G.R. No. L-28607 February 21, 1929 PRATS & COMPANY, a registered partnership, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, a corporation, defendant-appellee. Abad Santos, Camus, Delgado and Recto and Ohnick and McFie for appellant. Gibbs and McDonough for appellee. STREET, J.: This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila by Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership, for the purpose of recovering from the Phoenix Insurance Co., of Hartford, Connecticut, the sum of P117,800.60, with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, on August 21, 1924, from a fire, it being alleged that said loss was covered by policy of insurance No. 600217, for the sum of P200,000, issued by the defendant company to the plaintiff. For answer, the defendant, Pheonix Insurance Co., admitted the insurance of the policy of insurance but, by way of special defense, alleged, among other things, that the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and that the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss, in contravention of the express terms of the policy. Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint with respect to the obligation created by the policy which was the subject of the suit, but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P11,731.93, with interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account of moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant, of remnants of the insured stock. From this judgment the plaintiff appelaed. So far as liability under the policy of insurance which is the subject of this action is concerned, we are of the opinion that the defendant has sufficiently established two defenses, either of which would be fatal to the right of recovery, namely, first, that the fire was set by the procurance or connivance of the plaintiff for the purpose of defrauding the insurer; and secondly, that the plaintiff, after the fire, submitted to the defendant a fraudulent claim supported by the false proof, in violation of the terms of the policy. Of these defenses the trial judge sustained the second but passed the first without express finding. We consider it important, however, briefly to exhibit the salient facts on both points, not only because of the considerable sum of money involved, but because the facts appearing in evidence supply a typical illustration of the manner in which frauds of this character against the insurance companies may be constructed with some hope of success, when insurance agents are accessible who, under the incentive of writing large amounts of insurance, can be induced to close their eyes to obvious dangers. On July 10, 1923, Francisco Prats, Elias Hanna and Isidro Bejar registered two mercantile partnerships in the Bureau of Commerce and Industry for the purpose of engaging in mercantile business. The articles of copartnership of these two entities were the same except in the firm names. It was apparently contemplated, in so far as any legitimate function may have been intended, that Prats & Co. should be an importing firm, while Hanna, Bejar & Co. should engage in retail businss. As eveents show, the existence of the parallel entities, controlled by the same individuals, supplied, undeniably, suitable engines for accomplishing an exploit of the kind that was here attempted. Of the three individuals mentioned Elias Hanna and Isidro Bejar were Turkish subjects of unsavory reputation in insurance circle of Manila, while Francisco Prats was a Spanish subject who had had some success as a merchant and, prior to his connection with the two associates above mentioned, apparently enjoyed a fair reputation. Another individual, who figures in the case as an instrument of the three partners, is one Domingo Romero, who at that the time which we are here concerned, was an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, with a salary of P150 per month. Ramon Prats, a son of Francisco Prats, was united in marriage to a daughter of Domingo Romero, with the result that social relations between Francisco Prats and Domingo Romero were close. Francisco Prats appear to have acted as manager for both Prats & Co. and Hanna, Bejar & Co. On May 27, 1924, Prats, acting for Hanna, Bejar & Co., purchased a one-story building at 95 Plaza Gardenia, Manila; and soon thereafter he begun to assemble in this place the stock of merchandise which was the subject of insurance in this case. The building referred to was purchasd outright for the sum of P1,600. It was old and was scarcely more than a shed but had been used in times past for human habitation. It was located in a part of the city which was inconvenient of success to traders and out of the ordinary channels of business activity. After purchasing the building, Prats knocked out the partitions, removed the floor, and laid along the center. The main part of the structure was thus converted into a

single store, or bodega, though certain adjuncts, consisting of kitchen and closets, remained unchanged in the rear of the building. A sign was then set up over the entrance bearing the firm name "Hanna, Bejar & Co." In effecting the purchase of this building Prats availed himself of the service of Domingo Romero, who lived only two doors away at 97 Plaza Gardenia. By August 21, 1924, there had been assembled and stored by Prats in the place above described a stock of goods which, according to the documents exhibited by him, had a valuation of P211,329.72, on which he had taken out insurance to the extent of P410,000. At midnight of the day mentioned a fire occurred at 95 Plaza Gardenia, which destroyed the building and ruined its contents, the amount realized from the salvage of the stock being P11,731.93. With respect to the insurance upon this stock at the time of the fire, the following facts appear: In the month of June preceeding the fire, nine policies aggregating P160,000 were taken out by Prats in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co. on merchandise stored at 95 Plaza Gardenia. At the time these policies were taken out the valuation of the goods then in said store could not have been more than P68,753. On June 28, 1924, Prats procured from the agent of the defendant in this case policy of insurance No. 600217 in the amount of P200,000 on merchandise stored in the same place. The nine policies already procured had been taken out, as we have seen, in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co.; but when Prats applied to the agent of the defendant for the P200,000 policy last above mentioned, the agent told him that if Hanna or Bejar had any interest in the stock to be insured the policy could not be issued for the reason that, in such case, the defendant would not be able to obtain reinsurance for any part of the policy, owing to the bad reputation of Hanna and Bejar. Accordingly, at the request of Prats & Co.; and Prats at the same time assured the agent that Hanna and Bejar were not partners in Prats & Co. With the writing of this policy the amount of insurance on the merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia was increased to P360,000, while the value of the stock at that time was not probably much in excess of P158,000. On August 11, 1924, or just ten days before the fire, Prats took out an additional policy for P50,000 in the name of Prats & Co. on the same stock. This made a total insurance of P410,000 on the contents of the store at 95 Plaza Gardenia. At the time, according to Prats himself, the evaluation of the merchandise then in the place was not in excess of P230,000. Furthermore, Prats, about this time, caused the first nine policies which had been taken out in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co. to be indorsed to Prats & Co., thereby making this firm the sole insured firm with respect to this stock of merchandise. With respect to the origin of the stock thus assembled, we find that part had been purchased in Europe by Prats; and in connection with its importation from abroad it is noteworthy that on June 18, 1924, Prats & Co. procured a policy of marine insurance to be issued by Meerkamp & Co., Ltd., as agents of the India Insurance Co., Ltd., Upon twenty-two cases of silk, of a supposed value of P43,400. at the time this policy was procured Prats informed the insurer that the goods were soon to arrive from France by the steamer Suwa Maru. For this policy of insurance Prats paid out the sum of P736.25. Nevertheless, it now appears that the twenty-two cases of silk covered by this marine policy were fictitious, as no such purchase of silk had been made by Prats & Co. in France or elsewhere. This fact was offered in evidence by the defendant, as tending to reveal a scheme by which, if a dstructive fire should occur, the plaintiff would be able to mislead the defendant as to the quantity of goods stored in the bodega. This item of proof, though circumstantial in its nature, was undoubtedly competent and should have been admitted by the trial court. The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure manipulations were used by the plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the contents of the bodega before the fire. In this connection it appears that forty-five cases of old stock of Hanna, Bejar & Co., at Legaspi, P. I., were shipped to Manila before the fire, but instead of being taken directly to 95 Plaza Gardenia, they were housed for a time in the back part of the lower floor of the Bazar Filipino in which Prats & Co. and Hanna, Bejar & Co. had their offices. Moreover, a quantity of merchandise purchased from place shortly before the fire, instead of directly to 95 Plaza Gardenia; and it is the theory of the defendant that new merchandise purchased from Talambiras Brothers was substituted for the old stock in boxes from Hanna, Bejar & Co. at Legaspi, leaving the old goods to be deposited in the bodega to swell the debris of the fire. There is evidence also, which was credited by the court, to the effect that on various occasions before the fire goods were removed from the bodega to the store of B. Abolafia, at Manila, where they were received without invoice. Some of these goods were subsequently sent away by Abolafia for sale in the provinces. If overinsurance and the assemblage of goods at inflated values in the bodega at 95 Plaza Gardenia, together with the surreptitious abstraction of goods therefrom by the insured, have suggested a possible intention on the part of its

manager to realize improperly on its insurance policies, this inference is, in our opinion, but beyond reach of reasonable doubt by facts relative to the destruction of the place. In this connection we note that about the time the bodega at 95 Plaza Gardenia had been purchased, Domingo Romero assisted one Ramon Osete to rent No. 69 Calle Gardenia, which was close to the rear of the building at 95 Plaza Gardenia. Osete appears to have been the individual chose for the role of incendiary, and he slept at the place mentioned until the night of the fire. A night or two before the fire this Osete, accompanied by one Antonio Prats, appears to have brought two cans of petroleum to his lodging place at 69 Calle Gardenia. After these cans had been taken to Osete's bathroom by hismuchacho, the latter was sent out on an errand; and while he was gone the petroleum disappeared. After the fire had been started in the plaintiff's bodega shortly after midnight on August 21, 1924, Osete conveyed this boy in his automobile to the fire alarm box on Plaza Gardenia. Reaching this place, Osete planted the boy there with instructions to stop anyone who might attempt to turn in the alarm by telling him that he (the boy) had already done so; and in fact, after the fire had gained some headway, one Joaquin Silos, who lived near the bodega, ran to the box to turn on the alarm but was stopped in the act by a person who stated that he had already given the alarm. Nevertheless, when Fire Chief Vanderford reached the scene of the fire a few minutes later, he found that the box had not been disturbed and he himself turned on the alarm. The boy stated that when he was on the way with Osete to the alarm box, as just stated, an explosion took place in the bodega and a dull sound was emitted. Vanderford says that upon his arrival he saw that the smoke issuing from the bodega black, suggesting the combustion of some inflammable material like petroleum. He also noted the odor of petroleum, as did also some of the firemen who reached the scene. It may be added that when the debris of the fire was subsequently searched, merchandise soaked with petroleum was found in the ruins. Domingo Romero, who had been living at 97 Plaza Gardenia, had before the fire taken his family temporarily to the home of Prats in Pasay. But after the fire was over the family moved back to 97 Plaza Gardenia, although that place had been considerably damaged by the flames. Among those who suffered from the fire were the members of the Artigas family, living at 93 Gardenia, on the side opposite Romero's house. Another neighbor who likewise suffered from the fire was one Juan Atayde, occupant of 67 Calle Gardenia, at the side of the house occupied by Osete. Soon after the fire Domingo Romero quietly passed a 100peso bill into the hand of Maria Luisa Artigas, a daughter belonging to the Artigas family. Romero likewise gave the same amount to Juan Atayde. It is self-evident that the gifts thus made by Romero to Luisa Artigas and Juan Atayde had other motives than pure charity and that the money probably came from some other source than his own modest earnings. After the fire that a special investigation was made by the police department with the result that Deputy Chief Lorenzo came to the conclusion that the fire had originated from an intentional act. Reflection upon the proof before the court engenders in us the same belief and conducts us to the further conclusion that Prats & Co. was not alien to the deed. The finding of the trial court in the effect that the plaintiff had submitted false proof in the support of his claim is also, in our opinion, well founded. That conclusion appears to have been based upon three items of proof, and with respect to at least two of these, we think that the conclusion of his Honor was correctly drawn. These two facts are, first, that the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P12,800 when th erule value of said jewelry was about P600; and, secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance company the value of goods which had been surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire. Neither of these two facts are consistent with good faith on the part of the plaintiff, and each constituted a breach of the stipulations of the policy against the use of fraudulent devices and false proof with respect to the loss. The other point relied upon by his Honor to sustain the conclusion that the plaintiff had attempted to deceive the defendant with respect to the extent of the loss was at least competent in its general bearing on the good faith of the plaintiff, even if, as is probably true, not alone sufficient to constitute a breach of the same stipulations. The point is this: After the fire the plaintiff presented to the adjuster certain cost sheets and cpies of supposed invoices in which the prices and expenses of importation of a quantity of goods were stated at double the true amount. The adjuster soon discovered the artificial nature of these documents, and, with his consent, they were withdrawn by Prats and subsequently destroyed. At the hearing Prats stated that these documents had been fabricated in order that they might be exhibited to intending purchasers of the goods, thereby making it appear to them that the cost of the mercahndise had been much greater than it in fact was a ruse which is supposed to have been entirely innocent or at least not

directed against the insurer. But a question naturally arises as to the purpose which these documents might have been made to serve if the fire, as doubtless intended by its designers, had been so destructive as to remove all vestiges of the stock actually involved. Upoon the whole we are forced to state the conclusion, not only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or connived therein, but also that it submitted fraudulent proof as the trial judge found. Before concluding this opinion we are constrained to make a few observations with reference to the trial of this case and the inordinate amountof time consumed in the proceedings. We are told in the appellant's brief that the trial of this case covered a period of almost two years, in which fifty separate sessions were held, without counting the numeruos hearings upon the taking of the deposition of Francisco Prats, a partner in the plaintiff firm, whose testimony was taken at the instance of the defendant. Taken all together, the time thus consumed was out of all proportion to the difficulties of the case. An examination of the voluminous transcript reveals at least part of the reason for this inordinate consumption of time; since we find that far too much of the space in the transcript is taken up with the record of petty skirmishes in court resulting from objections over the admission of evidence. In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectivly and expenditiously administered in the courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objection to its materiality or technical objection to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of error without returning the case for a new trial, -- a step which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment. In this connection it should be remembered that many of the technical rules of evidence which are often invoked in our courts were originally worked out in England and the United States, where the jury system prevails. These rules were adopted for the purpose of keeping matter from juries which it was supposed might unduly influence them in deciding on the facts. They have little pertinence to a system of procedure, like ours, in which the court is judge both of law and facts, and in which accordingly it is necessary for the court to know what the proof is before it rules upon the propriety of receiving it. Apart from these considerations is the circumstance mentioned above that the time consumed in the trial on such collateral points is generally many times greater than would be consumed if the questionable testimony should be admitted for what it is worth. What has been said above finds special relevancy in this case in view of the action of the trial court in refusing to consider the proof referred to in the opinion showing that the plaintiff, while engaged in assembling its stock, procured maritime insurance upon a fictitious importation of silk. We earnestly commend the maintenance of liberal practice in the admission of proof. Our examination of the case leads to the conclusion that the result reached by the trial court was correct. The appealed decision will therefore be affirmed, and it is also ordered, with costs against the appellant. Avancena, C. J., Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur. Romualdez, J., concurs for the affirmance of the appealed judgment. Villa-Real, J., concurs in the result. Separate Opinions MALCOLM, J., concurring:

I concur in the result and agree with the clear decision of the trial judge sustaining the defense of false proof, but desire to make of record my nonconfirmity as to a discussion of questions not involved in the disposition of the assignment of errors. G.R. No. L-48224 September 23, 1942 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff. NATIVIDAD FLORENDO, complaint-appellant, vs. GENEROSO MACEDA and CORAZON MACEDA, defendants-appellees. Constancio E. Castaeda for appellant. Estanislao A. Fernandez for appellees. MORAN, J.: This is a criminal action for slight slander instituted in the justice of the peace court of Pasig, Rizal, against defendants Generoso Maceda and Corazon Maceda and which was dismissed on the ground that the offense had already prescribed. The offense was allegedly committed on July 21, 1940, and the action was filed on October 22, 1940, that is three months and one day after the supposed commission thereof. The appeal of the private prosecutor to the Court of First Instance having been dismissed on the same ground on motion of the fiscal, the complainant appealed to this Court. The first question here raised is: May the offended party appeal from the order of dismissal rendered upon petition of the fiscal to that effect? This question inevitably leads to the inquiry as to whether the offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a criminal action and, in the affirmative case, the instances where intervention is proper. This is so because, obviously where there is no right to intervene, there is no right to appeal. Rule 106, section 15, of the Rules of Court, provides: Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it after the termination of the criminal case, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense. This provision was taken from section 107 of General Orders, No. 58, which recites: The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming to be injured by commission of an offense to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages for the injury sustained by reason of the same shall not be held to be abridged by the provision of this order; but such person may appear and shall be heard either individually or by attorney at all stages of the case, and the court upon conviction of the accused may enter judgment against him for the damages occasioned by his wrongful act. It shall, however, be the duty of the promoter fiscal to direct the prosecution, subject to the right of the person injured to appeal from any decision of the court denying him a legal right. The late Chief Justice Arellano, one of the members of the commission which drafted General Orders, No. 58, commenting on the right of the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal action as provided for in section 107 aforequoted, said: ... La accion penal privada del ofendido mismo era necessario mantener como consecuencia de la vigencia del Codigo Penal por dos razones; primera porque, en principio, con el pronunciamiento principal acerca de la responsabilidad criminal suele ir el relativo a la responsabilidad civil; y segunda, porque hay delitos que no pueden perseguirse de otro modo que por medio de instancia formal de la persona ofendida. Por estas razones, bajo el epigrafe "derechos de la persona agraviada por el delito"; se dicto la section 107, segun la cual, "los derechos hasta ahora asegurados por la Ley a la persona que alega haber sido agraviada por la comision de un delito, para tomar parte en su persecucion y exigir la responsabilidad civil nacida del delito, no quedan restringidos por las disposiciones de esta orden. (Estados Unidos contra Malabon, 1 Jur. Fil., 760, 762.) In a resolution, upon a motion for reconsideration in the case of People vs. Orais (38 Off. Gaz., 2434), this Court had occasion to explain the specific import of the above-quoted observations of the late Chief Justice, thus:

... No pudo haber sido la intencion del legislador el permitir al particular lesionado por la comision de un delito tomar parte en sun persecucion haya o no sufrido daos y perjuicios en su persona o en sus intereses. La frase "tomar parte en su persecucion y exigir la responsabilidad civil nacida del delito limita esta intervencion a los casos en que el ofendido particular haya surfrido daos y perjuicios provenientes del hecho delictivo. And in Gonzalez vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan (63 Phil., 846, 857), this Court reaffirmed these observations as follows: Some of the rights secured by the Spanish law to the person claiming to be injured by the commission of the offense and conserved by section 107 of General Orders, No. 58, are to take part in the prosecution of the offense, to recover damages for the injury sustained by reason of the same and to appeal only in matters affecting restitutions, reparations and indemnities claimed by them, but not with regard to the criminal action. (Emphasis ours.) It is thus evident, in the light of the history of the enactment of section 107 of General Orders, No. 58, as reflected in the observations of one of its framers and the explanatory decisions of this Court, that the offended party may, as of right, intervene in the prosecution of a criminal action, but then only when, from the nature of the offense, he is entitled to indemnity and his action therefor has not by him been waived or expressly reserved. This is the rule we have now embodied in section 15 of Rule 106 of the new Rules of Court, elsewhere quoted. But, as expressly provided in this same section, this right of intervention in appropriate cases is subject to the provision of section 4 of the same Rule which reads as follows: All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. As a necessary corollary to this provision, we laid down the principle that even if the offense is one where civil indemnity might rightly be claimed, if the criminal action is dismissed by the court, on motion of the fiscal, on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the offended party cannot appeal from the order of dismissal because otherwise the prosecution of the offense would, in the last analysis, be thrown beyond the direction and control of the fiscal. (Gonzalez vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, supra; People vs. Orais, supra; People vs. Moll, 40 Off,. Gaz., 2d Sup., p. 231; People vs. Lipana, 40 Off. Gaz., 3456.) In the case cited, statements were, however, made by this Court importing a grant right to the offended party to appeal upon a question of law. We reaffirm these statements as a correct qualification of the rule, it being understood, however, that such right to appeal upon a question of law presupposes the existence of a rightful claim to civil indemnity and the offended party has neither waived nor reserved expressly his action therefor. It is argued that in People vs. Baes (38 Off. Gaz., 2319), wherein the crime charged is that of offending religious feelings which obviously precludes any idea of civil indemnity, we ruled that the offended party may appeal upon a question of law from the dismissal of the case ordered by the Court of First Instance. The contention rests on an erroneous predicate regarding the true offense alleged to have been committed. In our resolution rendered upon a motion for a reconsideration in People vs. Orais (38 Gac. Off., pag. 2434), we explained our ruling thus: ... Existe, pues, una distincion fundamental entre la cuestion envuelta en la causa de Baes y la envuelta en la de Gonzales. Aunque en la primera causa los hechos denunciados constituyen mas bien delito de allanamiento de una propieda, previsto y penado por el articulo 281 del Codigo Penal Revisado, que lleva consigo responsabilidad civil, no habiendose alegado en la denuncia que el denunciante particular hubiese sufrido algun dao, hubiera sido mas propio el que hubiesemos considerado la solicitud de mandamus como si se hubiese presentado para obligar al Juzgado inferior a admitir no la apelacion, sino la denuncia en la que los hechos denunciados constituian el delito de allanamiento de una propiedad, y no el de "ofensa a los sentimientos religiosos", ya que la calificacion que el Ministerio Fiscal da en una querella a un delito no es la que determina su naturaleza, sino los hechos delictivos alegados en la denuncia y probados en el juicio; puesto que, no teniendo el particular agraviado por la comision de un delito derecho de tomar parte en su presecucion y de apelar, a menos que reclamase daos y perjuicious o el delito enjuiciado fuese de los que necesariamente producen responsabilidad civil, al unico remedio que le queda es el de mandamus para

obligar al Ministerio Fiscal a presentar la querella correspondiente con vista de la denuncia que alega hechos constitutivos de delito, probados en la investigacion preliminar, y al Juez que sobreseyo la denuncia a mocion del Ministerio Fiscal a reponer la causa, si se ve que uno y otro cometieron abuso de discrecion. In the instant case, the civil action for damages arising from the oral defamation charged does not appear to have been waived or expressly reserved by the supposed offended party. And since, according to Rule 107, section 1, paragraph (a) "when a criminal action is instituted the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action," we believe, and so hold, that the offended party may rightly intervene by interposing an appeal from the order dismissing the action upon a question of law. An admission is imputed to the attorney for the offended party to the effect that no damages had been sustained by the latter arising from the offense charged, but this supposed admission is denied. Besides, no attorney can waive his client's cause of action unless with the consent of the client (7 C. J. S., 922), and, in the instance case, the admission attributed to the private prosecuting attorney is not alleged to have been made with the offended party's consent. The next question is: Has the offense of slight slander charged in the complaint prescribed? Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflicted penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years. Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. The crime of libel or other similar offense shall prescribe in two years. The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months. When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. This provision fixes the different prescriptive periods for grave felonies. Thus, a grave felony prescribes in 20 years if it is punishable by death, reclusion perpetual or reclusion temporal, or in 15 years if it is punishable by other afflictive penalty. Less grave felonies prescribe in 10 years if they are punishable by correctional penalty, or 15 years if punishable by arresto mayor, except the offense of libel or other similar offenses which shall prescribe in 2 years, or the offense of oral defamation and slander by deed which shall prescribe in 6 months. All light offense prescribe in 2 months. As the offense charged in the instant case is a light offense, the prescriptive period of 2 months applies thereto. The case, therefore, was rightly dismissed. It is contended by complainant-appellant that all offenses of oral defamation, whether light or serious, prescribe in six months because the second to the last paragraph of article 90 above quoted apparently so implies. We cannot uphold such interpretation. The very fact that the prescriptive period for serious oral defamation was expressly excepted from the general rule by lowering it from ten years to six months argues against the supposition that the lawmaker intended to raise the prescriptive period for light oral defamation from two months (as that of all other light offenses) to six months, i. e, on the same level with serious oral defamation. The obvious reason for shortening the period of limitation for the prosecution of serious oral defamation namely, that a verbal insult is forgotten as soon as the heat of passion subsides applies with equal, if not greater, force to light oral defamation. Hence, there is no reason to suppose that the lawmaker intended to raise the prescriptive period for light oral defamation above that of other light offenses. Indeed, that was the same law under the old Penal Code, and there has been no reason or occasion for any change. The order of dismissal is affirmed with costs against appellant. Yulo, C.J., Paras, Bocobo, and Generoso, JJ., concur.