To appear, Journal of Philosophy

TheNatureandPurposeofNumbers
G.AldoAntonelli Dept.ofPhilosophy UniversityofCalifornia,Davis Numbersareabstractentitiesintroducedforthepurposeofcounting.Thepresent paperisdedicatedtotheexplicationofthisclaim,andinparticularitaddressesthe questionsofwhatmakestheseentitiesabstract,inwhatsensetheyare introduced,andwhatwemeanbycounting.Alongtheway,weinvestigatethe logicalstatusofarithmetic,thefunctionofabstractionprinciples,andtherespective meritsofvariousstrategiesforreducingarithmeticalnotionstothoseofatheory thatisviewedasmorefundamental.Themainemphasisisontheconceptual, foundationalandphilosophicalissues,withthetechnicaldetailsfullydeveloped elsewhere.1 Twomainconceptualthreadsareatthebasisofthepresentapproach:adeflationary conceptionofabstractionandanonreductionistversionoflogicism.Eachis implementedthroughaspecificdevice,i.e.,respectively,anextralogicaloperator representingnumericalabstractionandanonstandard(butstillfirstorder) cardinalityquantier.Theresultisanaccountofarithmeticcharacterizingnumbers asobtainedbyabstractionfromtheequinumerosityrelationandemphasizingtheir cardinalproperties(asusedinansweringhowmany?questions)overtheir structuralones. Abstractentitiesareobtainedthroughtheapplicationofanabstractionoperatorto whatFregewouldhavecalledaconcept,andwhichwewillalsorefertoasa (possiblycomplex)predicateaslongaswetakecaretodistinguishpredicates frompredicateexpressions.However,noteverymappingoftheconceptsintothe objectsrepresentsaninstanceofabstraction.Abstractionoperatorsare distinguishedfromothersuchassignmentsinthattheyareassumedtomap conceptsintoobjectswhilerespectingagivenequivalencerelation.Frege,for instance,postulatedanabstractionoperatorassigningobjectsofaparticularkind whichhecalledextensionstoconceptsinsuchawaythatequiextensional concepts(i.e.,conceptsunderwhichthesameobjectsfall)areassignedthesame object.Thisparticularpostulation,asembodiedinanabstractionprincipleknown asFregesBasicLawV,turnedouttobeinconsistent.Nonetheless,manyother abstractionprinciplesareindeedconsistent,andamongthem,mostnotablyforour
1SeeG.A.Antonelli,NumericalAbstractionviatheFregeQuantifier,NotreDameJournalof

FormalLogic,forthcoming.

2 purposes,isaprincipleofnumericalabstraction,alsoknownasHumesPrinciple.HP postulatesanoperatorNumassigningobjectstoconceptsinsuchawaythat conceptsPandQareassignedthesameobjectpreciselywhenPandQare equinumerous,i.e.,whenjustasmanyobjectsfallunderPastheyfallunderQ.The objectNum(P)assignedtoPcanthenberegardedasthenumberofP. Itisnaturaltothinkoftheabstractobjectsdeliveredbysuchoperatorsashavinga somewhatmysteriousnature,withsuchpropertiesasnonspatiotemporalexistence andcausalinefficacy,forinstance.Butthatwouldbeamistake,forabstraction principlesdonotforceuponusanyparticularviewoftheentitiestheyintroduce.In fact,allthattheadoptionofaparticularabstractionprinciplecommitsusto,isthe existenceofsomemappingoftheconceptsintotheobjectssatisfyingcertainfurther conditionsrelatedtoagivenequivalencerelation.Theabstractionprinciples themselvesdonottellusanythingabouttheultimatenatureoftheseobjects andthatishowitshouldbe.Theroleoftheseabstractionprinciplesisnottosinglea specialclassofobjects(theabstractentitieslivingperhapsinseparatesphereof reality),butrathertomakesurethatthefirstorderdomainofobjectsislarge enoughtoaccommodateanadequateaccountofarithmetic.Nowonemight entertainspecificworriesabouttheontologicallyinflationarynatureofabstraction thefactthat,forinstance,HPforcesustoaccepttheexistenceofaninfinite numberofobjectsbutsuchworriesarequitedistinctfromthoseconcerningthe causalinefficacyorthenonspatiotemporalexistenceofnumbers. Accordingtotheviewofabstractionproposedhere,thereisnothingspecialabout abstractentities,whichcanbedrawnfromwhateverfirstorderdomainwetakeour ordinaryquantifiersthereisandforalltorangeover.Inthissenseabstract entitiescanbetakentobejustordinaryobjectsrecruitedforthepurposeofserving asproxiesfortheequivalenceclassesofconceptsgeneratedbythegiven equivalencerelation.Abstractionprinciplesgivealowerboundonthecardinalityof thedomainofobjects,relativetothesizeoftheclassofallconcepts,takenmoduloa givenequivalencerelation.Wecharacterizethisviewofabstractionasdeflationary inthatthemainroleitascribestoabstractionistoprovidesuchalowerbound, whiledenyingtheobjectsdeliveredbyabstractionanyspecialstatus. Abstractionprinciplesarerepresentedlinguisticallybytheexplicitintroductionof termformingoperatorssuchasNum(P)or,inthegeneralcase,(P).Forany possiblycomplexpredicateexpressionP,theterm(P)willdenoteanobjectinthe firstorderdomain.Suchanobjectisintroducedbyabstractionaslongasthe assignmentofobjectstopredicatessatisfiestheconstraintsassociatedwiththe correspondingequivalencerelation.Thisofcoursedoesnotprecludethepossibility thatthesameobjectmightalsobedenotedbyothertermsapossibilitythat,as wewillsee,pointsinthedirectionofapossibledissolutionofthesocalledCaesar problem. Thedeflationaryaccountofabstractiongoeshandinhandwiththeviewthat

3 abstractionprinciplesareproperlyregardedasextralogicalprinciplesthat,assuch, donotenjoyalogicallyorepistemologicallyprivilegedstatus.Onthecontrary,on manyaccountsinspiredbysomeformorotheroflogicism,thelogicalcharacterof arithmeticalnotionsismadetodependonsomekindofreductionofarithmetical truthstoHumesPrinciple,whichinturnisclaimedtobeconstitutiveofthenotion ofnumber,andthereforesomewhatclosetoananalyticalprinciple. Theselogicistorneologicistviewsarebased,however,onanequivocation.When logicismisproperlyunderstoodinnonreductionistfashion,itisthenotionof cardinality,ratherthanthatofnumber,thatappearslogicallyprivileged.Numbers, aswehaveseen,areobjects,andmattersofexistenceofobjectsfalloutsidethe purviewoflogicproper.Ontheotherhand,fromalogicistpointofview,cardinality canbeviewedaslogicallyinnocent.Whentakenatfacevalue,thisbroadconstrual oflogicismopensupthepossibilityofincludingcardinalityasoneofthebasic buildingblocksofalanguagesuitablefortherepresentationofarithmetic.The notionofcardinalitythatturnsouttobeatissuehere,aswewillsee,isa comparativenotion,specifyingarelationbetweenconceptsPandQthatholdsifand onlyiftherearenomoreobjectsfallingunderPthantherearefallingunderQ.This notionofcomparativecardinalityislinguisticallyrepresentedthroughthe introductionoftheFregequantifierF,bindingtwoformulasand,andexpressing thefactthatthereareatleastasmanyobjectssatisfyingastherearesatisfying. NumericalabstractionandtheFregequantifierarethetwomaindevicesthatwillbe employedtogiveafirstorderrepresentationofarithmeticemphasizingthecardinal propertiesofnumbers. Itisworthnotinghere,beforewegettosomeofthedetailsoftheproject,thatthere doesnotseemtobeanyobviouswaytoextendthepresenttreatmenttoordinal notions,excepttriviallyinfinitedomains,whereordinalandcardinalnumbers coincide.Certainlyitwouldseemthatnosuchtreatmentcouldbedevelopedusing theFregequantifierandtheabstractionoperator,whichareaimedsquarelyat cardinalnotions.Butonemightthinkthatasimilartreatmentforordinalnotions couldbedevelopedbyintroducingordinalabstraction.Butaswewillsee,sucha principlegivesrisetoparadox.Inthisrespectordinalnotions,whileordinarily regardedasonaparwiththeircardinalcounterparts(orperhapsevenasprimary, asinsettheorywherecardinalsaredefinedasinitialordinals),appearinsteadtobe intrinsicallymorecomplexthanthelatter,andindeedquitepossiblybeyondthe reachofafirstordertreatment.

1.Numbersasabstracta
Arithmeticisthetheoryofthenaturalnumbers0,1,2,...withwhichweareall acquainted.Becauseofthebasiccharacterofthenaturalnumbersasthefoundation uponwhichmathematicsandsciencerest,eversinceFregeandDedekind

4 philosophershavebeenconcernedwiththeproperformalizationofarithmetic.2 Thislineofinvestigationhasleadtoavarietyofapproaches,includingthe DedekindPeanoaxiomsthatarenowadaysstandard,severalsettheoretic reductions,andfinallyarenewedinterestintheFregeanprojectaschampionedby theneologicistschoolofHaleandWright.3 Onepossibilityistoregardnumbersasprimitiveobjectsthatneednoreductionto others.Aproponentofthisviewwouldthenfullyembracetheaxiomsofstandard firstorderarithmeticasextralogicalcharacterizationsofthefundamental propertiesofnumbers.Theseaxioms,firstformulatedbyDedekind4andPeano,5 identifythebasicpropertiesofthesuccessoroperationonthenaturalnumbers(as wellaspossiblythepropertiesofadditionandmultiplication),andpostulatean inductionschemaexpressingthatanypropertiesofnaturalnumbersthatholdof zeroandarepreservedbythesuccessoroperation,holdofallnaturalnumbers. AlthoughPeanoArithmetic(PA),asthetheoryascometobeknown,issometimes supplementedbyasecondorderinductionprinciple,itisstandardlyexpressedat thefirstorderlevel.Theinsistenceonafirstorderaxiomatizationismotivatedby thedesiretopreservecertainpropertiesoffirstorderlogic,suchas axiomatizability,compactness,LwenheimSkolem,etc.,whichfailatthesecond orderlevel.6Letusrefertothisviewastheaxiomaticapproach. AsecondapproachwaschampionedbothbyFrege(inhisGrundlagenand,laterthe Grundgesetze7)andWhiteheadandRussell,8eachoneofwhomprovidedanaccount ofthenaturalnumbersasintimatelyrelatedtoclassesofequinumerousconcepts, i.e.,asequivalenceclassesunderthehavingthesamecardinalityrelation.In WhiteheadsandRussells(unramied)theoryoftypes,numbersareconceptsof concepts(thatis,conceptsofpropositionalfunctions)suchthatbetweenanytwoof
2GottlobFrege,Begrisschrift,einederarithmetischenachgebildeteFormel

sprachedesreinesDenkens,Halle,1879,Englishtransl.inJ.vanHeijenoort(ed.),FromFrege toGdel.AsourcebookinMathematicalLogic,HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MA, 1967.SeealsoG.Frege,DieGrundlagenderArithmetik,einelogischmathematische UntersuchungberdenBegriffderZahl,Nebert,Breslau,1884,Englishtransl.byJ.L.Austin, TheFoundationsofArithmetic:ALogicoMathematicalEnquiryintotheConceptofNumber, Blackwell,Oxford,1950. 3R.HaleandC.Wright,TheReasonsProperStudy.EssaystowardaNeoFregeanPhilosophy ofMathematics,OxfordClarendonPress,2001. 4R.Dedekind,WassindundwassollendieZahlen?,Brunswick,1888. 5G.Peano,ArithmeticesPrincipia,novamethodoexposita,Bocca,Torino,1889,English transl.invanHeijenoort,op.cit. 6Foranaccessible,clear,andrigoroustreatmentofsecondorderlogicseeH.Enderton Secondorderandhigherorderlogic,inE.Zalta(ed.),StanfordEncyclopediaof Philosophy,2008,URL:http://plato.stanford.edu. 7G.Frege,GrundgesetzederArithmetik,HermannPohle,Jena,1903,Englishtransl.byM. Furth,TheBasicLawsofArithmetic,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1967. 8A.N.WhiteheadandB.Russell,PrincipiaMathematica,volumeI,CambridgeUniversity Press,Cambridge,England,secondedition,1925.

5 suchfunctionsthereisarelationthatisbothoneoneandonto.Asaconsequenceof therigidtypetheoreticdisciplineofthetheory,numbersarereduplicatedateach typehigherthan2,aresultthatmakesitimpossibletocomparecardinalitiesacross typesandhardlysquareswithourintuitionsthatthereis,infact,justoneclassof naturalnumbers.SuchundesirableconsequencesareavoidedinFregesframework byacharacteristicrecoursetoatypeloweringdevice,i.e.,conceptextensions.9 Conceptextensionsderivefromtheapplicationofaparticularabstractionprinciple, whosecrucialfunctionistheassignmentoffirstorderobjectstoconceptsinsucha wayastorespecttheequiextensionalityrelationamongconcepts.Fregesstrategy ultimatelyfailedbecauseitwasdrivenbythedesireforunattainablegenerality theideathattheassignmentofextensionstoconceptsneedstobeuniversal whereasasweknowfromCantorstheoremtherearemanymoreconceptsthan objects,evenwhenconceptsaretakenmoduloequiextensionality. Finally,eversincetheacceptance,bysome,ofZermeloFrnkelsettheoryasthe privilegedframeworkformathematics,settheoreticreductionsofarithmetichave becomestandard.Suchreductionsproceedbyidentifyingparticularrepresentatives forFregesandRussellsequinumerosityclasses.Theserepresentativesaregivenin theformofalinearlyorderedsequenceofsets,havingafirstelement,andwiththe additionalpropertythatanyelementhasonlyfinitelymanypredecessorsinthe sequence.Sometimes,aparticularnmemberedsetisselectedasrepresentativefor thenumbern(aswhenthesequencecomprisesthevonNeumannfiniteordinals). Butthisneednotalwaysbethecase,aswiththeZermelonumbers(standardly,but somewhatinappropriately,referredtoasZermelonumerals),inwhicheach elementisthesingletoncontainingitsuniquepredecessor,sothatthe representativechosenforthenumberndoesnotitselfhavenmembers.Infact, quiteingeneral,representativeschosenforequivalenceclassesrelativetosome relationRneednotthemselvesbeinthefieldofR(althoughtheyoftenwill):allthat isrequiredisthattheassignmentofrepresentativesrespecttheequivalence relation. Eachoftheabovementionedapproachesiswantinginsomerespectorother. Formalizingarithmeticasafirstordertheory,PA,ultimatelyleavesthenatureof numbersunexplained.Thereiscertainlysomethingtobesaidfortakingan approachthatfocusesontheintrinsicordertheoreticalpropertiesofthenatural numbers,forinstancethefactthattheyformansequence,withoutbeing concernedwiththeirultimatenature.Butthisapproachfailstotakeintoaccount other,crucialandextrinsic,propertiesofthenaturalnumbers:firstandforemost theircardinalproperties,astheyareputtouseinconnectionwiththeactof counting.Naturalnumbersfindtheirprimarydomainofapplicationinanswering questionssuchasHowmany?Itisthereforeadesirablefeatureofanyformal accountofarithmeticthatthecardinalpropertiesofthenaturalnumberstake
9AreconstructionofFregesextensionalistasopposedtologicistprogramcan

befoundinG.A.AntonelliandR.May,FregesOtherProgram,NotreDameJournal ofFormalLogic,46:117,2005.

6 centerstage,atleastonaparwiththemathematicalpropertiesofsequences.Itis thisemphasisontheapplicabilityofarithmeticthatislackinginanyaccountthat privilegesordertheoreticalpropertiesofsequencesovercardinalones.Inthis respect,PAstillneedstobesupplementedbyaseparateaccountofhownumbers areusedincounting. SettheoreticreductionsfaresomewhatbetterthanPAwhenitcomestotheir employmentintheassignmentofcardinalnumbers,ifanythingbecausetheyare embeddedintoarichertheoryallowingformanysortsofmapsbetweensetsof differentkinds.Thedetailsheredependontheparticularsettheoreticreduction beingadopted,butsettheorydoesprovidethebeginningsofanaccountofthe cardinalpropertiesofthenaturalnumbers.Butagain,thisaccountisnotbasedon anexplicitconsiderationofsuchproperties.Moreover,settheoreticreductions sufferfromaproblemfirstpointedoutbyBenacerraf,10whoarguesthatthereisno privilegedwaytoselectoneparticularsettheoreticreductionoveranyotherone, andthatinfact,intheend,anysequencewilldo.Giventhatallsettheoretic reductions(ofwhichthereareindeedinfinitelymany)provideforthesame intrinsicordeertheoreticalpropertiesofthenaturalnumbers,howisonetoassess therelativemeritsof,anddecidebetween,say,ZermelonumeralsandvonNeumann cardinals?Benacerrafsansweristhatthereisnoprincipledreasontochoose betweenthem,andthatsincethenaturalnumberscantbebothZermelonumerals andvonNeumannordinals,numberscantbesetsatall. Thisleavesuswithalastoption,theFregeRussellaccountofthenaturalnumbers. Thegreatadvantageofthisapproachisthattheintrinsicmathematicalpropertiesof thenaturalnumbersarederivedfromtheircardinalproperties,ratherthanthe otherwayaround.Whereasforboththeaxiomaticapproachandsettheoretic reductionscardinalpropertiesrequireaseparateaccount,accordingtotheFrege Russellconceptionsuchpropertiesarecentraltotheaccountofthenatural numbers.Theessentiallinesofsuchanapproach,therefore,appeartobeintuitively wellmotivatedandmathematicallyelegant.Unfortunately,themathematical implementationsarerifewithproblems:FregesownattemptinGrundgesetzewas notoriouslyinconsistent,andWhiteheadsandRussellsimpositionofatype discipline,whileblockingtheinconsistencyafflictingFregestheory,ledto reduplicationsandrestrictionsthathardlydojusticetoactualmathematical practice. Lately,HaleandWright(op.cit.)havechampionedasomewhatdifferent,neo logicistapproach,whichaddressesdirectlytheideathatnumbersarerelatedto
10P.Benacerraf,Whatnumberscouldnotbe,PhilosophicalReview,74:4773,

1965,reprintedinP.BenacerrafandH.Putnam(eds),PhilosophyofMathematics.Selected Readings,CambridgeUniversityPress,1983,secondedition,pp.27294;andRecantation oranyoldsequencewoulddoafterall,PhilosophiaMathematica,19964(2),pp.184 189.

7 equivalenceclassesundertheequinumerosityrelation,dispensingwiththewhole apparatusofconceptextensions.11Theyintroduceatheoryofnumbersbasedon whatwehavebeenreferringtoasthe Numoperatorandpostulatingthatsuchan operatoristosatisfyHumesPrinciple.SinceasitwasalreadyknowntoFregethe axiomsofPAcanbederived,withinsecondorderlogic,fromHumesPrinciple,the resultingneologicistsystemisthusadequatefortherepresentationofsecond orderarithmetic(andinfactequiconsistentwithit). Therearetwomainissueswithsuchanapproach.Thefirstisbothphilosophical andconceptual:HaleandWrightrelyonthelogicalcharacterofHumesPrinciplein ordertocharacterizetheirprojectascontinuouswithFregesoriginallogicistviews. However,theextenttowhichHumesPrincipleenjoysalogicallyoreven epistemologicallyprivilegedstatusisdebatable,forinstanceinthelightofthefact thattherearemodelsofarithmeticwhereHumesPrinciplefails.12 Butevendiscountingtheseworries,amaintechnicalobstacleremains,namelythe factthattheneologicistprogramiswhollycarriedoutwithintheframeworkof secondorderlogic,characterizedbythealreadymentionedfailureofthosemeta theoreticpropertiesthatmakefirstorderlogicsoattractive.Nonetheless,theFrege Russellapproachappearstobeconceptuallysuperiorinitscharacterizationof numbersasabstractaoftheequinumerosityrelation,inthewayitderivesbasic mathematicalpropertiesfromcardinalones(andtheconcomitantemphasisonthe applicabilityofarithmetic),andinitsintuitivemotivation.

2.DeflationaryAbstraction
Intheirmostgeneralform,abstractionprinciplessuchasHPgoverntheassignment ofobjectstoconceptsaccordingtoagivenequivalencerelation:13 f(P)=f(Q)Rf(P,Q). AprincipleofthisformassertsthattheobjectfassignstotheconceptPisthesame astheobjectitassignstotheconceptQifandonlyifPandQareappropriately relatedtoeachotherbytheequivalencerelationRf. Becauseabstractioninsomesenselivesinconceptualspaceasevidencedby theconnectionofabstractiontoconceptformation,e.g.,inchildrenorinscience
11AntonelliandMay,op.cit.,instead,gointheoppositedirection,developinganexplicitly

extensionalistprogramdispensingwiththelogicalcharacterofarithmeticalprinciples. 12AcounterexampletotherighttoleftdirectionofHumesPrinciplecanbefoundinG. Boolos,OntheproofofFregestheorem,inAdamMortonandStephenStitch(eds), BenacerrafandhisCritics,pages14359,Blackwell,1996;acounterexampletotheleftto rightdirectionusuallyconsideredthelessquestionableonecanbefoundinAntonelli andMay,op.cit. 13SeeG.Rosen,Abstractobjects,inE.N.Zalta(ed.),StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy, 2006,URLhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstractobjects/,(Spring 2006Edition).

8 (wherebyaconceptisabstractedfromavarietyofinstances)abstraction principleshaveoftenbeenthoughttoenjoyaparticularlyprivilegedstatus.But clearlynotallsuchprinciplesareacceptable.Forinstance,onecouldnothavea principleoftheformf(P)=f(Q)P=Q,forthenwewouldhaveatleastasmany objectsasthereareconceptsoveragivendomain,contradictingCantorstheorem (independentlyofwhethertheidentityP=Qistakenextensionallyorintensionally). Therearetwopossiblestrategies,acombinationofwhichcanbeusedtoobviate suchasituation:theequivalencerelationappearingontherightoftheequivalence canbemadecoarser,allowingpossiblyagreatmanydistinctconceptstobe assignedthesameobject;orthefunctionfontheleftcanbemadetoapplyonlytoa subsetofalltheconcepts(thedefinableones,forinstance). HumesPrincipleimplementsthefirstofthesestrategies,bytakingtheequivalence oftherighttobeequinumerosity.Asmentioned,neologicistssuchasHaleand WrightclaimforHPastatusnotunlikethatofalogicaloranalyticaltruth,and considerHPsomehowconstitutiveofthenotionofnumber.However,several objectionshavebeenraisedagainstsuchaprivilegedstatus,beginningwiththeso calledBadCompanyobjection,i.e.,thefactthatthereareprinciplesverymuchlike HPthatturnouttobeinconsistent.Onesuchexampleofcourse,isFregesownBasic LawV.Anotherexamplereplacesequinumerositywithorderisomorphism: accordingtosuchaprinciple,givenrelationalpredicates(x,y)and(x,y),onesays thatthetype()ofequalsthetype()ofifandonlyif(x,y)and(x,y)are orderisomorphic.Attractiveasthistreatmentofordinalnotionsmightappear,itis inconsistent,foritgivesustheBuraliFortiparadox.14 Againstthis,neologicistscan(anddid)rebutthatconsistencyitselfoughttobe takenasthehallmarkofacceptabilityforabstractionprinciples.ButbothR.Heck15 andA.Weir16havecriticizedthislineofargument,pointingoutthatthereare individuallyconsistentbutpairwiseincompatibleabstractionprinciples:ifboth principlesinsuchapairareacceptable,henceatleasttoanextentanalytic,then bothneedtoberegardedastrue,whichisofcourseimpossible(thisisWeirsso calledEmbarrassmentofRichesobjection).Thereisavastliteratureattemptingto findageneralandwellmotivateddemarcationbetweenacceptableabstraction principlesandunacceptableones.17Butintheendtherearereasonstobelievethat anysuchattempttofindacompletelysatisfactorydemarcationmightturnouttobe futile. Theissueoftheprivilegedstatusofabstractionprinciplescanbeapproachedalso
14SeeJ.Burgess,FixingFrege,PrincetonUniversityPress,2005,pp.16470foranexcellent

treatmentoftheseissues. 15R.G.Heck,Ontheconsistencyofsecondordercontextualdefinitions,Nos,26:49194, 1992. 16A.Weir,Neofregeanism:Anembarrassmentofriches,NotreDameJournalofFormal Logic,44:1348,2003. 17See.Linnebo(ed.),TheBadCompanyObjection,specialissueofSynthse,170(3).

9 fromadifferentangle.Thereisalongtradition,goingbacktotheworkof AlfredTarski,accordingtowhichlogicalnotionsarethosethatareinvariantunder permutationsofthedomainofobjects,ostensiblybecauselogicalnotionsare completelygeneralanddonothaveanyspecificsubjectmatter(thisproposalhas sincecometobeknownastheTarskiSherthesis18).Tarskifirstintroducedthisidea initsfullgeneralityinaposthumouslypublished1966lecture,19explicitlyinspired byKleinsErlangenprogram. LetuscallapredicatePlogicallyinvariantifandonlyifforanypermutationand objecta,(a)fallsunderPifandonlyifadoes.Thisideacanbegeneralizedto notionsofarbitrarytype,includingconnectives,quantifiers,andotherhigherorder objects.WhileTarskisproposalisnowadaysconsideredtooliberal(inthatit countenancesaslogicalnotionsthatappeartobeproperlymathematical,rather thanlogical,incharacter),thereiswidespreadconsensusthatpermutation invarianceprovidesatleastanecessary(althoughlikelynotsufficient)conditionfor logicalityofpredicatesandquantifiers.20Somewhatsurprisingly,theinvariance criterionwasnotappliedtothequestionofthestatusofabstractionprinciplesuntil relativelyrecently. KitFinefirstconsideredcriteriaoflogicalinvarianceforabstractionprinciplesin theirfullgenerality.21Amongtheseveralpossiblewaysinwhichsuchcriteriacanbe formulated,wefollowthereconstructiongivenbyJohnBurgess,22andcallan abstractionprincipleoftheform f(X)=f(Y)Rf(X,Y) invariantifandonlyifforanypermutation,itholdsthatRf(X,[X]),where[X]is thepointwiseimageofXunder.Clearlythisimpliestheweakercriterion accordingtowhichRf(X,Y)holdspreciselywhenRf([X],[Y])alsoholds. Sincepermutationspreservethecardinalityofaset,itfollowsimmediatelythatHP islogicallyinvariant,inthesensethatifRistheequinumerosityrelationbetween concepts(viewedassets)thenforanysuchconceptX,wehaveR(X,[X]).Butwe shouldnotmaketoomuchofthis.Firstofall,itisnotatallclearthatthereisa privilegedwaytoexpressinvarianceforabstractionprinciples.Buteven consideringjustthisversionofinvariance,thereisanotherprinciple,verycloseto HP,thatisinvariantinthissense,butinconsistent:thisistheprinciplementionedin thebadcompanyobjectionstoHPassigningabstractstobinaryrelationsRandS insuchawaythatRandSareassignedthesameobjectpreciselywhenthereisan
18AftertheproposalwasendorsedandfurtherdevelopedbyG.Sher,TheBoundsofLogic,

MITPress,Cambridge,MA1991. 19A.Tarski,Whatarelogicalnotions?,HistoryandPhilosophyofLogic,7:14354,1986 (posthumouslyedited.byJ.Corcoran). 20SeeD.Bonnay,LogicalityandInvariance,TheBulletinofSymbolicLogic,14(1)2008,pp. 2968. 21K.Fine,TheLimitsofAbstraction,OxfordUniversityPress,2002. 22J.Burgess,FixingFrege,op.cit.

10 orderisomorphismbetweenthem.TheprincipleisinvariantbecausearelationR anditsimageSunderapermutationareorderisomorphic(withitselfproviding theisomorphism),butasalreadymentioneditgivesrisetotheBuraliFortiparadox. Theapproachofthispaperaimstosidesteptheissueoftheprivilegedstatusof abstractionprinciplescompletely.Abstractionprinciples,whenproperly understood,justprovideanassignmentofrepresentativestotheequivalence classesinducedbyequivalencerelations.Nothingmoreissaidaboutthese representatives,otherthantheassignmentmustrespecttheequivalencerelation. Accordingly,theseprinciplesarebestviewedasextralogicaldevices,whosemain functionistoprovideinflationarythrustonthefirstorderdomainDofobjectsby imposingalowerboundonthecardinalityofD,relativetothesizeofthespaceof conceptsoverD.23 Someabstractionprinciplesaregoodandsomebad,andamongthebadoneswe shouldcertainlycountthosethatareinconsistent.Goodabstractionprinciplescan beputtouseinavarietyofphilosophicalcontexts,andtheyarecapableof accomplishingavarietyoftasks.Butbyclassifyingthemasgoodnoprincipled good/baddemarcationisimplied,butonlythestatementthattheyhaveturnedout tobeusefulinsomecontextorother. Wecharacterizethisviewofabstractionasdeflationary,inthatitdeniesabstract objectsanyprivilegedstatus(thefactthatthedeflationaryaccountemphasizesthe inflationaryroleofabstractionprinciplesshouldnotitishopedleadto confusion).Anyworriesaboutthespecialontologicalstatusofabstractobjects,or thespeciallogicalstatusofabstractionprinciples,totheextentthattheyhaveany cogencyatallarenolongerfoisteduponusbyaconsiderationofabstraction.For fromalogicalpointofview,weneednotassumeanythinglogically(or epistemologically)privilegedaboutsuchprinciples;andfromanontologicalpointof view,weneednotassumethatabstractobjectsmakeupaseparate,privileged ontologicalrealm.Anythingatallevenordinaryobjectscanplaytheroleof theseabstracta,aslongasthechoicerespectstheequivalencerelation. Oneoftherecurringworriesconnectedwiththeintroductionofnaturalnumbers viaHumesPrincipleisthesocalledCaesarProblem,i.e.,thefactthatHPonly givesusenoughinformationtosettlethetruthvalueofidentitiesinwhichboth termsareabstracts,butsaysnothingaboutidentitiesinvolvinganabstractanda termofadifferentkind.Theworrythenisthatnoaccountofthenaturalnumbers canberegardedascompleteunlesstheiridentityconditionssettleallsuch questions. Suchworriesaremisplaced.Theanswertothequestion,Whatpreventsthe numberoftheplanetstobeequaltoJuliusCaesar?is:nothing.Thenumberofthe
23KitFine,andothersfollowinghim,useinflationaryinconnectionwithabstraction

principlesinadifferentsense.

11 planetswillindeedbeequaltoJuliusCaesarinsomemodels,anddistinctfromitin someothermodels.Nothingmuchistobemadeofthis,forthecorresponding abstractionprinciple,HP,issilentaboutit.Toworryaboutthisisnottounderstand thepropernatureofabstractionasimposingalowerboundonthesizeofthe domainofobjects,ratherthanopeningupametaphysicallyseparatedomainof abstractorobjects.24Theexistenceofsuchaseparaterealmhasnothingtodo withabstraction,forabstractionisperfectlycompatiblewiththerebeingonlyone domainofdiscourse,populatedbyobjectstowhichweshouldhavenoqualms appealingforwhateverphilosophical,logical,ormathematicalpurposewemightbe pursuing.So,inthissense,thepresentaccountisdeflationaryasregardstheCaesar problemaswell. Itisworthnotingthatinhisclassicpaperonthenatureofnumbers(anditssequel) PaulBenacerrafalsoreachedagenerallydeflationarypointofview.Hisconclusion thatanysequencewilldoafteralldeflatesmetaphysicalworriesaboutthe ultimatenatureofnumbers.ButBenacerrafsaccountmovesinadifferentdirection fromthepresentone,focusingontheordertheoreticalratherthanthecardinal propertiesofthenaturalnumbers.Beingansequenceisanordertheoretical propertyparexcellence,andsuchpropertiesarebestviewedassupervenientupon cardinalonesorsowesubmit.Benacerrafsaccount,then,isincomplete,butnot becauseitfailstoprovideacharacterizationoftheontologicalstatusofnumbers; Benacerrafhimselfshowedthatnosuchstrategycouldsucceed.Rather,theaccount isincompletebecauseitdoesnotaddresstheroleofcardinalpropertiesin arithmeticalapplicationssuchascounting. Benacerrafsviewshavelongbeenregardedaspromotingaversionofstructuralism asregardsarithmetic.Hisclaimthatanysequencesequencecanplaytheroleof thenaturalnumbershasbeeninterpretedasimplyingthatthereisnothingmoreto thenaturalnumbersthantheirordertheoreticalproperties.Bethatasitmay, Benacerrafcertainlydidargueagainsttheclaimthatthereisaprivilegedwayto selectobjectstobearrangedinansequence.Asimilarargumentcanthenbeput forwardafterweshiftthefocusfromtheordertheoreticalpropertiestothecardinal ones.ThelessontobelearnedfromBenacerrafsargumentisthis:oncewehavean accountofnaturalnumbersintermsofcardinalproperties,itdoesnotmakeany differencewhichobjectsarechosenasrepresentativesoftheequinumerosity classes,aslongaswehaveenoughofthemtosatisfytheinflationarythrustofthe correspondingabstractionprinciple.
24Itisthenperfectlypossibleforabstractatohaveadditionalnaturebeyondthe

propertiestheyinheritinvirtueofHP.ThisissuehasrecentlybeentakenupbyB.Haleand C.WrightinAbstractionandAdditionalNature(PhilosophiaMathematica16(2),2008,pp. 182208)inresponsetoM.PotterandP.Sullivan,WhatisWrongwithAbstraction?, PhilosophiaMathematica13(3),2005,pp.18793.Thelinetakenhereisthatabstractaare allowedtohavesuchadditionalnature,afactthatpresentsnoobstacletotheir employmentinmathematicsandscience.

12

3.NonreductionistLogicism
Traditionallogicismandneologicismrelyonthespecialstatusofabstraction principlessuchasHPtoestablishthelogicalcharacterofarithmeticalnotions.But onceweadoptthedeflationarypointofviewandregardtheseprinciplesasextra logicalandnotepistemicallyprivileged,whatisthenleftoflogicism?Whatarethe prospectsoftheambitiousprograminitiatedbyFregeandrevivedbytheneo logicistschool? Fregesoriginalprogramaimstocombinetwolargelyincompatibleviews:logicism, construedastheviewthatarithmeticisinterpretableinto(higherorder)logic;and extensionalism,construedasatheoryofconceptextensionsquaabstractobjects. Dummett25referredtothelatterasFregesplatonismtheviewthatthereare logicalobjectsintheformofconceptextensionsandpointedoutthattheviewis notonlyindependentfrom,butinfactindirecttensionwithFregeslogicism,afact thatunderpinsthecontradictionuncoveredbyRussell.Andinfact,onthenatural viewoflogic,therearenologicalobjects:allthatisneededorrequiredforthe completionofthelogicistprogramisaninterpretationofallmathematical statements(oratleastthearithmeticalones)intoalogicallanguage. Inrecentversionsofneologicism,Fregesextensionalismhasbeenreplacedbya theoryofnumbersqualogicalobjectsdeliveredbyHP.Butitisindeedpossible, perhapsforthesakeofconceptualpurity,topursueonepartofFregesoriginal programindependentlyoftheother.Forinstance,oneapproach26istopursue extensionalismbyprovidingatheoryinwhichconceptextensionsareexplicitly governedbyextralogicalprinciples,andarithmeticrecoveredasasecondorder theoryidentifyingnumberswithparticularconcepts.Butcanlogicismalsobe pursuedforitsownsakewithoutrelyingonatheoryofnumbersaslogicalobjects? Arithmeticallogicism27isgenerallycharacterizedastheviewthatarithmeticis,ina substantialsense,logic.Thisviewisusuallytakentocomprisethetwodistinct claimsthatarithmeticalnotionsaredefinableintermsofpurelylogicalonesand thatunderthisinterpretationarithmeticaltheoremscanbeprovedfrompurely logicalprinciples.EversinceFrege,theviewthatarithmeticislogicismostoften articulatedinareductionistfashionbyidentifyingsomeprinciple,claimedtoenjoy somelogicallyorepistemologicallyprivilegedstatus,towhich(translationsof)
25M.Dummett,Frege.PhilosophyofMathematics,HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,

Mass.,1991,p.301. 26AntonelliandMay(op.cit.). 27Byarithmeticallogicismwemeanlogicismasappliedtoarithmetic.Thereisalsoamore ambitiousversionoflogicismclaimingthatmathematicsasawholeisalsointhesame senseinterpretableaslogic.Herewerestrictourattentiontothemorelimitedversion,to whichwereferaslogicismsimpliciter.

13 arithmeticaltruthsturnouttobeprooftheoreticallyreducible.Theneedforsucha principleisclear.Evenwhenarithmeticalnotionshavebeenappropriately translatedinapurelylogicallanguage,onecannotexpecttranslationsof arithmeticaltheoremstobeprovableusingonlythemostgeneralaxiomsandrules characterizingreasoningintermsofconnectivesandquantifiers.Foronething, arithmeticimpliestheexistenceofgreatmanyobjects,andpurelogicalonecannot establishexistenceclaims.Hencetheneedforsomeintermediateprinciplecarrying enoughinflationarythrusttoallowthederivationofsucharithmeticaltruths,while atthesametimeretainingitspurelylogicalcharacter.Suchaprinciplewas identifiedbyFregeinBasicLawV,whosecompletelygeneralnaturedoesindeed lendsomeplausibilitytotheclaimthatitisaproperpartoflogic.Butunfortunately BasicLawVistooinflationaryandthereforeunsatisfiable.Theoptionpursuedby theneologicists,instead,isHumesPrinciple.WhileHPisinflationary,itisalso consistent.Itisarguable,however,thatHPenjoysthefullgeneralitythatmade claiminglogicalstatusforFregesBasicLawVplausible.Andindeed,aswehave seen,therearereasonstoquestionthelogicalcharacterofHP. Thereductionistimplementationoflogicismseemsthustofallshortofthedesired goal.Butwhygothereductionistrouteinthefirstplace?Reductionismdidindeed enjoyacertaincurrencyinthephilosophyofscience,arolelatercodifiedinthe workofNagel,28whochampionedintertheoreticreductionviabridgeprinciples playingarolenottoodissimilarfromthatofBasicLawVorHumesPrinciplein logicistorneologicisttheories.Butevenifreductionismcouldbedefendedinthe caseofempiricalscience,inthecaseofarithmeticsuchastrategyisnottheonly,the mostgeneral,orindeednoteventhemostnaturalinterpretationoflogicism. Onthebroadestinterpretationoflogicism,cardinalityisalreadyalogicalnotion, anditdoesnotneedadefinitionintermsofaspecialkindoflogicalobjectstomake itso.ThisisapointalreadymadebyDummet,29althoughforDummettitappliesto thenotionofcardinalnumber,ratherthandirectlytothemorebasicnotionof cardinality.Thetwo,asmentioned,areindeeddistinct.Whereascardinalnumbers areobjectsintroducedbyabstraction,cardinalityexpressesapropertyofconcepts or,moregenerally(inthecaseofequinumerosity),arelationbetweenconcepts.And whilethecaseforthelogicalcharacterofcardinalnumbersisphilosophically suspect,thosesameobjectionshardlyapplytothegeneralnotionofcardinality. Oncewerecognizethatcardinalityisalsoavailabletothelogicistasagenuine logicalnotionperse,independentlyofthestatusofanyabstractionprinciples involved,wecometoabroader,andmorenaturalconstrualofthelogicistproject,in whichcardinalityisemployedasoneofthebasic,orperhapsthefundamental buildingblockindesigningaformalframeworkadequatefortherepresentationof arithmeticalfacts.Asmentioned,thebasicnotionofcardinalityinvolvedisthatofa relationFbetweenconceptsXandYthatholdswhenevertherearenomoreXsthan
28E.Nagel,TheStructureofScience,Harcourt,Brace,andWorld,NewYork,1961. 29Op.cit.,p.224.

14 Ysor,insettheoreticterms,wheneverthereisaninjectionoftheXsintotheYs. Thatthisnotionismorebasicthanthatofequinumerositycanbeseenfromthefact thatthelatterisdefinablefromtheformer(butnotviceversa):Xisequinumerous toYifandonlyifbothF(X,Y)andF(Y,X)hold. Arelationbetweenconcepts,aswewillsee,isaquantifier.30Wewillaccordingly developaformalframeworkfortheformalizationofarithmetichavingtheF quantifierasoneitsbasicbuildingblocks.WerefertosuchaquantifierastheFrege quantifier,anduseittodevelop,inanonreductionistfashion,anaccountof arithmeticinwhichthelogiciststandardisnotcarriedbytheabstractionprinciple butratherbythequantifieritself.Theveryideaofcardinalityisthusfirmlyseated atthecenteroftheresultinglogicalframeworkasaprimitivelogicalnotion.31 ThedefiningfeatureoftheFregequantifieristhatitdealswithcardinalitynotions directly,withoutappealingtoanyseparatelygivenmathematicalmachinery. Comparethistothesituationinsettheory,whereinordertoexpresscertain relationshipsbetweenthecardinalityoftwogivensets,onehastoappealtothe existenceofcertainotherobjectsinthedomainofquantificationsuchobjectsare, inturn,setsofacertainkind,containingorderedpairsasmembersandsatisfying certainfurtherconditions.Thesameholdsifoneinsteaddecidestoexpresssuch cardinalitynotionsatthesecondorder,byassertingtheexistenceofrelations satisfyingcertainfurtherconstraints. Eschewingbothoftheseoptions,wedecideinsteadtotakecardinalitynotionsas linguisticprimitivesandexploretheexpressivepoweroftheresultinglinguistic framework.Weproposetoadoptalanguageinspiredbyanonreductionist approachtologicisminwhichtheFregequantifieristheonlyprimitivelogical machinerybesidespredicationandsententialconnectives.32
30ThemostcomprehensivesurveyongeneralizedquantifierscanbefoundinS.Petersand

D.Westersthl,QuantifiersinLanguageandLogic,OxfordUniversityPress2006. 31TheFregequantifierisnot,ofcourse,aloneamongcardinalityquantifiers.Mostnotably, quantifiersinthesameveinwerefirstintroducedbyH.Hrtig,bereinenQuantifikator mitzweiWirkungsbereichen,inL.Kalmr(ed.),Colloquiumonthefoundationsof mathematics,mathematicalmachinesandtheirapplications,AkadmiaiKiad,Budapest, 1965,pp.3136;andN.Rescher,Pluralityquantification,JournalofSymbolicLogic,27 (1962),pp.37347.TheHrtigquantifierI(A,B)holdsifandonlyifAandBhavethesame cardinality,andtheRescherquantifierR(A,B)holdsifandonlyiftherearestrictlymoreAs thanBs.Bothhavebeenextensivelystudiedfromamathematicalpointofview(asurvey canbefoundinH.Herre,M.Krynicki,A.Pinus,andJ.Vnnen,TheHrtigquantifier:a survey,JournalofSymbolicLogic,56(4)1991,pp.115383). 32Thepresentapproachthusdiffersfromtheusualstudyofgeneralizedquantifiers,in whichfirstorderlogicistakenforgranted:wheneverlogiciansandlinguistsareinterested inthepropertiesofsomequantifierQ,theyexploretheexpressivenessofthelanguageLQ obtainedbyaddingQtofullfledgedfirstorderlogic(forinstance,seeS.PetersandD. Westersthl,Op.Cit.).

15

4.Themodernviewofquantifiers
Accordingtothemodernview,afirstorderquantifieroveradomainDisa collectionof,ormoregenerallyarelationamong,subsetsofD.Thisideacanbe tracedbacktotheworkofFrege,andspecifically21ofhisGrundgesetzeder Arithmetik,whereFregeasksustoconsiderformsoftheconceptualnotation correspondingtothemodernformulasa(a2=4)anda(a>0):theseformscanbe obtainedfromthegeneralforma(a)byreplacingthefunctionnameplaceholder ()bynamesforthefirstlevelfunctions2=4and>0(afunctionisatthefirst levelifittakesitsargumentsfromthedomainofobjects).Thesetwofunctionstake numbersasargumentsandreturnthevaluetrueifthosenumbersaresquareroots of2or(respectively)positive,andfalseotherwise.Inotherwords,theyareexactly whatFregereferstoasconcepts.Itfollowsthenthatthegeneralformofa quantifier,a(a),isthatofasecondlevelconcept,i.e.,afunctiontakingfirstlevel conceptsasargumentsandreturningtruthvalues.Themodernview,madeprecise inthetheoryofgeneralizedquantifiers,33identifiessuchsecondlevelconceptswith collectionsofsubsetsofthedomain.Soforinstance: Theordinaryexistentialquantifiercanbeidentifiedwiththecollectionofall nonemptysubsetsofD; Duallytheuniversalquantifiercanbeidentifiedwiththecollectionof subsetsofDthatcontainsDitselfasitsonlymember:={D}; Thequantifierthereexistexactlyk,usuallywritten!kcanbeidentifiedwith thecollectionofallkmemberedsubsetsofD. Theseexamplesapplytoasingleopenformula(x)atatime:theyare,aswewill say,unary.Butinfact,somequantifiersarenotonlybestviewedasapplyingtomore thanonesuchformula,buttheyarealsosuchthatnootherinterpretationis possible.OnesuchexampleisthequantifierMost.ThestatementMostx((x),(x)) representsmostsaresanditistruewhenmoresaresthansthatare nots.ItiswellknownthatMostcannotberepresentedbyaformulaofordinary firstorderlogic.34Incontrast,thequantifierOnly,applyingtoformulasandand justincaseallsares,canbeexpressedusingtheordinaryuniversalquantifier andBooleanconnectives. Afurtherdistinctionconcernsthedimensionofaquantifiersarguments,asdistinct
33ThetheoryoriginatedwithA.Mostowski,Onageneralizationofquantifiers,

FundamentaMathematic,44:1236,1957;andR.Montague,Englishasaformal language,inR.H.Thomason(ed.),FormalPhilosophy,YaleUniversityPress,1974,originally published1969. 34SeePetersandWestersthl,op.cit.

16 fromtheirnumber.Forinstance,aquantifiercansimultaneouslybindtwovariables xandy(thushavingdimension2),asinthecaseofthequantifierQxy(x,y)which returnsvaluetrueifandonlyifexpressestheuniversalbinaryrelationoverD. Alltheabovementionedquantifiersarefirstorder,anotionthatcanbe characterizedpreciselyinsemanticterms.Aunaryquantifierisfirstorderifand onlyifitrepresentsacollectionofsubsetsofD(andsimilarly,abinaryquantifieris firstorderifandonlyifitexpressesarelationbetweensubsetsofD).Accordingto thisdefinition,somequantifiersarefirstordereventhough,likeMost,theyarenot definablebyafirstorderformula. ThesameistrueoftheFregequantifier.TheFregequantifierrepresentsarelation betweensubsetsofthedomaintherelationthatholdsbetweenFandGwhen therearenomoreFsthanGs.Hence,thequantifierrelatesFandGpreciselywhen thereisaninjectivefunctionmappingtheFsintotheGs.Thusitmightappearthat theFregequantifierinherentlyappealstoasecondordernotion.Afterall,existence claimsforrelations,functions,etc.,areproperlyexpressedatthesecondorder.But appearancesaredeceiving:theFregequantifierisnomoreatthesecondorderthan Onlyor Most,andjustlikethemitexpresses,butdoesnotasserttheexistenceofa relationbetweentheconceptsappearingasarguments.Thedistinctionbetween expressingandassertingtheexistenceofhigherorderentitiesisacrucialone,one thatproperlydemarcatesthefirstfromthesecondorderrealm. Thepropertyofpermutationinvarianceplaysacrucialrolealsointhemodern conceptionofquantifiers.Quantifierssuchas and answerthequestionHow many?withnoconcernforthespecificnatureoftheobjectsinquestionandare thereforeinvariantunderpermutationsthatswaparoundobjectsofthedomain. Whereasnotionsofinvarianceforabstractionprinciplescanbeformulatedinat leastafewnonequivalentways,itiseasytomakeprecisesuchanotioninthecase ofquantifiers: IfisapermutationofD,thenabinaryfirstorderquantifierQis permutationinvariantifandonlyif foreverysubsetsAandBofD, Q(A,B) holdspreciselywhenQ([A],[B])holdsaswell. Whilethestandardquantifiersoffirstorderlogicarepermutationinvariantinthe abovesense,manymorequantifiersenjoythisproperty,mostnotablythosedealing withcardinalityconstraints(includingtheHrtigandtheRescherquantifiers). Amongthelatter,ofcourse,istheFregequantifierF.Ourfirsttaskistoexplorethe expressivepropertiesofthelogicalframeworkresultingfromtakingtheFrege quantifierasthebasicbuildingblock.

5.Thelanguageofthearithmetic
Formally,weconsiderafirstorderlanguageLFwithformulasbuiltupfrom

17 (individualorpredicate)constantsbymeansofBooleanconnectivesandthe quantifierF;specifically,Ftakestwoarguments,sothatif(x)and(x)are formulas,soisFx((x),(x)).35ThelanguageoftheFregequantifiercanbegivena standardinterpretationbysupplyingarecursivetruthdefinitionlaTarski.Models forLF lookjustlikefirstordermodels,providinganonemptydomainDand interpretationsfornonlogicalconstants.Therecursiveclausesfortheconnectives areasusual,andformulasoftheformFx((x),(x))aresatisfiedinthemodelifand onlyiftherearenomoreobjectsinDthatsatisfy(x)thanthereareobjects satisfying(x). Thelanguagethusdefinedisquiteexpressive.Firstobservethatthestandardfirst orderquantifiersareexpressibleinLF:auniversallyquantifiedformulax(x)can berepresentedbysayingthatthecomplementofisempty,i.e.,thatthereareno moreobjectssatisfying(x)thantherearesatisfyingxx.Duallyanexistentially quantifiedformulax(x)canberepresentedbysayingthatthereisnoinjectionof intotheemptyset.Butthelanguageturnsouttobemuchmoreexpressivethan ordinaryfirstorderlogic.Forinstance,whileinfinitycannotbecharacterizedin firstorderlogicusingonlythestandardexistentialanduniversalquantifier,thereis anaxiomofinfinityinthepureidentityfragmentofLF(suchanaxiomstatesthatthe universeisDedekindinfinite).Thenegationofsuchanaxiom,then,istrueinalland onlythefinitedomains,afactthatshowsthat,asaconsequence,compactness fails.36Andinasimilarway,foranyformulaonecanexpressthefactthattheset ofobjectssatisfyingisDedekindfinite. Thereis,however,analternativeinterpretationoftheFregequantifier,whichwe regardasequallyattractivewerefertoitasthegeneralinterpretationofFon whichtheFregequantifierismuchlessexpressive.Recallthatsecondorder quantifierscanbegiven,besideastandardinterpretation,alsoasocalledgeneral interpretation(firstintroducedbyHenkin37).Onsuchageneralinterpretation secondorderquantifiersaretakentorangenotoverthetruepowersetofD,but oversomepreviouslygivenuniversecomprisingsome,butnotnecessarilyall, subsetsofD.Sowhilestandardmodelsforsecondorderlogicareindistinguishable fromfirstordermodels,generalmodelscarry,besideadomainD,alsoauniverseof nplacerelationsoverD(foreachn).38Allthisiswellknown.
35Inthemostgeneralpresentation,wewillallowtheformulas(x)and(x)tocontain

parameters,andthequantifiertobindoneormorevariablessimultaneously. 36SinceHrtigsquantifierisinterpretableinL (bytheSchrderBernsteintheoremsetsA F andBhavethesamecardinalityifandonlyifthereareinjectionsfromAtoBandvice versa),anyresultsabouttheexpressivenessofIasdetailed,e.g.,inHerreetal.(op.cit.), carryovertotheFregequantifier. 37L.Henkin,Completenessinthetheoryoftypes,JournalofSymbolicLogic,15(1950)pp. 8191. 38Inpractice,suchauniverseofrelationswillsatisfysomeclosureconditionsitwillbe, e.g.,closedunderdefinability,therebysatisfyingthesecondordercomprehensionaxiom.

18 Perhapsmoresurprisingly,firstorderquantifierscanalsobesointerpreted(an apparentlyhithertounnoticedfact).Considerforinstancetheordinaryexistential quantifier:aswehaveseen,inaclassicalfirstorderlanguagethisquantifierranges overthecollectionofallnonemptysubsetsofthedomain.Butanalternative, generalinterpretationispossibleaswell,onwhichrangesoversomecollection ofnonemptysubsetsofthedomain.39Thesetofsentencesvalidonsuchan interpretationofthequantifiersturnsouttobewellknown,ifunexpected:itisthe setofvaliditiesofpositivefreelogic.40 Inasimilarvein,weconsideralessexpressiveinterpretationofthefirstorder quantifierF,which,justasinthecaseof,isspecifiedbysinglingoutaparticular classofmodels.ByageneralmodelforLFweunderstandastructureprovidinga nonemptydomainDandinterpretationsforthenonlogicalconstants,aswellasa collectionFof1to1functionsbetweensubsetsofD.Onthisaccount,aformula Fx((x),(x))issatisfiedinthemodelifandonlyifthereisafunctionfinFtaking thesetofobjectssatisfyingintothesetofobjectssatisfying.Inpractice,we wantthecollectionFtosatisfyalsocertainclosureconditions,whichensurethatthe languageisstillpowerfulenoughforanadequateformalizationofarithmetic.41One suchclosurecondition,forinstance,ensuresthatiftherearenomoreFsthanHs thentherearenomoreFsandGsthanHs. Thuswehavetwoequallyattractivewaystospecifyasemanticsforthelanguageof theFregequantifier.Thislanguagecanbegiveneitherthestandardinterpretation, inwhichF rangesoverallinjectionsbetweensubsetsofthedomain,orthegeneral interpretation,inwhichlesscomprehensivecollectionsoffunctionsareallowed.We regardthetwointerpretationsasequallyattractive. Onemoreingredientismissinginordertospecifycompletelythelanguage,viz.,the abstractionoperator.WethusintroduceanabstractionoperatorNummapping formulasintoterms:Num()picksoutanobjecttobeconstruedasthenumberof .(Strictlyspeaking,Numisavariablebindingoperatorsothatitshouldproperly bewrittenasNum x(x,y)whereyisaplaceholderforpossibleparameters;in practice,theboundvariableisunderstood).Itisclearwhatamodelforsucha languagewouldlooklike:onthegeneralinterpretation,besidessupplyinganon emptydomainDandinterpretationsforthenonlogicalconstants,amodelwould alsosupplybothacollectionFofinjectionsbetweensubsetsofDandafunction
39Sothenonstandardexistentialquantifiercanrangeoveranycollectionofsubsets

omittingtheemptyset;thendually,thenonstandarduniversalquantifierwouldrangeover anycollectionofsubsetsaslongasthatcollectioncontainsDitself. 40SeeG.A.Antonelli,Freequantificationandlogicalinvariance,inA.Paternoster,M. AndronicoandA.Voltolini(eds),Ilsignificatoeluso.SaggiinonorediDiegoMarconi, Rosenberg&Sellier,Torino,2007pp.6173(specialissueofRivistadiestetica,vol.33(1)). 41ThereaderisreferredtoG.A.Antonelli,NumericalAbstractionviatheFregeQuantifier, cit.,forthetechnicaldetails.

19 takingsubsetsofDintoD:theformer,ofcourse,isusedfortheinterpretationofthe Fregequantifier,whilethelatterprovidesaninterpretationfortheabstraction operatorNum.Onthestandardinterpretation,ontheotherhand,thereisnoneedto specifythecollectionF(or,equivalently,Fcanbetakentobethecollectionofall injectionsbetweensubsetsofD.)

6.FormalizingArithmetic
Wenowhavebothmaincomponentsofourapproachtoarithmetic:theFrege quantifier,embodyinganonreductionisttakeonlogicism;andtheNumoperator, construedaccordingtoadeflationaryviewofabstraction.Specialextralogical axiomschemasformulatedinthelanguageLFaugmentedwithNumwillbeneeded togoverntheinteractionbetweenthecardinalityquantifierandtheabstraction operator.Wewillgivejustasketchoftheseaxiomshere,sincethedetailsarefully developedelsewhere.42 Theseextralogicalaxiomschemasfallnaturallyintothreemaincategories.Thefirst groupofaxiomscontainsdefinitionalanduniquenessprinciples,beginningfirstand foremostwithHumesPrinciple.HPcanbeeasilyexpressedbyassertingthatthe identityNum()=Num()holdsifandonlyifthereisabijectionbetweenthes andthes,i.e.,ifandonlyifbothFx((x),(x))andFx((x),(x))hold.Inasimilar veinonecandefineanorderingrelationbymeansofaschemasayingthatNum() Num()ifandonlyifFx((x),(x))holds(whereistakenasprimitive).Next, onecharacterizesthenaturalnumbersbyintroducingaprimitivepredicateN(x) alongwiththeaxiomstatingthatN(x)holdsifandonlyifxisthenumberofthe predicatenaturalnumberlessthanx,i.e.,x=Num(N(y)&y<x),andmoreover thereareonlyfinitelymanyyssatisfyingthepredicateN(y)&y<x. Thesecondgroupofaxiomscomprisesexistenceandclosureprinciples.Among theseaprominentroleisplayedbyaninfinitaryprinciple,statingthatifaformula (x,y)definesafunctionfromtoi.e.,ifforallxinthereisexactlyoneyin suchthat(x,y))thenFx((x),(x))holds.Thisaxiomexpressestheclosure underdefinabilityofthespaceofinjectionsusedtointerprettheFregequantifier.A furtheraxiomexpressesaninductionprincipleoftheformeveryfiniteandnon emptysetofnumbershasamaximum.Onecanthenshowtheequivalencebetween thelatteraxiomandthestandardinductionschema(everyclassofnumbers containingzeroandclosedundersuccessorcontainsallthenumbers). Sofar,wehavebeenconcerneduniquelywiththebasicarithmeticaltheoryof successorandordering.Thethirdgroupofaxiomsisusedtoextendthetheorytoan accountoftheotherarithmeticaloperations,especiallyadditionandmultiplication.
42Antonelli,NumericalAbstractionviatheFregeQuantifier,(forthcoming).

20 Whileagainwewillnotgivethedetailshere,wenotethat,onthemostnatural treatment,multiplicationrequirestheversionoftheFregequantifierbindingtwo variablessimultaneously(sothatwecantocountpairs).Thus,beginningwith cardinalproperties,wehavebeenabletorecapturethebasicstructuralfeaturesof thenaturalnumberswithinthecontextofafirstorderlanguagecontainingboththe Fregequantifierandanabstractionoperator.

7.Conclusion
Wehavethusdevelopedanaccountofarithmeticinspiredbythetwinprinciplesof deflationaryabstractionandnonreductionistlogicism.Theaccounthasthreemain conceptualfeatures: 1. Itemphasizesthecardinalpropertiesofthenaturalnumbersoverthe structuralones,derivingthelatterfromtheformer,ratherthantheother wayaround,asisthecase,forinstance,withsettheoreticreductions. 2. ItfollowstheFregeRussellintuitionthatnaturalnumbersaredeliveredby abstractionasrepresentativesofequinumerosityclasses. 3. Itproceedsentirelyatthefirstorderfromasemanticalpointofview regardlessofwhetherthestandardorthegeneralinterpretationischosen fortheFregequantifier. Inaccordancewiththedeflationaryviewofabstraction,theultimatenatureof numbersisleftcompletelyunspecifiedonthepresentaccount,sinceabstract entitiesarepickedfromwithinthesamedomainoverwhichourordinary quantifiersrange.Soweopentheroadforapossibledeflationofgeneralworries concerningabstractobjectsingeneral,andnumbersinparticular.Abstractobjects neednotformaseparaterealm,butcanberecruitedviaHumesPrinciple fromamongtheordinaryobjectsofourontology,afactthatleavesthemaccessible foruseforwhateverphilosophical,logical,ormathematicalpurposewemightbe pursuing.Inthissense,thepresentaccountagreeswithBenacerrafsgeneral structuraliststance(asithasbeenoftencharacterized)inemphasizingthatthe intrinsicnatureofnumbersisirrelevantfortheirroleasabstractentities.Wherethe accountinsteaddivergesfromBenacerrafsisindeemphasizingordertheoretical properties,suchasformingansequence,whicharebestviewedassupervenient uponcardinalones. Indeed,inkeepingwiththebroadestandmostgeneralconstrualoflogicism, cardinalitynotionsdotakecenterstageinthepresentaccount.Insofarastheydeal directlywithpropertiesandrelationsofconceptsratherthanmattersof existenceofobjectssuchasnumberscardinalitynotionscanbeproperly regardedashavinglogicalcharacter.Accordingly,wetakethelogicistclaimthat cardinalityisalogicalnotionatfacevalue,andratherthanarguingforit(perhaps

21 byprovidingareductiontosomeotherprinciple),wesetouttoexploreits consequencesbyintroducingcardinality,intheformoftheFregequantifier,asthe mainbuildingblockinthelanguageofarithmetic.43 28December2009

43IamgratefultoElaineLandry,AlbertVisser,EdZaltaandananonymousrefereefor

helpfulcomments,suggestions,andcriticism.