Ways to Strengthen the Democratic Transformation in Egypt

Conference in cooperation between Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) and Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue (FRIDE) Spain

26 27 July 2011 Cairo, Egypt Semiramis Hotel

Challenges Facing Religious, Confessional, and Ethnic Pluralism

Dr. Kamal Zakher Moussa Coordinator of the Coptic Secular Current

Religious pluralism is a problematic issue of long standing in Egypt that extends beyond the creation of the modern state under Mohammed Ali (1805-1848), born out of the consolidation of various sects under different systems of rule. The relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims was volatile and varied depending on the rulers attitude toward non-Muslims. According to historians, this relationship witnessed numerous tensions, with religious difference playing a primary role. Despite Egypts development into a modern civil state over the 19th and 20 centuries as a result of various forms of contact with the West, it was unable to adequately resolve the problematic status of religious pluralism and convert it into an added value for the civil state. The reversals in the evolution of the civil state were responsible for the failure to engage objectively with religious pluralism, although we are able to discern fleeting glimpses of national fusion, primarily the 1919 revolution and the October 1973 war. The issue grew more complex following the growing religious polarization that reached its peak on September 11, 2001, which heralded the cementing of religious divisions around the world. Egypt saw its share of this polarization, which found a favorable climate that had been fostered by President Sadat upon his assumption of the presidency (1970-1981) and his efforts to confront the legacy of the Nasserist era by supplanting Nasserist and leftist ideology with an Islamic religious ideology. He gained some regional and international support for this from parties who saw this stance as serving their own regional or international interests and so supported the dream of reviving the Caliphate. As a result, sectarian tension increased and religious pluralism became a minefield threatening the nation. Things were not substantially different in the post-Sadat era, as the Mubarak regime (1981-2011) used tension and strife, and the subsequent clashes and disturbances, as a tool to control the street, pressing on the inflamed nerve of religion and deepening the gap between Egyptians based on religion. Sectarian tension and strife became part of Egyptians daily bread. When the peoples revolution of January 25th erupted, one manifestation was a national fusion of all ethnicities and religions. Indeed, this moment can be added to those historical glimpses of full integration. This spontaneous scene inspired hopes of the return of Egyptians innate moderation and acceptance of pluralism, and an end to a painful, extended era that nearly fragmented the country. Nevertheless, events on the ground threatened this national fusion and promised to take us back to strife and possibly conflict, as religious and confessional pluralism became a volatile source of tension. We can identify some phenomena that, taken as a whole, represent a challenge to the embrace of pluralism as a value that strengthens the nation and the translation of this embrace into development and advancement. Perhaps the first warning, which went unnoticed, was the former regimes attempt, shortly before it collapsed, to find a popular pillar of support and its decision to lift the ban on the Muslim Brothers. This measure did it little good, however, as successive events led to the fall of the regime head. Yet, it had planted the seeds of a conflict between radical forces that reject religious and confessional pluralism, outside their own Islamic framework and those forces that believe the solution is the establishment of a civil state that adopts pluralism without confessional or religious restriction. The situation did not change after the evolution. Indeed, the political arena saw the rise of the Muslim Brothers, as they rode the revolutionary wave, occupied important positions in the media, and created a political party to represent them (Freedom and Justice). The demolition and burning of the village church in Soul, located in the Atfih district of Giza, was an early, sudden shock (March 4, 2011) coming on the heels of the scenes of national integration glimpsed in Tahrir Square and other provincial squares during the January 25th revolution. This incident must be read objectively as revealing the deep roots of the crisis and its salience in the Egyptian streets, rather than as one of a series of similar events over the past four decades (19722011). It was the first test of the strength pitting the new military administration against Salafi forces,

and what is worrying is how the crisis and its fallout were managed. Two prominent Salafi figures, Sheikh Mohammed Hassan and Sheikh Safwat Hegazi, took the lead in negotiating with the Muslims residents of the village to convince them to lift the siege on the site of the church and permit Christians to return to the village. This was followed by a fiery speech from Sheikh Hassan to the agitated crowds in order to placate them, in the presence of military leaders from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Although the crisis was successfully contained and the SCAF promised to rebuild the churchwhich it did, in record timethe event as a whole established the precedence of noninstitutional customary channels over the law. In Imbaba on May 7, 2011, two churches were again burned amid a climate of sectarian tension, stoked yet again by the Salafist movement. The escalation to armed clashes was a worrying sign, and the same scenario of crisis management was repeated. We can see, then, that the issue of sectarian tension constitutes one of the most significant challenges to religious pluralism. The new political Salafi movements are a real challenge to religious pluralism. According to their statements and those of their leaders, they have adopted a unilateral stance that excludes the other. Some have discussed the minority tax (jizya), mentioned protected minorities (ahl al-dhimma), and suggested the exclusion of non-Muslims from military service. The most prominent example is that of Abboud al-Zumur in statements made to satellite channels following his release from prison. Indeed, a possible Salafi presidential candidate said that liberal and secularist movements were fighting God, in a Salafi conference held on June 16, 2011, titled But they fight God, at the Islamic Caliphate Mosque in Ghabriyal in eastern Alexandria. In the meantime, several calls have been heard accusing the Church and Copts of allegiance to the West against the nation, openly questioning their patriotism, and some have demanded that the Church be placed under close supervision, following accusations that churches had become weapons storehouses, according to an Islamist legal thinker who is also a possible presidential candidate. It is possible that we are seeing attempts by political Islamists to claim the January 25th revolution for the religious sphere by allowing the SCAF to understand that they control the street and are capable of mobilizing it. This may be one reason the committee drafting the constitutional amendments was reconstituted to give a majority to those with Islamist views. The committee was headed by Judge Tareq al-Bishri and included Muslim Brother Lawyer Sobhi Saleh, a former MP for the group, and Dr. Atef al-Banna, Law Professor and Chair of the General Law Department at Cairo University. This was also reflected in the battle over the amendments and the religious cast the referendum assumed, in which support or rejection of the amendments was figured as support or opposition to Islam. This illustrates that religious and confessional pluralism is unwelcomed among forces that have a strong political presence in the street. These movements only accept it within an Islamic perspective that ultimately leads to the category of protected minorities for adherents of religions, recognized by Islam and the category of unbelievers who must be fought and excluded, including Bahais, for example, but also non-Sunni Muslims such as Shiites and Quranists. Here we reach a more dangerous level of rejection of religious and confessional pluralism, insofar as it undermines the pillars of the civil state even as prominent political Islamists claim that they support the civil state. We could interpret the growing sway of political Salafis in light of current political conditions, such as the removal of all security restrictions on their activities after the collapse of State Security Investigations, which allegedly maintained relations with these currents and used them to implement its plans to create sectarian turmoil and conflict. These matters, starting with the bombing of the Two Saints Church in Alexandria, are under investigation. Those familiar with the literature of these forces will find nothing new in their ideas; what is new is that now they publicly proclaim them. These currents have been permitted to form political parties that make no secret of their religious identity in either form or content, in violation of the constitutional declaration issued on March 30, 2011, based on the constitutional amendments approved in the referendum of March 19, 2011. According to Article Four of the constitutional declaration, citizens have the right to form associations and establish trade unions, federations, and parties in accordance with the law. The article

prohibits associations whose activities are hostile to the social system, secret, or are of a military nature. No political activity is permitted and no political parties may be established on the basis of religion or discrimination on the basis of race or origin. Article 4, paragraph 3, of the political parties law (Law 12/2011) reiterates this point, noting that no political party may air principles or a platform, practice its activities, or choose its leaders or members on the basis of religion, class, sect, group, geography, race, language, religion, or doctrine. Despite these unequivocal passages, more than one party has been approved that unhesitatingly proclaims its adoption of an Islamic, religious orientation and announces its support for a civil state with an Islamic reference. Thus far, three parties have been formed representing the Muslim Brothers, the Salafis, and Sufis: Freedom and Justice, the Nour Party, and the Fadila Party; the Wasat Party preceded them. Perhaps the genuine challenge is that these forces are close to parliamentary seats and thus will be responsible for drafting the new constitution, especially the Brothers Freedom and Justice Party, which has ample opportunities given their organizational experience, acquired under dictatorships with whom it alternately allied or opposed depending on the historical situation, and greater populist appeal. They may draft a new constitution in keeping with this stance, opposing religious pluralism or, at least, restricting it and inhibiting, and thus preventing diversity and pluralism from being invested to fuel development and advancement. There are other challenges to religious and confessional pluralism that are deeply entrenched in the Egyptian society, including the prevailing culture formed over more than 75 years, promoted, and fostered through the tools of mass indoctrination: Education, Media, and Culture. This is perhaps the most serious challenge because it is ultimately translated into everyday conduct, political attitudes, and social interactions in the street. The waves of sectarian tensions are the best evidence of this. I believe that this requires specialized research to trace the roots of this reality and offer practical and academic proposals for containing it. Several research centers have published relevant studies, most prominently the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and the Pedagogical Research Center in the Ministry of Education, in addition to numerous advocacy centers. If we are to protect religious pluralism and invest it to support the establishment of a genuinely civil state, we must leave behind theorizing and enter the sphere of political action. This is difficult given the current moment, as alliance building dominates various political forces, many of which tend to flatter the street, which is already prepared to accept exclusion and unilateralism. For many, perhaps even for some decision makers, this is compounded by a retrograde culture, which represents an additional challenge facing pluralism of all types.