provide for compulsory arbitration in order to prevent nonpacific methods in the determination of industrial and agricultural disputes. Under Bill no. 700, the explanatory statement appears: This bill creating a Board of Industrial Relations provides compulsory arbitration in accordance with Art. 6, Title XIII of the Constitution, which provides that The state may establish binding arbitration. a. Incorporating the conclusion reached by a committee appointed a year or so before, it was observed that under the current legislation (refer to Act 4055) there is no suitable instrument to avoid strikes. The Department of Labor merely occupies the role of peacemaker between the parties in dispute and its decisions are not binding for either employers or workers. The people have reached a level of industrial development, which makes it imperative that the governments intervention in these conflicts to be more effective. (Ang Tibay v. CIR) b. In order that this declaration of policy may not just be and empty gesture, CA103, in various sections thereof, has provided the means towards its realization. Thus, in Sec. 4, the CIR is empowered to take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision,, and settlement of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regard wages, shares or compensation, dismissals, lay-offs, or suspension of employees or laborers, tenants, or farm-laborers, hours of labor, or conditions of tenancy or employment between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers. c. The petitioner suggests that if an industrial dispute between an employer and its employees causes a strike or lockout arising from differences as regards a minimum wage, CIR would be without authority to take cognizance of the dispute for arbitration and settlement unless the President, under Sec 5 of CA103, directs it to investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing a minimum wage which shall apply generally to all the employers engaged in such industry. To adopt such a narrow construction would be to set at naught the plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to "settle all question, matters, controversies, or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees" and to frustrate the very objective of the law, namely, to create an instrumentality through which the intervention of the Government could be made effective in order to prevent non-pacific methods in the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes. It is fundamental that the intention and policy of the National Assembly, as expressed in the enactment, should be effectuated, and the Act should receive a construction that will lead to this result. The contention that Sec 4 CA 103 is unconstitutional as constituting an undue delegation of legislative power to the court and depriving HARDWOOD equal protection of the laws because the provision "does not indicate in what manner, by what standards, or in accordance with what rules, the Court of Industrial Relations shall determine minimum wages under said section" is without merit. a. Sec 20 CA103 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms. The National Assembly has by

this section furnished a sufficient standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its discretion in the determination of any question or controversy before it, and we have already ruled that the discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in character and does not infringe upon the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function, and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Antamok Gold Fields Mining Company v CIR, June 28, 1940.) 4. What is moral, educational or amusing - 100 MUTUAL FILMS v INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION (1915) FACTS 1. 2. 3. Complainant is engaged in the business of purchasing, selling, and leasing films. The films are produced in other states than Ohio, in European countries, and other foreign countries. In its Detroit exchange, complaint has at least 2,500 reels of films, which it intends to exhibit in Ohio. However, it will be impossible to exhibit the films until the same have been approved by the board of censors. The board has demanded that complainants submit its films to censorship. They threaten that unless the complainant complies with the demand, any and all persons who seek to place on exhibition any film not so censored or approved by the censor congress on and after November 4, 1913, the date to which the act was extended, will be arrested. It is physically impossible to comply with such demand and physically impossible for the board to censor the films with such rapidity as to enable complainant to proceed with its business. Furthermore, the delay would cause great and irreparable injury to the business, and would involve a multiplicity of suits.

4.

ISSUE/S 1. WON the statute violates the freedom of speech and publication guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution. (NO) 2. WON the statute is a permitted delegation of legislative power (YES) HELD 1. It seems that it did not occur to anybody in the cited cases that freedom of opinion was repressed in the exertion of the police power of the State. The rights of property were only considered as involved. It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution, as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion. They are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and known; vivid, useful, and entertaining, no doubt, but, as we have said, capable of evil, with great power because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition. It was this capability and power that induced the state of Ohio, in addition to prescribing penalties for immoral exhibitions, as it does in its Criminal Code, to require censorship before exhibition. We cannot regard this as beyond the power of government. 2. YES. The next contention of complainant is that the Ohio statute is a delegation of legislative power prohibited by law; thus, it is void. While administration and legislation are quite distinct powers, the line which separates exactly their exercise is not easy to define in words. It is best recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power to ascertain the facts

2.

and conditions to which the policy and principles apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss sufficiency both in provision and execution. The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no standard of what is educational, moral, amusing, or harmless, and hence leaves decision to arbitrary judgment, whim, and caprice; or, aside from those extremes, leaving it to the different views which might be entertained of the effect of the pictures, permitting the 'personal equation' to enter, resulting 'in unjust discrimination against some propagandist film,' while others might be approved without question. But the statute by its provisions guards against such variant judgments, and its terms, like other general terms, get precision from the sense and experience of men, and become certain and useful guides in reasoning and conduct. The exact specification of the instances of their application would be as impossible as the attempt would be futile. Upon such sense and experience, therefore, the law properly relies. Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson (1952)

Appellant brought the issue to court, saying that the statute 1. violates the 14th Amendment as a prior restraint upon freedom of speech and the press. 2. violates separation of church and state 3. that the term sacrilegious is so vague and indefinite as to offend due process.

Issue: W/N a film may be banned on the basis that is sacrilegious (NO)

Held: The NY courts defined sacrilegious as no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule." This is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society. It is too broad and all-inclusive. New York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority. Application of the "sacrilegious" test, in these or other respects, might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment's guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. However, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of the government to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures. Obiter: The doctrine of Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission which states that moving pictures, having been made in order to profit, are not part of the press or organs of public opinion was abandoned. Motion pictures should therefore be included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Digest by: Korina Manibog Adequate and Efficient Instruction - #102 PACU v. Secretary (1955) Facts: 1. Act No. 2706: "An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its provisions, the Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated all private schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the general acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned.

Doctrine: Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments a state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is "sacrilegious." The State has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. Facts: A New York statute makes it unlawful to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for exhibition at any place of amusement for pay or in connection with any business in the state of New York, any motion picture film or reel, unless there is at the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit therefor of the education department. In order to obtain a permit, the director of the motion picture divison of the education department or duly authorized officers of a local office/bureau shall examine every film submitted to them and shall issue a license for it except when it is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime.

Appellant is the distributor of the film The Miracle. After examining the film, the motion picture department of the NY education division issued a license for the exhibition of the film as part of a trilogy called Ways of Love. During the time it was exhibited, the NY Board of Regents received a lot protests. The Chancellor then requested three members of the BoR to review the film. They reported that it was sacrilegious so the Regents ordered the Commissioner of Education (Wilson) to rescind the appellants license, which he did.

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Sec. 1: "It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same," Commonwealth Act No. 180: introduced the requirement that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. The petitioning colleges and universities alleged that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 are unconstitutional, because: a. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law. contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint They are referring to Sec. 3 of Act 2706 which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education.

Issues: W/N the questioned statutes (specifically Act No. 2706, Sec. 1) "conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power as certain terms such as 'adequate instruction to the public and 'efficiency of instruction were not clearly defined. (NO) Ratio: The Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. The Legislature validly relied upon the educational experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of any private school. Petitioners failed to show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation so no reason exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Sec. of Education. If the petitioners believe that the Secretary has issued whimsical and capricious rules and regulations, the remedy is to challenge those regulations specifically or to subject the erring inspectors to administrative and judicial proceedings, not to invalidate the law. Adequate and efficient Instruction should be considered sufficient in the same way as public welfare, necessary in the interest of law and order, public interest and justice and equity and substantial merits of the case have been held sufficient as legislative standards justifying delegation of authority to regulate. Digest by: Korina Manibog Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman (1928) FACTS: 1. 2. Insurance commissioner is an administrative officer. Because it was among the earlier administrative agencies created, the laws delegating powers to insurance commissioners were very closely scrutinized and a rather rigid and inflexible application was made of the doctrine of separation of powers and its corollary that powers once vested cannot be redelegated. Law is question is Chapter 203 of the Wisconsin Statutes (rating law). a. 203.36: All regulations or rules of any such rating bureau, shall be filed with the commissioner of insurance, and no such regulations or rules shall be in force before such filing, nor, in any case, after a written order by the commissioner of insurance, disapproving such regulations or rules. b. In accordance with the provisions of the act, a rating bureau was organized, known as the Wisconsin inspection bureau, and on August 1, 1922, it filed its rule book in the office of the commissioner of insurance. (rule book = used to gauge w/n the rates, rules, and regulations promulgated by the various rating bureaus are reasonable and nondiscriminatory.) c. The rule book contains 73 pages. The commissioner considered each proposed rule, form, rider, and privilege, and approved or disapproved the same in his discretion. In determining whether or not this broad power was conferred by the

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b. c. 4.

They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

Governments defense: a. b. No justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions. Petitioners in estoppel. None of petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. They do not assert that the respondent Sec. of Educ. has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of the law and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.

3.

c. 5.

Acts constitutionally valid

Despite the fact that judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants, the Court decided to act on the case lest they are accused of refusing to act even in the face of clear violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property.

act upon the commissioner, some attention must be given to the field in which the law was designed to operate. i. Anti-compact statute: all insurance companies were prohibited from combining for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a fixed schedule of rates. As originally enacted, it authorized local boards of underwriters to establish rates for their respective localities. Under the 1897 law (chapter 356), state supervision over rate making was very difficult and necessarily inadequate. The commissioner could not supervise the rate-making activities of innumerable local boards. ii. The Rating Act of 1917, the law here under consideration, was designed to set up a new plan which would make state supervision of rate making more efficient and attainable. 1. Every company writing the designated kind of insurance is required to be a member of a rating bureau. 2. A rating bureau may be formed by any five or more companies, and each bureau is required to admit applying companies to membership. 3. Subject to certain supervisory powers of the commissioner, each bureau was charged with the management of its own affairs, and was required to be licensed. 4. Rates were to be established by the bureau, and no company could establish a different rate except in the manner provided by the act. Section 203.40. All rates were required to be reasonable. 5. In order to prevent discrimination in rates through difference in contract rights or privileges, a rider which permits an increase of hazard not contemplated in the bureau rate for any risk, is required to be charged for at a rate fixed by the bureau; and no rider affecting the hazard for which no charge is to be made may be used until filed and approved by the commissioner. 6. To provide a check upon the operations of the various member companies and their agents, a stamping office was provided for. iii. BASICALLY: The commissioner was authorized to review any rate for the purpose of determining whether the same is unreasonable or discriminatory., disapprove rules and regulations proposed by the different bureaus, and approve/disapprove the forms proposed it is argued that if the act is to be construed as to confer power upon the commissioner of insurance to disapprove rules and regulations filed with him by a bureau, he can do what he did do in this case, viz. not only disapprove the form filed by the bureau, but indicate what kind of a form he will approve. If he has this power, he has in practical effect the power to prescribe the rules and regulations merely by way of disapproving them until the regulations and rules filed meet his notion of what the rules and regulations should be. ISSUE: W/N there was undue delegation of legislative power. NO

HELD: (The case has a thorough discussion of the rise of administrative agencies. Its informative but extremely long and dull. Basically, delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies were once prohibited as it violates the separation of powers. However, due to necessity such prohibition had to be abandoned.)

The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law; to determine the general purpose or policy to be achieved by the law; to fix the limits within which the law shall operate--is a power which is vested by our Constitution in the Legislature, and may not be delegated. When, however, the Legislature has laid down these fundamentals of a law, it may delegate to administrative agencies the authority to exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry into effect the general legislative purpose; in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, to fill up the details; in the language of Chief Justice Taft, to make public regulations interpreting the statute and directing the details of its execution. It is legislative power of the latter kind which is oftentimes called the rule-making power of boards, bureaus, and commissions.

The power which can be exercised by the commissioner of insurance under the provisions of the rating law, compared with the whole volume of power exercised by other administrative agencies in this state, is insignificant. It is manifest that it is the substance of the power delegated rather than the number of acts which may be performed pursuant to it that should determine whether it falls within or without the field of power which may be delegated. There is no substantial difference in the character of the power exercised by the commissioner of insurance in the disapproval of rules and regulations proposed by the bureau and filed by it in his office and the power to prescribe methods by which employers are to make places of employment reasonably safe. Applying common sense and the inherent necessity of governmental co-ordination, the Court held that the power conferred upon the commissioner of insurance by section 203.36 IS NOT an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

In determining whether or not the power granted by legislative act in a particular case to an administrative agency is of the kind which may be delegated, due regard must be paid to the nature of the subject-matter with which the act deals. It would be practically impossible for the Legislature to prescribe definite standards to meet the varying situations which arise in the administration of the securities act. It can only indicate in general terms the legislative policy to be achieved and the methods by which the administrative agencies can work out the declared policy. As already indicated, an attempt to specify a standard for rules and regulations to be promulgated by rating bureaus and approved by the commissioner of insurance would be nothing more nor less than the prescribing of the rules and regulations and riders themselves. If this were done by legislative enactment, the flexibility in practice necessary to meet changing conditions in the business world would be destroyed. The general purpose

of the law is indicated. The commissioner of insurance must act within the boundaries of reason and not oppressively. Therefore the standard prescribed, considering the subject-matter dealt with, meets the test already indicated.

ISSUE: W/N the Control Committee had the right to pass upon the resolution of the NAFCO board of directors granting quarters allowance to the petitioners. (YES)

RATIO: In the instant case the general purpose to be achieved by uniformity of rules and regulations proposed by rate-making bureaus is indicated, and the power of the commissioner of insurance is limited to disapproving those which in his judgment would not further the legislative purpose or run counter to it. This power the Legislature might properly delegate to the commissioner of insurance. The NAFCO is a GOCC subject to the provisions of RA 512 and the EO 933 promulgated in accordance therewith. Consequently, it was also subject to the powers of the Control Committee created in said EO, among which is the power of supervision for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in the operations of the corporation and also the power to pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the board of directors. Under these powers the Control Committee had the right to pass upon, and consequently to approve or disapprove, the resolution of the NAFCO board of directors granting quarters allowance to the petitioners as such allowance necessarily constitute an item of expenditure in the corporation's budget. The Control Committee had good grounds for disapproving the resolution as the granting of the allowance amounted to an illegal increase of petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate charter and was furthermore not justified by the precarious financial condition of the corporation.

While the statute does not in terms provide that the commissioner of insurance shall exercise a sound and reasonable discretion in the disapproval of proposed rules and regulations, that condition is necessarily implied. As has been said many times, in many cases administrative officers or bodies must act, not only within the field of their statutory powers, but in a reasonable and orderly manner. There is nothing in the action of the commissioner of insurance in this case that indicates that he places any other construction upon the act or that he supposes that there is vested in him an arbitrary and uncontrolled power. The rule of reasonableness inheres in every law, and the action of those charged with its enforcement must in the nature of things be subject to the test of reasonableness. CENON S. CERVANTES v. THE AUDITOR GENERAL

EO 93 is NOT null and void 1. NO illegal delegation of legislature power to executive a. Rule: NO undue delegation as long as legislature lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute b. RA 51: lays down a standard and set policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. NOT promulgated beyond the period of one year limited in said law. a. Rule: first day is excluded and the last day included b. Act was approved on October 4, 1946, and the President was given a period of one year within which to promulgate his executive order and that the order was in fact promulgated on October 4, 1947.

FACTS: 1. The National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation (NAFCO) was created by the Commonwealth Act No. 332. Its capital stock is 51% owned by the government. The management the corporation was vested in a board of directors of not more than 5 members appointed by the president of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The petitioner was the manager of NAFCO. He was granted through a resolution, quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of that month. Submitted the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said resolution was disapproved upon the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General. According to them: a. that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and b. the corporation was in precarious financial condition Petitioner asked the Control Committee to reconsider. The committee asked for the Auditor Generals comment, which in turn asked for the NAFCO auditors comment, who reaffirmed his previous comment.

2.

2. 3. 4. 5.

Regardless of whether quarters allowance should be considered as compensation or not, the resolution of the board of the directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner cannot be given effect since it
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6.

authorized President to effect such reforms and changes in GOCCs for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation. 3 created the Government Enterprises Council which was tasked to advise the President in the exercise of his power of supervision and control over these corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might be necessary to coordinate their functions and activities. It provided that the council was to have a Control Committee.

was disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of powers granted to it by EO 93. Note that EO 77 by expressly exempts from the prohibition the payment of quarters allowance "in favor of local government officials and employees entitled to this under existing law." This is a clear indication that quarters allowance was meant to be included in the term "additional compensation". Quarters allowance is considered additional compensation and, therefore, prohibited.

determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.

The rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." Sec 74 of RA 265 conferred upon the Monetary Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange "in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take constructive measures to combat such crisis." Sec 70 of RA 265: The Board is, likewise, authorized "to take such appropriate remedial measures as are appropriate" to protect the international reserve" Sec. 2 of RA 265: such powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines." These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers.

Digest by: Korina Manibog People v. Jolliffe (1959)

Facts: Accused William Jolliffe, a Canadian born in China and residing in Hong Kong, On one of his trips in the Philippines, he came to collect the debt owed to him by one T. W. Woo in peso or in gold. He was paid in gold. He was about to board one of the planes of the Pam American World Airways but when he was on his way to the door leading to the runway, he was accosted by a woman Amada Arimbay, a secret service agent and told to go to the search room. Four pieces of gold bullion were found tied to his body a few inches above the waist. He tried to bribe the agents but failed. Accused argues that Circular 21 of the Central Bank is not a valid penal law, because it did not comply with the provisions of section 74 of Republic Act 265 as: a. It was not approved by the President of the Philippines; b. The Monetary Board exceeded the authority granted it by the Central Bank Act, because the context of the circular does not indicate that it was a temporary emergency measure; c. No period of effectivity stated d. Not adequately published. e. invalid delegation of legislative power and, therefore, unconstitutional and void. He was charged for violating Circular 21 for exportation of gold without a license and Sec. 34 of RA 265 which prescribed its penalty.

Other points decided (you can opt to delete this part): 1. There is a presumption of regularity. RA 265 does not require the Presidents signature as proof of approval.

Issue: W/N RA 625 (of which Circular 21 derives its validity) unduly delegates legislative power. NO

2. The Monetary Board has authority to suspend or restrict the sales of exchange by the Central Bank and to subject all transactions involving foreign exchange to license, temporarily during an exchange crisis, as an emergency measure to combat such crisis. It is not necessary for its temporary character be stated on its face, so long as the circular has been issued during an exchange crisis, for the purpose of combating the same. It is presumed that the provision of Sec 74 of RA 265 has been complied with. Besides, there has been an exchange crisis in the Philippines from the time the circular was issued up to the time this case was decided.

Ratio: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Under our system of government, said power may not be delegated except to local governments. However, it is one thing is to delegate the power to

Failure to specify the duration of its effectivity does not necessarily impair its validity. As a measure taken under the police power of the state, said period had to be commensurate with the crisis that led to its adoption, and the duration of said crisis could not be anticipated with reasonable certainty. Upon the termination of the aforementioned crisis, as determined by competent authority, the circular would become inoperative.

3. It is only the decision of the Monetary Board to subject to license by the Central Bank all transactions in gold and foreign exchange that needs the approval of the President. The assent of the President is not a prerequisite to the validity and effectivity of these regulations, as distinguished from the aforementioned decision thereby sought to be enforced or executed.

4. Art. 45 of the RPC authorizing the forfeiture of the proceeds of a crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed applies to this case even if what was involved was a special law, pursuant to sec. 10 of the RPC which states that the provisions of said Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, "unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary".

5. The confiscation of the traveller's check for $100 should not be forfeited to the government because the accused did not know that it was in his physical possession, and therefore had no criminal intent in connection therewith.

Digest by: Korina Manibog

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