BELLIS vs BELLIS Facts: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death.

Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing his Texas properties, the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, the recognized illegitimate children were not given any share. Texas has no conflict rule (Rule of Private International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs.

Issue: Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to successional rights.

Held: The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas law, there are no legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his national law, still, will govern the properties for succession even if it is stated in his testate that it shall be governed by the Philippine law.

Remedios NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. Felix NUGUID and Paz Salonga NUGUID, oppositors and appellees. G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966 FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her death. The will stated as follows: Nov. 17, 1951 I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B

Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one. (Sgd.) Illegible T/ ROSARIO NUGUID Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by the parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz. The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of the parents and declared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited and that they are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. ISSUE: May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still be valid with respect to the free portion of the will? RULING: No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the Civil Code states that (T)he preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. The will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the legitime and that she should thus be considered a devisee or legatee is without merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees must be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present. Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of disinheritance as the law also requires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in the will. Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.

Spouses Alvaro PASTOR, Jr. and Ma. Elena Achaval de PASTOR, petitioners, vs. The COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Juan Y. REYES, and Lewellyn QUEMADA, respondents. G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983.

FACTS: Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedents estate, of which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being immediately executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositors motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied as well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity. RULING: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed

and approved the holographic will with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties. The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez, Apolonio TABOADA, petitioner, vs. Hon. Avelino S. ROSAL, Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte (Branch III, Maasin) respondent. G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982 FACTS: In the petition for probate filed with respondent court, Taboada attached the alleged last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez which was written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and consisting two pages: the first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by three (3) instrumental witnesses; and the second page contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of such clause by the said instrumental witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. The trial court, through Judge Pamatian, denied the probate of the will for want of formality in its execution and ordered Taboada to submit the names of the intestate heirs, however, the latter did not comply with the said order. Instead, he filed a manifestation and/or motion ex parte praying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the disallowance of the will and further, he filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the motions could not acted upon by Judge Pamatian due to his transfer and thus, Judge Rosal assumed the position. Meanwhile, Taboada filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator. Subsequently, the three motions filed by the petitioner were denied, hence this present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the law requires that the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another. RULING: Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or cause some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of identification. The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly identified by the subscribing witnesses. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order. ROXAS VS DE JESUS Facts: Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, was appointed administrator of his sister Bibianas estate. He found a notebook belonging to his sister, containing a letter will address to her children. It was entirely written and signed by Bibiana. The date of which was written: Feb/61. Handwriting and signature that was written on what purposed to be her holographic will. Issue: Whether or not the date Feb. /61 appearing on the holographic will of the deceased is a valid compliance with the Art. 810 of the Civil Code? Ruling: The court agreed with the petitioner when it contented that liberal construction of the holographic will should prevail. Neither absents any evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of wills and testaments. There is no question that the holographic will of the deceased was entirely written, dated and signed by the testratix herself and in a language known to her. The objection interposed by respondent Luz Henson that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date Feb/.61 appearing on the will is not sufficient compliance with Art. 810 of NCC was declared too technical to be entertained The SC pronounced that the Feb/61 appearing on the will is valid applying the principle of substantial compliance.

Testate Estate of the Late Adriana Maloto, Aldina MALOTO CASIANO, et al., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Panfilo MALOTO and Felino MALOTO, respondents. G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988 FACTS: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs the parties (Aldina, Constantcio, Panfilo and Felino) in this case who are her niece and nephews. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, the four (4) heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunts estate which was instituted in the then CFI. However, while the case was still in progress, the heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adrianas estate which provides for the division of the estate into four equal parts among themselves. When presented before the court, said agreement was approved. However, three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adrianas counsel, discovered a document entitled KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento) and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate that what they have received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners. Thus, Aldino and Constancio joined by other devisees and legatees filed a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will. Upon denial of the trial court, the petitioners came before the Supreme Court by way or petition for certiorari and mandamus which were dismissed because they were not the proper remedies. The appellate court found out that the will was burned by the househelper of Adriana and was at the possession of the lawyer in because Adriana was seeking the services of the lawyer in order to have a new will drawn up. ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Adriana Maloto had been efficiently revoked. RULING: Article 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases: By implication of law; or

By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or

By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.

In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adrianas maid was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana and was not done in her presence.

PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FRANCISCA SALAK DEPAZ and ERNESTO BAUTISTA, defendants-appelleesOctober 28, 1966 FACTS:Prima Carillo and Lorenzo Licup were claiming portions of their inheritance from their deceased

mother. The property was currently on the name of the appellees. ISSUE:Whether or not the issue of survivorship can be applied in this case. RULING: Reserva troncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the new Civil Code and Article 811 of the old Civil Code, which state:"The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may haveacquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reservesuch property as he may have acquitted by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who arewithin the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came."The reserva troncal arose as had been finally decided by the Court of Appeals in SpecialProceeding No. 23 when Agustina acquired by operation of law all the properties of her descendant Adolfo (grandson), who acquired them by gratuitous title from another ascendant,Isabel (Adolfo's mother). According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of thereservista, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who canbring a revindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised within the time for recovering real properties, can be lost by prescription.Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the property 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 - from Francisca Salak de Paz, who has been possessing it in the concept of anowner, from April 24, 1950 when Agustina died. And the Court of Appeals' decision affirming theexistence of reserva troncal, promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the more doubtless thatsuch right had accrued in their favor from the time Agustina died. It is clear, therefore, that theright or cause of action accrued in favor of the plaintiffsreservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor andHeir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellantJanuary 31, 1963 FACTS:Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided andconsequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where hebecame a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in thiscountry he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5,1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir,but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to havebeen declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California lawshould be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile;

that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must beincreased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On theother hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts mustimmediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there areno compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by himin absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his willremain undisturbed. ISSUE:Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen? RULING:The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are tworules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled inCalifornia; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California.The California conflict rule says: If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personalproperty is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of hisdomicile. Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines,ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referringto both country back and forth. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY,executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositorsappellants, VS.EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appelleesJune 6, 1967FACTS:Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children withhis 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estateshould be divided in trust in the following order and manner:a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident

of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted toprobate in the Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paidthe entire bequest therein.Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its Executors FinalAccount, Report of Administration and Project of Partition where it reported, inter alia, thesatisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 deliveredto her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portionsfor the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respectiveopposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates asillegitimate children.The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply. RULING:It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at thetime of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the samewould not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for theapplication of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since theproperties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to theconflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position istherefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA andthat under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since theintrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to bedetermined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testateof Amos Bellis.