II. COMMON CARRIERS IN GENERAL A. COMMON CARRIAGE OF GOODS 22. Mirasol v.

Dollar Facts: Amando Mirasol was the owner of two cases of books shipped by The Robert Dollar Co., steamship, President Garfield, from New York, in good order. Upon arrival in Manila, Both cases were in bad order and damage condition. Issues: 1. Whether Mirasol was bound by the liability limitation clause 2. Whether Dollar was liable for the damaged goods Ruling: 1. No. Numerous jurisprudence was cited by the SC, stating that a liability limitation clause would be unreasonable and in conflict with public policy. 2. Yes. From the time the shipment was boarded until it was delivered, the boxes were under the control and supervision of Dollar. Having admitted that the boxes were damaged while in transit, and under its possession, the burden of proof now shifts to prove that the damage was caused by reason of some fact, which exempts it from liability. This fact was not proven by Dollar, which makes it liable for damages. The statement that it was destroyed by seawater is not evidence that it was damaged by force majeure, or beyond the control of Dollar. 23. Ynchausti Steamship v. Dexter Facts: The Government of the Philippine Islands, acting by and through the respondent Insular Purchasing Agent, employed the services of Ynchausti Steamship Co. for the transportation from Manila to Cagayan of a consignment of merchandise consisting of cases of mineral oil. The goods were delivered to the carrier, which accordingly received by them and the parties executed the Government bill of lading. Upon delivery of the said shipment, the consignee claimed that two cases were delivered empty. Ynchausti said that the shortages were due to causes entirely unknown to it, and were not due to any fault or negligence on its part. The Acting Insular Purchasing Agent notified Ynchausti that after due investigation, the Insular Auditor found that the leakages were due to its negligence and that the deduction of the invoice value of the good lost had been authorized. Ynchausti demanded that it be paid the full amount due for the transportation of the shipments of merchandise. ISSUE: w/n the Insular Auditor is entitled to withhold, from the amount admittedly due to the petitioner for the freight charges, a sum sufficient to cover the value of the oil lost in transit. HELD: YES When Government property is transported by common carrier, it is the duty of the consignee to make notation of any loss, shortage or damage upon the bill of lading, or receipt, before accomplishing it. It is admitted by petitioner that the consignee, at the time the oil was delivered, noted the loss upon the two respective bills of lading. The notation of these losses is competent evidence to show that the shortage in fact existed. As the petitioner admits that the oil was received by it for carriage and inasmuch as the fact of loss is proved, it results that there is a presumption that the petitioner was to blame for the loss; and it was incumbent upon the petitioner in order to entitle it to relief to rebut that presumption by proving that the loss was not due to its fault or negligence.
1 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

The mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to a carrier, and of their arrival at the place of destination in bad order, makes out a prima facie case against the carrier, so that if no explanation is given as to how the injury occurred, the carrier must be held responsible. It is incumbent upon the carrier to prove that the loss was due to accident or some other circumstance inconsistent with its liability. In the absence of proof showing that the carrier was not at fault, the Insular Auditor is entitled to withhold, from the amount admittedly due to the petitioner for the freight charges, a sum sufficient to cover the value of the oil lost in transit. 24. Eastern Shipping v. IAC Facts: This is a consolidation of three cases concerning the same instance filed by respondents Nisshin Fire and Marine Insurance, Dowa Fire and Marine Insurance and Development Insurance and Surety Corp. M/S ASIATICA, operated by petitioner Eastern Shipping loaded several articles that were insured by private respondents. Enroute from Japan to Manila, the vessel caught fire and sank, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo. The respondent Insurers paid the corresponding marine insurance values to the concerned consignees and were thus subrogated unto the rights of the latter as the insured. Eastern denied liability on the principal grounds that the fire which caused the sinking of the ship is an exempting circumstance under COGSA. Issues: 1. Which law should govern the Civil Code provisions on common carriers or COGSA? Held: 1. Applicable law the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carriers in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. Hence, the Civil Code of the Philippines must govern but in matters not regulated by the said Code, the Code of Commerce and COGSA (being a special law) is suppletory to the provisions of the Code. 2. The civil code only exculpates a carrier if the loss is due to a fortuitous event. Fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. It does not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lighting or by other natural disaster or calamity. As the peril is not comprehended within the exception, the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault, unless it has proved that extraordinary diligence has been observed. On the other hand, COGSA considers that the carriers are not liable for loss due to fire unless the latter is at fault. 3. Both the TC and IAC found that there was ACTUAL FAULT of the carrier as shown by LACK OF DILIGENCE based on the fact that when the smoke was noticed, the fire was already big and must have been existing for 24 hrs and that the no regular inspection was made as to the condition of the cargoes. 4. Other matters: a. Liability of carrier was decreased to the set amount of COGSA to $500 per package b. Attorneys fees were decreased from35k to 5k for Development Insurance 25. Ganzon v. CA Facts
2 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

Tumambing contracted the services of Ganzon for the latter to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT Batman. Accordingly, Ganzon sent his lighter Batman to Mariveles. Tumambing then delivered the scrap iron for loading to Filomeno Niza, the lighters captain. However, when about half of the scrap iron was being loaded, Mayor Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, demanded P5,000 from Tumambing. The latter refused, an altercation started, until Mayor Advincula fired his gun at Tumambing, who was later brought to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan. After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron resumed. However, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by 3 policemen, ordered Captain Niza and its crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. The remaining scrap iron was confiscated and brought to the compound of NASSCO. A receipt was issued by the Acting Mayor stating that he had taken custody of the scrap iron. Hence, Tumambing filed an action against Ganzon for damages based on culpa contractual. Ganzon claims that he should not be liable because the scrap iron has not been unconditionally placed under his custody and control. Issue Whether or not Ganzon is liable for Tumambings loss. Ruling Yes, Ganzon is liable. Ratio Decidendi There is no dispute that the scrap iron was already delivered to Ganzons carrier and received by Captain Niza and the crew. By the said act of delivery, the scrap iron was already deemed to be unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier and upon their receipt, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, petitioner-carriers extraordinary responsibility for the loss or deterioration of the goods commenced. According to Art 1736 of the NCC, such responsibility will only cease upon the actual or constructive delivery to the consignee or any person who has a right to receive the goods. However, in this case, the same is not true since the scrap iron remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded. Ganzon may be exempt from liability if the loss of the scrap iron was due to any of the causes enumerated under Art. 1734 of the NCC. However, Ganzon was not able to prove the same. Art 1743 provides as follows: Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority.
3 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

Lastly, the SC cannot sustain Ganzons claim that the cause of the loss was a caso fortuito considering that in the courts below, his defense was that the loss of the scrap iron was due to an order or act of a competent public authority. Such change in theory on appeal cannot be allowed. In any case, the intervention of the municipal officials is not of such character as would render the fulfilment of Ganzons obligation impossible. According to the SC, the scrap iron could have still been delivered in accordance with the contract of carriage after the dispute has been settled. 26. Citadel Lines v. CA Facts: o Manila Wine Merchants (consignee) is the importer of Dunhill Cigarettes from England. Petitioner Citadel Lines (carrier) is the general agent of the vessel Cardigan Bay/Strait Enterprise. o On or about March 17, 1979, the vessel "Cardigan Bay/Strait Enterprise" loaded on board at Southampton, England, for carriage to Manila, 180 Filbrite cartons of mixed British manufactured cigarettes called "Dunhill International Filter" and "Dunhill International Menthol. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila Pier 13, on April 18, 1979 o Due to lack of space at the Special Cargo Coral, the aforesaid cigarettes were placed in two containers with two pallets in the original container, and four pallets in the other container, with both containers duly padlocked and sealed by the representative of the CARRIER. o In the morning of May 1, 1979, the CARRIER'S headchecker discovered that one of the container vans had a different padlock and the seal was tampered with. The matter was reported to Jose G. Sibucao, Pier Superintendent, Pier 13, and upon verification, it was found that 90 cases of imported British manufactured cigarettes were missing. o Per investigation conducted by the ARRASTRE, it was revealed that the cargo in question was not formally turned over to it by the CARRIER but was kept the inside container van which was padlocked and sealed by the representatives of the CARRIER without any participation of the ARRASTRE. o When the CONSIGNEE learned that 90 cases were missing, it filed a formal claim with the CARRIER, demanding the payment of P315,000.00 representing the market value of the missing cargoes. o The CARRIER, in its reply letter. admitted the loss but alleged that the same occurred at Pier 13, an area absolutely under the control of the ARRASTRE. In view thereof, the CONSIGNEE filed a formal claim with the ARRASTRE, demanding payment of the value of the goods but said claim was denied. o After trial, the lower court rendered a decision exonerating the ARRASTRE of any liability on the ground that the subject container van was not formally turned over to its custody. ISSUES: 1. Whether the loss occurred while the cargo in question was in the custody of E. Razon, Inc. or of Citadel Lines, Inc; and 2. Whether the stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier contained in the bill of lading is binding on the consignee. HELD:
1.

The first issue is factual in nature. On the basis of the evidence presented, the subject cargo which was placed in a container van, padlocked and sealed by the

4 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

representative of the CARRIER was still in its possession and control when the loss occurred, there having been no formal turnover of the cargo to the ARRASTRE. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. If the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extra ordinary diligence as required in Article 1733 of the Civil Code. The duty of the consignee is to prove merely that the goods were lost. Thereafter, the burden is shifted to the carrier to prove that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. And, its extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has the right to receive them. Considering, therefore, that the subject shipment was lost while it was still in the custody of the CARRIER, and considering further that it failed to prove that the loss was occasioned by an excepted cause, the inescapable conclusion is that the CARRIER was negligent and should be held liable.
2.

The CONSIGNEE itself admits in its memorandum that the value of the goods shipped does not appear in the bills of lading. 16 Hence, the stipulation on the carrier's limited liability applies. There is no question that the stipulation is just and reasonable under the circumstances and have been fairly and freely agreed upon. The bill of lading shows that 120 cartons weigh 2,978 kilos or 24.82 kilos per carton. Since 90 cartons were lost and the weight of said cartons is 2,233.80 kilos, at $2.00 per kilo the CARRIER's liability amounts to only US$4,467.60.

27. Saludo Jr. v. CA Facts: Crispina Galdo Saludo, mother of the petitioners, died in Chicago, Illinois. Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of Chicago, made the necessary preparations and arrangements for the shipment of the remains from Chicago to the Philippines. Pomierski brought the remains to Continental Mortuary Air Services (CMAS) at the Chicago Airport which made the necessary arrangements such as flights, transfers, etc. CMAS booked the shipment with PAL thru the carriers agent Air Care International. PAL Airway Bill Ordinary was issued wherein the requested routing was from Chicago to San Francisco on board Trans World Airline (TWA) and from San Francisco to Manila on board PAL. Salvacion (one of the petitioners), upon arrival at San Francisco, went to the TWA to inquire about her mothers remains. But she was told they did not know anything about it. She then called Pomierski that her mothers remains were not at the West Coast terminal. Pomierski immediately called CMAS which informed that the remains were on a plane to Mexico City, that there were two bodies at the terminal, and somehow they were switched. CMAS called and told Pomierski that they were sending the remains back to California via Texas. Petitioners filed a complaint against TWA and PAL fir the misshipment and delay in the delay of the cargo containing the remains of the late Crispina Saludo. Petitioners alleged that private respondents received the casketed remains of Crispina on October 26, 1976, as
5 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

evidenced by the issuance of PAL Airway Bill by Air Care and from said date, private respondents were charged with the responsibility to exercise extraordinary diligence so much so that the alleged switching of the caskets on October 27, 1976, or one day after the private respondents received the cargo, the latter must necessarily be liable. Issues: Whether or not there was delivery of the cargo upon mere issuance of the airway bill Whether or not the delay in the delivery of the casketed remains of petitioners mother was due to the fault of respondent airline companies Held: NO to both, but TWA was held to pay petitioners nominal damages of P40,000 for its violation of the degree of diligence required by law to be exercised by every common carrier Ordinarily, a receipt is not essential to a complete delivery of goods to the carrier for transportation but, when issued, is competent and prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of delivery to the carrier. A bill of lading, when properly executed and delivered to a shipper, is evidence that the carrier has received the goods described therein for shipment. Except as modified by statute, it is a general rule as to the parties to a contract of carriage of goods in connection with which a bill of lading is issued reciting that goods have been received for transportation, that the recital being in essence a receipt alone, is not conclusive, but may be explained, varied or contradicted by parol or other evidence. In other words, on October 26, 1976 the cargo containing the casketed remains of Crispina Saludo was booked for PAL Flight Number PR-107 leaving San Francisco for Manila on October 27, 1976, PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 was issued, not as evidence of receipt of delivery of the cargo on October 26, 1976, but merely as a confirmation of the booking thus made for the San Francisco-Manila flight scheduled on October 27, 1976. Actually, it was not until October 28, 1976 that PAL received physical delivery of the body at San Francisco, as duly evidenced by the Interline Freight Transfer Manifest of the American Airline Freight System and signed for by Virgilio Rosales at 1945H, or 7:45 P.M. on said date. Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled to receive them. And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier has accepted them. Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences eo instanti. Hence, while we agree with petitioners that the extraordinary diligence statutorily required to be observed by the carrier instantaneously commences upon delivery of the goods thereto, for such duty to commence there must in fact have been delivery of the cargo subject of the contract of carriage. Only when such fact of delivery has been unequivocally
6 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

established can the liability for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier, absent the excepting causes under Article 1734, attach and the presumption of fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be invoked. As already demonstrated, the facts in the case at bar belie the averment that there was delivery of the cargo to the carrier on October 26, 1976. Rather, as earlier explained, the body intended to be shipped as agreed upon was really placed in the possession and control of PAL on October 28, 1976 and it was from that date that private respondents became responsible for the agreed cargo under their undertakings in PAL Airway Bill No. 07901180454. Consequently, for the switching of caskets prior thereto which was not caused by them, and subsequent events caused thereby, private respondents cannot be held liable. The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier's liability for delay is that in the absence of a special contract, a carrier is not an insurer against delay in transportation of goods. When a common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a contract that they shall be delivered at destination within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any agreement as to the time of delivery. But where a carrier has made an express contract to transport and deliver property within a specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract and is liable for any delay, no matter from what cause it may have arisen. This result logically follows from the well-settled rule that where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled from performing it without any default in himself, and has no remedy over, then the law will excuse him, but where the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good notwithstanding any accident or delay by inevitable necessity because he might have provided against it by contract. Whether or not there has been such an undertaking on the part of the carrier to be determined from the circumstances surrounding the case and by application of the ordinary rules for the interpretation of contracts. Echoing the findings of the trial court, the respondent court correctly declared that In a similar case of delayed delivery of air cargo under a very similar stipulation contained in the airway bill which reads: "The carrier does not obligate itself to carry the goods by any specified aircraft or on a specified time. Said carrier being hereby authorized to deviate from the route of the shipment without any liability therefor", our Supreme Court ruled that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise, and persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation. Said rights and obligations are created by a specific contract entered into by the parties (Mendoza vs. PAL, 90 Phil. 836). There is no showing by plaintiffs that such a special or specific contract had been entered into between them and the defendant airline companies. And this special contract for prompt delivery should call the attention of the carrier to the circumstances surrounding the case and the approximate amount of damages to be suffered in case of delay (See Mendoza vs. PAL, supra). There was no such contract entered into in the instant case. A common carrier undertaking to transport property has the implicit duty to carry and deliver it within reasonable time, absent any particular stipulation regarding time of
7 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

delivery, and to guard against delay. In case of any unreasonable delay, the carrier shall be liable for damages immediately and proximately resulting from such neglect of duty. As found by the trial court, the delay in the delivery of the remains of Crispina Saludo, undeniable and regrettable as it was, cannot be attributed to the fault, negligence or malice of private respondents, a conclusion concurred in by respondent court and which we are not inclined to disturb. 28. Cathay Pacific v. CA FACTS: Respondent Alcantara was a first class passenger of a Cathay Pacific flight to Jakarta to attend a business conference with the Director General of Trade of Indonesia. Upon his arrival in Jakarta, he discovered that his luggage was missing. He was informed that his luggage was left behind in Hongkong and was offered $20.00 as "inconvenience money" to buy his immediate personal needs. He had to seek postponement of his pre-arranged conference. And when his luggage finally reached Jakarta after a day, it was required to be picked up by an official of the Philippine Embassy. The trial court ordered Cathay to pay. The CA affirmed but increased the award of damages. SC affirmed but modified the award of damages. Cathay argues that the one-day delay was not made in bad faith because it had a mechanical trouble wherein all pieces of luggage on board the first aircraft bound for Jakarta were unloaded and transferred to the second aircraft which departed an hour and a half later. Cathay also argues that he was not treated rudely and arrogantly by its employees. Also, that the CA erred in failing to apply the Warsaw Convention on the liability of a carrier to its passengers. ISSUE: W/N Cathay breached its contract of carriage with Alcantara and acted in bad faith? YES. Cathay failed to deliver his luggage at the designated place and time, it being the obligation of a common carrier to carry its passengers and their luggage safely to their destination, which includes the duty not to delay their transportation. It was not even aware that the luggage was left behind until its attention was called by the Hongkong Customs authorities. It also refused to deliver the luggage at his hotel and required him to pick it up with an official of the Philippine Embassy The Cathay employees were also discourteous, rude, and insulting. He was simply advised to buy anything he wanted with only $20.00 which was certainly not enough to purchase comfortable clothing appropriate for an executive conference. Cathays agents only replied, "What can we do, the baggage is missing. I cannot do anything . . . Anyhow, you can buy anything you need, charged to Cathay Pacific." Moral and exemplary damages are proper where in breaching the contract of carriage bad faith or fraud is shown. In the absence of fraud or bad faith, liability is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. Further, Cathay contends that the extent of its liability should be limited absolutely to that set forth in the Warsaw Convention. The said treaty does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. The Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases and under certain limitations. However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for

8 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if wilfull misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established, as in this case. 29. Ysmael v. Barreto Facts: On 25 October 1922, Juan Ysmael & Co. (JY&Co.) supposedly delivered 164 cases of its merchandise to the steamer Andres, which is owned by Gabino Barretto & Co. (GB&Co.), to be shipped to Surigao. GB&Co. claims that they only received 160 cases of JY&Co.s merchandise. They also alleged that, under provision 12 of the bill of lading, they are not liable in excess of three hundred pesos for any package of silk unless the value and contents of such packages are correctly declared in the bill of lading at the time of the shipment. JY&Co. instituted suit to recover P9,940.95, the alleged value of the missing four cases. Issues: Whether the provision in the bill of lading limiting the liability of the carrier (GB&Co.) not to exceed three hundred pesos is valid? Held: No. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability, unless such exemption is just and reasonable and the contract is freely and fairly made. The evidence shows that 164 cases were shipped and that the value of each case was very near P2,500. In this case, the limit of GB&Co.s liability for each case of silk for loss or damage from any cause or for any reason would put it in the power of GB&Co. to have taken the whole cargo of 164 cases of silk at a valuation of P300 for each case, or less than one-eighth of its actual value. If this is sustained, no silk would ever be shipped from one island to another in the Philippines. Such a limitation of value is unconscionable and void as against public policy. As the contract of the carrier is to carry and deliver the goods, and a contract that undertakes to relieve the carrier from any liability or loss or damage accruing or arising from its own negligence would in legal effect nullify the contract. The natural effect of a limitation of liability against negligence is to induce want of care on the part of the carrier in the performance of its duty. By the weight of modern authority, the carrier cannot limit its liability for injury to or loss of goods shipped where such injury or loss was caused by its own negligence. 30. Shewaram v. Pal FACTS: Parmanand Shewaram was a paying passenger on a PAL flight from Zamboanga City bound for Manila. PAL is a common carrier engaged in air line transportation in the Philippines, offering its services to the public to carry and transport passengers and cargoes from and to different points in the Philippines. Shawaram checked in three (3) pieces of baggages, one of which is a suitcase. When Shewaram arrived in Manila his suitcase did not arrive with his flight because it was mistakenly sent to Iligan. When the suitcase finally arrived in Manila the Transistor Radio 7 and the Rollflex Camera were missing. Shewaram instituted an action to recover damages suffered by him due to PALs failure to observe extraordinary vigilance and carriage of his luggage. The trial court undoubtebly found that the suitcase was tampered, and the transistor radio and the camera contained therein were lost, and that the loss of those articles was due to
9 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

the negligence of the employees of PAL. The evidence shows that the transistor radio cost P197.00 and the camera cost P176.00, so the total value of the two articles was P373.00. ISSUE: Whether the liability of PAL should be to the amount stated in the conditions of carriage printed at the back of the plane ticket stub. HELD: NO. PAL should pay the value of the lost items Article 1750 of the New Civil Code provides that the pecuniary liability of a common carrier may, by contract, be limited to a fixed amount. It is required, however, that the contract must be "reasonable and just under the circumstances and has been fairly and freely agreed upon." In this case before us the SC believed that the requirements of said article have not been met. It cannot be said that the Shewaram had actually entered into a contract with the appellant, embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket stub that was issued by the appellant to the appellee. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption that the appellee was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions. The trial court has categorically stated in its decision that the "PAL admits that passengers do not sign the ticket, much less did Shewaram sign his ticket when he made the flight. Therefore, Shewaram is not, and can not be, bound by the conditions of carriage found at the back of the ticket stub issued to him when he made the flight. The liability of the appellant in the present case should be governed by the provisions of Articles 1734 and 1735 of the New Civil Code, which provides: ART. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority. ART. 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. It having been clearly found by the trial court that the transistor radio and the camera of the appellee were lost as a result of the negligence of the appellant as a common carrier, the liability of the appellant is clear it must pay the appellee the value of those two articles. 31. Ong Yiu v. CA Ong Yiu was a businessman flying on a PAL flight from Cebu to Butuan City. He checked-in a blue maleta at the PAL Cebu counter and was issued the corresponding claim stub. Upon arrival at Butuan Airport, he waited for his luggage but found out that it was over-delivered to Manila. Upon his demands, the Butuan PAL representative relayed a message to the Cebu office which confirmed the situation and notified Butuan PAL that the luggage would arrive on the first flight in from Manila. The message was however, not received since it was
10 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

relayed after office hours and the employees had gone home. Ong Yiu personally telegrammed Cebu PAL at around 10PM, obviously with no one to receive it on the Cebuu office. The next morning Ong Yiu went to the airport and demanded from PAL his luggage, however, he did not wait for the arrival of the flight and left immediately. When the flight arrived the baggage as inspected and opened by airport personel and the taxi driver who drove for Ong Yiu and insisted on delivering it to him. Ong Yiu in claiming for damages bases his contention PALs breach of contract of transportation, bad faith, and negligence. He also contests the validity of the P100.00 limited liability of the airlines with the regard to lost luggages. The Supreme Court ruled that PAL employees were not in bad faith. In the first place, the message from Cebu was received by Butuan after office hours. Secondly, Ong Yius message to PAL was sent and received past 10PM, where obviously no employee will be able to receive it. There is no bad faith when the airline company exerted due diligence with its duty in locating a passengers lost luggage. With regard the limited liability the SC ruled that the plane ticket was a valid contract of adhesion, as such Ong Yiu was bound by it regardless of the latters lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation. Considering that the Ong Yiu had failed to declare a higher value for his baggage, he cannot be permitted a recovery in excess of the P100.00. Besides, passengers are advised not to place valuable items inside their baggage but to avail of our V-cargo service. COMMON CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS 32. KAPALARAN BUS LINE V. CORONADO FACTS: On August, 1982, the jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was coming from Laguna on its way to Sta. Cruz. As it reached the intersection where there is a traffic sign yield, it stopped an cautiously treated the intersection as a Thru Stop street, which it is not. The Kapalaran Bus Line was on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna driven by its driver, Virgilio Llamoso, on its way towards Manila. As the KBL neared the intersection, Llamoso inquired from his conductor if they could still accommodate passengers and learning that they were already full, he decided to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed along the national highway. Virgilio admitted that there was another vehicle ahead of him. The general rule is that the vehicle on the national highway has the right of way as against a feeder road. Another general rule is that a vehicle coming from the right has the right of way voer the vehicle coming from the left.The general rules on right of way may be invoked only if both the vehicles approach the intersection at almost the same time. In the case at bar, both roads are national roads. Also, the KBL Bus was still far from the intersection when the jeepney reached the same. As testified by Atty. Conrado Manicad, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera. However, there was a collision between the jeepney and the bus. The KBL bus ignored the stopped vehicles and the other vehicles behind Atty. Manicad and overtook both vehicles at the intersection therefore causing the accident. Kapalaran filed a suit against the owner of the jeepney and its driver. However, it lost the case. Furthermore, the Court did not hold as liable the driver of the bus. ISSUE: Whether or not KBL is accountable, considering the driver of the bus was not held liable by the Courts.
11 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

HELD: Yes, Kapalaran is liable. The driver violated certain general rules, and provisions in the Land Transportation and Traffice Code. Hence, he can be presumed negligent. The patent and gross negligence on the part of Kapalarans driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligene either in the selection or supervision of its bus drivers. Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. If petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its right of recourse against or reimbursement from its own driver, it should have appealed from that portion of the trial courts decision which had failed to hold the bus driver accountable for damages. The liability of employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent on its own part. The law requires Kapalaran as common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence in carrying and transporting their passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers. 33. NECESITO V. PARAS FACTS: Serverina Garces and her 1 yr old son, Precillano Necesito were passengers on a Philippine Rabbit bus form Pangasinan to Manila driven by Bardonell. As the bus was traversing a wooden bridge, its wheels swerved to the right and the driver lost control. The bus fell into a creek and the mother, Severina drowned while the baby suffered injuries. An action for damages was filed by the heirs of Severina Garces( the husband) but the TC dismissed the claim saying the accident was not caused by the negligence of the driver, who was driving slowly due to the bad road conditions, but by a fracture in the right steering knuckle of the bus i.e. defective parts. ISSUE: Whether or not the carrier is liable for damages for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle and if it discharged its duty under Art. 1755 HELD: YES. ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for the all the circumstances. It is clear that the carrier is not the passengers insurer, his liability is based on negligence and Art. 1756 states that if a passenger dies, the carrier has the burden to prove that the carrier exercised the requisite diligence. American jurisprudence holds: "The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability
12 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not in insurer of the safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable.

34. GACAL V. PAL Facts: Gacal et al. boarded the plane of PAL from Davao, heading towards Manila. Unknown to them, six MNLF members were also inside the plane. 10min after take off, they announced a hijack, and forced the pilot to take them to Sabah. Due to lack of fuel, they had to land at the Zamboanga Airport, where military personnel were waiting for them. After a few days, negotiation failed, and battle ensued, where 10 passengers were killed (buti na lang hindi foreigners yung hostage). Gacal et al. filed the case, but was dismissed by the RTC. Issue: Whether hijacking or air piracy during martial law is a caso fortuito which would exempt and aircraft from payment of damages to its passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy and whose personal belongings were lost during the incident (Bernas style of issue) Ruling: Yes it is a case of force majeure. There are four elements of a force majeure: 1. The cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will 2. The event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable 3. The event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner 4. The debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor The first element, the failure to transport was due to the hijacking done by the MNLF. The second element, although foreseeable, it was due to the military take over of the airport during martial law that made it impossible for PAL to perform its obligations (of frisking and checking the baggage of the passengers). The third element, the hijacking rendered the obligation impossible (doy!). The fourth element was supposedly satisfied, according to the case. Thus, PAL is exempted from the payment of damages to its passengers. 35. SULPICIO V. CA FACTS: Sulpicio Lines and ALC entered into a Contract of Carriage for the transport of latters timber from Surigao del Sur. On a late date, Sulpicio sent its tugboat MT Edmund and barge Solid VI to pick up ALCs timber but no loading could be made because of the heavy downpour. The next morning, several stevedores of CBL, who were hired by ALC, boarded Solid VI and opened its storeroom despite being warned by the employees of Sulpicio of the gas and heat generated by the copra stored in the holds of the ship. Leonicio Pamalaran was one of those who entered the ship. He lost consciousness and eventually died of gas poisoning.

13 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

Pamalarans heirs filed a Civil Case for damages against Sulpicio, CBL, ALC and its manager, Ernie Santiago.

ISSUE:

Whether Sulpicio Lines, Inc. is liable as a common carrier despite the fact that Pamalaran was never a passenger. HELD: RATIO: ALC had a contract of carriage with petitioner. The presence of the stevedores sent by ALC on board the barge of Sulpicio was called for by the contract of carriage. Petitioner knew of the presence and role of the stevedores, as those who place the timbers on board the ship, and thus, consented to their presence. Hence, petitioner was responsible for their safety while on board the barge. Moreover, Sulpicios claim that its employees even warned the stevedores and tried to prevent their entry into the storeroom does not have merit. It failed to prove that its employees were actually trained or given specific instructions to see to it that the barge is fit and safe not only in transporting goods but also for people who would be loading the cargo into the bodega of the barge. Thus, it failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. 36. QUISUMBING V. CA FACTS: Quisumbing, Sr. and Leoffler were passengers of a PAL flight from Mactan City to Manila. NBI Agent Villarin, also a passenger, noticed Zaldy, a murder suspect, on board the plane. Villarin gave a note to the pilot informing him about the situation and requesting him to contact NBI Manila. The pilot talked to Villarin and Zaldy and his group noticed them. An exchange of gunshots ensued between them and then Zaldy announced that it was a holdup and ordered the pilot not to send any SOS. The hold-uppers divested the passengers of their belongings, such as cash, jewelries, etc. Upon landing, Zaldy and his group succeeded in escaping. Petitioners sought indemnity from PAL to recover the value of the property lost by them to the robbers as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. PAL denied liability. CFI dismissed. CA affirmed. The CA ruled that PAL could not be faulted for failing to take positive measures to implement Civil Aeronautics Administration regulations prohibiting civilians from carrying firearms on board aircrafts; and that the absence of coded transmissions, the amateurish behavior of the pilot in dealing with the NBI agent, the allegedly open cockpit door, and the failure to return to Mactan, in the light of the circumstances of the case, were not negligent acts sufficient to overcome the force majeure nature of the armed robbery. PAL faithfully complied with the requirements of government agencies and adhered to the established procedures and precautions of the airline industry at any particular time, its failure to take certain steps that a passenger in hindsight believes should have been taken is not the negligence or misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active and cooperative cause. The acts of PAL and its crew cannot be faulted as negligence. The lives of the passengers and crew were more important than their properties. Cooperation with the hijackers until they released their hostages was dictated by the circumstances.
14 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

YES.

ISSUE: W/N PAL is negligent in preventing the robbery HELD: No. Evidence failed to prove any want of diligence on the part of PAL, or that it had failed to comply with applicable regulations or universally accepted and observed procedures to preclude hijacking; and that the particular acts singled out by the petitioners as supposedly demonstrative of negligence were, in the light of the circumstances of the case, not in truth negligent acts sufficient to overcome the force majeure nature of the armed robbery. The CA was correct in ruling that PAL's failure to take certain steps that a passenger in hindsight believes should have been taken is not the negligence or misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active and cooperative cause. 37. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS V. RAPADAS FACTS: Private respondent Jose Rapadas was standing in line to board the flight at the Guam airport when he was ordered by Pan Ams employee to check-in his Samsonite attach case. Rapadas protested. He stepped out of the line only to get back again at the end of it to try if he can get through without having to register his attach case. However, the same man in charge of handcarry control did not fail to notice him and ordered him again to register his baggage. For fear that he would miss the flight if he insisted, he acceded to checking it in. He then gave his attach case to his brother who happened to be around but without declaring its contents or the value of its contents. Rapadas was given a baggage claim tag. Upon arriving in Manila, Rapadas discovered that his attach case was missing. Pan Am exerted efforts to locate the missing luggage, but to no avail. Pan Am offered Mr. Rapadas the sum of one hundred sixty dollars ($160.00) representing the petitioners alleged limit of liability for loss or damage to a passengers personal property under the contract of carriage between Rapadas and Pan Am. Rapadas refused the settlement. He filed an action for damages. The RTC decided in favor of Mr. Rapadas and rejected Pan Ams contention limiting its liability to $160. The Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: Whether a passenger is bound by the terms of a passenger ticket declaring that the limitations of liability set forth in the Warsaw Convention shall apply in case of loss, damage or destruction to a registered luggage of a passenger? HELD: Yes. The Notice and paragraph 2 of the Conditions of Contract (which provides that carriage is subject to rules and limitations established by the Warsaw Convention) should be sufficient notice showing the applicability of the Warsaw limitation. It is not required under the Warsaw Convention that there be a detailed notice of baggage liability limitation in the passenger ticket. Contracts of adhesion, such as the one involved here, are not entirely prohibited, unless there are facts and circumstances showing its one-sided nature. This does not obtain here. Passengers are expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations, he cannot avoid the application of the liability limitations.
15 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

Had Mr. Rapadas not wavered in his decision to register his luggage, he could have had enough time to disclose the true worth of the articles in it and pay the extra charges or remove them from the checked-in-luggage. Unless the contents are declared, it will always be the word of a passenger against that of the airline. If the loss of life or property is caused by the gross negligence or arbitrary acts of the airline or the contents of the lost luggage are proved by satisfactory evidence other than the self-serving declarations of one party, the Court will not hesitate to disregard the fine print in a contract of adhesion. Otherwise, the contract would have to be enforced, as it is the only reasonable basis to arrive at a just award. DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE 38. PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES V. IAC FACTS: Catalina Pascua et al were passengers of the jeepney owned by Sps. Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo. On their way from Pampanga to Pangasinan, the right wheel of the jeepney was detached causing it to run in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake causing it to make a U-turn and invaded the western lane where it faced south instead of north. Phil. Rabbit bumped the right rear portion of the jeep just when it made it sudden u-turn resulting to death and injury of some jeepney passengers. The heirs of Catalina Pascua sued the Sps. Carreon and Manalo to which the CFI ruled in their favor holding that latter is liable through breach of contract of carriage with their passengers and granted the cross claim of Phil. Rabbit. The IAC reversed holding Phil. Rabbit liable as it had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, hence the case at bar. ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable HELD: NO! The IAC misappreciated the facts and misapplied the law warranting its reversal. The principle of the last clear chance would call for application in a suit between the owner and the driver of 2 colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. It would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. The IAC likewise applied the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence. The SC ruled that the application of the presumption in the case at bar would have been correct had the u-turn made by the jeepney not abrupt. The driver of the bus could not have anticipated the u-turn made. Likewise, he cannot be expected to avoid the collision. ACCOMMODATION OF PASSENGERS 39. LARA V. VALENCIA FACTS Lara was an inspector for the Bureau of Forestry. The defendant is engaged in the business of exporting logs from his lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said concession upon instructions of his chief to classify the logs of defendant which were about to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. The work of Lara lasted for six days during which he contracted malaria fever. On a later date, Lara who then in a hurry to return to Davao asked defendant if he could if he could take him in his pick-up as there was then no other means of transportation, to which defendant agree, and in
16 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

that same morning the pick-up left Parang bound for Davao taking along six passengers, including Lara. The pick-up has a front seat where the driver and two passengers can be accommodated and the back has a steel flooring enclosed with a steel walling of 16 to 17 inches tall on the sides and with a 19 inches tall walling at the back. In the middle Lara sat on a bag. Before leaving, Parang, defendant invited Lara to sit with him on the front seat but Lara declined. It was their understanding that upon reaching barrio Samoay, Cotabato, the passengers would alight and take a passenger bus bound for Davao, but when they arrived at that place, only one alighted and the other passengers requested defendant to allow them to ride with him up to Davao because there was then no available bus that they could take in going to that place. Defendant again accommodated the passengers. When they continued their trip, the sitting arrangement of the passengers remained the same, Lara being seated on a bag in the middle with his arms on a suitcase and his head covered by a jacket. Upon reaching Km. 96, barrio Catidtuan, Lara accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a result he suffered serious injuries. Valencia stopped the pick-up to see what happened to Lara. He sought the help of the residents of that place and applied water to Lara but to no avail. They brought Lara to the nearest place where they could find a doctor and not having found any they took him to St. Josephs clinic of Kidapwan. But when Lara arrived, he was already dead. From there they proceeded to Davao City and immediately notified the local authorities.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N defendant is duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. Defendant is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence It therefore appears that the deceased, as well his companions who rode in the pick-up of defendant, were merely accommodation passengers who paid nothing for the service and so they can be considered as invited guests within the meaning of the law. As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the pickup owes to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their destination. Thus, "The rule is established by the weight of authority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. This rule, as frequently stated by the courts, is that an owner of an automobile owes a guest the duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Since one riding in an automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the privilege of doing so, the same obligation of care is imposed upon the driver as in the case of one expressly invited to ride" (5 Am. Jur., 626627). Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law (Articles 1755 and 1756, new Civil Code). COMMENCEMENT, DURATION AND TERMINATION OF CARRIERS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFETY OF PASSENGERS 40. LA MALLORCA V. CA Facts: Mariano Beltrans family (wife and 3 minor daughters) boarded a Pambusco bus bound for Pampanga. After its arrival, the bus stopped to allow the passengers to alight, among whom were Beltan family. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in
17 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While Mariano was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off. Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano jumped from the running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents. Issue: Are Mariano and Raquel may still be considered passengers in order that the bus company may be held liable under the contract of carriage Held: YES, both Mariano and Raquel were considered passengers. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car. As regards her family (including the daughter), the presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage. Additional (with respect to the negligence of the driver): The bus driver was held negligent. The father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano and family. 41. ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP. V. CA FACTS: Passenger disembarked from the ship but had to return because he forgot some of his cargo. He pointed to the crew members to notify them of such, and at that moment, he was hit by the crane which was used to unload the cargoes. ISSUE AT BAR: DURATION OF THE COMMON CARRIERS LIABILITY (VESSELS) HELD:
18 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

It is of common knowledge that by the very nature of petitioners business as a shipper, the passenger of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as a Passenger Bus. Such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both passenger and baggage as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage, whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are deemed to be passengers. The passenger remained within a reasonable time in the carriers premises. His presence is justified, because of the nature and kind of the common carrier and the length of time it will take to go through all the procedures such as to safely alight from the carriers conveyance and to claim his baggage. Therefore, the duration of the carriers liability is lengthened up to the time that the passenger is still within the premises for a reasonable period of time. 42. VDA. DE ABETA V. PAL Facts: PAL plane bound for Manila from Iloilo City crashed somewhere at Mt. Baco in Mindoro. All passengers, including the relative of the plaintiffs, Judge Abeto, died instantly and their remains were scattered all over the area. Among the articles recovered was the leather bag of Judge Abeto with his name on it. PAL would not hear demands for settlement of damages so the Abetos were compelled to institute the instant case. The trial court found that PAL is liable because it did not exercise extraordinary diligence required to transport passenger. Issue: W/N PAL is liable Held: YES 1. Laws Civil Code Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. Art. 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers as required in Articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise. 2. The prescribed route was not followed by the pilot by a clear showing that the crash site was not within the area, this tragedy would not have happened had the pilot continued the indicated route. The weather was clear, contrary to the claim of PAL, during that day so there was no need to divert from the prescribed route. 3. At any rate, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation as to how the accident occurred, the presumption is that PAL is at fault. By the contract of carriage, the
19 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence 43. BLTB v. IAC FACTS: The case stems from the COLLISION between a BLTB bus driven by Armando Pon and Superlines bus driven by Ruben Dasco. The said collision resulted in the death of 3 people and in several injuries to two more who are all passengers of the BLTB Bus. The evidence shows that as the BLTB Bus was negotiating the bend of the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as the Superlines Bus was coming from the opposite direction. Seeing the approaching Superlines bus, Armando Pon (driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his proper lane. It was an unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided with each other. The victims instituted separate cases against BLTB and Superlines together with their respective drivers. Also, criminal cases against the drivers of the two buses were filed. Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon and Dasco, denied liability by claiming that they exercised due care and diligence and shifted the fault, against each other. After trial on the merits, the lower court exonerated defendants Superlines and its driver Dasco from liability and attributed sole responsibility to defendants BLTB and its driver Pon, and ordered them jointly and severally to pay damages to the plaintiffs. The Appellate Court affirmed with slight modification. ISSUE: Whether the courts below erred in holding BLTB liable. RULING: Finding no reversible error, SC affirmed the questioned decision. The Court ruled that the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and injuries to two of the passengers of BLTB was the sole negligence of the driver of the BLTB Bus, who recklessly operated and drove said bus in a lane where overtaking is not allowed by Traffic Rules and Regulations. Such negligence and recklessness is binding against petitioner BLTB, more so when We consider the fact that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of the damages sought by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art. 1756, New Civil Code). A reading of the respondent court's decision shows that it anchored petitioners' liability both in culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana. The court below held that the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and injuries to two of the passengers of BLTB was the negligence of the driver of the BLTB bus, who recklessly operated and drove said bus by overtaking a Ford Fiera car as he was negotiating the ascending bend of the highway which was divided into two lanes by a continuous yellow strip. The driver of the BLTB bus admitted in his cross-examination that the continuous yellow line on the ascending bend of the highway signifies a NO OVERTAKING ZONE. It is no surprise then that the driver of the Superlines bus was exonerated by the lower court. He
20 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA

had a valid reason to presuppose that no one would overtake in such a dangerous situation. These facts show the imprudence of the BLTB driver. It is well settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in ordinary situation has the duty to see that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. The said rule becomes more particularly applicable in this case when the overtaking took place on an ascending curved highway divided into two lanes by a continuous yellow line. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.' Coming to the subject of the liability, the Court held: For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned by his employer, appellant Armando Pon is primarily liable (Article 2176, Civil Code). On the other hand the liability of Pon's employer, appellant BLTB, is also primary, direct and immediate in view of the fact that the death of or injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of its employee, and such liability does not cease even upon proof that BLTB had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees (Article 1759, Civil Code). "The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based on its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination. That obligation is so serious that the Civil Code requires "utmost diligence of very cautious person (Article 1755, Civil Code). They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence (Article 1756, Civil Code). In the present case, the appellants have failed to prove extraordinary diligence. Indeed, this legal presumption was confirmed by the fact that the bus driver of BLTB was negligent. It must follow that both the driver and the owner must answer for injuries or death to its passengers.

21 ANTONIO | ARRIOLA | BLEZA | CALALANG | CRISOLOGO | CURAMMENG | DIALINO | DOCENA | ESCUETA | FABIA | FRANCISCO | IMPERIAL | JULARBAL | MARTIN | NARAG | PICHAY | PLAZO | ROJO | SIA