Contention 1 Customary International Law

The mail order bride industry is defined as a form of trafficking by international trafficking law Kim 10 [Jane Kim, A.B. from Harvard in 2005, M.A. from the UN Mandated University for Peace in 2008, expected J.D. from Columbia in 2011, Trafficked: Domestic Violence, Exploitation in Marriage, and the Foreign-Bride Industry, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 51, No. 2, Winter 2011] The recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, and receipt of foreign women through fraudulent promises of employment or “happy marriage” or through the abuse of power, inequality, or vulnerability for the purpose of exploitation in marriage, including sex exploitation, servitude, or domestic violence, constitutes trafficking under international law. 222 While widespread connections between the foreign-bride industry and trafficking have been referenced by scholars, governments, and service-providers, who often note that mail-order brides can be victims of trafficking or that the IMB-T industry may facilitate trafficking, 223 the argument that the foreign-bride industry inherently constitutes trafficking seems to hold a minority position. 224 Indeed, most governments have been hesitant to declare that the foreign-bride industry constitutes human trafficking. 225 Such tolerance of bride trafficking results in the exclusion of foreign-bride traffickers from criminal prosecution and the accelerated growth of bride trafficking as a form of modern-day slavery. There are several reasons why the international community may be hesitant to classify the foreign-bride industry as trafficking. Part of this hesitancy may stem from a perceived historic acceptance of the foreign bride industry, which grew in part from the “picture-bride system.” 226 Involving the exchange of photographs for the purpose of marital matchmaking, the picture-bride system was popular among twentiethcentury Chinese and Japanese men who immigrated to the United States to work gold mines and railroads and wanted to marry women from their countries of origin. 227 The operation and objectives of the picturebride system, however, were quite different from the operation and objectives of the current foreign-bride industry. 228 Another reason for the international community’s hesitancy in criminalizing the foreign-bride industry by classifying it as trafficking is that countries may have incentives to allow the foreign-bride industry to continue because of its profitability, for both bride-sending 229 and bride-receiving countries. 230 In effect, the transfer of “reproductive and productive duties from richer women in industrialized countries to poor immigrant women” results in hidden savings for governments who need childcare and domestic labor and a labor subsidy for lowpaid or unpaid female workers or foreign brides who fulfill these needs. Finally, the strongest argument against classifying the foreign-bride industry as trafficking, at least in the United States, lies in the intersection of privacy and liberty rights: namely, the right to privacy, 231 the right to marry, 232 and the right to make fundamental decisions about one’s life, including consent to marriage. 233 However, in recent years, the foreign-bride industry’s growth may be its ultimate downfall, as increased information regarding the industry’s operations confirms that the foreign-bride industry constitutes trafficking. This Part makes four arguments. First, the sale and transfer of North Korean refugee women in China and the recruitment and transfer of foreign women via IMB-Ts in the U nited States constitute trafficking under the Palermo Protocol. Second, the foreign-bride industry constitutes trafficking under international law, and the TVPA’s definition of trafficking is incomplete and ineffective. 234 To believe otherwise is to buy into a constructed spectrum of force and consent discussed in this Part, to believe that force, fraud, or coercion are necessary to establish the means of trafficking, and to trivialize the exploitation that foreign brides experience. Third, in refusing to acknowledge the abuse of power and vulnerabilities as a means of trafficking, U.S. law prioritizes physical force as the keystone to crimes of violence against women, which violates the premises of the Palermo Protocol and is ineffective in addressing the realities of human trafficking. Fourth, marriage protects the bride trafficking industry and exploitation of foreign brides through the veil of marital consent. Such exploitation, which includes servitude, forced labor, sex exploitation, and domestic violence, may not fit neatly within the categories of exploitation enumerated by the TVPA and thus may be further marginalized by the TVPA’s definition of trafficking. This Section will examine the “means” element and “purposes of exploitation” element under the Palermo Protocol’s definition of trafficking, focusing on the framework of trafficking established by international law. 235 Each Subsection discusses the cases of North Korean enslaved brides and IMB-T brides, both under the Palermo Protocol and under the TVPA, identifying and discussing the significant problems in the TVPA’s definition of trafficking. The third requirement needed to constitute trafficking — “acts” that amount to trafficking — are not the focus of this inquiry because the foreign-bride market easily satisfies the act requirement of both the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA. 236 Under the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA, the acts that initiate trafficking include recruitment, transport, harboring (both Palermo and TVPA), transfer or receipt (Palermo), or provision or obtaining of person (TVPA). 237 When North Korean women are sold or resold to Chinese men, the acts of recruitment, transport, harboring, receipt, and transfer of persons are satisfied under the Palermo Protocol and under the TVPA. 238 When foreign women are recruited, transported, transferred, and received by U.S. men, the acts of recruitment, provision, and obtaining of persons are satisfied under the Palermo Protocol and under the TVPA. 239

But, U.S. trafficking law through the TVPA advances a less inclusive definition from international trafficking law; this amounts to US. rejection of the Protocol Kim 10 [Jane Kim, A.B. from Harvard in 2005, M.A. from the UN Mandated University for Peace in 2008, expected J.D. from Columbia in 2011, Trafficked: Domestic Violence, Exploitation in Marriage, and the Foreign-Bride Industry, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 51, No. 2, Winter 2011] There are two leading definitions of trafficking in international and national discourse: the international definition advanced by the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol), 17 and the definition advanced by the United States’ Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA). 18 This Part discusses the definitions set forth by the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA and the significance of these definitions in combating human trafficking. Figure 1 presents and contrasts the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA's definitions of trafficking. The Palermo Protocol entered into force in 2003 and has been widely accepted as the first global, legally binding instrument with an agreed definition of trafficking. 19 The Protocol’s definition of trafficking aligns with the conception of trafficking set forth by the United Nations General Assembly (GA) in 1997 and affirmed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Kunarac case of 2001. 20 The Palermo Protocol defines “trafficking in persons” as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. 21 If any of the means of trafficking have been established or if the trafficked person is a minor, the consent of the trafficked person is irrelevant under international law. 22 Despite the Protocol’s positive international reception, its authority as an international treaty, and the United States’ active role in its drafting, 23 the United States continues to advance an alternate definition of trafficking through the TVPA. 24 Although the TVPA is a national law, its definition of trafficking is internationally significant and problematic for three reasons. First, the United States ratified the Palermo Protocol with three reservations, the second of which limits U.S. implementation of the Protocol to the extent provided by U.S. federal law and the fundamental principles of U.S. federalism. 25 This reservation declares that “U.S. federal criminal law, which regulates conduct based on its effect on interstate or foreign commerce, or another federal interest, such as the Thirteen Amendment's prohibition of ‘slavery’ and ‘involuntary servitude,’ serves as the principal legal regime within the United States for combating the conduct addressed in this Protocol.” 26 The Palmero Protocol consequently only applies in the United States for a narrow, virtually nonexistent band of “conceivable situations” or “rare offenses of a purely local character” where the criminal conduct does not involve interstate or foreign commerce or other federal interests, including the Thirteenth Amendment. 27 In effect, the United States’ reservations to the Protocol authorize the TVPA to regulate human trafficking in the United States and to reject U.S. implementation of the Protocol’s definition of trafficking. 28 Such reservations and the United States’ rejection of the Protocol’s definition of human trafficking are significant because they undermine the United States’ obligations under international law and because the United States is a destination country 29 for thousands of trafficked persons each year, with estimates ranging from 14,500 to 50,000 persons trafficked into the United States yearly. 30 As such, U.S. services for victims of trafficking and U.S. prosecution of trafficking crimes are limited by the scope of the TVPA’s definition of trafficking. And, this encourages active non-compliance internationally with international trafficking law Kim 10 [Jane Kim, A.B. from Harvard in 2005, M.A. from the UN Mandated University for Peace in 2008, expected J.D. from Columbia in 2011, Trafficked: Domestic Violence, Exploitation in Marriage, and the Foreign-Bride Industry, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 51, No. 2, Winter 2011] Second, the TVPA and the United States’ reservations to Palermo are concerning because if other countries follow suit, similar reservations will render the Palermo Protocol’s definition of trafficking meaningless. Third, the TVPA authorizes the United States to impose unilateral sanctions against countries that do not sufficiently comply with the U.S. government’s “minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking” — minimum standards that are based upon the TVPA’s definition of trafficking. 31 The threat of U.S. sanctions has compelled an “unprecedented number of governments worldwide” to pass anti-trafficking legislation and to develop domestic infrastructure to meet U.S. minimal standards. Figure 2 depicts global law enforcement trends from 2003 to 2008. 32 Thus, the TVPA is internationally significant because it dictates U.S. trafficking prosecutions, 33 and it imposes and elevates U.S. norms over international

norms by advancing the United States’ definition of trafficking over that of the international community. 34 As illustrated by Figure 1, the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA’s definitions of trafficking diverge with regard to the “means” required to establish trafficking and with regard to the “purposes of exploitation.” First, the TVPA’s definition of trafficking requires force, fraud, or coercion to satisfy its “means element.” 35 The U.S. government defines “force, fraud, and coercion” in the following way: Force involves the use of rape, beatings and confinement to control victims. Forceful violence is used especially during the early stages of victimization, known as the ‘seasoning process,’ which is used to break victim’s resistance to make them easier to control. Fraud often involves false offers that induce people into trafficking situations. For example, women and children will reply to advertisements promising jobs as waitresses, maids and dancers in other countries and are then trafficked for purpose of prostitution once they arrive at their destinations. Coercion involves threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint of, any Conversely, the Palermo Protocol’s definition of trafficking includes a broader list of potential means, including the “abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability.” 37 Unlike the TVPA, the Protocol’s incorporation of power differentials recognizes that traffickers often exploit a trafficked person’s vulnerabilities, for example, through threats of violence or fear of harm, starvation, or survival for oneself or for one’s family. Inspired by anti-trafficking advocates, the Palermo Protocol’s means element was purposefully made more inclusive in order to cover “the reality of what happens” to trafficked persons by encompassing situations where the victim “has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse.” 38 In effect, the Palermo Protocol does not mistake submission for consent and addresses the evidentiary burden imposed by the traditional means element standard of “force, fraud, and coercion” 39 that is often difficult to prove in the contexts of human trafficking. 40 The Protocol focuses on exploitation rather than coercion, affording protection to all trafficked persons, drawing no distinctions between those who can prove they were forced and those who cannot, and offering traffickers no defense based on the alleged consent of the victim. 41 This recognition of the abuse of power or vulnerability as a means of trafficking is also important because trafficking is a transnational crime that requires the incorporation of global experiences that range across socioeconomic class, culture, and religion and spans varying protections afforded by both sending and receiving countries. Application of the TVPA’s definition or other similar definitions of trafficking significantly limits the cases that constitute trafficking, thus reducing the chances that traffickers will face prosecution and that the trafficked victims will receive relief and protection. 42 And, U.S. trafficking law is the DIRECT cause of non-compliance; the sanctions regime defined by our definition of trafficking forces other countries to selectively implement international human trafficking law Chuang 06 [Janie Chuang, ARTICLE: THE UNITED STATES AS GLOBAL SHERIFF: USING UNILATERAL SANCTIONS TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING, University of Michigan Law School, 27 Mich. J. Int’L. 437, Winter 2006, LexisNexis] Once an issue relegated to the margins of international human rights discourse, human trafficking has rapidly become a mainstream political concern, both internationally and domestically. Defined roughly as the recruitment or movement of persons by means of coercion or deception into exploitative labor or slavery-like practices, trafficking is an international crime and human rights violation. According to the International Labour Organization, approximately 2.5 million people are trafficked within and across borders at any point in time, generating an estimated $ 32 billion in profits for organized crime. n1 As the global economy impels more and more people to migrate under circumstances rendering them vulnerable to traffickers, governments worldwide have hastened to pass laws and initiatives to combat the problem. In the midst of this rapidly changing legal environment, the United States has emerged as a dominant force, with the political and financial wherewithal to influence how other countries respond to the problem of human trafficking. In 2000 the United Nations Member States finalized a new international law on trafficking - the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol or Protocol). n2 The Palermo Protocol reflects a fragile international consensus, born from hard-wrought compromise on complex and highly contested issues over legal definitions and frameworks for addressing this transnational problem. The drafting sessions quickly became a forum for heated debates over global anti-trafficking policy, including whether the international legal definition of trafficking should encompass "voluntary" prostitution, and how to balance states' concerns over irregular migration and criminal activity against their obligations to protect trafficked persons' human rights. Emblematic of the priority placed on fostering international cooperation to combat this growing [*439] problem, states ultimately agreed to leave resolution of the more contested issues to individual state discretion. Just weeks before the UN General Assembly adopted the Palermo Protocol, however, the United States promulgated its own comprehensive domestic anti-trafficking legislation - the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA). n3 The TVPA is one of the most comprehensive pieces of domestic antitrafficking legislation in the world. Identifying trafficking as "an evil requiring concerted and vigorous action by countries of origin, transit, or destination," n4 the TVPA reaches beyond U.S. borders to affect anti-trafficking policy abroad.

Specifically, it establishes a sanctions regime authorizing the President to withdraw U.S. (and certain multilateral) nontrade-related, non-humanitarian financial assistance from countries deemed not sufficiently compliant with the U.S. government's "minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking." n5 In assuming such extraterritorial reach, the United States has proclaimed itself global sheriff on trafficking. This raises grave concerns both as a matter of international law and as a matter of global anti-trafficking strategy. A powerful but blunt weapon for influencing the behavior of other states, unilateral sanctions have long been criticized as inconsistent with international law and ineffective in practice. The TVPA sanctions regime invites more of the same criticism. By injecting U.S. norms into the international arena, the sanctions regime risks undermining the fragile international cooperation framework created by the Palermo Protocol. The sanctions threat arguably elevates U.S. norms over international norms by giving the former the teeth the latter so often lack. In doing so, the sanctions regime presents a ready opportunity for the United States to impose - by the threat of sanctions - its own anti-trafficking paradigm on other states. In practice, the sanctions regime has inspired many governments to develop domestic laws and policies to combat trafficking. But whether these actions contribute positively to the global fight against trafficking should not be assumed. The "minimum standards" by which the United States evaluates country performance are poorly articulated and inconsistently applied. Moreover, the legal norms the United States encourages other governments to adopt employ selective (and sometimes misleading) [*440] references to the Palermo Protocol norms, inviting the oft-repeated criticism of U.S. unilateralism for exporting U.S. domestic standards under the guise of universally applicable international norms. With many controversial issues still being actively debated, and much yet to be understood about this complex problem, efforts to assess and guide global anti-trafficking practices through the single lens of U.S. experience risk misfire. Still in its infancy, the TVPA sanctions regime's longterm implications remain to be seen. The results so far, however, provide a fruitful basis for critique with an eye toward achieving consistency with the international legal framework established under the Palermo Protocol. Such an assessment is both timely and necessary, especially given the United States' recent ratification of the Protocol. n6 This Article aims to develop and apply this analysis. By situating the U.S. rise to dominance in historical and political context, this Article underscores the significance of U.S. unilateralism for international anti-trafficking law and policy. Part I provides an overview of the political history of the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA, focusing on policy debates that continue to plague international efforts to coordinate and implement domestic legal responses to human trafficking. Part II examines the resort to unilateralism, and critiques thereof, as a matter of international law, and sets out a critical framework for assessing the trafficking sanctions regime. In conducting this inquiry, this Article adopts, for sake of argument, Professor Sarah Cleveland's optimistic view that, when crafted in accordance with international norms, sanctions can affirmatively contribute to the international system by promoting domestic internalization of such norms. n7 Having established context and methodology, Part III applies this critique to the TVPA sanctions regime to identify the areas where it falls short of compliance with the evolving international legal framework on trafficking. The Article then draws on this analysis to conclude with a modest proposal for transforming the sanctions regime into a more effective tool to combat human trafficking. Establishing clear obligations under international trafficking law is key to the effectiveness of customary international law Gallagher 10 [Anne T. Gallagher, Technical Director, Asia Regional Trafficking in Persons Project; Head of Operations, Equity International; independent scholar and legal adviser. Ph.D., University of Utrecht; M.Int.L (Australian National University); BA, LLB (Macquarie University), The International Law of Human Trafficking, 2010] Recent legal developments in the field of human trafficking, in particular the expansion of trafficking law outside the traditional vague domain of human rights, provide a unique opportunity to clarify the relevant obligations, including the scope and substantive content, with a level of exactness that was never previously possible. The task of clarifying obligations is important because, despite more and better laws, there is still abundant evidence of uncertainty and disagreement as to what States must do – or not do – when it comes to human trafficking. Inevitable legal complexities are one explanation but certainly not the only obstacle to clarity. Except where an immediate strategic interest can be met, States are generally reluctant to tie themselves down to obligations that are so specific as to give rise to clear and measurable expectations. Normative imprecision is, in this sense, a tool by which States exercise control over the international political and legislative process. As long as the law remains unclear, they can continue to argue about it. As long as the law remains unclear, they will, almost certainly not be brought to task for failing to apply it. States are not alone in succumbing to the lure of normative imprecision. For reform-minded advocates, including some international lawyers, the inexactness and ambiguity that has characterized the international legal framework around trafficking has proven irresistible—providing ample and uncritical space within which to articulate and defend certain normative claims, often based on legitimate moral or humanitarian concerns, that may not otherwise have survived rigorous examination.

Overly generous interpretations of legal rules, however well intended, are likely just as harmful to the integrity of international law as avoiding of obligation through failure to articulate and specify. There are other reasons for promoting greater normative clarity at the international level. One of the more pressing is the risk that the international legal framework around trafficking will be sidelined or rendered irrelevant through the emergence of a parallel unilateral regime that has adopted its own criteria for measuring State performance. For those concerned with using legal rules to shape behavior of States, normative precision in international law is not a luxury but an operational necessity. States must understand exactly what international law requires of them if the international legal system is to have any hope of influencing and attaching consequences to their actions. A clear understanding of relevant rules is also essential for advocacy that purports to draw its authority from international law. Revising U.S. immigration law to include bride-trafficking brings the U.S. in line with Palermo Kim 10 [Jane Kim, A.B. from Harvard in 2005, M.A. from the UN Mandated University for Peace in 2008, expected J.D. from Columbia in 2011, Trafficked: Domestic Violence, Exploitation in Marriage, and the Foreign-Bride Industry, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 51, No. 2, Winter 2011] The trafficking of foreign brides for the purposes of exploitation in marriage — in Northeast China and through the IMBT industry — violates international law. 333 The foreign-bride industry should thus be prohibited and criminalized in order to truly combat modern forms of slavery. National and international law should be careful not to marginalize and minimize bride trafficking under the guise of marriage, through the legal fiction of consent, or by rejecting power differentials as a means of trafficking. Additionally, U.S. law should revise its definition of human trafficking to fulfill its international obligations under the Palermo Protocol and to effectively address the realities and harms of human trafficking. However, even if the foreign-bride industry is criminalized, the process toward criminalization will likely only occur over a long-term period and the effects of criminalization will likely be similar to those of the criminalization of prostitution, pushing the market underground. Additionally, there is the chance that sending and receiving countries will resist the criminalization of the foreign-bride industry for economic reasons. 334 As such, it would be irresponsible to argue for the prohibition and criminalization of the bride-trafficking industry and not offer interim and supplementary measures that are equally important and necessary to combat the trafficking of foreign brides . In conclusion, this Note lists both broad and case-specific interim and supplementary measures to combat the trafficking of foreign brides, arguing that both sending and receiving countries must work to reduce the means of foreign-bride trafficking and exploitation. To reduce the means of bride trafficking, the following interim and supplementary measures should be considered :  Receiving countries should create opportunities for immigration that enable foreign women to immigrate on their own terms. These programs could occur at the governmental level or through universities and skills-training institutions that offer opportunities for immigration independent of marriage. Court incorporation of CIL spillsover to broader incorporation of CIL Kundmueller 02
[Michelle, Journal of Legislation, p. lexis] This section of this Note, on the legal authority of customary international law vis-a-vis federal legislation, has not been included with the purpose of discovering which position is correct. Rather, the overview of this debate holds a central place in this Note because it

demonstrates some of the issues at stake as U.S. courts begin to integrate customary international law into what were previously thought of as purely or primarily domestic issues. Admittedly, the number of cases using customary international law in this manner is still few and primarily based on some enabling federal statute. Nonetheless, these decisions take on a greater importance in light of the debate discussed above. Should theorists such as Paust and Lillich prevail, these early cases, taking the first modern steps in the process of identifying and applying customary international law would become crucial precedent in a lawmaking process that Congress would be powerless to overturn. On the other hand, the case law about to be analyzed will lie at the mercy of the will of the people
and their Congress, should the theories of Kelley and Garland prove prophetic. It is still too early to know which faction will dominate, but this analysis of their theories does survey the potential spectrum of outcomes and the legal and political issues yet to be determined.

A strong system of customary international law bolsters U.S. leadership, solves disease, terrorism, and proliferation Brooks and Wohlforth 09 [Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Reshaping the world order: how Washington should reform international institutions.(the role of the United States in reforming international institutions)(Essay) Foreign Affairs, March-April 2009]

EVEN A RUTHLESSLY self-interested United States should want a robust framework of international institutions, which include not just formal organizations and treaties but also informal rules and standards of legitimacy. Why? Because institutions facilitate the United States' own global leadership. Clearly, it is far easier to manage the world economy with an effective World Trade Organization (WTO). Less obvious but just as significant are the manifold ways that international institutions help the United States advance its security interests. Marshaling "coalitions of the willing" is an inefficient approach. Each new coalition requires striking a new set of bargains with different partners and offering them new carrots and sticks. Within an established institution, in contrast, states develop habits for working together. Having an institution in place to facilitate cooperation on one issue also makes it easier for the participating states to rapidly achieve cooperation on a related issue. NATO'S intelligence-sharing network was designed in the Cold War to gather information on the Soviet Union, for example, but later was quickly adapted to deal with the unforeseen issue of global Islamist terrorism. Institutions are no panacea. They do not obviate the need for tough negotiating between states. But they do tend to center the bargaining on how the burden of cooperation should be shared rather than on whether cooperation should occur at all--a focus that is preferable for the United States. The United States may be frustrated that other members Of NATO are not contributing more to the mission in Afghanistan, but it is far better to have this particular conversation than to debate whether countries such as France and Germany should make any contribution at all. As interdependence among countries intensifies and the list of global problems that the United States cannot resolve on its own grows, the benefits of international institutions will increase. Many current problems require continuous attention rather than one-shot solutions. To prevent terrorism, for example, the world will need to establish a reliable and efficient set of controls for monitoring borders. Such an effort will work only if appropriate standards are widely adopted and cooperation in implementing them becomes routine. Even if it turns out that the United States is less vulnerable than other states to new global problems--such as the augmented threat of infectious diseases and greater flows of refugees from conflicts in Africa--it is clearly better off in a world with institutional structures that establish standards to address them. The world's growing complexity means that governments place a premium on accumulating information in order to meet today's challenges. Although the United States is able to gather a great deal of information on its own, it sometimes wastes resources by unknowingly duplicating the efforts of its allies. And when it possesses only partial information, its work must be combined with that of other countries. Routinizing the sharing of data within global institutions can help with both problems. Moreover, information about topics such as nuclear programs, which are sensitive, may only be available via international organizations, whose perceived impartiality and wider inspection access often put them in a better position to secure it. Institutions can also reduce the need for states to actively manage the international system, thereby lessening the sometimes irksome perception that U.S. power is being exercised. The U.S. government has a strong interest in gaining as much information as possible about Iran's nuclear program, for example. Conveniently for Washington, the International Atomic Energy Agency is directing the effort; absent the IAEA, the United States would be forced to burn up resources and political capital to procure such information and would likely be much less successful. In short, the more the network of global institutions protects the interests of the United States, the less Washington needs to employ its power in ways that provoke resentment among other governments. US leadership prevents great powers wars Khalilzad 11
(ZALMAY KHALILZAD FEBRUARY 8, 2011 4:00 A.M. The Economy and National Security — Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992.) We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great

powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Unchecked disease causes extinction Toolis 09
(Kevin, The Express, April 28, 2009 U.K. 1st Edition “Pandemic Pandemonium” lexis)

It destroyed the Roman Empire, wiped out most of the New World and killed millions in Europe. How disease not just Mexico's swine fever - has shaped the planet SCIENTISTS call it the Big Die Off, when a terrifying new virus rips through a species and kills up to a third of the entire population. And we all now could be facing a new apocalypse, though no one yet knows how potent the new strain of Mexican swine fever will be, or how many millions could die. Yet if history teaches us anything it tells us that the greatest danger the human race faces is not some crackpot North Korean dictator but a six-gene virus that could wipe out one third of the global population. Our real enemy, a new plague virus, is so small you can barely see it even with an advanced electron microscope. It has no morality, no thought or no plan. All it wants to do is reproduce itself inside another human body. We are just another biological opportunity, a nice warm place to feed and replicate. Viruses are as old as life itself. What is startling though is how vulnerable our globalised societies are to the threat of a new deadly plague. Before World Health Organisation scientists could identify this new H1N1 virus it had travelled halfway across the world via international flights.
Terrorism leads to extinction Speice ‘6
(Patrick F. Jr., JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” February 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427] Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in

terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or
its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

Prolfieration causes extinction Utgoff 02 [Victor, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions” 2002 p. 87-90]
Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclearbacked aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets,
and these

initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept
that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war

before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using
conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons failing into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.’ These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states ‘known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‘victory or destruction’’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat. And Japan’s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?” If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states. Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognize clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‘These people are not willing to die for this interest’. ‘No sane person would actually use such weapons’. ‘Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons’. ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decisionmaking. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.’ Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and

Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other.

Contention 2 Domestic Violence
Mail-order brides are particularly vulnerable to domestic violence because of enabling immigration policies Del Vecchio 7 [Christina Del Vecchio, Notes Editor of the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, J.D. Candidate at Columbia Law School, graduated summa cum laude from the University of Florida, “Match-Made in Cyberspace: How Best to Regulate the International Mail-Order Bride Industry”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 2007, 46 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 177, LexisNexis] The passage of IMBRA [International Marriage Broker Regulation Act] is a historic step towards protecting the thousands of foreign women who each year fall prey to predatory abusers who use IMBs [International Marriage Brokers] to find their next victims. n1 IMBRA supporters insist on falsely stereotyping all foreign women who marry American men as weak, submissive and desperate ... . They suggest falsely that because the women are not American women and are so desperate to reach our shores, [sic] they are willing to allow themselves to be used as "products" purchased by and beholden to any American man who chooses to marry them ... . Such attitudes are sexist, racist, ethnocentric, gynocentric, xenophobic and they display a breathtaking ignorance of foreign cultures, human relations and international dating. n2 [*179] Polarized commentaries, much like the two quoted above, litter internet forums in response to the "International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005" ("IMBRA"), which President Bush signed into law on January 5, 2006 and went into effect on March 6, 2006. n3 From activist groups seeking to combat domestic violence and the trafficking of women n4 to organizations determined to protect the constitutional rights of online daters, n5 the reactions to IMBRA are visceral. At its core, IMBRA attempts to address the growing concern over domestic violence among mail-order brides. IMBRA accomplishes this through affirmative responsibilities on international marriage brokers, including mandatory background checks of U.S. patrons and disclosure of immigration and domestic violence resources to foreign clients. While these measures may bridge the initial information gap between the U.S. citizen and the foreign bride, IMBRA fails to strike at the legally-sanctioned power imbalance that breeds and perpetuates abuse within these relationships - the U.S. immigration laws. The mail-order bride industry has had a long history in the U.S. and, until recently, remained largely unregulated. n6 The debate surrounding the modern incarnation of mail-order brides, however, has intensified in recent years. It is well documented that domestic violence is notoriously underreported in the U.S, n7 and this is true of [*180] abuse among mail-order brides as well. For instance, a 1999 Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") n8 report cautioned that, in light of "the pervasiveness of domestic violence in our society ... [and] the burgeoning number of unregulated international matchmaking organizations and clients using their services, the potential for abuse in mail-order marriages is considerable." n9 Thus, with the substantial expansion of international marriage brokers from approximately 100 in 1994 to 500 in 2004 in the U.S. alone, n10 the exponential number of women entering the U.S. on fiancee visas and temporary visas for spouses of American citizens, n11 and the high profile murder cases of two mail-order brides, n12 the industry warrants increased attention and regulation. While reports of violence are increasing, n13 many advocates and scholars note the difficulty in conceptualizing the true breadth of the mail-order bride industry. n14 This challenge is exacerbated by the [*181] explosion of international marriage agencies on the internet and the difficultly in assessing their scope and, in turn, evaluating their impact. As one scholar noted, the internet is an ideal forum for the industry "because of its immediacy, promises of anonymity and lack of accountability." n15 Another obstacle in evaluating the mail-order bride industry is the concern for invading the individual choices of adults, whether American or foreign. Arguably, both parties are consenting adults who have a recognized right to privacy in marital relationships. n16 In addition, some advocates are concerned that more heightened attention and regulation on the industry will only create more difficulties for immigrant women in the U.S. n17 Despite these conceptual challenges, members of Congress began their campaign to enact the current legislation targeting the mail-order bride industry in 2003. n18 In rallying support for the initiative, supporters linked the industry to several areas - specifically domestic violence, trafficking, and sex tourism. Notwithstanding the potentially expansive nature of the problems posed by international marriage brokers in these other areas, Congress eventually enacted IMBRA solely as part of the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA 2005"). VAWA provisions are primarily focused on reacting to domestic violence by providing immigration alternatives and needed services to battered immigrant spouses living in the U.S. Notably, this decision to attach the IMBRA provisions to VAWA may be justified in light of alternative legal remedies to combat trafficking and sex tourism. n19 Congress also likely chose to address the mail-order bride industry through VAWA 2005 because marriage is the vehicle and the [*182] legally recognized institution that forms the foundation of the mail-order bride industry. Thus, since mail-order brides legally enter the U.S. through spouse-based immigration provisions, this Note, like Congress, will evaluate the mail-order bride industry solely through the lens of marriage and the corresponding increased risk of domestic violence. Part I will briefly outline the history and current state of the mail-order bride industry, including the mechanics of the industry and the identification of its main participants. In considering the motivations and characteristics of the bridegrooms and the brides, Part II will discuss the evolving perception of marriage in the U.S. and its connection

with domestic violence in the mail-order bride context. Part III will then explore Congress's recent initiative to combat domestic violence among mail-order brides through its primarily information-bridging response. While information is a powerful tool, especially for foreigners who are unfamiliar with the laws and resources available in the U.S., Part IV will illustrate that the power imbalance between the U.S. citizen and the immigrant spouse not only remains, but functions as a legally-sanctioned tool that perpetuates abusive relationships. After briefly exploring the historical origins of U.S. immigration laws and their current structure, Part V will argue that in order to begin combating domestic violence among U.S. citizens and their immigrant spouses, which extends beyond the mail-order bride context, Congress needs to consider revising the Nation's harmful immigration policies. This Note will conclude by outlining several viable options that Congress could adopt to begin easing the impact of the power inequities between battered immigrants and their abusive spouses. While both IMBRA and the U.S. immigration laws are gender neutral, the overwhelming majority of those seeking mail-order brides are men and the majority of citizens filing spouse-based immigration petitions are also men. n20 Thus, this Note will address the mail-order bride industry and spouse-based immigration in accordance with these gender assumptions. Furthermore, this Note does not intend to suggest that all marriages between mail-order brides and U.S. citizens result in abuse. Naturally, those marriages with positive outcomes are not widely reported nor officially tallied. Rather, the [*183] focus of this Note is on that portion of marriages between mail-order brides and U.S. citizens that pose an increased risk for violence. Domestic violence and patriarchal systems can be considered the root cause of environmental destruction and war; extinction becomes inevitable Warren and Cady 94 (Spring 1994, Hypatia, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing connections,” pg 16-17) Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise, (c), and the unmanageability, (d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows, globally, rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sadomasochistic pornography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy. In the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to “rape the earth,” that it is “man’s God-given right” to have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price that we pay for “progress.” And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability. Much of the current “unmanageability” of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male-gender-identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors—the symptoms of dysfunctionality—that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them.

The judge should make an ethical decision about domestic violence; rejecting the abuse of mail-order brides sends challenge to the trivialization that traditional impact calculus gives to impacts like domestic abuse Enloe 04 [Cynthia, prof of IR, The Curious Feminist, p. 74] Thus we need to become more curious about the process of trivialization. How exactly do regimes, opposition parties, judges, popular movements, and the press go about making any incident of violence against women appear trivial? The gendered violence can be explained as inevitable - that is, not worth the expenditure of political capital. Or it can be treated by the trivializers as numerically inconsequential, so rare that it would seem wasteful of scarce political will or state resources to try to prevent it. Third, trivialization can be accomplished by engaging in comparisons: how can one spend limited political attention on, say, domestic violence or forced prostitutionwhen there are market forces like global competition, structural adjustment, or nuclear testing to deal with- as if, that is, none of those had any relationship to the incidence of violence against women? Finally, trivialization may take the form of undermining the credibility of the messenger. As early as
the 1800's trivializers already were labeling women who spoke out publicly against violence against women as "loose," "prudish," or disappointed (it would be the trivializers twentieth century successors who would thing to add "lesbian").

Don’t evaluate disadvantages to your ethical choice regarding mail-order brides; it invites the worst form of nihilism and ongoing atrocities Alan Gewirth, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, PhD in philosophy from Columbia University, 1982, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Application, p. 229-230 None of the above distinctions, then, serves its intended purpose of defending the absolutist against the consequentialist. They do not show that the son's refusal to torture his mother to death does not violate the other persons' rights to life and that he is not morally responsible for their deaths. Nevertheless, the distinctions can be supplemented in a way that does serve to establish these conclusions. The required supplement is provided by the principle of the intervening action. According to this principle, when there is a causal connection between some person A's performing some action (or inaction) X and some other person C's incurring a certain harm Z, A's moral responsibility for Z is removed if, between X and Z, there intervenes some other action Y of some person B who knows the relevant circumstances of his action and who intends to produce Z or who produces Z through recklessness. The reason for this removal is that B's intervening action Y is the more direct or proximate cause of Z and, unlike A's action (or inaction), Y is the sufficient condition of Z as it actually occurs." An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King Jr. was repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the American Republic to its foundations.” By the principle of the intervening action, however, it was King's opponents who were responsible because their intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the rights of the other Americans to peace and order, reply would be that these rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks. It follows from the principle of the intervening action that it is not the son but rather the terrorists who are morally as well as causally responsible for the many deaths that do or may ensue on his refusal to torture his mother to death. The important point is not that he lets these persons die rat than kills them, or that he does not harm them but only fails to help the or that he intends their deaths only obliquely but not directly. The point is rather that it is only through the intervening lethal actions of the terror that his refusal eventuates in the many deaths. Since the moral responsibility is not the son's, it does not affect his moral duty not to torture his mother to death, so that her correlative right remains absolute. Reject the urge to evaluate magnitude first on DAs against this advantage; it trivializes real risks and engages in a form of unrealism that damages effective policymaking Nicholas Rescher, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, 1983, Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management, p. 50 The "worst possible case fixation" is one of the most damaging modes of unrealism in deliberations about risk in real-life situations. Preoccupation about what might happen "if worst comes to worst" is counterproductive whenever we proceed without recognizing that, often as not, these worst possible outcomes are wildly improbable (and sometimes do not deserve to be viewed as real possibilities at all). The crux in risk deliberations is not the issue of loss "if worst comes to worst" but the potential acceptability of this prospect within the wider framework of the risk situation, where we may well be prepared "to. take our chances," considering the possible advantages that beckon along this route. The worst threat is certainly something to be borne in mind and taken into account, but it is emphatically not a satisfactory index of the overall seriousness or gravity of a situation of hazard.

Visas provide remedies for victims of bride trafficking; making them available for mail-order brides is key Brocato 04 [Vanessa Brocato, ARTICLE: Profitable Proposals: Explaining and Addressing the Mail-Order Bride Industry Through International Human Rights Law, San Diego Journal of International Law, 2004, 5 San Diego Int'l L.J. 225] All states have laws prohibiting domestic violence and providing various remedies for victims, including civil protection orders that provide for a wide range of relief. The immigration status of mail-order brides, however, complicates any attempt for them to leave abusive marriages, because they are dependent on their consumer-husbands for legal residence in the United States. n147 If these women become victims of domestic violence, they are often ineligible for cash assistance because of their immigrant status. n148 Unable to get work authorization from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), these women are economically dependent on abusive husbands. The self-petitioning process and two new visas, designed for victims of trafficking and abused immigrant spouses, may offer some relief. Under the

Violence Against Women Act, n149 an abused spouse of a U.S. citizen (USC) may "self-petition," that is, file a family preference visa on her or his own behalf without the participation of the abuser. n150 If this application [*255] is approved, the petitioner becomes eligible to apply for permanent legal residency in the United States. n151 Granted at the discretion of INS adjudicators and Immigration Judges, the success of self-petitioning remains unpredictable, and rejected applications have only limited hope of review. n152 The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (hereinafter TVPA) n153 offers several protections for victims of trafficking. Mail-order brides, however, are not explicitly included in the definition in trafficking victims, n154 and no case has been brought to argue for their inclusion. The TVPA purports to cover people brought by force, fraud or coercion for commercial sex or involuntary servitude. Arguably, a mail-order bride in an abusive situation meets these requirements. n155 If mail-order brides are recognized as victims of trafficking then they would be eligible for the TVPA created T-visa. n156 INS is authorized to issue 5,000 T-visas a year to trafficking victims facing deportation for entering the country illegally. n157 The visas are under-publicized, currently without guiding regulations, and the fee, [*256] $ 400, is prohibitively high. n158 Likewise, these women are unlikely to know U-visas are available. U-visas allow battered, tortured or kidnapped women to remain in the U.S. to seek help. Even if they do apply, the waiting period can be up to five months, leaving them in the continued control of their abusive husbands. In addition to pragmatic difficulties associated with the U-visa, the current administration has failed to issue the regulations necessary for its full implementation. n159

The plan is a crucial first step to curbing the supply and demand of bride-trafficking Flowe 10 [Meredith Flowe, “The International Market for Trafficking in Persons for the Purpose of Sexual
Exploitation: Analyzing Current Treatment of Supply and Demand”, North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation, Spring, 2010, l/n] An essential component of effective anti-trafficking legislation that addresses both the supply and demand factors for trafficking in persons is to define trafficked persons as "victims." n289 The Convention already does so. n290 The Convention states that a "'[v]ictim' shall mean any natural person who is subject to trafficking in human beings as defined" in the Convention. n291 However, while the Protocol and the TVPA use the term "victim," neither includes language defining who is a victim of trafficking. n292 If legislation or international agreements do not define who constitutes a "victim" of trafficking it creates the danger that victims of trafficking in persons will not be identified as victims, but rather punished for being in the destination country illegally or for violating the laws of the destination country by engaging in prostitution. n293 Dr. Mohammed Mattar, Executive Director of the Protection Project at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, observed that in the United States trafficking victims are simply not being identified. n294 In 2005, the [*713] United States had only identified 700 victims of trafficking n295 despite estimates by the government that 18,000-20,000 persons are trafficked into the United States each year. n296 For example, in 2008, a North Carolina "[m]assage parlor [was] shut down after a three-month undercover investigation . . . . The owner of the [spa] . . . was charged with human trafficking and maintaining a place of prostitution. Employee Min Ye was charged with solicitation. Another employee, Dan Kim, was charged with two counts of indecent exposure." n297 Even though the owner was charged with human trafficking, those he had victimized were not treated as victims, but rather charged with the crimes of solicitation and indecent exposure. n298 The market for human trafficking will not be shut down by charging the owner with human trafficking but failing to identify victims like Min Ye and Dan Kim as true victims of trafficking. As discussed in Section I, to close down the market for human trafficking requires efforts to address both the demand and supply for victims. n299 In this case the trafficker was charged with human trafficking, thus increasing the cost of operation and deterring his future demand to utilized victims of trafficking in his business. n300 However, the victims were not identified as victims; rather they were treated as criminals and not provided rehabilitation services. Thus, the supply of victims has not been decreased because their likelihood of being trafficked again for the purposes of sexual exploitation is increased. n301 As illustrated by this example, the failure to identify victims of trafficking as victims leads to several consequences influencing both supply and demand for human trafficking. First, if trafficked persons are not identified as victims, they may be precluded from accessing needed medical assistance, counseling, educational, financial, or other services provided to assist victims in the [*714] reintegration process. n302 If victims are treated as criminals and not provided access to rehabilitation services, the probability that they will not successfully reintegrate into society is in-creased. Thus, these non-identified victims will be more susceptible to being retrafficked, increasing the supply of victims. n303 Furthermore, if victims are not identified as such it increases the probability that traffickers will not be charged with human trafficking. This failure to increase the potential penalties for traffickers leads to no change in the cost of operation for traffickers, which in turn does make any impact on demand for victims. n304 For these reasons, the inclusion of the definition of a victim of human trafficking in national legislation and international agreements is essential to influencing both the supply and demand for trafficking victims. In addition to

including a victim definition, it is necessary to educate law enforcement personnel, individuals providing rehabilitation services, and other persons who may come in contact with trafficking victims on the definition and the rights of victims under the law. A beneficial aspect of the agreements and legislation discussed above is their inclusion of provisions regarding educational efforts for these professionals. n305 Further, these agreements and legislation contain education and awareness campaigns targeted at informing potential victims of tactics used by traffickers and the dangers inherent in trafficking. n306 However, there is a need to increase the awareness of the general public in both countries of origin and destination, and of the consumers of sexual services in countries of destination, that trafficking is not a victimless crime.

The Supreme Court of the United States should rule that individuals subjected to bride trafficking by international marriage brokers are eligible for T-visas, citing the definition of “trafficking in persons” put forward in the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, U.S. obligations under customary international law based on that treaty, and that current means of visa entrance for those individuals rely on federal law that intrudes on the states’ right to define marriage.