GETTIERS WAKE, recap by Ramon de Leon

February 7 &12, 2013

No-false-grounds approach (NFGA), no-false-grounds approach from relevance, defeasibility approach In Gettiers wake, we have posited that possibly, since JTB seems to be unable to account for some instances where each condition [J, T, B] are present, then JTB is not sufficient for knowledge. We have also noted that the necessity of J, T, and B as any Ss conditions for knowing seemed to not have been contested by Gettier. Rather, what Gettier seems to have challenged is their being sufficient. As such, would it not be possible that some version with the conditions JTB present and an additional condition added to it suffice as a better definition of knowledge powerful enough to account even for Gettier cases?

No-false-grounds approach (NFGA) and its many versions

Here is a revision of JTB with the addition of another condition: (4) D6 S knows that p = Df. (1) S believes that p, (2) p is true, (3) p is epistemically justified for S, and (4) Ss grounds for believing that p do not include any false propositions.

Lemos refers to D6 as the no-false-grounds approach (NFGA). D6 requires one to check the truth values of each member of the set of the grounds for believing that p, such that if [Q, R] -> p, Ksp or [Q, R] -> p ~Ksp

This definition of knowledge, however, is not satisfactory. It is too weak to rule out some Gettier cases where all of the premises that are grounds for Ss belief that P are true, yet the truth of the conclusion only happened through mere luck or coincidence. It is also too strong as it rules out some plausible instances of knowledge. Consider the case: Ss grounds for believing that p are: AF [A, B, C, D, E, F], where AF is a set of grounds for Ss belief that P. All but F are true. Due to the strictness of D6 as a definition, it will not allow knowledge ascription to S in this case. Lemos provides a revision of D6, D7, by restating condition (4): D7 S knows that p = Df. (1) S believes that p, (2) p is true, (3) p is epistemically justified for S, and (4) Ss grounds for believing that p do not justify any false propositions.

The difference between D6 and D7 is that D6 necessitates that all grounds for believing that p are true for the subject to know, while D7 requires that if one member of ss grounds for believing p justifies at least one false proposition, then the subject does not know that p (~Ksp).

Still, D7 is too strong. Recall the case in which Jones does not really own a Ford (case Ford): (j) Jones, who works in my office, has always driven a Ford in the past, has offered me a ride in a Ford, and says he owns a Ford. From (j) Smith deduces, (k) There is someone who works in my office, who has always driven a Ford in the past, who has just offered me a ride in a Ford, and says he owns a Ford. We can say that Smith knows that k. Smiths grounds for (k), however, include (j), and (j) justifies Smith in believing a false proposition (f), Jones owns a Ford. Given D7s conditions, this will not allow Smith to be ascribed knowledge for his justified belief (k). We have ruled out the 2 iterations of the no-false-grounds approach, D6 and D7, for their respectively being too weak or too strong for cases of knowledge. There may be attempts to revise the fourth condition in the NFGA model, such that we have D8: D8 S knows that p = Df. (1) S believes that p, (2) p is true, (3) p is epistemically justified for S, and (4) There is no relevant false proposition included in Ss grounds for believing p.

Lets further explicate this relevance condition: Any false proposition R is relevant to Ss justified belief that p = Df., such that if ~R then S is no longer justified in believing p. Unfortunately, even this version of the NFGA is has some issues. There are problems with defining relevance, as well as qualifying relevance, especially with how a false proposition may affect ones possibility of knowing.

Defeasibility approach
If NFGA in the versions above are not sufficient to account for the said cases, let us try another: an approach from defeasibility. Lemos states it in this fashion: () there is some true proposition such that if one were justified in believing it, then one would no longer be justified in believing the spurious instance of knowledge. In other words, the added condition by this version of the defeasibility approach to JTB requires that there is no true proposition Q such that if S were justified in believing Q then S would not be justified in believing P.