QUIZZER

IN

POLITICAL LAW
TAKEN FROM CASES PROMULGATED FROM JANUARY 2008 TO SEPTEMBER 2009

Prepared by:

BARTOLAZO, Hazelle V. BAUTISTA, Charise C. BUCCAT, Rozzanne Victoria G. QUERIDA, Rosalyn Mary L.

Adviser: ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN Professor of Law University of the Cordilleras

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW 1. IS THE CONCEPT OF ASSOCIATION RECOGNIZED UNDER PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. (The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008)

2. CAN CONGRESS ENACT LAWS THAT WILL ADD QUALIFICATIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE BOTH IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT?

Congress cannot enact laws adding the qualifications of national candidates. The qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution are: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. However, for Local Candidates, the Congress can add qualifications. The reason is that the Local Government Code which provides for the qualification for candidates of local government was enacted by Congress thus can be amended by Congress.
(Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161658, November 3, 2008 )

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW 3. MAY A SINGLE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT BE DIVIDED INTO TWO?

Section 10, Article X of the Local Government Code provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.

However, in the case of Rogelio Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, (G.R.

December 8, 2008),

No. 176970,

Cagayan De Oro was divided into two districts.

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision Section 1 provides: Legislative Districts. The lone legislative

SECTION 1.

district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon,

Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another
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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.

4. WHAT IS LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT? Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides: Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

xxx

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a

population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
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(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
(Rogelio Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008)

5. WHAT IS EQUALITY OF REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE? Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative, every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal representation in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio with each district being, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. This formulation was essentially carried over to the 1987 Constitution, distinguished only from the previous one by the presence of party-list representatives.
(Rogelio Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008)

6. WHAT IS PARTY-LIST SYSTEM?

The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

7. WHAT ARE THE FOUR INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS IN

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW A PHILIPPINE-STYLE PARTY-LIST ELECTION?

A Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are: First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list; Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
(Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271,
May 2009)

8. WHAT IS THE FORMULA IN DETERMINING THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES?

Number of Party-List Representatives: The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

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Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list

representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Number

of

seats

Number of seats available to party-list representatives

available to legislative x .20 = districts .80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
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220 .80

x .20 =

55

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that

has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. The Supreme Court therefore strikes down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an

unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

1.

The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to

the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2.

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)

of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3.

Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in

paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4.

Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three

(3) seats.

(Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271,
May 2009)

9. IS THE 20% CEILING MANDATORY?

It is not mandatory. It is because the seats allotted for party list will not be filled up.
(Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271,
May 2009)

10. WHAT IS ELECTION CAMPAIGN OR PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY?

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW Section 79. x x x (b) The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate; (2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
(Dr. Hans Christian M. Seneris v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009 )

11. WHAT IS HOLD-OVER PRINCIPLE? As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed.
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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW The holdover doctrine has, to be sure, a purpose which is at once legal as it is practical. It accords validity to what would otherwise be deemed as dubious corporate acts and gives continuity to a corporate enterprise in its relation to outsiders.
(Dr. Hans Christian M. Seneris v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009 )

12. WHO HAS JURISDICTION OVER ELECTION CONTESTS AGAINST A CANDIDATE ALREADY PROCLAIMED?

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
(Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009)

13. DOES THE CONGRESS HAVE THE POWER TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES?

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
(Virgillo Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information et al., G.R. No. 170338,
December 23, 2008)

14. MAY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CONDUCT INVESTIGATION IN AID OF LEGISLATION FOR AN ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTS COMMITTED BY POLICE GENERALS IN MOSCOW, RUSSIA WHICH IS OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES?
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Yes. Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides: 12) Committee on Foreign Relations. Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular services; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.

A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow incident involving petitioners is well within the respondent Committees jurisdiction. The Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines and Russia. Gen. Dela Paz went to Moscow in an official capacity, as a member of the Philippine delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in St. Petersburg, carrying a huge amount of public money ostensibly to cover the expenses to be incurred by the delegation. For his failure to comply with

immigration and currency laws, the Russian government confiscated the money in his possession and detained him and other members of the delegation in Moscow. Furthermore, the matter affects Philippine international obligations. We take judicial notice of the fact that the Philippines is a state-party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The two conventions contain provisions

dealing with the movement of considerable foreign currency across borders. The Moscow incident would reflect on our countrys compliance with the obligations required of state-parties under these conventions. Thus, the respondent Committee can properly inquire into this matter, particularly as to the source and purpose of the funds discovered in Moscow as this would involve the Philippines commitments under these conventions.
(Spouses PNP Director Eliseo Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 184849, February 13,
2009)

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15. WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE?

The doctrine of executive privilege applies only to certain types of information of a sensitive character that would be against the public interest to divulge. As held in Senate v. Ermita, the doctrine is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Considering that the privilege is an exemption from the

obligation to disclose information, the necessity for non-disclosure must be of such high degree as to outweigh public interest.
(Romulo L. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008)

16. IS EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE ABSOLUTE?

Executive privilege is not absolute. It was clearly stated in Senate v. Ermita that a claim of executive privilege may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.

17. IS THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL? IS IT A SELF-EXECUTING TREATY THAT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT RATIFICATION BY THE US SENATE THOUGH RATIFIED BY THE PHILIPPINE SENATE?

The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional. VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international
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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification. The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence allowed under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence. (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, G.R. No.
175888, February 11, 2009)

18. DID THE CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE SECTION 10, ARTICLE X OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE?

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13 th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Constitution provides: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in
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Section 6, Article X of the

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted. Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11 th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11 th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement. To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law, not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated.
(League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008 )
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19. WHAT IS RATIONAL BASIS TEST?

The rational basis test is the minimum level of scrutiny that all government actions challenged under the equal protection clause must meet. The strict scrutiny test is used in discriminations based on race or those which result in violations of fundamental rights. Under the strict scrutiny test, to be valid the classification must promote a compelling state interest. The intermediate scrutiny test is used in discriminations based on gender or illegitimacy of children. Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the classification must be substantially related to an important government objective. Laws not subject to the strict or intermediate scrutiny test are evaluated under the rational basis test, which is the easiest test to satisfy since the classification must only show a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose. (See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies, 2nd Edition, pp. 645-646.;

League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008 )

20. WHAT ARE THE TWO CONDITIONS THE APPLICATION OF THE DISQUALIFICATION MUST CONCUR IN LOCAL ELECTION?

In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, (370 Phil. 625 [1999]) the Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, (356
Phil. 467 [1998]),

the Court

emphasized that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the same position.

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21. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION? Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. (Federico
Montebon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008) T.

22. IS THE OMBUDSMAN EMPOWERED TO DISMISS PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES?

The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of an erring public official, other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary, within the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority as provided for in Section 13(3), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 15(3) of Republic Act No. 6770. The clear and precise discussion of Justice Carpio on the matter in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals is worth repeating here, to wit: While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion x x x of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of RA 6770.
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The

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW word or in Section 15(3) before the phrase enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 grants the Ombudsman this alternative power. Section 21 of RA 6770 vests in the Ombudsman disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government, except impeachable officers, members of Congress, and the Judiciary. And under Section 25 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman may impose in administrative proceedings the penalty ranging from suspension

without pay for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman x x x.
(Remia F. Boncalon v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 171812, December 24, 2008 )

23. WAS THERE VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE OF PUNONG BARANGAY BY PETITIONER WHEN HE ASSUMED OFFICE AS MUNICIPAL COUNCILOR? IS HE DEEMED TO HAVE FULLY SERVED HIS THIRD TERM AS PUNONG BARANGAY, WARRANTING HIS DISQUALIFICATION FROM RUNNING FOR THE SAME POSITION IN THE OCTOBER 29, 2007
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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS?

The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was voluntary renunciation by petitioner of his position as Punong Barangay.

The COMELEC correctly held: It is our finding that Nicasio Bolos, Jr.s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation. As conceded even by him, respondent (petitioner herein) had already completed two consecutive terms of office when he ran for a third term in the Barangay Elections of 2002. When he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan of Dauis, Bohol, in the May 10, 2004 [elections], he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary renunciation of said office.
(Nicasio Bolos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009 )

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW 24. IF THE INFORMATION FAILED TO STATE THE PRECISE DATES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED, WILL IT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HIM?

No. (People of the Philippines v. Jerry Nazareno, G.R. No. 167756, April 8, 2008) An information is intended to inform an accused of the accusations against him in order that he could adequately prepare his defense. Verily, an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Thus, to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not violated, the information should state the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed. (People v. Quitlong, 354 Phil. 372, 388 (1998), citing Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Secs. 6 and 8.) Further, it must embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense. (People v. Santos, 390 Phil. 150, 161 (2000)) Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Sec. 11 reads: Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW In People v. Gianan, (G.R. Nos. 135288-93, September 15, 2000, 340 SCRA 477) the Court ruled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element of the said crime as it is defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e.: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In accordance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as long as it alleges that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed, information is sufficient.

The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in People v. Salalima (G.R.
Nos. 137969-71, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 192. ) 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62.)

and in People v. Lizada. (G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January

25. IS A TESTIMONY REQUIRED TO BE CORROBORATED IN ORDER THAT IT BE CONSIDERED CREDIBLE?

No rule exists which requires a testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. (People

of the Philippines v. Rommel Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008 ).

Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. (People v. Jumao-as, G.R. No 101334, February 14,
1994, 230 SCRA 70, 77.)

Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such testimony is found positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction. (People v. Abo, G.R. No 107235, March
2, 1994, 230 SCRA 612, 619; People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 105689, February 3, 1994, 230 SCRA 291, 296; People v. Amaguin, G.R. Nos. 54344-45, January 10, 1994, 229 SCRA 166, 174; People v. Cario, G.R. Nos. 92144-49, December 18, 1992, 216 SCRA 702, 713.

Although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 1; Sapu-an v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 91869, October 19,

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW

1992, 214 SCRA 701, 706.)

Conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and

positive testimony of a single witness.

26. DOES THE DELAY IN APPEALING THE INSTANT CASE, DUE TO THE DEFIANCE OF THE PETITIONER'S COUNSEL DE OFICIO TO SEASONABLY FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL, CONSTITUTE EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE TO ENTITLE THE UNDERSIGNED DETENTION PRISONER/ PETITIONER TO PURSUE HIS APPEAL?

While as a general rule, negligence of counsel may not be condoned and should bind the client, (Lamsan Trading, Inc. v. Leogrado, Jr., 228 Phil. 542, 550 (1986)) the exception is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. (Sapad v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 478, 483 (2000)) In the case of John Hilario v. People of the Philippines, (G.R. No. 161070, April 14,
2008),

the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for having been filed late. It

appears that the CA Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari was received at the address written in the petition on September 1, 2003, and that petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on September 18, 2003, or two days late.

In Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, (320 Phil. 456 (1995)) we held: x x x Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be frowned upon despite the fiction that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The established jurisprudence holds:

xxxx

The function of the rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in procedure is imputed to and binding upon the client, as any other procedural rule, is to serve as an instrument to advance the ends of justice. When in the circumstances of each case the rule desert its proper office as an aid to justice
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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.

xxxx

The court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

xxxx

If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present his case. In a criminal proceeding, where certain evidence was not presented because of counsel's error or incompetence, the defendant in order to secure a new trial must satisfy the court that he has a good defense and that the acquittal would in all probability have followed the introduction of the omitted evidence. What should guide judicial action is that a party be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.

27. IS THE MERE INVOCATION OF JUSTICE WARRANTS A REVIEW OF FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT?

While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory, we have on some occasions relaxed this rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla (G.R. No. 160753, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 675.) we held: However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case,
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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be final.

In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, speaking through the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, had occasion to state:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation.

Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. ( Id.
686-687.) at

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW 28. WHEN IS THERE A VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL? The right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. (Dante Tan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009)

29. WHEN IS THERE VEXATIOUS, CAPRICIOUS, AND OPPRESSIVE DELAY? Apply the four-factor test. (Dante Tan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009). In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical

reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, (Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil.
151, 170 (1996); Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 971, 977 [1999])

and particular regard must be

given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

30. THE HRET CAUSED THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON THE

PETITIONER THROUGH REGISTERED MAIL, BUT THE LATTER DID NOT RECEIVE IT PERSONALLY. THE REGISTRY RETURN RECEIPT CARD INDICATED THAT SOMEONE ELSE RECEIVED IT. a. Is service of summons made through registered mail proper? b. Did the HRET acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner? c. Was there violation of due process by the HRET?

a. No, service of summons made through registered mail is not proper. It is not among the allowed modes of service under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If in ordinary civil cases personal service of summons is preferred and service by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional and due process grounds, with more reason should election cases which involve public
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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW interest and the will of the electorate strictly follow the hierarchy or modes of service of summons under the Rules of Court.

b. HRET never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner because of the absence of a valid service of summons. Since the process servers return failed to show on its face the impossibility of personal service, then the submitted service was improper and invalid.

c. There was violation of due process. The proper service of summons is a jurisdictional requirement and goes into the heart of due process. (Datu Pax Mangudadatu vs House of Representatives Electoral TribunalG.R. No. 179813, December 18, 2008 )

31. ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS EXERCISING QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS ARE FREE FROM THE RIGIDITY OF CERTAIN PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS. CAN THIS FREEDOM BE INVOKED EVEN IF IT VIOLATES A PERSONS RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS?

No, this freedom of the rigidity of procedure cannot be invoked to evade such right. All administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. (Department of Education vs Godofredo Cuanan, G.R.
No. 169013, December 16, 2008)

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW 32. IN THE CASE OF DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS GODOFREDO CUANAN
(G.R. NO. 169013, DECEMBER 16, 2008),

NO COPY OF THE PLEADINGS FILED BY

THE PETITIONER WAS SERVED UPON THE RESPONDENT. WHAT RIGHT OF THE RESPONDENT WAS VIOLATED? Respondent was denied procedural due process. He had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings since no copy was served upon him or his counsel. He was not even required to file his comments thereon.

33. THE SPECIAL LAW ON COUNTERFEIT DRUGS (SLCD) PROHIBITS

THE SALE OF COUNTERFEIT DRUGS WHICH INCLUDES AN UNREGISTERED IMPORTED DRUG PRODUCT. IS THIS A VALID CLASSIFICATION?

Such classification would result in absurd results, and so it is invalid. The classification does not accommodate the situation where the drug is out of stock in the Philippines, beyond the reach of a patient who urgently depends on it. It likewise deprives Filipinos to choose a less expensive regime for their health care by denying them a plausible and safe means of purchasing medicines at a cheaper cost. Even worse is the fact that the law is not content with simply banning, at civil costs, the importation of unregistered drugs. It equates the importers of such drugs, many of whom motivated to do so out of altruism or basic human love, with the malevolent who would alter or counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs for reasons of profit at the expense of public safety. (Roma Drug vs RTC, G.R. No. 149907, April 16, 2009)

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW 34. WHAT IS PRIOR RESTRAINT? Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. (Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. vs Caesar Dy, G.R. Nos. 170270 and 179411, April 2, 2009 )

35. WHAT ARE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CONTENT-NEUTRAL

REGULATION AND CONTENT-BASED RESTRAINT OR CENSORSHIP? The following are distinctions between content-neutral regulation and contentbased restraint or censorship: 1. Content-neutral regulation is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards, while content-based restraint is concerned with the subject matter of the utterance of speech; 2. Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than contentneutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression; and 3. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny. (Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. vs Caesar Dy, G.R. Nos. 170270 and 179411, April 2, 2009)

36. WHAT IS OBSCENITY? There is no perfect definition of obscenity, but there are established basic guidelines to determine whether there is such, to wit: 1. whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; 2. whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 3. whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW Furthermore, obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judges sound discretion. (Eliseo Soriano vs Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785 & 165636, April 29, 2009 )

37. WHAT AVERAGE PERSON IS SPOKEN OF IN THE GUIDELINES TO DETERMINE OBSCENITY? The average person referred to in the guidelines is the average child, not the average adult. The average child may not have the adults grasp of figures of speech, and may lack the understanding that language may be colorful, and words may convey more than the literal meaning. (Eliseo
165636, April 29, 2009) Soriano vs Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785 &

38. WAS THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF THE ACCUSED VIOLATED WHEN THE PAOCTF CONTACTED AND SUGGESTED THE LAWYERS FOR THEM FOR THEIR EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION? No, there was no evidence showing that the lawyer had organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. (PEOPLE V. DOMINGO REYES, G.R. No. 178300,
March 17, 2009)

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW 39. WAS THERE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN HE WAS REPRESENTED BY SOMEONE WHO IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE BAR DURING THE ARRAIGNMENT, PRETRIAL, AND PRESENTATION OF PRINCIPAL WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION? There was no violation. An examination of the records shows that while accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes, who seems not a lawyer, during the early stages of trial, the latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity of the former as early as July 28, 2000 and subsequently, approved by the RTC in its Order dated August 4, 2000. Thereafter, accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Rainald C. Paggao from the Public Defenders (Attorneys) Office of Makati City. Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense, albeit unsuccessfully, then he cannot now be heard to complain about having been denied of due process. ( PEDRO
CONSULTA V. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009)

40. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE APPREHENDING OFFICERS NONCOMPLIANCE, DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE REQUIREMENTS IN HANDLING EVIDENCE? The failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against appellant. The appellant was acquitted. Note: In People v. Pringas the Court held that: Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. (ELPIDIO
2008) BONDAD, JR., V. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173804, December 10,

41. WHAT IS THE RESULT OF IRREGULARITY IN HANDLING OF EVIDENCE IN THE PROSECUTION OF DRUG-RELATED CASES? The prosecution evidence would fall short of satisfying the quantum of evidence required to arrive at a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the evidence chain failed to solidly connect appellant with the seized drug in a way that would establish that the specimen is one and the same as that seized in the first place and offered in court as evidence. (PEOPLE
181492, December 16, 2008) V. SAMUEL OBMIRANIS, G.R. No.

42. WHAT IS MUST BE ESTABLISHED BEYOND DOUBT IN PROSECUTION OF CASES INVOLVING PROHIBITED DRUGS? The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.

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University of the Cordilleras COLLEGE OF LAW The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. (MALLILLIN V. PEOPLE,G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008) 43. IS THE NON-PRESENTATION OF THE FORENSIC CHEMIST IN ILLEGAL DRUGS CASES A SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR ACQUITTAL? No, it is not a sufficient cause for acquittal. At any rate, Inspector Trias testimony on, and the presentation of, the chemistry report in question only established, at best, the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the results of the chemistry analysis. It does not prove compliance with the requisite chain of custody over the confiscated substance from the time of seizure of the evidence. NOTE: It should be pointed out, however, that the Bandang ruling was cast against a different backdrop where: (1) the seized crystalline substance was the same item examined and tested positive for shabu and presented in court, implying that the identity and integrity of prohibited drug was safeguarded throughout, a circumstance not obtaining in this case; (2) there was a compelling reason for not presenting the examining forensic chemist, i.e., the parties stipulated that the confiscated seven plastic bags have been identified and examined and that the chemist stated in his report that the substance is positive for shabu. In this case, C/I Geronimos resignation from the service is not, standing alone, a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with her testimony; and (3) accused Bandang, et al. did not raise any objection to the chemical report during trial, unlike here where accused-appellant objected to Inspector Trias competency to testify on the Geronimo chemical report. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
V. MONALYN CERVANTES, G.R. NO. 181494, MARCH 17, 2009) 33

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