Evaluating Theories Author(s): Kenneth N. Waltz Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol.

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AmericanPoliticalScience Review

Vol. 91, No. 4 December 1997

Evaluating Theories
KENNETH N. WALTZ Universityof California, Berkeley

John Vasquezclaims to follow Imre Lakatos but distortshis criteriaforjudging theories and evaluating
research programs. Vasquez claims that facts observed can falsify a theory by showing that its predictions are wrong.He fails to consider thepuzzles posed by the interdependenceof theoryand fact. He places all realists in a single paradigm despite the divergentassumptions of traditional and structural realists. In contrast to Vasquez, I argue that explanation, not prediction, is the ultimate criterion of good theory, that a theory can be validated only by working back and forth between its implications and an uncertain state of affairs that we take to be the realityagainst which theory is tested, and that the results of tests are alwaysproblematic.

aving previously covered the criticisms John Vasquez makes (see especially Waltz 1979, 1986), I respond to his article reluctantly. One is, however, always tempted to try again. Following Lakatos (1970), albeit shakily, in moving from paradigms to theories to research programs, Vasquez says he places theories in a single paradigm if they "share certain fundamental assumptions" (p. 900). He thereupon lumps old and new realists together in one realist paradigm. This is odd since, as he recognizes, old and new realists work from different basic assumptions. Believing that states strive for ever more power, Hans Morgenthau took power to be an end in itself. In contrast, I built structural theory on the assumption that survival is the goal of states and that power is one of the means to that end. Political scientists generally work from two different paradigms: one behavioral, the other systemic. Old realists see causes as running directly from states to the outcomes their actions produce. New realists see states forming a structure by their interactions and then being strongly affected by the structure their interactions have formed. Old realists account for political outcomes mainly by analyzing differences among states; new realists show why states tend to become like units as they try to coexist in a self-help system, with behaviors and outcomes explained by differences in the positions of states as well as by their internal characteristics (see Waltz 1990). If the term "paradigm"means anything at all, it cannot accommodate such fundamental differences. Vasquez puts old and new realists in the same pot because he misunderstands realists. He makes odd statements about what paradigms do because he misunderstands paradigms. He believes that paradigms easily generate a family of theories (p. 900). Paradigms are apparently like sausage machines: Turn the crank, and theories come out. Yet no one in any field is able to generate theories easily or even to say how to go about creating them. Vasquez finds lots of realist theories because he defines theories loosely as "inter-related propositions purporting to explain behavior" (footnote 3). If interH

Kenneth N. Waltz is Ford Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1950. The author is grateful to Karen Ruth Adams for her assistance.

relating propositions were all it took to make theories, then, of course, we would have many of them. I can, however, think of any number of propositions purporting to explain something that would not qualify as theories by any useful definition of the term. I define theory as a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory depicts the organization of a realm and the connections among its parts. The infinite materials of any realm can be organized in endlessly different ways. Reality is complex; theory is simple. By simplification, theories lay bare the essential elements in play and indicate necessary relations of cause and interdependency-or suggest where to look for them (see Waltz 1979, 1-13). Vasquez, following his definition, finds many theories; I find few. Vasquez's belief that theories are plentiful and easy to produce reflects the positivist tradition that permeates American political science. At the extreme, positivists believe that reality can be apprehended directly, without benefit of theory. Reality is whatever we directly observe. In a more moderate version of positivism, theory is but one step removed from reality, is arrived at largely by induction, is rather easy to construct, and is fairly easy to test. In their book on interdependence, Keohane and Nye provide a clear example when they "argue that complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism" (1989, 23). Yet, if we knew what reality is, theory would serve no purpose. Statements such as "parsimony is a judgment .., about the nature of the world: it is assumed to be simple," neatly express the idea that theory does little more than mirror reality (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 20) Faced with an infinite number of "facts" one must wonder, however, which ones are to be taken as pertinent when trying to explain something. As the molecular biologist Gunther Stent has put it: "Reality is constructed by the mind ... the recognition of structures is nothing else than the selective destruction of information" (1973, E17). Scientists and philosophers of science refer to facts as being "theory laden" and to theory and fact as being "interdependent." "Every fact," as Goethe nicely put it, "is already a theory." Theory, rather than being a mirror in which reality is reflected, is an instrument to be used in attempting to explain a circumscribed part of a reality of whose true

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Evaluating Theories dimensions we can never be sure. The instrument is of no use if it does little more than ape the complexity of the world. To say that a "theory should be just as complicated as all our evidence suggests" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 20) amounts to a renunciation of science from Galileo onward. Because of the interdependence of theory and fact, the construction and testing of theories is a more problematic task than most political scientists have thought. Understanding this, Lakatos rejected "dogmatic falsification" in favor of judging theories by the fruitfulness of the research programs they may spawn. Following Lakatos, Vasquez faults the realist paradigm for what he takes to be the regressive quality of its research program. Forsaking Lakatos, he then adduces evidence that in his view falsifies balance-of-power theory in its structural-realist form. I shall consider both claims. I disagree with Lakatos on some points, but not on his rejection of the notion that tests can falsify theories. To explain why falsification won't do, I all too briefly mention two problems. First, proving something false requires proving something else true. Yet the facts against which we test theories are themselves problematic. As Lakatos rightly says, in italics, "theoriesare not only equally unprovable,. . . they are also equally undisprovable" (1970, 103; cf. Harris 1970, 353). Among natural scientists, falsification is a little used method (Bochenski 1965, 109; cf. Harris 1970). Social scientists should think about why this is so. Second, citing Popper (1959), Vasquez insists that "paradigms" should specify the evidence that would disprove them and criticizes realism for not doing so (p. 905). In contrast, Lakatos observes that "the most admired scientific theories simply fail to forbid any observablestate of affairs"(1970, 100, his italics). This is true for many reasons. Lakatos himself points out that we always evaluate theories with a ceteris paribus clause implied, and we can never be sure that it holds. To express the same thought in different words, scientific theories deal in idealizations. If the results of scientific experiments are carried to enough decimal points, hypotheses inferred from theories are always proved wrong. As the Nobel Laureate in physics, Steven Weinberg, puts it: "There is no theory that is not contradicted by some experiment" (1992, 93). Ernst Nagel (1961, 460-6, 505-9) expressed a similar thought when he pointed out that social-science predictions fail because social scientists do not deal in idealizations. It is because falsification is untenable that Lakatos proposes that we evaluate theories by the fruitfulness of their research programs. Ultimately, he concludes, as others had earlier, that a theory is overthrown only by a better theory (p. 119; cf. Conant 1947, 48). Despite claiming to follow Lakatos's advice to evaluate theories through their research programs, Vasquez emphasizes what he takes to be evidence falsifying balance-of-power theory. According to him, the historian Paul Schroeder (1994) has presented

December 1997

FIGURE 1 International Structure

Interacting Units

attempting to test it. Early in his piece, Schroeder (p. 109) draws a picture of neorealism's logic. All of his arrows run in one direction, from the system downward. Realizing that many people have trouble understanding theory, I drew a few pictures myself. Figure 1 depicts one of them (Waltz 1979, 40). Structural theory emphasizes that causation runs from structures to states and from states to structure. It also explains, among other things, why balances of power recurrently form. Schroeder rejects structural theory because it fails to account for the motives of statesmen. Yet, as William Graham Sumner wrote: "Motives from which men act have nothing at all to do with the consequences of their action" ([1911] 1968, 212). I would say "little" rather than "nothing," but the point is clear, and structural theory explains why it holds. What Vasquez takes to be Schroeder's "devastating evidence" turns out to be a melange of irrelevant diplomatic lore. Like Vasquez, Schroeder ignores the basic injunction that theories be judged by what they claim to explain. Moreover, both fail to notice that Morgenthau's understanding of balances of power differs fundamentally from mine. For Morgenthau, balances are intended and must be sought by the statesmen who produce them. For me, balances are produced whether or not intended. Schroeder's "evidence" may apply to Morgenthau's ideas about balances of power; it does not apply to mine. This again shows how misleading it is to place all realists in a single paradigm. Vasquez and Schroeder note that power is often out of balance. Is structural theory invalidated because the actions of states sometimes fail to bring their system into balance? In answering this question, it is helpful to think of similar problems in economics. Classical economic theory holds that, in the absence of governmental intervention, competitive economies tend toward equilibrium at full employment of the factors of production. Yet one rarely finds an economy in equilibrium. Further, theory leads one to expect that competition will lead to a similarity of products as well as of prices. Illustrating the result, Harold Hotelling (1929) pointed out that autos, furniture, cider, churches, and political parties become much like one another. But a tendency toward the sameness of products may not be apparent at a given moment, for a competitor may successfully outflank its rivals by offering a design that breaks the mold. Do economies in disequilibrium and variations in product design cast doubt on hypotheses

"devastatingevidence" against it. One must understand,however,what a theoryclaimsto explainbefore 914

inferred from theories of competition?Hardly.Economic theorypredictsstrongand persistenttendencies

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American Political Science Review rather than particular states or conditions. Similarly, no contradiction exists between saying that internationalpolitical systems tend strongly toward balance but are seldom in balance. Vasquez's attempt to apply Lakatos's ideas about research programs to balance-of-power theory is as unsuccessful as his attempt to adduce evidence that would falsify it. Lakatos defines a series of theories as progressive "if each new theory has some excess empirical content over its predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected facts" (1970, 116). Newtonian science is a wonderful example of a progressive series of theories, incorporating the same basic assumptions about the universe in theories covering successively more phenomena. Classical economics, able to explain the working of national and of international economies as well, is another example. In international politics, where can one find such a use of fundamental concepts to develop theories covering ever more phenomena? Vasquez claims to find several, but his claim rests sometimes on placing in a single realist program work that belongs in different ones, and sometimes on taking work done when applying a theory as being the creation of a new one. One cannot judge the fertility of a research program by evaluating work done outside of it. Vasquez takes Randall Schweller's (1994) essay on bandwagoning as work done within the realist paradigm and argues that it provides an example of its degeneration. Schweller, however, sets out to show that the central theory of neorealism is wrong. He rejects neorealism's assumptions about power as a means and survival as the goal of states in favor of Morgenthau's assumption that states seek ever more power. He claims to show that bandwagoning is more common than balancing, believing that if it is, then neorealist theory fails. Schweller and I work within different research programs. The question therefore shifts from the quality of the program to whether his claims about bandwagoning invalidate structural theory. Structural theory assumes that the dominant goal of states is security, since to pursue whatever other goals they may have, they first must survive. Bandwagoning and balancing by the logic of the theory are opposite responses of security-seeking states to their situations. States concerned for their security value relative gains over absolute ones. At the extremes, however, with very secure or very insecure states, the quest for absolute gains may prevail over the quest for relative ones. Very weak states cannot make themselves secure by their own efforts. Whatever the risks, their main chance may be to jump on a bandwagon pulled by stronger states. Other states may have a choice between joining a stronger state and balancing against it, and they may make the wrong one. States sometimes blunder when trying to respond sensibly to both internal and external pressures. Morgenthau once compared a statesman not believing in the balance of power to a scientist not believing in the law of gravity. Laws can be broken, but breaking them risks punish-

Vol. 91, No. 4 condign punishment. A state that bandwagons when the situation calls for balancing runs risks, as Mussolini's Italy discovered after it jumped on Hitler's bandwagon, although in international politics punishment may not be swift and sure. By joining the stronger side, Italy became Germany's junior partner, and Mussolini lost control of his policy. Bandwagoning by some states strengthened Germany and encouraged Hitler to further conquest. Only balancing in the middle and later 1930s could have stopped him. Various states, including Italy, paid a great price for their failure to balance earlier. Theory does not direct the policies of states; it does describe their expected consequences. States' actions are not determined by structure. Rather, as I have said before, structures shape and shove; they encourage states to do some things and to refrain from doing others. Because states coexist in a self-help system, they are free to do any fool thing they care to, but they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and punished for behavior that is not. Vasquez requires that theories predict, since prediction seems to make falsification possible. He therefore seizes upon Schweller's claim that bandwagoning is more common than balancing. Whether this looks like falsifying evidence depends on what is predicted. Like classical economic theory, balance-of-power theory does not say that a system will be in equilibrium most or even much of the time. Instead, it predicts that, willy nilly, balances will form over time. That, Vasquez would no doubt say, is not much of a prediction. Yet Charles Kegley (1993, 139) has sensibly remarked that if a multipolar system emerges from the present unipolar one, realism will be vindicated. Seldom in international politics do signs of vindication appear so quickly. Multipolarity is developing before our eyes: To all but the myopic, it can already be seen on the horizon. Moreover, it is emerging in accordance with the balancing imperative. In the light of structural theory, unipolarity appears as the least stable of international configurations. Unlikely though it is, a dominant power may behave with moderation, restraint, and forbearance. Even if it does, however, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. America's founding fathers warned against the perils of power in the absence of checks and balances. Is unbalanced power less of a danger in international than in national politics? Some countries will not want to bet that it is. As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power. Faced by unbalanced power, states try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance. The reactions of other states to the drive for dominance of Charles I of Spain, of Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte of France, of Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler of Germany, illustrate the point. Will the preponderant power of the United States elicit similar reactions? Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others. The powerful

ment. One who violates the law of gravityby stepping from a nineteenth-story windowwill sufferinstantand

state may,and the United Statesdoes, thinkof itself as actingfor the sake of peace, justice, and well-beingin 915

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Evaluating Theories the world. These terms, however, will be defined to the liking of the powerful, which may conflict with the preferences and interests of others. The powerful state will at times act in ways that appear arbitraryand high handed to others, who will smart under the unfair treatment they believe they are receiving. Some of the weaker states in the system will therefore act to restore a balance and thus move the system back to bi- or multipolarity. China and Japan are doing so now. In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to balance against it. Stephen Walt (1987, viii, 5, 21, 263-5) has offered a reformulation of balance-of-power theory, believing that states balance not against power but against threat. Vasquez sees Walt's "refinement" as placing a semantic patch on the original theory in an attempt to rescue it from falsifying evidence. I would agree if I took Walt's reformulation to be the correction of a concept that increases the explanatory power of a defective theory and makes it more precise. Changing the concepts of a theory, however, makes an old theory into a new one that has to be evaluated in its own right. I see "balance of threat" not as the name of a new theory but as part of a description of how makers of foreign policy think when making alliance decisions. Theory is an instrument. The empirical material on which it is to be used is not found in the instrument; it has to be adduced by the person using it. Walt makes this clear when he describes "threat"as one of the "factors that statesmen consider when deciding with whom to ally" (p. 21). In moving from international-political theory to foreignpolicy application one has to consider such matters as statesmen's assessments of threats, but they do not thereby become part of the theory. Forcing more empirical content into a theory would truly amount to a "regressive theory shift." It would turn a general theory into a particular explanation. Vasquez, and Walt, have unfortunately taken the imaginative application of a theory to be the creation of a new one. Vasquez makes a similar mistake in his appraisal of Christensen's and Snyder's (1990) essay, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks." "The authors," according to Vasquez, "find a gap in Waltz's explanation [of European diplomacy preceding World War II] and try to correct it by bringing in a variable from Jervis" (p. 906). However good or bad my brief explanation of what happened in Europe prior to World War II may be (Waltz 1979, 164-70), an explanation is not a theory. A theory does not provide an account of what has happened or of what may happen. Just as a hammer becomes a useful tool when nails and wood are available, so a theory becomes useful in devising an explanation of events when combined with information about them. The question is not what should be included in an account of foreign policies but what can be included in a theory of international politics. A theory is not a mere collection of variables. If a "gap" is found in a theory, it cannot be plugged by adding a "variable" to it. To add to a theory something that one believes has

December 1997 that were easy to do, we would be blessed with a wealth of strong and comprehensive theories. I conclude by emphasizing a few points about the testing of theories. A theory's ability to explain is more important than its ability to predict. At least Steven Weinberg and many others think so. Believing that scientists will one day come up with a final theory, he writes that even then we will not be able "to predict everything or even very much," but, he adds, we will be able to understand why things "work the way they do" (1992, 45; cf. Toulmin 1961, 36-8). Success in explaining, not in predicting, is the ultimate criterion of good theory. Theories of evolution, after all, predict nothing in particular. Vasquez makes the testing of theories seem easy by adopting a positivist standard: Does the observation made correspond with a theory's prediction? His adoption of such a standard is shown by his crisp assertion that the failure of states to balance "in the period before World War II... should be taken as falsifying evidence" (p. 906). Yet what is to be taken as evidence for or against a theory is always in question. Some attempts to balance were made in the prewar years, but a balance formed, so to speak, only in the end. Should delay in completing a balance be taken as evidence contradicting balance-of-power theory? One may not be able to answer the question decisively. Testing theories is an uncertain business. In this case, however, one should certainly remember that the theory being tested explains the process of balancing as well as predicting that balances recurrently form. The theory cannot say how long the process will take. The title of Errol Harris's (1970) book, Hypothesis and Perception, implies a criticism of Popper's claim that a critical test of a hypothesis, if flunked, falsifies a theory once and for all. As Harris suggests, our perceptions count; the results of tests require interpretation. Evaluating a theory requires working back and forth between the implications of the theory and an uncertain state of affairs that we take to be the reality against which the theory is tested. Whether or not events in the 1930s tend to validate or to falsify my version of balance-of-power theory depends as much on how one interprets the theory as on what happened. However thorough the evaluation of a theory, we can never say for sure that the theory is true. All the more, then, we should test a theory in all of the ways we can think of-by trying to falsify and to confirm it, by seeing whether things work in the way the theory suggests, and by comparing events in arenas of similar structure to see if they follow similar patterns. Weinberg suggests yet another way. "The most important thing for the progress of physics," he writes, "is not the decision that a theory is true, but the decision that it is worth taking seriously" (1992, 103). The structural theoryset forthin my Theoryof InternationalPolitics at least passes that test.

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