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Jay Colburn Reaction Paper Week 5

2/24/2011 GOVT 530

Given that the Weberian definition of the state involves a monopoly on the use of force within a territory, the military is a crucial component of the existence and survival of states. The military may have various roles to play in states, whether authoritarian or democratic, and indeed can play an important role in the transition from one to the other. Alfred Stepan's Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone investigates not only the military dimensions of the state before, during, and after transitions from authoritarianism from democracy, but also takes into consideration analyses of the relationships between civil society, political society, and the state and with the military. The main focus of the book is Brazil from 1964 through 1985, during which the military was in charge of the government and the country began a process of abertura, or liberalization. Stepan's investigation delves into the various facets of the military, as the government (leadership of the polity), as a security community (the planning and execution of repression, intelligence, etc.), and as an institution (the military bureaucracy) and the changes that took place within and between them in the opening of the Brazilian political system towards democratic rule in the 1980s. Also discussed throughout the book are the cases of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay to compare the differences of the military's role in the state and society and the differing outcomes in terms of liberalization and democratization. While the cases are limited to South America, countries around the world experience military coups and Stepan's research can be used to better inform and understand developments in places with similar circumstances. Published in 1988, Rethinking Military Politics made contributions to the literature on democratization in his emphasis on not just civil society's role in democratization, but relationships between different aspects of civil society and links with political society and the state. The greatly expanded autonomy and role of the military after the 1964 coup is in part shown by the establishment of the Servio Nacional de Informaes (SNI)(National Information Service), which, among other things, was the "organ of the president," permeated all state apparatuses, was the top domestic and international intelligence agency, and established a military school which came to dominate intelligence education. Major policies of abertura began after the 1969-1972 anti-guerrilla campaign, which allowed for more civil society participation; loosening censorship of the press was one of the first policies. Changes in the military's acceptance of types of opposition and elections also progressed through the 1970s. Stepan offers discourse analysis of Brazilian national security doctrine from the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG)(Superior War College). The ESG was tasked with systematizing, updating, and disseminating the official national security doctrine. By analyzing the changes in doctrinal status of certain key terminologies related to abertura, namely the definitions of "opposition," "participation," and "elections," Stepan demonstrates the slow process of loosening restrictions and expectations of how civil and political society may participate in the Brazilian political system. Even given these changes from the 1970s to early 1980s and the many various social, economic, and political factors that diminished the relative power of the military compared to the opposition by 1982, the military still did not expect to relinquish power in 1985 to an opposition candidate for president. However, a number of factors led the military to allow the victorious opposition to assume power, including the changing military perception of the opposition, the changing international context, increasing legitimacy concerns within the military, presidential ambivalence (of Figueiredo), and a cost benefit analysis given the military's interests and duties. After consolidation of a new democratic regime, the military still has major functions to perform in the polity; Stepan addresses some of the potential issues that arise, particularly civilian democratic control of the military and new military prerogatives, and finally poses recommendations for civil society, political society, and the state in how to deal with some of these issues in a mutually beneficial manner. In the end, one of the books major strengths of Stepan's book is how it clearly and in great detail highlights the very important role of the military in transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes across a handful of South American countries. While this study provides some variation from the main case of Brazil, application to other geographic areas may prove more difficult given the widely varying characteristics or nature of other types of military institutions. Also, Rethinking Military Politics, while well organized, clear, and concise, is not the most accessible book for those who do not have a broad knowledge of South American, and specifically Brazilian, history. Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies addresses some similar issues as Stepan, looking at characteristics of societies as they change from one type of system to another. In Chapter 4 of 1

Jay Colburn Reaction Paper Week 5

2/24/2011 GOVT 530

this book, "Praetorianism and Political Decay," Huntington focuses on praetorianism, which he describes simply as the politicization of social forces. A wide range of social groups, whether students, the clergy, or the military, each with their own interests, are involved in nearly all political systems in various ways. While a student organization or a military becoming involved in politics may seem drastically different from one another, Huntington claims that the reason for military involvement is the same as other social groups. It is not the nature of a group, but the structure of society that motivates participation, specifically the absence or weakness of effective political institutions, including institutions or mechanisms for conflict resolution. This is what Huntington attributes as the main source of praetorianism. However, in societies with such weak institutions, increased participation of new social groups in the system exacerbates tensions. The stability of praetorian societies is inversely related to the scope of political participation (i.e. oligarchies can last for centuries, middle-class systems for decades, and mass systems for a few years). Huntington traces the paths of different praetorian systems, from oligarchical praetorianism to radical praetorianism to mass praetorianism, exploring the causes and differences of each. Many 19th century Latin American societies suffered from weak political institutions in praetorian oligarchies, a common dilemma in many post-colonial societies. Often dominated by great landowners, the clergy, and the military, these systems are rigid and unable (or unwilling) to adapt to social changes, and will commonly result in military coups. Huntington notes that almost all oligarchies lead to radical praetorian systems, but not all radical praetorian systems come from oligarchies. Radical praetorian societies suffer from different issues from the oligarchies, namely social and economic gaps between urban and rural areas. Urban instability commonly stems from students and intelligentsia, who may participate in political action such as strikes, bribery, demonstrations, and may even try to get the military to side with them and overthrow the existing order. A number of scenarios are put forth of different possible coalitions between labor movements, the government, and the military, but military intervention, in the form of a coup as a political technique, is usually a response to social conflict among several groups and the decline of effectiveness and legitimacy of political institutions; Stepan, on the other hand, does not specifically address when or why military gets involved in politics, but the nature of their involvement. In the section on radical to mass praetorianism, Huntington explains that veto coups will occur either when a certain party or movement is kept out of power or when the government promotes radical policies and attracts groups the military opposes; the latter was the case in Brazil in 1964, when the military intervened to uphold their responsibility defend the Brazilian form of republicanism and social peace and order. This only brought temporary relief, however, as coalitions soon split and the military is presented with four options: to return power to civilians and restrict political access to unfavored groups, to return power and expand political access, to retain power and expand access, or to retain power and restrict political access. This final option, which was the path taken by Brazil post-1964, often leads to repressive measures, like the anti-guerrilla campaign of the 1969-1972. Huntington and Stepan both make similar observations in their works, that the utility of a coup as a political technique declines as the scope of political participation widens, hence the Brazilian military's decision to allow the victory of the opposition in 1985. It can be difficult to break the cycle of praetorianism, however; praetorianism can become embedded in society in an almost path dependent way. Huntington claims that a coalescence of urban and rural interests as well as the creation of new political institutions is necessary to break the cycle, and that political stability requires a coalition between at least two of either the intelligentsia (the brains), the military (the guns), or the peasants (the votes). Another similarity between Stepan and Huntington's observations are their consideration of accounting for the military in a democratic society, specifically their interests, level of involvement, and oversight. Like Stepan, many of Huntington's cases are from Latin America, but he also involves many other countries (although in much less detail) like Burma, Mexico, Korea, and a number of Middle Eastern countries. During the period Political Order in Changing Societies was published (1968), Huntington's focus differed from the predominant theories on transitions to democratic political systems. Instead of simply economic changes and development, Huntington's analysis concentrates on social groups participation in politics, or praetorianism, structural factors like political institutions, and other factors of social change in the rest of the book (urbanization, literacy, etc.). While Huntington's book does expand the types of phenomena examined and used to explain political change, his focus on the structural 2

Jay Colburn Reaction Paper Week 5

2/24/2011 GOVT 530

factors, such as the weakness of institutions being the main motivator of political participation; other factors such as group ideology or societal culture may have intervening effects on political and social change. Both Stepan's Rethinking Military Politics and Huntington's chapter "Praetorianism and Political Decay" complement each other well, one providing a detailed analysis of military dimensions of authoritarian to democratic transition in Brazil and the other offering a broader look at how and why societies may experience democratic and other political changes. Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish offers a seemingly very different view of power in society. In his chapter on panopticism, he explains a principle of Jeremy Bentham that power should be visible and unverifiable. The example of a panopticon, which can have many uses but is often described in terms of a prison with a central tower that looks out in all directions onto a peripheric building housing prisoners in walled cells. This setting creates a situation where a prisoner knows he can be seen at all times but never knows whether or not he's being watched. This panoptic schema does not only have a negative function, however; it can be applied to many other institutions, for example a school or hospital. It is useful in situations of discipline and monitoring. Discipline, Foucault explains, "is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets" (Foucault, p.215). Discipline is a technology of power. The panoptic schema is a way to arrange power to make it more effective and efficient, with the aim of strengthening social forces, "to increase production, to develop the economy, spread education, raise the level of public morality; to increase and multiply." So this schema can be used for either negative or positive functions, much like social groups vying for political power, which can be used positively or negatively. Foucault gives the th example of 18 century Europe and its egalitarian framework through parliamentary representative systems. With more popular systems of politics, social groups in power gain control over institutions like police forces and prisons, which provide the power of discipline that can be used asymmetrically and for their own interest. As described by Stepan and Huntington, social groups in society like the military or middle-class come to power in praetorian systems, but their success or failure rely not only on the structure of the existing state and institutions, but also on the relationships between social groups and the way in which power is used or abused.

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