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E N D O W M E N T F O R I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E A C E
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December 2008

Thinking Strategically About Russia


Dmitri Trenin
Deputy Director, Carnegie Moscow Center

S u m mary
n U.S.–Russian relations matter again.
n To succeed where Bush has failed, Obama needs to approach Russia strategically: enhancing cooperation where
possible, mitigating conflict where necessary.
n To prevent new conflict and receive Moscow’s cooperation, Washington needs to deal seriously with Russian concerns.
n Leave Russia’s domestic politics to the Russians.
n To keep Ukraine whole and free, the EU integration way is the way. NATO has reached the safe limits of eastward
expansion.
n To protect against missile threats, a pan-European TMD system—which includes Russia—is the best option.
n On Iran and Afghanistan, Russia should be treated as an equal partner.

The brief war in the Caucasus—resulting from Cold War parallel is not to minimize the prob-
Mikheil Saakashvili’s assault on South Ossetia, lem. Relations between America and Russia are
which provoked Moscow’s massive response— indeed very bad—and potentially dangerous—
has suddenly put Russia back onto the United but in a different way.
States’ radar screen after a long absence. The The principal potential danger is the absence
specter of a renewed Cold War–style confron- of rules for the relationship. As Russia has risen
tation haunts many minds. But this analogy from its 1990s state of abject impotence, it has
is wrong, and not just because most people emulated the United States and its allies in using
would recoil from it. Today there is no ideo- force. Russia has been particularly stung by the
logical context, no Iron Curtain, and no central U.S. refusal to recognize the post-Soviet space
Washington–Moscow relationship for either as Moscow’s backyard. Moscow’s 2008 military
capital, not to speak of the rest of the world. campaign against Georgia borrowed a page from
In other words, Georgia is no Germany, and NATO’s 1999 operation against Serbia, and an-
Russia is no Soviet Union. Moreover, the global other from the 2007–2008 Western recognition
economy forms a world market, the Internet of Kosovo, in the face of Belgrade’s protests. To
knows no borders, and people cross borders deflect U.S. criticism of Moscow wanting to ef-
in ever-greater numbers. But to repudiate the fect “regime change” in Tbilisi, the Russian am-
2 POLICY BRIEF

bassador quipped that regime change was not a Against that background, the withering away
notion invented by Moscow. And the Kremlin of arms control is a major risk factor. After the
closely studied the 2003–2005 “color revolu- George W. Bush administration’s pullout from
tions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty, and its deci-
which it saw as U.S. geopolitical advances into sion to deploy ballistic missile defenses in Poland
the post-Soviet space. One day, it hopes to re- and the Czech Republic, Russia suspended the
turn the compliment. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
In a speech at the 2007 Munich Security Europe, which had served as the basis for the
Conference, Vladimir Putin complained that continent’s military security since the Cold War.
America respected no borders and sought to im- The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which
pose its law and order around the world. A year bans particular U.S. and Russian systems even as
Dmitri Trenin is deputy later, Russia took the crucial step of recogniz- they are proliferating, is facing an uncertain fu-
director of the Carnegie ing Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence ture. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, with
Moscow Center, a senior from Georgia. Then Russian warships watched its inspection provisions, will expire in 2009.
associate of the Carnegie warily as the U.S. Navy unloaded humanitarian The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, which
Endowment, and co-chair of supplies in Georgian ports. Soon, two Russian runs until 2012, would then be unverifiable.
the Moscow Center’s Foreign Air Force bombers flew to Venezuela for training Even as the accords of unlimited duration, such
and Security Policy Program.
over the Caribbean. The Russian Navy sailed to as the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty, are abro-
South America in the fall. gated, those with a defined life span are being
He has been with the Center
Moscow is sending a message to Washington: allowed to expire without progeny.
since its inception.
Stop your geopolitical harassment, or we will fol- The general factors leading to a more adver-
In 1993–1997, Trenin
low suit. Now, U.S. global hegemony is directly sarial U.S.–Russian relationship are converging
held the posts of senior challenged by Russia’s regional great power am- on Ukraine, which is of utmost importance to
research fellow at the NATO bitions. In the absence of agreed-on rules, each Russian and European security. Ukraine’s em-
Defense College in Rome party has drawn its own redlines whose cross- battled president, Viktor Yushchenko, is highly
and senior research fellow ing would trigger direct action; for Russia, these suspicious of Russia and a strong proponent
at the Institute of Europe in include attacks on its forces and citizens, U.S. of NATO accession; his ex-ally turned bitter
Moscow. He served in the military bases in the CIS countries, and NATO rival, the very popular prime minister, Yulia
Soviet and Russian armed enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia. Tymoshenko, is at best ambivalent on the issue
forces from 1972 to 1993, This new situation is inherently unstable and leaning against; and the former adversary of
because of the two players’ disparities. Russia’s both, the influential leader of the Regions Party,
including experience work-
gross domestic product is a dozen times smaller Viktor Yanukovych, is firmly against. President
ing as a liaison officer in the
than that of the United States, and the Russian Yushchenko hopes to raise his low electoral rat-
External Relations Branch of
defense budget is a puny 4 percent of America’s. ing by emphasizing the Russian threat. Right
the Group of Soviet Forces
Moscow has virtually no allies; China would do now, this does not get him too much traction,
(stationed in Potsdam) and nothing that might impair its steady rise. But because only 20 percent of Ukrainians support
as a staff member of the Washington has largely repaired relations with NATO membership and 44 percent have sided
delegation to the U.S.–Soviet Europe and found a new friend in India. Few in with Russia in its war with Georgia.
nuclear arms talks in Geneva the United States would see Russia as a worthy The Ukrainian president, however, has de-
from 1985 to 1991. He also opponent rather than a petro-state with an an- creed that the Russian Black Sea Fleet, anchored
taught at the war studies tique arsenal. For their part, the Russians see the at Sevastopol, must notify Kiev of its movements
department of the Military United States as having passed its prime in global in and out of Ukraine’s waters and disclose its
Institute from 1986 to 1993.
dominance, and they discount the relevance of armaments, personnel, and precise mission. So
the United States’ overextended military might far, Moscow has declined to comply, saying it
in this age of asymmetrical warfare and contin- will only be bound by bilateral agreements. But
ued nuclear deterrence. Thus, when both sides what if Kiev decides to enforce the presiden-
see each other as weak and getting no stronger, tial decree, stressing its sovereign rights? Will
they might even take reckless steps. Moscow back off, or will it resist this attempt
Thinking Strategically About Russia 3

to constrain its navy? Will the Ukrainians then lation from the West favor the traditionalists.
try to use force to make the Russians behave? If But growing trade and investment, economic
shots are fired and a ship sinks, what will hap- diversification and development, and the need
pen in the Sevastopol harbor, shared for now to promote innovation and build institutions
by the two navies? What will happen onshore, require the modernizers. It is striking that the
where Russian separatists are facing Ukrainian war in the Caucasus was immediately followed
nationalists—and Crimean Tartars wait in the by a plunge of the Russian stock exchange in-
background? What orders would the U.S. Sixth dex, which soon suffered even more as part of
Fleet receive? Would the Crimean crisis resem- the global fallout from the crisis on Wall Street.
ble the Cuban one? Would Medvedev, or Putin, The message to Moscow is clear: War or peace,
back off as Khrushchev did in 1962? Or would markets matter, and global interdependence is
that be impossible because of Russian public for real.
opinion or Crimea’s proximity? That prospect Those in Russia who want to replace the
reduces the recent Georgian war, its tragic losses modernization agenda with mobilization will
notwithstanding, to sandbox play. need to consider repeating the Soviet Union’s
trajectory, but at a faster pace and not necessar-
What Does Russia Want? ily with a soft landing. Paradoxically, those who
Seventeen years after the end of the Soviet want to compete with America need to realize
Union, Russia’s transformation is not complete. that only a modernized, Westernized nation can
There are ups and downs, but fundamental
changes are continuing—and though seen least
The bitter irony is that Russia is becoming increasingly
where most Russia watchers focus, in the politi-
cal system, even there, Russian authoritarian-
Westernized, even as it has ceased to be pro-Western.
ism thrives with the consent of the governed.
The changes are most evident in the economy, hope to succeed, and that unlike in Tsarist and
including agriculture; in social life; and in Soviet times, modernizing the military, adminis-
the gradual recovery of urban centers outside trative, or even industrial structures will not suf-
Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This is not to fice. Successful innovation requires individual
claim that Russia today is anything but mod- freedom and genuine openness to the world.
erately authoritarian, that power and property Those who want a bigger share for Russia in the
do not go hand in hand, or that Russia’s for- international system will surely notice that nei-
eign policy does not challenge America’s world ther shrill anti-Americanism nor crude national
dominance. The bitter irony is that Russia is egoism will go a long way. If Russia wants to
becoming increasingly Westernized, even as it be among the agents shaping the future, it will
has ceased to be pro-Western. need to develop its own powers of attraction and
There is nothing predetermined about formulate a compelling message larger than its
Russia’s changes and direction. The relevant national interest.
divide is not between the country’s few pro-
Western liberals and its immobile autocratic What Has the United States
establishment but between modernizing and Done Wrong?
traditionalist groups, both within and outside When Putin was asked recently why Russia had
the establishment. Both groups want Russia to failed to build strong relations with the West, he
be powerful, but they disagree on the methods. quipped, “Why has the West not succeeded in
Sometimes these groups conflict; more often, building relations with Russia?” He has at least
they compromise; occasionally, they do both. half a point. Successive U.S. administrations
Putin, for example, moves back and forth be- have forfeited the chance, first, after commu-
tween the two groups. Conflicts with neighbors, nism’s collapse, to integrate Russia into the West;
confrontation with the United States, and iso- then, in the wake of 9/11, to forge an alliance
4 POLICY BRIEF

to deal with the new dangers around the world; The practical effect of this de facto regime
and ultimately, to treat Russia as a fellow great delegitimation has been the rejection of a range of
power, a partner in global governance. Instead, Russian interests. Thus, Moscow’s opposition to
Russia has been successively treated as a limbless NATO enlargement was seen as atavistic; without
trunk of the defeated Soviet empire; a weakling the Soviet threat, NATO could not be construed
and an international beggar; a petro-state not as an enemy of Russia, and Moscow’s wailings
deserving its windfall profits; and a regional against NATO accepting new members (but not
bully, first on probation, and then at large. Russia) were interpreted as phantom pains of the
long-severed imperial possessions. The Russian
Incredibly, the outgoing Bush administration, with protests against treating the Serbs as the principal
culprits of the Balkan wars were dismissed as aris-
its many former Soviet experts, has largely ignored
ing out of kinship among Orthodox Slavs. And
Russia. The Bush–Putin personal connection has Moscow’s helpless anger over the 1999 NATO sev-
served as an excuse for the lack of focus on Russia. enty-eight-day air war against Serbia over Kosovo
was called pathetic. Russia was shown that it was
Incredibly, the outgoing Bush administra- unable to block a United States–led military ac-
tion, with its many former Soviet experts, has tion, either in the Balkans or in Iraq, by using its
largely ignored Russia. The Bush–Putin personal veto right at the UN Security Council; the coun-
connection has served as an excuse for the lack cil, and the UN, would not be allowed to stand in
of focus on Russia. In the absence of a Russia the way of “just wars.”
strategy, Russia became merely an aspect of im- Even before 9/11, in a goodwill gesture,
portant American policies—such as the nonpro- Putin ordered the dismantlement of the Russian
liferation of weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence-gathering facility in Cuba and of
war on terror, and democracy promotion—that a naval facility in Vietnam. The United States
contradicted one another when presented in treated this as a late recognition by the Kremlin
Moscow. In the absence of a consolidated policy of post-Soviet realities that did not merit reci-
approach, Russia has also become a soft target procity. Russia’s help in Afghanistan in the wake
for several U.S. vested interests. Russia is hardly of 9/11 was praised as useful but not decisive,
unique. Rather, it is an illustration of a more and Moscow’s acquiescence to the U.S. military
general attitude, and of the resulting inability of presence at former Soviet airfields in Central
the U.S. leadership, Republican and Democrat Asia was seen as its only available option. The
alike, to rise to the occasion of America’s unprec- common front against terrorism forged in the
edented global moment. fall of 2001 did not prevent Washington from
In Russia’s case, the salient feature of the then serving notice on Moscow within weeks
American approach has been the view that a about the imminent U.S. withdrawal from the
government is legitimate only if it is a democ- Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty. The only payoff
racy. Though this maxim does not really apply to Russia was the toning down of U.S. official
to America’s key allies, such as Saudi Arabia and rhetoric against Moscow’s own antiterrorist cam-
Egypt, or to its important commercial partners, paign in Chechnya.
such as China, others are fair game. Because Russia Amid America’s Iraq-inspired quest for de-
has rejected the role of junior partner to the United mocracy promotion, color revolutions in the
States and has relatively weak trade links to former Soviet republics of Georgia, Ukraine, and
America, it cannot expect leniency from Washing- Kyrgyzstan were hailed not only as the triumph
ton. It has also had to bear the disappointment of of the ordinary people over corrupt bureaucra-
those in America who had hoped that it would cies but also as fresh advances in decolonization.
soon complete its transition by developing a Ukraine, it was claimed, was finally independent
democratic polity and a market economy and by now that a Western-oriented Orange coalition
charting a pro-Western foreign policy. had replaced its Russian-speaking eastern elite.
Thinking Strategically About Russia 5

For the Russians, however, the issue was not de- have recognized its economy as market based;
mocracy—they did not think much of Georgia’s, a “strategic” partnership has been proclaimed;
and soon discovered the opportunities offered by its inclusion in summit meetings has become
Ukraine’s new pluralism—but U.S. geopolitical routine; and most important, people, ideas, and
advances, evinced by American troops’ presence capital have moved across its borders. Today’s
and, more seriously, NATO membership. situation does not in the least resemble 1948; if
From a seemingly timid beginning—Germany’s a parallel to the past could be drawn, it would be
1990 reunification within NATO—the pro- with 1908. In a world where countries are grow-
cess of NATO enlargement has intensified to ing ever more interdependent, international
involve all the former Warsaw Pact countries, rivalries are not governed by one code of con-
the three Baltic states, and half the states of the duct recognized by all the key players. Moscow’s
former Yugoslavia. Moscow has seen this as the impetuous rebellion against the “unipolar world
“NATO-ization of European security,” which has order” is symptomatic—even if other nations,
marginalized its own role, despite the signing in like China, have much more patience. Thus
1997 of the Russia-NATO Founding Act and the the analogy to the post–World War II world is
creation in 2002 of the NATO-Russia Council. wrong; the era before World War I is more per-
NATO’s decisions—such as waging military tinent. A totally unnecessary conflict may be in
campaigns in Europe, new U.S. military deploy- the offing before most people recognize it.
ments on the continent, and the admission of
new members—were expressly protected against What Can Be Done?
a “Russian veto.” NATO members refused to es- As the United States rebuilds its foreign policy,
tablish formal links to the Russia-led Collective Russia merits sustained, comprehensive atten-
Security Treaty Organization, so as not to legiti- tion. Thus, Washington needs to think strategi-
mize Moscow’s regional role in Central Asia, and cally about Moscow, not ideologically or theo-
they balked at antidrug cooperation with Russia, logically. This is no concession to Russia. A
for fear of undermining the Afghan economy and democratic tsar will not suddenly show up in
thus eroding the support for the Hamid Karzai the Kremlin. A pro–United States foreign policy
government. In reality, the NATO–Russia part- cannot be expected from Moscow, where
nership was reduced to technical cooperation. America’s moral standing has plunged. And
For Moscow, NATO’s expansion has three hoping that some disaster will throw the Russian
problematic levels. The first is the West’s bad people back into misery, toppling the current
faith; Mikhail Gorbachev had been promised no Russian regime and opening the way for a dem-
further enlargement after Germany’s reunifica- ocratic revolution, is morally flawed and naive.
tion. The second level is the West’s arrogance; U.S. policy makers also need to recognize that
both Yeltsin and Putin were rebuffed when they the Russian political system is no threat to the
personally sought membership for Russia. Third, United States and its allies—or to Russia’s neigh-
the new and especially prospective member states bors. Saakashvili was treated harshly not because
are seen by Moscow as Washington’s pawns, Georgia had been moving toward democracy
ready to become platforms for the Pentagon. but because he decided to take the Russian-pro-
As the Russian leadership and military see such tected enclaves by force and attacked Russian
platforms proliferating in their vicinity—even as soldiers. Moscow’s problem with Kiev is NATO,
their own offers to construct a joint security sys- not free elections or EU integration prospects.
tem with the United States and its allies, such as Russia has good relations with Germany and bad
theater missile defense in Europe, are finding no ones with Estonia, both of which are EU and
takers—they are drawing bleak conclusions. NATO members, largely because Estonia dis-
Certainly, in the last decade, Russia has been criminates against local ethnic Russians and glo-
admitted to the group of leading industrial na- rifies local Nazi supporters who fought against
tions; the United States and European Union the Soviets during World War II.
6 POLICY BRIEF

Russia’s domestic politics are best left to the be part of Europe, but they do not want to part,
Russians themselves, especially because there is emotionally, with Russia—clearly favoring the
no other option. Capitalism will keep changing long, arduous road toward the EU over the seem-
Russia, whose transformation will take genera- ingly shorter route to NATO. This road is the way
tions, not decades. Russia’s political system will to keep Ukraine whole and free. A democratic
alliance true to its principles would need to heed
Russia’s domestic politics are best left to the Russians the popular will—and ensure that Yushchenko
does not follow Saakashvili in provoking Russia’s
themselves, especially because there is no other
armed response.
option. Capitalism will keep changing Russia, whose In Georgia, of course, the situation is differ-
transformation will take generations, not decades. ent. Most members of the elite and the popula-
tion at large support NATO membership. But a
also evolve. Americans need to be aware, how- Georgia in NATO still claiming ownership over
ever, that a more democratic Russia will not Abkhazia and South Ossetia would turn those
mean a more pliable Russia. If anything, a more disputes into direct issues between NATO and
advanced Russian polity, presiding over a more Russia. There is hardly any doubt that, even
modern economy, will probably mean a more before the recent war, almost the entire Abkhaz
equal and demanding partner and a more ef- and Ossetian populations had rejected both
fective competitor. The idea that the world’s Georgia and NATO. Under these circumstances,
democracies are naturally junior allies of the should NATO enter into an “all for one, one for
United States was born of post–World War II all” compact with Tbilisi? A better way would
exigencies and has little place in the world today, be to engage in patient crisis management, re-
where strongly sovereign nations with broad na- habilitation, and eventual conflict resolution in
tional interests, such as Russia and China, are the Caucasus, again with the European Union
modernizing. taking the lead.
Washington need not pursue relations with The Georgia war has pushed forward the
Russia’s neighbors as if Russia did not exist. If long-neglected European security agenda. It is
that were the case, the United States would in- no use repeating the old mantra that the end of
evitably reach the point of choosing to go to war the Cold War has made European security ob-
with Russia over such places as Sevastopol, or solete. Indeed, the instinct now is to reach for
abandoning its clients and beating a humiliating the Cold War toolbox: rearming Russia’s nervous
retreat. The Bush administration has just dem- neighbors, deploying U.S. forces to Poland and
onstrated a mild version of this scenario with possibly also Georgia and the Baltic states, giving
regard to Georgia. The next U.S. administration a NATO membership action plan to Ukraine and
will need to recognize that NATO’s expansion has Georgia, and terminating the NATO-Russia co-
reached safe limits, and that any move in the di- operation agreement and U.S.–Russian military
rection of Ukraine and Georgia is fraught with exchanges. If such approaches became policy—
real danger. and elements probably will—the result would be
The danger is not Russia’s allegedly patholog- a Europe that is more tense but not more secure.
ical expansionism, and a compromise solution is To ensure security for the whole of Europe, there
not Munich-like appeasement. In Ukraine’s case, needs to be a different agenda.
NATO membership touches the raw nerve of na- This new agenda for European security
tional identity. Whereas about 20 percent of the would have three main items. The first would
population see Russia as a historical oppressor, be resolution of the formerly frozen conflicts: in
more than half see it as part of the extended fam- Kosovo (where not only the Serbs cannot rule
ily, which NATO would split. Unless there is un- the Albanians, but vice versa; the Serbian-popu-
provoked Russian aggression, these proportions lated Mitrovica enclave north of the Ibar River
are unlikely to change. Most Ukrainians want to has stayed de facto outside Pristina’s control);
Thinking Strategically About Russia 7

Abkhazia (which cannot be expected to go back thing other than mutual. If there has been an
to Georgia, just as Kosovo will never again be energy weapon, it was pre-2005 Gazprom sell-
ruled from Belgrade, but which does not need ing its produce at a huge discount, with the
the Gali district with its overwhelming ethnic Kremlin expecting beneficiary countries to pay
Georgian majority); South Ossetia (which once the difference in kind. But since Ukraine has
might have been evolving into a Russo–Georgian started to pay an internationally recognizable
condominium but has become a true challenge price for the gas it consumes, this leverage has
to diplomats as a result of the August 2008 evaporated. As they aptly say in Kiev, indepen-
war); Moldova (where there is a chance now dence means no one is paying for you. What is
of a Russian-brokered unity agreement); and
Nagorno Karabakh (which, if it explodes, will Most Ukrainians want to be part of Europe, but they
put the Caspian pipelines at risk).
do not want to part, emotionally, with Russia—clearly
The second item on the agenda would be
conventional arms control: what to do about the favoring the long, arduous road toward the EU over the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe seemingly shorter route to NATO.
after the West has refused to ratify its adapted
version, which Russia did ratify (but it then with- needed is to stop pipeline wars and restart a
drew from the original 1990 bloc-to-bloc ver- high-level energy dialogue on the concerns of
sion). The third item would be missile defense; producer, consumer, and transit countries.
will the United States revisit the Russian offer of
Europe-wide theater missile defense or decide Conclusion
to proceed with deployments in Poland and the The end of the Cold War has been widely—and
Czech Republic (and if the latter, will Russia be wrongly—interpreted in the United States as
reassured by a permanent monitoring system)? a victory of the West resulting from President
(Strategic arms control is dealt with in another Ronald Reagan’s arms buildup, Pope John Paul
Carnegie Policy Brief, by Rose Gottemoeller.) II’s appeal, and the attrition sustained at the
And one could add a fourth item to the agenda: hands of the United States–backed Afghan resis-
a trilateral exploratory dialogue on strategic arms tance. These factors did matter, but ultimately
issues among America, Russia, and China. Soviet Communism collapsed under its own
Beyond the European agenda, a strategic ap- weight, with its own citizens as its principal
proach to U.S.–Russian relations needs to en- gravediggers. The idea that it may take two cold
compass the issues of the greater Middle East wars to solve the Russian problem, just as it took
and terrorism. As supply routes to Afghanistan two world wars to solve the German one, may
become riskier due to the developments in fit with America’s experience, but it is misleading
Pakistan, it is high time to revisit the northern and dangerous—not least to the United States.
route across Russia and Central Asia. On Iran A successful U.S. policy toward Russia must pro-
and North Korea, the United States is of course ceed from realities, not past myths or dreams
free to apply unilateral military options, but a for the future. This will require courage. But
diplomatic solution would require cooperation the recent developments in the Caucasus and
with Russia as well as China. Indeed, it can be beyond may constitute a moment of truth that
argued that Moscow’s so-called foot-dragging on could cleanse U.S. thinking on Russia and finally
sanctions has kept the political option open with help produce a strategy worth the name. n
respect to Iran. But it would be Washington’s
choice to start treating Iran as a major regional The Carnegie Endowment normally does not
player instead of a rogue state. take institutional positions on public policy
Finally, there is the issue of whether Russia issues; the views presented here do not © 2008 Carnegie Endowment for
can wield an energy “weapon.” Nothing suggests necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment, International Peace. All rights
that Russo–European energy dependence is any- its officers, staff, or trustees. reserved.
www.CarnegieEndowment.org

RESOURCES
The Carnegie Endowment Visit www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs for these and other publications.
for International Peace is a
Getting Russia Right, Dmitri Trenin (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).
private, nonprofit organiza-
tion dedicated to advancing
A Less Ideological America, Dmitri Trenin, Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2008.
cooperation between
nations and promoting active
What Has Moscow Done? Rebuilding U.S.–Russian Relations, Stephen Sestanovich,
international engagement by
Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008.
the United States. Founded
in 1910, Carnegie is nonparti-
Building on Common Ground With Russia, Henry A. Kissinger and George P. Schultz,
san and dedicated to achiev-
Washington Post, October 8, 2008; Page A19.
ing practical results. Building
on the successful establish-
ment of the Carnegie
Moscow Center, the Endow-
ment has added operations
in Beijing, Beirut, and Brus-
sels to its existing offices in
Washington and Moscow.

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