Introduction

Floods caused in Pakistan has affected millions of people and caused a significant humanitarian disaster with economic instability and security consequence within the country, flooding in Pakistan started in late July and still persists today leaving its effects on the society, flood disasters during 2010, 2011 has directly affected over 20 million people. Over 1.8 million households have been destroyed, damaged and finished from the place where they existed before. Approximately around 1,752 people have died and over 2,700 are reported injured, it is estimated to be larger than other recent natural disasters experienced globally, Still more than half of the people who suffered during the flood devastation dont have access to Shelter, Food staples, access to clean water, proper sanitary conditions from standing water and submerged lands and dead livestock are some of the more immediate issues. Concerns about malnutrition, gastroenteritis, diarrhea, skin infections, cholera, typhoid, malaria, and hepatitis have been reported. The Pakistan government has established a National Oversight Disaster Management Council to improve the transparency in the distribution of flood relief. However, humanitarian relief efforts have been tempered by initially low levels of donations and security concerns in some regions. Some medium and long-term consequences of flooding have been projected. Lost livelihoods for farmers and a diminished food supply are a concern for many. The flooding destroyed crops, food stockpiles, livestock, seeds, structures, and equipment. Food prices have dramatically increased since the flooding, putting an economic strain on the entire population. Rebuilding damaged and destroyed housing is also expected to affect the return of displaced populations. As tensions mount and the struggle to stabilize persists, public confidence in government efforts to provide assistance might be further tested. Long term consequences such as damaged infrastructure (e.g., bridges, roads, electrical plants, and schools) are also expected to hamper recovery efforts and have a lasting effect on the country. Before the flooding, Pakistan was suffering from regional and global terrorism; stability in neighboring Afghanistan; domestic political stability and democratization; nuclear weapons proliferation and security; human rights protection; and economic development. Flooding has exacerbated these concerns. The effects of the flood on the stability of the Pakistani government increased a lot during this specific time period.

Monsoon Flood 2010 and 2011

Heavy rains associated with monsoons began around July 22, 2010, and led to flash floods in the northwest and east of Pakistan. Downpours continued for the rest of the month and persisted into August. The runoff caused the Indus River and its tributaries to breach levees and overflow into floodplains housing both rural and urban populations. At times river flows reached 40 times their normal levels. As floodwaters moved downstream, new areas of flooding emerged in southern provinces, such as Sindh. Intentional levee breaks were made in attempts to protect urban centers (e.g. Hyderabad); nonetheless, levee breaches affecting populations clusters (e.g., Thatta city) were still occurring in early September. Through early September, the Pakistan Meteorological Department was warning of potential new areas of flooding in low lying areas in the southern portion of the country. At the same time, some of the affected populations in other portions of the basin were returning to their damaged communities as floodwaters receded. Some of these areas were underwater for weeks, resulting in significant agricultural and property losses; concerns about food, shelter, safe water, sanitation, health, and livelihood are likely to persist.

Effects of Flood 2010 and 2011

Effects on Infrastructure, Energy Disruption, and Rebuilding
Early damage estimates that 5,000 miles of roads and railways, 11,000 schools, and 400 health facilities, with damage being particularly severe in northern regions like the Swat Valley. The difficulty, time, and expense of rebuilding this lost infrastructure is likely to be substantial. The flood characteristics and pre-flood economic data estimated damages between $5.1 billion and $7.1 billion to building and transportation infrastructure and $2.12 billion in losses from the disruption of trade. This flood damage infrastructure exacerbates preexisting infrastructure needs in Pakistan. Floods also have shut down some electricity, oil, and gas facilities. According to media reports, around 2.8 gigawatts of power generation capacity in flood affected areas may still be offline. Most of the outages are due to damage to power plants and to the electricity grid. Around 0.9 gigawatts of generation capacity is offline because the oil, natural gas, or other energy sources that fuel it cannot reach power plants. Output at key refining and natural gas facilities has been curtailed due to disruption of transport to customers. Prior to the floods, the country was already suffering from a shortage of electricity generation capacity and rolling blackouts,25 and needed various measures to improve Pakistans energy supply.

Effects on Agriculture and Food Security

Agriculture is one of the primary mainstays of Pakistans economy. It accounts for approximately 23% of GDP, employs about 43% of the labor force and provides about 60% of the countrys export earnings.27 Arable crops, livestock, and fishing and forestry represent 65%, 31%, and 4% of Pakistans agricultural GDP, respectively. Pakistan typically has two major

growing seasons, Rabi (winter crop, spring harvest) and Kharif (summer crop, fall harvest).28 The Kharif crop is also called the summer or monsoon crop because it is grown during the time of the southwest monsoons, which typically occur from July to October. During the Kharif season, agricultural activities take place in rain-fed and irrigated areas. During the Rabi season, agricultural activities take place only in the irrigated areas. Nearly 80% of the cropped area is irrigated, producing about 90% of Pakistans total farm output. Pakistans agriculture sector has suffered severe losses as a result of the torrential rain and flooding of July and August, 2010. The majority of adverse flooding impacts have occurred in four provinces: the Punjab, often called the breadbasket of Pakistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the north, and the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan in the south, all of which have significant crop production. Approximately 80% of people in the flood-affected areas depend on agriculture for their livelihood. The affected populations have suffered severe crop, livestock, and grain stock losses, though assessments of medium and longer term impacts on the agricultural sector in Pakistan are still ongoing. Prior to the recent flooding, poverty and hunger in Pakistan were already widespread and were especially prevalent in rural areas. Nearly two-thirds of the population and 80% of the countrys poor (about 35 million people) live in rural parts of the country. Women in Pakistan, who have the lowest socio-economic status in South Asia, are often among the most vulnerable populations, along with children. The recent global food price and economic crises has exacerbated poverty and food security issues in Pakistan. It is estimated that an additional 17 million people became food-insecure as a result of food price inflation in Pakistan over the past few years, and that the poorest households are now spending more than 70% of their incomes on food. Even before the flooding, it is estimated that about 60 million people were food-insecure in Pakistan, which accounts for about half of the countrys population. While the full extent of damage from the summer 2010 flooding has not yet been fully quantified, the direct and future losses are likely to impact national production of staple crops, such as wheat and rice, and affect the food security of millions of people.

Effects on Health
Immediate and long-term health risks caused by the flood are high. Flooding increased the spread of water-borne diseases when access to clean drinking water is compromised. Likewise, standing water caused by flooding can serve as breeding grounds for mosquitoes, increasing the potential for vector-borne diseases. These risks are heightened when there is significant population displacement, abnormal overcrowding, and a reduction in disease control activities. Children are particularly vulnerable in these circumstances. Access to health services and medicines is of key concern in Pakistans flood-affected areas, as is the restoration of the countrys public health infrastructure. The Pakistan Health Cluster reports that over 450 health facilities in flood-affected areas have been damaged or destroyed, including several hospitals. Of key concern is the insufficient access that women have to reproductive health services and the limited number of female health workers available. Poor hygiene and sanitation conditions in flood affected areas represent a major risk factor, particularly in

settlements where individuals have informally or officially gathered. UNICEF reports indicate that approximately 3.5 million flood survivors only have access to contaminated water. On September 3, 2010, close to 4.6 million individuals have received flood-related medical treatment. The main conditions reported are acute diarrhea, acute respiratory infections, skin diseases, and quickly increasing cases of malaria.38 while few cases have been officially confirmed as yet, cholera is endemic in Pakistan and the threat of an outbreak in flood-affected areas remains critical. It was estimated that 1.5 million cases of diarrheal diseases (including up to 140,000 cases of cholera), and up to 100,000 cases of malaria over the next three months. In addition, there is some concern of potential cases of typhoid fever, Hepatitis A and E, Leptospirosis, Dengue fever, Measles and Polio, and increasing malnutrition among children and pregnant women. Mental health care for survivors dealing with trauma is also an acknowledged priority.

Economic Effects of the Floods

Flood water to determine the extent of damage to Pakistans crops, farmland, housing, roads and bridges, electrical grid, and other critical elements to its economic recovery. Also, as the response to the floods shifts from emergency relief to reconstruction, the level of international support and the effectiveness of recovery programs run by the Pakistan government and the international assistance community will be important forces in recovery process. In addition, other factors such as the degree and pace at which the millions of displaced people return to their home towns and villages, and the actions of militant groups in the post-flood periodwill have serious implications about the economic ripple effects of the floods of 2010. Pakistans Minister of Finance has estimated that there was zero GDP growth and 25% inflation in the current fiscal year, compared to the IMF targets of 4.5% real GDP growth and 9.5% inflation. Other estimates predict real GDP growth of about 2%-3% for the current fiscal year, compared to 4.1% in the previous fiscal year. The long-term economic effects are more difficult to assess. According to one source, repairing damaged infrastructure, including countless destroyed roads, bridges, and dams, could cost up to $15 billion. Critical factors that influenced the speed of Pakistans economic progress over the next few years were: the pace of the recovery of the agricultural sector; the status of the millions of displaced people; and the level of international support for the relief and reconstruction assistance. Agricultural production not only plays a critical role for Pakistans domestic economy, it also is important for its exports. Pakistans rice exports in 2009 were worth $1.8 billion, accounting for 10% of its exports. Cotton and cotton yarn exports in 2009 totaled $3.2 billion, or 18% of Pakistans total exports. Cotton is also vital for Pakistans other leading exportsclothing and other textile articleswhich together were worth $5.8 billion, or 33% of total exports. A slow recovery in agricultural production will adversely affect its balance of trade and potentially contribute to a balance of payments crisis.

An economic problem looming on the horizon is the cost of servicing the IMF loans and other debt incurred since 2008. Pakistans current outstanding debt is $55.5 billion, which is 56% of GDP. Under the current agreement, repayments on the IMF loan will cost the Pakistan government over $3 billion per year starting in fiscal year 2012/2013. There is concern that the cost of service studying its debts may undermine Pakistans economic recovery.

The Government of Pakistans response

After a natural disaster, the initial response and any subsequent appeal for help is usually led by the national government. In Pakistan the Government and the military, with previous experience of responding to natural disasters from the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, were able to respond quickly and save lives which might otherwise have been lost. Unsurprisingly, its limited national disaster preparedness and management capacity was unable to match the immense scale of need.

National and Provincial Disaster Response Management Agencies

The scale of the damage prompted the largest humanitarian appeal in the history of both Pakistan and the UN. The Government of Pakistan responded with an initial Floods Emergency Response Plan on 11 August requesting US$459 million for a three month period. Subsequently a revised Floods Emergency Response Plan identified a total funding requirement of US$1.9 billion for the period August 2010 to August 2011. The Government of Pakistan already had in place a National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) set up after the Kashmir earthquake, with hopes of addressing future challenges in disaster preparedness and disaster management. The system envisaged a devolved and decentralized mechanism for disaster management with the establishment of Provincial Disaster Management Commissions (PDMCs) and Authorities (PDMAs) and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs) which are the linchpin of the whole system and are envisaged to play the role of the first line of defense in the event of a disaster. Although the floods affected up to one fifth of the country, they had very distinct impacts in different parts of the country. The response in the north was generally quicker and more organized, largely because this area was affected by the 2005 earthquake and local disaster management capacities were better and there was a larger NGO presence. It was, however, pointed out that in some areas of KPK province, the Government had difficulty coordinating a response, and there were already large numbers of people living in temporary accommodation because of the conflict there. In contrast in Sindh and Punjab, in the south, even though there was more time to prepare due to the slow onset of the floods, levels of disaster preparedness were lower and the PDMAs less capable.

Islamic Relief and Oxfam said the Pakistan Government gave too much responsibility to the PDMAs without providing sufficient resources. Others said the Government lacked trained and knowledgeable staff, particularly at the local government level, and there was an urgent need to train government officials in such areas as humanitarian principles, contingency planning, disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction. It is clear that the previous experience of responding to the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir significantly strengthened the ability of the Government of Pakistan to respond to the floods, demonstrating the value of local capacity and leadership. The local response fell short in those parts of the country with less experience. As a result the southern provinces, especially Sindh, have been slower to recover. As the HERR noted, the more prepared a nation, the less lasting damage disasters cause and the quicker they can recover.

The Watan scheme

The Government of Pakistan set up a scheme to deliver much needed cash to flood victims by providing a card registered to each family head which could be used to obtain cash from ATM machines. This was known as the Watan scheme. The value of cash, especially in urban areas, is clearit allows people to make decisions about what to purchase and when, and helps to kickstart local markets. The Secretary of State told us how successful it was: The Government of Pakistan introduced this cash transfer programme based on bank cards. It was bold, ambitious and, actually, quite successful. Payments were in the order of 150 to some 1.5 million floodaffected households. This initiative was scaled up at the point where 30,000 cards were being issued per day at one point. It is a very effective way of getting funding through to families and communities that have been very badly affected by it. There were, however, some problems with the Watan system related to registration, impartial distribution and transparency, and on the whole NGOs felt it was too bureaucratic and complex. For example the system relied on identification cards which, while common in Pakistan, excluded some of the poorest people; female headed households experienced difficulties registering for cards; and for cultural reasons women found it difficult to go to an ATM to get money out. Oxfam also noted that while the official Watan cash transfer scheme has assisted many people, there have been incidents of local nepotism and corruption, and at times the scheme has lacked the basic infrastructure needed to deliver it. The Watan system was an innovative response to get cash to affected families. It was perhaps too complex, relying as it did on an overly bureaucratic and inflexible registration system. We nevertheless commend the Government of Pakistans efforts to innovate and to experiment with best practice.

The role of the Pakistan army

We were told that the Pakistan army mobilized quickly and played a crucial role, especially in the first seventy-two hoursa key window of opportunity for delivering assistance and saving

lives. As the NGO Merlin noted, the Pakistan military played a pivotal role in the response across the country in rescuing the stranded population and providing the basic services.18 The CBHA and MSF both echoed this view describing how the army had airlifted people to safety, repaired damaged bridges and roads and set up mobile camps. However, concern was expressed about the army restricting humanitarian access to certain parts of the country in the conflict-affected north and east. MSF said: We have been trying to get into districts such as Dera Ismail Khan, which is close to Waziristan, where there are displaced persons from the conflict that has been going in Waziristan for years. Then of course with the floods it was known that those areas were flood-affected, and there were flash floods. You already have an extremely vulnerable population because of the conflict, and then they become flood-affected. That is what we are talking about with the restrictions. It was the same in southern Punjab as well. Again, there were some areas that were very poor and vulnerable before, but which we were not allowed starting working in. We were told that the UK and the US had been made aware of the refusal of access and had made representations to the Government of Pakistan. The Secretary of State agreed that the use of the army did create some difficulties in areas where soldiers might previously have been deployed in an offensive capacity. The impact of the conflict on the effectiveness of the humanitarian response was highlighted in much of our evidence. It is clear to us that there is a very important role for the military in helping people in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and in rebuilding damaged infrastructure quickly. The army in Pakistan was able to reach parts of the country which others were unable to and in so doing, significantly reduced the number of fatalities. However we are concerned about claims that the Pakistan army denied humanitarian organizations access to some flood-affected parts of the country. During and after a natural disaster there needs to be strong leadership and effective coordination of the relief effort by the countrys government. Control needs to be exercised over the deployment of the assets which are available, including those offered by NGOs. These decisions need to be made openly, transparently and solely on humanitarian grounds.

DFIDs response to the floods

We commend the Government on its speedy and generous response. We welcome the introduction of an electronic display on DFIDs website to demonstrate to the UK public how DFIDs humanitarian assistance is being spent. We also commend the British public for their generosity in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Pakistan despite the UKs own economic difficulties. It is clear DFIDs role as a network enablershaping the way the UN and other multilateral organizations operate, making them more effectiveis important. DFID channels the majority of its humanitarian assistance through multilateral organizations. We agree with the HERR that DFID should recognize this key role so that it can help improve the way the humanitarian system works.

The Humanitarian Response to the Pakistan Floods

The UK Pakistani community makes regular contributions to the country and generously increased these in the aftermath of the floods, helping to provide much needed relief to the many millions of affected persons. As part of its assessment of the reaction to the floods we recommend that DFID investigate how much additional funding was foregone, by not being registered as gift aid, because of the need to get money out quickly. We do not consider gift aid to be an additional contribution to the DFID budgetrather as standard and acceptable practice for charitable donations.

Humanitarian principles and the role of the military

We strongly support key humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. Using military assets for the delivery of humanitarian assistance is generally an option of last resort in conflictaffected areas because the intentions of such assistance could be misconstrued. Nevertheless we recognize that there are occasions when no other options are available to help people in need, and this may well have been the case with regards to the use of RAF aircraft to deliver bridges. However we take seriously the concerns of the UN given the NATO-coordinated stabilization efforts in the north and Afghan border areas and the perception this might create.

Resources
Although some parts of the UN worked well, for example the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), others did not. The UN has disbursed only $700 million of a nearly $2 billion appeal. This is unacceptable given the millions of people still in need of humanitarian assistance and those living in camps.

Strategic Leadership
We support the recommendation of the Humanitarian and Emergency Response Review (HERR) that the UK should champion a complete overhaul of strategic and operational leadership in the UN. This should include provision to train more people able to carry out the role of Humanitarian Coordinator. We also agree with Humanitarian and Emergency Response Review that DFID should assign a Director General to champion humanitarian work within DFID.

Coordination
The performance of the cluster system was mixed. We appreciate that NGOs want to help people in need, but there were too many NGOs and other agencies at some meetings to make clusters effective. We agree with UN OCHA that clusters should focus on providing strategic sector leadership. We recommend that only those agencies with operational experience and a proven record in the sector should be involved in cluster meetings and that information should be shared with others in a less resource intensive manner.

Disaster preparedness and risk reduction

In its response to this report DFID should indicate how its increased spending in Pakistan will result in an increased focus on disaster preparedness and risk reduction.

Funding the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)

Given the evident importance of disaster risk reduction we were surprised to learn that DFID is to withdraw from the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. We recommend DFID explain in detail how it intends to priorities disaster risk reduction in the multilateral system in its response to this report. We also recommend that DFID sets out its proposals to work with the ISDR to assist it to improve its effectiveness, and that DFID sets out clear criterion which, when met by ISDR, would permit DFID to start funding the organization once again.

Conclusion
The country and international humanitarian system needs to be much better prepared to respond to natural disasters to reduce the risks to life and livelihoods. Predicted increases in the incidence and severity of natural disasters, coupled with demographic trends call for a step change in the system. DFID must play a key role in promoting changes in the system and must itself better integrate disaster risk reduction into its own development programmes.