THIRD DIVISION EMILIO E. DIOKNO, VICENTE R. ALCANTARA, ANTONIO Z. VERGARA, JR., DANTE M. TONG, JAIME C. MENDOZA, ROMEO M.

MACAPULAY, ROBERTO M. MASIGLAT, LEANDRO C. ATIENZA, ROMULO AQUINO, JESUS SAMIA, GAUDENCIO CAMIT, DANTE PARAO, ALBERTO MABUGAT, EDGARDO VILLANUEVA, JR., FRANCISCO ESCOTO, EDGARDO SEVILLA, FELICITO MACASAET, and JOSE Z. TULLO, Petitioners, - versus HON. HANS LEO J. CACDAC, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, DOLE, MANILA, MEDARBITER TRANQUILINO C. REYES, EDGARDO DAYA, PABLO LUCAS, LEANDRO M. TABILOG, REYNALDO ESPIRITU, JOSE VITO, ANTONIO DE LUNA, ARMANDO YALUNG, EDWIN LAYUG, NARDS PABILONA, REYNALDO REYES, G.R. No. 168475

Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ.

EVANGELINE ESCALL, ALBERTO ALCANTARA, ROGELIO CERVITILLO, MARCELINO MORELOS, FAUSTINO ERMINO, JIMMY S. ONG, ALFREDO ESCALL, NARDITO C. ALVAREZ, JAIME T. VALERIANO, JOHNSON S. REYES, GAUDENCIO JIMENEZ, JR., GAVINO R. VIDANES, ARNALDO G. TAYAO, BONIFACIO F. CIRUJANO, EDGARDO G. CADVONA, MAXIMO A. CAOC, JOSE O. MACLIT, JR., LUZMINDO D. ACORDA, JR., LEMUEL R. RAGASA, and GIL G. DE Promulgated: VERA, Respondents. July 4, 2007 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the nullification of the Decision1[1] and Resolution2[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83061, dated 17 June 2004 and 10 June 2005, respectively, which dismissed

[1]

2[2]

Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring. Rollo, pp. 62-72. Id. at 74-75.

petitioners Petition for Certiorari and denied their Motion for Reconsideration thereon. The Facts The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory union of Meralco. Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES. On 1 April 2003, the FLAMES Executive Board created the Committee on Election (COMELEC) for the conduct of its union elections scheduled on 7 May 2003.3[3] The COMELEC was composed of petitioner Dante M. Tong as its chairman, and petitioners Jaime C. Mendoza and Romeo M. Macapulay as members. Subsequently, private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano filed their respective certificates of candidacy. On 12 April 2003, the COMELEC rejected Jimmy S. Ongs candidacy on the ground that he was not a member of FLAMES. Meanwhile, the certificates of candidacy of Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano were similarly rejected on the basis of the exclusion of their department from the scope of the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA). membership in the union for being confidential employees. The employees assigned to the aforesaid department are allegedly deemed disqualified from

[3]

According to Section 5, Article V of the FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws, the OFFICERS of the UNION shall hold office for a period of three (3) years from the date of their election until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified; provided that they remain members of the UNION in good standing. Id. at 83.

On 24 April 2003, private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, Jaime T. Valeriano (Ong, et al.), and a certain Leandro M. Tabilog filed a Petition4[4] before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). They prayed, inter alia, for the nullification of the order of the COMELEC which disallowed their candidacy.5[5] They further prayed that petitioners be directed to render an accounting of funds with full and detailed disclosure of expenditures and financial transactions; and that a representative from the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) be designated to act as chairman of the COMELEC in lieu of petitioner Dante M. Tong.6[6] On 30 April 2003, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Alex E. Maraan issued an Order7[7] directing DOLE personnel to observe the conduct of the FLAMES election on 7 May 2003.8[8] On 2 May 2003, petitioners filed a Petition9[9] with the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of private respondents Edgardo Daya, Pablo Lucas, Leandro Tabilog, Reynaldo Espiritu, Jose Vito, Antonio de Luna,
4[4] 5[5] 6[6] 7[7] 8[8]

9[9]

Id. at 88-103. Id. at p. 100. Id. Id. at 105. DOLE personnel were assigned to the following precincts, to wit: a) Head Office Ortigas b) Manila Sector c) Pasig Sector d) Balintawak Sector e) Valenzuela Sector f) Alabang Sector g) Plaridel Sector h) Rizal Sector i) Sta. Rosa Sector j) Dasmarinas Sector k) San Pablo Sector. Id. Id. at 106-113.

Armando Yalung, Edwin Layug, Nards Pabilona, Reynaldo Reyes, Evangeline Escall, Alberto Alcantara, Rogelio Cervitillo, Marcelino Morelos, and Faustino Ermino (Daya, et al.). Petitioners alleged that Daya, et al., allowed themselves to be assisted by non-union members, and committed acts of disloyalty which are inimical to the interest of FLAMES. In their campaign, they allegedly colluded with the officers of the Meralco Savings and Loan Association (MESALA) and the Meralco Mutual Aid and Benefits Association (MEMABA) and exerted undue influence on the members of FLAMES. On 6 May 2003, the COMELEC issued a Decision,10[10] declaring Daya, et al., officially disqualified to run and/or to participate in the 7 May 2003 FLAMES elections. The COMELEC also resolved to exclude their names from the list of candidates in the polls or precincts, and further declared that any vote cast in their favor shall not be counted. According to the COMELEC, Daya, et al., violated Article IV, Section 4(a)(6)11[11] of the FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws (CBL) by allowing non-members to aid them in their campaign. Their acts of solicitation for support from nonunion members were deemed inimical to the interest of FLAMES. On 7 May 2003, the COMELEC proclaimed the following candidates, including some of herein petitioners as winners of the elections, to wit12[12]:

10[10] 11[11]

12[12]

Id. at 121-128. Section 4. (a) Any member may be DISMISSED and/or EXPELLED from the UNION, after due process and investigation, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board for any of the following causes: xxxx 6. Acting in a manner harmful to the interest and welfare of the UNION and/or its MEMBERS. Rollo, p. 129.

NAME Emilio E. Diokno Vicente P. Alcantara Antonio Z. Vergara, Jr. Alberto L. Mabugat Roberto D. Masiglat, Jr. Leandro C. Atienza Felito C. Macasaet Edgardo R. Villanueva Romulo C. Aquino Jesus D. Samia Gaudencio C. Camit Rodante B. [Parao] Jose Z. Tullo Bernardo C. Sevilla Francis B. Escoto

POSITION President Executive Vice President External Executive Vice President Internal Vice-President Organizing Vice-President Education Vice-President Chief Steward Secretary Asst. Secretary Treasurer Asst. Treasurer Auditor Asst. Auditor Central Coordinator North Coordinator South Coordinator

On 8 May 2003, private respondents Daya, et al., along with Ong, et al., filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR, a Petition13[13] to: a) Nullify Order of Disqualification; b) Nullify Election Proceedings and Counting of Votes; c) Declare Failure of Election; and d) Declare Holding of New Election to be Controlled and Supervised by the DOLE. The Petition was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-0304-002-LRD. On 14 May 2003, another group led by private respondent Gaudencio Jimenez, Jr., along with private respondents Johnson S. Reyes, Gavino R. Vidanes, Arnaldo G. Tayao, Bonifacio F. Cirujano, Edgardo G. Cadavona, Maximo A. Caoc, Jose O. Maclit, Jr., Luzmindo D. Acorda, Jr., Lemuel R. Ragasa and Gil G. de Vera (Jimenez, et al.) filed a Petition with the MedArbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR against petitioners to nullify the 7 May
13[13]

Id. at 130.

2003 election on the ground that the same was not free, orderly, and peaceful. It was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-0305-004-LRD, which was subsequently consolidated with the Petition of Daya, et al. and the earlier Petition of Ong, et al. Meanwhile, the records show that a subsequent election was held on 30 June 2004, which was participated in and won by herein private respondents Daya, et al. The validity of the 30 June 2004 elections was assailed by herein petitioners before the DOLE14[14] and taken to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88264 on certiorari, which case does not concern us in the instant Petition. The Court of Appeals, in the aforesaid case, rendered a Decision15[15] dated 12 January 2007, upholding the validity of the 30 June 2004 elections, and the declaration of herein private respondents Daya, et al., as the duly elected winners therein. The Decision of the Med-Arbiter On 7 July 2003, Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes, Jr. issued a Decision16[16] in favor of private respondents, Daya, et al. However, the petition of Jimenez, et al., was dismissed because it was premature, it appearing that the COMELEC had not yet resolved their protest prior to their resort to the Med-Arbiter. Finally, the Petition of Ong, et al., seeking
14 [14]

15

16[16]

From the Decision dated 12 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88264, it can be gleaned that on 4 October 2004, Med-Arbiter Tranquilino C. Reyes proclaimed private respondents Daya, et al. as the duly elected winners. On appeal, BLR Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac affirmed the Med-Arbiter and upheld the validity of the 30 June 2004 election, as well as the propriety of the proclamation of private respondents Daya, et al., as officers-elect of FLAMES. Id. at 420. [15] Penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; id. at 417-435. Id. at 170-183.

to declare themselves as bona fide members of FLAMES was ordered dismissed. The Med-Arbiter noted in his decision that during a conference which was held on 15 May 2003, the parties agreed that the issue anent the qualifications of private respondents Ong, et al. had been rendered moot and academic.17[17] The Med-Arbiter reversed the disqualification imposed by the COMELEC against private respondents Daya, et al. He said that the COMELEC accepted all the allegations of petitioners against private respondents Daya, et al., sans evidence to substantiate the same. Moreover, he found that the COMELEC erred in relying on Article IV, Section 4(a) (6) of the CBL as basis for their disqualification. The Med-Arbiter read the aforesaid provision to refer to the dismissal and/or expulsion of a member from FLAMES, but not to the disqualification of a member as a candidate in a union election. He rationalized that the COMELEC cannot disqualify a candidate on the same grounds for expulsion of members, which power is vested by the CBL on the Executive Board. The Med-Arbiter also held that there was a denial of due process because the COMELEC failed to receive
17 [17]

Id. at 176, 179. Notwithstanding his statement in the Decision dated 7 July 2003, that the parties had agreed in a conference on 15 May 2003 that the qualifications of private respondents Ong, et al. became moot and academic, the Med-Arbiter proceeded to rule that Jimmy S. Ong is not a member of FLAMES as he was assigned to the Accounting Department which had been excluded from the bargaining unit per Addendum to the 1998 CBA. The Med-Arbiter said that Ongs transfer to a department not excluded from the bargaining unit per the 2002 CBA as well as the deduction from his salary of union dues did not automatically make him a member of FLAMES. It was not shown that he filed an application for membership nor was the same approved by the union president. Moreover, the Med-Arbiter stressed that private respondents Alfredo J. Escall, Nardito C. Alvarez, and Jaime T. Valeriano are disqualified from FLAMES membership because they belong to departments excluded from the bargaining unit pursuant to 2002 CBA. The group of Ong, et al. were found to have no corresponding right to inquire into the funds of the union.

private respondents Daya, et al.s motion for reconsideration of the order of their disqualification. The COMELEC was also found to have refused to receive their written protest in violation of the unions CBL.18[18] Lastly, the Med-Arbiter defended his jurisdiction over the case. He concluded that even as the election of union officers is an internal affair of the union, his office has the right to inquire into the merits and conduct of the election when its jurisdiction is sought.19[19] The decretal portion of the Med-Arbiters Decision states, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [P]etition to Nullify the Order of Disqualification; Nullify Election proceedings and counting of Votes; and Declare a Failure of Elections is hereby granted. The disqualification of [private respondent] Ed[gardo] Daya, et al., is hereby considered as null and void. Perforce, the election of union officers of FLAMES on May 7, 2003 is declared a failure and a new election is ordered conducted under the supervision of the Department of Labor and Employment. The [P]etition to conduct an accounting of union funds and to stop the release of funds to [petitioner] Diokno, et al., is ordered dismissed for lack of merit. And the Petition to Declare [private respondents] Jimmy Ong, Alfredo [E]scall, Nardito Alvarez, and Jaime Valeriano as members of FLAMES is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.

18

[18]

19[19]

The Med-Arbiter in his Decision, cited Article IX, Section 1 of the FLAMES CBL, which provides, thus: Section 1. xxxx (c) In the event of any election protest or questions, the COMELEC shall rule [on] such protest or questions regarding the conduct of the election provided that the protest or questions must be submitted in writing within twenty-four (24) hours from the time that the last ballot has been officially opened. The COMELEC has three (3) days to decide the protest or question. Id. at 181.

The [P]etition to Nullify the election filed by [private respondents] Gaudencio Jimenez, et al., is likewise ordered dismissed.20[20]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the Director of the BLR. The Ruling of the BLR Director On 3 December 2003, the Director of the BLR issued a Resolution,21
[21]

affirming in toto the assailed Decision of the Med-Arbiter. Public respondent Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac ruled, inter alia, that

the COMELECs reliance on Article IV, Section 4(a) (6) of the CBL, as a ground for disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al., was premature. He echoed the interpretation of the Med-Arbiter that the COMELEC erroneously resorted to the aforecited provision which refers to the expulsion of a member from the union on valid grounds and with due process, along with the requisite 2/3 vote of the Executive Board. Hence, the COMELEC cut short the expulsion proceedings in disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al.22[22] The BLR Director further held that the case involves a question of disqualification on account of the alleged commission by private respondents Daya, et al., of illegal campaign acts, which acts were not specifically mentioned in the guidelines for the conduct of election as issued by the COMELEC. Likewise, on the alleged refusal of private respondents Daya, et al., to submit to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by failing to file a petition to nullify its order of disqualification, the BLR Director deemed

20[20] 21[21] 22[22]

Id. at 183. Penned by Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac; id. at 209-216. Id. at 214.

the same as an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus:

By themselves, such acts could not be taken as repugnant of COMELECs authority. Sensing that they were prejudiced by the disqualification order, it was only incumbent upon [private respondents Daya, et al.] to seek remedy before a body, which they thought has a more objective perspective over the situation. In short, they opted to bypass the administrative remedies within the union. Such a move could not be taken against [private respondents Daya, et al.] considering that non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is justified in instances where it would practically amount to a denial of justice, or would be illusory or vain, as in the present controversy.23[23]

The BLR Director disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes, DOLE-NCR, dated 7 July 2003 is AFFIRMED in its entirety. Let the records of this case be returned to the DOLE-NCR for the immediate conduct of election of officers of the First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) under the supervision of DOLE-NCR personnel.24[24]

Subsequently, petitioners sought a reversal of the 3 December 2003 Resolution, but the BLR Director issued a Resolution dated 10 February 2003,25[25] refusing to reverse his earlier Resolution for lack of merit. Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari.

23[23] 24[24] 25[25]

Id. at 216. Id. Id. at 217-220.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal to be bereft of merit. The appellate court held that the provision relied upon by the COMELEC concerns the dismissal and/or expulsion of union members, which power is vested in the FLAMES Executive Board, and not the COMELEC. It affirmed the finding of the BLR Director that the COMELEC, in disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al., committed a procedural shortcut. It held:
Without the requisite two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board dismissing and/or expelling private respondents for acts contemplated thereunder, the COMELEC was clearly violating the unions constitution and bylaws (sic) by utilizing the aforequoted provision in its said May 6, 2003 decision and, in the process, arrogating unto itself a power it did not possess. As the document embodying the covenant between a union and its members and the fundamental law governing the members rights and obligations, it goes without saying that the constitution and bylaws (sic) should be upheld for as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or public policy.26[26]

On the matter of the failure of private respondents Daya, et al. to come up with 30 percent (30%) members support in filing the Petition to Nullify the COMELECs Decision before the Med-Arbiter, the Court of Appeals said that the petition did not involve the entire membership of FLAMES, so there was no need to comply with the aforesaid requirement. Furthermore, the appellate court applied the exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies on the ground, inter alia, that resort to
26[26]

Id. at 69.

such a remedy would have been futile, illusory or vain.27[27] Indeed, the Court of Appeals emphasized that private respondents Daya, et al., were directed by the COMELEC to file their Answer to the petition for their disqualification only on 5 May 2003. Private respondents Daya, et al., filed their Answer on 6 May 2003. On the same day, the COMELEC issued its Decision disqualifying them. A day after, the 7 May 2003 election was held. The Court of Appeals further stressed that private respondents Daya, et al.s efforts to have their disqualification reconsidered were rebuffed by the COMELEC; hence, they were left with no choice but to seek the intervention of the BLR,28[28] which was declared to have jurisdiction over intra-union disputes even at its own initiative under Article 22629[29] of the Labor Code. Petitioners sought a reconsideration of the 17 June 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied in a Resolution30[30] dated 10 June 2005.
27[27]

28[28] 29

30[30]

The Court of Appeals expounded in this wise, thus: Although the rule had, likewise, been long-settled that redress must first be sought within the union itself, in accordance with its constitution and bylaws (sic), before a case should be elevated to the jurisdiction of labor agencies, said requirement had been traditionally held inapplicable under the following circumstances, to wit: (a) when resort to the remedy would be futile, illusory or vain; (b) when the remedy applied for was not acted upon for an unreasonable length of time; (c) when the relief sought was simply for damages; (d) when the act complained of is contrary to the constitution and bylaws (sic); (e) when the issue is purely a question of law; and (f) when due process was not observed. Id. at 71. Id. at 70. [29] ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration. The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties. Id. at 74.

Hence, the instant Petition. At the outset, petitioners contend that the instant Petition falls under the exceptions to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. They implore this Court to make factual determination anent the conduct of the 7 May 2003 elections. They also question the jurisdiction of the BLR on the case at bar because of the failure of private respondents Daya, et al., to exhaust administrative remedies within the union. It is the stance of petitioner that Article 22631[31] of the Labor Code which grants power to the BLR to resolve inter-union and intra-union disputes is dead law, and has been amended by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6715, whereby the conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration functions of the BLR had been transferred to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Petitioners similarly assert that the 7 May 2003 election was conducted in a clean, honest, and orderly manner, and that private respondents, some of whom are not bona fide members of FLAMES, were validly disqualified by the COMELEC from running in the election. They also rehashed their argument that non-members of the union were allowed by private respondents Daya, et al., to participate in the affair. They challenge the finding of the BLR Director that the reliance by the COMELEC on Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the CBL, was premature. Petitioners insist that the COMELEC had the sole and exclusive power to pass upon the qualification of any candidate, and therefore, it has the

31

[31]

Supra note 29.

correlative power to disqualify any candidate in accordance with its guidelines. For their part, private respondents Daya, et al., maintain that the Petition they filed before the DOLE-NCR Med-Arbiter questioning the disqualification order of the COMELEC and seeking the nullification of the 7 May 2003 election involves an intra-union dispute which is within the jurisdiction of the BLR. They further claim that the COMELEC, in disqualifying them, mistakenly relied on a provision in the FLAMES CBL that addresses the expulsion of members from the union, and no expulsion proceedings were held against them. Finally, they underscore the finding of the appellate court that there was disenfranchisement among the general membership of FLAMES due to their wrongful disqualification which restricted the members choices of candidates. They reiterate the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that had the COMELEC tabulated the votes cast in their favor, there would have been, at least, a basis for the declaration that they lost in the elections. Issues Petitioners attribute to the Court of Appeals several errors to substantiate their Petition.32[32] They all boil down, though, to the question of whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the jurisdiction of the BLR to take cognizance of the case and then upheld the ruling of the BLR Director and Med-Arbiter, nullifying the

32[32]

Id. at 367.

COMELECs order of disqualification of private respondents Daya et al., and annulling the 7 May 2003 FLAMES elections. The Courts Ruling The Petition is devoid of merit. We affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals upholding the jurisdiction of the BLR. reproduced, to wit:
ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration. The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties.

Article 226 of the Labor Code is hereunder

The amendment to Article 226, as couched in Republic Act No. 6715,33[33] which is relied upon by petitioners in arguing that the BLR had been divested of its jurisdiction, simply reads, thus:
33
[33]

Entitled AN ACT TO EXTEND PROTECTION TO LABOR, STRENGTHEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WORKERS TO SELF-ORGANIZATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PEACEFUL CONCERTED ACTIVITIES, FOSTER INDUSTRIAL PEACE AND HARMONY, PROMOTE THE PREFERENTIAL USE OF VOLUNTARY MODES OF SETTLING LABOR DISPUTES, AND REORGANIZE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR ANDFOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Sec. 14. The second paragraph of Article 226 of the same Code is likewise hereby amended to read as follows: "The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) calendar days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties."

This Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34[34] interpreting Article 226 of the Labor Code, was explicit in declaring that the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. We said that since Article 226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, there should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction. As defined, an intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-union controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among unions.35[35] More specifically, an intra-union dispute is defined under Section (z), Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, viz:
(z) Intra-Union Dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, and includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including cases arising from chartering or affiliation of labor organizations or from any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code.

The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute. There is no question that this is one which involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union. At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al., by the FLAMES COMELEC in the 7 May
34 35 [34] [35]

G.R. 123375, 28 February 2005, 452 SCRA 406, 420. Id.

2003 elections. It must also be stressed that even as the dispute involves allegations that private respondents Daya, et al., sought the help of nonmembers of the union in their election campaign to the detriment of FLAMES, the same does not detract from the real character of the controversy. It remains as one which involves the grievance over the constitution and bylaws of a union, and it is a controversy involving members of the union. Moreover, the non-members of the union who were alleged to have aided private respondents Daya, et al., are not parties in the case. We are, therefore, unable to understand petitioners persistence in placing the controversy outside of the jurisdiction of the BLR. The law is very clear. It requires no further interpretation. The Petition which was initiated by private respondents Daya, et al., before the BLR was properly within its cognizance, it being an intra-union dispute. Indubitably, when private respondents Daya, et al., brought the case to the BLR, it was an invocation of the power and authority of the BLR to act on an intra-union conflict. After having settled the jurisdiction of the BLR, we proceed to determine if petitioners correctly raised the argument that private respondents Daya, et al., prematurely sought the BLRs jurisdiction on the ground that they failed to exhaust administrative remedies within the union. On this matter, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals which upheld the application by the BLR Director of the exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this regard, this Court is emphatic that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have

availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction when such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. of action.36[36] Verily, there are exceptions to the applicability of the doctrine.37[37] Among the established exceptions are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the proceeding is private land; 10) in quo warranto proceedings;38
[38] [39]

The

premature invocation of courts judicial intervention is fatal to ones cause

and 11) where the facts show that there was a violation of due process.39 As aptly determined by the BLR Director, private respondents Daya, et

al., were prejudiced by the disqualification order of the COMELEC. They endeavored to seek reconsideration, but the COMELEC failed to act thereon.40[40] The COMELEC was also found to have refused to receive their written protest.41[41]
36 [36]

The foregoing facts sustain the finding that private

37[37] 38[38] 39

40[40] 41[41]

Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. v. Metro Drug Corporation Employees AssociationFederation of Free Workers, G.R. No. 142666, 26 September 2005, 471 SCRA 45, 58, citing Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 143398, 25 October 2000, 344 SCRA 372. Morcal v. Lavia, G.R. No. 166753, 29 November 2005, 476 SCRA 508, 512-513. Id. [39] Verceles v. Bureau of Labor Relations-Department of Labor and Employment-national Capital Region, G.R. No. 153322, 15 February 2005, 451 SCRA 338, 349. Id. at 175. Id.

respondents Daya, et al., were deprived of due process. Hence, it becomes incumbent upon private respondents Daya, et al., to seek the aid of the BLR. To insist on the contrary is to render their exhaustion of remedies within the union as illusory and vain.42[42] These antecedent circumstances convince this Court that there was proper application by the Med-Arbiter of the exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as affirmed by the BLR Director, and upheld by the Court of Appeals. We cannot accept, and the Court of Appeals rightfully rejected, the contention of petitioners that the private respondents Daya, et al.s complaint filed before the Med-Arbiter failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement because it was not supported by at least thirty percent (30%) of the members of the union. Section 1 of Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of Book V mandates the thirty percent (30%) requirement only in cases where the issue involves the entire membership of the union, which is clearly not the case before us. The issue is obviously limited to the disqualification from participation in the elections by particular union members. Having resolved the jurisdictional cobwebs in the instant case, it is now apt for this Court to address the issue anent the disqualification of private respondents and the conduct of the 7 May 2003 elections. On this matter, petitioners want this Court to consider the instant case as an exception to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; hence, importuning that we make findings of fact anew. It bears stressing
42[42]

Rollo, p. 216.

that in a petition for review on certiorari, the scope of this Courts judicial review of decisions of the Court of Appeals is generally confined only to errors of law,43[43] and questions of fact are not entertained. We elucidated on our fidelity to this rule, and we said:
Thus, only questions of law may be brought by the parties and passed upon by this Court in the exercise of its power to review. Also, judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination.44[44]

It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law.45[45] The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below.46[46] This is already outside the province of the instant Petition for Certiorari. While there may be exceptions to this rule, petitioners miserably failed to show why the exceptions should be applied here. With greater force must this rule be applied in the instant case where the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter were affirmed by the BLR Director, and then, finally, by the Court of Appeals. The findings below had sufficient bases both in fact and in law. The uniform conclusion was that private respondents Daya, et al., were wrongfully disqualified by the COMELEC; consequently, the FLAMES election should be annulled.

43[43] 44[44] 45[45] 46[46]

Gerlach v. Reuters Limited, Phils., G.R. No. 148542, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 535, 544-545. Id. Umpoc v. Mercado, G.R. No. 158166, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 220, 235. Id.

On the issue of disqualification, there was a blatant misapplication by the COMELEC of the FLAMES CBL. As has been established ad nauseam, the provision47[47] relied upon by the COMELEC in disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al., applies to a case of expulsion of members from the union. In full, Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) of the FLAMES CBL, provides, to wit:
Section 4(a). Any member may be DISMISSED and/or EXPELLED from the UNION, after due process and investigation, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board, for any of the following causes: xxxx (6) Acting in a manner harmful to the interest and welfare of the UNION and/or its MEMBERS.48[48]

We highlight five points, thus: First, Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES CBL, embraces exclusively the case of dismissal and/or expulsion of members from the union. Even a cursory reading of the provision does not tell us that the same is to be automatically or directly applied in the disqualification of a candidate from union elections, which is the matter at bar. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC erroneously relied on Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) because the same does not contemplate the situation of private respondents Daya, et al. The latter are not sought to be expelled or dismissed by the
47[47] 48[48]

Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES CBL.

Rollo, p. 82 and its dorsal page.

Executive Board.

They were brought before the COMELEC to be

disqualified as candidates in the 7 May 2003 elections. Second, the aforecited provision evidently enunciates with clarity the procedural course that should be taken to dismiss and expel a member from FLAMES. The CBL is succinct in stating that the dismissal and expulsion of a member from the union should be after due process and investigation, the same to be exercised by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board for any of the causes49[49] mentioned therein. The unmistakable directive is that in cases of expulsion and dismissal, due process must be observed as laid down in the CBL. Third, nevertheless, even if we maintain a lenient stance and consider the applicability of Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) in the disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al., from the elections of 7 May 2003, still, the disqualification made by the COMELEC pursuant to the subject provision was a rank disregard of the clear due process requirement embodied therein. Nowhere do we find that private respondents Daya, et al. were investigated by the Executive Board. Neither do we see the observance of the voting requirement as regards private respondents Daya, et al. In all respects, they were denied due process.
49 [49]

(1) Non-payment of dues and other monetary obligations for a reasonable period of time, subject to the provisions of Article X; (2) Joining or forming another UNION; (3) Violation of any provision of the Constitution, By-laws, rules and regulations of the UNION; (4) Willfull (sic) violation of any provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA); (5) Urging or advocating that a member start an action in any court of justice against the UNION or any of its officers, without first exhausting all internal remedies open to him or available in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the UNION; (6) Acting in a manner harmful to the interest and welfare of the UNION and/or its MEMBERS; id.

Fourth, the Court of Appeals, the BLR Director, and the Med-Arbiter uniformly found that due process was wanting in the disqualification order of the COMELEC. We are in accord with their conclusion. If, indeed, there was a violation by private respondents Daya, et al., of the FLAMES CBL that could be a ground for their expulsion and/or dismissal from the union, which in turn could possibly be made a ground for their disqualification from the elections, the procedural requirements for their expulsion should have been observed. In any event, therefore, whether the case involves dismissal and/or expulsion from the union or disqualification from the elections, the proper procedure must be observed. The disqualification ruled by the COMELEC against private respondents Daya, et al., must not be allowed to abridge a clear procedural policy established in the FLAMES CBL. If we uphold the COMELEC, we are countenancing a clear case of denial of due process which is anathema to the Constitution of the Philippines which safeguards the right to due process. Fifth, from another angle, the erroneous disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al., constituted a case of disenfranchisement on the part of the member-voters of FLAMES. By wrongfully excluding them from the 7 May 2003 elections, the options afforded to the union members were clipped. Hence, the mandate of the union cannot be said to have been rightfully determined. The factual irregularities in the FLAMES elections clearly provide proper bases for the annulment of the union elections of 7 May 2003.

On a final note, as it appears that the question of the qualifications of private respondents Ong, et al. had been rendered moot and academic,50[50] we do not find any reason for this Court to rule on the matter. As borne out by the records, the question had been laid to rest even when the case was still before the Med-Arbiter.51[51] WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 June 2004, and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83061 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson

50[50] 51[51]

Supra note 17. Id.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ NACHURA Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. Associate Justice

ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

G.R. No. 123375

February 28, 2005

GENARO BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE OFFICIALS AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF KAISAHAN AT KAPATIRAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA AT KAWANI SA METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM UNION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, PRUDENCIO CRUZ, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, dated 09 October 1995 and 08 January 1996, respectively. The court a quo, in said Decision, held that the jurisdiction to determine the proper representative of employees in the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System pertains to the Department of Labor and Employment, more particularly to the Bureau of Labor Relations. The Facts On 07 May 1993, after a petition for election of officers of Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (KKMK-MWSS) was filed by Bonifacio De Guzman, former auditor of KKMK-MWSS, a Resolution was issued by Perlita Bathan-Velasco, in her capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), the decretal portion of which states: Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby granted and the Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (KKMK-MWSS) is hereby directed to immediately conduct an election of the following union officers: 1. President, 2. 1st Vice President, 3. 2nd Vice President, 4. Executive Secretary, 5. Assistant Executive Secretary, 6. Treasurer, 7. Assistant Treasurer, 8. Auditor, 9. Assistant Auditor, 10. Public Relations Officer, 11. Twenty Three (23) Directors, 12. Four Sergeants at Arms, and 13. Business Manager, after the usual pre-election conferences. The Labor Organizations Division, this Bureau, shall supervise the conduct of said election.3 A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the incumbent officers of KKMK-MWSS, led by its President, Genaro Bautista, with the BLR, but was denied by Perlita Bathan-Velasco on 08 July 1993.
1awphi1.nt

An appeal was filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment where the order of the BLR was assailed as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction.4 On 24 August 1993, an Order was issued by the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, part of which reads: Records clearly show that the subject of the present controversy is an intra union conflict involving an employees organization in the public sector created and registered pursuant to Executive Order No. 180. Consequently, this office (referring to the Secretary of Labor and Employment) has no other recourse but to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

... Wherefore, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, let the entire records of this case be returned to the Bureau of Labor Relations, for appropriate action.5 The then incumbent officers of KKMK-MWSS, represented by its President, Genaro C. Bautista, filed a special civil action for certiorari which was, however, dismissed. The Court, on 20 September 1993, issued the following Resolution:
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G.R. No. 111635 (Incumbent Officers of KKMK-MWSS represented by its President Genaro C. Bautista v. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, in his capacity as Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, Hon. Perlita Bathan-Velasco, in her capacity as Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Bonifacio De Guzman and 544 other members of KKMK-MWSS). Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for being insufficient in form and substance, and for want of a genuine justiciable issue. Petitioners claim to be incumbent officers of the Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa sa Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (KKMK-MWSS). However, they are not individually named in the petition. In the main, the petition argues that public respondents have no jurisdiction over an intraunion dispute among government employees, hence, cannot order a new election of officers. A cursory reading of the Order of 24 August 1993 issued by respondent Undersecretary reveals that he agrees with this view. Thus Records clearly show that the subject of the present controversy is an intra-union conflict involving an employees organization in the public sector created and registered pursuant to Executive Order No. 180. Consequently, this Office (referring to the Secretary of Labor and Employment) has no other recourse but to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. There is no valid issue therefore to be resolved in the instant petition.6 This Resolution of the Court became final and executory on 27 October 1994 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.7 Earlier, or on 25 November 1993, a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction8 was filed by Genaro Bautista, et al., against Perlita BathanVelasco, Director, Eugenia Fernandez, Med-Arbiter, and Johnny P. Garcia, Chief, Labor Organizations Division, all of the BLR, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City, Branch 87. The petition sought to enjoin the herein respondents from proceeding with the election of officers of KKMK-MWSS scheduled on 02 December 1993, and to permanently prohibit them from exercising jurisdiction over the conduct of election of the officers of the KKMK-MWSS.
1a\^/phi1.net

On 26 November 1993, the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 87, through Judge Elsie Ligot Telan, issued a temporary restraining order, quoted as follows: A verified petition for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/injunction has been filed by the plaintiffs. The petition being sufficient in form and substance, and so as not

to render the issues raised moot and academic, the defendants are hereby ordered to temporarily refrain from proceeding with the election of officers of the KKMK-MWSS scheduled on December 2, 1993, until further orders from the Court. Let the prayer for issuance of injunction be set for hearing on December 7, 1993 at 8:30 a.m., at which date and time, defendants may show cause why the same should not be granted. Let summons together with copies of the complaint be served upon the defendants.9 Copies of this Order were served upon the defendants therein on 29 November 1993. 10 On 02 December 1993, the election of the officers of KKMK-MWSS pushed through despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order. Another Order was issued by Branch 87 on the same date, hereunder quoted: Counsel for petitioners appeared today with an urgent ex-parte manifestation stating that despite the order of this Court, dated November 26, 1993, restraining the defendants temporarily from proceeding with the election of officers of the KKMK-MWSS scheduled for today, until further orders, and that the officials of the MWSS had been served copy of this order, the election is now being held in utter defiance and disobedience of the said order of this Court. To substantiate the above manifestation report are affidavits attached thereto executed by Angelito Ignacio, alleged incumbent Asst. Treasurer of the KKMK-MWSS and Mario Perez, incumbent assistant auditor, respectively, swearing to the truth that the prohibited elections are now being held at the compounds of the MWSS, Balara, Quezon City, and at Arroceros, Manila. The defendants in this case together with Teofilo Asuncion and Gregorio Garcia, who were furnished copy of the order and such other persons who are involved in conducting [of] the election and/or sanctioning the same are hereby given up to 4:30 oclock this afternoon to explain why they should not be punished for contempt in defying the order of this Court dated November 26, 1993.
1awphi1.nt

The Court hereby reiterates its order restraining the defendants, their agents, assigns and representatives, and any or all persons having to do with such elections, specifically the management of the MWSS and all others acting in cooperation with them or acting on their behalf or direction, from conducting or continuing or tolerating the elections scheduled today.11 On 07 December 1993, another Order was issued by the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 87, part of which reads: . . . [T]he defendants, as well as all their agents, assigns, representatives and any or all persons having to do with the elections, scheduled on December 2, 1993, including the BLR officials and the management of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, and all others cooperating with them, or acting on their behalf and direction, are hereby restrained from continuing or tolerating the election process in question at any stage thereof, and if already accomplished in defiance of the orders of this Court, the said defendants are ordered to refrain from giving effect to the election by ratifying and registering the same and

recognizing the persons supposedly elected. Further, the persons allegedly elected in said elections are hereby ordered to refrain from assuming office and acting as officers of the KKMK-MWSS.12 On 28 December 1993, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by Branch 87.13 A day later, or on 29 December 1993, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued by the RTC, the pertinent portion of which reads: NOW THEREFORE, you the respondents, your agents and representatives, particularly the officers concerned ordering them until further orders of this Court to refrain from giving any effect to the elections above adverted to by ratifying and registering the same, and recognizing as officers the persons supposedly elected; and for the latter to refrain from assuming office and acting as officers of the KKMK-MWSS.14 After the case was re-raffled to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City,15 presided by Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr., the respondents, on 20 June 1994, filed a Reiteration of Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary Injunction,16 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and that the injunction does not anymore serve its purpose.17 Branch 220 issued an Order dated 01 July 1994, dismissing the case, the decretal portion of which states: WHEREFORE, the instant case is dismissed. The Writ is ordered quashed and Petitioners are hereby ordered to show cause why their injunction bond should not be confiscated in favor of the respondents.18 A motion for reconsideration was filed by Bautista, et al., dated 16 July 1994, alleging among other things, that the RTC has jurisdiction considering that the case before it was an action for prohibition, which was cognizable by it.19 As a result of which Branch 220 issued another Order20 dated 27 December 1994 reinstating the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and injunction bond.
1a\^/phi1.net

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the private respondents but was denied by Branch 220 in its order dated 27 April 1995.21 On 18 May 1995, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order was filed before the Court of Appeals by private respondents herein.22 In it, the orders of Branch 220 dated 27 December 1994 and 27 April 1995 were assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. On 09 October 1995, a Decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals finding for the private respondents, upholding that the BLR had jurisdiction over an intra-union dispute, the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of December 27, 1994 and April 27, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED for reasons above-stated. No costs.23 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration dated 27 October 1995,24 but was denied by the court a quo in its Resolution dated 08 January 1996, which is quoted hereunder: This Court hereby resolves the following:

(1) to DENY the motion for the issuance of temporary restraining order of the petitioners, considering that the instant case has already been decided on October 9, 1995; (2) to DENY the motion for reconsideration of the respondents, it appearing that there are no new issues raised which would warrant the reversal or modification of Our decision.25 On 13 February 1996, a petition for review on certiorari was filed before this Court by Genaro Bautista26 seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals cited earlier. Meanwhile, on 28 May 1996, a petition for mandamus was filed by Genaro Bautista, as President, and by the other officers27 and members of the board28 of KKMK-MWSS against Angel L. Lazaro III, Administrator, MWSS, and the Board of Trustees of MWSS, before the RTC, Quezon City, raffled again to Branch 220, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-96-27586.29 In this petition, it was prayed, among other things, that Angel Lazaro III and the Board of Trustees of MWSS give due recognition to Genaro Bautista, et al., as officers of KKMKMWSS, and that the union dues be released to the latter. On 27 June 1996, an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order30 was filed before this Court by the private respondents praying that Regional Trial Court Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo be enjoined from hearing the mandamus case. Then Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla, as Chairman of the First Division, issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 08 July 1996, a portion of which reads: NOW, THEREFORE, you (respondents), your officers, agents, representatives, and/or persons acting upon your orders or, in your place or stead, are hereby ENJOINED to desist from hearing the case in SP Case No. Q-96-27586 entitled "Genaro Bautista, et al. vs. Angel L. Lazaro, Administrator, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), Board of Trustees (MWSS)." A Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order31 and a Supplemental Motion32 thereto were later filed by Genaro Bautista, et al. Thereafter, petitioner Genaro Bautista filed an urgent motion to declare the administrator, Angel L. Lazaro III, and manager, Erlich V. Barraquias, of the Legal Department of the MWSS in indirect contempt of court.33 The petitioner, in this motion, alleged that Lazaro and Barraquias both failed to follow the opinions rendered by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) to the effect that the petitioner and his set of officers are still the rightful parties with whom MWSS management has to deal with in all union matters as they continue to be the incumbent officers.34 The Court issued a Resolution35 dated 18 June 1997 requiring the said administrator and manager to comment on the motion. A joint comment was thereafter filed by Lazaro and Barraquias dated 28 July 1997. In it, they contended that the first two opinions rendered by the OGCC were overtaken by the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, now the subjects of this petition for review on certiorari, wherein it declared that the regular courts have no jurisdiction to prohibit the holding of the election of the officers and members of the board of KKMK-MWSS, as it is lodged with the BLR. When they again sought the guidance of the OGCC as to the effect of the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals, another opinion was issued by the OGCC which, they said, did not

resolve that question but instead merely reiterated its previous opinions deviant to the conclusions of the Court of Appeals.36 THE ISSUE AND PENDING INCIDENTS The bombardment of cases filed before several fora notwithstanding, the solitary question raised by the petitioner is simply whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over a case involving an intra-union dispute (election of officers) of an employees organization in the public sector (MWSS).37 Stated in another way, does the BLR have jurisdiction to call for and conduct the election of officers of an employees association in the public sector? Pending resolution in the instant case are the motions to lift the temporary restraining order in the mandamus case before the lower court and to declare the administrator and the manager of the Legal Department of the MWSS in indirect contempt of court. THE COURTS RULINGS The decision of the Court of Appeals relied on our earlier ruling in the case of Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) v. Ferrer-Calleja.38 In this case, we held that the BLR has the jurisdiction to call for and supervise the conduct of certification elections in the public sector, viz: . . . In the same way that CSC validly conducts competitive examinations to grant requisite eligibilities to court employees, we see no constitutional objection to DOLE handling the certification process in the Court of Appeals, considering its expertise, machinery, and experience in this particular activity. Executive Order No. 180 requires organizations of government employees to register with both CSC and DOLE. This ambivalence notwithstanding, the CSC has no facilities, personnel, or experience in the conduct of certification elections. The BLR has to do the job.
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Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate employee representatives must be jointly approved by the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary. Executive Order No. 180 is not too helpful in determining whose opinion shall prevail if the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary arrive at different conclusions. At any rate, we shall deal with that problem when it occurs. Insofar as power to call for and supervise the conduct of certification elections is concerned, we rule against the petitioner.39 The petitioner contends that the aforecited case finds no application in the case at bar for the following reasons. First, the ACAE case involved a conflict between two government unions in the Court of Appeals, a situation not obtaining in the instant case because what is involved here is only one and the same employees organization, the KKMK-MWSS.40 Second, the ACAE case concerned a certification election, i.e., which between the two government unions should be considered as the bargaining unit before the Court of Appeals, while the present case embraces the issue of who among the members of the organization shall be elected as officers and members of the board.41

The petitioner likewise advances the theory that the power of the BLR, as found in Executive Order No. 180, is limited only to the registration of a union in a government corporation, and to call for a certification election.42 Moreover, the petitioner assails the ruling of the court a quo to the effect that his group participated in the questioned elections and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the BLR. According to him, the records will readily show that they did not in any way join in it.43 We disagree in petitioners assertions, hence, the petition must fail. It may be true that the ACAE case involved a certification election between two unions in a government entity. However, this does not mean that our previous ruling cannot apply in the instant case. The authority of the BLR in assuming jurisdiction over a certification election, or any interunion or intra-union conflicts, is found in Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which reads: Art. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration. The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties. It is quite clear from this provision that BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. An intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, and an inter-union controversy or dispute, one occurring or carried on between or among unions.44 The subject of the case at bar, which is the election of the officers and members of the board of KMKK-MWSS, is, clearly, an intra-union conflict, being within or inside a labor union. It is well within the powers of the BLR to act upon. The petitioner is asking us to make an illogical edict by declaring that our ruling in the ACAE case, considering that it involved an inter-union conflict, should not apply to the instant case for the reason that the latter involves an intra-union conflict. This, we cannot do because the law is very clear on this matter. Executive Order No. 180 (1987),45 particularly Section 16 thereof, is completely lucid as to the settlement of disputes involving government employees, viz: SEC. 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees.46 Since Article 226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, then there should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction.

We likewise find bereft of merit petitioners claim that his group did not in any way participate in the subject elections, and therefore, the principle of estoppel cannot apply. In the Order of the RTC dated 01 July 1994, it appears that the petitioner, indeed, participated in the election. A portion of the Order states: Candidate Genaro C. Bautista Prudencio Cruz Bonifacio De Guzman Vote s 288 1080 1081
47

The petitioner was, undoubtedly, a candidate in the election. The 288 votes for him were counted in his favor. Further, the petitioner and his group submitted a list of candidates before the BLR dated 04 October 199348, which included the name of petitioner himself. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals being in accord with law, are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Urgent Motion to Declare the Administrator and Manager, Legal Department, MWSS, in indirect contempt of court is DENIED, and the temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby made permanent. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo

G.R. No. 96821, December 09, 1994] LA TONDEA WORKERS UNION, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND HON. PURA FERRERCALLEJA, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS. DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside orders and the decision of respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and Secretary of Labor and Employment in BLR-AE-8-18-89, finding Ramon de la Cruz and Norma Marin, president and treasurer respectively of petitioner La Tondea Workers' Union (LTWU), accountable for union funds in the amount of P367,553.00.

Petitioner LTWU is a duly registered labor organization. For more than thirty years it was the bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of La Tondea Inc. at its Tondo Plant. On May 31, 1989 it lost in a certification election to the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM). It appears that, on March 14, 1989, about 200, out of 1,015 members of petitioner, petitioned the National Capital Region Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (hereafter referred to as DOLE-NCR) for an audit or examination of the funds and financial records of the union. Accordingly an audit was ordered and, on April 17, 1989, the acting auditing examiner of the DOLE-NCR, Nepomuceno Leao II, submitted a report finding Ramon de Ia Cruz and Norma Marin accountable for P367,553.00 for union dues remitted by La Tondea Inc. to LTWU. De Ia Cruz and Marin appealed to then DOLE Secretary Franklin Drilon, complaining that they had not been heard before the report was made. The case was indorsed to the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, who, on August 7, 1989, directed the DOLE-NCR to forward to the BLR the records of the case. In her order dated September 29, 1989, the respondent BLR Director found that indeed De la Cruz and Marin had not been heard before they were held liable for union funds. For this reason she set aside the findings and recommendations of the DOLE-NCR and ordered another audit/examination to be conducted. The dispositve portion of her order stated: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the findings/recommendations of the National Capital Region contained in the letter of NCR Director Luna C. Piezas to Teodoro Monleon, et al. petitioners, dated 11 May 1989 are hereby set aside. Accordingly, the Labor Relations and Reporting Division (LRRD), this Bureau is hereby directed to conduct an audit/examination of the books of accounts and other financial records of La Tondea Workers Union (LTWU) for the period of 1986 to February 1989. SO ORDERED. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order insofar as it ordered an audit/examination of books of accounts and financial records. It argued that certain requirements of art. 274 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, must first be complied with before an audit/examination could be ordered, to wit: (1) there must be a sworn written complaint, (2) it must be supported by at least 20% of the total membership of the union and (3) it must not have been conducted during the freedom period nor within the 30 days immediately preceding the date of election of union officials. Petitioner's motion was denied by the BLR in a resolution dated December 1, 1989. Ramon de la Cruz, Danilo Manrique, Arturo Bautista and Norma Marin were ordered to submit "all financial records and related documents of the union for the period 1986 to February 1989 within ten (10) days from receipt of this order." The union, through its new president, Danilo Manrique; again moved for a reconsideration, this time raising a jurisdictional question: That under art. 274 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, the power to order an examination of the books of accounts and financial activities of a union is vested in the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his representative and the BLR can not be

considered the Secretary's representative. In its order of January 22, 1990, however, the BLR denied petitioner's motion, even as it reiterated its previous order of December 1, 1989, with warning that if the records and documents required were not produced within five days petitioner would be deemed to have waived the right to present its evidence. The union filed a petition for review of the orders of December 1, 1989 and January 22, 1990 to the DOLE Secretary. But the BLR proceeded with its examination, and, as the union officers refused to comply with its orders, the BLR based the audit/examination on the certification of the company. In an order dated July 5, 1990, the BLR found the union officers personally accountable and liable for the total amount of P367,553.00, which La Tondea Inc. certified it had remitted to LTWU as union dues. The Secretary of Labor and Employment did not act on the petition for review of the union. Instead, he referred the petition to the BLR which denied the petition for having become moot and academic. The dispositive portion of its order, dated November 21, 1990, states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The Order of this Bureau dated 5 July 1990 issued in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over audit/examination case heard before the Regional Office, this Department, is hereby affirmed in toto. Hence this petition, alleging grave abuse of discretion by respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment and Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Petitioner alleges several grounds which raise the following issues: 1. Whether under the law the power to examine the books of accounts of petitioner is vested in the Secretary of Labor and Employment or in the Bureau of Labor Relations. 2. If it is vested in the Secretary of Labor and Employment, whether the power was not delegated by him in this case to the Bureau of Labor Relations. 3. Whether the examination of petitioner's books was validly ordered despite the fact that the requirements of art. 274 of the Labor Code had not been complied with. 4. Whether the union officers were properly held accountable for union funds. With regard to the first issue, the petitioner cites art. 274 of the Labor code and Rule VIII-A of the implementing rules, in support of its contention that the BLR had no authority to conduct an examination of the books of the LTWU and that such authority is vested solely in the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative. These provisions state: Art. 274. Visitorial Power. - The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative is hereby empowered to inquire into the financial activities of legitimate labor organizations upon the filing of a complaint under oath and duly supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of the total membership of the labor organization concerned and to examine their books of accounts and other records to determine compliance or non-compliance with the law and to prosecute any violations of the law and the union constitutions and by-laws; Provided, that such inquiry or examination shall not be conducted during the sixty

(60) day freedom period nor within the thirty (30) days immediately preceding the date of election of union officials.

Rule VIII-A VISITORIAL POWER

Sec. 1. Exercise of visitorial power. - The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative shall inquire into the financial activities of any legitimate labor organization and examine their books of accounts and other records to determine compliance with the law and the organization, constitution and by-laws, upon the filing of a complaint under oath and duly supported by the written consent of at least 20% of the total membership of the labor organization concerned. Sec. 2. Period of inquiry or examination. - No inquiry or examination of the financial activities and books of accounts as well as other records of any legitimate labor organization mentioned in the preceding section shall be conducted during the 60 day freedom period nor within 30 days immediately preceding the date of election of union officials. The petitioner argues that although art. 274 authorizes the Secretary to delegate the examination of accounts to a representative, the BLR Director cannot be considered a duly authorized representative because the power to examine the books of accounts of a union has already been delegated to union account officers pursuant to the implementing rules, Rule 1, sec. 1(ff) which provides: "Union Accounts Examiners" are officials of the Bureau or the Industrial Relations Division in the Regional Office empowered to audit books of accounts of the union. On the other hand, the public respondents contend that union accounts examiners are actually officials of the BLR because the word "Bureau" in sec. 1(ff) refers to the Bureau of Labor Relations. At any rate, they contend that by endorsing the case to the BLR, the Secretary of Labor and Employment clearly designated the BLR to act on his behalf. Respondents' contention is well taken. The "union accounts examiners of the Bureau" mentioned in Rule 1, sec. 1(ff) of the implementing rules as having the power to audit the books of accounts of unions are actually officials of the BLR because the word "Bureau" is defined in Rule 1, sec. 1(b) of the same rules as the Bureau of Labor Relations. Anyway, the delegation of authority to union accounts examiners in Rule 1, sec. 1(ff) is not exclusive. By indorsing the case to the BLR, the Secretary of Labor and Employment must be presumed to have authorized the BLR to act on his behalf. As already stated, the Secretary made two indorsements: first, when he referred to the BLR the letter dated July 27, 1989 of Ramon de la Cruz and Norma Marin seeking the annulment of the audit report of the DOLE NCR, and second, on September 4, 1990 when, instead of acting on the petition for review of the union, he indorsed it to the BLR.

Independently of any delegation, the BLR had power of its own to conduct the examination of accounts in this case. Book IV, Title VII, Chapter 4, sec. 16 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides: Sec. 16. Bureau of Labor Relations. - The Bureau of Labor Relations shall set policies, standards, and procedures on the registration and supervision of legitimate labor union activities including denial, cancellation and revocation of labor union permits. It shall also set policies, standards, and procedure relating to collective bargaining agreements, and the examination of financial records of accounts of labor organizations to determine compliance with relevant laws. The Bureau shall also provide proper orientation to workers on their rights and privileges under existing laws and regulations, and develop schemes and project for the improvement of the standards of living of workers and their families. The Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, likewise authorizes the BLR to decide intra-union disputes. This includes the examinations of accounts. Thus, art. 226 of the Code provides: Art. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. - The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration. The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties. Petitioner's contention that the intra-union dispute mentioned in this provision does not include the examination of accounts of the union because it contemplates intraunion conflicts affecting labor-management relations is untenable. Conflicts affecting labor-management relations are apart from intra-union conflicts, as is apparent from the text of art. 226. This brings us to the second question, whether the examination of accounts in this case is valid considering that it was not initiated through a sworn written complaint by at least 20% of the total membership of the LTWU. As already stated, the case arose from a letter written by 200, out of a total membership force of 1,015 of the LTWU. These represented 19.70% of the total membership of the union, just a little less than the required number. The requirements referred to were inserted in art. 274 by way of an amendment by R.A. 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989. On the other hand, the letter of the union members petitioning for an examination of the financial records of the union was made on March 14, 1989, i.e., seven days before the effectivity of the amendments. At the time the letter was made, art. 274 merely provided: ART. 274. Visitorial power. - The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative is hereby empowered to inquire, from time to time, into the financial activities of legitimate labor organizations and to examine their books of accounts

and other records to determine compliance or non?compliance with the law and to prosecute any violations of the law and the union constitution and by-laws. The validity of the request for examination of union accounts must be determined as of the time of its filing. Hence we hold that the request of the 200 union members in this case was validly made and conferred jurisdiction on the DOLE-NCR to conduct the examination of the books of accounts of the petitioners. It is indeed true that, in setting aside the audit report of the DOLE-NCR, the BLR cited the fact that the examination of accounts had been made within the so-called "freedom period." But as the BLR pointed out in its order dated September 29, 1989, the ban on examination or audit of union funds within 60 days of the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement had been a policy of the Department of Labor and Employment even before R.A, 6715 took effect. There is, therefore, nothing inconsistent in holding that the examination of accounts by the DOLE-NCR as void for having been conducted within the freedom period and saying now that since the letter requesting such an examination was made before the effectivity of R.A. 6715, the requirements of sworn written complaint and support of at least 20% of the total membership of the union do not apply. The examination subsequently ordered by the BLR, although made after the effectivity of R.A. 6715, was validly conducted because it was simply a continuation of proceedings already began in the DOLE-NCR. As a matter of fact the petitioners, in elevating the matter to the Secretary of Labor, specifically requested that their letter be treated as a motion for reconsideration or as an appeal from the audit report of the DOLE-NCR. Finally, it is claimed that petitioners Ramon de la Cruz and Norma Marin were denied due process by the BLR. As already shown, however, they were given every opportunity to defend themselves, including a warning that if they persisted in their refusal to submit the books of accounts of the union they would be considered to have waived the right to present their evidence. As they did not heed the warning, we think the BLR was justified in using, as basis of its examination, the certification of La Tondea, Inc. as to the amount remitted by it to the LTWU as union dues. This, at any rate, is a factual matter and the rule is that the findings of facts of administrative agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.