Memorandum

To: Front Office

From: John Roth, Team Leader, Team 4
Date: August 20, 2003

The inability of the FBI and other agencies to produce documents is threatening
Team 4's ability to complete its work by the statutory deadline. Despite dozens of
meetings, and innumerable promises of performance, we have received barely a trickle of
documents. We are now approximately two months after the deadline set for
production.1 To our knowledge, no agency has any outstanding objections that our
requests are unduly burdensome or otherwise unacceptable. Issues raised by State and
the FBI were quickly resolved through negotiation.

While the idea of a "litmus test" approach to document production may be useful for
other teams, we feel that narrowing our request to a few items will simply allow the
agencies to produce only those documents and nothing more. Respectfully, it has been
our experience in similar situations that a more complete recounting of the agencies'
failures, complete with a recounting of our efforts to get even minimal compliance, both
gives us a better historical record and will get a more urgent response.

I suggest more aggressive action. Because the agencies' inability to produce the
documents in a timely manner is imperiling the work of our team, selected agencies
(specifically, State and the FBI) should give us on-site access to all records, and allow us
to retrieve them at will. We should argue that they have forfeited their ability to rely on
the standard access controls because of their inability to comply with reasonable
document requests.

All agencies:

We have received no documents from any agency responsive to our request for
documents from the EOF or NSC concerning policy and strategy for tracking and
disrupting terrorist financing. This includes State (Request 1, item 2), FBI (Request 5,
item 7), and Treasury (Request 1, item 6, Request 2, item 2, Request 3, item 2). These
requests were directed at understanding the workings of the Policy Coordinating
Committee, which was the government's interagency group charged with developing a
strategy and coordinating the attack against terrorist finances. Other than generalized
public statements about the function of the PCC, we have no ability to determine whether
any recommendations for the future should include alternatives to the PCC.

The July 2 deadline was later than we wanted, as it took almost two weeks to get
internal approval of our document requests.
FBI Request No. 5

FBI request 5 was due on July 2, 2003. They have produced approximately a foot of
materials pursuant to our request. Not knowing what the FBI has, it is difficult to say
what are the most important documents they have not produced. Generally, it appears
they have not completed production to any of our items, although they have produced at
least some documents for many of them. Additionally, as you know, many of the
documents we received had excessive and unacceptable redactions.

In terms of importance, we would say they have been very weak on the following
numbered items:

4. Analytic product regarding Means and Methods of Al Qaeda funding from 96-present
(some documents, but very few).

5. For the period from 98 thorough 9/20/01, documents re (a) programs, policies
and operations concerning Al Qaeda financing; and (b) re cooperation of foreign
governments re Al Qaeda financing, (no documents).

7. Strategy or policy guidance from the NSC, EOF or AG concerning terrorist financing
from 98 to 9/20/01 and those now in force, (no documents).

8. For the period from 98 to 9/20/01, documents (a) evaluating or analyzing the
effectiveness of programs to track or disrupt terrorist financing; (b) policies and
procedures concerning cooperation with US agencies re terrorist financing; (c) policies
and procedures concerning cooperation with foreign governments, (few documents)

9. Documents concerning specific investigations. (Some very useful documents have

been produced, but this production is far from complete, and many documents remain
unproduced, especially as to 9.a (al Barakaat), 9.b (al Taqua), 9.e. (al Haramain), and 9.f,
9.g, (re two identified individuals).

12. Reports, summaries, and intelligence or analytic products discussing changes in the
financing of Al-Qaeda or other Islamic extremist groups in response to post 9/11 US
efforts on terrorist financing, (few documents).

14. Documents related to any investigation of 18 USC 2339A or 2339B presented to

DOJ for prosecution, where such prosecution was declined, (no documents).

15. Any policy statements, procedures, and guidelines received from DOJ re
investigations or prosecutions under 18 USC 2339A or 2339B. (no documents).

They have produced some documents to the other items, but major deficiencies plainly
exist there as well. For example, FBI CT official John Pistole testified on 7/31/03 before
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs that ongoing investigation "has traced the
origin of the funding of 9/11 back to financial accounts in Pakistan, where high-ranking
and well-known Al-Qa'ida operatives played a major role in moving the money forward,
eventually into the hands of the hijackers in the U.S." We pointed out in an August 5
email to Pat O'Brien that to the extent any documents exist summarizing, identifying or
analyzing the financial accounts in Pakistan or related transactions, they are responsive
to our item 2. We have not received any such documents, which seemingly must exist.

Overall, with the exception of items 10 (TFOS organizational documents) and 13

(trading investigation documents), the FBI production has been inadequate. Even those
two items are not complete.

State Request number 1:

State's request was due July 7. They have produced about two feet of material, although
some of that material was responsive to team 1's request added to our request, and some
of it included publicly available materials. It is easier to describe what State has produced
than what it has not. They have produced (1) the administrative records to the FTO
designations (responsive to item 6), (2) some material relating to the abilities of foreign
governments and recommendations to improve such abilities post-9/11 (responsive in
part to items 7 and 8), and (3) some cables regarding State's efforts to get countries to
comply with the designation process post-9/11.

Specifically, they have failed to provide any documents for items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 13.

They have completed item 6. The document production process for item 6 gives a good
illustration of our frustration with the process. State provided the original materials in a
State reading room in early July. Within days, Serena and I were able to look at the
materials and tagged the materials. It then took State three weeks to copy and deliver the
documents to us.

State has given us partial production on 7 and 8 in the most recent production this week.
With respect to item 9, they have produced relatively superficial and publicly available
materials on the assessment of anti-money laundering laws and a partial production of
materials regarding training assessments but only for 2002. State has produced a handful
of documents with regard to 10, and limited documentation for 11. The individual
responsible for item 12 has been on vacation and we will contact him.

Treasury requests 1 through 3:

Treasury has been meting materials out at a slow but steady pace. We estimate that they
have produced about four boxes of materials, as well as a number of electronic
documents. This status does not include last week's production, which has not yet been
logged in and given bates numbers. Additionally, it does not include Treasury's
production of electronic documents, since we don't have a way to read them and can't tell
what they contain.
Request 1 (Main Treasury): There has been very little material produced as a result of
this request, although some of it may be in the latest production. This also may be
because main Treasury simply has no information with regard to these items, in that it
may reside within the agencies.

Request 2 (FinCEN): Generally, OK. Specifically, FinCEN gave partial production on

items 1,3,4, 10, 11,13 and 14. No production on items 2, 5 and 5. Complete or near-
complete production on items 6, 7, 8, 9, 12.

Request 3 (OFAC): Generally, the critical deficiencies include OFAC's foreign trips to
the Middle East, particularly pre-9/11, and the results of those trips. Additionally, except
for redacted packages for BIF and GRF, we have failed to receive the designation
packages for the FTOs we intend to focus on: al-Qaeda, the Taliban, al-Barakaat, al-
Taqua and al-Haramain.

Specifically, no production on items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 a through d, 8g, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,

14, 15. Partial production on items 7, 8e, 8f