Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
14 March 2012
Italian Banks
New Capital, New Collateral... Old Problems
We revise our expectations on asset quality trends and we foresee an increase of loan loss charges similar to the one experienced in 2008/2009 based on expectations that the austerity measures introduced in H211 increase the probabilities of an economic recession. We highlight that on the previous occasion Italian banks managed to withstand asset quality deterioration and maintained their investorfriendly policies, but this time we note that BPIM, MONTE and UBIIM are showing depleted loan loss reserves, hence we think are likely to suffer more. In spite of 17.5bn of capital raised together with the more recent liability management exercises, we note that solvency shortfalls persist for the 2nd tier institutions. We highlight that ISPIM and UCGIM are now in compliance with EBA requirements and UBIIM is also likely to bridge its capital deficit by exercising the option on its 1bn convertible. However MONTE and BPIM still face a 3bn and 2.5bn shortfall respectively, which in our view represents a challenge relative to their respective market capitalisations. Ultimately we see a risk of these issuers having to resort to the issuance of contingent convertible instruments, as designed by the EBA, triggering an embargo on Tier I coupon payments and on calls of all subordinated debt. Recent measures taken by the government and the Bank of Italy contributed to build a solid buffer of central bank eligible assets that should safeguard senior investors. The issuance of 60bn of government guaranteed bonds helped manufacture collateral ahead of the first 3yr LTRO, while relaxed collateral requirements should have generated an additional 70-90bn buffer, taking estimated unencumbered assets for Italian banks post February LTRO up to 136-156bn. In light of the weak capital position and potential issuers with regard to the availability of collateral, we decided to downgrade MONTE from Overweight to Neutral (5Yr Senior CDS at 389/399bp). While we note that the potential sale of a significant participation by the main shareholder, Fondazione Montepaschi, together with the recent change of CEO might improve corporate governance, we think that it is unlikely to bridge its capital shortfall on its own.
Table 1: Italian banks recommended buy list
ISIN XS0545782020 XS0527624059 XS0324790657 XS0243399556
Source: J.P. Morgan.
Alan Bowe
(44-20) 7325-6281 alan.m.bowe@jpmorgan.com J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd.
In our opinion since the outset of the sovereign crisis, the differential among Italian banks has been widening, highlighting two tiers of institutions; 1st tier institutions such as Intesa San Paolo and Unicredit, and 2nd tier banks, such as Montepaschi, UBI Banca and Banco Popolare. We think that the most important differences among these two groups can be found in their relative levels of capitalisation, as stressed by the shortfalls shown by the European Banking Authority (EBA) as well as the ability to access the market at economically viable levels. In addition we also note that as asset quality deterioration advances, the 2nd tier institutions will be more exposed to the downturn given their depleted loan loss reserves at a point where the credit cycle threatens to turn down again. In our view this set of challenges will pose particular pressure on MONTE, UBIIM and BPIM, resulting in potential suboptimal outcomes such as extension risk and coupon deferral. However, medium-term we believe that senior bondholders will be safe-guarded by the significant liquidity guaranteed by the ECB and by the substantial amount of unencumbered assets eligible for refinancing operations.
ISPIM
Neutral
MONTE
Neutral
UBIIM
Neutral
BPIM
Underweight
We like ISPIM and UCGIMs high coupon tier Is for their attractive risk-return profile
Under these circumstances we recommend ISPIM 9.5% 16 and the UCGIM 9.375% 20, as they provide a significant yield-to-maturity (just below 11%) as well as yield-to-call (~11% as well) with the extension risk being effectively mitigated by the high post-call spread of these instruments. In particular we note that both instruments were subject to liability management with limited acceptance thereby reiterating investor confidence in these structures and also leaving sufficient liquidity in the outstanding instruments.
Sub T1 T1
Apr-11
Jun-11
Aug-11
Oct-11
Dec-11
Feb-12
0 Feb-11
Apr-11
Jun-11
Aug-11
Oct-11
Dec-11
Feb-12
As opposed the market we believe that ISPIM will keep calling its LTII instruments, maintaining its positive track record
Looking at the coming calls we highlight two ISPIM lower tier IIs, the ISPIM 6.375% 12-17 and the ISPIM FRN 13-18 that we believe will get called at the first call date. We believe this will be the most likely scenario as the bank has kept calling all its instruments so far, regardless of the currency they were issued in and regardless of the stress in the wholesale funding market. We remind investors that Intesa called the ISPIM 5.5% $ 11-16 in December, just prior to the 1st 3yr LTRO. Furthermore, we note that, as the Bank of Italy removed the restriction on liability management exercises by removing the pre-funding requirement which will allow banks the option of calling capital instruments without having to explicitly refinance. Under these circumstances we think that ISPIM may use ECB liquidity for early repayment of senior subordinated instruments, maintaining its positive track record.
Figure 3: ISPIM 6.375% 12-17 vs. SUSI Banks Lower Tier II Index
Yield-to-call %
Figure 4: ISPIM FRN 13-18 vs. SUSI Banks Lower Tier II Index
Yield-to-call %
ISPIM - Index ISPIM 6.375% 12-17 SUSI Banks Lower Tier II Index
ISPIM - Index ISPIM FRN 13-18 SUSI Banks Lower Tier II Index
Apr-11
Jun-11
Aug-11
Oct-11
Dec-11
Feb-12
Apr-11
Jun-11
Aug-11
Oct-11
Dec-11
Feb-12
2 0 -2 -4
0.4
The deterioration of the European macroeconomic environment and the implementation of the austerity measures are expected to be a drag on Italy; according to both official estimates and our Economic Research team, the country should be in a recession in both 2012 and 2013. Yet, we note that our economics research colleagues expect the downturn to be milder that the one seen in 2008/2009, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers; in their base case, the Italian GDP is expected to decline by 1.8% and 0.7% in 2012 and 2013 respectively (see Nicola Mai Money and credit flag downside risk for Italian growth). The clear consequence on Italian banks will be substantial asset quality deterioration and consequently higher loan loss provisions, marking a clear reversion of current trends. Under the circumstances outlined above, and assuming that there is no tail event like a breakup of the Euro Area, we believe that it is fairly conservative to forecast an increase of the cost of risk comparable to that one seen in between Q4 08 and Q4 09.
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates, Company data. Note (*): BPIM standalone excludes Banca Italease. Note: see Appendix for full updated asset quality tables.
140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Q4 07 Estimated Avg cost of risk - Best & worst case (LHS) Q4 08 Q4 09 Q4 10 Q4 11 Q4 12 Avg. cost of risk (LHS) GDP % q/q saar (inverted scale - RHS)
-15 -10 -5 0 5
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates. Average of for the banks in our coverage (BPIM, ISPIM, MONTE, UBIIM and UCGIM).
Potential losses should be a marginal risk, on the basis of 2008/09 performance, however some will suffer more than others
Looking back at asset quality figures and the financial performance of the institutions in our coverage (see charts from Figure 8 to Figure 12) we note that impact of the previous downturn has been relatively contained and it mainly affected second tier banks, i.e. MONTE, UBIIM and BPIM. Nevertheless we highlight that banks remained committed to their bondholder-friendly policy and kept paying coupons on their Tier Is all the way through the period, even after they received the governments support in the form of Tremonti Bonds. What in our view will be different this time is that the previous recession depleted the stock of provisions, as highlighted by the sharp decline in coverage ratios over the past years. Hence we think that our second tier banks, and BPIM and UBIIM in particular, will be more exposed than peers to the cycle, resulting in a more marked differential between their performance and that one of ISPIM and UCGIM.
Figure 7: Italian banks evolution of coverage ratios from 2007 to Q3 11
70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 66% 52% 62% 50% 51% 44% 33% 55% 50%
in fact the decline in coverage ratios for MONTE, BPIM, and UBIIM implies smaller buffers, leaving them more exposed to the downturn
30% BPIM **
ISPIM
UBIIM Q3 11
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates, Company data. Note (*): BPIMs 2007 and 2008 data is pre-Italease consolidation.
2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 -500 -1,000 -1,500 -2,000 Net income Cost of risk
-10.6bn
Q1 08 Q3 08 Q1 09 Q3 09 Q1 10 Q3 10 Q1 11 Q3 11 *
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates, Company data. Note (*): Q311 includes 8bn goodwill writedown.
700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 -100 -200 -300 Q1 08 Q3 08 Q1 09 Q3 09 Q1 10 Net income
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates, Company data.
400 300 200 100 0 -100 -200 -300 -400 -500 -600 Q1 08 Q3 08 Q1 09 Q3 09 Q1 10 Net income
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates, Company data.
400 300 200 100 0 -100 -200 Q1 09 Q3 09 Q1 10 Net income Q3 10 Q1 11 Q3 11 Cost of risk
120 100 80 60 40 20 0
MONTE UCGIM
Source: J.P. Morgan.
Announcement date October - 2010 April - 2011 April - 2011 April - 2011 November - 2011
Together with our renewed concerns about asset quality, we believe that the old capitalisation issues are still lingering, even though notable steps forwards have been made. Firstly, we note that the sector has undergone a series of recapitalisations that, together with the latest effort from UCGIM, contributed to a total capital raise for the system of about 17.5bn. Secondly we highlight that the changed stance of Bank of Italy (BoI) with regards to liability management exercises on subordinated debt, prompting an unprecedented series of tender offers for cash, in an attempt to add precious basis points to their Core Tier I ratios. However, in spite of these efforts we estimate that MONTE, BPIM and UBIIM still have to raise approximately 7bn of capital to meet the requirements set by the European Banking Authority (EBA) on December 8th, and we believe that our 2nd institutions are likely to face difficulties correcting their capital deficit.
Figure 13: Italian banks Basel 2.5 capital under ratios before and after EBA sovereign buffer
12.0% 10.0% 8.0% 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0% ISPIM UCGIM* Core Tier I (B2.5)
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates.
Yet second tier banks still have to address their EBA capital shortfalls
10.0%
9.2%
9.9% 9.4%
9.2% 6.0%
8.4%
7.5%
6.5% 6.1%
MONTE
UBIIM
BPIM
The EBA highlighted a 15.4bn capital shortfall that has only partially been addressed
EBA: Setting the benchmark As Italian banks were started to address their capitalisation issues, the sovereign crisis spread to Italy, and the EBA came up with the ill-fated decision of stressing government bonds held in the banking books of financials across Europe. As a result the authority concluded that the main five Italian banks still needed 15.4bn of fresh capital to compensate for the transition from Basel 2 to Basel 2.5 and to have sufficient support for their holdings of government bonds, de-facto implying a nonzero risk-weight for Italian Treasuries. The operation made Unicredits management announce a 7.5bn rights issue that, despite market challenges , was completed in 2012, leaving MONTE, BPIM and UBIIM as the only institutions with a capital gap. Now, while we note that UBI Banca can almost erase the gap with the conversion of its 1bn convertible bond, we also conclude that it will be challenging for Montepaschi and Banco Popolare to fill the gap without taking extraordinary measures.
Table 7: EBA sovereign stress results: capital shortfalls and banks' plans
Bank UCGIM MONTE Shortfall 7.97bn 3.27bn Current shortfall 0bn 2.98bn Update - 7.5bn rights issue - 2.4bn from restructuring of CASHES for inclusion in Core Tier I (0.6bn remain as Tier I capital) - No dividend paid for 2011 - 0.29bn from the conversion of FRESH 2003 into equity - MONTE aims to meet the requirement by obtaining the inclusion of its FRESH 2008 instruments (950mn) into Core Tier I, expanding the use of advanced internal rating models, asset disposals and possible revaluation of assets - An estimated 0.22bn from the liability management exercise - The bank plans to use its 1bn soft mandatory convertible and to adopt internal rating models that should generate an 80bp increase of its capital ratios (equal to 0.77bn capital increase). Additional capital management actions will also be taken into consideration, but a rights issue has been excluded so far - UBIIM expects to meet requirements thanks to its convertible bond (1bn), the progressive migration to the advanced internal rating models, deleveraging action currently underway; and capital accretion
BPIM UBIIM
2.73bn 1.39bn
2.51bn 1.39bn
It is difficult to see how MONTE and BPIM can fulfil their requirements by June
At the moment the capital shortfalls of Montepaschi and Banco Popolare, 2.98bn and 2.51bn respectively, still remain way behind their earnings generation capability and any clearly executable measure like restructuring the FRESH 2008 for MONTE or exercising the option on the 1bn convertible for BPIM cannot provide a comprehensive solution to any of the two institutions. Under these circumstances we believe that these two are likely to require the issuance of contingent convertible instruments, as prescribed by the EBA; this will then trigger state-aid resolutions from the European Commission, and ultimately put an embargo on coupon payments on Tier Is and on the exercise of call options on subordinated instruments. With regards to Montepaschi we also note that the ownership structure is being partially reshuffled, as Fondazione Montepaschi, the main shareholder with 49.1%, is being forced to sell a 15% stake in order to partially repay its creditors; yet we do not believe that this will be a game changer for the bank and for its EBA capital requirement. While this event should be seen as a positive, as it can limit the impact that the financial situation of the Fondazione has on the bank, we think that there will be a fragmented sale to various investors, ranging from private equity funds to Italian entrepreneurs; furthermore, Fondazione Montepaschi would still remain the main shareholder of the bank, with a ~34% stake, and it is then likely to remain the kingmaker, making an eventual impact on corporate governance relatively limited. Liability management: when it rains it pours While capital shortfalls were still gripping Italian banks the Bank of Italy has finally decided, at the end of January, to change its rules on debt buybacks, prompting a sequence of tender offers for cash on subordinated debt, and in particular on institutional Tier Is.
The reshuffling of MONTEs shareholders composition will be a small positive but not enough to turn around the situation
While the EBA chose to stand by its decision the Bank of Italy has eased its regulation of LMEs, in an attempt to generate additional capital
LMEs offer a chance for capital structure optimization, taking the responsibility for missed calls off the issuer
We believe this represents both a chance to achieve a better capital structure, as the regulators attention shifts to the Core Tier I ratio, and an attempt to offer a way out to investors, so that banks can decline any responsibility in the event of missed call for economic reasons. With this regards we note that the common denominator of all these offers, aside from UCGIMs, is the economic incentive language with regards to future calls. While we do not exclude the chance of a better treatment in case of a significant improvement of market conditions, we believe that these offers will be fundamental in addressing future calls, as they will allow even the better geared issuers to claim that their benevolent tender was a sufficient effort to keep an investor-friendly behaviour. A similar argument can in our view apply to Unicredit that stated that its decisions will be taken on a best interest basis; this language is in our view slightly more accommodating to investors as it leaves the door open to non-economical considerations like reputation or a good relationship with investors. Consequently we think that any consideration with regards to the potential call of Italian Tier I instruments and on Tier II bonds issued by MONTE, UBIIM and BPIM should be based on cost of funding and eligibility criteria, while we still expect that UCGIM and ISPIM will keep calling their Tier II bonds, as the have been doing so far.
Going forward, each call, with the exception of those of UCIGM and ISPIM LTIIs should be judged on an economic basis
We expect MONTE to follow its peers, with a tender offer across the whole capital structure, but we believe premia will be limited
With regards to the quality of the offers we note that while the first buyback launched by Unicredit carried a significant premium, it also fuelled a rally among other Italian tier Is contributing to lower premia on subsequent offers. We also note that among the institutions in our coverage Montepaschi is the only one that has not taken any action yet, but in our view a similar operation is imminent. In this sense we expect the bank to propose a buyback of not only on Tier I instruments, but also on Upper Tier II and Lower Tier II bonds, given that the these categories represent a larger component of the subordinated bonds issued by the institution. However we expect that given the precedents the premia would be fairly small, in the 2-3pts area. A direct exchange offer into equity would also contribute to a more significant capital benefit for Monte.
3m + 100bp 3m + 100bp
30/11/2012 15/01/2013
Maturity Perp. Perp. Perp. 15/05/2018 31/05/2016 30/09/2016 21/04/2020 30/11/2017 09/09/2020 15/01/2018
Amt out (local mn) 350 220 80 1,603 750 200 500 500 500 150
Take-up (hypothesis) 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
In spite of the tentative improvements on capital and the threats posed by worsening asset quality we still remain confident that Italian banks have access to sufficient liquidity to withstand the crisis. On the one hand we note that ISPIMs recent issuance of a 1.5yr and a 5yr senior unsecured bonds for a total of 2.5bn, together with UCGIMs and MONTEs highlights that, regardless of the levels, first tier institutions can still access the market, while on the other hand the 3yr LTRO and the sizable amount of ECB eligible assets, together with occasional market access, should still provide the broader sector with the support needed. With this regards we highlight that even if the Italian banking system has increased its reliance on the ECB, there is still a substantial pool of unpledged assets, and there is potential for the creation of further liquidity via the issuance of covered bonds.
Table 10: New senior unsecured
Bank ISPIM ISPIM UCGIM MONTE
Source: J.P. Morgan.
The government issuance of government guarantees and the relaxed collateral requirements have expanded the pool of ECB eligible assets substantially
Recent statistics from the Bank of Italy show that reliance on the central banks funding has increased significantly over the past few months, raising questions on the amount of eligible collateral still available. However we note that both the government and the regulator have been supporting the banks effort to expand the pool of resources, the first one by setting up a new government guarantee scheme and the second one by relaxing the collateral requirements.
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The Italian government instituted a government guarantee scheme that provided the fostered issuance of 60bn of new bonds to be retained and pledged as additional collateral
With regards to the guarantee scheme we note that the government implemented the plan presented by the European Commission on December 1st, 2011, giving to the banks the possibility of manufacturing additional ECB eligible collateral, as we already outlined in The power of money. As a result, over the span of less than two months, Italian banks issued 60bn worth of new government guaranteed paper, and pledged it as collateral at the two 3yr LTRO auctions in December and February. We note that the programme technically allows for a total issuance of more than 200bn1, however we do not expect further significant issuance, given that each additional bond increments the already vast pile of government debt, and the strained Italian public finances cannot be stretched further. Under these circumstances we believe that the existence of this option remains just as a form of an indirect safety net that could be reactivated in case of a new exacerbation of the sovereign crisis. On the other hand we believe that the action taken by the Bank of Italy, following the new stance of the ECB, is much more effective, as it exits from the sovereign-bank loop. At the end of January, BoI decided to relax its collateral requirements and to start accepting bank loans with probability of default below 1% as a guarantee for its refinancing operations. But while this decision seems to have the potential of unleashing a vast amount of assets we note that the regulator, under recommendation of the ECB, is applying severe haircuts to compensate for the illiquidity of the collateral and to prevent banks from pledging lower quality assets first. As a result, according to what stated by the governor of the BoI, the regulator expects this new change to increment the pool of eligible assets by an estimated 70-90bn2.
BoI relaxed collateral requirements, adding another 70-90bn of central bank eligible asset
Figure 14: Italian banks: ECB/National Central Bank eligible assets and utilisation
billion
60 280 70-90
297
357
70 147-167
~80 136-156 Estimated net Estimated total use of 2nd 3yr unencumbered LTRO assets (Mar-12)
New Unencumbered Estimated unencumbered assets pre-2nd increase in assets 3yr LTRO eligible assets
The maximum issuance of government guaranteed bonds that each bank can issue is capped to the amount of total regulatory capital. 2 Estimate from Bank of Italy (see http://www.bancaditalia.it/interventi/integov/2012/forex18022012/en_Visco_180212.pdf).
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We can estimate the ECB eligible assets on a bank specific basis only relying on several assumptions
Now, while on a sector-wide basis we know that the amount of collateral available is quite substantial, we have to rely on estimates to be able to draw any conclusion for single institutions. Looking back at the data presented by the banks when reporting Q3 11 results we note that Unicredit and Montepaschi were the banks in which the utilisation of ECB liquidity versus the amount of unencumbered assets was more pronounced. However, taking into consideration the 3yr LTRO and the relaxed collateral requirements we believe that the differential among institutions is being reduced and we estimate that MONTE and, to a smaller extent, BPIM are the banks in our peer group that show an above average utilisation. In particular we note that the issuance of government guaranteed bonds allowed for a substantial rollover of short term operations and we estimate that part of the second 3yr LTRO was used to decrease the amount of repo with other counterparties, contributing to a further lengthening of the debt maturity profile. Furthermore, we estimate the benefit of the expanded collateral requirements to be proportional to the relative size of the loan books of the institutions, even if we acknowledge that this approach does not take into consideration the peculiarities of each bank.
We believe that a large chunk of the first LTRO has been used to roll already existing facilities
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates. Notes: (*) UCGIM unencumbered and total eligible assets estimates encapsulate the deduction of 38.8bn repos with clients and 32.8bn repos with banks; (**) estimates based on Q3 11 data; (***) pre 3yr LTRO estimates related to the beginning of Dec-11.
We note that there is scope for further creation of collateral through issuance of new covered bonds
Furthermore, while we note that the amount of unencumbered collateral is on a declining trend, we believe that there is still room for the creation of high quality assets, through the issuance of new covered bonds. Specifically we highlight that Italian banks should have enough room for manoeuvre, as the ratio of covered bonds to loans outstanding is extremely low, even for Unicredit that has a stronger track record due to its German operations. Finally we can conclude that our thesis is clearly supported by the recent inauguration of a 25bn retained covered bond programme by Unicredit and a smaller one (1.9bn) by Banco Popolare, both with the sole purpose of increasing the pool of eligible securities.
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Figure 15: Covered bonds still remain a small portion of funding so there is scope for an increase
billion
167 130 6% 50 21 ISPIM UCGIM Securities issued 65 9 MONTE Covered bonds 9% 7% 6% 55 7 BPIM 48 6 UBIIM 6%
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Appendix
Table 13: NPL ratios
% Q4 07 BPIM BPIM standalone* ISPIM MONTE UBIIM UCGIM 4.9 4.8 n/a 2.8 6.2 Q1 08 4.6 4.8 n/a 3.0 6.0 Q2 08 5.2 4.9 n/a 3.0 6.0 Q3 08 5.7 5.1 7.7 3.2 6.0 Q4 08 7.2 5.7 8.5 3.8 6.6 Q1 09 7.6 6.0 9.4 4.1 7.2 Q2 09 7.9 7.3 10.5 4.9 8.1 Q3 09 Q4 09 Q1 10 Q2 10 Q3 10 Q4 10 Q1 11 Q2 11 Q3 11 12.2 13.3 13.6 12.7 13.0 13.1 13.4 13.6 14.1 8.2 9.5 9.9 9.3 9.9 10.0 10.4 10.2 10.6 7.9 8.8 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.4 9.5 9.8 10.0 10.8 10.7 11.0 11.7 12.1 11.9 12.6 13.0 13.5 5.2 6.4 6.6 6.6 6.9 7.1 7.5 7.6 8.1 9.0 9.7 10.1 10.8 11.0 11.6 11.6 11.1 12.0
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates, Company data. Note (*): BPIM standalone excludes Banca Italease.
Source: J.P. Morgan estimates, Company data. Note (*): BPIM standalone excludes Banca Italease.
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Important Disclosures
Market Maker/ Liquidity Provider: J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. and/or an affiliate is a market maker and/or liquidity provider in UniCredit, Banco Popolare, UBI, IntesaSanpaolo, Monte Paschi di Siena. Lead or Co-manager: J.P. Morgan acted as lead or co-manager in a public offering of equity and/or debt securities for UniCredit, Banco Popolare, IntesaSanpaolo, Monte Paschi di Siena within the past 12 months. Other Significant Financial Interests: J.P. Morgan owns a position of 1 million USD or more in the debt securities of UniCredit, Banco Popolare, UBI, IntesaSanpaolo, Monte Paschi di Siena. Company-Specific Disclosures: Important disclosures are available for compendium reports and all J.P. Morgancovered companies by visiting https://mm.jpmorgan.com/disclosures/company, calling 1-800-477-0406, or emailing research.disclosure.inquiries@jpmorgan.com with your request.
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UniCredit - J.P. Morgan Recommendation History Date 27 May 11 Rating Overweight Instrument 5yr CDS
Recommendation changes made by J.P. Morgan Credit Research Analysts in the subject company over the past 12 months (or, if no recommendation changes were made in that period, the most recent change). Banco Popolare - J.P. Morgan Recommendation History Date 27 May 11 Rating Underweight Instrument 5yr CDS
Recommendation changes made by J.P. Morgan Credit Research Analysts in the subject company over the past 12 months (or, if no recommendation changes were made in that period, the most recent change). UBI - J.P. Morgan Recommendation History Date 27 May 11 Rating Neutral Instrument 5yr senior CDS
Recommendation changes made by J.P. Morgan Credit Research Analysts in the subject company over the past 12 months (or, if no recommendation changes were made in that period, the most recent change). IntesaSanpaolo - J.P. Morgan Recommendation History Date 20 Feb 06 Rating Neutral Instrument CDS
Recommendation changes made by J.P. Morgan Credit Research Analysts in the subject company over the past 12 months (or, if no recommendation changes were made in that period, the most recent change). Monte Paschi di Siena - J.P. Morgan Recommendation History Date 27 May 11 Rating Overweight Instrument 5yr CDS
Recommendation changes made by J.P. Morgan Credit Research Analysts in the subject company over the past 12 months (or, if no recommendation changes were made in that period, the most recent change).
Explanation of Credit Research Ratings: Ratings System: J.P. Morgan uses the following sector/issuer portfolio weightings: Overweight (over the next three months, the recommended risk position is expected to outperform the relevant index, sector, or benchmark), Neutral (over the next three months, the recommended risk position is expected to perform in line with the relevant index, sector, or benchmark), and Underweight (over the next three months, the recommended risk position is expected to underperform the relevant index, sector, or benchmark). J.P. Morgan's Emerging Market research uses a rating of Marketweight, which is equivalent to a Neutral rating. Valuation & Methodology: In J.P. Morgan's credit research, we assign a rating to each issuer (Overweight, Underweight or Neutral) based on our credit view of the issuer and the relative value of its securities, taking into account the ratings assigned to the issuer by credit rating agencies and the market prices for the issuer's securities. Our credit view of an issuer is based upon our opinion as to whether the issuer will be able service its debt obligations when they become due and payable. We assess this by analyzing, among other things, the issuer's credit position using standard credit ratios such as cash flow to debt and fixed charge coverage (including and excluding capital investment). We also analyze the issuer's ability to generate cash flow by reviewing standard operational measures for comparable companies in the sector, such as revenue and earnings growth rates, margins, and the composition of the issuer's balance sheet relative to the operational leverage in its business.
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Represents Ratings on the most liquid bond or 5-year CDS for all companies under coverage. *Percentage of investment banking clients in each rating category.
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Taiwan: J.P.Morgan Securities (Taiwan) Limited is a participant of the Taiwan Stock Exchange (company-type) and regulated by the Taiwan Securities and Futures Bureau. India: J.P. Morgan India Private Limited, having its registered office at J.P. Morgan Tower, Off. C.S.T. Road, Kalina, Santacruz East, Mumbai - 400098, is a member of the National Stock Exchange of India Limited (SEBI Registration Number - INB 230675231/INF 230675231/INE 230675231) and Bombay Stock Exchange Limited (SEBI Registration Number - INB 010675237/INF 010675237) and is regulated by Securities and Exchange Board of India. Thailand: JPMorgan Securities (Thailand) Limited is a member of the Stock Exchange of Thailand and is regulated by the Ministry of Finance and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Indonesia: PT J.P. Morgan Securities Indonesia is a member of the Indonesia Stock Exchange and is regulated by the BAPEPAM LK. Philippines: J.P. 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Dubai: JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Dubai Branch is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) and its registered address is Dubai International Financial Centre - Building 3, Level 7, PO Box 506551, Dubai, UAE. Country and Region Specific Disclosures U.K. and European Economic Area (EEA): Unless specified to the contrary, issued and approved for distribution in the U.K. and the EEA by JPMSL. Investment research issued by JPMSL has been prepared in accordance with JPMSL's policies for managing conflicts of interest arising as a result of publication and distribution of investment research. Many European regulators require a firm to establish, implement and maintain such a policy. This report has been issued in the U.K. only to persons of a kind described in Article 19 (5), 38, 47 and 49 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (all such persons being referred to as "relevant persons"). This document must not be acted on or relied on by persons who are not relevant persons. Any investment or investment activity to which this document relates is only available to relevant persons and will be engaged in only with relevant persons. In other EEA countries, the report has been issued to persons regarded as professional investors (or equivalent) in their home jurisdiction. Australia: This material is issued and distributed by JPMSAL in Australia to "wholesale clients" only. JPMSAL does not issue or distribute this material to "retail clients". The recipient of this material must not distribute it to any third party or outside Australia without the prior written consent of JPMSAL. For the purposes of this paragraph the terms "wholesale client" and "retail client" have the meanings given to them in section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. Germany: This material is distributed in Germany by J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd., Frankfurt Branch and J.P.Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Frankfurt Branch which are regulated by the Bundesanstalt fr Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht. Hong Kong: The 1% ownership disclosure as of the previous month end satisfies the requirements under Paragraph 16.5(a) of the Hong Kong Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with
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the Securities and Futures Commission. (For research published within the first ten days of the month, the disclosure may be based on the month end data from two months prior.) J.P. Morgan Broking (Hong Kong) Limited is the liquidity provider/market maker for derivative warrants, callable bull bear contracts and stock options listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited. An updated list can be found on HKEx website: http://www.hkex.com.hk. Japan: There is a risk that a loss may occur due to a change in the price of the shares in the case of share trading, and that a loss may occur due to the exchange rate in the case of foreign share trading. In the case of share trading, JPMorgan Securities Japan Co., Ltd., will be receiving a brokerage fee and consumption tax (shouhizei) calculated by multiplying the executed price by the commission rate which was individually agreed between JPMorgan Securities Japan Co., Ltd., and the customer in advance. Financial Instruments Firms: JPMorgan Securities Japan Co., Ltd., Kanto Local Finance Bureau (kinsho) No. 82 Participating Association / Japan Securities Dealers Association, The Financial Futures Association of Japan, Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association and Japan Securities Investment Advisers Association. Korea: This report may have been edited or contributed to from time to time by affiliates of J.P. Morgan Securities (Far East) Ltd, Seoul Branch. Singapore: JPMSS and/or its affiliates may have a holding in any of the securities discussed in this report; for securities where the holding is 1% or greater, the specific holding is disclosed in the Important Disclosures section above. India: For private circulation only, not for sale. Pakistan: For private circulation only, not for sale. New Zealand: This material is issued and distributed by JPMSAL in New Zealand only to persons whose principal business is the investment of money or who, in the course of and for the purposes of their business, habitually invest money. JPMSAL does not issue or distribute this material to members of "the public" as determined in accordance with section 3 of the Securities Act 1978. The recipient of this material must not distribute it to any third party or outside New Zealand without the prior written consent of JPMSAL. Canada: The information contained herein is not, and under no circumstances is to be construed as, a prospectus, an advertisement, a public offering, an offer to sell securities described herein, or solicitation of an offer to buy securities described herein, in Canada or any province or territory thereof. Any offer or sale of the securities described herein in Canada will be made only under an exemption from the requirements to file a prospectus with the relevant Canadian securities regulators and only by a dealer properly registered under applicable securities laws or, alternatively, pursuant to an exemption from the dealer registration requirement in the relevant province or territory of Canada in which such offer or sale is made. The information contained herein is under no circumstances to be construed as investment advice in any province or territory of Canada and is not tailored to the needs of the recipient. To the extent that the information contained herein references securities of an issuer incorporated, formed or created under the laws of Canada or a province or territory of Canada, any trades in such securities must be conducted through a dealer registered in Canada. No securities commission or similar regulatory authority in Canada has reviewed or in any way passed judgment upon these materials, the information contained herein or the merits of the securities described herein, and any representation to the contrary is an offence. Dubai: This report has been issued to persons regarded as professional clients as defined under the DFSA rules. General: Additional information is available upon request. Information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but JPMorgan Chase & Co. or its affiliates and/or subsidiaries (collectively J.P. Morgan) do not warrant its completeness or accuracy except with respect to any disclosures relative to JPMS and/or its affiliates and the analyst's involvement with the issuer that is the subject of the research. All pricing is as of the close of market for the securities discussed, unless otherwise stated. Opinions and estimates constitute our judgment as of the date of this material and are subject to change without notice. Past performance is not indicative of future results. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument. The opinions and recommendations herein do not take into account individual client circumstances, objectives, or needs and are not intended as recommendations of particular securities, financial instruments or strategies to particular clients. The recipient of this report must make its own independent decisions regarding any securities or financial instruments mentioned herein. JPMS distributes in the U.S. research published by non-U.S. affiliates and accepts responsibility for its contents. Periodic updates may be provided on companies/industries based on company specific developments or announcements, market conditions or any other publicly available information. Clients should contact analysts and execute transactions through a J.P. Morgan subsidiary or affiliate in their home jurisdiction unless governing law permits otherwise. "Other Disclosures" last revised January 6, 2012.
Copyright 2012 JPMorgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved. This report or any portion hereof may not be reprinted, sold or redistributed without the written consent of J.P. Morgan. #$J&098$#*P
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