Philosophy of Science Association

MalIenalics and BeaIil Tvo Nolions oJ Spaceline in lIe AnaIlic and Conslvuclionisl
Vievs oJ Oauge FieId TIeovies
AulIov|s) Sunn Y. Auang
Souvce FIiIosopI oJ Science, VoI. 67, SuppIenenl. Fvoceedings oJ lIe 1998 BienniaI Meelings
oJ lIe FIiIosopI oJ Science Associalion. Favl II Snposia Fapevs |Sep., 2000), pp. S482-S494
FuIIisIed I The University of Chicago Press on IeIaIJ oJ lIe Philosophy of Science Association
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Mathematics and Reality: Two Notions
of Spacetime in the Analytic and
Constructionist Views of Gauge Field
Theories
Sunny Y. Auyangtt
This paper presents two interpretations of the fiber bundle formalism that is applicable
to all gauge field theories. The constructionist interpretation yields a substantival space-
time. The analytic interpretation yields a structural spacetime, a third option besides
the familiar substantivalism and relationalism. That the same mathematical formalism
can be derived in two different ways leading to two different ontological interpretations
reveals the inadequacy of pure formal arguments.
1. Introduction. Physical theories are mathematical, and the mathematical
structures of modern physical theories are increasingly complicated. The
relation between mathematics and nature has always been an amazement
for physicists and a puzzle for philosophers. Realists and antirealists lock
horns over it. This paper does not go into the extended debate but focuses
on a narrower issue from the realist perspective. Let us assume that mod-
ern physical theories are more than sophisticated recipes for predicting
experimental outcomes. At least parts of their mathematics are descriptive
of the microscopic world remote from experience. Assume also that we
can distinguish the objective parts that are ascribed to nature from the
instrumental parts that are not, a difficult task with deep philosophical
implications. Then we have to interpret the objective terms: What are the
entities and features of the world depicted by the objective part of a physi-
cal theory? Usually there are more than one consistent interpretations,
tSend requests for reprints to the author, 100 Memorial Dr., #521B, Cambridge, MA
02142; e-mail: sauyang@prodigy.net.
1I
thank Paul Teller for helpful discussions and John Stachel and Andrew Wayne for
critical readings of the first draft.
Philosophy of Science, 67 (Proceedings) pp. S482-S494. 0031-8248/2000/67supp-0037$0.00
Copyright 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
S482
MATHEMATICS AND REALITY S483
hence more than one plausible ontologies. Faced with the ambiguity, re-
alists can admit defeat and give up the objectivity of physical theories. Or
they can try to narrow down the ambiguity by ferreting out and clarifying
its sources, which are often hidden in presuppositions so familiar no one
but philosophers would worry about. This paper is an exercise in the latter
attitude.
The particular problem considered here can be framed as follows. Sup-
pose the matured theories for a domain P of the physical world use a
complicated mathematical structure M
=
{m, m2, . . .
mJ,
of which sci-
entific consensus regards the substructure M'
=
{ml, . . .
mkj,
k < X, to
be objective. As terms in a mathematical structure, the
mi's
are interre-
lated. How then do we interpret individual terms? Does a term in the
objective substructure M' necessarily refers to an entity that exists inde-
pendently of P, the physical system to which M' as a whole describes?
What I call the analytic view answers negatively, the constructionist view
affirmatively. The two answers lead to two ontologies. In judging their
relative merits, mathematical formalism offers no guide. Physical and phil-
osophical considerations are mandatory in deciding the relation between
the formalism and reality. Much mathematics is abstract construction.
However, it is erroneous to prescribe a priori that the construction of
complex mathematical structures mirrors the construction of complex
physical structures; that because a mathematical term M3 is defined in
terms of m1 and m2, there must be preexisting entities represented by mi
and m2 from which M3 is constructed.
To be more specific, consider the ontology represented by gauge field
theories, especially the status of spacetime in the world of fields. Gauge
field theories-general relativity for the gravitational interaction and
quantum field theory for the electromagnetic and nuclear interactions-
are presently our most fundamental physical theories with experimental
confirmation. They posit as the basic ontology of the universe a set of
interacting fields. What is a physical field? Are there entities in a field?
What are the general relations of fields to individual entities on the one
hand and spacetime on the other? Gauge field theories contain terms with
usual spatiotemporal interpretation. Does this imply that spacetime is an
entity existing independently of physical fields? Substantivalism answers
yes. From the application of differential geometry to field theories, some
substantivalists argue that the mathematical notion of differentiable mani-
fold must refer to spacetime as an independent primordial substance (Field
1980, Earman 1989). I will show that their arguments follow a construc-
tionist approach, and that an analytic approach yields a different inter-
pretation of the same differential geometry applied to the same gauge field
theories. In the analytic interpretation, spacetime appears as an indis-
pensable substructure integral to the physical field and not a preexisting
S484 SUNNY Y. AUYANG
substance on which the field is built (Stachel 1986, Auyang 1995). Opposed
to the structural spacetime, the mathematical weaponry deployed by the
advocates of the substantival spacetime against the relational spacetime
becomes impotent, because it cuts both ways. In the end, we are forced
back to philosophical analyses, including an examination of what it means
to be an entity.
2. The Analytic and Constructionist Approaches. A field may be the ele-
mentary stratum of the physical world, but this in no way implies that it
is trivial in structure. Elementary fields are complex. If they were not,
gauge field theories would not be so complicated. Thus interpretations of
field theories cut into the general scientific approaches to complex systems.
There are two general approaches to study physical systems of any
complexity, one proceeds from the top down, the other from the bottom
up. The top down approach, which I call synthetic analysis, takes on the
target system as a whole, then draws distinctions to find the parts appro-
priate for explaining the whole's properties. Imagine we analyze a geo-
metric whole, say a disc, into two parts by drawing the boundary R to
differentiate the parts A and B. R not merely differentiates but simulta-
neously unites the two parts that it delimits. Whenever we talk about one
part, we tacitly invoke the other part and the whole via the boundary R
without which it is not defined. Therefore R is an intrinsic relation between
the two parts. The two parts are intrinsically related, for their mutual
relationship is constitutive of the properties of each. A, B, and their in-
trinsic relation R constitute a gross structure of the whole. Further analysis
reveals finer structures of the whole by drawing more distinctions and
delineating more intrinsically related parts.
In theoretical science, the "boundaries" that cut up the whole into
"parts" are concepts. Metaphorically, we conceptually carve nature at its
joints. The trick, as Plato said, is to observe the natural joins, not to
mangle it up like an unskilled butcher (Phaedrus 265-266). The metaphor
of the butcher is not quite appropriate, because in conceptual analysis we
are careful not to kill our subject. Thus analysis is different from decom-
position, which breaks a whole into independent parts. In analysis, we
examine the parts within the whole and study their functions therein. On
the other hand, analysis is not enslaved to holism. We can make approx-
imations that decouple a part from the whole and study it on its own.
Nevertheless,
even as we talk about entities and treat them independently,
we acknowledge our approximations and note their consequences, often
take into account the effects of the suppressed parts by some parameters.
Analyses of complex systems may be long processes. To emphasize that
their chief goal is to understand the systems as complex wholes, I qualify
analyses with "synthetic."
MATHEMATICS AND REALITY S485
One consequence of the analytic approach is that we do not assume in
advance any parts and their relations. Depending on the depth and re-
finement of analysis, the parts, their properties, and relations can change.
Thus we do not posit any given set of constituent entities with absolute
properties and relations. Elsewhere I have given many examples of syn-
thetic analysis from various sciences (Auyang 1998).
In contrast; the bottom up approach presupposes a given set of entities
with intrinsic properties and extrinsic relations among the entities. Imagine
a miscellany of blocks, which can be stacked up to form a pyramid or a
tower. The relations among the blocks are extrinsic to them because it
neither depends on their properties nor changes them by its operation.
The constructionist approach sees a complex system as being built from
the given entities.
Both the analytic and constructionist methods are productive in science,
but neither is appropriate in all circumstances. When we say the gauge
fields are the building blocks of the universe, we are assuming a construc-
tionist stance. Our question now is: Which approach is more fruitful when
we come to study structure of the gauge field itself? The answers naturally
lead to two different notions of spacetime.
3. Fields and Local Fields. A physical field is a dynamical system with an
infinite degrees of freedom. To gain an intuitive idea of what it means, let
us start from a system with a finite degree of freedom, a composite system
that is not a field. Consider the oscillation of N identical beads attached
at various positions to an inelastic weightless thread whose ends are fixed,
as depicted in Figure 1. We index the beads by integers n = 1, 2, . . , N.
The only property of the beads we are interested in is their respective
position or displacement. We represent the property of the nth bead at
time t by the mathematical function
f,(t).
The temporal variation of the
property of the whole system of beads is described by N coupled equations
of motion for the
f(t)'s,
taking into account the tension of the thread and
the masses of the beads.
'Ai
(a) (b)
Figure 1. (a) The integers n index the beads on a thread, whose properties are represented
by the function f(t). (b) The real numbers x index the points in a string, whose properties
are represented by f (x, t).
S486 SUNNY Y. AUYANG
Now imagine that the number of beads N increases but their individual
mass m decreases so that the product mN remains constant. As N goes to
infinity, the beads are squashed together, and in the limit we obtain an
inelastic string with a continuous and uniform mass distribution. Instead
of using integers n that parameterize the beads, we use real numbers x, 0
?
x ' L to index the points on a string of length L. Instead of
fn(t),
the
property of the string is characterized by f(t, x), called the displacement
field of the string.
Generally, a field is a dynamical variable for a continuous system pa-
rameterized by one or more continuous variables, which I summarily call
x. Unless explicitly specified as in the displacement field, the spatial con-
notation of a field is exhausted by the spatiotemporal parameter x, which
has the same status as the temporal parameter t. With x fixed,f varies but
generally does not vary spatially. Therefore it is usually called the "inter-
nal" property of a point in the field. For a classical field, f may be the
strength of the electric or magnetic field component. For quantum fields,
f
is a quantum property represented by noncommuting
operators,
which
are usually not observables.
There is a general difference between the displacement field and gauge
fields. The property of the displacement field is represented by an ordinary
function. The internal property of a gauge field is represented by a group
of symmetry transformations, for example, the unitary group U(1) for the
electron field. Furthermore, the symmetry group is "gauged" or localized
to each point in the field, hence is often called the gauge group. With the
local symmetry representation, the property of one point in the gauge field
can be described totally independently of those of the other points. Con-
sequently it makes explicit the notion that the points in the gauge fields
are discrete entities, called the localfields. If we want to relate or compare
their individual properties, then we must introduce explicit interaction
mechanisms, which are beyond the scope of this paper. The constitution
of a gauge field by discrete local fields makes its analogy with the bead
system closer.
In short, a gauge field is a continuous system consisting discrete local
fields, each with its individual internal property and its numerical identity,
which is individuated, identified, or indexed by the spatiotemporal vari-
able x, the generalization of the variable x for the displacement field. Since
x serves the same function as x, it is well to examine the significance of
the more intuitive x. The continuous variable x for the displacement field
plays the same role as the discrete variable n for the bead system, differing
only in that x satisfies the mathematical criterion of completeness whereas
n does not. A particular value of x designates a specific point on the string,
just as a value of n designates a specific bead. Sometimesf(t, x) is said to
be the displacement at each space point x. However, x cannot be position
MATHEMATICS AND REALITY S487
in space because it remains fixed when the string moves spatially; x denotes
not position in space but position on the string. We can call x a spatial
index but not an index of space points in which the string sits. We can
theoretically abstract the characteristics of the variable x and say it is a
one-dimensional continuum. However, this theoretical continuum repre-
sents only a structural aspect of the string and not an immaterial substance
that can be torn out of the string and let stand on its own. The same
argument applies for the spatiotemporal variable x for the gauge fields.
How then do we get the idea of spacetime as a preexisting substratum
supporting the gauge fields?
4. The Constructionist Approach and the Substantival Spacetime. Gauge
field theories are highly mathematical, including a healthy dose of differ-
ential geometry. When we look at the mathematics, we find that the most
common mode of presentation is abstract construction. Thus a textbook
in differential geometry first defines a differentiable manifold by general
coordinate transformations. Then it introduces various constructions on
the manifold: mathematical objects such as tangent spaces are assigned to
each point in the manifold; structures such as the inner product or coor-
dinate frames are introduced on the tangent space; and so on. Mathe-
maticians call the collection of a type of object over all points in the mani-
fold a "field" because of its smoothly varying nature. Thus the collection
of inner products on the tangent spaces is called the metric field. It is
important to remember that these mathematical objects and fields are gen-
erally not physical objects and fields. They are totally abstract. If they
happen to represent physical objects and fields in a physical theory, then
their physical interpretation is an extra step.
If we assume that the construction of the physical world mirrors the
abstract mathematical construction, then we would interpret each layer of
mathematic structure as an independent entity. More specifically, we
would automatically identify mathematical fields with physical fields. Un-
der the notion that mathematics mirrors nature, the constructionist stance
leads us to interpret the differentiable manifold as representative of a sub-
stantival substratum supporting the physical fields represented by the
mathematical fields. Because the manifold comes first in mathematics and
is presupposed by other mathematical constructions, we tend to think of
the corresponding physical substratum as primitively existing. Conse-
quently we have the notion of a substantival space.
The constructionist reasoning is apparent in the writings of leading
manifold substantivalists. Harty Field wrote, "a field is usually described
as an assignment of some property, or some number or vector or tensor,
to each point of space-time; obviously this assumes that there are space-
time points" (1980, 35). John Earman called Field's position "manifold
S488 SUNNY Y. AUYANG
substantivalism" and rephrased his point: "When relativity theory ban-
ished the ether, the space-time manifold M began to function as a kind of
dematerialized ether needed to support the fields." He then proceeded to
flesh out the argument by parading the mathematical definitions of the
differentiable manifold and various mathematical object fields on it, con-
cluding: "It is clear that the standard characterization of fields uses the
full manifold structure" (1980, 155, 158-159). The mathematics is clear.
What is obscured is their philosophical assumption that no distinction
need to be made between mathematical and physical fields, which they
identify under the same word "field." Consequently they marshal the ab-
stract construction of mathematical fields upon the differentiable manifold
as the direct argument for the construction of physical fields upon a de-
materialized ethereal spacetime.
Manifold substantivalists count only the bare differential manifold as
spacetime; other substantivalists want to include more structures. In all
cases, the bottom up constructionist approach plus the notion of mathe-
matics-physics mirroring lead to a substantival spacetime as a pizza crust
ready for toppings. The crust may be thin or thick, but it stands on its
own. The toppings may be plain or as exotic as local quantum fields. In
all cases we have a preexisting spacetime on which material entities will
be placed. Thus an extrinsic relation, supporting, underlying, or occupy-
ing, obtains between the spatiotemporal substratum and the fields.
I want to argue against this pizza model of physical fields. Even if
abstract construction is the way we learn the mathematics, we have no
right to assume that it is mirrored by the construction of the physical
world. First, there is more than one way to present a mathematical struc-
ture, and even more ways to interpret it. Equally important, when applied
in physical theories, many concepts in a mathematical theory are instru-
mental and not objective. The pizza model results from the mistake of
indiscriminate objective interpretations of the elements in a mathematical
theory.
5. The Fiber Bundle Formulation of Gauge Field Theories. Since spacetime
is a general notion, it would be convenient to have a general framework
for discussing field theories featuring it. The mathematics of fiber bundle
provides such a framework. John Stachel (1986) has used the fiber bundle
concept to explain generally covariant field theories and Einstein's view
that there is no spacetime without the metric field.
As seen in Table 1, the fiber bundle formalism applies to most impor-
tant dynamical systems. Its generality makes it useful for conceptual anal-
ysis and comparison. The gauge fields, general relativity and quantum
fields, differ from classical mechanics in that their representative fibers
MATHEMATICS AND REALITY S489
TABLE 1 The fiber bundle formulation of gauge field theories. (References can
be found in Auyang, 1995, 60.)
Physical system Physical theory Fiber bundle
Gravitation interaction General relativity Orthonormal frame bundle
Electromagnetic and Quantum field theory Principal fiber bundle
nuclear interactions
Classical mechanics Lagrangian formulation Tangent bundle
Hamiltonian formulation Cotangent bundle
have complex structures characterized by the mathematics of group, the
gauge group. I will consider them only.
The fiber bundle is a high-level construction in differential geometry.
Crudely, a fiber is a complex mathematical object that is associated with
a point in the differentiable manifold. For instance, the tangent space with
its structures is a fiber. By collecting the tangent spaces over all points in
a manifold and bundling them up according to certain mathematical cri-
teria, we get a fiber bundle, the tangent bundle. Another kind of mathe-
matical object assigned to the points gives another kind of fiber and an-
other fiber bundle, but the idea is the same.
The fiber bundle is a mathematical structure with four major elements:
(D, M, Gx, i). M, called the base space, is usually a differentiable manifold.
To illustrate its idea schematically, I have drawn M in two dimensions in
Figure. 2c. Each point x in the base space is associated with a mathemat-
ical object, a fiber
G,
which can be a tangent space, a tensor, a differen-
tiable manifold, or a group space. The patchwork of the products of the
fiber and the manifold, which contains all fibers, is called the total space,
D. The manifold and the total space, or each point in the manifold and
the fiber associated with it, are related by the projection map, it. Rigorous
definitions are readily available in mathematics books, but it is important
in philosophy to catch the main ideas and not be distracted by the com-
plicated mathematical details.
Applied in physical theories, the total space D is interpreted as the state
space of a gauge field, analogous to all the possible configurations of the
displacement field of a string. It consists of the distinctive state spaces GX
of a set of discrete entities, the local fields, analogous to a point on the
string with its possible displacements. The local field Gx is indexed by the
spatiotemporal point x, and M is usually interpreted as spacetime.
As I have presented it, the fiber bundle seems perfect for substantival-
ism. M is the substantival spacetime, ft the extrinsic relation of supporting,
and Gx a piece of topping on each point in the pizza crust. Nevertheless,
mathematicians have shown that the same fiber bundle can be mathemat-
ically constructed in another way. This alternative mathematical construc-
S490 SUNNY Y. AUYANG
tion can be physically interpreted as the analysis of a complex physical
system instead of the physical construction from prefabricated parts.
6. The Analytic Approach and Spacetime as the Principle of Individuation.
Suppose the state space of the physical field we aim to understand is some-
thing like the Mobius strip in Figure 2a, but we do not know it yet. The
Mobius strip shares with the cylinder an arching spatial structure, which
is a circle. How do we find out about it? How do we "extract" the circle
from the strip?
Suppose we observe various qualities u on various locations on the
Mobius strip. We can say the qualities are properties of the strip as a
whole but not the property of any smaller entities, because we have not
yet differentiated any entities in the strip. How can we get a finer-grained
description? How can we analyze the strip into a set of entities? Without
such analysis, the M6bius strip is analogous to a physical field as some-
thing amorphous.
If we posit that the entities belong to the same type and therefore share
the same set of possible properties related by a symmetry group G, then
we have a way of partitioning the whole into entities. A mathematic group
consists a set of transformations that map one possible quality into an-
other. It establishes an
equivalence
relation
among
the
qualities
it con-
< ~ ~ ~ ~
~~~~~ =1 DIG
(a)(c
(b)(c
Figure 2. The analytic view of the fiber bundle formalism. (a) We aim to study an extended
complex system with possible properties u on various locations. (b) The qualities are parti-
tioned into G-orbits {u': u' u} according to the equivalence relation that is contained in
the symmetry group G. (c) The projection map 7t sends all elements in a G-orbit into a single
p6int x, which serves as the numerical identity of the fiber Gx. The identities x of all fibers
Gx constitute the base space M. The fibers constitute the total space D = { Gx x EM}
which is a set with an indexing set M.
MATHEMATICS AND REALITY S491
nects. We pick an arbitrary quality u and collect all qualities u' that it can
map into under the transformations of the symmetry group. In this way
we obtain a G-orbit {u': u' u}. We
pick
another
quality w,
collect all its
companions w',
and
get
another G-orbit {w': w' w}. In this
way
we can
exhaustively partition all the qualities on the strip into pairwise disjoint
G-orbits. Because the grouping is accomplished by an equivalence relation,
the resultant G-orbits do not share common elements. Two G-orbits either
have no element in common or share every element, in which case they
are identical. They make explicit the notion of exclusiveness.
A G-orbit is a cluster of possible qualities but not possible properties,
for we still lack the notion of what they are properties of. We still lack the
concept of an entity that we can refer to individually and ascribe prop-
erties. All G-orbits are identical because they are all cut with the same
cookie cutter, the symmetry group G. To make explicit the idea that two
G-orbits are distinct although they share all qualities, we use the idea of
a quotient that results from dividing the whole by a part. We introduce a
map
i
that sends all qualities in a G-orbit into a single point x, i(u)
=
x,
which represents the numerical identity of the G-orbit. The addition of a
numerical identity x turns a G-orbit into an entity that we can definitely
refer to, a fiber
Gx.
The whole, partitioned into individual fibers, we now
call the total space D. Furthermore, we find that the points x projected
from all fibers
Gx
in the strip constitute a system, M. In the case of the
Mobius strip, M has the characteristic of a circle.
Here we have another way of arriving at the fiber bundle, the structure
(D, M,
Gx,
i). Mathematically, it is still abstract construction, as we in-
troduce more and more structures. Applied to physical theories, however,
the abstract construction appears not as a building from given parts but
as an analysis revealing the finer structures of a large system. We analyze
a large system, the Mobius strip, into constituent entities
Gx,
which are
not given beforehand. Furthermore, by systematically distinguishing the
numerical identities of the entities, we have theoretically extracted an arch-
ing structure that spans the Mobius strip as a whole, namely, its spatial
structure of a circle, represented by M. M is customarily called spacetime,
but this spacetime does not induce the notion of a pregiven substratum.
The basic idea behind the analytic view of the fiber bundle is the set
theoretic notion of the partition of unity by an equivalence relation, quo-
tient space, and a set with an indexing set. These simple set theoretic no-
tions bring out an important function of spacetime that is obscured by the
glamor of mathematical details. They show that a most primitive function
of spatiotemporal concepts in our understanding is the individuation and
identification, the indexing, of physical entities. What we learn from the
fiber bundle formulation of field theories is that to represent a system of
physical entities theoretically, the concept of a simple set is not enough.
S492 SUNNY Y. AUYANG
We need at least the concept of a set with an indexing set. D is a set with
the indexing set M, D = {
Gx
x E M}. Spacetime is the indexing set for
the set of local fields in a gauge field, just as certain integers form the
indexing set for the system of beads on a string. Unlike substantival sup-
porting, the indexing role of spacetime is crucial to physical field theories.
Spacetime points do not support local fields in any physical sense. They
make the local fields distinct.
Physically, we still interpret the total space D as the state space of an
entire gauge field, a fiber
Gx
as the state space of a local field, and M as
spacetime. However, in this analytic view, spacetime M is neither a sub-
stratum nor an entity that can stand on its own. Rather, it is an arching
structure of the physical gauge field as a whole. There is no a priori guar-
antee that all dynamical systems have the same spatiotemporal structure,
in existing theories they often do not. If we want to posit a universal
spacetime, then it must come as an extra constraint on the theories for
various physical domains. The constraint may serve as a unifying factor,
but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
An important consequence of analysis is that spacetime and the local
fields are intrinsically related. Spacetime is derived by reckoning with the
properties of the local fields. Conversely, the local fields as individual en-
tities with definite identities are recognized only within the spatiotemporal
system. Therefore, to say that spacetime is not an independently existing
substance does not mean that it is not objective. It is objective as an in-
dispensable structure of the physical field. It is absolute in the sense that
without it, there would be no individual entities in the field. It rejects
Newton's notion of space as a substance, but agrees to Newton's notion
of absolute space: "Space is a disposition of being qua being.... When
any being is postulated, space is postulated" (1962, 136). When any entity
or any local field is posited, spacetime is posited.
7. Two Physical Interpretations of the Same Mathematics. To sum up,
gauge field theories can be generally represented by the fiber bundle for-
malism, and the same mathematical structure can be abstractly con-
structed in two different ways. Physically, one way is easily interpreted as
the physical construction from prefabricated parts, the other way as the
analysis of a whole into finer structures. The two interpretations lead to
two different ontologies, especially two notions of spacetime.
Spacetime substantivalism, which is based on the bottom up construc-
tionist view, assigns physical significance to all major mathematical terms
in the fiber bundle (D, M,
Gx,
i). It sees the gauge field D as a construction
out of two sets of independent physical entities: local fields
Gx
and pre-
existing spacetime points x, which constitute the substantival spacetime
M. Connecting the two is the extrinsic relation of supporting, represented
MATHEMATICS AND REALITY S493
by i. This is a sumptuous ontology, perhaps too sumptuous. To account
for all its physical objects and relations, the stock of theoretical concepts
are spread thin, leaving many questions unattended. Each set of entities
requires its criterion of individuation, which is at best left vague. Substan-
tivalism does not answer what differentiates one spacetime point from
another, since all of them are exactly featureless. Furthermore, it says
almost nothing about the physical relation between spacetime and the
field. Physical theories are most sensitive to causal mechanisms, but the
alleged mechanism of spacetime physically supporting the field is not
found in physical field theories, nor is there any evidence for its causal
role.
The top down analytic view sees the whole gauge field as an integral
system, complex but primitive. It analyzes the whole D into a set of in-
trinsically related physical entities, the local fields
Gx,
the individuation of
which depends on a structure spanning the whole, the spatiotemporal
structure M. This is a parsimonious ontology with a single set of physical
entities. That it engages the same stock of theoretical concepts as substan-
tivalism reveals the conceptual complexity required to characterize physi-
cal entities properly. Conversely, it reveals the conditions a physical system
must satisfy if it is to be analyzed into a set of individual entities. Analysis
addresses the problem of individuation explicitly, showing that to refer to
and describe particular entities individually, we need certain spatiotem-
poral concepts. In this interpretation, the mapping i represents not a
physical mechanism but the conceptual relation between identification and
predication.
Which physical interpretation of the mathematical formalism is better?
The mathematics itself is neutral, as it should be, to this point. Here I will
not examine the pros and cons for the two notions of spacetime, having
considered it elsewhere (Auyang 1995). In laying out alternative interpre-
tations of the same mathematics, this paper aims to emphasize the insuf-
ficiency of formal and technical considerations in philosophical matters.
The mathematical structures of physical theories are important, but
equally indispensable are careful consideration of the physics and analysis
of general concepts such as entity and substance. This adage is more read-
ily acknowledged than practiced. General concepts are intuitive but dif-
ficult to analyze and articulate, although the conclusions of philosophical
arguments are framed in terms of them. The mathematical structures of
physical theories are complicated but susceptible to clear articulation.
Thus the mathematics sometimes turns into a "technique trap" where phi-
losophers are snowed by formalism and blinded to its physical meaning.
An example of the trap's effects is the jump from a rehearsal of differential
geometric definitions to the conclusion that substantival spacetime points
are the basic objects of reference and of predication. The jump ignores
S494 SUNNY Y. AUYANG
important physical and philosophical factors and invokes general concepts
most carelessly. What does it mean to be the basic object of predication?
How do we refer to individual objects? These are central questions in
contemporary analytic philosophy. They cannot be taken lightly by phi-
losophers of physics. It is precisely in the world of fields where individual
objects are not obvious at all that these questions become more poignant
and demand close attention. By ignoring them and concentrating on math-
ematical details, philosophers of physics can be oblivious of the philo-
sophical assumptions hidden in their arguments, such as physical con-
struction mirrors mathematical construction. It is well to remember Saul
Kripke's admonition: "There is no mathematical substitution for philos-
ophy" (1976, 416).
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