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ARTICLE 2180 (VICARIOUS LIABILITY/ IMPUTED ABILITY) DIGESTED CASES: PART 1 AND 2 (PARENTS AND GUARDIANS): Basis Bonus Pater Familias BAHIA v LITONJUA AND LEYNES March 30, 1912 FACTS: Fausta Litonjua purchased an automobile and later turned it over to International garage, which is owned and managed by his son Ramon Ramirez. As part of the daily operations of his business, Ramirez rented the automobile donated by his mother to Mariano Leynes. Ramirez also supplied Leynes a chauffeur and a machinist for the purpose of conveying to and from Balayan and Tuy. While in Balayan, the automobile refused to obey the direction of the driver in turning a corner due to a defect in the steering gear. As a consequence, it rammed into the wall of a house against which the daughter of plaintiff Bahia was leaning at the time. The automobile crushed the child to death. Bahia then filed an action against the Fausta (donor of auto), and Leynes,under who was directing and controlling the operation of the automobile at the time of the accident. Ramirez was not made a party. TC found Leynes liable but dismissed complait against Fausta. ISSUE: Who should be held responsible HELD: SC opined that the action as to Fausta was properly dismissed. Although the mother purchased the automobile, she turned it over to the garage of her son for use therein. The establishment belonged to the son, Ramirez, and he had the full management and control of it and received all the profits therefrom. It appears that Fausta was not aware of the contract with Leynes. While she may have been in one sense the owner of the machine, that fact does not, under the other facts of the case, make her responsible for the results of the accident. The judgment against Leynes must be reversed and the complaint against him must be dismissed. While is may be said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur who was driving the auto was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derived from the trips of the auto belonged to him and the auto was operated under his direction, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making him responsible for the negligence of the chauffeur or for the defects in the auto itself. Under Article 1903 of the CC (now Article 2176), 2 things are apparent: 1. 2. presumption of negligence on the part of the employer whenever there is an injury caused by the negligence employee presumption is juris tantum and may be rebutted.

In the instant case, the death of the child caused by a defect in the steering gear immediately raised the presumption that Leynes was negligence in selecting a defective automobile or in his failure to maintain it in good condition after selection. As to selection, SC found that defendant had exercised due diligence when he obtained the machine from a reputable garage, which so far as appeared in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive of the defective condition of the steering gear. Sufficient time had not elapsed to require an examination of the machine by the defendant as a part of his duty of inspection and supervision. While it does not appear that the defendant formulated rules and regulations for the guidance of the drivers and gave them proper instructions designed for the protection of the public and the passengers, the evidence shows that the death of the child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rules and regulations. It was caused by a defect in the machine as to which the defendant has shown himself free from responsibility. ____________________ Bahia vs Litonjua and Leynes FACTS: On May 14, 1911, Leynes rented a car from International Garage owned and operated by Ramirez. As per the arrangement, Ramirez would also provide for the driver and a machinist. Leynes was to used the car to transport people

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from fiesta for profit. The car was actually brand new and was only used a few hours. On May 16, 2011, while driven on the road, the automobile, by reason of a defect in the steering gear, refused to obey the direction of the driver in turning a corner in the streets, and, as a consequence, ran across the street and into the wall of a house against which the daughter of Bahia was leaning at the time. The front of the machine struck the child in the center of the body and crushed her to death. ISSUE: Whether or not Leynes is liable in the case at bar. HELD: No. While it may be said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur who was driving the machine was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derived from the trips of the automobile belonged to him and the automobile was operated under his direction, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making him responsible for the negligence of the chauffeur or for defects in the automobile itself. Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when that liability shall cease. It says: The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damages. From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of a law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and notjuris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. As to selection, Leynes has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from astandard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The car had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that Leynes had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear. While it does not appear that Leynes formulated rules and regulations for the guidance of the drivers and gave them properinstructions, designed for the protection of the public and the passengers, the evidence shows that the death of the child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rules and regulations. It was caused by a defect in the car as to which Leynes has shown himself free from responsibility. _________________________ Elcano V. Hill Case: This case dwells on the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation. Quasi delicto and Culpa Aquiliana An appeal from the order of the RTC of QC in a civil case for the recovery of damages for the killing by Reginald Hill of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapinto Elcano. Of which, when Reginald Hill was criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake Spouse Elcano moved for an MR and was dismissed by the court, hence this appeal at the SC. W/N the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed? W/N art 2180 of the civil code be applicable to Atty Hill? The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. The action of the agent killeth was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under art 1902 of the civil code. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. Art 2177 states that, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence but for the damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. Art 2176 states that, where it refers to fault or negligence covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts also criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. It results therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the Criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action. Under Art 2180, it states that the obligation under art 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

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persons of whom one is responsible. The Father or Mother is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Atty. Hill is subsidiarily liable to the acts of his son, although Reginald is emancipated and married, the fact that he is still living with his father and receives sustenance from him at the time of the occurrence of the crime. The order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. ________________________________ Elcano vs Hill Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes FACTS: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180. HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity. _________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. NOEL DARILAY (NO DIGEST) ________________________ PAR. 4 & 5 (EMPLOYER) JAYME vs APOSTOL (NO DIGEST) _________________ Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. Phil-American Forwarders Tags: digest, employer, manager, ncc 2180, philippine rabbit v. philamerican forwarders, torts PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES and FELIX PANGALANGAN v. PHILAMERICAN FORWARDERS, ARCHIMEDES BALINGIT, and FERNANDO PINEDA 1975 / Aquino / Appeal from CFI order FACTS Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders] along the national highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL bus driven by Pangalangan. As a result,Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders. PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American Forwarders, Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that PRBL and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI dismissed the complaint against Balingit, on the ground thathe is not the manager of an establishment as contemplated in NCC 2180. ISSUE AND HOLDING

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WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose. NO. RATIO Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of NCC 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer". Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, in connection with the vehicular accident in question, because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders. ________________ a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments: Art.2180 uses the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer. - Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders , Inc. * This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses. Dispositive Lower courts order of dismissal is AFFIRMED. -------------------------------Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. vs. Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM) [GR 141994, 17 January 2005] Carpio (J): 4 concur Facts: Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo Mel Rima (Rima) and Hermogenes Jun Alegre (Alegre). Expos is aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (FBNI). Expos is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay municipalities and other Bicol areas. In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago (Ago), as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990. The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed exposs, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs (AMEC and Ago) reputation. AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. On 18 June 1990, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, through Atty. Rozil Lozares, filed an Answer alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. FBNI, Rima and Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report the goings-on in AMEC, [which is] an institution imbued with public interest. Thereafter, trial ensued. During the presentation of the evidence for the defense, Atty. Edmundo Cea, collaborating counsel of Atty. Lozares, filed a Motion to Dismiss on FBNIs

PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO; March 25, 1975
NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHILAMERICAN FORWARDERS, Inc., its manager BALINGIT and the driver, PINEDA. - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK, owned by Phil-Am, along the natl highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan, owned by Phil Rabbit. Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days. This deprived the company of earnings of about P8,600. - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art.2180 CC. - In the appeal, the bus company also argued that Phil- Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil- Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. But this was not alleged in their complaint.* ISSUE WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in Art. 2180 NCC (Art.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of

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behalf. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Consequently, FBNI filed a separate Answer claiming that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI claimed that before hiring a broadcaster, the broadcaster should (1) file an application; (2) be interviewed; and (3) undergo an apprenticeship and training program after passing the interview. FBNI likewise claimed that it always reminds its broadcasters to observe truth, fairness and objectivity in their broadcasts and to refrain from using libelous and indecent language. Moreover, FBNI requires all broadcasters to pass the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) accreditation test and to secure a KBP permit. On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The trial court held that the broadcasts are libelous per se. The trial court rejected the broadcasters claim that their utterances were the result of straight reporting because it had no factual basis. The broadcasters did not even verify their reports before airing them to show good faith. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. In absolving Rima from the charge, the trial court ruled that Rimas only participation was when he agreed with Alegres expos. The trial court found Rimas statement within the bounds of freedom of speech, expression, and of the press. Both parties, namely, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, on one hand, and AMEC and Ago, on the other, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification. The appellate court made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. The appellate court denied Agos claim for damages and attorneys fees because the broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and not against her. FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its 26 January 2000 Resolution. Hence, FBNI filed the petition for review. Issue: Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damages. Held: A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al. to justify the award of moral damages. However, the Courts statement in Mambulao that a corporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages is an obiter dictum. Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages. However, the Court found the award of P300,000 moral damages unreasonable. The record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation. Therefore, the Court reduced the award of moral damages from P300,000 to P150,000. __________________________

228 UE Vs. Jader FACTS Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student in UE and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Ortega which was approved by Dean Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5), a failing grade. In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (19871988) with the following annotation: JADER ROMEO A. Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with S.O. The name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates for graduation.

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At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however the following annotation: This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports The plaintiff attended the grad ceremonies on 16th of April 1988 and during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called, escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the occasion. He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination. Respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N UE liable for damages o Jader: UE misled me through their negligence. o UE: We never misled you. We have good faith. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, UE liable for damages. When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered into between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under the contract. Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises

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general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students' standing. The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. He must see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer. Considering further, that the

institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.8 In civilized society, men must

be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society.9 Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at

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any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendantappellee University had been informed during the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendantappellee university, despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-appellant's name in the "tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after the deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement rites program. Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was allowed to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to remedy the situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something to complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I. ___________________ CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. vs. VASQUEZ JR. GR No. 132266 | December 21, 1999 | Davide Jr., C.J. | Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the CA Petitioners: Castilex Industrial Corp. Respondents: Vicente Vasquez Jr., Luisa So Vasquez & Cebu Doctors Hospital, Inc. Facts: On August 28, 1988, at around 1:30 to 2 AM, Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was travelling counter-clockwise, the normal flow of traffic, but without any
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protective helmet or goggles. He was only carrying a Students Permit to Drive. Benjamin Abad, a Production Manager of Castilex Industries Corp, a business engaged in the manufacturing and selling of furniture, was then driving the company-owned Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. Abad drove the said car out of the parking lot of Goldies Restaurant where he had some snacks after working overtime and had a chat with his friends. Instead of going around the Osmea Rotunda, he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to general Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. In the process, a collision occurred between the motorcycle and Toyota Hi-Luz Pick-up. Vasquez sustained severe injuries as a result of the collision. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital. On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. Abad signed an acknowledgement of Responsible party where he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur. A criminal case was filed against Abad which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Spouses Vasquez instituted an action for damages against Abad and Castilex. Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo Vasquez. TC: ordered Abad and Castilex to pay jointly and severally the spouses and Cebu Doctors Hospital CA: affirmed the TCs ruling but held the liability of Castilex as vicarious and not solidary with Abad Issue: 1. WON Castilex is vicariously liable with Abad 2. WON Abad was performing acts within the range of his employment Ratio: 1. YES

The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the 5th paragraph1 of Article 2180 should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

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moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts. In Filamer Christian vs. IAC, the SC held that: acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks includes "any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages. The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.

Distinctions between paragraph 42 and 5 Paragraph 5 employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task expansion of paragraph 4 in both employer coverage and acts included. negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions.

Paragraph 4 owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions

Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. 2. NO

Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or From Meals employee is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer

Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or From Work traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer

There is no absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours employer is not generally liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer

evidence that by using the

in the absence of some special

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employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle

special errand or roving commission employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home employer is not liable, even if the employee is deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment, when the employee has left the direct route of his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own

Although the aforementioned principles of Americam common law are based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, they are still applicable in this jurisdiction. Before the collision occurred, Abad had snacks and a chat with his friends at Goldies Restaurant, which is 7 km away from Castilex. Fuente Osmea is known as a lively place where prostitutes, pimps and drug addicts littered. At the time of the vehicular accident, Abad was with a woman in his car who shouted: Daddy, Daddy!. Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. Hence, Castilex has no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in providing Abad with a service vehicle. Dispositive: Petition is granted. CA decision and resolution is affirmed with modification that Castilex is absolved from liability. _____________________ Marquez vs Castillo 68 Phil 568 Torts and Damages Employer Not Liable When Injury Did Not Occur in the Course of Duty or Service On April 30, 1937, Mariano Capulong, a chauffeur, without the knowledge of his employer, Bernardo Castillo, drove his bosss car. Capulong ran over Fernanda Marquez thereby killing her. The heirs of Marquez sued Capulong and the latter was convicted. As he was insolvent, the heirs of Marquez sued Castillo for damages caused by his employees negligence. ISSUE: Whether or not Castillo is liable for damages for the negligence of his chauffeur. HELD: No. it was established that Castillo exercised due diligence in employing Capulong; that he had no knowledge of the fact that Capulong drove the car without his permission; that Castillo is not engaged in any kind of business or industry on or about April 30, 1937, the date of the accident; that Castillo was not riding in the car at the time of the accident.

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It is clearly shown that the accident did not occur in the course of the performance of the duties or service for which Capulong had been hired. Castillo did not hire him to do as he pleased, using Castillos car as if it were his own. His duties and service were confined to driving his masters car as the latter ordered him, and the accident did not take place under said circumstances. The subsidiary civil liability of the master, according to the provisions of Article 103 of said Revised Penal Code, arises and takes place only when the servant, subordinate or employee commits a punishable criminal act while in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service, and he is insolvent thereby rendering him incapable of satisfying by himself his own civil liability, this is not so in the case at bar. ___________________ Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads: An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that: SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same. Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract - By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. In determining the scope of this act - It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. __________________ E. Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands Facts: When riding a motorcycle, plaintiff E. Meritt, who is a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital Ambulance without any sound of whistle or horn. By reason of the collision, the plaintiff was severely injured which resulted him to be slightly deaf and had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental

(1)

MERITT vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

When the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there. By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.

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condition. In addition, the accident affected his work as a contractor because, prior to the collision, the plaintiffs mental and physical condition was excellent. The plaintiff is seeking a certain amount for permanentinjuries and the loss of wages during he was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. By authority of the United States, an Act was enacted in favor of the plaintiff, authorizing the latter to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said court. Issue: Whether or not the Government is legally liable for damages resulting therefrom and, if so, could it be extended to any case not previously recognized Held: According to Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code, in a damage case, the responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent. The evidence showed that the chauffeur, who acted negligently, of the ambulance was not such an agent. The court held that the judgment must be reversed and herein case rests solely with the Legislature and not with the Court. _____________________________________ ROSETE V AUDITOR GENERAL FACTS: Inside the building used by Emergency Control Administration as a bodega in which oil and gasoline were stored, Jose Frayno ignited his cigarette-lighter near a 5-gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained. A fire erupted burning the bodega as well as neighboring houses including the house and personal property of Rosete. The storing of gasoline and other combustible materials requires the securing of license and permit and ECA was not granted such permit. ISSUE: WON Govt is liable for the damages caused by the fire HELD: NO RATIO: Art 1903 par 5 applies in this case The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable There was no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to ECA was done by a special agent. The officers of ECA did not act as special agents of government within the meaning in Art 1903 when they stored gasoline in the warehouse of ECA. Thus the Govt is not liable. DISSENT: Perfecto, J ECA is a special agent of the Govt since it was organized by the govt for the same substantial purpose as Phil Relief and Rehabilitation purposes. All persons and entities acting by commission of the govt such as governmental enterprises and other organs of the govt created for activities ordinarily of ungovernmental nature, are special agents. Thus, the government is liable for the damages caused by ECA. _________________________

193 Fontanilla vs. Maliaman | Paras G.R. No. L-55963, December 1, 1989|

FACTS It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities. This petition is an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their

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son resulting from the accident. The trial court rendered judgment which directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. Art. 2176 thus provides: Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable. The liability of the State has two aspects. namely: 1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ). In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent. Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.) Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601 Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing nongovernmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes

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answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision. It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction. Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group. Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award. _________________ FONTANILLA v MALIAMAN FACTS: National Irrigation Administration was created for the purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating and administering all national irrigation systems of the Philippines. NIAs driver caused the death of Fontanilla due to the fault and/or negligence. His parents fled a suit for damages. ISSUE: WON NIA is liable HELD: YES. NIAs functions are basically proprietary and incidentally governmental. RA 3601 and PD 552 provide that NIA is a body corporate invested with a corporate personality and distinct from the government. So, it may be sued. At the time, the driver was an agent. Where a private individual is commissioned to do a special task, he may be considered a special agent within the contemplation of the provision. NOTES: The state agencies or subdivisions, in the pursuance of proprietary functions, are akin to any other private corporation. They may be sued for: - torts committed by them (art 2176) or - torts committed by their employees (art 2180). As long as it is performing proprietary functions, it can be held liable for the acts of its employees, both regular and special. Feliciano: State refers to judicial persons meaning the government of the Philippines; hence it excludes GOCCs with original functions. The dichotomy makes the law unstable! _________________________
PAR. 7 (TEACHERS / SCHOOL) Amadora v. CA [1988] Cruz, J. Facts:

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April 13, 1972: Alfredo Amadora, a high school graduating student of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos went to school to finish a Physics experiment. However, while he was in the auditorium, his classmate Pablito Daffon fired a gun that hit him. He died at 17. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Mercado v. CA: a student cut a classmate w/a razor blade at the Lourdes Catholic School, QC. Exconde ruling reiterated. Custody requirement was defined as a situation where student lives & boards w/teacher such that control, direction & influences on pupil supersede those of parents. Palisoc v. Brillantes: a 16-yr old student was killed by a classmate w/fist blows in the lab of Manila Technical Institute. Court ruled that even if offender was already of age & not boarding in the school, the head & teacher-in-charge were solidarily liable w/him. Custody was defined as the protective & supervisory custody that school, its heads & teachers exercise over students for as long as they are at the attendance in the school including recess time. No such requirement as actual living & boarding in the school before such liability is attached. It set aside Mercado ruling. Even students of age were still covered by provision since theyre equally in custody of school & subj to its discipline. CC Art. 2180 applies to all schools whether academic or nonacademic. In the former, teacher-in-charge of student is the person responsible (general rule). Whereas in the latter (arts & trades), it is the head (exception). SC agrees w/dissent in Exconde, saying that while the child is in school, parent is not supposed to interfere w/discipline of school nor w/authority & supervision of teacher. W/o authority, there can be no responsibility. No reason to differentiate the vigilance expected from teachers from academic institutions and non-academic ones. History of disparity: a. head of school of arts & trades exercised closer tutelage over his students who apprenticed to their master, the school head. He was personally involved in teaching his students who usually boarded w/him & thus he exercised constant control, supervision & influence. b. Head of academic school: exercised only administrative duties over teachers who were directly dealing w/students. Thus, teacher is liable. CC Art. 2180s custody requirement is not limited to boarding w/school authorities. Its not co-terminous w/sem. It includes periods of registration or before graduation during w/c, student is still subj to the disciplinary authority of the school. There is custody for as long as hes under control & influence of school & w/in its premises regardless of time and for as long as student can show that he is in school in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, exercise & enjoyment of a legitimate student rt/privilege. It includes relaxing in the campus. Under similar circumstances, teacher-incharge should be liable for his students torts. He need not be physically present or in a position to prevent the injury. Custody refers more to his influence on the child & the discipline instilled. Applicable as well to head of school of arts & trade. Teacher is liable regardless of students age. Teacher

Amadoras parents filed a civil action for damages under CC Art. 21803 against the school, its rector, HS principal, dean of boys & Physics teacher, plus Daffon & 2 other students thru their parents. Complaint against students was later dropped. CFI Cebu: defendants were liable in the sum of P294,984.00 (death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages & attorneys fees) CA: reversed, all defendants absolved completely. 1. As per Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 45, CC Art. 2180 is not applicable since the school was an academic institution of learning & not a school of arts & trades. 2. Students were not in custody of the school at the time of the incident since the semester had already ended. 3. No clear identification of the fatal gun. 4. Defendants exercised necessary diligence in preventing injury. Petitioners claim their son was still under schools custody because he went to school to comply w/a requirement for graduation. Respondents: Amadora went to school to submit a Physics report & he was no longer in their custody since the semester was over. A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso, dean of boys, from Jose Gumban on April 7, 1972. It was an unlicensed pistol w/c was later on returned to Gumban w/o reporting such to the principal or taking further action. Gumban was one Daffons companions when the incident happened. Petitioners claim it was this gun that killed their son w/c respondents rebutted by saying there was no proof that they were one and the same.

ISSUE & RATIO: WON respondents are liable. NO. Exconde v Capuno: Capuno, a student of Balintawak Elementary School & a boy scout attended a Rizal Day parade on city school supervisors instructions. Afterwards, Capuno boarded a jeep & drove it recklessly that it turned turtle killing 2 passengers. SC exculpated school in obiter dictum (it was not party to the case) since it was not a school of arts & trades. Some justices dissented claiming that liability under CC Art. 2180 applied to teachers in general & heads of schools of arts & trades in particular.
3

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts & trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils & students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody. (CC Art. 2180)

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should be liable & not school itself unless he can prove that he exercised the diligence of a good father such as by employing sufficient no. of security guards, etc. This defense is made available to the teacher considering that his responsibility/influence over the child cannot be equated to that of the parents. Parents can expect more obedience from the child since kid depends more on parents. Parent can instill more lasting discipline on child than teacher & thus, should be held to a greater accountability for tort committed by kid. WRT liability for kids of the age of majority, leniency should be observed in assessing teachers responsibility considering that parents are no longer liable for the acts of their emancipated children. became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died. Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of the deceased had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for damages. Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "Defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to his action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated." The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code however absolved from liability the three other defendants officials of the Manila Technical Institute citing that Article 2180 is not applicable in the case at hand. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the trial court erred in absolving the defendant-school officials. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES, DEFENDANTS-SCHOOL OFFICIALS ARE LIABLE UNDER ART. 2180 The lower erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their codefendant Daffon in the latter having caused the death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate

HOLDING: Petition denied. 1. Rector, principal & dean not liable because they are not teachers-in-charge. They only had general authority over students. 2. Teacher-in-charge: not disclosed by evidence. Just because Amadora went to school in connection w/a physics report doesnt necessarily make physics teacher the teacher-in-charge. Besides, theres no showing that the teacher was negligent in any manner. He was not even required to report to school on that day thus, his absence cannot be considered as negligence. On the contrary, they have proven that they exercised due diligence. 3. Dean of boys no proof that the gun he released was the same gun that killed Amadora. 4. School only teacher or head is responsible ___________________________

PALISOC VS BRILLANTES G.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971| 41 SCRA 557 FACTS Deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc

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supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. . ____________________________ St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002 FACTS: Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages. HELD: CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner. ___________________________ St. Mary's Academy vs. Carpitanos Efficient Intervening Cause- is one that destroys the causal connection between the negligent act and the injury thereby negates liability Facts: St. Mary conducted an enrolment drive and as part of this drive, they campaign to different schools for prospective students. On that fortunate day, one named Sherwin Carpitanos--student of St. Mary and part of the campaign group went to a particular school with his classmates riding in a mitsubishi jeepney owned by one named Vivencio Villanueva and driven by his classmate who was a minor. Allegedly the latter droved the jeepney in a reckless manner and as a result the jeepney turned turtle. As a result Sherwin Carpitanos died due to the injuries he sustained from the accident The lower court held St. Mary solidarily Liable under article 218 and 219 of the family code and the guardians of the minor driver and the owner of the jeepney as subsudiarily liable. on appeal to CA the owner of the jeepney was freed from liabilities. Issue/s: (1) WON St. Mary is liable (2) WON Vivencio Villanueva is Liable Held: SC reversed the decision and did not hold St. Mary liable but instead held Vivencio Villanueva--the owner of the mitsubishi jeep liable. Ratio: In order that St. Mary be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

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In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. (2) Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. _________________ ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school.

ISSUE: RULING: Petition RATIO:

W/N

petitioner

school

and

teachers

are

liable. granted.

Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the holding of the same. No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. Philippine School of Business Administration et al vs. Court of Appeals et al Date (4 February 1992) | Ponente: Padilla Overview: PSBA is being made to account by the parents of its student, Carlitos Bautista, who was stabbed to death by assailants from outside the school inside the school premises. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC decision to deny the schools motion to dismiss was correct, affirming the order, following the rule on quasi-delicts (NCC Arts. 2180 and 2176). The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the law on quasi-delicts does not apply, as there exists a contract between school and student including an obligation to safety; it rules that torts may be the acts that break a contract and thus liability may still be incurred by the school following NCC Art. 21. Topic: Obligations; quasi-delicts; torts Statement of the Case The death of one Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted his parents to file a suit for damages resulting from negligence, recklessness, and insufficiency of safety precautions against said school, specifically its officials, at the RTC of Manila, which was presided over by Judge Regina

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Ordonez-Benitez. As defendants, PSBA et al sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that PSBA, as an academic institution, is beyond the ambit of Article 2180 of the NCC, under which they are being sued. The RTC denied their motion to dismiss, then the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Defendants-turned-petitioners assailed the RTCs dispositions before the CA, but the appellate court upheld the ruling given by the RTC, and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration, bringing the appellants to the Supreme Court. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. Art. 21, NCC: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Issues: 1. Was the Court of Appeals correct in affirming the decision of the RTC not to dismiss the case against PSBA? Held Rationale: HOWEVER, the Supreme Court disagrees with the CAs basis for the decision being anchored on Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the NCC. The SC agrees with the CA that the case must be remanded to the RTC for trial on its merits. But the reason provided by the CA, which is that in light of previous jurisprudence and the fact that Article 2180 is a holdover from the Spanish era, the school administrators should be made liable for damages until they prove themselves absolved of liability in trial by merits, is erroneous. The SC points out that Arts 2180 and 2176 establish the rule of in loco parentis (in place of the parents Mikey) and that in the discussions provided in the cases cited by the CA, it was clear that the liability of the school exists only for the acts performed by students while in school custody, something which was established to have not been the case here. Thus the rule on quasi-delicts does not apply. 1. Yes. The SC rules that despite the inapplicability of the rule on quasidelicts, the school is still liable because all academic institutions enter into a contract with all its enrollees. Part of the obligations of this contract is the providence of an adequate atmosphere of safety for its students (x x x no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb.). Obligations from quasi-delict or tort* do not govern, since these are extra-contractual and a contract has been made here. However, in Air France vs. Carroscoso, it was established that liability from tort may still exist even if there is a contract, because the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. This rule obeys Art. 21. The SC here dictates that a trial is necessary in order to determine whether such willful negligence really lies, in order that liability should be properly determined.

Statement of Facts 30 August 1985: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed to death on the second floor balcony of PSBA. Bautista was a student in said school, a junior commerce major. It was established that the assailants were outsiders, not enrolled nor affiliated with the school. o His parents (the private respondents Segunda [?] and Arsenia), filed suit for damages against the school and the following school officials: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security). The last, during the proceedings, resigned from his position. 8 December 1987: The respondent Manila RTC, having overruled instant petitioners contentions, denies their motion to dismiss the case. 25 January 1988: The RTC dismisses the motion for reconsideration as well. 10 June 1988: The CA affirms the trial courts orders; petitioners file a motion for reconsideration. 22 August 1988: The CA denies the motion for reconsideration. Applicable Laws: Art. 1157(5), NCC: Obligations arise from: (5) Quasi-delicts Art. 1162, NCC: Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws. Art. 2176, NCC: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. - Art. 2180, pars. 1, 7, NCC: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. XXX

Judgment: Case remanded to Manila RTC, the court of origin.

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article The TC overruled the petitioners contention and dismissed their petition. This was affirmed by the CA The respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasidelicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the court erred in dismissing the petition. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. (But the court did not agree with the premise of the CA for holding such) Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. This material situation does not exist in the present case. However, this does not necessarily follow that the school is exculpated from liability. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Notes: * tort. 1. A civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usu. in the form of damages; a breach of duty that the law imposes on everyone in the same relation to one another as those involved in a given transaction. 2. (pl.) The branch of law dealing with such wrongs. (Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th ed.)

_______________________ 197 Phil. School of Business Administration v CA | Padilla February 4, 1992 | 205 SCRA 729 FACTS A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the RTC for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and its president, VP, treasurer, and Chief of Security Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. Petitioners herein sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated

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A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasidelicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso, the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence. _____________________ A pitogo (an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank) belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the pitogo belonged to Augusto. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. thought it was Benedictos, so when Augusto attempted to get the pitogo from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the pitogo. Augusto resented his remark and pushed Manuel, Jr., which started the fight. After successive blows to Manuel, Jr., Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a piece of razor. Manuel, Jr. and his father filed a complaint against Ciriaco Mercado, Augustos father. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the father? o Petitioner: Since the incident occurred in the school during recess time, through no fault of the father. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. CHILDREN WERE NOT IN THEIR CUSTODY. Petitioner rests his claim on the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code: o Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. That clause contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

MERCADO VS CA G.R. No. 87584, May 30, 1960 | 108 Phil. 414
FACTS Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. are both pupils of the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City.

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In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. __________________ MERCADO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR; May 30, 1960 NATURE This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City. - A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. ISSUES 1. WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2. WON the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive. HELD 1. NO. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable, is as follows: ART. 2180. . . . Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. - It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. - Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. 2. YES. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment, which motivated the assault, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not justified. ______________________

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N O T H I N G F O L L O W S