RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED CASE DIGESTS Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio, GR 186652, October 6, 2010 Posted by Pius Morados

on November 13, 2011 (Admin Law, DOJ Secretary, Prosecutor, Quasi-judicial power) Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary, herein respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations. The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error. The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based). Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice, and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ. Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals. Issue: 1. Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power. 2. Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power. Held: 1. No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt of innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused. 2. No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.

Galman v Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 392 (1986) Facts: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration. The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on. The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a retrial before an impartial tribunal. Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them. Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no doublejeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused. The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.

Galman Vs. Sandiganbayan Case Digest Galman Vs. Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 43 G.R. No.72670 September 12, 1986 Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom. The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them. Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution. But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them). Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process. However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process. Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division)

would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'. The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office. More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

US Vs. Tan Teng Case Digest US Vs. Tan Teng 23 Phil 145 G.R. No. 7081 September 7, 1912 Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police. Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights against selfincrimination. Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him. DIGESTED: Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Tengwas gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered herhome and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers.Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea.Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police.Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. Hewas then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He wasfound to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to theBureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering fromgonorrhea.The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim hadacquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by theunlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the saidevidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his rightagainst self-incrimination. Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of thedefendants rights against selfincrimination. Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not aviolation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or toanswer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without hisobjection and was examined by competent medical authority.The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the useof physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not anexclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the sameas if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may beused as evidence against him.

VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920] Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

by Coffeeholic

Writes

Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights against selfincrimination.

Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

Beltran Vs. Samson Case Digest Beltran Vs. Samson 53 Phil 570 G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929 Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination. Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

Miranda v. Arizona Share on facebookShare on emailShare on print|More Sharing ServicesMore View this case and other resources at:

Citation. 384 U.S. 436, 10 Ohio Misc. 9, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating evidence during police interrogations without prior notification of their rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need to inform individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights prior to an interrogation following an arrest. Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) consolidated four separate cases with issues regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained during police interrogations. The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr. Miranda), was arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an immigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two hours of investigation. The signed statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights. The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr. Vignera), was arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the robbery to the first officer after the arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours before he made an admission to an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he was notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr. Westover), was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned over fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, who were able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities did not notify Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr. Stewart), was arrested, along with members of his family (although there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence that Mr. Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted to the crimes. Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the defendants? Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against them in court; their right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be admissible in court. Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) argued that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution would apply to interrogations. There is not enough evidence to demonstrate a need to apply a new rule as the majority finds here. The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) also argues that the Due Process Clauses should apply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth Amendment rule against self-incrimination was never intended to forbid any and all pressures against self-incrimination. Justice Byron White (J. White) argued that there is no historical support for broadening the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to include the rights that the majority extends in their decision. The majority is making new law with their holding. Discussion. The majority notes that once an individual chooses to remain silent or asks to first see an attorney, any interrogation should cease. Further, the individual has the right to stop the interrogation at any time, and the government will not be allowed to argue for an exception to the notification rule.