The Peripatetic Tradition on the Place of the Conjunction among the Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics 10)1

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

N.B. The reader will note that Scribd does not support my SGreek Font.

Being a supplement to my paper Poetics Chapter 20: The Elements of Language (Papers In Poetics 9).

CONTENTS I. THE PERIPATETIC TRADITION ON THE PARTS OF SPEECH, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE NAME, THE VERB, AND THE CONJUNCTION. II. ON HERMENEIA [INTERPRETATION], PHASIS [WORD], AND SYNCATEGOREMATA OR CONSIGNIFICANTIA [CONSIGNIFYING WORDS]. III. ON THE SIGNIFICATIVE AND CONSIGNIFICATIVE PARTS OF SPEECH

I. THE PERIPATETIC TRADITION ON THE PARTS OF SPEECH, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE NAME, THE VERB, AND THE CONJUNCTION. 1. The doctrine with respect to the name or noun and the verb. Cf. Simplicius of Cilicia, Comm. in Arist. Cat. 10, 24-25 (In: Michael Chase [trans.], Simplicius. On Aristotles Categories 1-4. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 25-26) (insertions {between curved braces} by B.A.M.):
Porphyry,142 for his part, both in his [commentary] To Gedalius and in his [commentary] By Questions and Answers, says that the [25-26] goal ( skopos) of the book is about predicates. These are simple words significant of realities, qua significant, and not qua simple expressions {= lexeis?}. For qua expressions, they have other fields of study, which are dealt with by Theophrastus in his work on the elements of speech, 143 [10,25] as well as by his followers, who wrote [on such topics as] whether nouns and verbs are the [sole] elements of speech, or whether articles, conjunctions, and other such things are also these, too, are parts of vocabulary (lexis {= language}), but the parts of speech ( logos) are nouns and verbs.144
142 143

Porphyry fr. 46, 35-6 Smith. en ti Peri tn tou logou stoikhein . Kalbfleisch assumed this was the title of a lost work by Theophrastus (c. 370-288 BC), the student and successor of Aristotle, while other schoolars interpret it as reference to Theophrastus elsewhere attested work Peri lexes (On Expression).... 144 cf. Boethius Introductio in syllogismos categoricos, PL 64, 766A-B; In Perihermeneias2, 14.25ff. Meiser; De syllogismo categorico, PL 64, 796Dff.; cited by G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, Amsterdam and London 1973, 124.

N.B. While Simplicius attributes the doctrine at issue here to Theophrastus...as well as his followers rather than to Aristotle, as we shall see, there is much evidence supporting the view that the Philosopher himself is the source for these distinctions. In particular, a remark by Boethius, shortly to be cited, attributes to the Poetics essentials of this teaching.1 Likewise, passages from Apollonius Dyscolus, Priscian of Caesarea, and Ammonius Hermeias among others support the same conclusion. Cf. ibid., p. 27:
Porphyry also adds the remarks of Boethus, which are full of sharp-wittedness ( ankhinoia) and tend in the same direction as what has been said. He too says that with regard to nouns and verbs, the division takes place in so far as the elements of speech ( logos), but [25] according to the categories the division takes place in so far as expressions ( lexeis) have a relation (skhesis) to beings, since they are significant of the latter. This, he says, is the reason why conjunctions (sundesmoi), although they are found within the vocabulary ( lexis), fall outside of the categories. For they do not indicate any being, not substance, nor the qualified, nor anything of the kind. 152 It is thus clear from what has been said that these men do not define [30] the goal (skopos) as being about mere words ( phnai), nor about beings themselves in so far as they are beings, nor about notions (nomata) alone.
1

To be sure, he may owe this observation, as well as the doctrine he hands on, to one or more intermediate texts or authors otherwise unknown to us, be it a commentary or doxographical report, but such a provenance does not preclude the possibility that its ultimate source was the Philosophers books About the Poetic Art.

Instead, because it is a prelude to the study of logic, 153 [the Categories] is about simple words (phnai) and expressions (lexeis); but [it deals with these] qua significant of primary and simple beings, and not in so far as they decline 154 or are transformed in order to accord 155 [with certain words], or undergo such-and-such modifications ( path) and have such-andsuch forms (ideai),156 all of [35] which <is> the domain of the investigation of expressions qua expressions. [12,1]
152

B. was apparently replying to the objection that the Cat. is incomplete, because it leaves out conjunctions and thus does not deal with all lexeis; cf. Athenodorus and Cornutus (below, 18,24-19,1); Lucius, below, 64,18-65,3. [N.B. Boethus is at fault here. Conjunctions, like all syncategorematic words, come under the category of toward something or the relative (pros ti) insofar as they indicate the way in which something has itself or stands toward something else. What this early Peripatetic should have said was that conjunctions, although they are found within lexis (= language, not vocabulary), fall outside of logos (= speech) because they do not signify anything by themselves, but only when conjoined to other words, as the authorities shortly to be cited attest. (B.A.M.)] 153 cf. above, 1,4-6; 9,9; cf. Ammon. In Cat. 10,9-10. 154 paraskhmatizontai. 155 suskhmatizontai. Cf., with Ph. Hoffman, Ammon. In De Interp. 65,7-9; Apollonius Dyscolus, On Pronouns, 15,24; On Adverbs, 128,25; 131,3. 156 On grammatical path and ideai, see above, nn. 128, 130.

Cf: Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary On the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aristotles On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, pp. 19-20).
<Distinction of name and verb from simple vocal sounds> One might think there is a problem as to why, when he treated of simple vocal sounds [phonai] at length in the book of the Predicaments he here again undertakes to speak about the name and the verb, each of which is obviously a simple vocal sound. The answer is that a simple vocal sound, a name, a verb, a thing said [ phasis], and a term [horos]50 are the same in subject [toi hupokeimeni] and differ only in relation [ tei skhesei],51 like [an apple considered as] the seed and the fruit, or the ascent and the descent. 52For when we consider that simple vocal sounds are significant [smantikai] of the things [pragmata] to which they have been assigned [tisthesthai], this is all we call them, simple vocal sounds, since we do not in this distinguish names from verbs. But when we have seen some lack of correspondence [diploe] among these, and find that some of them are combined with articles and others are not, or also that some signify a certain time in addition, while others do not, we distinguish them from one another and call those which are combined with articles and do not consignify time names, and those which cannot be combined with articles but are said according to a certain time we call verbs. But when, on the other hand, we do not take each of these kinds of vocal sound by and for itself but rather insofar as it is part of an affirmation and denial, then we call it a thing said [ phasis], as Aristotle will clearly teach us in what follows [cfr. 16b 26]. And when he examines vocal sounds insofar as they are used in a syllogism, we call them terms [ horoi], as will be said in the proem of the Analytics.53 This is also how Plato spoke in the ninth book of the Laws [878b]54.
50 51

These represent the four stages of Porphyrys semantic theory.... [remainder omitted] The difference in relation ( skhesis) is a favorite device of Porphyry and later Neoplatonists in general. 52 [footnote omitted] 53 An. Post. 1.1, 24b16. 54 Laws 9.878B.

Cf. ibid,, pp. 20-22 (tr. slightly rev. B.A.M.):

<Why does Aristotle mention only name and verb?> [11,1] But why, one might ask, when what the grammarians call the parts of speech [ tou merou logou] are various, does he now teach us only these, the name and the verb? Because, we shall say, these alone, without all the others, can make an assertoric sentence, 1 as when we [5] say man is healthy. Therefore Aristotle conducts his investigation in this <book> only about these, which of necessity are used in every assertoric sentence and suffice to generate the simple assertion. 56
56

cf. Boethius II 14.7-30.

Cf. ibid., p. 67:

One should not be surprised if we do not call the parts of the names and verbs parts of speech consisting of them, strictly speaking. <...> However, the names and verbs themselves, which effect not only the pronunciation but also the signification ( smasia) of speech through their own combination (sunthesis) and which are the most primitive parts to have semantic force, are rightly said by us to be [20] first parts of speech. Hence, Socrates in the Cratylus also says that the smallest part of speech is the name, 223 by which, of course, he means both the name properly speaking and the verb.
223

cf. Cratylus 385C.

N.B. For an additional witness to the provenance of the foregoing teaching in Plato, cf. Plutarch, Quaest Plat. Question X (= Moralia 1009 c):2
The Complete Works Volume 3, Essays and Miscellanies. By Plutarch. Platonic Questions. (tr. William Watson Goodwin) [Greek Added by B.A.M.] Plutarch, Mor. 1009 C1011 E. (In: Plutarchs Moralia In Seventeen Volumes. XIII Part I 99 C1032 F. With an English Translation by Harold Cherniss. Platonic Questions X, 1009 ff. QUESTION X. Question X a

WHY SAID PLATO, THAT SPEECH WAS (1009) 1. What was Platos reason for saying b COMPOSED OF NOUNS AND VERBS? that speech is a blend of nouns and verbs? (Platos Sophist, p. 262 A.) For he seems to make no other parts of speech but them. But Homer in a playful humor has comprehended them all in one verse:
1

For it seems that except for these two Plato dismissed all the parts of speech whereas Homer in his exuberance went so far as to pack all [C] together into a single line, the following:

That is, only these produce statement-making, or enunciative, speech; cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.): And so only enunciative speech in which the true or false is found is called interpretation. Hence, what Blank calls the assertoric sentence I call enunciative speech. On the enunciation in the perspective of the logic of the second act, see further below on the meaning of hermeneia. 2 N.B. I give both translations of this text in full below (the appended notes being by Cherniss), but cf. the remarks of Anneli Luhtala immediately following.

au)toj i)w\v klisi/nde, to\ so\n ge/raj: o)/fr eu)= ei)d$=j. (Iliad, i. 185.)

Tentward going myself take the guerdon that well you may know it.c

For in it there is pronoun, participle, noun, preposition, article, conjunction, adverb, and verb, the particlede being put instead of the preposition ei)j; for klisi/nde, TO THE TENT, is said in the same sense as Aqh/naze, TO ATHENS.
a

In this there are in fact a pronoun and a participle and noun and verb and preposition and article and conjunction and adverb,d for the suffix ward has here been put in place of the preposition to, the expression tentward being of the same kind as the expression Athensward.e

This question is translated and discussed by J. J. Hartman in De Avindzon des Heidendoms (Leiden, 1910), ii, pp. 22-30 and translated in part by A. von Mrl in Die Grosse Weltordnung (Berlin/Wien/Leipzig, 1948), ii, pp. 85-89; it is commented on in detail by O. G ldi, Plutarchs

sprachliche Interessen (Diss. Zrich, 1922), pp. 2-10.

b

Sophist 262 c 2-7; cf. Crat. 425 A 1-5 and 431 B 5-C 1, Theaetetus 206 D 1-5, and [Plato] Epistle vii, 342 B 6-7 and 343 b 4-5; O. Apelt, Platonis Sophista (Lipsiae, 1897), p. 189. and F. M. Cornford, Platos Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), pp. 307-308.
c
d

Iliad i, 185.

For these eight parts of speech cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica 11 (9. 23 1-2 [Uhlig]). As the Homeric line containing all of them the grammarians cite Iliad xxii, 59 (Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 58, 13-19 and p. 357, 29-36 [Hilgard]); Eustathius, Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem 1256, 60-61; and there the noun is du/sthnon, for the adjective (noun adjective in older grammars [cf. O.E.D. s.v. noun 3]) was considered to be a kind of noun, o)/noma e)pi/qeton (Dionysius Thrax, op. cit., 12 [p. 33, 1 and pp. 34, 3-35, 2]) with Scholia...., p. 233, 7-33 and p. 553, 11-17....). e Cf. Etym. Magnum 761, 30-32 and 809, 8-9 (Gaisford) and further for mo/rion as prefix or suffix 141, 47-52.

Cf. A. Luhtala, Imposition of Names in Ancient Grammar and Philosophy [In: Stephanos Matthaios, Franco Montanari, Antonios Rengakos (ed.), Ancient Scholarship and Grammar: Archetypes, Concepts and Contexts. Trends in classics supplementary volumes, 8. Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2011. pp. 483-484]:
3. The Philosophers versus Grammarians Parts of Speech The status of the grammarians eight parts of speech as opposed to the philosophers two parts was discussed in several philosophical and grammatical works, starting with the Middle Platonist Plutarch (46-120 AD). Inspired by the Sophist, he raised the question why Plato should have recognized only two parts of speech, the noun and the verb, and dismissed all the other parts of speech, if Homer had included them all in a [483-484] single verse (Quaest. Plat. [X] 1009c). He drew a distinction between two kinds of words, (1) those which form significant expressions with one another, and (2) those which signify nothing either by themselves nor (sic) in association with one another. 1 Such are conjunctions, articles and prepositions. He defends the view that only the noun and verbs are parts of speech, because they can signify and form a proposition without the other parts. According to him, the other parts do contribute to speech, but in a different way, just as salt contributes to a dish of food and water to a barley-cake (1010c). 12
1

Cf. the texts of Boethius cited in sec. 3.

12

In accordance with the Sophist, he maintains that the noun and the verb were first invented in order to signify agents and patients as well action and undergoing action (1009d).

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. p. 15 (5-7) (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.):
Therefore the parts of speech according to the Dialecticians 1 are two, the name [5] and the verb, since these two alone by themselves when conjoined produce complete speech. But the other parts they named syncategoremata; that is to say, consignificantia [or co-signifying words].2

2. The several considerations of speech and the meaning of complete speech. As we have seen, Simplicius distinguishes the consideration of simple words significant of realities, qua significant from their consideration qua simple expressions. Likewise, speech considered as complex has a manifold consideration, as Aristotle makes clear:
Yet every instance of speech is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is speech, but is neither true nor false. [5] Let us therefore dismiss all other types of speech but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.3

The consideration of speech that is neither true nor false, then, is proper to rhetoric and poetics, whereas the first is proper to the logician strictly so called. St. Thomas Aquinas lays out these distinctions, together with an additional one, in the following text:
Enunciative speech belongs to the present consideration. The reason for this is that the consideration of this book is ordered directly to demonstrative science, in which the soul of man is led by an act of reasoning to assent to truth from those things that are proper to the thing; and so to this end the demonstrator uses nothing except enunciative speech which signifies things according as truth about them is in the soul. The rhetorician and the poet, on the other hand, induce assent to what they intend not only through what is proper to the thing but also through the dispositions of the hearer. Hence, rhetoricians and poets for the most part strive to move their hearers by arousing certain passions in the them as the Philosopher says in his Rhetoric (cf. Bk. I, 2, 1356a 2, 1356a 14; Bk. III, 1, 1403b 12). And so the consideration of the species of speech mentioned, which pertains to the ordination of the hearer toward something, falls to the consideration of rhetoric or poetics by reason of its sense; but to the consideration of the grammarian as regards a fitting construction of the vocal sounds is considered in them.4
1

As Priscian goes on to cite the Stoics as holding five parts of speech, the Dialecticians cannot include them, contra Philotheus Boehner, Medieval Logic, excerpted below. 2 Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos duae, nomen [5] et verbum, quia hae solae etiam per se coniunctae plenam faciunt orationem, alias autem partes syncategoremata, hoc est consignificantia, appellabant. These being words which signify only when joined to the others, as will be made clear below. 3 Aristotle, De Int. (On Interpretation) I. 4 (17a 2-7) (tr. E. M. Edgehill; slightly rev. B.A.M.). 4 In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 6. (tr. B.A.M.): sed enunciativa oratio praesentis considerationis est. cuius ratio est, quia consideratio huius libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrativam, in qua animus hominis per rationem inducitur ad consentiendum vero ex his quae sunt propria rei; et ideo demonstrator non utitur ad suum finem nisi enunciativis orationibus, significantibus res secundum quod earum veritas est in anima. sed rhetor et poeta inducunt ad assentiendum ei quod intendunt, non solum per ea quae sunt propria rei, sed

We can see, then, that there is also a consideration of speech proper to the grammarian. Now as is clear from elsewhere in St. Thomas commentary, the subject of the grammarians consideration is oratio perfecta, perfect speech, which we call a sentence, being that which completes a thought [perfectae orationis, quae complet sententiam], and make[s] perfect sense in the soul of the hearer [ (facit) perfectum sensum in animo audientis] (cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 4).1 On this matter, consider the following: Cf. Dionysius Thrax, Techne Grammatike (tr. B.A.M.):
Speech is a composition of words disclosing a thought. 2

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm. ii. 4. 14 (tr. B.A.M.):

Speech is a fitting ordering of words, expressing a complete thought. 3

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 4 (tr. B.A.M.):

Then when he says But not in every, etc. he shows that through this definition the enunciation [or statement] differs from the other speeches [= kinds of speech]. And indeed in the case of imperfect speeches it is obvious that they do not signify the true or false since they do not make perfect sense in the soul of the hearer, [and] it is [also] obvious that they do not perfectly express the judgement of reason, in which the true and the false consist. Therefore, with these things having been determined, it must be understood that of perfect speech, which completes a thought, there are five forms [ species], namely, enunciative [= making a statement, signifying the true or false], deprecative [= expressing a prayer], imperative [= issuing a command], interrogative [= asking a question] and vocative [= addressing a person].4

Cf. also Plato, Crat. 431b (tr. Jowett; slightly rev. B.A.M.):
Speeches are, I conceive, a combination of verbs and nouns.

Cf. Plato, Sophist 262 A (tr. Benjamin Jowett):

etiam per dispositiones audientis. unde rhetores et poetae plerumque movere auditores nituntur provocando eos ad aliquas passiones, ut philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. et ideo consideratio dictarum specierum orationis, quae pertinet ad ordinationem audientis in aliquid, cadit proprie sub consideratione rhetoricae vel poeticae, ratione sui significati; ad considerationem autem grammatici, prout consideratur in eis congrua vocum constructio. 1 Such speech possessing both a subject and a predicate; a subject being that about which we speak, a predicate that which we say of the subject. See further under sec. II further below.
2 3

logo/j e)sti le/cewj sun/qesij dia/noian dhlou=sa.

Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans . Note how Prisicians definition improves on that of Thrax: the whole making up a sentence is more accurately described as an ordering than as a composition. It is further specified as fitting, an attribute of the sentence that is the proper concern of the grammarian; and the thought expressed is described as complete, which serves to distinguish the sentence from the phrase. 4 deinde cum dicit: non autem in omnibus etc., ostendit quod per hanc definitionem enunciatio differt ab aliis orationibus. et quidem de orationibus imperfectis manifestum est quod non significant verum vel falsum, quia cum non faciant perfectum sensum in animo audientis, manifestum est quod perfecte non exprimunt iudicium rationis, in quo consistit verum vel falsum. his igitur praetermissis, sciendum est quod perfectae orationis, quae complet sententiam, quinque sunt species, videlicet enunciativa, deprecativa, imperativa, interrogativa et vocativa.

Str. That which denotes action we call a verb. [262] Theaet. True. Str. And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun.

Cf. the following, excerpted from an Internet article called The Greeks:
Plato (Sophist 262a3ff.) discusses onoma as the deloma, disclosure, of pragma, that which is dealt with, and the rhema as the deloma of praxis, the disclosure of the dealing with. Therefore logos must always be an entwining ( symploke) of onoma and rhema, such that neither a string of nouns alone, nor verbs, can constitute a disclosive sentence.

N.B. I return to this subject below, but before proceeding, it will be helpful to consider two additional texts which handle several of the issues broached above, beginning with the following: Cf. Dexippus, On Aristotle Categories. (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle.) John M. Dillon (tr.) (London: Duckworth, 1990) Book 1, 32,17, p. 66:
SELEUCUS: They also raise the question as to why he left out conjunctions. 115 DEXIPPUS: Because, we say, the employment of them is not a primary but a secondary use of language, nor are they complete, but incomplete, nor really parts of discourse ( lektik), but act as symbols (symbolik); nor do they signify primarily [20], but rather in a subsidiary way, even as we are accustomed to use marks of punctuation ( diplai),116 which in combination with the text contribute to the signifying of breaks in the thought, but on their own they mean nothing. So, also, then, conjunctions signify in a subsidiary way, in combination with the other parts of speech, but they in themselves are not significant on their own, but are like glue.1 [25] It is for this reason that we do not class them as elements of speech, but, if anything, as parts of speech. Even if these do signify, they signify only in combination, like, for example, the syllable ba, 2 and we say that the present subject of discussion is words without combination which are significant by themselves, and for the primary uses of language, not the secondary ones.
115 116

[footnote omitted] Diplai are really marginal marks, used by grammarians and scribes to indicate such things as a variant reading, a rejected verse, or a change of speaker, but this translation preserves the sense well enough.

Cf. The Reception of Aristotles Categories, c. 80 BC to AD 220. Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Greek and Latin Language and Literature (Classics) 30 March 2009. Michael J. Griffin, pp. 300-301:
The Co-Significant Dexippus 11,11 and the related passage 32,17 ff. are relevant in exploring the attribution of Simplicius 64,18-65,13. Dexippus tackles the (evidently Stoic) argument that the Categories should include conjunctions among other grammatical elements by remarking that the Categories considers only what is significant and conjunctions are co-significant (T2b.2):
1 2

On this comparison, see the multitude of witnesses assembled below. The reader would do well to keep in mind this comparison of the syllable with the conjunction as agreeing in being non-significative, as we shall meet it again in excerpts from Boethius and Averroes below.

If we take an element of speech which is non-significant in itself, such as blityri, or if something is significant by reference to something else, as in the case of so-called pronouns... or if a term is co-signicant () with something else, as is the case with articles and conjunctions ( ), in no way would it be proper to include these among the predicates ( ). [300-301] This term co-signicant () is unusual. In our record, it first occurs in Plotinuss treatment of the categories (6.1.5,14), where voice is divided into the impact on air and the movement, one of which signies as the other co-signies. It recurs later in Dexippus at 32,17, the passage mirroring the text of Simplicius ascribed to Lucius above. At 11,11, under a chapter-heading dedicated to the Stoics, Dexippus mentions the term briefly during his defense against the arguments of Athenodorus presumably an epitome of the arguments of Porphyry in the Ad Gedalium. At 32,17 we are given much more detail about the reason why conjunctions are such co-signifiers they specifically co-signify breaks in thought ( , 32,22), but on their own they mean nothing.1

Doctrinal Summary: According to the foregoing writers, who are either Peripatetics or witnesses to its tradition, in addition to their treatment in the Categories, there were several considerations of these simple parts of speech proper to other sciences; the doctrine of concern to us being that the name and the verb are to be considered the sole parts of speech because these two alone produce complete or enunciative speech. Moreover, according to Priscian, the other sorts of words were known as syncategoreumata or consignificantia, terms the meanings of which we shall have occasion to explore below. Again, as has been noted above, the latter are components of speech which do not signify by themselves, but only in combination with the other parts of speech, that is, only when joined to others, namely, the name and verb, a doctrine to which we next proceed.

As may be seen by a careful reading of the passage in question, the author has clearly misunderstood Dexippus here: signifying breaks in the thought being proper to diplai, which are merely comparanda, not sundesmoi, the co-signification of which is made perfectly evident by the witnesses we cite next.

10

3. The propria of the conjunction and preposition as conjunctive parts of speech. Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Primae Editionis . Liber Primus. [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):
Wherefore, since among the parts of speech there are certain ones which signify nothing by themselves, yet do convey a meaning when joined to the others, as do conjunctions or prepositions, these things we do not call interpretations. 1

Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu Majora Commentaria (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):
For interpretation is articulate vocal sound signifying by itself . But not every vocal sound is interpretation; for there are vocal sounds belonging to the rest of the animals which are not included under the word interpretation. Neither is every locution interpretation because, as has been said, there are certain utterances which lack signification and, although they do not signify anything by themselves, nevertheless when they are joined with the others do signify, like conjunctions. Interpretation, however, consists solely in articulate vocal sounds signifying by themselves. Wherefore the following conversion of statements holds good, that whatever is an interpretation, that signifies, and whatever signifies is named by the word interpretation. That is why Aristotle in the books he wrote About the Poetic Art also taught that syllables and conjunctions are parts of language, of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all [cf. Poetics ch. 20, 1456b 20ff.]. But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves. 2 In this book, however, he has established the name and verb as parts of an interpretation, which, of course, signify by themselves. And nevertheless it cannot be denied that speech is interpretation which, since it is vocal sound joined from parts which are significative, does not lack signification. Wherefore not of speech alone, but also of the name and the verb, and not of locution alone, but also of significative locution, which is interpretation, are treated by Aristotle in this book, and as the name interpretation designates verbs, names, and significative utterances as well, this book is entitled On Interpretation from the common name of the things which are treated in this book; that is, interpretation.3
1

Quare cum sint quaedam in orationis partibus quae per se nihil significant, aliis tamen iuncta designant, ut sunt coniunctiones uel praepositiones, haec interpretationes esse non dicimus . Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem., n. 3, excerpted below. 2 Needless to say, no such statement concerning conjunctions is to be found in the text of the Poetics which has come down to us, whereas his preceding remarks, as noted, are witnessed to therein. That is to say, of the three things he asserts about the constitution of the text, the first two are undeniably true. 3 Interpretatio namque est vox articulata per seipsam signifcans. Quocirca non omnis vox interpretatio est, sunt enim caeterorum animalium voces, quae interpretationis vocabulo non tenentur. Nec omnis locutio interpretatio est, idcirco quia (ut dictum est) sunt locutiones quaedam, quae significatione carent et cum per se quaedam non significent, juncta tamen cum aliis significant, ut conjunctiones. Interpretatio autem in solis per se significativis et articulatis vocibus permanent (?). Quare convertitur, ut quidquid sit intepretatio, illud significet. Et quidquid significat, interpretationis vocabulo nuncupetur . Unde etiam ipse quoque Aristoteles in libris quos de Arte poetica scripsit, locutionis partes esse syllabas et conjunctiones etiam tradit, quarum syllabae, in eo quod sunt syllabae, nihil omnino significant. Conjunctiones vero consignificare quidem possunt, per se vero nihil designant . Interpretationis vero partes hoc libro constituit nomen et verbum, quae scilicet per seipsa significant. Nihilominus quoque orationem interpretationem esse constat, quae et ipsa cum vox sit et significativis partibus juncta, significatione non caret. Quare quoniam non de oratione sola, sed etiam de nomine et verbo, nec vero de sola locutione, sed etiam de significativa locutione, quae est interpret-tatio, in hoc libro ab Aristotele tractatur, idcirco quoniam verbis atque nominibus, et significativis locut-ionibus nomen interpretationis aptatur, a communi nomine eorum de quibus in hoc libro tractatur, id est interpretatione, ipse quoque de Interpretatione liber inscriptus est .

11

Doctrinal Summary: According to Boethius, the conjunction and the preposition agree in signifying nothing by themselves, but only when conjoined to the others, namely, the name and the verb; both being parts of language, according to the second text, and so are not be reckoned interpretations, as he understands the term. (Rather, as we have noted above, his contemporary Priscian holds that they are syncategoreumata or consignificantia.) 4. That as parts of language, connectives are like certain kinds of supports or bonds. Cf. Boethius, De Syllogismo Categorico. Liber Primus (ed. Migne, PL 64 796C-D; tr. B.A.M.):
The name and the verb are reckoned to be the two sole parts, for the rest are not parts of speech but rather supports: for as the bridle or reins of a chariot are not parts, but are in a way certain ligaturesand, as has been said, supports are not even partsso conjunctions and prepositions and other things of this sort are not parts of speech but certain bonds. 1

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., GL II, 551 18. (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004) p. 132):
Therefore some philosophers regarded the noun and the verb as the sole parts of speech, and the others as having a supporting and binding function, in the same way in a ship, its parts are the sides [or planks], the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails are not parts but things that bind and glue the parts together.2

Cf. Scholion on Dionysius Thrax (Grammatici Graeci I 3, p. 515, 19; tr. B.A.M.):
The Peripatetics believed the parts of speech to be two, the name and the verb; but the rest they did not say were parts of speech, but were added for the sake of binding and gluing. <The noun and the verb may be compared to the sides [or planks], the rudder, and the sail of a ship, whereas the other words are more like the pitch, the tow, and the nails>. 3

Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the De Interpretatione (In: Ammonius: On Aristotles On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank; slightly rev. B.A.M., pp. 21-22):
1

Nomen et uerbum, duae solae partes sunt putandae, caeterae enim non partes sed orationis supplementa sunt: ut enim quadrigarum frena uel lora non partes sed quaedam quodammodo ligaturae sunt et, ut dictum est, supplementa non etiam partes, sic coniunctiones et praepositiones et alia huiusmodi non partes orationis sunt sed quaedam colligamenta. For an elaboration of this comparison, see the text of Plutarch below. 2 Quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et verbum solas esse partes orationem, cetera vero admincula vel iuncturas earum, quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae et trabes, cetera autem, id est stuppa et clavi et similia vincula et conglutinationes partium navis [hoc est tabularum et trabium], non partes navis dicuntur . A more literal translation of the foregoing Latin reads as follows: Some philosophers were agreed that the name and the verb were the sole parts of speech, but the rest their supports or bindings, in the way in which the parts of a ship are planks and beams, but the rest, for instance, tow (or oakum) and spikes (or nails) and similar bonds and joinings of the parts of a ship [that is, of the planks and beams], are not called parts of the ship.
3

oi( Peripathtikoi\ du/o me/rh lo/gou e)do/casan ei)=nai, o)/noma kai\ r(h=ma, ta\ de\ a)/lla ou) le/gousin ei)=nai me/rh lo/gou, a)ll e(/neken sunde/sewj kai\ ko/llhj paralamba/nesqai . [N.B. For

this last sentence, see Gabriel Nuchelmans Theories of the Proposition, excerpted below. (B.A.M.)]

12

For just as the planks of a ship are properly [25] speaking its parts, while bolts, sailcloth1 and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole, 64 in the same way in the sentence conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves do the work of bolts,[2] but they would not correctly be called parts inasmuch as they cannot be put together and on their own produce a [30] complete speech. So these are not parts of speech, but they are parts of lexis, of which speech itself also is a [13,1] part, as has been said in [the books] About the Poetic Art [e)n toi=j Peri\ poihtikh=j ei)/rhtai, ed. Busse].65 And these are useful for the [21-22] specific sorts of composition (sunthesis) and construction (suntaxis)66 of the parts of speech with one another, just as a bond (is useful) for adding unity to things bound and glue to things joined by it.67 [35] But these are not parts of the things bound or glued, and neither are conjunctions, articles, prepositions or adverbs particles (moria) of speech.68
64

This is a common simile, known already to Apollonius Dyscolus in the early second century as Peripatetic; cf. R. Schneider (ed.) Apolloni Dyscoli Quae Supersunt, Grammatici Graeci II 3 Librorum Apolloni Deperditorum Fragmenta, Leipzig 1910, 31.26ff. = Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam [Sch. Lond.] 515,19ff. Hilgard; Schneider (30) attributes this discussion to Apollonius lost work on the division of the parts of speech ( peri merismou). It was probably used also by Porphyry (Ebbesen, Porphyrys legacy to logic, in Aristotle Transformed, op. cit., 156f.), as it appears here, in Boethius in Int. II 6 Meiser, and elsewhere as well. 65 Poet. 20, 1456b20; cf. below. [Missing from our Poetics. (B.A.M.)] 66 Sunthesis and suntaxis may be used as synonyms; where they are not, however, the former refers to the way letters, syllables and words as sounds are used together, while the latter refers to the combination of the meanings of words to create larger units such as the sentence. 67 For the various bonds and joins used in this paragraph, see Metaph. 8.2, 1042b17f. [N.B. For this and related texts, see further below. (B.A.M.)] 68 The long discussion of this Peripatetic argument in our fragment of Apollonius Dyscolus On Division is concerned solely with the question whether name and verb are the only parts of logos; that all the word-classes together are the parts of lexis is never mentioned. The discussion of Theophrastus On the Elements of the Sentence by Simplicius (in Cat. 10,20-11,2 = fr. 683 Fortenbaugh) makes it clear that Theophrastus did not actually make this distinction, for the words as expression ( lexis) were discussed by him in that work. It seems likely that the Stoics used the term elements of expression ( stoikheia lexes) to refer to the letters and elements of the sentence to refer to the word-classes (Diogenes Laertius 7.56; Galen, On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates 8.3). I believe that the distinction made here by Ammonius cannot be traced back further than Porphyry, whose interest in Stoic logic may have inspired him to interpret Aristotles usage in this way; note that it is with Porphyrys book To Gedalius and By Question and Answer that Simplicius introduces the note which cites Theophrastus. Boethius, who is dependant upon Porphyry, gives a fuller account of the distinction (II 6.15ff.): like Ammonius, he cites Poet. 20 to the effect that the parts of expression (locutio = lexis) are syllables or also conjunctions, neither of which are significant by themselves, while the parts of the interpretation ( interpretatio, one might translate speech) he establishes in this book as name and verb.
1

The underlying Greek being linon, flax, one kind of which is tow, either of these two words would have been acceptable translations, whereas sail-cloth, being a composing part and no bond, is impossible. 2 ' , , . [added by B.A.M.]

13

He ends with the explanation: hence in this book Aristotle deals not merely with the sentence (oratio), but also with verb and name, nor indeed with mere expression ( locutio), but actually with significant expressions, which is speech (interpretatio).

Cf. Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), pp 136-137
I will now proceed to highlight one more author, who attests to the continuous interest shown in this topic by philosophers of Late Antiquity, namely, Ammonius. The parts of speech are described somewhat similarly as by Priscian and the Scholiasts, as will emerge from the passages quoted below: Now somebody might say: Seeing that there are more parts of speech as the grammarians call them, why does he speak to us of only two, onoma and rhema? Because, we shall say, only these two of them all can form a proposition, for instance: Man thrives. () Now it is worth knowing that of the often-named eight parts of sentence 1 some signify substances (physeis), or persons or doings or sufferings or a combination of them like noun and pronoun and verb and participle, which alone suffice to constitute a proposition like Socrates walks or I walk or The runner walks Socrates is running, the one being used as subject, the other as predicate, whereas the other parts [136-137] of sentence have no such signification: they designate a relation or the predicate to the subject, like most of the adverbs, sc. how the predicate inheres in the subject, or when or where, or how often, either definitely or indefinitely, in what position to another, more or less, or intensely inheres, or how we think something is or is not. () With how the predicate inheres I mean the adverbs of the intermediate kind ( mesotes) and of quality, like: Socrates disputes well, Melanthius kicked Ulysses with the foot. The bees fly in clusters and the adverbs which indicate whether the predicate inheres in those we speak of altogether or not altogether. () Those parts of speech then which signify substances or persons or doings or sufferings or a combination of person and action or passion Aristotle divides them all into onomata and rhemata, calling those with indication of time and used as predicates in propositions rhemata and those without temporal relation and taking the function of subjects onomata, whereas those not used in either of these functions though they belong to the propositions in other ways, denoting inherence or non-inherence or when or why or how often a predicate inheres in a subject, or some other mutual relation, he does not call parts of sentence in the proper sense, for just as the planks are the proper parts of a ship, while nails, flax, and pitch are used for holding together the parts and for the union of the whole, so the conjunctions, articles, prepositions and even the adverbs in a sentence have the function of nails and so they are not rightly called parts of the sentence being not fit to form a complete sentence if joined to one another alone. These then are not parts of sentence (logos), but parts of speech (lexis) () (tr. Arens 1984: 66-67) [= Arens, Hans, 1984. Aristotles Theory of Language and its Tradition. (= Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, III.29). Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.]

Cf ibid., p. 133:
Schneider edited a discussion on this topic among Apollonius fragments, which are preserved by the Scholiasts.2 The discussion elaborates on the notion of the parts of speech from various viewpoints, and contains many Apollonian themes; yet it cannot be regarded as genuinely Apollonian.
1

For sentence one should read speech. Likewise, lexis below should be translated language.

14

Quare non dubito totam illam egregiam disputationem, quae in scholiis Londinensibus ad Dion. Thr. 515, 19-521, 37 Hilg. servata est, ut desumptam ex Apollonii de merismo libro, transcribere (CG II.3, 31, 23-25).

Cf. ibid., pp. 134-136:

The following passage involves elements which are distinctly Peripatetic and cannot therefore be ascribed to Apollonius Dyscolus. It is said that the Peripatetic philosophers recognized two parts of speech, the noun and the verb, and claimed that the others are not parts of speech, but are merely used for the sake of binding and gluing. Moreover, just as a boat can be made of a single piece of wood, without glue or binding agent, so a sentence can consist of just a noun and a verb, without words of any other type. But a sentence cannot be formed with no noun or with no verb, just as, by implication, no boat can consist just of pitch, tow and nails. Just as there are ships made of one piece of wood only, he argues, similarly there are sentences which need no binding, e.g. Swkra/thj peripatei=, Swkra/thj u(giai/nei Soc-rates is walking, Socrates flourishes ( GG I.3, 515, 28-29). There is a certain natural union between the noun and the verb, it is claimed, comparable to that between form and matter; this is why they do not need binding. Form and matter are concepts pertaining to Peripatetic philosophy. In Apollonius surviving works, Peripatetic philosophy is not used.
No doubt even other parts of speech have their own meanings, which are not those of the noun and the verb, and they never bind together verbs with nouns. For when we say ho anthropos peripatei, the article is joined to the noun only, not the verb. Similarly in ho anthropos kalos peritpatei well pertains to the verb only, not the [134-135] noun. And those that we call conjunctions do not bind together the noun and the verb, for nobody says Tryphon and reads. They bind either two nouns or two verbs: Theon and Tryphon, I read and write. For conjunctions combine similar parts by themselves: I, you and Apollonius. If even those that we call conjunctions do not bind together the noun and the verb, it is clear that these parts are not used for the sake of binding, but rather have a meaning of their own, which is not that of binding and gluing. For the article indicates reference, which is expressed neither by the noun nor the verb. And the pronoun indicates reference or anaphora, and neither of these functions pertain to the noun or the verb. Saying baino is not the same as saying katabaino or hyperbaino, for the preposition changes the meaning. Similarly the adverb. When it is said A man is walking or A man is walking well, the meaning changes, for in the latter even quality is expressed by the adverb. Even conjunctions have the effect of changing meaning. The expression I write is complete because it is an assertion, but the expression And I write is a confirmation and is not independent. Neither are grapho men and grapheis de independent. It has thus been proved that the parts of speech are not used for the sake of binding, but for such a meaning as is not contained in the noun and the verb. As for the view that the sentence cannot exist without a noun and a verb, it can be said that some parts of speech are more venerable than others, as is also the case with man. Mans body parts are his hands and feet and brain and heart; he can live without a hand or a leg, but not without the brain and heart, and therefore a complete sentence cannot occur without a noun and a verb ( GG I.3, 516, 28-36). A further problem is inherent in the following argument: If those, that are said to be parts of something, are missing, they cause effects, as is the case with man. When he has lost a leg or a hand, he has suffered something. Given that the sentence has eight or seven or five parts, how can a complete sentence consist of two or three or four parts? Therefore they are not parts of a sentence.

The Scholiast then presents a long digression on the two modes of being deficient ( GG I.3, 517, 4ff.), which will not be quoted. He concludes that this is an argument against the Peripatetics, and it is immediately clear that its orientation is Platonic. Thereafter the Scholiast discusses the ordering of the parts of speech definitely showing Apollonian influences; but this is quite an independent elaboration of the Apollonian argument.

15

The noun and the verb are to be placed before the other parts, since they can form an independent clause without the others, e.g. Socrates is reading. It is justified to place them first, as they are nearly the only parts and the others exist for their sake. That which exists for the sake of something else is secondary. The noun holds the primary position because it expresses the substance, and the verb accidents, the substances being prior to accidents. Or because when the noun is refuted, even the verb is refuted. Or the noun is brought along, while the verb brings along; those that are brought along are prior to those bringing along. And because the noun makes (a construction) complete, and the verb is made complete; those that make complete are prior to those that are made complete. [135-136] Since the participle is nothing more than the noun and the verb, it is placed before (the other five parts of speech). The article precedes pronouns since articles are used with nouns and pronouns are used instead of nouns, and that which is used with something precedes that which is used instead of something, and because the pronoun is not only used instead of the noun, but even instead of the article which is attached to the noun. The preposition precedes the adverbs, since the preposition is used with the nouns on its own. The adverbs are joined to verbs in their own right: I write well. Nouns precede verbs; it is therefore appropriate that the preposition which is associated with the noun should precede the verb which is associated with the verb. The conjunction holds the final position, since its function is to bind together the prior mentioned parts of speech (GG I.3, 515, 19-29).

But the Scholiast proceeds to claim that the function of these parts of speech is not to bind the noun and the verb, but each part has a meaning of its own, and they do not bind together nouns and verbs. Thus in The man walks about the article the bears a relationship to the noun, but none whatsoever to the verb. Conversely, in the man walks about beautifully the adverb kals bears a relationship to the verb but none whatever to the noun and so forth ( GG I.3, 515, 35). The second objection is to the argument that only a noun and a verb are needed to form a complete sentence. That is so: but similarly a man, for example, may be without hands or feet but cannot be without a brain or a heart. One does not then say that hands or feet are not parts of a man. Likewise it does not follow that the other elements are not parts of a sentence; merely that the noun and the verb are the pre-eminent parts. 1 Again, it appears unlikely that this discussion is authentically Apollonian, as it explicitly refers to Plato ( GG I.3, 517, 10).

Cf. also Apulieus of Madaura. The Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius. sec. IV. [In: David Londey and Carmen Johanson. The Logic of Apuleius (Brill, 1987, p. 85)]:
IV. A proposition, as Plato says in the Theaetetus, consists of two very special parts of speech, the noun and the verb,2 e.g. Apuleius argues, which is either true or false, and so is a proposition. From this, some men have thought that these two are the only parts of speech because a complete utterance can be made from these alone that is, because they express a meaning very well.3 Indeed, adverbs, pronouns, participles, conjunctions, and other such things which grammarians list are no more parts of speech than ornamented curved stems are parts of ships or hair of men; or at least they are fit to be classed in the general structure of speech like nails, pitch and glue.4
1

On this matter, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 6, n. 6 (tr. Jean T. Oesterle): Now, since what is properly called a part of a whole is that which contributes immediately to the formation of the whole, and not that which is a part of a part, some parts should be understood as the parts from which speech is immediately formed, i.e., the name and verb, and not as parts of the name or verb, which are syllables or letters. But neither should their various bindings and joinings be considered parts, properly speaking. 2 More literally, the statement reads, Moreover, as Plato says in the Theatetus, a proposition minimally (paucissimus) consists of a noun [or name] and a verb. See the Latin given below. 3 That is to say, a name composed with a verb sufficiently comprehends a thought. 4 Ceterum propositio, ut ait in Theateto Plato, duabus paucissimus orationis partibus constat, nomine et verbo, ut: Apuleius disserit, quod aut verum aut falsam est et ideo propositio est. Unde quidam rati sunt has duas solas orationis esse partes, quod ex his soli fieri possit perfecta oratio, id est, quod abunde

16

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

Or it may be said that only the name and the verb are [the] principal parts of speech. For under names are comprehended pronouns, which, although they do not name a nature, nevertheless determine a person, and therefore are put in place of names. But under the verb, the participle, because it consignifies time, although it have an agreement with the name. But the others are more bonds of the parts of speech, signifying the relationship [ habitudo] of one thing to another, than parts of speech [themselves], just as spikes [or nails] and other things of this kind are not parts of a ship, but conjunctions of the parts of a ship. 1

On the various bonds and gluings mentioned in the foregoing texts, cf. Ineke Sluiter, Parapleromatic Lucubrations, from footnote 30, p. 242:2
The more general usage of and in Aristotle 3 also points in this direction. and are two of the means by which unity is achieved, e.g. Ar. Met. 2, 1042bl6ff. (, , , , ); Met. 1, 1052a24 . Interestingly, these metaphors are picked up and applied to all the lesser parts of speech by Ammonius In Ar. int., CAG IV 5.12.25ff.: ' , , ;4 cf. 13.3ff. Obviously, in none of these cases does the application of the metaphor envisage the parapleromatics.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. VIII. 2 (1042b 15-19) (tr. H. G. Apostle):

But many differences appear to exist. For example, some things are spoken of as being combinations of matters, as in the case of things formed by fusion, such as honey-water, others as being bound together, such as a bundle, others as being glued together, such as a book, others as being nailed together, such as a casket, others in more than one of the ways.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. X. 1 (1052a 151052b 2) (tr. H. G. Apostle):

[15] That one is used in many senses has been stated previously in our account of the various meanings of terms.1 Although one has many meanings, things which are called one primarily and essentially, but not accidentally, can be summarized under four heads.
sententiam comprehendant. Adverbia autem et pronomina et participia et coniunctiones et id genus cetera, quae grammaticii numerant, non magis partes orationis quam navium aplustria et hominum pilos aut certe in universa compage orationis vice clavorum et picis et glutinis deputanda . (excerpt from Apuleius Liber Peri ermeneias) More literally: or at least they are as a whole assigned the role of conjoining [the parts] of speech like nails, pitch, and glue [conjoin the parts of a ship]. 1 vel potest dici quod sola nomina et verba sunt principales orationis partes. sub nominibus enim comprehenduntur pronomina, quae, etsi non nominant naturam, personam tamen determinant, et ideo loco nominum ponuntur: sub verbo vero participium, quod consignificat tempus: quamvis et cum nomine convenientiam habeat. alia vero sunt magis colligationes partium orationis, significantes habitudinem unius ad aliam, quam orationis partes; sicut clavi et alia huiusmodi non sunt partes navis, sed partium navis coniunctiones. 2 (https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/retrieve/4156/347_017.pdf+parapleromatic&hl=en [11/11/05]) 3 Desmos, bond, fetter; kolla, glue. I give next the passages Sluiter cites from Aristotle. 4 Cf. Ammonius Hermeias supra: For just as the planks of a ship are properly speaking its parts, while bolts, [tow], and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole, in the same way in speech conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves do the work of bolts....

17

(1) Things are one if they are continuous, either simply 2, or in the [20] highest degree by nature, and not by contact or by being bound together, and of these, those whose motion is more indivisible and more simple are one to a higher degree and are prior. 3
1 2

1015b161017a6. That is, just continuous, without any restrictions or regardless of the cause. 3 1016a5-17.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., XIV. 5 (1092a 22-28) (ed. & tr. W. D. Ross):
Those who say that existing things come from elements and that the first of existing things are the numbers, should have first distinguished the senses in which one thing comes from another, and then said in which sense number comes from its first principles. By intermixture? But (1) not everything is capable of intermixture, and [25] (2) that which is produced by it is different from its elements, and on this view the one will not remain separate or a distinct entity; but they want it to be so. By juxtaposition, like a syllable? But then (1) the elements must have position; and (2) he who thinks of number will be able to think of the unity and the plurality apart; number then will be thisa unit and plurality, or the one and the unequal.

Doctrinal Summary: Unlike the name and the verb, which, being conjoined, by themselves produce complete speech, conjunctions (along with prepositions, or the conjunctive parts of speech generally) are more like bonds of the parts of speech than parts themselves; the former being like the composing parts of a ship, its planks and beams, etc.; the latter, as with pitch, tow, and nails, their bindings or gluings. One may therefore distinguish the proper parts of speech being those which immediately enter into its constitutionfrom the restconjunctions, prepositions, articles and the like. In sum, just as one could not construct a ship out of pitch and tow and wax, or nails and bolts and the like, so neither can one produce speech out conjunctions, prepositions, articles, or adverbs. 5. An overview of the foregoing witnesses. Cf. Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (North-Holland: Amsterdam and London, 1973), sec. 6.2.5, pp. 96-97:
It is evident that the importance assigned to the noun and the verb as the indispensable ingredients of a self-sufficient utterance that can be true or false has certain consequences for the treatment of the other elements of speech. It seems that the Peripatetics took the most radical attitude and refused to admit other parts of speech ( mer tou logou) than nouns and verbs. In his commentary on the De interpretatione (ed. Busse p. 12, 29) Ammonius says that it would be wrong to call conjunctions, articles, pronouns, and adverbs parts of speech, because no combination of these elements alone can yield a perfect utterance. This is confirmed by the Scholia on Dionysius Thrax (ed. Hilgard p. 515, 19), where we read that the Peripatetics recognized only two parts of speech, the noun and the verb. The other words are not parts of speech but are used only as a means of binding the actual parts together, as a kind of glue. The noun and the verb may be compared to the sides, the rudder, and the sail of a ship, whereas the other words are more like the pitch, the tow, and the nails.

18

Others took a less extreme course: they admitted the other kinds of words as parts of speech but drew a borderline between the nouns and verbs, which are necessary components of a complete statement-making utterance, and the rest. Nouns and verbs are the parts of speech in the most proper and genuine sense, being as it were the body and soul of the utterance (Anecdota Graeca, ed. I. Bekker II, p. 881, 2; cf. also Scholia on Dionysius Thrax, ed. Hilgard p. 216, 13). Apollonius Dyscolus ( De adverbiis, ed. Schneider p. 121, 5) says that the noun and the verb are the most important ( thematiktera) parts of speech and that the other parts only serve to make them function in a ready way. Elsewhere ( De syntaxi, ed. Uhlig p. 28, 6) he calls the noun and the verb the most vital ( empsychotata) parts of speech; if the speaker does not make them known, he will cause the hearer to ask questions about them. One of the criteria for drawing a distinction between two groups of parts of speech, then, is the contribution they make to the completeness of an utterance. Another criterion is reminiscent of what Aristotle ( De int. 16 b 20) says about the difference between the copula and other verbs. As we saw in 3.2.2, verbs by themselves do not yet signify something is the case or not, but most of them have a meaning on their own in the sense that the speaker arrests his thought and the hearer pauses. The copula, on the other hand, is nothing by itself, but it additionally signifies some synthesis, which cannot be thought of without the components. This criterion whether or not the word is accompanied by a thought which is relatively distinct and self-sufficient is also applied by Plutarch ( Platonicae quaestiones 1010a), [96-97] as we already noted in 4.1.4. The verbs beats and is beaten and the nouns Socrates and Pythagoras make us think of something; but if such words as men, gar, peri are pronounced in isolation, they are not associated with any distinct thought or either a pragma or a sma. Unless they are uttered in combination with nouns and verbs, they are like empty noises; by themselves they signify nothing. In the same vein is the remark made by Apollonius Dyscolus (De syntaxi, ed. Uhlig p. 27, 10) that a conjunction does not signify in an independent way, just as binding material is useless if there are no objects which it binds together.1 In De syntaxi (ed. Uhlig p. 13, 1) he draws a parallel between words and sounds. Just as we can distinguish between vowels (which by themselves form a sound) and consonants (which cannot form a sound without a vowel), so we can distinguish between, on the one hand, verbs, nouns, pronouns, and some adverbs (for instance, Very well) and, on the other hand, prepositions, articles, and con-junctions, which are more like consonants in so far as they have no meaning on their own but signify only together with the other parts of speech (syssmainein, a term which is also used of conjunctions in De coniunctionibus, ed. Schneider p. 222, 12).2 As the completeness of an utterance is determined by the completeness of the thought expressed by it, it is not surprising that the two criteria lead to much the same result: nouns and verbs are the essential components of a complete utterance because they contribute those parts of the complete thought which can also be conceived in isolation.

Cf. ibid., sec. 8.1.1, pp. 123-124:

Boethius identifies the simple interpretationes with verbs and nouns among which he includes also participles, pronouns, adverbs, and some interjections and contrasts them with conjunctions and prepositions, which by themselves do not signify anything but designnate something only in combination with other words and are, therefore, not interpretati1

Cf. ed. Householder, p. 27, cited above: 28. After all the parts that have been listed we take the conjuncttion, which conjoins, and cannot convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, just as physical bonds are no use if there are no physical objects [to connect]. Note how this explanation agrees both with what Aristotle says about the copula, as well as with the Peripatetic tradition on conjunctions as being bonds of the parts of speech. (B.A.M.) 2 For this text, and the corresponding passage in Priscian, see below.

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ones. While the [123-124] grammarians distinguish eight parts of speech ( orationis partes), the philosophers consider the parts of speech only those expressions which have a full signification (quidquid plenam significationem tenet ), namely the verb and the noun, with which participles, adverbs, pronouns, and conventional interjections may be aligned. Conjunctions and prepositions, on the other hand, are not parts of speech for philosophers but merely means of holding the actual parts together, comparable to a chariots reins and strips of leather (In P. herm. (II) p. 14, 28; Intr. 766 A-C; De syll. cat. 796 D). The copula est or non est is said to signify or designate the quality of a statement, just as the words omnis, nullus, and quidam signify the quantity (Intr. 769 A-B). As the signs of quality and of quantity are distinguished from the termini, which are the nouns and the verbs serving as subjects and predicates, their signification must be of the same kind as the signification of conjunctions and prepositions: they signify only in combination with interpretationes. Boethius does not yet have a technical term for all those words which are not interpretationnes. That such a technical term already existed is shown by a remark of his contemporary Priscian (Institutiones grammaticae, ed. Hertz I, p. 54, 5): according to the dialecticians there are only two parts of speech, the noun and the verb, since they alone make a combination of words complete even if it consists of nothing else; the other parts they called synkatgoremata, that is, consignificantia. That the dialecticians cannot be the Stoics is clear from the next line, in which Priscian says that according to the Stoics there are five parts of speech. As to the meaning of the Greek term synkatgoremata, it is advisable, I think, to follow Priscians explanation, namely that it literally means things which co-signify. There is good evidence that katgorein was used in the sense of indicating, revealing, signifying, and katgorema in the sense of indication or sign. It is therefore plausible to assume that synkatgorein could be a synonym of such verbs as prossmainein (Cf. 3.2.2)2 and syssmainein (Cf. 6.2.5). It is from this passage in Priscians grammar that the technical terms syncategorema and consignificans, which often occur in medieval writings, originate.[1]
2

In his translation of De interpretatione Boethius uses the verb consignificare to render prossmainein.

6. The foregoing doctrine according to Priscian. Cf. Priscian, Inst. gram. GL II 549-551. (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), pp. 132-133]:
Nec solum participium non ab alique propria vi, sed ab affinitate nominis et verbi nominatum est, sed aliae quoque quinque partes orationis non a sua vi, sed ab adiunctione, quam habent ad nomen vel verbum, vocabulum acceperunt: pronomen enim dicitur quod pro nomine ponitur, et adverbium, quod verbo adiungitur, et praepositio, quae tam nomini quam verbo praeponitur, et coniunctio, quae coniungit ea, et interiectio, quae his interiacet. Not only the participle but even the other five parts of speech are named according to their connection with the noun and the verb rather than on account of some property of their own. For the pronoun is so named because it is used instead of a noun, and the adverb because it is joined to the verb; and the preposition, as it is joined to both nouns and verbs; and the conjunction, since it joins these two parts, and the interjection, because it lies between them.

1[]

On the meanings of the terms Nuchelmans considers, see further below.

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Unde est dicendum, quod, si non sit nomen et verbum, nec alia pars orationis constare poterit. Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et verbum solas esse partes orationis, cetera vero admincula vel iuncturas earum, quomodo navium partes sunt tabulae et trabes, cetera autem, id est stuppa et clavi et similia vincula et conglutinationes partium navis (hoc est tabularum et trabium), non partes navis dicuntur. sed est obiciendum ad hoc, quod cera et stuppa non ex eadem constat materia, ex qua tabulae et trabes, coniunctiones autem et praepositiones et similia ex eadem sunt materia, ex qua et nomen et verbum constat, hoc est literis et syllabis et accentibus et intellectu. itaque etiam per se prolatae, quod partes sunt orationis, ostendunt. quid enim est aliud pars orationis nisi vox indicans mentis conceptum, id est cogitationem? quaecumque igitur vox literata profertur significans aliquid, iure pars orationis est dicenda. quod si non essent partes, numquam loco earum nomina ponerentur, cum loco cerae vel stuppae in navi tabula fungi non potest; invenimus enim loco adverbii nomen, ut una, multum, falso, qua, et pronomen similiter: eo, illo, et loco coniunctionis tam nomen quam pronomen: quare, ideo, et adverbium loco nominis, ut mane novum et sponte sua et euge tuum et belle et cras alterum. sed si, quia compaginem videntur praestare nomini et verbo, non sunt partes orationis dicendae, ergo nec partes corporis debemus accipere nervos, quia ligant membra et articulos, quod penitus videtur absurdum. multo melius igitur, qui principales et egregias partes nomen dicunt et verbum, alias autem his nominis et verbi, nihil mirum, cum inueniuntur quaedam nominationes etiam ex abnegatione nascentes, ut neutrum genus, quod nec masculinum est nec femininum, et infinitum verbum, quod personam non habet.

Therefore, it must be said, that without the noun and the verb, no other part would exist. Therefore some philosophers regarded the noun and the verb as the sole parts of speech, and the others as having a supporting and binding function, in the same way in a ship, its parts are the sides, the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails are not parts but things that bind and glue the parts together. But to this it must be objected that wax, tow and nails are not made of the same material as the sides, rudder and the sail; but conjunctions and prepositions and their like are made of the same material, as even the noun and the verb, that is of letters, syllables, accents and meaning. Therefore, even when pronounced as such, they prove to be parts of speech. [For what is a part of speech unless a vocal expression which signifies a mental concept, namely a thought? Whatever is expressed by means of a literate vocal form, which signifies something, is a part of speech.] Were they not parts of speech, nouns could not be used instead of them, whereas pitch and tow cannot replace the sides of a ship. For the noun is used instead of the adverb, e.g., una, multum, falso, qua; and so can the pronoun: eo, illo; both the noun and the pronoun can be used instead of the conjunction (quare, ideo), and the adverb instead of the noun, e.g., mane novum and sponte sua and euge tuum and belle et cras alterum. For if they are not to be called parts of speech because they seem to bind the noun and the verb, neither must sinews be regarded as parts of a body, because they join together limbs and joints, what [read which] seems totally absurd. It is therefore much preferable to say that the noun and the verb are the principal and most eminent parts, the others being adjuncts. It is no wonder that the participle should receive its name from the noun and the verb, since even some names derive from a negation, e.g. neuter gender, which is neither masculine nor feminine, and infinite verb, which lacks person.

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participium est igitur pars orationis, quae pro verbo accipitur, ex quo et derivatur naturaliter, genus et casum habens ad similitudinem nominis et accidentia verbo absque discretione personarum et modorum.

[Therefore the participle is a part of speech which is taken in place of the verb, from which it naturally derives, having gender and case similar to the noun and accidents to the verb without distinction of persons and moods. (tr. B.A.M)]

6. Note on the foregoing. The reader will note that the objections raised against the doctrinal point at issue in the foregoing passage are exceedingly weak and quite easily disposed of. With respect to the first objection, to claim that, inasmuch as they are made of the same stuff, conjunctions and the like are therefore the same kind of thing as the name and the verb is like claiming that a table is the same kind of thing as the chairs surrounding it because they happen to be made of the same kind of wood; it being the form of a thing rather than its matter which gives it its species. As for the second objection, were one so-called part of speech to be used as another, it would no longer taken as that part of speech. Conversely, just as a pair of pliers would not become a hammer if someone were to manage to use them to drive in a nail, so neither would a noun become a conjunction were someone to find a way to use it to conjoin the other parts of speech, supposing such a thing even possible.

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7. The copulative conjunction according to Averroes. Cf. Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Averrois Expositio Poeticae interprete Hermanno Alemanno, textum receptum revisit L. M.-P (ap. Aristoteles Latinus XXXIII, editio altera, De Arte Poetica. Translatio Gullelmi De Moerbeka. Ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello), p. 66. [eng. tr. B.A.M.]:
DIXIT. Copulatio est vox composita non significativa separatim, ut est et, deinde, atque, et universaliter dictiones consignificative, que sunt tamquam ligamenta partium orationis ad se invicem; et hec autem in principio sermonis, ut quoniam, quidem; et dictiones conditionales que significant continuationem, ut si, quando et consimiles. DIXIT. Disiunctio vero est etiam vox composita non significativa separatim disiunc-tiva dictionis a dictione, ut aut, vel,* sive, et consimiles; et dictiones exceptive, ut preter, preterquam, et consimiles; et adversative ut sed, verum, verumtamen, et consimiles. Et iste aut ponuntur in principio orationis aut in fine [B 236] aut in medio. Et intendimus hic per sermonem nostrum vox non significativa separatim voces simplices que, quando coniunguntur aliis, consignificant ut dictiones sincathegoreumatice, non voces simplices ut sunt littere; quoniam voces significative separatim composite ex vocibus pluribus aut tribus aut quator aut amplius secundum [L 33] figures compositionum sillibicarum, sunt nomen et verbum. HE SAID. A copulative is a composite vocal sound not significative separately, as is and, then, and also, and in general consignificative words, which are like bonds of the parts of speech with one another; and these, however, [are placed] at the beginning of speech, such as seeing that, indeed [or now]; and conditional words which signify continuation, such as if, when, and the like. HE SAID. But a disjunctive is also a composite vocal sound not significative separately that disjoins a word from a word, such as either or or, and the like; and exceptive words, such as except, except for, and the like; and adversative [words], such as but, however, but indeed, and the like. And these are placed either at the beginning of speech, or at the end, or in the middle. And by our remark vocal sound not significative separately here we mean simple vocal sounds which when conjoined to others consignify as syncategorematic words, not simple vocal sounds like letters [or elements] , seeing as how vocal sounds significative separately composed from many vocal sounds, whether three or four or more according to the [various] arrangements of the composition of syllables, are the name and the verb.

* N.B. Minio-Paluello is wrong to treat vel as an example; rather it must be taken formally as joining the other two words in the example, as is the case with the Preminger translation (for which see elsewhere) and the corresponding passage as translated by Butterworth. See my separate discussion.

8. Note on Averroes text. 23

The reader will note here that the text of Averroes explanation requires revision, as it makes no sense as it stands. Taken generally, the sense of his remarks is clear: those simple vocal sounds which do not signify something by themselves are said to consignify as syncategorematic words; such vocal sounds being called simple in a sense different from that of letters. To understand this last observation, it must be borne in mind that the letter or elementum is distinguished from the syllable inasmuch as the former is indivisible, whereas the latter, being composed of two or more letters, is composite. 1 But a similar distinction is made with respect to a vocal sound significative by itself, it being either simple, like black or bird, or composite, like blackbird. 2 Now if we emend the text in the light of these distinctions, we can arrive at the following (intelligible) reading:
seeing as how vocal sounds significative separately, < being either simple, or> composed from many vocal sounds, whether <two or> three or four or more according to the [various] arrangements of the composition of the syllables, are the name and the verb.

That is to say, those vocal sounds which are significative separately are the name and the verb, and these are either simple or are composed from many vocal sounds, whether two or three or four or however many, etc. Still, it must be pointed out that, as explained elsewhere, even syncategorematic words, though called simple here, can be composite, as Averroes own (Arabic) examples show.3 But a further emendation regarding the mention of letters in the preceding member is called for by Averroes reference to the composition of the syllables in the present clause, as well as by the role played by the syllable in the definition of speech, as at De Int. I. 4 16b 30.4 In light of these considerations, I read the <syllables and> letters (i.e. elements) <composing names>. Moreover, as we have seen from our discussion on the forms of name, there is a reason why Aristotle would have drawn a distinction between syllables and conjunctions on the one hand, and the name and the verb on the other, seeing as how the former agree in not signifying something by themselves, whereas the latter do. But then he would have had to have noted the difference between them in this regard, inasmuch as the former, as parts of compound names, signify in a certain respect, whereas the latter only consignifythat is, when conjoined to the others, as our witnesses attest, Averroes statement, however, still appears incomplete, but may be perfected by supplementing it with the relevant parts of other witnesses cited above, as we shall endeavor to show in our separate reconstruction of the definition of the conjunction. 8. Note on the provenance of the foregoing doctrines: As we have seen, with regard to the doctrine under discussion, namely, that the name and the verb were considered to be the two sole parts of speech , David Blank, the translator of Ammonius Hermeias, states:
1 2

Cf. Aristotle, Poet. 20 (1456b 22-25; 34-35) And note that this difference of being either simple or composed is addressed by Aristotle in his various accounts of the double name (for which, see elsewhere in this paper). 3 And why is he calling them simple when he has just defined them as composite? 4 And cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri. Herm., lect. 6, n. 6 (tr. B.A.M.): But because that is properly called a part of some whole which immediately enters into the constitution of the whole, but not the part of a part; therefore, this must be understood about the parts from which speech is immediately constituted, namely, from the name and the verb, but not about the parts of the name or the verb, which are syllables or letters .

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I believe that the distinction made here by Ammonius cannot be traced back further than Porphyry, whose interest in Stoic logic may have inspired him to interpret Aristotles usage in this way....

Now inasmuch as it is inextricably bound up with other teachings that are undeniably those of the Philosopher himself, one is left to wonder what sort of evidence Blank would require in order to accept Aristotle as its ultimate source. As the reader will have observed, essential components of this complexus are directly attributed to the Poetics by Boethius, Ammonius, and Averroes; the last reporting essentials of the same doctrine in the text of the Poetics he was commenting upon. Those witnesses who do not mention Aristotle, but are in evident agreement with them, such as Apollonius Dyscolus, the Scholiast, and Priscian, it is reasonable to believe must ultimately derive from the same source. 1 Consequently, I see no reason to resort to a work of Porphyry, or of any similar predecessor, whether influenced by the Stoics or otherwise, to account for the provenance of this teaching. Now in light of the fact that our versions of Aristotles book or books About the Poetic Art are incomplete, it is not unreasonable to presume Aristotle and the Poetics to be their fons et origo. Indeed, unless one discover some manifest incompatibility with the Philosophers assured teaching, the most reasonable course is to treat these witnesses as preserving otherwise lost portions of the text. Of course, the reader may agree with this view of things without taking my reconstructions as definitive; but then, as this sort of undertaking could never be more than provisional, I make no such claim on their behalf. 9. Some additional texts supplementing the foregoing. Cf. Averroes Middle Commentary on Aristotles Poetics. Translation by Charles E. Butterworth, from the Arabic MSS, p. 118
81. He said: the conjunction is a compound sound that has no meaning when taken by itself. In general, they are the letters binding one part of discourse to another....

Cf. The Middle Commentary of Averroes of Cordova on the Poetics of Aristotle. Translated by Alex Preminger, O.B. Hardison, & Kevin Kerrane, p. 373:
Aristotle says: A conjunction is a composite sound that does not mean anything by itself, ...and in general words of like meaning that are like the cords tying the parts of the statement together.

Cf. Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Averrois Expositio Poeticae [sc. Aristotelis], ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 66 (tr. B.A.M.):
HE SAID. A copulative is a composite vocal sound not significative separately, ...and in general consignificative words, which are like bonds of the parts of speech with one another....2

And I know of no route by which Latin authors such as Boethius and Priscian could have reached an Islamic philosopher like Ibn Rushd, for which reason the simplest hypothesis to account for their evident agreement is a common source: but two of these three witnesses explicitly cite the Poetics for their doctrine. 2 Dixit. Copulatio est vox composita non significativa separatim, ut est et, deinde, atque, et universaliter dictiones consignificative, que sunt tamquam ligamenta partium orationis ad se invicem ....

25

Cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax (= The Syntax or Peri Suntaxes [De Constructione] of Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and with commentary by Fred W. Householder), Bk. I, n. 28, p. 28:
After all the parts that have been listed we take the conjunction, which conjoins, and cannot convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, just as physical bonds are no use if there are no physical objects [to connect].

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.):
For they always consignifythat is, they signify when conjoined to the othersbut by themselves they do not.1

On the parts of speech in general, cf. Boethius, Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos, init. (ed. Migne, PL 64, 766 A-B; tr. B.A.M.):
Restat igitur ut de oratione dicamus sed prius uidetur esse monstrandum utrumne nomen et uerbum sola in partibus orationis ponantur, an ut grammatici uolunt et reliquae orationis partibus debeant aggregari. Grammatici enim considerantes uocum figuras, octo orationis partes annumerant. [766B] Philosophi uero, quorum omnis de nomine uerboque tractatus in significatione est constituta, duas tantum orationis partes esse docuerunt, quidquid plenam significationem tenet, siquidem sine tempore significat, nomen uocantes, uerbum uero si cum tempore: atque ideo aduerbia quidem atque pronomina nominibus iungunt, sine tempore enim quiddam constitutum definitumque significant, nec interest quod flecti casibus nequeunt, non est hoc nominum proprium ut casibus inflectantur. Sunt enim nomina quae a grammaticis *monoptota* nominantur, participium uero quia temporis significationem trahit, etsi casibus effertur, uerbo tamen recte coniungitur. Accordingly it remains for us to speak about speech, but first it seems that whether the noun and the verb alone are [to be] placed among the parts of speech must be shown, or whether, as the grammarians wish, the remaining parts of speech ought to be included. For grammarians, considering the (various) arrangements of words, enumerate eight parts of speech. [766B] But philosophers, all of whom have treated the noun and the verb as being established in signification, have taught that there are only two parts of speech, calling whatever has a complete signification a noun if it signifies without time, but a verb if (it signifies) with time: and so accordingly they join adverbs and pronouns to nouns, for some of them [being so] constituted and defined signify without time, which are not inflected for case; for this is not unique to the noun, that they be inflected for cases. For there are nouns which are named monoptota by grammarians, but the participle because it draws to itself the signification of time, even if it is put forward with cases, is nevertheless rightly conjoined to the verb.

eae etenim semper consignificant, id est coniunctae aliis significant, per se autem non . Cp. Boethius remarks just cited to the effect that conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves unless joined to the others; statements manifestly bearing witness to a common tradition of doctrine.

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Interiectiones autem siquidem, naturaliter significent, nec uerbo, nec nomini copulandae sunt; uerbi enim ac nominis definitiones non habent esse [766C] naturalia sed ad ponentis placitum constituta, atque ideo nec in orationis partibus numerabuntur.

But interjections in fact signify naturally, [and so] are to be coupled neither to the noun nor the verb. For the definitions of the verb and the noun need not be natural but are established at the pleasure of the one imposing the name, and so accordingly they [interjections] are not to be numbered among the parts of speech.1

For more a particular observation relevant to the foregoing, cf. Boethius, Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos (ed. Migne, PL 64, 762 D ff.; tr. B.A.M.):
...uelut quod nomen designatiua uox dicitur. Sunt enim uoces quae nihil designant, ut syllabae, nomen uero designatiua uox est, quoniam nomen designat id semper cuius nomen est. <...> Quae uero ipsa, quidem nulla propria significatione nituntur, cum aliis uero iunctae designnant, ut coniunctiones atque praepositiones, illae ne partes quidem orationis esse dicendae sunt; oratio enim ex significatiuis partibus iuncta est. Quocirca recte nomen ac uerbum solae orationis partes esse dicuntur. ...just as a name is called a designative vocal sound. For there are vocal sounds which designate nothing, like syllables, but the name is a designnative vocal sound since a name always designnates that of which it is the name. <...> But those which themselves depend on no signification of their own, but designate when joined to the others, like conjunctions and prepositions, are not in fact to be called parts of speech; for speech is joined from significative parts. For which reason the name and verb are rightly said to be the parts of speech.

Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Secundae Editionis, Liber Primus [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64; tr. B.A.M.):
Quamquam duae propriae partes orationis esse dicendae sint, nomen scilicet atque uerbum. Haec enim per sese utraque significant, coniunctiones autem uel praepositiones nihil omnino nisi cum aliis iunctae designant.... Therefore two things are to be called the proper parts of speech, namely, the name and the verb. For these two signify by themselves; but conjunctions or prepositions signify nothing at all unless they are joined to the others....

If the Latin text is correct, I confess I do not understand the point being made here.

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10. The Peripatetic tradition on the conjunctive parts of speech in relation to the name and the verb: a compendium of texts.
(1) A copulative is a [simple or] composite (2) After all the parts that have been listed we vocal sound not significative separately, 1 as is take the conjunction, which conjoins, and canand, then, and also, not convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, and in general consignificative words, which just as physical bonds are no use if there are no are like bonds of the parts of speech with physical objects [to connect]. (Apollonius Dysone another.... (Averroes) colus) (3) But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but (4) For they always consignifythat is, they signify nothing by themselves. (Boethius) signify when conjoined to the othersbut by themselves they do not. (Priscian) (5) Therefore two things are to be called the proper parts of speech, namely, the name and the verb. For these two signify by themselves; but conjunctions or prepositions signify nothing at all unless they are joined to the others.... (Boethius)

[cf. Poet. ch 20, where Aristotles definition of the name makes it clear that, unlike the syllables some of them are composed of, as with Theodoron, it signifies by itself]

(6) Therefore the parts of speech according to (7) But why, one might ask, when what the the Dialecticians are two, the name [5] and the grammarians call the parts of speech (tou verb, merou logou) are various, does he now teach us only these, the name and the verb? since these two alone by themselves when conjoined produce complete speech. Because, we shall say, these alone, without all the others, can produce enunciative speech, as when we [5] say man is healthy. (Ammonius Hermeias)

But the other parts they named syncategoremata; that is to say, consignificantia [or co- [On these technical terms, cf. (9) infra] signifying words]. (Priscian) (8) Wherefore, since among the parts of speech there are certain ones which signify nothing by themselves, yet do convey a meaning when joined to the others, as do conjunctions or prepositions, these things we do not call interpretations (Boethius) (9) And by our remark vocal sound not significative separately here we mean simple vocal sounds which, when conjoined to the others consignify as syncategorematic words, not simple vocal sounds like the letters [read the syllables and letters (or elements)] composing names], seeing as how vocal sounds significative separately composed from many vocal sounds, whether <two or> three or four or more according to the [various] arrangements of the composition of the syllables, are the name and the verb. (Averroes)

[cf. Poet. ch. 21 (1457a 32-1457b 36) on names which are single or double, etc.]

Rather, as is stated in (4), (5), (8), and (9), it signifies only when conjoined to the others.

28

(10) For there are vocal sounds which designate [cf. De Int. I. 4 (16b 30) where Aristotle exnothing, like [elements and] syllables, but the plains that one syllable of a simple name (like name is a designative vocal sound since a name apple in English) does not signify anything.] always designates that of which it is the name. <...> But those which themselves depend on no sig- [cf. 5 supra] nification of their own, but designate when joined to the others, like conjunctions and prepositions, are not in fact to be called parts of (11) For neither alone nor joined one with anspeech; other do they signify anything. (Plutarch) for speech is joined from significative parts. For which reason the name and verb are rightly said to be the parts of speech. (Boethius) (12) That is why Aristotle in the books he wrote About the Poetic Art also taught that syllables and conjunctions are parts of language, of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all. (Boethius) (14) And these are useful for the specific sorts of composition (sunthesis) and construction (suntaxis) of the parts of speech with one another, just as a bond (is useful) for adding unity to things bound and glue to things joined by it. But these are not parts of the things bound or glued, and neither are conjunctions, articles, prepositions or adverbs particles (moria) of speech (Ammonius Hermeias) (16) Therefore some philosophers regarded the noun and the verb as the sole parts of speech , and the others as having a supporting and binding function, in the same way in a ship, its parts are the sides, the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails are not parts but things that bind and glue the parts together. (Priscian) (13) So these are not parts of speech, but they are parts of language, of which speech itself also is a [13,1] part, as has been said in [the books] About the Poetic Art [e)n toi=j Peri\ poihtikh=j ei)/rhtai]. (Ammonius Hermeias) (15) (cf. 1 supra) After all the parts that have been listed we take the conjunction, which conjoins, and cannot convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, just as physical bonds are no use if there are no physical objects [to connect]. (Apollonius Dyscolus) [On things bound and glued, cf. the following excerpts.] (17) The Peripatetics believed the parts of speech to be two, the name and the verb; but the rest they did not say were parts of speech, but were added for the sake of binding and gluing. [The noun and the verb may be compared to the sides, the rudder, and the sail of a ship, whereas the other words are more like the pitch, the tow, and the nails ]. (Scholion to Dionysius Thrax)

(18) The name and the verb are reckoned to be the two sole parts, for the rest are not parts of speech but rather supports: for as the bridle [cf. 16 supra] or reins of a chariot are not parts but are in a way certain ligaturesand, as has been said, supports are not even parts

29

so conjunctions and prepositions and other [cf. 1 and 2 supra] things of this sort are not parts of speech but certain bonds. (Boethius) (19) Moreover, just as a boat can be made of a single piece of wood, without glue or binding agent, so a sentence can consist of just a noun and a verb, without words of any other type. But a sentence cannot be formed with no noun or with no verb, just as, by implication, no boat can consist just of pitch, tow and nails. Just as there are ships made of one piece of wood only, he argues, similarly there are sentences which need no binding, e.g. Swkra/thj peripatei=, Swkra/thj u(giai/nei Socrates is walking, Socrates flourishes (GG I.3, 515, 28-29). There is a certain natural union between the noun and the verb, it is claimed, comparable to that between form and matter; this is why they do not need binding. (fragment of Apollonius Dyscolus, On Division, summarized by Anneli Luhtala) [cf. 17 supra] (20) (cf. 13 supra) For just as the planks [or sides] of a ship are properly [25] speaking its parts, while bolts [or nails], [tow], and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole, [cp. Aristotles example of Cleon walks. (Poet. 20, 1457a 26)]

[On this relation, which is that of substance and accident, cf. Peter of Spain, Syncategoreumata, cap. 1, excerpted below.]

in the same way in the speech conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves do the work of bolts, but they would not cor(21) (cf. 16 supra) ...since these two alone by rectly be called parts inasmuch as they cannot themselves when conjoined produce complete be put together and on their own produce a speech. (Priscian) [30] complete speech.1 (Ammonius Hermeias)

Sources: (1) Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Averrois Expositio Poeticae interprete Hermanno Alemanno, textum receptum revisit L. M.-P (ap. Aristoteles Latinus XXXIII, editio altera, De Arte Poetica. Translatio Gullelmi De Moerbeka. Ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello), p. 66. [Eng. tr. B.A.M.] (2) Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax (= The Syntax or Peri Suntaxes [De Constructione] of Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and with commentary by Fred W. House-holder), Bk. I, n. 28, p. 28 (3) Boethius, Introductio ad Syllogismos Categoricos, init. (ed. Migne, PL 64, 766 A-B; tr. B.A.M.) (4) Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.) (5) Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Secundae Editionis, Liber Primus [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64; tr. B.A.M.) (6) Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. p. 15 (5-7) (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.)
1

From this, some men have thought that these two are the only parts of speech because a complete utterance can be made from these alone. (Apulieus of Madaura. The Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius. sec. IV. [In: David Londey and Carmen Johanson. The Logic of Apuleius [Brill, 1987, p. 85])

30

(7) Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary On the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aristotles On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, p. 20) (slightly rev. B.A.M.) (8) Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Primae Editionis . Liber Primus. [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.) (9) Averroes, op.cit. (10) Boethius, Introductio, op.cit. (11) Plutarch, Platonic Questions X (tr. William Watson Goodwin) (12) Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu Majora Commentaria (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.) (13) Ammonius Hermeias, op.cit., pp. 21-22 (14) Ammonius Hermeias, op.cit., p. 21 (15) Apollonius Dyscolus, op.cit. (16) Priscian, Inst. gramm., FL II 551, 18 (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), p. 132 (17) Scholion on Dionysius Thrax (Grammatici Graeci I 3, p. 515, 19; tr. B.A.M.) (18) Boethius, De Syllogismo Categorico. Liber Primus (ed. Migne, PL 64 796C-D; tr. B.A.M.) (19) Apollonius Dyscolous. On Division (summary of fragment) (In: Anneli Luhtala, Grammar and Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), p. 134 (20) Ammonius Hermeias, op.cit., p. 22 (21) Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. p. 15 (5-7) (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.)

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11. Supplement: The Poetics as a source of the foregoing doctrines. It is convenient here to review the doctrines directly attributed to the Poetics by three of our witnesses: (1) Ammonius: (a) the comparison with the parts of a ship: that connectives are like bonds: For just as the planks of a ship are properly [25] speaking its parts, while bolts, [tow] and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole, in the same way in the sentence conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves do the work of bolts, (b) the nature of proper parts: but they would not correctly be called parts inasmuch as they cannot be put together and on their own produce a [30] complete speech. (c) the distinction between parts of language and parts of speech: So these are not parts of speech, but they are parts of lexis [= language], of which speech itself also is a [13,1] part, as has been said in [the books] About the Poetic Art [e)n toi=j Peri\ poihtikh=j ei)/rhtai, ed. Busse]. What is directly attributed to the Poetics: That these, namely, conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs, are not parts of speech, but they are parts of language, of which speech itself is a part. Note that our texts do not make any such statement, nor is there any mention of prepositions and adverbs at all. Still, inasmuch as speech is put down as an element of language, that much is attested. We must consider, then, the possibility that the text once included the other doctrines besides this, namely, the comparison of the connective parts with the bindings of a ship, and the claim about proper parts. (2) Boethius: (a) the agreement between syllables and conjunctions as parts of language:
That is why Aristotle in the books he wrote About the Poetic Art also taught that syllables and conjunctions are parts of language,

(b) that syllables do not signify:

of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all [cf. Poetics ch. 20, 1456b 20ff.].

(c) the definition of the conjunction: 32

But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves. 1 In this book, however, he has established the name and verb as parts of an interpretation, which, of course, signify by themselves.

What is directly attributed to the Poetics: As we noted above, the first two doctrines are found in the Poetics, but not the definition of the conjunction. But, as I have endeavored to show in my paper on Poetics, Ch. 20, of which this is a supplement, the proposed definition fits the account that Aristotle gives of the parts of lexis. (3) Averroes: (a) that the definition of the conjunction includes the note of being not significative by itself: HE SAID. A copulative is a [simple or] composite vocal sound not significative separately, as is and, then, and also, (b) that they are of the sort called consigificative and have the character of being bonds of the parts of speech with one another: and in general consignificative words, which are like bonds of the parts of speech with one another (c) that words which consignify are also sycategorematic and that they are to be distinguished from the letters or elements [and syllables] which agree with them in being not significative separately: And by our remark vocal sound not significative separately here we mean simple vocal sounds which, when conjoined to the others consignify as syncategorematic words, not simple vocal sounds like the letters [read the syllables and letters (or elements)] composing names], seeing as how vocal sounds significative separately composed from many vocal sounds, whether <two or> three or four or more according to the [various] arrangements of the composition of the syllables, are the name and the verb. What is directly attributed to the Poetics: Since the text is a commentary, we must recognize that everything it asserts must have belonged to the text upon which Averroes was commenting.

Needless to say, no such statement concerning conjunctions is to be found in the text of the Poetics which has come down to us, whereas his preceding remarks, as noted, are witnessed to therein. That is to say, of the three things he asserts about the constitution of the text, the first two are undeniably true.

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II. ON HERMENEIA [INTERPRETATION], PHASIS [WORD], AND SYNCATEGOREMATA OR CONSIGNIFICANTIA [CONSIGNIFYING WORDS]. 1. On hermeneia or interpretation in relation to the foregoing doctrine. Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Primae Editionis . Liber Primus. [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):
Wherefore, since among the parts of speech1 there are certain ones which signify nothing by themselves, yet do convey a meaning when joined to the others, as do conjunctions or prepositions, these things we do not call interpretations. 2

Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu Majora Commentaria (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):
For interpretation is articulate vocal sound signifying by itself . But not every vocal sound is interpretation; for there are vocal sounds belonging to the rest of the animals which are not included under the word interpretation. Neither is every locution interpretation because, as has been said, there are certain utterances which lack signification and, although they do not signify anything by themselves, nevertheless when they are joined with the others do signify, like conjunctions. Interpretation, however, consists solely in articulate vocal sounds signifying by themselves. Wherefore the following conversion of statements holds good, that whatever is an interpretation, that signifies, and whatever signifies is named by the word interpretation. That is why Aristotle in the books he wrote about the poetic art also taught that syllables and conjunctions are parts of language [cf. Poetics ch. 20, 1456b 20ff.], of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all. But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves. 3 In this book, however, he has established the name and verb as parts of an interpretation, which, of course, signify by themselves. And nevertheless it cannot be denied that speech is interpretation which, since it is vocal sound joined from parts which are significative, does not lack signification. Wherefore not of speech alone, but also of the name and the verb, and not of locution alone, but also of significative locution, which is interpretation, are treated by Aristotle in this book, and as the name interpretation designates verbs, names, and significative utterances as well, this book is entitled On Interpretation from the common name of the things which are treated in this book; that is, interpretation.4
1 2

Notice how Boethius speaks of parts of speech rather than of language in this earlier commentary. Quare cum sint quaedam in orationis partibus quae per se nihil significant, aliis tamen iuncta designant, ut sunt coniunctiones uel praepositiones, haec interpretationes esse non dicimus . 3 Notice that while the non-significative character of syllables is treated in the text of the Poetics as it has reached us, no such statement concerning conjuctions is to be found there, having beeng lost, with much else, from the work, as I argue at length here and elsewhere.
4

Interpretatio namque est vox articulata per seipsam signifcans. Quocirca non omnis vox interpretatio est, sunt enim caeterorum animalium voces, quae interpretationis vocabulo non tenentur. Nec omnis locutio interpretatio est, idcirco quia (ut dictum est) sunt locutiones quaedam, quae significatione carent et cum per se quaedam non significent, juncta tamen cum aliis significant, ut conjunctiones. Interpretatio autem in solis per se significativis et articulatis vocibus permanent (?). Quare convertitur, ut quidquid sit intepretatio, illud significet. Et quidquid significat, interpretationis vocabulo nuncupetur. Unde etiam ipse quoque Aristoteles in libris quos de Arte poetica scripsit, locutionis partes esse syllabas et conjunctiones etiam tradit, quarum syllabae, in eo quod sunt syllabae, nihil omnino significant. Conjunctiones vero consignificare quidem possunt, per se vero nihil designant . Interpretationis vero partes hoc libro constituit nomen et verbum, quae scilicet per seipsa significant. Nihilominus quoque orationem interpretationem esse constat, quae et ipsa cum vox sit et significativis partibus juncta, significatione non caret. Quare quoniam non de oratione sola, sed etiam de nomine et verbo, nec vero de sola locutione, sed etiam de significativa locutione, quae est interpret-tatio, in hoc libro ab Aristotele tractatur, idcirco quoniam verbis atque nominibus, et significativis locutionibus nomen interpretationis aptatur, a communi nomine eorum de quibus in hoc libro tractatur, id est interpretatione,

34

Cf. Boethius, Commentarium In Librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Primae Editionis . Liber Primus. [Introductio] (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.):
But the intention of the work we have before us must be briefly explained: for in Greek the book is entitled PERHERMENEIAS, which in Latin means On Interpretation. What interpretation is must therefore be cleared up a little. Interpretation is significative vocal sound signifying something by itself . For whether it be a name, which signifies by itself, as is manor whether a verb, as is [I] runor whether what the grammarians call the participle [, as is running]or whether it is a pronoun [, as is I]or whether [it is] speech conjoined from these, as is Man runsor whether in any other way either a name or a verb or speech conjoined from these might signify something by itself, it is named interpretation. Wherefore, since among the parts of speech 1 there are certain ones which signify nothing by themselves, yet do convey a meaning when joined to the others, as do conjunctions or prepositions, these things we do not call interpretations. For interpretation is either simple, like the name and verb, or complex, like speech conjoined and coupled from these, or should signify by itself, if it is simple, or being conjoined from these [words] which signify by themselves, if it is composed. Wherefore interpretation is vocal sound signifying something by itself. But since verbs and names are interpretations, so also every [instance of] speech joined from things signifying predicaments by themselves is named interpretation,2 and there are many interpretations, among which are those speeches in which the true and the false may be found, that is, the enunciative, which is to be treated in this book: for that reason Aristotle entitled the book under the common and comprehensive name.3

2. Note. The reader will not be surprised to learn that I consider the substance of the foregoing reports to derive from Aristotle himself; the doctrine they preserve consisting for the most part in an orderly presentation of observations the Philosopher makes elsewhere. 4 Now inasmuch as the last thing it determines, namely, that interpretation is articulate vocal sound signifying by itself, is the first thing presupposed by the account of signification in the Peri Hermeneias, it seems to me not unlikely that the doctrine contained in the foregoing passages originated as a proem to that work.
ipse quoque de Interpretatione liber inscriptus est.
1 2

Notice how Boethius speaks of parts of speech rather than of language in this earlier commentary. That is, the sort of terms logicians call categorematic are here called interpretations. 3 Et prius quae sit huius operis intentio breuiter demonstrandum est. Inscribitur etenim liber Graece PERIHERMENEIAS quod Latine De interpretatione significat. Quid ergo sit interpretatio paucis absoluam. Interpretatio est uox significatiua per se ipsam aliquid significans. Siue enim nomen sit, quod per se significat, ut est homo; siue uerbum, ut est curro; siue quod grammatici participium uocant, siue pronomen est, siue ex his iuncta oratio, ut est Homo currit, siue quolibet alio modo uel nomen uel uerbum uel ex his oratio iuncta per se aliquid significet, interpretatio nominatur. Quare cum sint quaedam in orationis partibus quae per se nihil significant, aliis tamen iuncta designant, ut sunt coniunctiones uel praepositiones, haec interpretationes esse non dicimus. Interpretatio enim siue simplex est, ut nomen et uerbum, siue composita, ut ex his iuncta copulataque oratio, uel per se ipsam significare debet, si simplex est, uel ex his quae per se significant iuncta esse, si composita est. Quare interpretatio est uox aliquid per se ipsam significans. Sed quoniam uerba nominaque interpretationes /33/ sunt, oratio quoque omnis quae ex significantibus per se praedicamentis iungitur interpretatio nuncupatur, et sunt plurimae interpretationes, inter quas illa quoque est oratio, in qua uerum falsumue inueniri potest, id est enuntiatiua, de qua hoc libro tractandum est: idcirco igitur Aristoteles de communi nomine et continenti libro titulum scripsit . 4 I mean the entire prooemia to these commentaries, not just the parts excerpted above.

35

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect., n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.).:

This book, therefore, which we have before our hands, is called Peri Hermeneias, as if to say, On Interpretation. But, according to Boethius, interpretation means significative vocal sound [or sound of voice] which signifies something by itself, 5 whether complex or incomplex. And so conjunctions and prepositions and other things of this sort are not called interpretations, because they do not signify something by themselves.... 6

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.):
For they always consignifythat is, they signify when conjoined to the othersbut by themselves they do not.7

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect., n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.). (cont.):
...Likewise vocal sounds signifying naturally, not intentionally, or with an imagination of signifying something, as are the vocal sounds of brute animals, also cannot be called interpretations. For one who interprets intends to explain something. And therefore only names [i.e. substantive nouns and adjectives] and verbs and instances of speech are called interpretations, which are determined about in this book. But even so, the name and the verb appear to be principles of an interpretation, rather than interpretations [themselves]. For he is seen to interpret who explains something to be true or false. And so only enunciative speech in which the true and false is found is called interpretation. But the rest of speeches, as the optative [= expressing a wish] and the imperative [= expressing a command], are ordered to expressing an affection [or feeling], rather than to interpreting what is held in the understanding. Therefore this book is entitled On Interpretation, as if to say, About Enunciative Speech in which the true and the false are found. For it does not treat of the name and the verb here except insofar as they are parts of an enunciation. For it is proper to each of the sciences to treat of the parts of its subject, precisely as its passions [or properties]. Therefore, the part of philosophy to which this book belongs is clear, and its necessity, and the order it holds among the other books of logic. 8
5

N.B. In the second edition of his commentary on the De Interpretatione, Boethius actually defines interpretation as vox articulata per seipsam significans, articulate vocal sound signifying by itself. 6 dicitur ergo liber iste, qui prae manibus habetur, perihermeneias, quasi de interpretatione. dicitur autem interpretatio, secundum boethium, vox significativa, quae per se aliquid significat, sive sit complexa sive incomplexa. unde coniunctiones et praepositiones et alia huiusmodi non dicuntur interpretationes, quia non per se aliquid significant. 7 eae etenim semper consignificant, id est coniunctae aliis significant, per se autem non . Cp. Boethius remarks just cited to the effect that conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves unless joined to the others; statements manifestly bearing witness to a common tradition of doctrine. 8 similiter etiam voces significantes naturaliter, non ex proposito aut cum imaginatione aliquid significandi, sicut sunt voces brutorum animalium, interpretationes dici non possunt. qui enim interpretatur aliquid exponere intendit. et ideo sola nomina et verba et orationes dicuntur interpretationes, de quibus in hoc libro determinatur. sed tamen nomen et verbum magis interpretationis principia esse videntur, quam interprettationes. ille enim interpretari videtur, qui exponit aliquid esse verum vel falsum. et ideo sola oratio enunciativa, in qua verum vel falsum invenitur, interpretatio vocatur. caeterae vero orationes, ut optativa et imperativa, magis ordinantur ad exprimendum affectum, quam ad interpretandum id quod in intellectu habetur. intitulatur ergo liber iste de interpretatione, ac si dicetur de enunciativa oratione: in qua verum vel falsum invenitur. non autem hic agitur de nomine et verbo, nisi in quantum sunt partes enunciationis. est enim proprium uniuscuiusque scientiae partes subiecti tradere, sicut et passiones. patet igitur ad quam partem philosophiae pertineat liber iste, et quae sit necessitas istius, et quem ordinem teneat inter logicae libros.

36

Cf. Henri DuLac, The Peri Hermeneias. Its Place in Logic and its Order. Laval thologique et philosophique 5, number 2 (November 1949) (pp. 161-169), pp. 161-162:
Both the Greek and Latin forms of the title of this treatise mean on interpretation. Since an interpreter explains something as true or false, an interpretation is enunciative speech 3 in which truth or falsity
3

Speech seems to be the best English equivalent of oratio. A parallel can be found in grammar in which partes orationis is translated parts of speech. can be found.1 The enunciation, then, is the principal subject of the Peri Hermeneias, and the noun and verb are treated in it only as they are parts of the enunciation.
1

St. Thomas, In I Peri Herm,, lect 1, n. 3. Thus interpretatio is the equivalent of enunciatio. For St. Albert, interpretatio has a wider meaning than enunciatio: he takes it to include every way of explaining something, either as a part, e.g., the noun and the verb, or as a whole, e.g., the different kinds of perfect orationes. (St. Albert, Perihermeneias. I. Tr. I, cap.i, ed. BORGNET) [Opera Omnia, Paris: Vives, 1890]. I, p. 374 a.) But St. Thomas says the noun and the verb are rather principles of an interpretation than interpretations themselves, and the other orationes, such as the optative and the imperative, are rather ex-pressions of affections than interpretations of what is in the intellect.

[N.B. Note how this report reveals Albert to be following Boethius hereand consequently, in my viewAristotle (B.A.M.)] 3. On the derivation of the name hermeneia from Hermes. Cf. Plato, Cratylus 407 E408 A (tr. B. Jowett):
SOCRATES: I should imagine that the name [408a] Hermes has to do with speech, and signifies that he is the interpreter (e(rmhneu/j), or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with language.

Cf. The Suda, s.v. Hermes (Adler no. epsilon, 3037 [excerpt]) (tr. Jennifer Benedict, The Suda On Line; italics added by B.A.M.):
Hermes: This is what they call a son of Zeus and Maia, which is, of mind and sense. For the word is engendered from mind and sense. On account of this they also make him winged, as if to be swift. For nothing is swifter than a word. And [that is why] Homer [says] winged words.9

Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Ref., ch. 4 (166b 11-15): parallel translation:

(tr. A. Pickard-Cambridge)
9

(tr. E. S. Forster)

(Ermh=n: tou=ton ui(o\n Dio\j le/gousi kai\ Mai/aj, oi(=on tou= nou= kai\ th=j fronh/sewj. e)k nou= ga\r kai\ fronh/sewj o( lo/goj genna=tai. dia\ tou=to kai\ pterwto\n au)to\n poiou=sin, w(j taxu/n: ou)de\n ga\r lo/gou taxu/teron. kai\ (/Omhroj, e)/pea ptero/enta . N.B. As the Suda explains,

Hermes is the offspring of mind (nous) understood as Zeus, and sense (phronesis), understood as Maia, and hence he is understood as the word ( ho logos); with respect to which meaning of phronesis, note that LSJ gives sense as its third meaning, and references Isocrates 14.61: if we may assume that the dead yonder possess any perception of what takes place here.... ( ei)/ tij a)/ra toi=j e)kei= f. peri\ tw=n e)nqa/de gignome/nwn).

37

Others [sc. fallacies] come about owing to the form of expression used, when what is really different is expressed [e((rmhneu/htai] in the same form, e.g. a masculine thing by a feminine termination, or a feminine thing by a masculine, or a neuter by either a masculine or a feminine; or, again, when a quality is expressed by a termination proper to quantity or vice versa, or what is active by a passive word, or a state by an active word, and so forth with the other divisions previously laid down. For it is possible to use an expression to denote [ti t$= le/cei shmai/nein] what does not belong to the class of actions at all as though it did so belong. Thus (e.g.) flourishing is a word which in the form of its expression is like cutting or building: yet the one denotes a certain quality i.e. a certain conditionwhile the other denotes a certain action. In the same man-ner also in the other instances.

Refutations which depend upon the form of expression occur when what is not the same is expressed [e((rmhneu/htai] in the same form, for example, when the masculine is expressed by the feminine or vice versa, or the neuter by the masculine or feminine; or again when a quality is expressed by a quantity or vice versa, or the active by a passive, or a state by the active, and so forth according to the distinctions previously made. For it is possible for something which is not of the nature of an action to signify by the language used [ti t$= le/cei shmai/nein] something which is of the nature of an action; for example, to flourish is a form of expression like to cut or to build: yet the former denotes a quality and a certain disposition, the latter an action. So too with the other possible examples.1

Note. The foregoing text implies that to signify by the language produces hermeneia or expression; that is to say, to signify by a locution produces an interpretation. On this point, consider the implication of the following passage:
The second and narrower sense of hermeneia is in fact the one that Aristotle privileges throughout his work: articulated linguistic self-expression and communication. In On Sophistical Refutations 4, 166 b 11, 15, Aristotle describes hermeneia as ti tei lexei semainein: to indicate or express something in speech, lexis (the Latin locutio), for which Aristotle uses equally the word dialektos (Latin articulatio).2

While the foregoing account is quite informative, it can be improved by noting that speech is not the most apt translation of lexis here; rather, as the Latin indicates, locution is a more accurate rendering; but even better is language. Hence, to interpret, or to produce an interpretation, is to indicate or express something by a locution, or rather, by ones languagethat is, by articulate vocal sound; but this when the vocal sounds are significative by themselves, as we have seen. When supplemented as I have done, note how this definition harmonizes with that given by Boethius in the second edition of his commentary on the Peri Hermeneias: vox articulata per seipsam signifcans. In light of his definition of locutio as vox articulata, interpretatio may also be defined as locutio per seipsam signifcans.
1

Note the forms of expression mentioned here: terminations of words indicating either quantity or quality, those indicating gender, either masculine, feminine, or neuter, and those indicating a quality as opposed to an action. 2 Thomas Sheehan, Hermeneia and Apophansis: The Early Heidegger on Aristotle [In: Franco Volpi et al., Heidegger et ide de la phnomnologie, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1988, pp. 67-80, p. 74].

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To interpret, then, is to signify something by ones languagethat is, by articulate vocal sound signifying something by itself. Now an interpretation is something signified by ones language; but an interpretation may signify either a simple or a composed understanding, the kind of vocal sound signifying the former being called a word, as St. Thomas Aquinas states, a point which will also be clear from the following: Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias (= Ammonius: On Aristotles On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David L. Blank, p. 14).
This kind of speech, the assertoric [i.e. the enunciative], Aristotle deems worthy to call interpretation, since it interprets the souls knowledge. 24
24

Boethius II 6.4 defines interpretation in the same way as logos, i.e. as articulate voice significant by itself. In his discussion of the intention, he reports (II 10.4ff.) that Aspasius and Alexander said that Int. was about oratio (= logos or sentence, discourse), for if to pronounce something in a sentence is to interpret, the book On Interpretation must be about the sentence. Boethius objects that interpretation refers to the sentence, name, and verb equally. Alexander then added that the title of the book was not complete, since it did not state which kind of sentence it was about and should have specified the philosophical or dialectical sentence, which can express truth or falsity (II 10.14ff.). Porphyry weighed in against this addition (II 11.9-11), saying that it amounted more to inventing than explaining the meaning of the word.

Cf. David L. Blank, excerpt from note 68, p. 140: Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the De Interpretatione (In: Ammonius: On Aristotles On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank; slightly rev. B.A.M.):
Boethius, who is dependant upon Porphyry, gives a fuller account of the distinction (II 6.15ff.): like Ammonius, he cites Poet. 20 to the effect that the parts of expression ( locutio = lexis) are syllables or also conjunctions, neither of which are significant by themselves, while the parts of the interpretation (interpretatio, one might translate speech) he establishes in this book as name and verb. He ends with the explanation: hence in this book Aristotle deals not merely with the sentence ( oratio), but also with verb and name, nor indeed with mere expression (locutio), but actually with significant expressions, which is speech (interpretatio).

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. p. 15 (5) (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.):
Therefore the parts of speech according to the Dialecticians are two, the name [5] and the verb, since these two alone by themselves when conjoined produce complete speech. But the other parts they named syncategoremata; that is to say, consignificantia [or co-signifying words].1

4. Definitions.

Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos duae, nomen [5] et verbum, quia hae solae etiam per se coniunctae plenam faciunt orationem, alias autem partes syncategoremata, hoc est consignificantia, appellabant. That is to say, the parts of speech which are not interpretationes are consignificantia.

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HERMENEIA (INTERPRETATIO, INTERPRETATION). (1) Commonly speaking, interpretation is something signified by ones language 1 (Aristotle, Soph. Ref., 4, 166b 13, tr. B.A.M.), in which case to interpret or to produce an interpretation, is to indicate or express something by locutionthat is, by articulate vocal sound; or again, (2) it is articulate vocal sound signifying by itself 2 (Boethius, Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, edit. sec., PL 64, tr. B.A.M.); that is to say, it is (3) significative vocal sound which signifies something by itself, whether complex or incomplex 3 (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.), and hence even a word [= verbum], being an incomplex vocal sound, may be called an interpretation; 4 but strictly speaking, in the logic of the second act, (4) only enunciative speech, in which the true or the false is found, is called interpretation5 (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.). 5. Note on hermeneia as meaning word. Recalling here that among the Greeks the messenger of the gods was Hermes, from whose name they spoke of a hermeneus, a messenger or interpreter (cf. Liddell-ScottJones), consider the implication of the following observation: And as the outward word announces by means of a sign what is in the mind, the Greeks have called it angelus intelligentiae, the messenger of the intelligence. (St. Albert the Great, commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, tract. I, cap. II) Now in the Summa Theologiae (cf. Ia, q. 34, art. 1. c.), St. Thomas Aquinas uses the same locutio exemplaris (quoted from St. John Damascene, De Fide. I, 10): verbum est angelus, idest, nuntius, intelligentiae, A word is the angelthat is, the messenger, of the intelligence. But if a word can be such, so much the more can speech, in agreement with which Ammonius Hermeias tells us, This kind of speech, the assertoric [= enunciative], Aristotle deems worthy to call interpretation [= hermeneia], since it interprets the souls knowledge. And note the relationship between the following terms: nuntius and hermeneus (both meaning messenger; cp. angelus), and phasis, which means tidings, or what is announced by a messenger. Cf. Acts 21:31: quaerentibus autem eum occidere nuntiatum est tribuno cohortis quia tota confunditur Hierusalem. (Vulgate) And as they were seeking to kill him, tidings came up to the chief captain of the band, that all Jerusalem was in confusion. (RSV)

1 2 3

ti t$= le/cei shmai/nein.

Interpretatio namque est vox articulata per seipsam signifcans. vox significativa, quae per se aliquid significat, sive sit complexa sive incomplexa . 4 See further below on the twofold signification of vocal sound. 5 et ideo sola oratio enunciativa, in qua verum vel falsum invenitur, interpretatio vocatur . In this sense, interpretation is opposed to words that are syncategorematicwhich is to say, consignificative.

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But in English we can use the word word in the same sense: The messenger brought tidings of victory. The messenger brought word of victory. Hence, word may be taken for tidings. (And recall here that Aristotle uses phasis of the name and the verb insofar as they are parts of an enunciation.) We may suppose, then, that from originally meaning the utterance of a messenger or tidings, the name has been carried over to mean word1 insofar as it announces what is held within the intelligence. But from thence it would have been moved to the state-ment which, inasmuch as it interprets the souls knowledge, is understood as enunciative speech, being that in which the true and the false is found, and thus is interpretation par excellence, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains. 6. Supplement: On dictio as meaning word. Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu Majora Commentaria (Latin ed. Migne, PL 64; tr. B.A.M.):
So when our breath so has itself that if it is struck and formed in such a way that the tongue strikes it, it is voice [or vocal sound]. For if the tongue so strikes it that the voice comes forth in a certain finite and distinct sound, it becomes locution [or an utterance], which is called le/xij in Greek. For locution is articulate vocal sound; for we do not call this word le/xij a dictio [word], because we translate fa/sij by dictio, but le/xij by locutio.2

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Anima, lect. 18, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

[A]nd so, in the book of the Predicaments [cf. Cat., ch. 6, 4b 20)] the speech which is brought forth in the voice is placed in the species of discrete quantity. For speech is distinguished by words [per dictiones], and a word by syllables; and this happens on account of diverse percussions of the air by the soul.3

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri. Herm., lect. 6, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

But because there is a twofold signification of vocal sound, one which is referred to a composed intellect, another which is referred to a simple intellect, the first signification belongs to speech, but the second does not belong to speech, but to a part of speech. And so he adds, as a word [or thing said, dictio (= phasis)], not as an affirmation [kataphasis]as if to say, a part of speech is significant, just as a word [ dictio] signifies, for example, as the name and the verb, not as an affirmation, which is composed from a name and a verb. 4
1 2

Lat. dictio, on the meaning of which, see the following section. Quare quoniam flatus noster ita sese habet, ut si ita percutiatur atque formetur, ut eum lingua percutiat, vox sit. Si enim lingua ita percutiat, ut terminato quodam et circumscriptio sono vox exeat, locutio fit quae Graece dicitur le/xij. Locutio enim est articulata vox, neque enim hunc sermonem, id est le/xin, dictionem dicemus, idcirco quid fa/sin dictionem interpretamur, le/xin, locutionem. 3 manifestum est enim, quod humana locutio non est continua; unde et in libro praedicamentorum, oratio, quae in voce profertur ponitur species quantitatis discretae. distinguitur enim oratio per dictiones, et dictio per syllabas; et hoc accidit propter diversas percussiones aeris ab anima. 4 sed quia duplex est significatio vocis, una quae refertur ad intellectum compositum, alia quae refertur ad intellectum simplicem; prima significatio competit orationi, secunda non competit orationi, sed parti

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N.B. In the foregoing text, St. Thomas gives the name dictio (which I have translated as word) to Aristotles phasis, occurring in the definition of speech (= logos or oratio), which word he explains as meaning a vocal sound which (in effect) signifies a simple understanding, and hence which belongs to a part of speech (as opposed to one which signifies a composed understanding which is signified not by a part of speech, but simply by speech). In sum, a word (= dictio = phasis) here is understood as a vocal sound signifying a simple understanding and hence a part of speech, being exemplified by the name and the verb. But it must be recognized that this definition can be further specified as follows: A word is an articulate vocal sound that by itself signifies a simple understanding (the signification in question being understood to belong to a part of speech rather than to speech itself). In support of the foregoing qualifications, note that it is clear from a consideration of voice that the kind entering into a word is articulate. But, as exemplified by the name or noun and the verb, it is also clear that those articulate vocal sounds called phasis (or rather phaseis) are those which by themselves signify a simple understanding. That is, in the first place and primarily, those articulate vocal sounds which signify a simple understanding per se (which are the name or noun and the verb), are those which he (as well as other Latins, such as Boethius), looking to Aristotles word phasis, call dictiones. Secondarily, however, we may say that even those vocal sounds which do not by themselves signify a simple understanding, but which, rather, are consignificant (of the kind elsewhere called syncategorematic), which signify only when conjoined to the name or verb, are also, in this later acceptation, considered to be dictiones or words. That is, in later usage (as is implied by St. Thomas remark on the Categories quoted above), the word dictiones is given to vocal sounds both significant and consignificant, as in English we use the word word for this purpose. Hence to the account given by St. Thomas, quoted above, where in we added the further specifications articulate and by itself to arrive at the definition given above, in light of the use of the word as also encompassing those vocal sounds which do not signify something by themselves, but only when conjoined to the others, we must note that dictio is used in an extended sense when said of them, on which point see further below. 7. A definition of word implicit in Aristotle. In the foregoing discussion, we have arrived at a definition of word based on certain remarks found in St. Thomas commentary on the Peri Hermeneias. One may, however, also define word in Aristotle by taking what is common to his definitions of onoma and rhema. According to him, the former is defined as a vocal sound significative by human agreement, without time, no part of which is significative separately, the latter, as a vocal sound signifying with time, and a sign of something said of something else ( De Int., 16a 19; 16b 5), it being proper to substance considered in itself to be signified by a noun or a pronoun (as St. Thomas Aquinas notes, In I Peri. Herm., lect. 4, n. 7), whereas the verb signifies action or passion (ibid., lect. 5, n. 5). Hence a word is a vocal sound significative by human agreement no part of which is significative separately

orationis. unde subdit: ut dictio, non ut affirmatio. quasi dicat: pars orationis est significativa, sicut dictio significat, puta ut nomen et verbum, non sicut affirmatio, quae componitur ex nomine et verbo .

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8. Some additional texts. Cf. Terms for Word in Roman Grammar. Malcolm D. Hyman, Harvard University.
When we come to the late antique artes grammaticae, we find that some terminological developments have taken place. Two stand out in particular. First, the term dictio for word has gained in popularity. Second, pars orationis is used not only to mean word class but also (single) word token. We know from Quintilian that earlier authors used dictio for word, but we dont know who they were. [7] (Remmius Palaemon always lurks in the shadows.) We might suppose that the shift was motivated by a desire to avoid the ambiguity of verbum (word or verb), vocabulum (word or common noun or nominal), and vox (word or spoken sound). But if this was the motivation, the shift wasnt very helpful, since, as Cominianus (apud Charisium) notes, dictio is also ambiguous:
barbarismus est dictio vitiosa. haec autem definitio et generalis est et specialis. sed quoniam dictio et contexta oratio et una pars eius intellegitur, consuetudo hunc tantum barbarismum appellat qui fit in una parte orationis. (349.1823 Barwick) Barbarism is a defective locution. This definition, however, is both general and specific. But since locution (dictio) means both connected speech and a single part of connected speech, its customary to use the term barbarism only in the case of a single part (i.e. a word, pars orationis).

Why then dictio? For one thing, it suggests the influence of Greek grammar: the term corresponds morpheme-by-morpheme to Greek (Holtz 1981: 139; Matthews 2002: 2678).19 We must admit, however, that its not a very good equivalent for : for one thing, its natural-language equivalents (act of speaking, utterance, speech) get in the way (as weve just seen Cominianus note). 20 Also, when Roman grammarians use dictio for (meaningful) word, they are fundamentally at odds with the Stoics, for whom was a possible (but not necessarily meaningful) sound sequence (Collinge 1986: 12).
19 20

Cf. Dineen (1985: 158). Cf. Menge (1977: 209).

References. Collinge, N. (1986): Greek (and Some Roman) Preferences in Language Categories, in: T. Bynon/F. Palmer (Edd.), Studies in the History of Western Linguistics (In Honour of R.H. Robins), Cambridge, 1121. Dineen, F.P. (1985): On Stoic Grammatical Theory, in: Historiographia Linguistica, 12, 14964. Dixon, R./Aikhenvald, A.Y. (Edd.) (2002b): Word: A Cross-Linguistic Typology, Cambridge. Holtz, L. (1981): Donat et la tradition de lenseignement grammatical: tude sur l Ars Donati et sa diffusion (IVeIXe) et dition critique, Paris. Matthews, P. (2002): What Can We Conclude?, in: Dixon/Aikhenvald (2002b), 26681. Menge, H. (1977): Lateinische Synonymik, 6th ed., Heidelberg.

In sum, according to Cominianus, dictio has a twofold meaning: by dictio is understood both connected speech and one part of it (tr. B.A.M.)1

dictio et contexta oratio et una pars eius intellegitur.

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9. Examples of the corresponding twofold usage in the case of lexis: (a) As meaning a single word: Cf. Dionysius Thrax, Techne Grammatike, 86.3f. (ed. Ineke Sluiter; tr. B.A.M.):
conjunction is a word binding together the ) . thought and setting it in order, as well as filling (v.l. ) up the gaps in the expression.

(b) As meaning connected speech: Aristotle, Rhet., III. 9 (1409a 37) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts):
By a period [periodos] I mean a portion of speech [ lexis] that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance.

10. A problem with Cominianuss formulation. In the foregoing definition, Cominianus includes the word oratio as meaning speech, the Greek equivalent of which is logos, a procedure that is reasonable insofar as dictio is understood to be significative vocal sound. But in the usage of the logician rather than the grammarian the definition is problematic insofar as dictio is taken to be equivalent to lexis; for logos (the equivalent of oratio) is itself defined as lexis semantike, significative lexis; but lexis is articulate vocal sound. Hence, since (for the logician) logos is a kind of lexis, one must not define lexis to be a kind of logos. One must, therefore, define dictio by a word other than oratio/logos. Convenient for this purpose is the word utterance, inasmuch as utterance is often used to mean articulate vocal sound. Let us say, then, that dictio is connected utterance as well as one part of it. In accordance with this understanding, one could reword the translation of Aristotles definition of the period as follows:
By a period [periodos] I mean a connected utterance [lexis] that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance.

Compare also the translations in the following excerpt:

Stoic discourse also worked to further objectify literary language and texts as objects of knowledge and interpretation. In Stoic grammatike a poem has two aspects: lexis (connected verbal expression) and logos (discourse, significant lexis).1

11. Definitions: PERIODOS (PERIOD). According to Aristotle, a connected utterance [lexis] that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance (Rhet,, III. 9, 1409a 37 [tr. W. Rhys Roberts; rev. B.A.M.]).
1

Martine Irvine, The Making of Textual Culture: Grammatica and Literary Theory, 350-1100 , (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 34.

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DICTIO (DICTION). commonly speaking, (1) by dictio is understood both connected speech and one part of it1 (Cominianus); and hence properly speaking, one part of connected speech (idem).

dictio et contexta oratio et una pars eius intellegitur.

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12. The dialecticians definitions of verbum and dictio: Cf. Augustine of Hippo (S. Aurelii Augustini), De Dialectica Liber, V (tr. J. Marchand;1 rev. B.A.M.):
Verbum est uniuscuiusque rei signum, quod ab audiente possit intellegi, a loquente prolatum. Res est quidquid vel sentitur vel intellegitur vel latet. Signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit. Loqui est articulata voce signum dare. Articulatam autem dico quae conpraehendi litteris potest. Haec omnia quae definita sunt, utrum recte definita sint et utrum hactenus verba definitionis aliis definitionibus persequenda fuerint, ille indicabit locus, quo definiendi disciplina tractatur. Nunc quod instat accipe intentus. Omne verbum sonat. Cum enim est in scripto, non verbum sed verbi signum est; quippe inspectis a legente litteris occurrit animo, quid voce prorumpat. Quid enim aliud litterae scriptae quam se ipsas oculis et praeter se voces animo ostendunt, et paulo ante diximus signum esse quod se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit. A word is the sign of anything which can be understood by the hearer when [it is] pronounced by the speaker. A thing is whatever is sensed, or understood, or hidden. A sign is something which presents itself to the senses and something besides itself to the mind. To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice. I call that articulate which is capable of being comprised in letters. Now all these [terms] which have been defined, whether they be rightly defined and whether up till now the words of the definition are to be followed by other definitions, he will indicate in the place where the discipline of defining is treated. Now take what is coming attentively. Every word sounds. Therefore, when it is written it is not a word, but the sign of a word. When they are seen by the reader, the letters occur to the mind, which breaks out in the voice. For what else do written letters do but present themselves to the eyes and beyond themselves vocal sounds to the mind? And we said a little earlier that a sign was something that presented itself to the senses and something besides itself to the mind. What we read, therefore, are not the words but the signs of words. But also, since a letter itself is the least part of articulate voice, we misuse this designation when we name letter even what we see written, although it is in every way silent,

Quae legimus igitur non verba sunt sed signa verborum. Sed ut, ipsa littera cum sit pars minima vocis articulatae, abutimur tamen hoc vocabulo, ut appellemus litteram etiam cum scriptam videmus, quamvis omnino tacita sit
1

(http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/texts/dialecticatrans.html [12/18/08])

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neque ulla pars vocis sed signum partis vocis appareat.

nor is it a part of vocal sound, but appears as a sign of a part of vocal sound

Ita etiam verbum appellatur cum scriptum est, Likewise, we also name something written a quamvis verbi signum, id est signum signify- word, although it is a sign of a word, that is, cantis vocis, eluceat. (even though it) appears as the sign of signifycant vocal sound. Ergo ut coeperam dicere omne verbum sonat. Sed quod sonat nihil ad dialecticam. De sono enim verbi agitur, cum quaeritur vel animadvertitur, quanta vocalium vel dispositione leniatur vel concursione dehiscat, item consonantium vel interpositione nodetur vel congestione asperetur et quot vel qualibus syllabis constet, ubi poeticus rhythmus accentusque a grammaticis solarum aurium tractantur negotia. Et tamen cum de his disputatur, praeter dialecticam non est. Haec enim scientia disputandi est. Sed cum verba sint rerum, quando de ipsis obtinent, verborum autem, quibus de his disputatur. Nam cum de verbis loqui nisi verbis nequeamus et cum loquimur nonnisi de aliquibus rebus loquamur, occurrit animo ita esse verba signa rerum, ut res esse non desinant. Cum ergo verbum ore procedit, si propter se procedit id est ut de ipso verbo aliquid quaeratur aut disputetur, res est utique disputationi quaestionique subiecta, sed ipsa res 'verbum' vocatur. Thus, as we had just begun to say, every word sounds. But what sounds has nothing to do with dialectic.1 For the sound of a word is treated when we seek to learn or pay heed to how vowels are softened in their disposition, or how they lose hiatus when they come together, likewise, how consonants cluster by interposeition, or are made harsh by clustering, and how many or what kind of syllables it consists of, where poetic rhythm and accent, a matter for the ears of the grammarian alone, are treated. But when there is dispute concerning these things, that is not beyond dialectic. For it is the science of disputing.2 But although words are of things, [nevertheless] when they hold about themselves, there is dispute about these things, but [I mean] of the words [themselves].3 Since we cannot speak of words unless with words, and when we speak we necessarily speak about certain things, these words that occur to the mind are signs of things, but things are not what they end in.4 For when a word goes out of the mouth, if it goes out on account of itself, that is, for example, when it disputes or asks something about itself, it is a thing undoubtedly subject to disputation and question, and then the thing is called a word.

1 2

On the contrary, the way in which a word is pronounced must be treated in the consideration of fallacies.. For further specifications relevant to this matter, see the first chapter of St. Thomas De Fallaciis. 3 I.e. they have material supposition. 4 I.e. when we speak about words, since they are signs of things, then signs of things occur to the mindyet the things they signify are not what the mind rests in, rather it is the words themselves as subject for a dispute.

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Quidquid autem ex verbo non aures sed animus sentit et ipso animo tenetur inclusum, 'dicibile' vocatur.

But all [that part] of a word which is not sensed by the ears but by the mind and is held enclosed in the mind is called a sayable [cp. the Stoic lekton].

Cum vero verbum procedit non propter se sed But when a word goes out not for its own sake, propter aliud aliquid significandum, 'dictio' but for the sake of signifying something about vocatur. another thing, it is called a dictio. Res autem ipsa, quae iam verbum non est neque verbi in mente conceptio, sive habeat verbum quo significari possit, sive non habeat, nihil aliud quam 'res' vocatur proprio iam nomine. Haec ergo quattuor distincta teneantur, 'verbum dicibile dictio res'. Quod dixi 'verbum' et verbum est et 'verbum' significat. That thing which is neither a word nor a conception of a word in the mind, whether it has a word with which it may be signified or not, is called by its proper name nothing other than thing. We then have four distinct things: word, sayable, dictio, thing. What I have called word is both a word and signifies word.

Quod dixi 'dicibile' verbum est, nec tamen What I have called a sayable is a word, but it 'verbum', sed quod in verbo intellegitur et animo does not signify word, but that which is continetur, significat. understood in the word and contained in the mind. Quod dixi 'dictionem' verbum est, sed quod iam illa duo simul id est et ipsum verbum et quod fit in animo per verbum significat. Quod dixi 'rem', verbum est, quod praeter illa tria quae dicta sunt quidquid restat significat. Sed exemplis haec inlustranda esse perspicio. Fac igitur a quoquam grammatico puerum interrogatum hoc modo: "'arma' quae pars orationis est?" Quod dictum est 'arma', propter se dictum est, id est verbum propter ipsum verbum. Cetera vero, quod ait 'quae pars orationis', non propter se, sed propter verbum, quod 'arma' dictum est, vel animo sensa vel voce prolata sunt. Sed cum animo sensa sunt, ante vocem dicibilia erunt; cum autem propter id quod dixi proruperunt in vocem, dictiones factae sunt. What I have called a dictio is a word, but it signifies in fact those two at once, that is, the word itself, and what comes about in the mind through the word. When I say thing it is a word which signifies that which is left over after those three which have just been mentioned. Let us see if we can illustrate this by examples: Let a boy be questioned by a schoolteacher in this manner: What part of speech is arma/ (arms)? arma is here said concerning itself (for its own sake), i.e. is a word concerning a word. The other parts, however, when he says What part of speech ... are either felt in the mind or pronounced by the voice, not for their own sake, but for the sake of arma. But since they were felt in the mind, dicibilia [sayables] came before voice; when they break out in voice concerning what I said, then they are dictiones [things said].

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Ipsum vero 'arma' quod hic verbum est, cum a Vergilio pronuntiatum est, dictio fuit; non enim propter se prolatum est, sed ut eo significarentur vel bella quae gessit Aeneas vel scutum et cetera arma quae Vulcanus heroi fabricatus est. Ipsa vero bella vel arma, quae gesta aut ingestata sunt ab Aenea ipsa inquam quae cum gererentur adque essent videbantur, quaeque si nunc adessent vel digito monstrare possemus aut tangere, quae etiamsi non cogitentur non eo tamen fit ut non fuerint ipsa ergo per se nec verba sunt nec dicibilia nec dictiones, sed res quae iam proprio nomine 'res' vocantur. Tractandum est igitur nobis in hac parte dialecticae de 'verbis', de 'dicibilibus', 'dictionibus', de 'rebus'. In quibus omnibus cum partim verba significentur partim non verba, nihil est tamen, de quo non verbis disputare necesse sit. Itaque de his primo disputetur per quae de ceteris disputare conceditur.

arma itself, since it is a word, when it was pronounced by Virgil, became a dictio, for it was not pronounced for its own sake, but that it might signify either the wars which Aeneas carried on, or the shield, or other arms which Vulcan made for the hero. These very wars or arms which were carried on or worn by Aeneas the same, I say, which were either carried on or existed, if they were now present could either be pointed out or touched with the finger, if they were not thought nor made for him, they are neither words nor `dicibilia' nor dictiones, but things which are properly called res [thing] by name. We must thus in this part of dialectic treat words, dicibilia, dictiones, things. In all these things, where words are partly signified and partly things which are not words, there is nothing concerning which it is not necessary to dispute using words. Thus, we must first discuss these, since it is conceded that we must dispute concerning the others by use of them.

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13. Definitions. VERBUM. 1. A word is the sign of anything which can be understood by the hearer when pronounced by the speaker. 2. Every word sounds [sonat]. 3. What I have called word is both a word and signifies word. DICTIO. 1. But when a word goes out [i.e. is uttered] not for its own sake, but for the sake of signifying something about another thing, it is called a dictio [i.e. a thing said, or word that has been spoken; an expression]. 2. What I have called a dictio is a word, but it signifies in fact those two at once, that is, the word itself, and what comes about in the mind through the word [i.e. it embraces both verbum and dicibile]. N.B. It is clear from the foregoing definitions that for St. Augustine a dictio is a verbum prolatumthat is, it is a word which has been pronounced or utterednot for its own sake (as when I say Man is a word, for instance), but in order to signifythat is, a spoken word, or perhaps something said, in order to convey a meaning. DICIBILE. 1. That part of a word which is not sensed by the ears but by the mind and is held enclosed in the mind is called a sayable [cp. the Stoic lekton].1 2. A sayable is a word, but it does not signify word, but that which is understood in the word and contained in the mind. 3. Sayables are first felt in the mind and so come before the voice. RES. A thing is whatever is sensed [or felt] or understood or hidden [e.g. when it is not understood by the hearer (?); when it is not expressed by a sayable (?)]. SIGNUM. A sign is something which presents itself to the senses and something besides itself to the mind. LOQUI. To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice. ARTICULATA. I call that articulate which is capable of being comprised in letters. LITERA. The least part of articulate voice [e.g. an elementary vocal sound, not the written sign of this, though both are called letter].

Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adv math. 8.11ff.; LCL 2:245, 247, frag. 166 von Arnim SVF2 (tr. Long & Sedley): (1) There was another disagreement among philosophers [concerning the true]: some took the sphere of what is true and false to be the signification, others utterance, and others the process that constitutes thought. (2) The Stoics defended the first opinion, saying that three things are linked together, the signification [pragma], the signifier [phone], and the name-bearer [tunchanon]. The signifier is an utterance, for instance Dion; the signification is the actual state of affairs revealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought, whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external object, for instance, Dion himself. (3) Of these, two are bodies the utterance and the namebearer; but one incorporeal the state of affairs signified and sayable [lekton], which is true or false.

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14. The definition of word in St. Augustine compared with Aristotle on the verb:
Augustine A word is the sign of anything which can be understood by a hearer when [it is] pronounced by a speaker. Aristotle But in themselves, said by themselves, verbs are names and signify something; for the one who speaks1 [20] establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is said] rests [sc. in what is said].

In sum: (a) name (cf. De Int. I. 2): A name, therefore, is a vocal sound significative by convention without time, no part of which is significative separately.... (it being proper to a name to signify something as existing per se, as St. Thomas explains in his commentary) (b) verb as a kind of name (cf. De Int. I. 3): But in themselves, said by themselves, verbs are names and signify something; for the one who speaks establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is said] rests [sc. in what is said]. a verb (rhema; verbum) when spoken by itself is a name and hence (an instance of speaking; a speaker) when heard by another (something heard by a hearer so as to be understood) signifies something (a pragma or res) c. verb and name in common (cf. De Dialectica V): A word [verbum] is the sign of anything which can be understood by a hearer when (it is) pronounced by a speaker. a word (verbum) when spoken by someone (an instance of speaking; a speaker) and understood by another (something heard by a hearer so as to be understood) signifies something (a pragma or res) 15. The elements common to the foregoing accounts: a vocal sound which when spoken by one person and heard by another is significative of something and so is understood (first by the one, and then by the other) Note the continuity exhibited by the foregoing definitions: First, Aristotle defines onoma, the nomen or name, then, having defined rhema, the verbum or verb, in distinc1

That is, the one who utters a verb by itself says something; in the present case, he utters a name.

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tion from the name,1 he points out that, looked at in a certain way, even verbs are names. But the definition of verbum handed on by St. Augustine follows immediately upon Aristotles account of the communia of onoma and rhema: that is to say, inasmuch as in themselves, said by themselves, verbs are names and signify something; for the one who speaks establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is said] rests [sc. in what is said], names and verbs are seen to agree in St. Augustines definition of verbum or word; it being true to say of either one that it is the sign of anything which can be understood by a hearer when (it is) pronounced by a speaker. Of course, many accounts of speaking will agree in the foregoing principles, but the continuity of the preceding definitions strongly suggests to me that they derive from a common source.

That is, as a vocal sound significative with time, which is always the sign of something said of something else.

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16. On the nature of a word according to St. Augustine. Cf. St. Augustine of Hippo, cited in the Catena Aurea on John 1, by St. Thomas Aquinas (tr. J. H. Newman et. al.):
1a. In the beginning was the Word. AUG. As our knowledge differs from Gods, so does our word, which arises from our knowledge, differ from that Word of God, which is born of the Fathers essence; we might say, from the Fathers knowledge, the Fathers wisdom, or, more correctly, the Father Who is Knowledge, the Father Who is Wisdom. The Word of God then, the Only-Begotten Son of the Father, is in all things like and equal to the Father; being altogether what the Father is, yet not the Father; because the one is the Son, the other the Father. And thereby He knows all things which the Father knows; yet His knowledge is from the Father, even as is His being: for knowing and being are the same with Him; and so as the Fathers being is not from the Son, so neither is His knowing. Wherefore the Father begat the Word equal to Himself in all things as uttering forth Himself. For had there been more or less in His Word than in Himself, He would not have uttered Himself fully and perfectly. With respect however to our own inner word, which we find, in whatever sense, to be like the Word, let us not object to see how very unlike it is also. A word is a formation of our mind going to take place, but not yet made, and something in our mind which we toss to and fro in a slippery circuitous way, as one thing and another is discovered, or occurs to our thoughts. When this, which we toss to and fro, has reached the subject of our knowledge, and been formed therefrom, when it has assumed the most exact likeness to it, and the conception has quite answered to the thing; then we have a true word. Who may not see how great the difference is here from that Word of God, which exists in the Form of God in such wise, that It could not have been first going to be formed, and afterwards formed, nor can ever have been unformed, being a Form absolute, and absolutely equal to Him from Whom It is. Wherefore; in speaking of the Word of God here nothing is said about thought in God; lest we should think there was any thing revolving in God, which might first receive form in order to be a Word, and afterwards lose it, and be canted round and round again in an unformed state.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Evangelium Johannis (= Commentary on the Gospel of St. John I, cap. 1, lect. 1, nn. 23-29, tr. James A. Weisheipl & Fabian R. Larcher, pp. ?-34):
LECTURE I 1 In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God; and the Word was God. 2 He was in the beginning with God. 23 John the Evangelist, as already indicated, makes it his principal object to show the divinity of the Incarnate Word. Accordingly, his Gospel is divided into two parts. In the first he states the divinity of Christ; in the second he shows it by the things Christ did in the flesh (2:1). In regard to the first, he does two things. First he shows the divinity of Christ; secondly he sets forth the manner in which Christs divinity is made known to us (1:14). Concerning the first he does two things. First he treats of the divinity of Christ; secondly of the incarnation of the Word of God (1:6).

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Because there are two items to be considered in each thing, namely, its existence and its operation or power, first he treats the existence of the Word as to his divine nature; secondly of his power or operation (1:3). In regard to the first he does four things. First he shows when the Word was: In the beginning was the Word; secondly where he was: and the Word was with God; thirdly what he was: and the Word was God; fourthly, in what way he was: He was in the beginning with God. The first two pertain to the inquiry whether something exists; the second two pertain to the inquiry what something is. 24 With respect to the first of these four we must examine the meaning of the statement, In the beginning was the Word. And here three things present themselves for careful study according to the three parts of this statement. First it is necessary to investigate the name Word; secondly the phrase in the beginning; thirdly the meaning of the Word was in the beginning. 25 To understand the name Word we should note that according to the Philosopher [ On Interpretation 16a3] vocal sounds are signs of the affections that exist in our soul. It is customary in Scripture for the things signified to be themselves called by the names of their signs, as in the statement, And the rock was Christ ( 1 Cor 10:4). It is fitting that what is within our soul, and which is signified by our external word, be called a word. But whether the name word belongs first to the exterior vocal sound or to the conception in our mind, is not our concern at present. However, it is obvious that what is signified by the vocal sound, as existing interiorly in the soul, exists prior to the vocal expression inasmuch as it is its actual cause. Therefore if we wish to grasp the meaning of the interior word, we must first look at the meaning of that which is exteriorly expressed in words. Now there are three things in our intellect: the intellectual power itself, the species of the thing understood (and this species is its form, being to the intellect what the species of a color is to the eye), and thirdly the very activity of the intellect, which is to understand. But none of these is what is signified by the exterior vocal word: for the name stone does not signify the substance of the intellect because this is not what the one naming intends; nor does it signify the species, which is that by which the intellect understands, since this also is not the intention of the one naming; nor does it signify the act itself of understanding since to understand is not an action proceeding to the exterior from the one understanding, but an action remaining within. Therefore, that is properly called an interior word which the one understanding forms when understanding. Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations. According to its operation which is called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; while according to its operation by which it unites and separates, it forms an enunciation or something of that sort. Hence, what is thus formed and expressed by the operation of the intellect, whether by defining or enunciating, is what the exterior vocal sound signifies. So the Philosopher says that the notion (ratio) which a name signifies is a definition. Hence, what is thus expressed, i.e., formed in the soul, is called an interior word. Consequently it is compared to the intellect, not as that by which the intellect understands, but as that in which it understands, because it is in what is thus expressed and formed that it sees the nature of the thing understood. Thus we have the meaning of the name word. Secondly, from what has been said we are able to understand that a word is always something that proceeds from an intellect existing in act; and furthermore, that a word is always a notion (ratio) and likeness of the thing understood. So if the one understanding and the thing understood are the same, then the word is a notion and likeness of the intellect from which it proceeds. On the other hand, if the one understanding is other than the thing understood, then the word is not a likeness and notion of the one understanding but of the thing

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understood, as the conception which one has of a stone is a likeness of only the stone. But when the intellect understands itself, its word is a likeness and notion of the intellect. And so Augustine (On the Trinity IX, 5) sees a likeness of the Trinity in the Soul insofar as the mind understands itself, but not insofar as it understands other things. It is clear then that it is necessary to have a word in any intellectual nature, for it is of the very nature of understanding that the intellect in understanding should form something. Now what is formed is called a word, and so it follows that in every being which understands there must be a word. However, intellectual natures are of three kinds: human, angelic and divine; and so there are three kinds of words. The human word, about which it is said in the Psalm (13:1): The fool said in his heart, There is no God. The angelic word, about which it is said in Zechariah (1:9), and in many places in Sacred Scripture, And the angel said to me. The third is the divine word, of which Genesis (1:3) says, And God said, Let there be light. So when the Evangelist says, In the beginning was the Word, we cannot understand this as a human or angelic word, because both these words have been made since man and angel have a cause and principle of their It is also clear that since in every nature that which issues forth and has a likeness to the nature from which it issues is called a son, and since this Word issues forth in a likeness and identity to the nature from which it issues, it is suitably and appropriately called a Son, and its production is called a generation. So now the first point is clear, the meaning of the term Word.

17. Supplement on verbum, ratio, and logos. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., q. 34, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
The most manifest and common way that word [ verbum] is said with respect to us is that which is brought forth [profertur] in the voice, which, in fact, proceeds from within us with respect to two things found in the exterior word, namely, the vocal sound [or sound of voice] itself, and the signification of the voice. For the vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect, according to the Philosopher (cf. De Int. I. 1, 16a 5), and, again, the vocal sound proceeds from the imagination, as is said in the De Anima (cf. II. 8, 420b 31 ff.). Therefore, the exterior vocal sound is called a word from this, that it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Thus, then, first and principally the interior concept of the mind is called a word, but secondly, the vocal sound itself that signifies the interior concept; but thirdly, the very imagination of the vocal sound is called a word. And these three ways Damascene lays down in the first book (ch. xiii), saying that a word is called the natural motion of the intellect, according to which it moves and understands and thinks, just as light and splendor , with respect to the first; and further, a word is what is not brought forth by a word, but is pronounced in the heart , with respect to the third; and further a word is also the angelthat is, the messengerof the intelligence , with respect to the second; but in a fourth way that is called a word figuratively which is signified or effected by a word, as we are wont to say, this is the word I have spoken to you , or (this is the word) which the king has commanded , when some deed which is signified by word has been pointed out either by simply announcing it or even commanding it.1
1

manifestius autem et communius in nobis dicitur verbum quod voce profertur. quod quidem ab interiori procedit quantum ad duo quae in verbo exteriori inveniuntur, scilicet vox ipsa, et significatio vocis. vox enim

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Cf. Theon of Smyrna, Expositio Rerum Mathematicarum ad Legendum Platoneum Utilium, Book II: Musica (Gr. ed. Hiller, pp. 72-73; tr. R. & D. Lawlor, pp. 47-48; rev. B.A.M.):
What logo/j means. XVII. According to the Peripatetics, logo/j is said in many ways [ lo/goj de\ kata\ me\n tou\j peripathtixou\j le/getai pollaxw=j]. The vocal sound which the moderns call prophor-ikos [= uttered], and the endiathetos, the reasoning within the mind without the utterance of the voice, are both designated in this way, and so is proportion, and it is in this sense that one thing is said to have a ratio to another thing. It also has the meaning of the explanation of the elements of the universe: the recognition of things which honor and are honored, and it is in this sense that we say: taking account of something, or not taking account of it (word of honor). The calculation of bankers is also called logo/j, as is the discourse of Demosthenes and Lysias in their written works (speech); the definition of things which explains their essence (reason), since it is to this that it applies; the syllogism and induction; the tales of Lybius, and fables. The name logo/j is also given to the fable, to the tale, and to the proverb. The ratio of form is also called this as well as the seminal ratio and many others. But accord-ing to Plato, the word logo/j is used with four different meanings: for thought without utterance; for discourse proceeding from thought and expressed by the voice; for the ex-planation of the elements of the universe; and for the ratio of proportion. It is this ratio that we propose now to seek.

Cf. Dominicus Gundisalvus, De Scientiis, Chapter 2, sec. 2: Concerning Logical Sciences (tr. John Longeway):1
But the interpretation of logic is taken from its highest intention. For logic is said from logos, according to three meanings ( intentiones): Logos in Greek is interpreted as ratio in Latin. But one sort of ratio is external with utterance, by which what is in the soul is interpreted through language. And another sort is ratio fixed in the soul, which is called a conception of the mind, which linguistic expressions [= vocal sounds (B.A.M.)] signify. Hence, there is, on the one hand, a ratio signifying, and on the other, a ratio that is signified. The third sort is a power created in man, by which one discriminates good and bad, and grasps the arts and sciences. And this is in every man, but in infants and some adults, it is weak, not being strong enough to perfect its actions, just as the foot of an infant is too weak for walking, and a small fire for burning a great mass of wood, and so it is even in those who are drunk or possessed by demons.

significat intellectus conceptum, secundum philosophum, in libro i periherm., et iterum vox ex imaginatione procedit, ut in libro de anima dicitur. vox autem quae non est significativa, verbum dici non potest. ex hoc ergo dicitur verbum vox exterior, quia significat interiorem mentis conceptum. sic igitur primo et principaliter interior mentis conceptus verbum dicitur, secundario vero, ipsa vox interioris conceptus significativa, tertio vero, ipsa imaginatio vocis verbum dicitur. et hos tres modos verbi ponit damascenus, in i libro, cap. xiii, dicens quod verbum dicitur naturalis intellectus motus, secundum quem movetur et intelligit et cogitat, velut lux et splendor, quantum ad primum, rursus verbum est quod non verbo profertur, sed in corde pronuntiatur, quantum ad tertium,. rursus etiam verbum est angelus, idest nuntius, intelligentiae, quantum ad secundum. dicitur autem figurative quarto modo verbum, id quod verbo significatur vel efficitur, sicut consuevimus dicere, hoc est verbum quod dixi tibi, vel quod mandavit rex, demonstrato aliquo facto quod verbo significatum est vel simpliciter enuntiantis, vel etiam imperantis. 1 In his footnote 5, Longeway notes that this portion of Gundisalvus work is taken from Al-Farabis De ortu scientiarum. (B.A.M.)

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Therefore, since this science gives rules concerning external speech ( logos), and concerning internal speech, by which it is certified in each of these the presence of the third logos, which is in man from the Creator, and directs him to a comprehension of what is more correct, for this reason it is called logic, a name derived from logos in accord with these three ways <of interpreting that term>. Now although many sciences that give rules concerning external speech, for instance, the grammatical science, might be called by the name of logic; still, this one, which directs us to what is necessary in every manner of speech ( logos), is more worthy of this name.

18. On subject and predicate in relation to name and verb. Cf. The Origins and Development of the Classical Word Class System:1
I. The Origins of the Classical Word Classes In discussing the history of the canonical parts of speech, it is customary to begin with Plato. He has been credited with being the first person to divide logos, sentence, into two components: onoma, nominal part or noun and rhema, verbal part or verb (Forbes 1933:109). This binary division has been claimed to correspond to the distinction between nouns and verbs. However, one must understand that the correspondence between the terms is far from complete for the reasons that follow. In his work Sophist (261E-262A), Plato defines onoma as an articulate mark set on those who do the actions and rhema as that which denotes action. Under this definition, the words onoma and rhema are most likely to mean what we now call subject and predicate respectively. It is clear that the distinction Plato drew here is built on semantic rather than grammatical grounds. For the conception of onoma and rhema, Plato thought of them as obligatory constituents of a sentence. This was made clear in his dialogue (262A), which reads Now a succession of onomata only can never form a sentence; neither can a succession of rhemata without onomata. Robins (1966:7) seems to best represent this idea by the first phrase structure rule of early generative grammar: logos, S onoma, NP + rhema, VP.

Cf. Historical Prelude:2

Plato and Aristotle The history of linguistic categorization in Europe begins with Plato who considered some language-related philosophical questions in some of his dialogues, most notably Cratylus.2 Although the principal issue taken up in Cratylus concerns the correctness of names (to put it simply, why a dog is called a dog and not a cat), some attention is devoted to analyzing a sentence into two major components the nominal one (onoma) and the verbal one (rheme): ... sentences are, I conceive, a
2

Cratylus and the philosophical issues raised in it have been subject to various, widely divergent inte rpretations (see A.O. Palmer 1989, Baxter 1992 and references cited there).

2 Historical prelude

1 2

(http://www.saehaneng.com/data/papers/nka_journal_2004_46_2_12_hwangkyuhong.htm [2/5/06]). (http://www.lotpublications.nl/publish/articles/001178/bookpart.pdf [2/5/6]).

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combination of verbs and nouns (Cratylus 431b). Thus, Plato approached the problem of noun-verb distinction very much like Pnini, also in terms of subject versus predicate. Since Platos focus was purely syntactic (i.e. on sentential analysis), Platonic nouns (onomata) and verbs (rhemata) do not exactly correspond to nouns and verbs as these are conceived nowadays and are more likely to be identified with modern NPs and VPs.

Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, Commentary on the De Interpretatione (= Ammonius: On Aristotles On Interpretation 1-8, tr. David Blank, p. 17):
But some propositions consist of only two simple vocal sounds intertwined, one subjected [hupokeimen] and the other predicated [katgouremen] as when I say Socrates walks; for here the vocal sound Socrates is called the subject-term [ hupokeimenos horos] and walks is predicated, because in every predicative speech one part is that about which the speech is, and the other part is that which is said about that thing; the part about which the speech is, here Socrates, is called a subject because it accepts the predications [made] of it, in this case walks, [which is] predicated insofar as it is addressed and said of the former.

Cf. Ammonius Hermeias, ibid, , p. 23:

<Only name and verb are properly called parts of a sentence> This is why he says that the assertoric sentence [= enunciative speech] is always composed of and breaks up into a name and a verb, believing as he does that these alone are properly called parts of [speech]. Be and not be [20] belong, on this view, to the things predicated immediately of some things, in which case they become as much parts of the propositions as the subjects are, as in Socrates exists, Socrates does not exist; but sometimes they belong to the vocal sounds used additionally in the propositions with a third added predication or in modal propositions, which are said to be added to the parts of the proposition or to be divided or to undergo something of this sort, as we shall learn in [25] the proem of the Analytics.1 Thus the part of the affirmation must always be either a name or a verb, but the verb is not always a part of the proposition, namely when it is not immediately predicated of the subject as having to signify an activity or a passion or simply the existence or non-existence of the subject.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 8 (tr. B.A.M.):

n. 8. Then when he says And it is always (an indication), etc., he explains the other part. Where it should be noted that since the subject of an enunciation is signified as (that) in which something inheres, since the verb signifies an action in the manner of an action <or a passion in the manner of a passion in the case of passive verbs>,2

N.B. On the presence of the copula as constituting a proposition tertii adiacentis, cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Peri Herm., lect. 2, nn. 2-4. 2 Cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.): In another way, that which is measured by time can be considered insofar as it is of this sort. And because that which is first and principally measured by time is motion, in which action and passion consist, therefore the verb which signifies action or passion signifies with time. ( alio modo, potest considerari id, quod tempore mensuratur, in quantum huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter tempore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit actio et passio, ideo verbum quod significat actionem vel passionem, significat cum tempore.)

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to whose account it belongs that it inhere, it is always put on the part of the predicate, but never on the part of the subject, unless it be taken with the force of a name, as has been said. Therefore the verb is always said to be an indication of those things which are said of another: both because the verb always signifies that which is predicated; as well as because in every predication there must be a verb, by reason of the fact that it implies composition, by means of which a predicate is composed with a subject. 1

Cf. Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. X (= Moralia 1009 c1011 e): parallel translations:
The Complete Works Volume 3, Essays and Miscellanies. By Plutarch. Platonic Questions. [Greek Added by B.A.M.] Plutarch, Mor. 1009 C1011 E. (In: Plutarchs Moralia In Seventeen Volumes. XIII Part I 99 C1032 F. With an English Translation by Harold Cherniss. Platonic Questions X, 1009 QUESTION X. <...> What then shall we say for Plato? Is it that at first the ancients called that [prw=toj lo/gwj], or <primary> speech, which once was called protasis and now is called axiom or pro-position,which as soon as a man speaks, he speaks either true or false? This consists of a noun and verb, which logicians call the subject and predicate. <...> What, then, is to be said on behalf of Plato? ...[I]s it that the ancients styled primary [105106] speech what then was called a pronouncement and now is called a proposition, that in the enunciation of which a truth or false-hood is first expressed? And this consists of a noun and a verb, the former of which the dialecticians call subject and [D] the latter predicate. Question X

Cf. J. T. Nesfield, Manual of English Grammar and Composition , Part I.Parsing and Analysis. Chapter I. Analysis in Outline, p. 1:
1. Sentence.When one person says something to another, or puts what he says into writing, he uses a combination of words which is called a sentence: Fire Burns. Here fire is the thing talked about. The word fire, though it names the thing, does not make a sentence. It is a name, and nothing more. It is only be adding such a word as burns to the word fire, that is, by saying what the thing (fire) does, that we can make a sentence. DefinitionA sentence is a combination of words, in which something is said about something else.
1

deinde cum dicit: et est semper etc.,exponit aliam particulam. ubi notandum est quod quia subiectum enunciationis significatur ut cui inhaeret aliquid, cum verbum significet actionem per modum actionis, de cuius ratione est ut inhaereat, semper ponitur ex parte praedicati, nunquam autem ex parte subiecti, nisi sumatur in vi nominis, ut dictum est. dicitur ergo verbum semper esse nota eorum quae dicuntur de altero: tum quia verbum semper significat id, quod praedicatur; tum quia in omni praedicatione oportet esse verbum, eo quod verbum importat compositionem, qua praedicatum componitur subiecto .

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Note.That which is said may be a statement, a question, a desire or an exclamation,whatever, in fact, can be expressed by a Finite verb (on the meaning of Finite verb see sec. 5).1

Cf. ibid., pp. 1-2:

2. Subject and Predicate.Every sentence, when it is expressed in full, consists of two parts, a Subject and a Predicate. [1-2] In a very short sentence like fire burns, the word fire (which is called a Noun) expresses the whole of the Subject, and the word burns (which is called a Finite Verb) expresses the whole of the Predicate. <> DefinitionsThe Subject of a sentence is a word or words denoting what we speak about. The Predicate is a word or words by which we say something about the thing denoted by the Subject. Note 1.In grammar the Subject is not what we speak, but the word or words denoting what
we speak about. Grammar deals exclusively with words, and this fact has to be recognised in all the definitions. Note 2.Such a sentence as Go! is elliptical. Here the Subject thou or you is understood. Still more elliptical is a sentence in which the Subject and the Finite verb are both understood: Companion, hence!SHAKESPEARE

To express this sentence in full, we have to say

Companion, go thou hence!

Cf. Plain English (Right Words):2

A simple definition of a sentence is: a set of words that expresses a complete thought and contains a subject and a predicate. Lets look at this. The subject is the person or thing performing the action that the sentence is talking about. Everything else in the sentence is the predicate. The predicate must include a verb the word that describes the action. It may also include an object a person or thing that is being acted upon and any other phrases. The shortest sentences are all verb; for example, Help! or Duck! In these one-word sentences, the subject (and the object, if there is one) is understood; if the sentence Help were written in full, it would read You help me. Usually, however, all the elements in the sentence are expressed: I love you madly consists of subject, verb, object and other (adverbial) phrase. Finally, the sentence must contain a complete thought. This is best demonstrated by considering an incomplete sentence: Although the car crashed through a barrier. This has a subject, car, a verb, crashed and a predicate, crashed through a barrier. If you left although out, it would be a sentence. But although signals that the writer has more to say; the thought, and therefore the sentence, isnt finished. Incompleteness is one of the two most common faults in sentence construction.

Cf. R. H. Robins, Noun and Verb in Universal Grammar (In: Diversions of Bloomsbury: Selected Writings on Linguistics. Amsterdam, 1970, p. 291) (First Published in: Language 28 [1952] 289-298):

Any part of a verb that can be used for saying something about something else (in any of the four senses shown in 1) is called Finite. 2 (www.zednet.lv/~avenija/bussines/new/Right%20Words%20newsletter%20articles.Htm [4/4/06])

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But a minimum of common grammatical structure, the universal existence or applicability of nominal and verbal categories, is asserted, or tacitly assumed, by almost all. Meillet and Sapir rejected the traditional apparatus of grammar as having no claim to universal validity. But Meillet declared11 that the categories of noun and verb are common to the grammar of all known languages and constitute a necessary minimum for any grammatical structure; [1] and Sapir wrote:12 There must be something to talk about and something must be said about this subject of discourse... No language wholly fails to distinguish noun and verb, though in particular cases the nature of the distinction may be an elusive one. It is different with the other parts of speech. No one of these is imperatively required for the life of language. These statements clearly retain logical criteria in their definition and establishment of the nominal and verbal classes, despite the objections (of which the authors were well aware) to the employment of nonlinguistic and especially philosophical categories to linguistic analysis. The assertion of Sapir, making the distinction of noun and verb rest on that between subject and predicate (which was criticized by Ogden and Richards 13) is particularly significant coming from him, since at the time of writing he had already analyzed a language that might seem to invalidate his statement. In Nootka14 he found only one form-class of major word-stems (word-stems other than particles); but he divided the syntactic function, or syntactic meaning, of the suffixed particles into two classes, which he named predicative (verbal) and non-predicative. There is only one form-class of major word-stems; but these stems can be nominalized or verbalized, and the two grammatical categories are thereby still introduced, though at a slightly different level of analysis.15 It seems reasonable, therefore, to begin the consideration of universality in grammatical structure by examining this asserted universality of the nominal and verbal categories. The claims for at least this irreducible minimum of common structure are made by those who are well aware how incomplete is our knowledge of the languages of the human race. Hjelmslev, in holding to the view that linguistics is an inductive science, admits that we are a long way from a complete enumeration and analysis of the grammatical systems to be found in the world, but considers that, nevertheless, we have sufficient evidence to frame inductive hypotheses on grammatical structure in general. 16
11 12

A. Meillet, Linguistique historique et linguistique gnrale 1.175 (Paris, 1926). Sapir, Language 126. 13 C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning8 260 (London, 1946). 14 Edward Sapir and Morris Swadesh, Nootka Texts 235-43 (Philadelphia, 1939). 15 Cf. the suggestion of B. L. Whorf, Lg. 21.9 (1945), that in Nitinat and the other Wakashan languages the terms noun and verb are meaningless, because the power of making predications or declarative sentences and of taking on such moduli as voice, aspect, and tense, may be a property of every major word. 16 Hjelmslev, Principles 39-42, 256.

Cf. R. H. Robins, ibid., pp. 295-296):

In the article by Burt and Ethel Aginsky referred to at the outset, the universal elements of grammar are given as segments, morphemes, and significant sequences of morphemes. 40
1

Cp. Marcus Berquist, (incomplete) paper on speculative grammar, Part I. On the Art and the Science of Grammar, p. 4. Nor is it true that the study of grammar is simply a study of the conventional and customary, which is singular and contingent rather than universal and necessary, and thus not the object of any art. This view has some plausibility, for there is Latin grammar, English grammar, French grammar, and so forth, and one might well wonder whether there is any grammar to learn beyond these particular grammars. However, it cannot withstand a more exact examination. For within the various languages, certain forms are universally present, such as the noun and the verb, and it does not seem there could be a language at all, still less an adequate language, without them. (emphasis added)

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These, and some other terms employed in grammatical analysisword (minimal free form), suffix, prefix, juncture, aggluti- [295-296]
40

Word 4.168.72 (1948). [= Burt W. and Ethel G. Aginsky, Word 4.168-72 (1948)]

nation, inflection, and so oncan be claimed by us as universally applicable, because, for us, all language consists of events in one dimension, time. In employing such terms we are doing no more than segmenting the unidimensional stream of speech into various meaningful pieces more or less independent; we are not attributing to the language itself or to its component parts any categories of meaning, however, abstract, that are found in the semantics of our own language. These categories are, therefore, of an altogether different order from word-classes (nouns, verbs, and the rest) and the secondary categories associated with them. Are we then able to say that there are any universal categories in grammar other than purely segmental ones? Or must we, in strictly adhering to the principles of descripttive linguistics, say that nouns and verbs in the widely diverse languages of the world have nothing necessarily in common save the name, and that the assumption of a universal semantic content is but a relic of the uncritical ethnocentric theories of the past? Against such a negative answer must be set the fact that grammatical analysis in terms of a basic distinction between nominal and verbal categories succeeds in new fields, and stands critical examination in the older areas of language study where so much else of traditional grammar has had to be abandoned. There is the additional fact that, when two formally differentiated wordclasses are established in any language as the basis of its grammatical system, a large proportion, at least, of the words in those two classes can be translated into the nouns and verbs, respectively, or nominal and verbal phrases, of the analysts language, to the satisfaction of a bilingual informant or of someone competent in the two languages concerned.

18. The foundational doctrine according to Plato. Cf. Plato, Sophist 261d263a (tr. B. Jowett):
Str. Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking of ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may be expected. Theaet. And what is the question at issue about names? Str. The question at issue is whether all names may be connected with one another, or none, or only some of them. Theaet. Clearly the last is true. Str. I understand you to say that words which have a meaning when in sequence may be connected, [e] but that words which have no meaning when in sequence cannot be connected? Theaet. What are you saying? Str. What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent; for there are two sorts of intimation of being which are given by the voice. Theaet. What are they? Str. One of them is called nouns, and the other verbs.

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Theaet. Describe them. Str. That which denotes action we call a verb. [262] Theaet. True. Str. And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun. Theaet. Quite true. Str. A succession of nouns only is not a sentence any more than of verbs without nouns. Theaet. I do not understand you. Str. I see that when you gave your assent you had something else [b] in your mind. But what I intended to say was, that a mere succession of nouns or of verbs is not discourse. Theaet. What do you mean? Str. I mean that words like walks, runs, sleeps, or any other words which denote action, however many of them you string together, do not make discourse. Theaet. How can they? Str. Or, again, when you say lion, stag, horse, or any other words which denote agents neither in this way of stringing words together do you attain to discourse; for there is [c] no expression of action or inaction, or of the existence or non-existence indicated by the sounds, until verbs are mingled with nouns; then the words fit, and the smallest com-bination of them forms language, and is the simplest and least form of discourse. Theaet. Again I ask, What do you mean? Str. When any one says A man learns, should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences? Theaet. Yes. [d] Str. Yes, for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation about something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be. And he not only names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with nouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connection of words [e] we give the name of discourse. Theaet. True. Str. And as there are some things which fit one another, and other things which do not fit, so there are some vocal signs which do, and others which do not, combine and form discourse. Theaet. Quite true. Str. There is another small matter. Theaet. What is it?

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Str. A sentence must and cannot help having a subject. Theaet. True. Str. And must be of a certain quality. Theaet. Certainly. Str. And now let us mind what we are about. Theaet. We must do so. Str. I will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an action are combined, by the help of a noun and a verb; and you shall tell me of whom the sentence speaks. Theaet. I will, to the best my power. Str. [263] Theaetetus sitsnot a very long sentence. Theaet. Not very. Str. Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject that is what you have to tell. Theaet. Of me; I am the subject. Str. Or this sentence, again Theaet. What sentence? Str. Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying. Theaet. That also is a sentence which will be admitted by every one to speak of me, and to apply to me. Str. [b] We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain quality. Theaet. Yes. Str. And what is the quality of each of these two sentences? Theaet. The one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true. Str. The true says what is true about you? Theaet. Yes. Str. And the false says what is other than true? Theaet. Yes. Str. And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were? Theaet. True.

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Str. And say that things are real of you which are not; for, as we were saying, in regard to each thing or person, there is much that is and much that is not. Theaet. Quite true. Str. [c] The second of the two sentences which related to you was first of all an example of the shortest form consistent with our definition. Theaet. Yes, this was implied in recent admission. Str. And, in the second place, it related to a subject? Theaet. Yes. Str. Who must be you, and can be nobody else? Theaet. Unquestionably. Str. And it would be no sentence at all if there were no subject, for, as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible. Theaet. Quite true. Str. When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being, [d] such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly false discourse. Theaet. Most true. Str. And therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved to exist in our minds both as true and false. Theaet. How so? Str. You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what they are, and in what they severally differ [e] from one another. Theaet. Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain. Str. Are not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself? Theaet. Quite true. Str. But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech? Theaet. True. Str. And we know that there exists in speech... Theaet. What exists? Str. Affirmation.

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Theaet. Yes, we know it. [264] Str. When the affirmation or denial takes place in silence and in the mind only, have you any other name by which to call it but opinion? Theaet. There can be no other name. Str. And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of sense, would you not call it imagination? Theaet. Certainly. Str. And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of thinking, and imagination or phantasy is the union [b] of sense and opinion, the inference is that some of them, since they are akin to language, should have an element of falsehood as well as of truth? Theaet. Certainly.

Cf. Keith Allan, Aristotles Footprints in the Linguists Garden, note 2, p. 5:

In Sophist 261e63 Plato identified two phonic signs for the essence of things: onoma and rhema. The rhema denotes an action; those who do the actions are signified by onomata (262a, c). Any combination [= sumploke] of onoma and rhema produces a logos (262c). Every logos is of something (tinos); i.e. it has a subject or topic named in the onoma. Moreover it is about something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be (262d).

20. Platos Sophist on speech in sum. The question is asked: Can all names fit together, or none, or only some of them? It will be answered: only some names, namely, the noun and the verb, can be fitted together. What Socrates means is this: only those combinations which express a complete thought and make perfect sense in the soul of the hearer are allowed to have meaning. Aristotle, on the other hand, allows that the name and the verb and their congeners are significative separately, but the two positions are complementary, as we explain elsewhere. Some words which have meaning when in sequence or succession may be fitted together, but words which have no meaning when in sequence cannot be fitted together. There are two sorts of intimations [unveilings] of being given by the voice, one of them being called onomata (names or nouns), the other rhemata (verbs). Note that each of these is both a sound of voice and a signthat is, a significant vocal sound or a vocal sound having meaning. The verb is the unveiling of action; the noun or name is a sign of voice placed on those who do the actions. Neither a succession of nouns nor one of verbs is logos (speech or discourse).1 There is no expression of action or inaction or of existence or non-existence until verbs are intertwined [sumploke] with nouns.2 The result of such intertwining forms speech and is the smallest and least form of discourse. E.g. A man learns. Every sentence has a subject, which is what it is about. Again, every sentence has a quality with respect to its truth value: for instance (in the case of enunciative speech), it is either true or false.
1

For a similar observation on conjunctions and prepositions, see Plutarchs Platonic Questions X further below. 2 Cp. Aristotle, Cat. chaps. 2 and 4 on sumploke.

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21. The principal divisions of lexis. Parts of language which are also parts of speech: the name and the verb

Parts of language which are not also parts of speech (= moria or particles of language): the conjunction, the article, the preposition, and the adverb

22. The principal division of significative vocal sounds in sum. Those which signify when conjoined to the others, syncategoremata or consignificantia: the conjunction and the preposition (and the article and the adverb)

Those which signify by themselves, which are called interpretations: the name and the verb enunciative speech3

The reader will recall here that Boethius, includes the other species of perfect speech under interpretation as well, in this wide understanding being followed St. Albert the Great; but both following Aristotle, according to the opinion I have expressed above.

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Appendix: The complete text of Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. Question X (= Moralia 1009 c 1011 e): parallel translations.
The Complete Works Volume 3, Essays and Miscellanies. By Plutarch. Platonic Questions. (tr. William Watson Goodwin) [Greek Added by B.A.M.] Plutarch, Mor. 1009 C1011 E. (In: Plutarchs Moralia In Seventeen Volumes. XIII Part I 99 C1032 F. With an English Translation by Harold Cherniss. Platonic Questions X, 1009 ff. QUESTION X. Question X a

WHY SAID PLATO, THAT SPEECH WAS (1009) 1. What was Platos reason for saying b COMPOSED OF NOUNS AND VERBS? that speech is a blend of nouns and verbs? (Platos Sophist, p. 262 A.) For he seems to make no other parts of speech but them. But Homer in a playful humor has comprehended them all in one verse: For it seems that except for these two Plato dismissed all the parts of speech whereas Homer in his exuberance went so far as to pack all [C] together into a single line, the following:
Tentward going myself take the guerdon that well you may know it.c [au)toj i)w\v klisi/nde, to\ so\n ge/raj: o)/fr eu)= ei)d$=j.]

au)toj i)w\v klisi/nde, to\ so\n ge/raj: o)/fr eu)= ei)d$=j. (Iliad, i. 185.)

For in it there is pronoun, participle, noun, preposition, article, conjunction, adverb, and verb, the particlede being put instead of the preposition ei)j; for klisi/nde, TO THE TENT, is said in the same sense as Aqh/naze, TO ATHENS.
a

In this there are in fact a pronoun and a participle and noun and verb and preposition and article and conjunction and adverb, d for the suffix ward has here been put in place of the preposition to, the expression tentward being of the same kind as the expression Athensward.e

This question is translated and discussed by J. J. Hartman in De Avindzon des Heidendoms (Leiden, 1910), ii, pp. 22-30 and translated in part by A. von Mrl in Die Grosse Weltordnung (Berlin/Wien/Leipzig, 1948), ii, pp. 85-89; it is commented on in detail by O. G ldi, Plutarchs

sprachliche Interessen (Diss. Zrich, 1922), pp. 2-10.

b

Sophist 262 c 2-7; cf. Crat. 425 A 1-5 and 431 B 5-C 1, Theaetetus 206 D 1-5, and [Plato] Epistle vii, 342 B 6-7 and 343 b 4-5; O. Apelt, Platonis Sophista (Lipsiae, 1897), p. 189. and F. M. Cornford, Platos Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), pp. 307-308.
c
d

Iliad i, 185.

For these eight parts of speech cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica 11 (9. 23 1-2 [Uhlig]). As the Homeric line containing all of them the grammarians cite Iliad xxii, 59 (Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 58, 13-19 and p. 357, 29-36 [Hilgard]); Eustathius, Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem 1256, 60-61; and there the noun is du/sthnon, for the adjective (noun adjective in older grammars [cf. O.E.D. s.v. noun 3]) was considered to be a kind of noun, o)/noma e)pi/qeton (Dionysius Thrax, op. cit., 12 [p. 33, 1 and pp. 34, 3-35, 2]) with Scholia...., p. 233, 7-33 and p. 553, 11-17....). e Cf. Etym. Magnum 761, 30-32 and 809, 8-9 (Gaisford) and further for mo/rion as prefix or suffix 141, 47-52.

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What then shall we say for Plato? Is it that at first the ancients called that prw=toj lo/gwj, or <primary> speech, which once was called protasis and now is called axiom or proposition, which as soon as a man speaks, he speaks either true or false? This consists of a noun and verb, which logicians call the subject and predicate. For when we hear this said, Socrates philosphizeth or Socrates is changed [tre/retai], requiring nothing more, we say the one is true, the other false. For very likely in the beginning men wanted speech and articulate voice, to enable them to express clearly at once the passions and the patients, the actions and the agents.
f

What, then, is to be said on behalf of Plato? Or f is it that the ancients styled primary [105-106] speecha what then was called a pronouncement and now is called a proposition, b that in the enunciation of which a truth or falsehood is first expressed?c And this consists of a noun and a verb, the former of which the dialecticians call subject and [D] the latter predicate.d For upon hearing Socrates philosophizes and again Socrates flies [pe/tetai] we should say without requiring anything else besides that the former is true speech and the latter false. e Moreover, it is likely that men first felt the need of speech and articulate sound f in desiring to designate and make quite clear to one another actions and their agents and patients and what they undergo.

See 1003 A and 1008 E supra and note c on De Comm. Not. 1075 F infra. Plato, Sophist 262 C 6-7 (tw=n lo/gwn o( prw=to/j kai\ smikro/tatoj ) and 9-10 (lo/gwn . . . e)la/xisto/n te kai\ prw=ton ); cf. Ammonius, De Interpretatione, p. 67, 20-30 and pp. 78, 29-79, 9. b Cf. [Apuleius], Peri\ e(rmenei/aj i (pp. 176, 15-177, 2 [Thomas]); Galen Institutio Logica i, 5 (with J. Maus note ad loc., Galen, Einfhrung in die Logik [Berlin, 1960], pp. 3-4); and Proclus, In Primum Euclidis El. Lib., pp. 193, 18-194, 4 (Friedlin). For pro/tasij used in the general sense of proposition cf. Albinus, Epitome vi, 1 and 3 (p. 29, 1-4 and 19-20 [Louis] = p. 158, 4-7 and 21-22 [Hermann] and Aristotle himself (Anal. Prior., 24 a 16-17 with Alexander, Anal. Prior., p. 44, 16-23); and for a)xi/oma as the Stoic term for this cf. besides the passage of Proclus just cited Ammonius, De Interpretatione, p. 2, 26 and Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 27-33 and p. 132, s.v. a)xi/oma. c Plato, Sophist 262 E 8-9 and 263 A 11-B 3; cf. [Apuleius], Peri\ e(rmenei/aj iv (pp. 178, 1-7 [Thomas]) and Ammonius, De Interpretatione, p. 18, 2-22 and pp. 26, 31-27, 4. It was express Stoic doctrine that every proposition is either true or false ( cf. Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 28-29). d Cf. [Apuleius], Peri\ e(rmenei/aj i (pp. 178, 12-15 [Thomas]); Martianus Capella, iv, 393; and Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 16-17 with notes 34-41 and p. 25 with notes 79-81. Notice the difference between Diogenes Laertius, vii, 58, and Plutarchs statement (Mates, p. 16, n. 34); and with ptw=sij as used by Plutarch here cf. besides Sextus, Adv. Math. xi, 29 (Mates, p. 17, n. 40) Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VIII, ix, 26, 4-5, cited by Pearson ( Fragments, p. 75) in connexion with Stobaeus, Ecl. i, 12, 3 (p. 137, 3-6 [Wachsmuth]) = S.V.F. i, p. 19, 24-26. oi( dialektikoi/ in the present passage as in 1011 A and 1011 D infra are the Stoics (cf. Aulus Gellius, XVI, viii, 1 and 8; Sextus, Pyrrh. Hyp. ii., 146 and 247 and Adv. Math. viii, 93; Cicero, Acad. Prior. ii, 97; and see note d on De Stoic. Repug. 1045 F infra). e Plato, Sophist 263 A 8-B 3. f i.e. lo/goj in the sense of speech. Cf. De Sollertia Animalium 973 A (proforikou= lo/gou kai\ fqnh=j e)na/rqrou) with S.V.F. ii, p. 43, 18-20 (t%= profprik%= lo/g%= e)na/rqrouj fwna/j [but in S.V.F. iii, p. 215, 35-36 h( shmai/nousa e)/narqroj fwnh/, with which cf. S.V.F. ii, frag. 143]); and De An. Proc. in Timaeo 1026 A (lo/goj de\ le/cij e)n fwn$= shmnatink$= dianoi/aj).
a

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Now, since actions and affections are adequately expressed by verbs, and they that act and are affected by nouns, as he says, these seem to signify. And one may say, the rest signify not. For instance, the groans and shrieks of stage players, and even their smiles and silence, make their discourse more emphatic. But they have no absolute power to signify anything, as a noun and verb have, but only an ascititious power to vary speech; just as they vary letters who mark spirits and quantities upon letters, these being the accidents and differences of letters.

Since, then, with the verb we do make adequately clear [107-108] acts and what is undergone and with the noun the agents and patients, as Plato has said himself,a it seemed that these signify, whereas one might say that the rest like the groans and [E] shouts of actors do not signify; and, by heaven, suddenly falling silent with a smile often makes speech more expressive and yet has not the force requisite for signifying as do the verb and the noun but a certain supplementary force embellishing speech in the way that the letters are embellished by those who make independent ones of their breathings and aspirates and in some cases of their long and short quantities,b although these are rather modifications and incidental characteristics and variations of letters,c as the ancients showed by adequately expressing themselves in actually writing with sixteen letters.d

This the ancients have made manifest, whom sixteen letters sufficed to speak and write anything.
a

Sophist 262 A 3-7, B 6, and B 10-c 1; but Plato here speaks only of pra/ceij and pra/ttontej as signified by verbs and nouns. For Plutarchs substitution of pra/gmata for pra/ceij cf. Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 215, 28-30 (Hilgard); Apollonius Dyscolus, De Constructione i, 130 and iii, 58 (p. 108, 11-14 and pp. 323, 9-324, 9 [Uhlig]). b ta\ pneu/mata are the two breathings, dasu\ kai\ yilo/n (cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica, Suppl. i, p. 107, 4 [Uhlig] and for the argument that such marks are letters cf. Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 187, 26-188, 21 and p. 496, 11-13 [Hilgard]); but ta\j dasu/thtaj refers to the aspirates q, f, x (cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica 6, p. 12, 5 [Uhlig]; Sextus, Adv. Math. i, 103; Priscian, Inst. Grammatica i, 24-25 = i, p. 19, 3-8 [Hertz] and e)kta/seij te kai\ sustola\j e)ni/wn to the distinction of h from e and of w from o (cf. Sextus, Adv. Math. i, 115). c cf. Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 496, 19-14 (Hilgard). d Cf. Plutarch, Quaestio Conviv. 738 F; Demetrius of Phaleron, frag. 196 (Wehrli); Varro, De Antiquitate Litterarum, frag. 2 (Funaioli, Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta i, p. 184; cf. pp. 2 and 120 for L. Cincius, frag. 1 and Cn. Gellius, frag. 1; Pliny, N.H. vii, 192; Tacitus, Ann. xi, 14; Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam , pp. 34, 27-35, 13 and pp. 184, 7-12 and 185, 3-7 (Hilgard). Besides, we must not fail to observe, that Plato says that speech is composed OF these, not BY these; nor must we find fault with Plato for omitting conjunctions, prepositions, and the rest, any more than we should criticise a man who should say such a medicine is composed of wax and galbanum, because fire and utensils are omitted, without which it cannot be produced. For speech is not composed of these; 2. In the second place, take care lest we fail to heed what Plato has said, that speech is a blend of [109-110] these, not that it is blended by means of them, and lest then like one who, when the medicine is said to be a mixture of wax and galbanum, carps at the omission of the fire and the receptacle, without which it could not have been mixed, we too similarly object that Plato disregarded conjunctions and pre-

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yet by their means, and not without them, speech must be composed. As, if a man says BEATS or IS BEATEN, and adds Socrates and Pythagoras to the same, he gives us something to conceive and understand. But if a man pronounce INDEED <me/n> or FOR <ga/r> or ABOUT <peri/> and no more, none can conceive any notion of a body or matter; and unless such words as these be uttered with verbs and nouns, they are but empty noise and chattering. For neither alone nor joined one with another do they signify anything. And join and confound together conjunctions, articles, and prepositions, supposing you would make something of them; yet you will be taken to babble, and not to speak sense.

positions and the like, for it is not of these that speech is naturally blended but, if at all, by means of them and [1010] not without them. For it is not the case that as one by uttering strikes or is struck and again Socrates or Pythagoras has provided something to conceive and have in mind somehow[;] so, when indeed or for or about has been pronounced by itself, it is possible to get some conception of an act or an object a ; but, unless these are expressions about those other words and in association with them, they resemble senseless sounds and noises. The reason is that they naturally signify nothing either by themselves or in association with one another; but, however we may combine or mix together conjunctions and articles and prepositions in trying to make of them a single thing in common, it will seem that we are babbling gib[111-112] berish [B] rather than speaking a language.

The phrase, sw=ma h)\ pra=gma shmai=non, occurs in the definition of o)/noma given by Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica 23 (p. 24, 3-4 [Uhlig]). Since Plutarch has just given both verbs and nouns as counter-examples, however, pra/gmatoj here is probably meant in the sense of ta\ pra/gmata in 1009 D supra (page 108, note a); cf. also Dionysius Hal., De Comp. Verb. xii, 69-70 (p 46, 21 f. [Usener-Radermacher]), %)= shmai/nei ti sw=ma h)\ pra=gma , where the preceding ou)/te 0)/noma ou)/te r(h=ma (ibid. p. 46, 18) indicates that pra/gma means act and not thing. The use of sw=ma for object generally reflects the Stoic doctrine that all agents and patientsand so all entitiesare sw/mata (see notes f and g on De Comm. Not. 1073 E infra and cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, De Constructione i, 16 = p. 18, 5-8 [Uhlig]). But when there is a verb in construction with a noun, the result is speech and sense. Therefore some do with justice make only these two parts of speech; and perhaps Homer is willing to declare himself of this mind, when he says so often,
e)/poj t e)/fat e)/k t o)no/mzen:

When a verb is combined with a noun, however, the result is straightaway language and speech. a Wherefore it is reasonable that some people consider these alone to be parts of speech b ; and this perhaps is what Homer wants to make clear each time he says
gave word to the thought and announced it,c

For by e)/poj he usually means a verb, as in for it was his custom to call the verb word, as these verses. in these lines:
w)= gu/nai, h)= ma/la tou=to e)/poj qumalge\j e)/eipej kai\] Verily, woman, a heart-breaking word is this thou has spokend

and,

and

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kai=re, pa/ter w)= zei=ne, e)/poj d ei)/per ti le/lektai deino/n, a)/far to\ fe/roien a)narpa/casai a)/ellai.

(Odyssey, xxiii. 183; viii. 408.) For neither conjunction, article, nor preposition could be said to be [deino/n] (TERRIBLE) or [qumalge\j] (SOUL GRIEVING), but only a verb signifying a base action or a foolish passion of the mind.
a b

Joy to thee, reverend guest; if offensive words have been spoken, May they be gone forthwith swept up and away by a whirlwind.e

For what is offensive and heart-breaking to speak is not a conjunction or an article or a preposition but a verb expressive of a shameful [C] action or of some improper experience.

Plato, Sophist 262 C 4-7 and D 2-6. Cf. [Apuleius], Peri\ e(rmenei/aj iv (pp. 178, 4-7 [Thomas]); Apollonius Dyscolus, De Constructione i, 30 (p. 28, 6-9 [Uhlig] with Priscian, Inst. Grammatica xvii, 22 = ii, pp. 121, 21122, 1 [Hertz]); and Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam , pp. 515, 19-517, 32 (Hilgard), where the doctrine is ascribed to the Peripatetics and some of the supporting arguments are answered (cf. Priscian, op.cit. ii, 15 and xi, 6-7 = i, p. 54, 5-7 and pp. 551, 17-522, 14 [Hertz]). An elaborate defense of the doctrine, in many particulars like Plutarchs, is given by Ammonius (De Interpretatione, pp. 11, 1-15, 13), who with explicit reference to the Cratylus and the Sophist asserts that Plato anticipated Aristotle in holding it ( De Interpretatione, p. 40, 26-30; p. 48, 30-32; p. 60, 1-3 and 17-23). Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1404 b 26-27 [= Language is composed of names and verbs. (tr. B.A.M.)]; Theophrastus and Boethus of Sidon in Simplicius, Categ., p. 10, 24-27 and p. 11, 23-25; and Adrastus in Theon Smyrnaeus, p. 10, 7-9 (Hiller). c Iliad vi, 253 and 406; vii, 108; and passim. d Odyssey xxiii,.183. e Odyssey viii, 408-409. Therefore, when we would praise or dispraise poets or writers, we are wont to say, such a man uses Attic nouns and good verbs, or else common nouns and verbs; but none can say that Thucydides or Euripides used Attic or common articles. This is also why we customarily praise or censure writers of poetry and prose in [113-114] terms like these, the nouns employed by soand-so are Attic and the verbs are elegant or again pedestrian,a whereas it would not be said by anyone that in the language of Euripides or Thucydides pedestrian or again elegant and Attic articles are used. 3. What then? one might say Do these words contribute nothing to speech? I should say that they do make a contribution to it just as salt does to a dish of food and water to a barley-cake. Evenus even said that fire is the best of sauces. b Nevertheless, we do not say either that water is a part of barley-cake or wheat-bread or that fire or salt is a part of greens or victuals, although we do always require fire and salt, whereas speech unlike this often has no need of

What then? May some say, do the rest of the parts conduce nothing to speech? I answer, They conduce, as salt does to victuals; or water to barley cakes. And Euenus calls fire the best sauce. Though sometimes there is neither occasion for fire to boil, nor for salt to season our food, which we have always occasion for. Nor has speech always occasion for articles.

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those [D] additional words. I think I may say this of the Latin tongue, which is now the universal language; for it has taken away all prepositions, saving a few, nor does it use any articles, but its nouns are (as it were) without skirts and borders.
a

So it is, it seems to me, with the speech of the Romans, which now is used by nearly all men, for it has eliminated all prepositions except for a fewc [115-116] and of the words called articles admits none at alla but employs nouns without tassels, as it were.

In such expressions o)/noma (and the same could be said for r(h=ma) is used in a different sense, i.e. ro\ koinw=j e)pi\ pa=n me/roj lo/gou diatei=non (cf. Simplicius, Categ., p. 25, 1417; Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 522, 21-28 [Hilgard]). b Evenus, frag. 10 (Bergk, Poetae Lyr. Graec. ii4, p. 271; Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus i, p. 476). The remark is ascribed to Evenus in Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur 50 A and in Quaest. Conviv. 697 C-D but to Prodicus in De Tuenda Sanitate 126 D. c According to Hartman (De Plutarcho, p. 583) this is an erroneous generalization from those Latin expressions of relations of place in which no preposition is used; according to H. J. Rose ( The Roman Questions of Plutarch [Oxford, 1924], p. 198 ad lxvii [208 A]) it is rather an exaggeration suggested by the contemporary fondness for archaic and poetical constructions which omitted the prepositions of Ciceronian grammar; and both these observations may be partial explanations of Plutarchs odd statement, but it should be remembered also that many Latin prepositions were regarded by the Greeks as not being prepositions at all (Priscian, Inst. Grammatica xiv, 9-10 and 23 = ii, pp. 28, 19-29, 11 and pp. 36, 20-37, 6 [Hertz])....
a

Cf. Quintilian, Inst. Orat. i, 4, 19; Priscian, Inst. Grammatica ii, 16 and xvii, 27 (i. p. 54, 13-16 and ii, p. 124, 16-18 [Hertz]). Nor is it any wonder, since Homer, who in fineness of epic surpasses all men, has put articles only to a few nouns, like handles to cans, or crests to helmets. Therefore these verses are remarkable wherein the articles are suppressed.
Ai)/anti de\ ma/lista dai/froni qumo\n o)/rine t%= Telamwnia/d$\ (Iliad, xiv.

This is not surprising either, since Homer too, who excelled in marshalling words,b attaches articles to few of his nouns, as it were crests to helmets or handles to goblets that do not require themc; and that is the very reason why critical marksd have been put at the verses in which he does so, for example:
Wrathful fury he chiefly excited in fiery Ajax, The Telamonian one,e

459.) and,
poi/een, o)/fra to\ lh=toj u(pekrofugw\n a)le/oito (Ibid. xx. 147.)

and
Built it to let him elude and evade the notorious monster f

and some few besides. But in a thousand others, the omission of the articles hinders neither perspicuity nor elegance of phrase.
b

and a few others besides. In the rest, however, countless [E] as they are, though an article is not present, the expression suffers nothing in clarity or beauty. [117-118]

Cf. Democritus, frag. B 21 (D.-K.) and Pausanius, ix, 30, 4 and 12. The phrase ko/smon e)pe/wn occurs in a line of Solons quoted by Plutarch himself ( Solon viii, 2 [82 C]); cf. also Parmenides, frag. B 8, 52 (D.-K.) and Philetas of Cos, frag. 8 (Diehl, Anth. Lyr. Graec. ii, p. 211) = 10 (Powell, Collectanea Alexandrina, p. 92).

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There were e)kpw/mata of countless kinds (Clement of Alexandria, Paedegogus II, iii, 35, 2), many without handles (Athenaeus, xi, 783 a, 478 b, and 481 d). d Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Elench. 177 b 6 (ka)kaei= . . . para/sma poiou=ntai ). e Iliad xiv, 459-460. Leaf (The Iliad ii2, p. 97ad 458-459) calls the use of t%= in 460 hardly Homeric. Cf. in general Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem ed. Dindorf i, p. 70, 10-11 ad B 1 and p. 339, 14-15 ad K 1 (e)/sti ga\r o( poihth\j paraleiptiko\j tw=n a)/rqrwn). f Iliad xx, 147. For the use of the article here, cf. Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem ed. Dindorf ii, p. 199, 19-20; Leaf (The Iliad ii2, p. 359) calls it very rare in Homer and says that instances such as this are confined to late passages in the Iliad. Now neither an animal nor an instrument nor arms nor anything else is more fine, efficacious, or pleasanter, for the loss of a part. 4. Moreover, it is not natural for any living being or instrument or weapon or any other existing thing to become more beautiful or more effective or more pleasant by the removal or loss of a part that belongs to ita ; but frequently when conjunctions have been eliminated speech has a force more emotional and stirring,b as in a case like this:
One just wounded alive in her clutches, another unwounded, Dead already another she dragged by the feet through the turmoil c

Yet speech, by taking away conjunctions, often becomes more persuasive, as here: One reard a dagger at a captives breast; One held a living foe, that freshly bled With new-made wounds, another draggd a dead. (Ibid. xviii. 536.) And this of Demosthenes: A bully in an assault may do much which his victim cannot even report to another person, by his attitude, his look, his voice, when he insults, when he attacks as an enemy, when he smites with his fist, when he strikes a blow on the face. These rouse a man; these make a man beside himself who is unused to such foul abuse.
a b

and this by Demosthenes: He who strikes one might do many things, some of which his victim could not even [F] report to another, by his posture, by his look, by his tone of voice, when insultingly, when in hostility, when with the fist, when with a slap in the face; these are the things that stir up, that drive to distraction men unused to contemptuous treatment.d

Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 516, 37-517, 4 (Hilgard). Cf. [Plutarch], De Vita Homeri 40 (vii, pp. 355, 20-356, 5 [Bernardakis]); for Plutarch, Caesar 1, 3-4 (731 F) cf. R. Jeuckens, Plutarch von Charonea und die Rhetorik (Strassburg, 1908), pp. 162163, pp. 162-163. c Iliad xviii, 536-537 = [Hesiod], Scutum 157-158 (cf. F. Solmsen, Hermes, xciii [1965], pp. 1-6). d Demosthenes, Oratio xxi, 72. The passage is quoted and analysed by Longinus ( De Sublimitate xx-xxi) for the combination of several figures, asyndeton included; cf. also Tiberius Rhteor, Peri\ sxhma/twn 40 (Rhetores Graeci iii, p. 78, 1-4 [Spengel]). And again: Not so with Midias; but from the very day, he talks, he abuses, he shouts. Is there an election of magistrates? And again: Not Meidias, however; but from this day forth he talks, reviles, shouts. Is someone to be elected?

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Midias the Anagyrrasian is nominated. He is the advocate of Plutarchus; he knows state secrets; the city cannot contain him. (Demosthenes against Midias, p. 537, 25, and p. 578, 29.)

Meidias of [1011] Anagyrus is a candidate. He represents the interests [119-120] of Plutarch, a knows the secrets of state, is too big for the city.b

Therefore the figure asyndeton, whereby This is just the reason why the figure of conjunctions are omitted, is highly commended asyndeton is very highly esteemed by the by writers of rhetoric. writers of rhetorical manuals, But such as keep overstrict to the law, and (according to custom) omit not a conjunction, rhetoricians blame for using a dull, flat, tedious style, without any variety in it. And inasmuch as logicians mightily want conjunctions for the joining together their axioms, as much as charioteers want yokes, and Ulysses wanted withs to tie Cyclops sheep; this shows they are not parts of speech, but a conjunctive instrument thereof, as the word conjunction imports.
a

and those who abide too strictly by the rules and leave out no conjunction of the ordinary language they censure for making their style dull and unemotional and wearisome from lack of variety.c That the dialecticians have special need of conjunctions for the connexions and combinations of propositions,d as charioteers have of yokes and as Odysseus <in the cave> of Cyclops had of withes for binding the sheep togethere <...>, this shows not that the conjunction is a part of speech f but that it is a kind of instrument for [B] conjoining, just as its name indicates,

Plutarch, the tyrant of Eretria (Cf. Plutarch, Phocion xii-xiii 747 [A-E] ; Demosthenes, Oratorio v, 5 [with scholion ad loc.] and xxi, 110). b Demosthenes, Oratorio xxi, 200. Part of this passage is quoted for ayndeton by [Aristides], Libri Rhetorici i, 28 (pp. 13, 23-14, 1 [W. Schmid]). c Cf. Demetrius, De Elocutione 193-194 and 268-269; Longinus, De Sublimitate xxi; Tiberius Rhetor, Peri\ sxhma/twn 40 (Rhetores Graeci iii, p. 78, 11-15 [Spengel]); [Cicero], Ad Herennium iv, 41. For ai( te/xnai = rhetorical manuals cf. Isocrates, Adv. Sophistas 19 (ta\j kaloume/nas te//xnaj) with the scholion ad loc. d The dialecticians are the Stoics (see note d on page 107 supra). The propositions in question are the conditional (sunhme/non), the conjunctive (sumplegme/non), and the disjunctive (diezeugme/non); and the su/ndesmoi required for these are respectively o(sunaptiko/j (ei)), o( sumplektiko/j (kai/), and o( diazeuktiko/j (h)/toi or h)/): cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii, 71-72 (S.V.F. ii, frag 207); Galen, Institutio Logica iii, 3-4 and iv, 4-6 (pp. 8, 13-9, 8 and pp. 10, 13-11, 12 [Kalbfleisch] = S.V.F. ii, frags. 208 and 217); and Plutarch, De E 386 F387 A, De Sollertia Animalium 969 A-B, and De An. Proc. in Timaeo 1026 B-C. e Cf. Odyssey ix, 427 and Euripides, Cyclops 225. f As the Stoics held it to be: cf. Diogenes Laertius vii, 57-58 (S.V.F. ii, frag. 147 and iii, p. 214, 12); S.V.F. ii, frag. 148; Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam , p. 356, 13-15 and p. 517, 33-34 with p. 519, 26-32 [Hilgard]. Posidonius wrote against those who said that conjunctions ou) dhlou=si me/n ti au)to/ de\ mo/non th\n fra/sin sunde/smoi (Apollonius Dyscolus, De Conjunctionibus, p. 214, 4-8 [Schneider]). Nor do conjunctions join all, but only such as are not spoken simply; that [121-122] is for holding together not all statements but those that are non-simple,a unless one also maintains that the strap is part

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unless you will make a cord part of the burthen, glue a part of a book, or distribution of money part of the government. For Demades says, that money which is given to the people out of the exchequer for public shows is the glue of a democracy.

of the load and the glue part of a book b and the dole, by heaven, part of the government, as Demades said when he called the festival-grants the glue of the democracy.c

What kind of conjunction, moreover, by Now what conjunction does so of several combining and connectingd makes of many a propositions make one, by fitting and joining proposition so thoroughly one as the marble them together, as marble joins iron that is makes the iron that is smelted with it in the fire? incited with it in the fire? The marble, however, is not and is not said to be Yet the marble neither is nor is said to be part of a part of the iron; and yet things of this kind the iron; although in this case the substances make something common out of a multiplicitye compose the mixture and are melted together, so by permeating the objects that are being blended as to make a common substance from several and by being fused [C] with them.f and to be mutually affected.
a

That is even for the Stoics the conjunction holds together only a molecular proposition, this consisting of two or more atomic (simple) propositions, each of which itself consists of a subject and a predicate not connected by any conjunction: cf. Sextus, Adv. Math. viii, 93-95 and 108-109 (S.V.F. ii, p. 66, 28-37 and pp. 70, 36-72, 2) with Mates, Stoic Logic, pp. 95-96; and Diogenes Laertius, vii, 68-69 and 71-72 (S.V.F. ii, frags. 203-207). b Cf. Apuleius, Peri\ e(rmhnei/aj iv (p. 178, 7-11 [Thomas]); Ammonius, De Interpretatione, pp. 12, 25-13, 6 and p. 67, 15-19 and p. 73, 19-22; Simplicius, Categ., p. 64, 23-25; Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 515, 19-29 (Hilgard). c Demades, frag. 13 (Baiter-Sauppe, Oratores Attici ii, p. 315 B 38-42) = xxxvi (De Falco, Demade Oratore2, p. 31). d See note d on 1011 A supra. e Cf. 1010 A supra: e(/n ti peirw/menoi koino\n e)c au)tw=n poiei=n. f The marble is not fused with the iron, as Plutarch apparently believed it is, but supplies the limestone which unites with the non-ferrous minerals of the ore (the gangue) and with the ash of the fuel to form the cinder or slag. It may be such a flux to which reference is made by [Aristotle], De Mirabilibus Auscultationibus 833 b 24-28 and by Theophrastus, De Lapidibus 9 (cf. Hans Blmner, Technologie und Terminologie der Gewerbe und Knste bei Griechen und Rmern iv [Leipzig, 1887], pp. 219-220; A. W. Persson, Eisen und Eisenbereitung in Altester Zeit [Lund, 1934], pp. 15-17; E. R. Caley and J. F. C. Richards, Theophrastus on Stones [Columbus, 1956], p. 77); but in no ancient text, so far as I know, is an explanation of the process offered, although the purpose of the flux used in refining gold is mentioned ( cf. Agatharchides in Photius, Bibliotheca, cod. 250, p. 448, 19-30 [Bekker]); Pliny, N.H. xxxiii, 60; H. Blmner, op.cit, pp. 131-135). It is to a different stage in the working of the iron that Plutarch refers in Quaest. Conviv. 660 C and De Primo Frigido 954 A-B; cf. also H. D. P. Lee on Aristotle, Meteorologica 383 a 32-b 7 (L.C.L., pp. 324-329). [N.B. As I explain below, Cherniss translation gives rise to a manifest contradiction in Plutarchs argument, whereas Goodwins translation makes perfect sense. (B.A.M.)] But there be some who think that conjunctions do not make anything one, but that this kind of speech is merely an enumeration, as when magistrates or days are reckoned in order. Moreover, as to the other parts of speech, a As to conjunctions, however, there are people who believe [123-124] that they do not make anything one but that language is an enumeration like that of annual magistrates <or> of days listed one after another.a 5. Now, of the rest the pronoun is patently a

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pronoun is manifestly a sort of noun; not only because it has cases, but because some pronouns, when they are used of objects already defined, by their mere utterance give the most distinct designation of them. Nor do I know whether he that says SOCRATES or he that says THIS ONE does more by name declare the person. The thing we call a participle, being a mixture of a verb and noun is nothing of itself, as are not the common names of male and female qualities (i.e, adjectives), but in construction it is put with others, in regard of tenses belonging to verbs, in regard of cases to nouns.
a

kind of noun, not only as it shares the cases of the noun but also by reason of the fact that some pronouns,b being expressions of definite reference, make an indication fully decisive as soon as they are spoken; and I do not know that a speaker uttering Socrates has by calling a name more clearly indicated a person than has one saying this man.c 6. And as for what is called the participle, since it is a mixture of verb and noun, d it does not exist of itself,e to be sure, as the nouns of common feminine and masculine gender [D] do not eitherf ; but it is ranked with those parts of speech, since through its tenses it borders on the verbs and through its cases on the nouns.

Cf. the sceptical argument that a statement or proposition cannot exist, because the expressions, which must be its constituent parts, do not coexist but are at most successive (Sextus, Adv. Math. i, 132-138 with Pyrrh. Hyp. ii, 108 and Adv. Math. viii, 81-84, 132, and 136). b i.e. demonstratives (cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, De Pronomine, pp. 9, 17-10, 7 and p. 10, 18-26 [Schneider]; Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 77, 25-78, 6 with p. 86, 7-13 and p. 86, 7-13 and p. 260, 21-24 [Hilgard]). c Cf. Sextus, Adv. Math. viii, 96-97 (S.V.F. ii, frag. 205 [pp. 66, 38-67, 9]): according to the Stoics Swkra/thj ka/qhtai is intermediate between the indefinite ti\j ka/qhtai and the definite ou(=toj ka/qhtai. d Cf. Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica 15 (p. 60, 2-4 [Uhlig]); Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, pp. 255, 25-256, 7 Hilgard); Ammonius, De Interpretatione, p. 15, 2-4. e Cf. Priscian, Inst. Grammatica xi, 2, (i, p. 549, 3-6 [Hertz]: ideo autem participium separatim non tradebant [scil. Stoici] partem orationis. . .) and ii, 16 (i, p. 54, 9-10 [Hertz]); Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 518, 17-22 (Hilgard). f Cf. Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam , pp. 218, 18-219, 15 and especially pp. 525, 32-526, 11 (Hilgard); R. Schneider, Apollonii Dyscoli Quae Supersunt i, 2 (Commentarium . . . in Apollonii Scripta Minora), pp. 24-25. Logicians call them a)ntana/klastouj, (i.e., REFLECTED),as fronw=n comes from fronimou, <and> sw/frronw=n <comes> from swfrono/j,having the force both of nouns and appellatives.
a

Terms of this kind, moreover, are [125-126] called reciprocals by the dialecticians a on the ground that they have the force of nouns, that is of appellatives,b as for example the reflecting instead of reflective and the abstaining instead of abstinent man.c

Cf. Priscian, Inst. Grammatica xi, 1 (i, pp. 548, 14-549, 1 [Hertz]): sic igitur supra dicti philosophi [scil. Stoici] etiam participiam aiebant appellationem esse reciprocam, id est a)ntana/klaston proshgori/an, hoc modo: legens est lector et lector legens, cursor est currens et currens cursor, amator est amans et amans amator, vel nomen verbale vel modum verbi casualem. b The correction, kai\ proshgori/an, is required because the Stoics had restricted o)/noma to proper nouns and had made a separate part of speech called proshgori/a to cover common nouns and noun adjectives (Diogenes Laertius, vii, 57-58 [ S.V.F. ii, frag. 147 and iii, p. 213, 27-31]), which the grammarians, however, continued to call o)no/mata or treated as a sub-class of o)/noma (Dionysius Thrax, Ars Grammatica, p. 23, 2-3 and pp. 33, 6-34, 2 [Uhlig] with Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam , pp. 214, 17-215, 3 and p. 356, 7-23 and pp. 517, 33-518, 16 [Hilgard]).

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The Stoics, for whom the sage alone is fro/nimoj and sw/frwn and alone fronei= and swfronei=, could hold that o( fronw=n must always be o( fro/nimoj and o( swfronw=n o( sw/fwv and even that o( fro/nimoj is always o( fronw=n, since the sages exercise of virtue is continual and unremitting (S.V.F. i, frags. 216 [p. 52, 25-33] and 569; iii, p. 149, 16-18). Nevertheless, they did distinguish between o( fro/nimoj and o( fronw=n (S.V.F. iii, p. 64, 3-5; cf. iii, frag. 244); and the same distinction between the appellative and the participle is implied in Chrysippus in S.V.F. iii, frag. 243 (De Stoic. Repug. 1046 F1047 A infra). And prepositions are like to the crests of a helmet, or footstools and pedestals, which (one may rather say) do belong to words than are words themselves. See whether they rather be not pieces and scraps of words, as they that are in haste write but dashes and points for letters. 7. The prepositions, for their part, can be likened to capitals and pedestals and bases as being not speech but rather appurtenances of speech. Consider to that they resemble bits and pieces of wordsd like the fragmentary letters and dashes used by those who write in haste.

For it is plain that e)mbh=nai and For incoming and outgoing are plainly e)kbh=nai are abbreviations of the whole contractions of [E] coming within and going words e)nto\j bh=nai and e)kto\j without, bh=nai. foregoing of going before, and underAs undoubtedly for haste and brevitys sake, setting of setting underneath, just as it is, of instead of progene/sqai and pro/teron course, by quickening and abridging the gene/sqai men first said kaqi/zein and expression that for pelting with [127-128] ka/tw i(/zein. stones and breaking into houses men say stoning and housebreaking.
d

o)no/mata here must have been meant in this general sense, since Plutarch proceeds to represent

the prepositions in composition as fragments of adverbs and not of what he calls nouns. Varro also appears to have taken the prepositions, which he called praeverbia, to be adverbs (frag. 267, 4-7 [Funaioli, Grammaticae Romanae Fragementa i. p. 286]). Therefore every one of these is of some use in speech; but nothing is a part or element of speech (as has been said) except a noun and a verb, which make the first juncture allowing of truth or falsehood, which some call a proposition or protasis, others an axiom, and which Plato called speech.
a

8. Consequently, while each of these renders some service to speech, none is a part of speech, that is a constituent element of it, a except, as has been said,b the verb and the noun, for these produce the first admitting of truth and falsity, combination

that combination which has been styled pronouncement by some and proposition by others but by Plato speech.*

Cf. Ammonius, De Interpretatione, p. 12, 27-30 and for the stoixei=on added by Plutarch in explanation of me/roj ibid., p. 64, 26-27 and S.V.F. ii, frag. 148 (p. 45, 9-11) with Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 356, 1-4 and pp. 514, 35-515, 12 (Hilgard). b See 1009 C supra. Of the six parts of speech besides the noun and verb which had there been listed as present in Iliad i, 185 Plutarch has accounted for all except the adverb (e)pi/rrhma). With his neglect of this cf. what is said of the Stoics, ta\ e)pirrh/mata ou)/te lo/gou ou)/te a)rqmou= h)ci/wsan, parafua/di kai\ e)pifulli/di au)ta\ pareika/santej (Scholia in Dionysii

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Thracis Artem Grammaticam, p. 356, 15-16 and p. 520, 16-18 [Hilgard]), for whose treatment of the adverb cf. M. Pohlenz, Kleine Schriften i (Hildesheim, 1958), p. 55. * Or protos logos, first (or primary) speech according to the ancients, as Plutarch stated at the outset (cf. sec. 1), but which Aristotle in the Peri Hermeneias called apophantikos logos, or simply apophansis, statement or enunciation (Lat. enunciatio). (B.A.M.)

1. Note on the comparison of the work of the conjunction with the role of marble (or rather, limestone) in the smelting of iron. As I have noted above, as it is quite clear that Plutarch is denying that the marble is fused with the iron, Cherniss translation leads to a manifest contradiction. An acceptable meaning can be arrived at simply by inserting a not in the appropriate place so that the text reads: the marble is NOT fused with the iron: rather, it achieves its purpose of making the iron more one by causing the impurities mixed with it to be separated out of it; the surplus running off it being known as slag, as he himself saw, and as the following accounts make clear: (a) Iron and Steel Industry (from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 19th ed.):
PRODUCTION PROCESS > How Iron Is Made > Flux and slag. The limestone in the furnace fluxes, or purifies, the iron. It helps some of the impurities in ore and coke to fuse, or melt. The limestone then combines with some of the melted impurities to form slag. The flux begins to melt below the halfway point in the furnace. Since the slag is lighter than iron, it floats on top of the melted iron, which is from four to five feet (1.2 to 1.5 meters)

(b) flux (from an Internet article):

flux: a substance that helps fuse together or separate metals; in an iron furnace limestone is used as flux to separate pure iron from impurities in iron.

(c) What is Slag?1

Slag is a product of the steel making process. Once scorned as a useless byproduct, it is now accepted and, often, preferred and specified as it is known to be a valuable material with many and varied uses. Blast Furnace Slag is formed when iron ore or iron pellets, coke and a flux (either limestone or dolomite) are melted together in a blast furnace. When the metallurgical smelting process is complete, the lime in the flux has been chemically combined with the aluminates and silicates of the ore and coke ash to form a non-metallic product called blast furnace slag. During the period of cooling and hardening from its molten state, BF slag can be cooled in several ways to form any of several types of BF slag products. Steel Furnace Slag is produced in a (BOF) Basic Oxygen Furnace or an (EAF) Electric Arc Furnace. Hot iron (BOF) and/or scrap metal (EAF) are the primary metals to make steel in each process. Lime is injected to act a fluxing agent. The lime combines with the silicates, aluminum oxides, magnesium oxides, manganese oxides and ferrites to form steel furnace
1

(http://www.nationalslagassoc.org/Slag_Information.html [2/21/06])

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slag, commonly called steel slag. Slag is poured from the furnace in a molten state. After cooling from its molten state, steel slag is processed to remove all free metallics and sized into products.

In sum: iron ore before smelting is impure insofar as foreign bodies are mixed with it; after the process, however, it is (relatively) pure, and therefore more one. The employment of a flux, such as limestone, causes the pure parts of the ore to fuse, in the process separating off any impurities (the gangue), which subsequently bond with the flux, resulting in the slag. The whole force of Plutarchs comparison, then, comes down to this: supposing his reader to be familiar with the foregoing process (!), he argues that, just as no one would suppose the marbleor, more precisely, the limestone in itto be part of the smelted ore which it causes to become one, much less would one suppose the conjunction to be part of the things conjoined by it. N.B. I give next the principal witnesses to what is manifestly an additional passage preserved from Aristotle on the connective parts of speech.

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III. ON THE SIGNIFICATIVE AND CONSIGNIFICATIVE PARTS OF SPEECH. 1. The analogy between the elements and the words of language.
Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax i. 12 (In: The Syntax or Peri Suntaxes (De Constructione) of Apollonius Dyscolus, translated, and with commentary by Fred W. Householder, pp. 22-23). 12. (III) (h) Furthermore, just as (1) some phonemes are vowels, which are [9] complete sounds even in isolation, and others consonants, whose pronunciation is not possible without vowels, so also (2) one can consider words of two kinds. Some words are, like vowels, independently speakable, e.g. verbs, nouns, pronouns, adverbs, when they can be applied to actions in the situational context, as when we shout kallista (very welli.e. bravo) at performers who are doing something just right, or hupis (soundly) or kalos (well).1 Other words resemble consonants, and just as they require vowels, so these require the presence of some of the aforesaid parts of speech; this is the case with prepositions, articles and conjunctions. These words always co-signify; Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.).

Further, just as among the elements, some are vowels, which complete a vocal sound by themselves, but others consonants, which are unable to complete a vocal sound without vowels, so also in words we advert to the fact that certain ones, like vowels, can be spoken by themselves, as is especially the case with imperative verbs and nouns or pronouns often with vocatives or adverbs, which are applied to antecedent actions or speeches, as when we cry Good! Right! Well said! to those who do or say something at the right moment. But there are other words which, like consonants, cannot be uttered to complete the sense without the help of the other parts of speech (which imitate vowels in this), like prepositions or conjunctions. For they always consignifythat is, they signify when conjoined to the othersbut by themselves they do not. And so their signification varies with the force of the things conjoined by them, as in signifies one thing when joined to the accusative, and something else when [joined] to the ablative, as in urbem and in urbe, and ad locum and in loco. But copulative and disjunctive conjunctions are

for instance, we say diApollniou (by Apol[22-23] lonios)2 with the genitive, implying that Apollonios was aware, but diApollnion (because of Apollonios) with the accusative, implying that he was to blame. Conjunctions, too, may vary in force according
1

Cf. Plato. Sophist (253 a) (tr. B. Jowett): STRANGER: This communion of some with some may be illustrated by the case of letters; for some letters do not fit each other, while others do. THEAETETUS: Of course. STRANGER: And the vowels, especially, are a sort of bond which pervades all the other letters, so that without a vowel one consonant cannot be joined to another . THEAETETUS: True. STRANGER: But does every one know what letters will unite with what? Or is art required in order to do so? THEAETETUS: Art is required. STRANGER: What art? THEAETETUS: The art of grammar. (emphasis added)

On the occurrence of the name Apollonios here, cf. C.H.M. Versteegh, Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking (Leiden: Brill, 1977), pp. 39-40: It is a well-known fact that the analysis of paradigms is very important for the history of Greek and Latin linguistics, not only because in giving examples grammarians tended to use their own names or those of their teachers, but also because the recurrent use of the same examples often helps to establish links between different groups of grammarians. And note that Versteegh goes on to cite Apollonius use of his teachers name, Tryphon.

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to their position in the sentence or the context, since toi is understood conjunctively, (sumplektikos)2 in Iliad 1.68: 1.11 toi ho ghs eipn katarhezeto (He said this and sat down.) Here toi is taken as equivalent to men, as is shown by the immediately following context, where de appears: toisi danest (Then Kalchas stood up.) Elsewhere toi is disjunctive (diazeuktikos): 1.12 toi neos estin palaios (He is either young or old.) The case is similar for articles; when conjoined with nouns they have their normal [10] force, but when they have no noun with them, they become a sort of pronoun, as will be explained in detail later [ch. 28], where we will also show the reason, since other parts of speech, too, may behave the samee.g. very often nouns may be heard used adverbially.

recognizably different from the other parts of speech, which are made one by them, as vel, aut [or, or] are not only disjunctive, but also are found copulative, such as Terence in the Eunuch: vel rex sempter maximas Mihi | [gratias] agebat quiquid feceram; aliis non item, for and the king.1

Praeterea, quemadmodum elementorum alia sunt vocalia, quae per se voce perficiunt, alia consonantia, quae sine vocalibus perficere vo- [10] cem nequent, sic etiam in dictionibus animadvertimus quasdam ad similitudinem vocalium per se esse dicendas, ut in verbis maxime imperativis vel nominibus vel pronominibus saepe vocativis vel adverbiis, quae adiciuntur antecedentibus actionibus vel orationibus, cum clamamus bene, recte, diserte ad illos, quo oportune aliquid agunt vel dicunt. aliae vero dictio- [15] nes sunt, quae ad similitudinem consonantium sine adiumento aliarum partium orationis, quae imitantur in hoc vocales, proferri ad perfectionem sensus non possunt, ut praepositiones vel coniunctiones. eae etenim semper consignificant, id est coniunctae aliis significant, per se autem non. coniunctiones quoque copulativae et disiunctivae esse dinoscuntur ab aliis partibus orationis, quae eis sociantur, ut vel, aut non solum disiunctivae, sed etiam copulativae reperiuntur, ut Terentius in eunucho: [114-115] vel rex sempter maximas Mihi | [gratias] agebat quiquid feceram; aliis non item, pro et rex. Note that Apollonius Greek, to which Priscian is manifestly indebted, is not accessible to me. But for the Latin grammarians relation to his Greek predecessor, cf. Inst. gramm. 12.13 [= G.L. 2.584.20, 14.1 [= G.L. 3.24.7]: maxime Apollonii, cuius auctoritatem in omnibus sequendem putavi.

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2. Apollonius and Priscian on the consignificative parts of speech. Notice that what is being distinguished here are words which when spoken signify something by themselves, and those which do not, as opposed to the more familiar distinction between words which signify by themselves without further qualification and those which do not; examples of the former being particular kinds of adverbs, whereas examples of the latter are the name and the verb. As both Apollonius and Priscian make clear, the completion of the meaning of such expressions as Right! or Well done! (as occurring in their respective languages) depends on their context: utterances like this are understood in reference to something previously stated (and so are elliptical); whereas the name and the verb are said to signify by themselves because, as one may gather from Aristotle on the verb, the one who speaks establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is said] rests [sc. in what is said]. (De Int. I. 3 16b 19-20, tr. B.A.M.); hence they determine the first operation of the intellect with respect to some nature, and so bring the understanding to rest (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 17). Further, both authors go on to illustrate the nature of consignification as it belongs to the depend-ently-speakable words, taking (prepositions and) conjunctions as the example. But there is this difference between their respective accounts: whereas Priscian is in agreement with Apollonius when he points out that their signification varies with the force of the things conjoined by themthat is, according to differences in the words to which they are conjoinedApollonius alone adds that differences in the meaning of consignifying words arise from their position in the sentence and their context. Also to be noted is that Priscian supplies a full definition of what it means to consignify, whereas Apollonius supplies only the name. This is surprising, as one would have expected a similar definition to occur in the corresponding place in Apollonius, suggesting that it has been lost from the text. With respect to the analogy as found in Priscian, compare the following from the 13th century logician Nicholas of Paris, from his work Syncategoremata:
But, on the other hand, Priscian says in the Minor (XVIII [read XVII] 10, p. 114.9-20) that some words behave like consonants and others like vowels. For just as vowels make an utterance on their own, so some words signify on their own; and just as consonants do not make an utterance on their own, so some words do not signify on their own e.g., conjunctions, prepositions, and adverbs. Again, nothing that takes on signification from things adjoined to it signifies anything on its own, but syncategorematic words are of that sort; therefore, etc. (132) 1

In explaining what is meant by syncategorematic words, the medieval scholastic argues according to the following proportion: As the vowel is to the consonant, so is the categorematic word to the syncategorematic; for in the case of vocal sounds, the vowel makes an utterance or sound on its own; while the latter does so only when joined with the former; whereas in the case of words, the categorematic signifies by itself, while the latter does so only when conjoined to the former . Now in the text just cited, Nicholas draws upon an account given by the 5th century grammarian Priscian of Caesarea; but Priscian, in turn, is employing a distinction between the sounding of vowels and consonants that is first met withindeed, which beyond all doubt comes fromAristotles
1

Nicholas of Paris, Syncategoremata (Selections). (In: The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts: Volume 1, Logic and the Philosophy of Language . Edited by Norman Kretzmann, Eleonore Stump, p. 180).

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Poetics, ch. 20, at the beginning (for which text, see my paper to which this is a supplement). Now as the former part of the proportion comes from Aristotle, it seems more likely than not that the latter part derives from the Philosopher as well. Whatever the case may be, the doctrine may be summed up as follows: Some words signify by themselves and some do not. Those words which do not signify by themselves are nevertheless said to con-signifythat is, they signify when conjoined to the words which do signify by themselves, as is the case with prepositions and conjunctions.

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3. The doctrine concerning significative and consignificative words. Taking into consideration several of our other sources cited above, the doctrinal content of the foregoing witnesses may be summed up as follows: In resemblance to vowels, which complete a sound by themselves, there are certain words which signify by themselves; but, like consonants, which cannot complete such a sound, there are some that do not. But those words which do not signify by themselves are nevertheless said to consignifythat is, they signify when conjoined to the words which do signify by themselves, as is the case with conjunctions and prepositions. Further, according to Averroes, the text of the Poetics upon which he was commenting included remarks about the consignification of the connective parts of speech being, so to speak, bonds of the others, leading him to explain that, by our remark vocal sound not significative separately here, we mean...vocal sounds which, when conjoined to the others, consignify as syncategorematic words, not... vocal sounds like the [ syllables and] letters [composing names] (cf. text rev. & tr. B.A.M.); it being the case, as Boethius explains, that syllables and conjunctions are parts of language, of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all. But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves; 1 so that, as a consequence, among the parts of [language] there are certain ones which signify nothing by themselves, yet do convey a meaning when joined to the others, as do conjunctions or prepositions, but that these things we do not call interpretations; rather, with Priscian and Averroes, we call them syncategorematic or consignificative words. One may therefore conclude with a high degree of probability that such doctrines (among which must be included the complexus of witness comparing conjuctions to bonds and joining and nails and the like) once belonged to a version of the Poetics more complete than that which has reached us via the manuscript tradition. 4. On the distinction between significative and consignificative words. In addition to the witnesses already cited, it will be helpful here to consider the following, early 13th century, account of the foregoing distinction:2
Of words, some are significative, others consignificative. A significative word is one which in itself and without the addition of another signifying word signifies something, as this word man. A consignificative one is one which not through itself, but together with another adjoined signifying word, signifies something, such as prepositions and conjunctions, and similarly the verb is according as it only implies composition: for as such it is infinite [infinitum, i.e. indefinite] and it has to be made finite [ finiri] through those things which it composes. It should be understood, however, that the foregoing division of words is the same as this one: of words, some are categorematic, others syncategorematic. Categorematic is the same as signifying, and syncategorematic is the same as consignifying. And it is called syncate-gorematic from syn, which is, together with, and categorematic, which is signifying; hence syncategorematic as if significative-with [consignificativa].3
1

Cf. Boethius, In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione Libri Sex Editio Secunda, Seu Majora Commentaria (ed. Migne, PL 64, tr. B.A.M.). 2 On Significant Words: A Selection from The Monacensis Dialectic . A translation of the first third of section VI of Dialectica Monacensis (Draft by Calvin Normore, and Terry Parsons with suggestions by Steve Barney; slightly rev. B.A.M.) (Lat. ed. de Rijk, added by B.A.M.). The work is dated ca. 1200. 3 Dictionum alia significativa, alia consignificativa. Dictio signi- [f. 115 vb] ficativa est que per se et sine adiunctione alterius dictione significantis aliquid significat, ut hec dictio homo. Consignificativa est illa que non [5] per se sed cum alia dictione significante adiuncta aliquid significat, ut sunt prepositiones et

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Note here that, while the foregoing account is quite informative for our purposes, it must be recognized that, contrary to what the author of this work claims, it is not true that the consignificative is the same as the syncategorematic, since, as we have seen, the verb consignifies time, but is also categorematic in a sense.1 Nor does the word categorematic mean signifying, but rather signifying something by itself, as may be inferred from the following remarks of Simplicius:
Insofar as an expression is significant, however, it is defined in accordance with the genera of beings. An expression (lexis) is called a category as applied ( agoureuomen) to a reality,149 whereas the reality (pragma) is called a predicate ( katgourma {better translated as catagoreme (B.A.M.)}).[2] Now, a category is either a reality taken together with the expression which signifies it, or the [5] signifying expression, in so far as it is significant; in either case, the category has something to do with realities (pragmata) as well.
149

cf. Porph. In Cat. 56,8-9. The entire following passage on the constitution of the table of categories (Simplicius 11,2-22), absent from Porphyrys smaller commentary but paralleled in Boethius (In Cat. col. 160b12-161a12), probably derives from Porphyrys lost commentary ad Gedalium; cf. Stan Ebbesen 1987, 303. kata + agoureu is obviously an attempt at an etymological explanation of the verb katgoreuein, to predicate.3

Now in this passage distinctions are drawn between katgoria,4 katgourma, and pragma: the first being the name of one of the (ten) highest genera of beings; the second, of a member of a katgoria used as a predicate, and the third the thing signified by such a name. To take an instance, substance is a category, man is a member of it, and hence a thing, and let Socrates be something of which man may be predicated. Now when one says Socrates is a man, and hence a substance, the word man, being predicated of Socrates, is clearly a catagoreme, understood as a member of a category used as a predicate.
coniunctiones et similiter hoc verbum est secundum quod solam compositionem importat: sic enim infinitum est et finiri habet per ea que componit. Sciendum tamen quod predicta diviso dictionis eadem est cum [10] hac: dictionum alia categoreumatica, alia sincategoreumatica. Categoreumatica idem est quod significans; syncategoreumatica idem esst quod consignificans. Et dicitur sincategoreumatica a sin, quod est con, et categoreumatica, quod est significans; inde sincategoreumatica quasi consignificativa . 1 What our author should have noted is that consignificative is said in more than one way, inasmuch as there is a meaning of that term belonging to categorematic words as well, as we have seen in the case of the verb. Still, it is the case nowadays that logicians speak solely of the name as being categorematic, since it is subjected in predications, as we shall go on to explain below. 2 One would have expected this last statement to be continued along the following lines: ...whereas the reality (pragma) is called a predicate because it is said of something else as subject . That is to say, something is called a kategoria or said-of (= predicatum) because it is said of another thing. 3 Simplicius of Cilicia, Comm. in Arist. Cat. 11, 2-6 (= Michael Chase [trans.], Simplicius. On Aristotles Categories 1-4. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 26). 4 It is convenient to note here that, with respect to its original imposition, katgoria meant accusation, being something said of another, as in a court of law, as Greek commentators such as Porphyry explain. Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Prologue to the Categories, n. 4: Now if you look up the word kathgoria in a Greek dictionary, you'll find that the first meaning of kathgoria is that of accusation in the courtroom. It is the opposite of what is called apologia, like the apologia in the Apology of Socrates, where hes giving his defense in the courtroom. Category is not from defense, but from accusation. You can see why it would be named from accusation rather than defense: if I am bringing charges against you in court, Im going to accuse you of robbing the bank, or murdering somebody, or whatever. Im going to say something about you. So that is a starting point: said of.

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Now in accordance with Simplicius observations, one may presume that the word katgourma was first given to a vocal sound which is predicated of some subject, and so would have been applied solely to the verb, and thence to any word which serves as a predicate, such as pale or just. But as used by Simplicius, the word is said of every category, and so has been extended to the name or noun in general. But this extension would have occurred only insofar as the name or noun has some fundamental agreement with the verb. What is that agreement? As is clear from Boethius definition of interprettatio, both noun and verb agree in being an articulate vocal sound signifying something by itself. One may therefore suppose that in this way the word acquired the general meaning of catagoreme.1 Hence, a categorematic word is one which has the character of signifying something by itself, and so is understood indifferently of the noun or the verb, for which reason it is used without regard to whether it is subjected or predicated in a statement-making speech, and so would not be accurately translated as predicate in this sense, 2 for which reason I use categoreme.3

On this last point, compare the following dictionary definitions: (a) James Mark Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology: Categorematic (Words, &c.) [Gr. ]: Ger. kategorematisch; Fr. catgormatique; Ital. categorematico. Such words as may by themselves form the expression of one term, subject or predicate, of a proposition. All others, e.g. prepositions, conjunctions, adverbs, are called Syncategorematic. The term appears occasionally in Aristotle as equivalent to predicate. This meaning was definitely assigned to it by the Stoics, who, distinguishing noun and verb as the essential parts of a proposition, gave a foundation for the grammatical distinction of categorematic from syncategorematic. That distinction was taken over from the Latin grammarians (e.g. Priscian), and begins to appear in logic in the tract de Generibus et Speciebus, often assigned to Abelard. Literature: PRANTL, Gesch. d. Logik, ii. 148, 191, 256, 266. (R.A.) (b) Catagoreme (from The Free Dictionary): 1 a categorematic expression; a term capable of standing alone as the subject or predicate of a logical proposition; names are called categoremes .

And cf. Boethius Commentary (ed. Prim.), quoted above: But since verbs and names are interpretations, so also every speech joined from things signifying predicaments by themselves is named interpretation. 3 Still, as noted above, in contemporary usage categoreme is typically restricted to the subject of a statement.

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5. Supplement: A comparable distinction in the perspective of a contemporary grammarian. Cf. Classification of Signs/Morphology: Day One by Edward Vajda:1
Content words denote entities, actions, or qualities that can be experienced or imagined: sun, red, man, day. Nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs of manner (-ly) are content words. Function words are the linguistic glue that links parts of a phrase or sentence together. They have little or no concrete meaning outside their grammatical function in the sentence. Function words include articles, conjunctions, prepositions, verbal particles: the, a, if, and, or, to, because. The other function word categories are a bit more like content words: prepositions, pronouns, and adverbs of place and time: here, there, then, now, above/below, after, vs. besides, to. Function words can more easily be defined by explaining how they are used in sentences; content words can more easily be defined by reference to the world.

N.B. It would appear that the distinction between content words and function words is common to contemporary linguistics, as is clear from our investigation of the meanings of morpheme, root, stem, and the like..

(http://pandora.cii.wwu.edu/vajda/ling201/test1materials/morphology.htm [2/8/06])

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6. Supplement: Syncategorematic terms as the concern of the logician. Cf. Philotheus Boehner, Medieval Logic: An Outline of its Development from 1250 to c . 1400. Part II. Important Contributions of Scholastic Logic. Ch. I: The Syncategor-amata as Logical Constants, pp. 19-24 [N.B. I have moved the endnotes to the body of text.]:
We have already mentioned in our general survey that quite a number of tracts on the syncategoremata were written in the Middle Ages. This fact, and their appearance as special tracts or chapters in the scholastic compendia of logic, proves that the scholastics were not unaware of their significance. In fact, we intend to show that a careful analysis of such terms is a sure sign of a deeper consciousness of the formality of logic. The reason for this is that the term syncategorematic refers to certain terms which are [19-20] necessary for logical discourse and without which logic could not start. Since we are in the dark as to the first independent treatment of these logical terms, we shall, for convenience sake, take for a starting-point the Syncategoremata of William Shyreswood.21 However, we know a little more about the origin of the term syncategoremata, for there is a strong tradition that the term goes back to the Stoics. Priscian informs us that the Dialecticians accepted only two parts of a sentence, namely, the noun and the verb, since, if they are joined, they constitute a complete sentence. They called the other parts of a sentence the syncategoremata, that is, the co-signifying words. 22 The Dialecticians, however, were not simply logicians, but Stoics as well, as Priscian himself suggests. 1 The identification of the Stoics with the Dialecticians is certainly more in agreement with the ancient usage of the term, at least so far as logic is concerned. 23 To all intents and purposes, therefore, we here have a definite link existing between scholastic and Stoic logic in that they make use of the same term in the same meaning. The meaning of the term syncategorema in scholastic logic can be classified in two ways. Both will serve our purpose equally well, for both reveal the characteristic function of a syncategorema, and both are offered by scholastics. The one presupposes the theory of supposition, while the other refers to the formal character of the science. 24
21

As to tracts on the Syncategoremata and other earlier tracts prior to Peter of Spain, see M. Grabmann, Bearbeitungen und Auslegungen der Aristotelischen Logick der Zeit von Peter Abaelard bis Petrus Hispanus, in Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, n. 5, Berlin, 1937. 22 Cf. the quotation from Priscian in ODonnells edition ( op.cit., footnote 11 [= Reginald ODonnell, C.S.B., The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood, in Mediaeval Studies, vol. 3, 1941, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, pp. 46-93.]), p. 47. The editor is not convinced, however, that the Stoics are meant. There seems no reason to believe it does not mean a dialectician as opposed to a grammarian even though Priscian goes on to speak of the Stoics (loc.cit.). 23 There is a highly commendable unpretentious little book written by M.I. Bochenski, O.P., Elementae Logicae Graecae, Romae, 1937, which in the index identifies the Dialectici with the Stoici. [N.B. Bochenski to the contrary notwithstanding, dialetici here, as Gabriel

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm., ii. 15. 5-7 (ed. Keil; tr. B.A.M.): Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum dialecticos duae, nomen [5] et verbum, quia hae solae etiam per se coniunctae plenam faciunt orationem, alias autem partes syncategoremata, hoc est consignificantia, appellabant . Therefore the parts of speech according to the Dialecticians are two, the noun [5] and the verb, since these two alone by themselves when conjoined produce full [or complete] speech. But the other parts they named syncategoremata; that is, consignificantia. (B.A.M.)

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Nuchelmans notes (cf. Theories of the Proposition, p. 124) excludes the Stoics, who are introduced in the next line as holding five parts of speech. (B.A.M.)]
24

[footnote omitted]

As we approach the characterization of a syncategorema from the viewpoint of supposition, we must remember that the scholastics used a definite language, Latin, with its own peculiar grammatical structure. In this language a sentence is formed through the combination of a noun with a verb or its equivalent. Sentences which are either true or false are called propositions. In addition to the noun and the verb, other expressions or words are found in propos- [20-21] tions, and further modifications of the noun and verb are also encountered. Some of these modifications of nouns and verbs have no influence on the truth or falsity of the proposition, and as far as logic or philosophy is concerned, they are irrelevant, being of interest only to the grammarian or rhetorician. On the other hand, some have a definite influence on the truth or falsity of a proposition, since, through their addition or omission, a proposition which was true may become false, or vice versa. For example, the addition of the word no, or the modification of the nominative case to the genitive case, and the like, changes or may change the quality of the proposition. Among the words, or modifications of words, which have such effects on propositions in which they occur are the following, according to Ockham: Nouns, verbs, conjunctions, prepositions and adverbs. He further adds the common accidents of nouns, such as case and number, and finally, the common accidents of verbs, such as mood, person, tense and number. 25
25

Cf. Ockham, Summae Logicae, pars 1, c. 3, and Quodlibeta, v, q. 8; ed. Argentina. Cf. also our article: Ockhams Theory of Signification, in Franciscan Studies, 6 (1946), pp. 152 s. [N.B. On the meaning of modification, cf. the discussion of Ammonius below. (B.A.M.)] All these words have a meaning connected with them, since they are spoken signs to which a distinct mental sign or thought corresponds in the understanding. Without further enlarging on the relation between the mental sign or thought and the spoken word, let us simply admit with the Scholastics that our language has spoken or written terms which, through their association with mental terms, have meanings precisely through this association. Thus, for instance, the terms man, red, not, if-then and the like have a meaning which can be explained by a definition. However, not all of these terms have an object which is thereby signified. In other words, some of these terms have objects signified by them, and they stand for their objects or significates in the proposition if they functions either as subject or predicate of the proposition without entering into any other union with any other term. On the other hand, there are terms which do not have objects [21-22] signified by them. They lack at least a definite significate, and since they have no definite significate, they cannot be subject or predicate of a proposition if they are not used in combination with another term, whether this term be composed or not, or whether it be a proposition or not. Admittedly, they sometimes do appear as subject in a proposition, as any word might, but then they only represent themselves and should be, according to a device of modern logician, set off with quotation marks, as, for instance, in this proposition, Every is a syncategorema. It is clear that no object is signified by Every in this proposition. However, when the term Every is combined with another term which signifies objects, Every modifies or determines the other term as regards the number of its significates. This, then, is the general nature of syncategorematic terms: They are determinations of other terms or propositions, having no signification when taken alone, but exercising their signification only as co-predicates, which is the literal translation of syncategorema. There is, therefore, a dependence of signification and supposition in a syncategorematic term, not, however, a dependence in its meaning, if by meaning the sense of a term is understood.

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Since they depend in their signification upon another term which has signification or signifies by itself, they are, if taken in their (dependent) significative function, incapable of becoming subject or predicate of a proposition. This distinction is clearly brought out by the scholastics and is particularly emphasized in the following passage from the Logic of Albert of Saxony: A categorematic term is a term which, taken in its significative function, can be subject or predicate, or part of the subject or part of the distributed predicate, in a categorematical proposition. Man, animal, stone, for instance, are such terms. They are called categorematic terms because they have a restricted and [22-23] fixed signification. A syncategorematic term, on the other hand, is a term which, when taken in its significative function, cannot be subject or predicate, or even part of the subject or part of the distributed predicate, in a categorematical proposition. Such are, for instance, the following terms: Every, none, some, etc., which are called signs either of universality or of particularity. So, too, negations, as, for instance, the negation not, the conjunctions, as and, the disjunctions, as or, and the exclusive and exceptive prepositions, as, for instance, except, only, and the like; all these are also syncategorematic terms. To further exemplify syncategorematic terms, let us consider the following proposition: Every man is running. Man is the subject, Every is neither subject nor predicate, nor is it part of either subject or predicate. Rather, it is a modification of the subject and signifies the manner of supposition in the subject itself. If every were part of the subject itself, then the following propositions would not have the same subject: Every man is running, and, Some man is not running. Consequently, these propositions would not be contradictory, which is a gross falsity. In defining a syncategorematic term, we have designedly inserted the phrase taken in its significative function as applying to these terms, for if such terms as every, none, etc., are taken materially, they do function as subject or predicates of propositions. For instance, consider these propositions: Every is a sign of universality; And is a copulative conjunction; No is an adverb. In these propositions the aforementioned expressions or terms are not taken in their significative function since they do not act in the capacity for which they were instituted. Thus, in the proposition, Every is a sign of universality, Every is no more a distributive term than no is a negation in the proposition, No is an adverb. By way of summary, then, we might say that the syncategorematic terms have meaning and signification, but their signification is dependent on a categorematic term [23-24] which is modified or disposed by the syncategorematic term. These terms, then, exercise signification only conjointly with a categorematic term. As Albert of Saxony put it 27: syncategorematic terms do not signify a thing or an object but the mode of a thing, whether this thing be a subject, a predicate, a proposition, or a number of propositions, and in this sense, these terms have a significable complexe. 28 We should like to mention here, without going into further details, that the scholastics have offered a system or a division of the syncategorematic terms accordingly as they are either dispositions or modes of other terms. Burleigh, for instance, distinguishes the following classes: (1) those which are modifications of the subject; (2) those which are modifications of the predicate; (3) modifications of the composition of the subject and a predicate, that is, of one, or even of several, propositions.29 From previous explanation, then, it follows that syncategorematic terms are not included in the basic terms of our object language. Rather, they are additions made to the terms of the object language. Yet, they are of such importance that, without them, logical discourse

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would be impossible. Hence, they are real, logical terms and, though we could dispense with some of them even in logic, many of them are essential.
26

Perutilis Logica, tract. 1, c. 3, fol. 2vb. Albert goes on to discuss the equivocation of certain terms which can be used either as pure syncategorematic terms or as categorematic terms, containing a syncategorematic term. For instance, the Latin word aliquis, taken alone and as subject, is not a purely categorematic term, though it functions as such. The proposition: Aliquis currit, is to be translated: Some- one is running, which immediately brings out the categorematic content. 27 Tertia conclusio: Syncategorema non significat aliquam rem quae sit substantia vel accidens, sed bene significat modum rei, quo ab aliis vocatur significabile compelexe. Patet hoc: nam praedicatum verificari de quolibet contento sub subiecto vel removeri a quolibet contento sub subiecto non est aliqua res quae sit substantia vel accidens, sed bene est modus rei et dispositio, puta subiecti vel praedicati. Et sic syncategorema bene significat aliquid, prout li aliquid non solum significat existentiam rei, se etiam modum rei et caetera. Quaestiones super Perihermenias , edited in the Expositio Aurea of Ockham, ed. Bologna, 1496. 28 On the problem of the significabile complexe cf. Hubert lie, Le Complex Significabile, Paris, Vrin. lie gives an interpretation different from that of Albert of Saxony. 29 Cf. Burleus minor of the Los Angeles MS. Univ. 6, first part. Albert of Saxony in his Sophismata follows a similar division of the Syncategoremata.

Cf. ibid, , pp. 16-18.

In testimony of this quite general conviction of the scholastics, we cite an interesting passage found at the beginning of an anonymous little work probably composed during the 15 th century. The work, entitled Copulata tractatum parvorum logicalium, affords a welcome opportunity to summarize our previous exposition. The unknown author asks whether Aristotle has dealt with logic in a sufficient manner, in view of the fact that he did not compose tracts on what we have referred to as the new elements. He answers: First it is to be stated that he (Aristotle) sufficiently completed Logic inasmuch as the being of Logic is concerned. Nevertheless, a few small tracts can be added which serve for the well-being of Logic itself and for its completion. 1 Secondly, it must be said that although Aristotle did not invent this Logic which is being treated here in itself and in the proper form of these tracts, he discovered, nevertheless, all these tracts in their principles, for he discovered certain principles from which these tracts are further developed and composed. Therefore, it is said of him that he discovered them in a certain way. From this it follows that the Philosopher is to be thanked more than Peter of Spain, because the former discovered the principles which are difficult to detect. <> The tract on the Syncategoremata is derived from the second book of the Perihermenias where Aristotle teaches how to multiply propositions in reference to finite and infinite terms; but the negation is one of the syncategorema.

On being versus well-being here, cf. Aristotle, De An. II. 8 (420b 16-22). (B.A.M.)

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N.B. A contemporary view of the basis in Aristotle for the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words is found in the following summary by Gabriel Nuchelmans: Cf. Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (North-Holland: Amsterdam and London, 1973), p. 29:
De. int. 16 b 201 is also interesting because it is in these lines that we find the first trace of a distinction that later came to be known as the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words. Although verbs by themselves do not yet signify whether something is the case or not and therefore do not possess the degree of completeness and independence which is characteristic of the units of the legein-level, it is still true that most of them have a meaning of their own in the sense that both the speaker and the hearer, in pronouncing or hearing the word, will have a definite thought in their minds, a thought that has some kind of self-sufficiency. The copula is, on the contrary, is not accompanied by any such distinct and relatively self-sufficient thought; it only adds a certain nuance to the meaning of the words to which it is joined. For this additional way of signifying Aristotle uses the word prossmainein. This word also occurs in De int. 20 a 13,2 in connection with every and no. These words additionally signify nothing other than that the affirmation or negation is about the name taken universally. Thus we have here the beginning of a trichotomy: expressions signifying that something is the case; verbs and nouns, which do not yet signify that something is the case but have some meaning on their own; and words like is, ever, no, which do not signify (smainein) in either of those ways but only contribute to the meaning of other words.

In view of the indebtedness of the Scholastic tradition on Aristotles work On Interpretation, and in furtherance of our investigation, let us proceed to consider more closely the Philosophers teaching of the consignification of the verb and related matters.

Cf. Aristotle, Peri Herm., I. 3 (16b 19-25): Verbs in and by themselves are substantival and have signifycance, for he who uses such expressions arrests the hearers mind, and fixes [20] his attention; but they do not, as they stand, express any judgement, either positive or negative. For neither are to be and not to be and the participle being significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the [25] things coupled (tr. E. M. Edghill). 2 Thus the adjectives every and no have no additional significance except that the subject, whether in a positive or in a negative sentence, is distributed (ibid.).

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7. On the consignification of the verb. Cf. Aristotle, De Int. I. 3 (16b 5-25) (tr. E. M. Edghill):
A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else. I will explain what I mean by saying that it carries with it the notion of time. Health is a noun, but is healthy is a verb; for besides its proper meaning it indicates the present existence of the state in question. Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of something [10] else, i.e. of something either predicable of [a subject] or present in some other thing. Such expressions as is not-healthy, is not, ill, I do not describe as verbs; for though they carry the additional note of time, and always form a predicate, there is no specified name for this variety; but let them be called indefinite verbs, since they apply equally [15] well to that which exists and to that which does not. Similarly he was healthy, he will be healthy, are not verbs, but tenses of a verb; the difference lies in the fact that the verb indicates present time, while the tenses of the verb indicate those times which lie outside the present. Verbs in and by themselves are substantival and have significance, for he who uses such expressions arrests the hearers mind, and fixes [20] his attention; but they do not, as they stand, express any judgement, either positive or negative. For neither are to be and not to be and the participle being significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the [25] things coupled.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, nn. 8-9 (on 16b 8-11) (= Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan . Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee, 1962, pp. 47-48):
8. Then he says, Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something that belongs to something, i.e. of something present in a subject .60 Here he explains the last part of the definition of the verb. It should be noted first that the subject of an enunciation signifies as that in which something inheres. Hence, when the verb signifies action through the mode of action (the nature of which is to inhere) it is always posited on the part of the predicate and never on the part of the subjectunless it is taken with the force of a name, as was said. The verb, therefore, is always said to be a sign of something said of another, and this not only because the verb always signifies that which is predicated but also because there must be a verb in every predication, for the verb introduces the composition by which the predicate is united to the subject. 9. The last phrase of this portion of the text presents a difficulty, namely, of something belonging to [i.e., of] a subject or in a subject. 61 For it seems that something is said of a subject when it is predicated essentially, as in Man is an animal; but in a subject, when it is an accident that is predicated of a subject, as in Man is white. But if verbs signify action or passion (which are accidents), it follows that they always signify what is in a subject. It is useless, therefore, to say belonging to [i.e., of] a subject or in a subject. In answer to this Boethius says that both pertain to the same thing, for an accident is predicated of a subject and is also in a subject.62 Aristotle, however, uses a disjunction, which seems to indicate that he means something different by each. Therefore it could be said in reply to this that when Aristotle says the verb is always a sign of those things that are predicated of another 63 it is not to be understood as though the things signified by verbs are predicated. For predications seem to [47-48]

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60

The Oxford Greek text of this sentence reads: . . . kai\ a)ei\ tw=n u(parxo/ntwn shmei=o/n e)stin, oi(=on tw=n kaq u(pokeime/nou. The Leonine Greek text (and several other Greek manuscripts) reads: . . . kai\ a)ei\ tw=n u(parxo/ntwn shmei=o/n e)stin, oi(=on tw=n kaq u(pokeime/nou, h)/ e)n u(pokeime/nou. St. Thomas comments on the text as having the phrase said [i.e. belonging to] a subject or in a subject (n. 9; italics added).
61 62

See note 60 for this variation in the text. Boethius, Comment in librum Aristotelis Peri\ e(rmhneia/j, I. De verbo, p. 314. 63 ...predicated of another is not in the Greek text, as can be noted in the quotation of the text in note 60, but it is implied in of something that belongs to something and is in the definition of the verb (16b 5) in the sense that said of something else could be translated as predicated of another. pertain more properly to composition; therefore, the verbs themselves are what are predicated, rather than signify predicates. 64 The verb, then is always a sign that something is predicated because all predication is made through the verb by reason of the composition introduced, whether what is being predicated is predicated essentially or accidentally. For a further discussion of this point see p. 24, n. b of the Leonine edition of the Peri Hermeneias, where the distinction is made between the predicate as formal and material
64

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, nn. 8-9 (tr. B.A.M.):
n. 8. Then when he says And it is always (an indication) , etc., he explains the other part. Where it should be noted that since the subject of an enunciation is signified as (that) in which something inheres, since the verb signifies an action in the manner of an action, <or a passion in the manner of a passion in the case of passive verbs,> 1 to whose account it belongs that it inhere, it is always put on the part of the predicate, but never on the part of the subject, unless it be taken with the force of a name, as has been said. Therefore the verb is always said to be an indication of those things which are said of another: both because the verb always signifies that which is predicated; as well as because in every predication there must be a verb, by reason of the fact that it implies composition, by means of which a predicate is composed with a subject.2 n. 9. But what is added appears to present a difficulty: that (it is said) of those things which are of a subject or in a subject . For it seems something is said as of a subject, which is predicated essentially, as Man is an animal; but in a subject, as an accident is predicated of a subject, as (a) Man is white.

As noted above, the words added are required by the sense; for it is not true to speak of every verb as if it were active, inasmuch as some are passive. Cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 4, n. 7 (tr. B.A.M.):
In another way, that which is measured by time can be considered insofar as it is of this sort. And because that which is first and principally measured by time is motion, in which action and passion consist , therefore the verb which signifies action or passion signi-fies with time. ( alio modo, potest considerari id, quod tempore mensuratur, in quantum huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter tempore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit actio et passio, ideo verbum quod significat actionem vel passionem, significat cum tempore .)
2

deinde cum dicit: et est semper etc., exponit aliam particulam. ubi notandum est quod quia subiectum enun-ciationis significatur ut cui inhaeret aliquid, cum verbum significet actionem per modum actionis, de cuius ratione est ut inhaereat, semper ponitur ex parte praedicati, nunquam autem ex parte subiecti, nisi sumatur in vi nominis, ut dictum est. dicitur ergo verbum semper esse nota eorum quae dicuntur de altero: tum quia verbum semper significat id, quod praedicatur; tum quia in omni praedicatione oportet esse verbum, eo quod verbum importat compositionem, qua praedicatum componitur subiecto.

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If, therefore, verbs signify action or passion, which are accidents, it follows that they always signify those things which are said as (being) in a subject. Therefore saying in a subject or of a subject is pointless. In answer to this Boethius says that both pertain to the same thing. For an accident is both predicated of a subject, and it is in a subject. But because Aristotle employs a disjunction, something else seems to be signified by each. And so it can be said that when Aristotle says that verbs are always indications of those things which are predicated of another, it is not to be so understood as if the significata of the verbs were predicated, for the reason that since predication would appear to pertain more properly to composition, the verbs themselves are the things which are predicated, rather than signify things predicated. Accordingly it is to be understood that a verb is always a sign that something is predicated, since every predication comes about through a verb by reason of the composition implied, whether something be predicated essentially or accidentally. 1

8. The explanation of St. Thomas in sum. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, when Aristotle says the verb is always an indication [nota] of those things that are predicated of another, this is not to be understood as if it were the significata of verbs which are predicated, but rather the verbs themselves, for which reason they do not signify things predicated; rather, they indicate that something is predicated. What verbs signify, it must be added, is the thing upon which they are placed or imposed (when, that is, such a thing has come to be understood), and this is their signification or meaning. Verbs are always said to be signs of something said of another thing by reason of the composition implied in their meaning, inasmuch as it is by virtue of the verb that the predicate is composed with the subject. But, as St. Thomas explains a little further down in his commentary (cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 5, n. 22, tr. Jean T. Oesterle), when we wish to signify that any form or act is actually in some subject we signify it through the verb is, either absolutely or relatively; absolutely, according to present time, relatively, according to other times; and for this reason the verb is signifies composition, not principally, but consequently. Likewise the expression is healthy principally signifies health, but ex consequenti it signifies composition. Hence, not only is composition implied in every verb, but the verb is also always a sign that something is in a subject as a form or act. 9. In sum: ex. Socrates is healthy. What is predicated is a verb (namely, is healthy). What is subjected is a noun (namely, Socrates).
1

sed dubium videtur quod subditur: ut eorum quae de subiecto vel in subiecto sunt. videtur enim aliquid dici ut de subiecto, quod essentialiter praedicatur; ut, homo est animal; in subiecto autem, sicut accidens de subiecto praedicatur; ut, homo est albus. si ergo verba significant actionem vel passionem, quae sunt accidentia, consequens est ut semper significent ea, quae dicuntur ut in subiecto. frustra igitur dicitur in subiecto vel de subiecto. et ad hoc dicit boethius quod utrumque ad idem pertinet. accidens enim et de subiecto praedicatur, et in subiecto est. sed quia aristoteles disiunctione utitur, videtur aliud per utrumque significare. et ideo potest dici quod cum aristoteles dicit quod, verbum semper est nota eorum, quae de altero praedicantur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi significata verborum sint quae praedicantur, quia cum praedicatio videatur magis proprie ad compositionem pertinere, ipsa verba sunt quae praedicantur, magis quam significent praedicata. est ergo intelligendum quod verbum semper est signum quod aliqua praedicentur, quia omnis praedicatio fit per verbum ratione compositionis importatae, sive praedicetur aliquid essentialiter sive accidentaliter.

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According to the text before St. Thomas: But what is added appears to present a difficulty: that (it is said) of those things which are of a subject or in a subject . For it seems something is said as of a subject, which is predicated essentially, as Man is an animal; but in a subject, as an accident is predicated of a subject, as (a) Man is white. <...> But because Aristotle employs a disjunction, something else seems to be signified by each. The solution of the difficulty: A verb is always an indication of something that is (said, or predicated) of a subject: this is composition; or in a subject: this is that any form or act is actually in some subjectthat is, the verb is always a sign that any form or act is actually in some subject. Hence a verb is always two things: (1) a sign of something of a subjectthat is, belonging to it, namely, composition, and (2) a sign of the inherence of a form in a subject. To sum up: a. What is indicated by a verb: (1) that something is said or predicated of a subject (2) that something is in a subject b. What is signified by the verb is (which is signified either principally or consequently): (1) what is signified principally: that any form or act is actually in some subject (for which reason it is said that a verb is always a sign of something in a subject) (2) what is signified consequently: composition (for which reason it is said that a verb is always a sign of something belonging to a subject) c. What is signified by the verb is healthy: (1) principally: health (as actually in some subject) (2) consequently: composition And note that what is signified consequently is the consignification of the verbthat is, what it consignifies. 10. Aristotles statements in sum: ...and it is a sign of something said of something else. Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of something [10] else, i.e. of something either predicable of [read of a subject] or present in some other thing. For neither are to be and not to be and the participle being significant of any fact, unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the [25] things coupled.

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11. Supplement: Aristotles account of the verb insofar as it couples in comparison with the coupling function of the conjunction. Cf. Aristotle, De Int. I. 3 (16b 19-26) (tr. B.A.M.):
But in themselves, said by themselves, verbs are names and signify something; for the one who speaks1 [20] establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is said] rests [sc. in what is said]. But whether it is or is not (the case), it does not yet signify;2 for neither is to be or not to be3 a sign of [the present existence of] a thing (nor if you say simply4 that which is). [By] itself, in fact, it is nothing;5 it consignifies, [25] however, a certain composition, which cannot be understood without the things composed.

N.B. The reader will note the close correspondence between Aristotles description of the verbal copula and the description found in the work of Apollonius Dyscolus: for just as the composition implied by the verb insofar as it couples a predicate with a subject cannot be understood without the extremes of that composition, so neither can the conjunction convey any meaning without the things conjoined by it.6 As for the consignification of the verb insofar as it involves the copulatio of composition, St. Thomas Aquinas explains it as follows:7
And so Porphyry explained in another way that this being [ ens] itself does not signify the nature of a thing as the name man or wise do, but only designates a certain conjunction, and this is why he [Aristotle] adds, it consignifies a certain composition, which cannot be understood without the things composing it. [51-52] This explanation does not seem to be consistent with the text either, for if being itself does not signify a thing, but only a conjunction, it, like prepositions and conjunctions, is neither a name nor a verb. Therefore this should be explained in another way, as Ammonius explains it. He says being itself is nothing means that it does not signify truth or falsity. And he assigns the reason for this when he says it consignifies, however, a certain composition. Nor is consignifies taken here, as he states, as when it is said that the verb consignifies time; but it consignifies, i.e. it signifies with another; that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition. 8

1 2

That is, the one who utters a verb by itself says something; in the present case, a name. That is, when a verb is uttered by itself, it does not yet signify whether the action or passion it signifies is the case or not; for this, the saying of something of something is required: e.g., to say walks does not yet signify that anyone walks; for this, one must form an enunciation such as Socrates walks or A man walks, or something of the sort. 3 Rather than the participles being and not-being, one would have expected is or is not to be repeated here, as the occurrence of the latter would make the argument more unified. 4 That is, by itself or without intertwining. 5 For this statement to be intelligible, nothing here must mean something like not the sign of the existence of a thing. But a better reading would be By itself the verb does not signify that something is so. 6 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 21, q. 2, art. 1, c.): And so since the verb by reason of composition conjoins the predicate to the subject, and relates to both.... ( unde cum verbum ratione compositionis conjungat praedicatum subjecto, et ad utrumque se habeat, [congrue possunt ista adverbia tam ad subjectum quam ad praedicatum adjungi...]), it resembles the conjunction; composition itself being a habitudo common to the verb, the preeminent form of which is the copula is, and the conjunction, the preeminent form of which is the copulative conjunction and. See also the texts cited further below. 7 St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, n. 19 (on 16b 19-23) (= Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee, 1962, pp. 49-53) (tr. rev. B.A.M.).

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But to return to our text: Since, as Nicholas of Paris explains, nothing that takes on signification from things adjoined to it signifies anything on its own, it follows that, with respect to conjunctions, ...their signification varies with the force of the things conjoined by them..., as Apollonius Dyscolus relates; for which reason, like verbal copulatives, they cannot be understood apart from the things they conjoin. Of course, as St. Thomas Aquinas makes clear, it is the composition consignified by the verb which cannot be understood without the extremes of that composition; it being the case that, unlike the conjunction, every verb does signify something, namely, to be in act, and hence the inherence of an act in some subject, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains:1
20. Therefore in order to understand what Aristotle is saying we should note that he has just said that the verb does not signify that a thing exists or does not exist [ rem esse vel non esse]; nor does being [ens] signify that a thing exists or does not exist. This is what he means when he says, it is nothing, i.e., it does not signify that a thing exists. This is indeed most clearly seen in saying being [ens], because being is nothing other than that which is. And thus we see that it signifies both a thing, when I say that which, and existence [ esse] when I say is [est]. If the word being [ens] as signifying a thing having existence were to signify existence [esse] principally, without a doubt it would signify that a thing exists. But the word being [ens] does not principally signify the composition that is implied in saying is [est]; rather, it signifies with composition inasmuch as it signifies the thing having existence. Such signifying with composition is not sufficient for truth or falsity; for the composition in which truth and falsity consists cannot be understood unless it connects the extremes of a composition.2 21. If in place of what Aristotle says we say nor would to be itself [nec ipsum esse], as it is in our texts, the meaning is clearer. 70 For Aristotle proves through the verb is [ est] that no verb signifies that a thing exists or does not exist, since is said by itself does not signify that a thing exists, although it signifies existence. And because to be itself seems to be a kind of composition, so also the verb is [ est], which signifies to be, can seem to signify the composition in which there is truth or falsity. To exclude this Aristotle adds that the composition which the verb is signifies cannot be understood without the compos- [52-53]
8

unde porphyrius aliter exposuit quod hoc ipsum ens non significat naturam alicuius rei, sicut hoc nomen homo vel sapiens, sed solum designat quamdam coniunctionem; unde subdit quod consignificat quamdam compositionem, quam sine compositis non est intelligere . sed neque hoc convenienter videtur dici: quia si non significaret aliquam rem, sed solum coniunctionem, non esset neque nomen, neque verbum, sicut nec praepositiones aut coniunctiones. et ideo aliter exponendum est, sicut ammonius exponit, quod ipsum ens nihil est, idest non significat verum vel falsum. et rationem huius assignat, cum subdit: consignificat autem quamdam compositionem. nec accipitur hic, ut ipse dicit, consignificat, sicut cum dicebatur quod verbum consignificat tempus, sed consignificat, idest cum alio significat, scilicet alii adiunctum compositionem significat, quae non potest intelligi sine extremis compositionis. 1 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, nn. 20-22 (on 16b 19-23) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle slightly rev. B.A.M.). 2 et ideo ut magis sequamur verba aristotelis considerandum est quod ipse dixerat quod verbum non significat rem esse vel non esse, sed nec ipsum ens significat rem esse vel non esse. et hoc est quod dicit, nihil est, idest non significat aliquid esse. etenim hoc maxime videbatur de hoc quod dico ens: quia ens nihil est aliud quam quod est. et sic videtur et rem significare, per hoc quod dico quod et esse, per hoc quod dico est. et si quidem haec dictio ens significaret esse principaliter, sicut significat rem quae habet esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse. sed ipsam compositionem, quae importatur in hoc quod dico est, non principaliter significat, sed consignificat eam in quantum significat rem habentem esse. unde talis consignificatio compositionis non sufficit ad veritatem vel falsitatem: quia compositio, in qua consistit veritas et falsitas, non potest intelligi, nisi secundum quod innectit extrema compositionis . Note here that, in a passage cited above, Gabriel Nuchelmans is in error when he states that the copula agrees with the conjunction in not signifying anything.

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70

The Greek to/ o)\n is closer to this reading.

ing things. The reason for this is that an understanding of the composition which is signifies depends on the extremes, and unless they are added, understanding of the composition is not complete and hence cannot be true or false. 22. Therefore he says that the verb is signifies with composition; for it does not signify composition principally but consequently. It primarily signifies that which is perceived in the mode of actuality absolutely; for is said simply, signifies to be in act, and therefore signifies in the mode of a verb. However, the actuality which the verb is principally signifies is the actuality of every form commonly, whether substantial or accidental. Hence, when we wish to signify that any form or act is actually in some subject we signify it through the verb is, either absolutely or relatively; absolutely, according to present time, relatively, according to other times; and for this reason the verb is signifies composition, not principally, but consequently.1

Hence there is only a partial agreement between the verb and the conjunction; the former signifying something by itself or separatelywhat St. Thomas calls its principal signifycationthe latter not by itself but only when conjoined to the others; the conjunction not involving the difference between what is signified principaliter et consequenter.

si vero dicatur, nec ipsum esse, ut libri nostri habent, planior est sensus. quod enim nullum verbum significat rem esse vel non esse, probat per hoc verbum est, quod secundum se dictum, non significat aliquid esse, licet significet esse. et quia hoc ipsum esse videtur compositio quaedam, et ita hoc verbum est, quod significat esse, potest videri significare compositionem, in qua sit verum vel falsum; ad hoc excludendum subdit quod illa compositio, quam significat hoc verbum est, non potest intelligi sine componentibus: quia dependet eius intellectus ab extremis, quae si non apponantur, non est perfectus intellectus compositionis, ut possit in ea esse verum, vel falsum . ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum est consignificat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam est, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi. quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum est, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum est, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum est significat compositionem .

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12. Supplement: The composition of the copula according to Peter of Spain. Cf. Peter of Spain, Syncategoreumata. First Critical Edition with an Introduction & Indexes by L. M. di Rijk. With an English Translation by Joke Spruyt, Tractatus Primus. Chapter I, nn. 25-26, pp. 63-64:
25 There is also a problem in which way that composition should be understood of which Aristotle says11 it cannot be understood without the things that are combined. And the answer should be that the composition of the act with the substance is understood through the extremes. For the act by itself inheres in its subject just as any other accident by itself inheres in the subject it resides in. And it is not through some other intermediate, for in that case we would have an infinite regress, as has been said before regarding the quality of the noun. Therefore the composition of an act with a substance occurs by means of the inclination of this act towards the substance itself as towards its subject. And since the inclination of
11

De interpr. 3, 16b24-5.

the one towards the other can only be understood via that which is inclined and via that toward which it is inclined, hence the composition of an act towards its substance, which is consignified by the verb, cannot be understood without the extremes. Therefore Aristotle says12 that is (est) consignifies a certain composition that cannot be understood without the things combined, since it can only be understood through that which is inclined and through that towards which it is inclined. Indeed, when that which is inclined and that towards which it is inclined has been taken away, the inclination of a verb, which is in fact that of its act towards the substance, is nothing. And so a composition without its extremes is nothing. And since everything is understood in virtue of that which grants being to it, therefore because the extremes grant being to the composition, the composition should be understood through the extremes, as has been said.
12

Ibid.

26 Note also that this composition as regards its true being is in a thing and cannot be separated from it, whereas in a verb, this composition is as in a sign, just as health as regards its true being is in an animal as its subject, but in urine as its sign. Note again that the composition exists through the inclination the act has towards a substance, insofar as the act is an accident of the substance, and it precedes the other inclination through which the act is <said> of something else, as has been said before.

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13. Supplement: On the distributive terms every and no. Cf. Aristotle, De Int., I. 10 (20a 13) (tr. Jean T. Oesterle; slightly rev. B.A.M.):
The every and no, then, additionally signify nothing other than that they affirm or deny about the name (taken) universally.

Cf. also the following from Oesterle (= Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee 1962, n. 35, p. 149):
The Greek reads: ...w(/ste to\ pa=j h)/ mhdei/j ou)de\n a)/llo prosshmai/nei h)/ o(/ti kaqo/lon tou= o)no/matoj kata/fhsin h)/ a)po/fhsin ; the every and the no, then, only signify no-thing other than that they affirm or deny universally of a name). In the present translation this is rendered as, The every and the no, then, only signify that the affirmation or nega-tion is of a name universally.

Cf. also Cardinal Cajetans commentary, ibid. p. 149:

15. Two things should be noted here: first, that Aristotle does not say every and no signify universally, but that the universal is taken universally; secondly, that he adds, that they affirm or deny of man.35 The [20a13] reason for the first is that the distributive sign does not signify the mode of universality or of particularity absolutely, but the mode applied to a distributed term. When I say, every man the every denotes that universality is applied to the term man. Hence, when Aristotle says every signifies that a universal is taken universally, by the that he conveys the application in actual exercise of the universality denoted by the every, just as in I Posteriorum in the definition of to know, namely, To know scientifically is to know a thing through its cause and that this is its cause , he signifies by the word that the application of the cause. 36
35 36

[Quoted above. Note that the wording is a paraphrase, not a lemma (B.A.M.).] Post. Anal. I, 2, 71b 10.

The reason for the second is to imply the difference between categorematic and syncategorematic terms. The former apply what is signified to the terms absolutely; the latter apply what they signify in relation to the predicates. For example, in white man the white denominates man in himself apart from any regard to something to be added; but in every man although every distributes man, the distribution does not confirm the intellect unless it is understood in relation to some predicate. A sign of this is that when we say Every man runs we do not intend to distribute man in its whole universality absolutely, but only in relation to running. When we say White man runs, on the other hand, we designate man in himself as white and not in relation to running.

On the foregoing matters, cf. Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, p. 29, excerpted above:
De. int. 16 b 20 is also interesting because it is in these lines that we find the first trace of a distinction that later came to be known as the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic words. Although verbs by themselves do not yet signify whether something is the case or not and therefore do not possess the degree of completeness and independence which is charac-

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teristic of the units of the legein-level, it is still true that most of them have a meaning of their own in the sense that both the speaker and the hearer, in pronouncing or hearing the word, will have a definite thought in their minds, a thought that has some kind of selfsufficiency. The copula is, on the contrary, is not accompanied by any such distinct and relatively self-sufficient thought; it only adds a certain nuance to the meaning of the words to which it is joined. For this additional way of signifying Aristotle uses the word prossmainein. This word also occurs in De int. 20 a 13, in connection with every and no. These words additionally signify nothing other than that the affirmation or negation is about the name taken universally. Thus we have here the beginning of a trichotomy: expressions signifying that something is the case; verbs and nouns, which do not yet signify that something is the case but have some meaning on their own; and words like is, ever, no, which do not signify ( smainein) in either of those ways but only contribute to the meaning of other words.

14. Comparison of versions:

(1) tr. B.A.M. based on Oesterle and Nuchelmans: The every and no, then, additionally signify nothing other than that they affirm or deny about the name (taken) universally. (2) tr. Jean T. Oesterle: the every and the no, then, only signify nothing other than that they affirm or deny universally of a name. (3) paraphrase by Gabriel Nuchelmans: This word [sc. prossmainein] also occurs in De int. 20 a 13, in connection with every and no. These words additionally signify nothing other than that the affirmation or negation is about the name taken universally.

15. What the names every and no consignify according to Aristotle. As Aristotle explains (De Int., I. 10, 20a 13), the names every and no as occurring in such statements as Every man is white and No man is white prossmainein, or additionally signify, an affirmation or denial with respect to the name to which they are attached taken universally; that is to say, the name to which they are attached is taken universally with respect to what they affirm or deny about it; and this is their consignification. To this explanation should be compared the following from St. Thomas Aquinas ( In I Peri Herm., lect. 6, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.):
But second, he puts down that in which speech differs from the name [or noun] and the verb, when he says, some parts of which are significative separately. For he said above that a part of a name does not signify something separate by itself, but only that it [i.e. such a name] is conjoined from two parts. But he significantly does not say: whose part when separated is significative of something , but of which some part is significative , on account of negations and other syncategorematic terms, which in and of themselves do not signify something absolute, but only the relationship of one thing to another. 1
1

secundo autem ponit id, in quo oratio differt a nomine et verbo, cum dicit: cuius partium aliquid significativum est separatim. supra enim dictum est quod pars nominis non significat aliquid per se separatum, sed solum quod est coniunctum ex duabus partibus. signanter autem non dicit: cuius pars est significativa aliquid separata, sed cuius aliquid partium est significativum, propter negationes et alia syncategoremata, quae secundum se non significant aliquid absolutum, sed solum habitudinem unius ad alterum .

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According to St. Thomas, negations and other syncategorematic terms do not signify something when separatedwhich is to say, in and of themselves they do not signify something absolute, but only the relationship of one thing to another. But, as we have seen from the account laid out above, such a habitudo or relationship is explained by saying that the name to which they are attached is taken universally with respect to what they affirm or deny about it, as I have worded it, which is to say they signify in relation to the predicates, as Cajetan puts it; whereas categorematic terms signify absolutely. 16. Supplement: Rsum on the way in which the copula and the verb are said to consignify. With respect to the consignification of the copula and the verb at issue earlier in Aristotles discussion, St. Thomas explains them in a text we have met with above:
And so Porphyry explained in another way that this being [ ens] itself does not signify the nature of a thing as the name man or wise do, but only designates a certain conjunction, and this is why he [Aristotle] adds, it consignifies a certain composition, which cannot be understood without the things composing it. [end of page 51] This explanation does not seem to be consistent with the text either, for if being itself does not signify a thing, but only a conjunction, it, like prepositions and conjunctions, is neither a name nor a verb. Therefore this should be explained in another way, as Ammonius explains it. He says being itself is nothing means that it does not signify truth or falsity. And he assigns the reason for this when he says, it consignifies, however, a certain composition. Nor is consignifies taken here, as he states, as when it is said that the verb consignifies time; but it consignifies, i.e. it signifies with another; that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition. 1

According to St. Thomas, when Aristotle says of the verb that it consignifies a certain composition, which cannot be understood without the things composing it, this means that it signifies with another; that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition, differing in this from the case of time, where consignifies means to signify in addition to or to additionally signify time. In this way, then, as noted above, the verb agrees with the conjunction as described by Apollonius Dyscolus (ed. Householder, n. 28, p. 27):
After all the parts that have been listed we take the conjunction, which conjoins, and cannot convey any meaning by itself without the substance of these words, just as physical bonds are no use if there are no physical objects [to connect].

unde porphyrius aliter exposuit quod hoc ipsum ens non significat naturam alicuius rei, sicut hoc nomen homo vel sapiens, sed solum designat quamdam coniunctionem; unde subdit quod consignificat quamdam compositionem, quam sine compositis non est intelligere . sed neque hoc convenienter videtur dici: quia si non significaret aliquam rem, sed solum coniunctionem, non esset neque nomen, neque verbum, sicut nec praepositiones aut coniunctiones. et ideo aliter exponendum est, sicut ammonius exponit, quod ipsum ens nihil est, idest non significat verum vel falsum. et rationem huius assignat, cum subdit: consignificat autem quamdam compositionem. nec accipitur hic, ut ipse dicit, consignificat, sicut cum dicebatur quod verbum consignificat tempus, sed consignificat, idest cum alio significat, scilicet alii adiunctum compositionem significat, quae non potest intelligi sine extremis compositionis . St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, n. 19 (on 16b 19-23) (= Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan . Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee 1962, pp. 49-53) (tr. rev. B.A.M.).

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17. Consignification in sum: (1) Of the verb in general: it signifies with time (Aristotle, De Int., I. 3, 16b 6). (That is, the verb not only signifies some thing or nature, as is healthy signifies health, but it also or in addition signifies time, most properly, the present.) (2) Of verb in general as well as the copula: (a) the copula: it signifies with another; that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, n. 19). (b) the verb in general: And so since the verb by reason of composition conjoins the predicate to the subject, and relates to both.... (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 21, q. 2, art. 1, c.). (On this formulation, see further below. And note here that composition is also a habitudo.) (3) Of negations and other syncategorematic terms (e.g. no and every and the like): The every and no, then, additionally signify nothing other than that they affirm or deny about the name (taken) universally (Aristotle, De Int. I. 10, 20a 13). (That is to say, they signify in relation to the predicates and hence are pros ti or toward something.) The verb, then, agrees with the distribuative terms every and no in signifying additionally, which is to consignify; but the copula agrees with the conjunction in the way in which it signifies with another, as we have just explained. 18. The consignification of the conjunction in sum. On the basis of the foregoing accounts, one could explain the consignification of the conjunction as follows: Like the copula, it signifies with another; that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition, which is to say that, like negations and other syncategorematic terms it signifies in relation to something, namely, other words (as when I say Plato and Socrates were philosophers); or phrases, which are certain combinations of words (as when I say The good man and the bad man differ); or clauses (as when I say I love you and you love me) all of which are extremes conjoined by it. On this point, compare the following definition from Priscian, Inst. gramm. xvi. 1, p. 93 (2-3) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.):
A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech conjunctive of the other parts of speech, which (conjunction of the parts) it consignifies, displaying a force or an order. 1
1

The Latin (ed. Hertz) reads: Coniunctio est pars orationis indeclinabilis, coniunctiva aliarum partium orationis, quibus consignificat, vim vel orderem demonstrans . Note that Peter of Spains text, which I give next, omits the words quibus consignificat. On Priscians understanding of the conjunction, cf. also Inst. gramm. (6.11) [II:21] (tr. B.A.M.): It is proper to the conjunction to conjoin diverse nouns, or whatever chance words [there may happen to be], whether diverse verbs or adverbs, for instance Terence and Cicero. ( Proprium est coniunctionis diversa nomina vel quascumque dictiones casuales vel diversa verba vel adverbia

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That is, the conjunction not only conjoins the other parts of speech, it also consignifies their conjunction. (And note here that I take quibus as referring to the conjunction of the parts, and not to the parts themselves, since to say the former is true, but the latter false, as is clear from what Priscian says elsewhere about consignification.)1 N.B. For a scholastic logicians account of Priscians understanding of the conjuncttion, cf. Peter of Spain, Syncategoreumata. First Critical Edition with an Introduction & Indexes by L. M. di Rijk. With an English Translation by Joke Spruyt, p. 199:
Now the word if signifies cause or causality. Therefore it signifies antecedence and not consecution. Furthermore, it may be argued that it signifies consecution on account of the definition of conjunction given by Priscian: 1 A conjunction is an indeclinable part of speech that conjoins other parts of speech and displays a force or an order. Priscian explains2 this as follows: conjunctions that signify a force are the ones that signify certain things to be simultaneous (e.g. Aeneas was pious and brave), and those conjunctions signify an order that display a consequence of certain states of affairs ( e.g. If he is walking, he is moving). Now the word if and the like signify an order. Therefore they signify consequences or states of affairs or a consecution. Hence they do not signify antecedence.
1 2

Inst. gramm. XVI 1, p. 93(2-3), ed. Hertz. Ibid., p. 93(4-6).

Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum (ap. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. Translated by Joseph P. Mullaley, Ph.D, pp. 77-78):
The conjunction or (vel) is one which does not signify a comparison according to the prior and the posterior but only a comparison of simultaneously existing things by disjoining any two things with respect to some third, so that the conjunction is posits the disjuncts to exist simultaneously and it is indifferently related to each. But it does not posit that with respect to which the disjunction exists, as simultaneously existing in them. Hence, when Sortes or Plato is running, Sortes and Plato are posited simultaneously as mutually existing; nevertheless they are not posited simultaneously as running. One ought to understand the statement of Boethius15 in this way when he says that the disjunctive conjunction means this because it does not allow those things which it conjoins to exist simultaneously. It is the same in the case of the definition of Priscian 16 when he says disjunctive conjunctions are those which, although they conjoin words, nevertheless disjoin meanings. Indeed, they signify that one thing is, but that the other is not. Thus it is clear that the disjunctive con[77-78] junction signifies that things exist simultaneously but it disjoins them with respect to a third.
15 16

De Syllogismo Hypothetico (PL 64, 834 CD). Inst. Gram., xvi, 7, 17-18.

Cf. Boethius, De Hypotheticis Syllogismus, Liber 3. (tr. B.A.M.):

coniungere, ut et Terentius et Cicero, ....).

1

Cf. Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11: For they always consignifythat is, they signify when conjoined to the othersbut by themselves they do not.

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For when we say Either a is or b is or [when] we vary the same propositions in some other way, the disjunctive conjunction which is put down cannot permit them to exist at the same time.1

Cf. Priscian, Inst. Gram., xvi, 7, 17-18 (tr. B.A.M.):

Disjunctives are those which, although they conjoin words, nevertheless disjoin meanings, and they signify that one thing exists but another does not, such as ve, vel, aut [= or]. 2

N.B. Inasmuch as to conjoin is to make one thing out of two or more things (or simply out of more than one thing), it follows that a disjunctive is that which makes two or more things out of at least one thing. But, as Priscian states, it does this by disjoining the meanings while conjoining the words. Hence. to take Peter of Spains example, when I say Either Socrates or Plato is running, Socrates and Plato are posited as existing at the same time, but not as running at the same time. Thus, says Peter, it is clear that the disjunctive conjunction signifies that things exist simultaneously but it disjoins them with respect to a third, the third being the predicate is running, being that with respect to which the disjunction Either Socrates or Plato is posited. It is instructive here to compare Cajetans explanation of the determiner every given above. In both cases, the relativity of a syncategorematic word is evident, since it must be taken with reference to something else in order to be understood. Note further that in the foregoing discussion, simultaneous existence applies to the two principal species of coordinating conjunctions, namely, the conjunctive or copulative, and the disjunctive. Those, on the other hand, which display an order in their meaningthat is, a before and after in the form of a consequence or following after (Gk akolouthia)are the subordinating conjunctions, which Priscian treats next. Also on these matters cf. the following: Peter of Spain, op.cit., pp. 80-81:
Having spoken of the disjunctive conjunction or ( vel), we now treat of the copulative conjunction and which is called copulative not because it signifies a connection but because it signifies a comparison which exists simultaneously or according to simultaneity. And the connection follows from simultaneity just as exclusion naturally follows from my expression not with another. Hence when I say: Sortes and Plato are white, the conjunction and affirms their simultaneity and oneness in whiteness. And on that account it unites them in whiteness. It does not however indicate simultaneity in time, because this would be false: Adam and Noah were two men, because they did not exist at the same time; but nevertheless one correctly asserts: He ran yesterday and he is running today and he will run tomorrow, yet these acts of running do not exist at the same time. But primarily and essentially it affirms the simultaneity of many subjects in one accident insofar as it enjoys being or of many accidents in one subject, for example, Sortes and Plato are white and Sortes is seated and he also is arguing. Hence it must be noted that a unit [= something one] is spoken of in many ways, for one kind of thing is a unit consisting of matter and form, as man is a composite of body and soul; in another way there is a unit by continuity, for example, a line, a surface, time and any continuum; in a third way there is a unit by grafting, for example, in the case of a tree a unit follows from the grafting of a branch of one tree and the trunk of another tree; in a fourth way by contiguity, as it exists where there are two bodies between which there is no intermediate, for example, a finger is contiguous to a finger because there is nothing in between;
1

Cum enim dicimus: Aut a est aut b est, aut easdem propositiones quolibet modo alio uariamus, id et coniunctio quae disiunctiua ponitur sentit simul eas esse non posse. 2 Disiunctivae sunt, quae quamvis dictiones coniungunt, sensum tamen [7] disiunctum et alteram quidem rem esse, alteram vero non esse significant, ut ve, vel, aut .

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in a fifth way by a collection, for example, from flesh and bone a third unit comes into existence which is neither wholly flesh nor wholly bone, as are the nerves and cartilages; in a sixth way by addition, for example, a multitude of stones. And in this last way the conjunction and produces unity but not in the other aforementioned ways. Thus the copulated term is one by addition. But this union though absolute, the conjunction and diversifies, because at times it is opposed to unity, for example, Man is a body and a soul, and the copulate whole produces a unit by the unity of the individual. Therefore it can be subject to a verb which is singular in number, for example, A rational soul and flesh constitute one man. Sometimes it is held copulatively in the proper sense and then only does it conjoin diverse objects which enjoy difference among themselves but agreement with respect to something else. Because the conjunction and refers equally to each of the extremes, for this reason, whenever it is placed in front of one of the extremes, it is necessary that it be repeated and placed before the other extreme in order that [80-81] it may be related equally to each, and that it not be related more to that before which it is placed. The copulate whole then produces a unit by addition and posits a multitude absolutely. Then alone is it subject to a verb of plural number, for example, Sortes and Plato are running. Further, note that although the copulative and ought to connect different things, it nevertheless does not connect anything whatever, because it does not join an adjective to a substantive, nor vice versa, for example, A white man is running, because of the fact that, of itself, it affirms a certain conjoining or association of something or other with some kind of a thing. Hence it is equally related to each. And so the cause of every copulative conjunction, except an enclitic, is its equal reference to each of the extremes. Therefore, primarily and essentially the conjunction and conjoins two substances to one act or two acts to one substance, as, for example, Sortes and Plato are white or The man is reading and also arguing. Hence, although this conjunction and more properly conjoins different subjects and different things which are signified as similarly conditioned, for example, A man and a horse are running, it can, nevertheless, conjoin different subjects with a unified signification, for example, A man and a man are running, because in the case of general terms the plural repeats the singular. But one correctly says: Men are, therefore one correctly says A man and a man are. Moreover such are the subjects as are permitted by their predicates. But when one affirms: A man and a man are running, the predicate requires that the term man be held for different men. But if it is held for different men, one correctly says: A man and a man are running.

19. On the nature of conjunction. As is clear from a text of St. Thomas cited above (sec. 13; cf. In I Sent., dist. 21, q. 2, art. 1, c.), composition involves a kind of conjoining or conjunction; but this is a form of union and hence a relation, as may be gathered from the following texts: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent., dist. 4, q. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
I reply that it must be said to the first question, that conjunction imports a kind of uniting [or making one, adunatio], and so wherever there is a making one of certain things there must be a certain conjunction.1

Cf. also In III Sent., dist. 5, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod conjunctio adunationem quamdam importat; unde ubicumque est adunatio aliquorum, ibi est aliqua conjunctio.

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I reply that it must be said to the first question that union is a certain relation....Now unition [or uniting] is a certain action or passion by [means of] which one thing is in some way effected [or produced] out of many things; and this action follows upon such a relation which is union.1

Cf. also Priscian, Inst. gramm., xvi. 10-11 (pp. 114-115) (ed. Hertz, tr. B.A.M.):
But copulative and disjunctive conjunctions are recognizably different from the other parts of speech, which are made one by them, as vel, aut [or, or] are not only disjunctive, but also are found copulative....2

Cf. also Aristotle, Rhet., III. 12 (1413b 321414a 6) (tr. Theodore Buckley):
...[F]or the connective [or conjunction, = sundesmos] makes many one; so that if it be taken away, it is evident that on the contrary one will be many. 3

Hence, insofar as conjunction makes many things one, it is a species of relation. 4 For a helpful account of the primary division of conjunctions, cf. the following witnesses: Cf. Universal Grammar. Encyclopedia Britannica (1st. ed, 1771), Of Conjunctions:
A conjunction is a part of speech void of signification itself, but so formed as to help signification, by making two or more significant sentences to be one significant sentence. As, therefore, it is the essence of a conjunction to connect sentences; at the same time that they do this, they must either connect their meaning or not. For example, let us take these two sentences, Rome was enslaved, Caesar was ambitions, and connect them together by the conjunction BECAUSE; Rome was enslaved, BECAUSE Caesar was ambitious. Here the meaning, as well as the sentences, appear to be connected. But if I say, manners must be reformed, OR liberty will be lost; here the conjunction OR, though it join the sentences, yet, as to their respective meanings, is a perfect disjunctive.And thus it appears, that though all conjunctions conjoin sentences, yet, with respect to the sense, some are conjunctive, others are disjunctive.

Cf. also Gould Brown, The Grammar of English Grammars (1851):

1

Respondeo dicendum, ad primam quaestionem, quod unio relatio quaedam est.... Unitio autem est quaedam actio vel passio qua ex multis efficitur aliquo modo unum; et hanc actionem sequitur ista relatio quae est unio. 2 coniunctiones quoque copulativae et disiunctivae esse dinoscuntur ab aliis partibus orationis, quae eis sociantur, ut vel, aut non solum disiunctivae, sed etiam copulativae reperiuntur....
3

o( ga\r su/ndesmoj e(\n poiei= ta\ polla/, w(/ste e)a\n e)caireqh=?, dh=lon o(/ti tou)nanti/on e)/stai to\ e(\n polla/. e)/xei ou)=n au)/chsin . Cf. also Poet. ch. 20 (1457a 4-5) (ed. R. Kassel; tr. B.A.M.): Or else [a conjunction is]

a non-significant vocal sound which [5] out of more than one significant vocal sound is naturally apt to produce [or effect, or make] one significant vocal sound; (h)\ fwnh\ a)/shmoj h(\ e)k pleio/nwn me\n [5] fwnw=n mia=j shmantikw=n de\ poiei=n pe/fuken mi/an shmantikh\n fwnh/n) . As I have argued elsewhere, I take this portion of Aristotles text, although missing its examples, to refer to every species of conjunction.
4

It may also be added that, as Aristotle makes clear in his various accounts of what it is to be one (for which, see elsewhere), things that are one by conjunction must be distinguished from those that are one by signifying one thing, as is the case with (real) definitions. In the latter instance, the parts stand to one another as potency to act inasmuch as the last differentia determines what comes before it, as with reason determines animal in the definition of man, such members being reached by a per se division of the genus. Where, on the other hand, the parts stand to one another just as it happens, as is the case with an accidental definition (an example of which is the definition of angler arrived at in Platos Sophist), no such unity exists. Similarly, a thing one by conjunction differs from a composition wherein the parts are mutually adapted and hence articulated, as is the case with a harmony of sounds, or speech disposed in members.

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A Conjunction is a word used to connect words or sentences in construction, and to show the dependence of the terms so connected: as, Thou and he are happy, because you are good.-Murray. Conjunctions are divided into two general classes, copulative and disjunctive; and a few of each class are particularly distinguished from the rest, as being corresponsive. A copulative conjunction is a conjunction that denotes an addition, a cause, a consequence, or a supposition: as, He and I shall not dispute; for, if he has any choice, I shall readily grant it. A disjunctive conjunction is a conjunction that denotes opposition of meaning: as, Though he were dead, yet shall he live.St. John's Gospel....The corresponsive conjunctions are those which are used in pairs, so that one refers or answers to the other: as, John came neither eating nor drinking.Matt., xi, 18.

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20. Supplement: St. Thomas Aquinas explanation ofAristotle on the nature of the verb. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, nn. 15-22 (on 16b 19-23) (= Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee 1962, pp. 49-53) (tr. slightly rev. B.A.M.):
LB1 LC-5N.15 deinde cum dicit: ipsa itaque etc., ostendit convenientiam verborum ad nomina. et circa hoc duo facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, manifestat propositum; ibi: et significant aliquid etc.. dicit ergo primo, quod ipsa verba secundum se dicta sunt nomina: quod a quibusdam exponitur de verbis quae sumuntur in vi nominis, ut dictum est, sive sint infinitivi modi; ut cum dico, currere est moveri, sive sint alterius modi; ut cum dico, curro est verbum. sed haec non videtur esse intentio aristotelis, quia ad hanc intentionem non respondent sequentia. et ideo aliter dicendum est quod nomen hic sumitur, prout communiter significat quamlibet dictionem impositam ad significandum aliquam rem. et quia etiam ipsum agere vel pati est quaedam res, inde est quod et ipsa verba in quantum nominant, idest significant agere vel pati, sub nominibus comprehenduntur communiter acceptis. nomen autem, prout a verbo distinguitur, significat rem sub determinato modo, prout scilicet potest intelligi ut per se existens. unde nomina possunt subiici et praedicari. LB1 LC-5N.16 deinde cum dicit: et significant aliquid etc., probat propositum. et primo, per hoc quod verba significant aliquid, sicut et nomina; secundo, per hoc quod non significant verum vel falsum, sicut nec nomina; ibi: sed si est, aut non est etc.. dicit ergo primo quod in tantum dictum est quod verba sunt nomina, in quantum significant aliquid. et hoc probat, quia supra dictum est [16b20] 16. He proves the point he has just made when he says and signifies something, etc., first by showing that, like names, they do not signify truth or falsity when he says, for the verb is not a sign of the being or nonbeing of a thing. He says first that verbs have been said to be names only inasmuch as they signify a [16b22] thing. Then he proves this: it has already been 15. He points out the conformity between verbs and names where [16b19] he says, Verbs in themselves, said alone, are names . He proposes this first and then manifests it. He says then, first, that verbs said by themselves are names. Some have taken this to mean the verbs that are taken with the force [49-50] of names, either verbs of the infinitive mode, as in To run is to be moving, or verbs of another mode, as in Matures is a verb. But this does not seem to be what Aristotle means, for it does not correspond to what he says next. Therefore name must be taken in another way here, i.e. as it commonly signifies any word whatsoever that is imposed to signify a thing. Now, since to act or to be acted upon is also a certain thing, verbs themselves as they name, i.e., as they signify to act or to be acted upon, are comprehended under names taken commonly. The name as distinguished from the verb signifies the thing under a determinate mode, i.e. according as the thing can be understood as existing per se. This is the reason names can be subjected and predicated.

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quod voces significativae significant intellectus. unde proprium vocis significativae est quod generet aliquem intellectum in animo audientis. et ideo ad ostendendum quod verbum sit vox significativa, assumit quod ille, qui dicit verbum, constituit intellectum in animo audientis. et ad hoc manifestandum inducit quod ille, qui audit, quiescit. LB1 LC-5N.17 sed hoc videtur esse falsum: quia sola oratio perfecta facit quiescere intellectum, non autem nomen, neque verbum si per se dicatur. si enim dicam, homo, suspensus est animus audientis, quid de eo dicere velim; si autem dico, currit, suspensus est eius animus de quo dicam.

said that significant vocal sound signifies thought; hence it is proper to significant vocal sound to produce something understood in the mind of the one who hears it. To show, then, that a verb is significant vocal sound he assumes that the one who utters a verb brings about understanding in the mind of the one who hears it. The evidence he introduces for this is that the mind of the one who hears it is set at rest.

17. But what Aristotle says here seems to be false, for it is only perfect speech that makes the intellect rest. The name or the verb said by themselves, do not do this. For example, if I say man, the mind of the hearer is left in suspense as to what I wish to say about man; and if I say runs, the hearers mind is left in suspense as to whom I am speaking of. It should be said in answer to this objection that the operation of the intellect is twofold, as was said above, and therefore the one who utters a name or a verb by itself, determines the intellect with respect to the first operation, which is the simple conception of something. It is in relation to this that the one hearing, whose mind was undetermined before the name or the verb was being uttered and its utterance terminated, is set at rest. Neither the name nor the verb said by itself, however, determines the intellect in respect to the second operation, which is the operation of the intellect composing and dividing; nor do the verb and the name said alone set the hearers mind at rest in respect to this operation. [50-52] 18. Aristotle therefore immediately adds, but they do not yet signify [16b21] whether a thing is or is not, i.e., they do not yet signify something by way of composition and division, or by way of truth or falsity. This is the second thing he intends to prove, 68 and he proves it by the verbs that especially seem to signify truth or falsity, namely the verb to be and the infinite verb to non-be, neither of

sed dicendum est quod cum duplex sit intellectus operatio, ut supra habitum est, ille qui dicit nomen vel verbum secundum se, constituit intellectum quantum ad primam operationem, quae est simplex conceptio alicuius, et secundum hoc, quiescit audiens, qui in suspenso erat antequam nomen vel verbum proferretur et eius prolatio terminaretur; non autem constituit intellectum quantum ad secundam operationem, quae est intellectus componentis et dividentis, ipsum verbum vel nomen per se dictum: nec quantum ad hoc facit quiescere audientem. LB1 LC-5N.18 et ideo statim subdit: sed si est, aut non est, nondum significat, idest nondum significat aliquid per modum compositionis et divisionis, aut veri vel falsi. et hoc est secundum, quod probare intendit. probat autem consequenter per illa verba, quae maxime videntur significare veritatem vel falsitatem, scilicet ipsum verbum quod est esse, et verbum infinitum quod est non esse; quorum

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neutrum per se dictum est significativum verytatis vel falsitatis in re; unde multo minus alia. vel potest intelligi hoc generaliter dici de omnibus verbis. quia enim dixerat quod verbum non significat si est res vel non est, hoc consequenter manifestat, quia nullum verbum est significativum esse rei vel non esse, idest quod res sit vel non sit. quamvis enim omne verbum finitum implicet esse, quia currere est currentem esse, et omne verbum infinitum implicet non esse, quia non currere est non currentem esse; tamen nullum verbum significat hoc totum, scilicet rem esse vel non esse. LB1 LC-5N.19 et hoc consequenter probat per id, de quo magis videtur cum subdit: nec si hoc ipsum est purum dixeris, ipsum quidem nihil est. ubi notandum est quod in graeco habetur: neque si ens ipsum nudum dixeris, ipsum quidem nihil est. ad probandum enim quod verba non significant rem esse vel non esse, assumpsit id quod est fons et origo ipsius esse, scilicet ipsum ens, de quo dicit quod nihil est (ut alexander exponit), quia ens aequivoce dicitur de decem praedicamentis; omne autem aequivocum per se positum nihil significat, nisi aliquid addatur quod determinet eius significationem; unde nec ipsum est per se dictum significat quod est vel non est.

which, said by itself, signifies real truth or falsity; much less so any other verbs. This could also be understood in a more general way, i.e., that here he is speaking of all verbs; for he says that the verb does not signify whether a thing is or is not; he manifests this further, therefore, by saying that no verb is significative of a things being or non-being, i.e. that a thing is or is not. For although every finite verb implies being, for to run is to be running, and every infinite verb implies non-being, for to non-run is to be non-running, nevertheless no verb signifies the whole, i.e., a thing is or a thing is not.

19. He proves this point from something in which it will be clearer when he adds, Nor would it be a sign of the being or nonbeing of a [19b23] thing if you were to say is alone,69 for it is nothing. It should be noted that the Greek text has the word being in place of is here. In order to prove that verbs do not signify that a thing is or is not, he takes the source and origin of to be [esse], i.e. being [ens] itself, of which he says, for it is nothing. Alexander explains this passage in the following way: Aristotle says being itself is nothing because being [ens] is said equivocally of the ten predicaments; now an equivocal name used by itself signifies nothing unless something is added to determine its signification; hence, is [ est] said by itself does not signify what is or what is not. But this explanation is not appropriate for this text. In the first place being is not, strictly speaking, said equivocally but according to the prior and the posterior. Consequently, said absolutely, it is understood of that of which it is said primarily. Secondly, an equivocal word does not signify nothing, but

sed haec expositio non videtur conveniens, tum quia ens non dicitur proprie aequivoce, sed secundum prius et posterius; unde simpliciter dictum intelligitur de eo, quod per prius dicitur: tum etiam, quia dictio aequivoca non nihil significat, sed multa

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significat; et quandoque hoc, quandoque illud per ipsam accipitur: tum etiam, quia talis expositio non multum facit ad intentionem praesentem. unde porphyrius aliter exposuit quod hoc ipsum ens non significat naturam alicuius rei, sicut hoc nomen homo vel sapiens, sed solum designat quamdam coniunctionem; unde subdit quod consignificat quamdam compositionem, quam sine compositis non est intelligere.

many things, sometimes being taken for one, sometimes for another. Thirdly, such an explanation does not have much application here. And so Porphyry explains in another way that this being [ens] itself does not signify the nature of a thing as the name man or wise do, but only designates a certain conjunction and this is why he [Aristotle] adds, it signifies with a composition, which cannot be conceived apart from the things composing it. [51-52]
Cf. n. 16 of St. Thomass Commentary for this division. 69 The Greek text has to/ o)\n here; the Latin, est.
68

sed neque hoc convenienter videtur dici: quia si non significaret aliquam rem, sed solum coniunctionem, non esset neque nomen, neque verbum, sicut nec praepositiones aut coniunctiones. et ideo aliter exponendum est, sicut ammonius exponit, quod ipsum ens nihil est, idest non significat verum vel falsum. et rationem huius assignat, cum subdit: consignificat autem quamdam compositionem. nec accipitur hic, ut ipse dicit, consignificat, sicut cum dicebatur quod verbum consignificat tempus, sed consignificat, idest cum alio significat, scilicet alii adiunctum compositionem significat, quae non potest intelligi sine extremis compositionis. sed quia hoc commune est omnibus nominibus et verbis, non videtur haec expositio esse secundum intentionem aristotelis, qui assumpsit ipsum ens quasi quoddam speciale. LB1 LC-5N.20 et ideo ut magis sequamur verba aristotelis considerandum est quod ipse dixerat quod verbum non significat rem esse vel non esse, sed nec ipsum ens significat rem esse vel non esse.

This explanation does not seem to be consistent with the text either, for if being itself does not signify a thing, but only a conjunction, it, like prepositions and conjunctions, is neither a name nor a verb. Therefore this should be explained in another way, as Ammonius explains it. He says being itself is nothing means that it does not signify truth or falsity. And he assigns the reason for this when he says, it consignifies, however, a certain composition. Nor is consignifies taken here, as he states, as when it is said that the verb consignifies time; but it consignifies, i.e. it signifies with another, that is to say, adjoined to another it signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition. But this explanation does not seem to be in accordance with the intention of Aristotle, for it is common to all names and verbs not to signify truth or falsity, whereas Aristotle takes being here as though it were something special. 20. Therefore in order to understand what Aristotle is saying we should note that he has just said that the verb does not signify that a thing exists or does not exist [rem esse vel non esse]; nor does being [ ens] signify that a thing exists or does not exist. This is what he means when he says, it is nothing, i.e., it does not signify that a thing exists.

et hoc est quod dicit, nihil est, idest non significat aliquid esse. etenim hoc maxime

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videbatur de hoc quod dico ens: quia ens nihil est aliud quam quod est. et sic videtur et rem significare, per hoc quod dico quod et esse, per hoc quod dico est. et si quidem haec dictio ens significaret esse principaliter, sicut significat rem quae habet esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse. sed ipsam compositionem, quae importatur in hoc quod dico est, non principaliter significat, sed consignificat eam in quantum significat rem habentem esse. unde talis consignificatio compositionis non sufficit ad veritatem vel falsitatem: quia compositio, in qua consistit veritas et falsitas, non potest intelligi, nisi secundum quod innectit extrema compositionis. LB1 LC-5N.21 si vero dicatur, nec ipsum esse, ut libri nostri habent, planior est sensus. quod enim nullum verbum significat rem esse vel non esse, probat per hoc verbum est, quod secundum se dictum, non significat aliquid esse, licet significet esse.

This is indeed most clearly seen in saying being [ens], because being is nothing other than that which is. And thus we see that it signifies both a thing, when I say that which, and existence [ esse] when I say is [est]. If the word being [ens] as signifying a thing having existence were to signify existence [esse] principally, without a doubt it would signify that a thing exists. But the word being [ens] does not principally signify the composition that is implied in saying is [est]; rather, it signifies with composition inasmuch as it signifies the thing having existence. Such signifying with composition is not sufficeent for truth or falsity; for the composition in which truth and falsity consists cannot be understood unless it connects the extremes of a composition.

21. If in place of what Aristotle says we say nor would to be itself [nec ipsum esse] , as it is in our texts, the meaning is clearer.70 For Aristotle proves through the verb is [ est] that no verb signifies that a thing exists or does not exist, since is said by itself does not signify that a thing exists, although it signifies existence. And because to be itself seems to be a kind of composition, so also the verb is [ est], which signifies to be, can seem to signify the composition in which there is truth or falsity. To exclude this Aristotle adds that the composition which the verb is signifies cannot be understood without the compos- [52-53]
70

et quia hoc ipsum esse videtur compositio quaedam, et ita hoc verbum est, quod significat esse, potest videri significare compositionem, in qua sit verum vel falsum; ad hoc excludendum subdit quod illa compositio, quam significat hoc verbum est, non potest intelligi sine componentibus:

The Greek to/ o)\n is closer to this reading.

ing things. quia dependet eius intellectus ab extremis, quae si non apponantur, non est perfectus intellectus compositionis, ut possit in ea esse verum, vel falsum. LB1 LC-5N.22 The reason for this is that an understanding of the composition which is signifies depends on the extremes, and unless they are added, understanding of the composition is not complete and hence cannot be true or false.

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ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum est consignificat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam est, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi. quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter signifycat hoc verbum est, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum est, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum est significat compositionem.

22. Therefore he says that the verb is signifies with composition; for it does not signify composition principally but consequently. It primarily signifies that which is perceived in the mode of actuality absolutely; for is said simply, signifies to be in act, and therefore signifies in the mode of a verb. However, the actuality which the verb is principally signifies is the actuality of every form commonly, whether substantial or accidental. Hence, when we wish to signify that any form or act is actually in some subject we signify it through the verb is, either absolutely or relatively; absolutely, according to present time, relatively, according to other times; and for this reason the verb is signifies composition, not principally, but consequently.

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21. On the several considerations of speech. Cf. Simplicius of Cilicia, Comm. in Arist. Cat. 10, 24-25 (In: Michael Chase [trans.], Simplicius. On Aristotles Categories 1-4. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 25-26) (insertions {between curved braces} by B.A.M.): [for this passage, see Part I, sec. 1 supra] Cf. ibid., p. 27: [idem] Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm., Proem, nn. 2-3 (tr. B.A.M.):
LB1 LC-1N.-2 si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro praedicamentorum de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum triplex potest esse consideratio. But if one were to ask, since in the book of the Predicaments he had spoken about simple words, why it was necessary that here, besides, the name and the verb were determined about; to this it must said that there can be a threefold consideration of simple words.

una quidem, secundum quod absolute signi- One, according as they signify absolutely a simficant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consi- ple understanding, and in this way their consideratio pertinet ad librum praedicamentorum. deration pertains to the book of the Predicaments. alio modo, secundum rationem, prout sunt partes enunciationis; et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro; et ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et verbi: de quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum tempore vel sine tempore, et alia huiusmodi, quae pertinent ad rationem dictionum, secundum quod constituunt enunciationem. tertio modo, considerantur secundum quod ex eis constituitur ordo syllogisticus, et sic determinatur de eis sub ratione terminorum in libro priorum. LB1 LC-1N.-3 potest iterum dubitari quare, praetermissis aliis orationis partibus, de solo nomine et verbo determinet. ad quod dicendum est quod, quia de simplici enunciatione determinare intendit, sufficit ut Again, one might wonder why, having considered earlier the other parts of speech he determines only about the name and the verb. To this it must be said that, because he intends to determine about the simple enunciation, it In another way, according to the notion they have as parts of an enunciation; and thus they are determined about in this book. And so they are treated under the ratio of the name and the verb, to whose notion it belongs that they signify something with time or without it, and other things of this kind, which belong to the notion of words, according as they constitute an enunciation. In a third way, they are considered according as from them a syllogistic order is constituted, and thus they are determined about under the character of terms in the Prior Analytics.

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solas illas partes enunciationis pertractet, ex quibus ex necessitate simplex oratio constat. potest autem ex solo nomine et verbo simplex enunciatio fieri, non autem ex aliis orationis partibus sine his; et ideo sufficiens ei fuit de his duabus determinare. vel potest dici quod sola nomina et verba sunt principales orationis partes. sub nominibus enim comprehenduntur pronomina, quae, etsi non nominant naturam, personam tamen determinant, et ideo loco nominum ponuntur: sub verbo vero participium, quod consignificat tempus: quamvis et cum nomine convenientiam habeat. alia vero sunt magis colligationes partium orationis, significantes habitudinem unius ad aliam, quam orationis partes; sicut clavi et alia huiusmodi non sunt partes navis, sed partium navis coniunctiones.

suffices that only those parts of the enunciation be treated out of which of necessity simple speech consists. Now a simple enunciation can be made solely from the name and verb, but not from the other parts of speech without these. And therefore it suffices for him to determine about these two things. Or it may be said that only the name and the verb are [the] principal parts of speech. For under names are comprehended pronouns, which, although they do not name a nature, nevertheless, determine a person, and therefore are put in place of names. But under the verb, the participle, because it consignifies time, although it have an agreement with the noun. But the others are more bonds of the parts of speech, signifying the relationship of one thing to another, than parts of speech [themselves]; just as spikes [or nails] and other things of this kind are not parts of a ship, but conjunctions of the parts of a ship.

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22. The several considerations of speech in sum. As we have seen, Simplicius distinguishes the consideration of simple words significant of realities, qua significant from their consideration qua simple expressions.1 Likewise, complex speech has a twofold consideration, as Aristotle explains:
Yet every instance of speech is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is speech, but is neither true nor false. [5] Let us therefore dismiss all other types of speech but the proposition, for this last concerns our present inquiry, whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry.2

In the second case, the consideration is proper to rhetoric and poetic, whereas the first is proper to the logician strictly so called. St. Thomas lays out these distinctions, together with an additional one, in the following text:
Enunciative speech belongs to the present consideration. The reason for this is that the consideration of this book is ordered directly to demonstrative science, in which the soul of man is led by an act of reasoning to assent to truth from those things that are proper to the thing; and so to this end the demonstrator uses nothing except enunciative speech which signifies things according as truth about them is in the soul. The rhetorician and the poet, on the other hand, induce assent to what they intend not only through what is proper to the thing, but also through the dispositions of the hearer. Hence, rhetoricians and poets for the most part strive to move their hearers by arousing certain passions in the them as the Philosopher says in his Rhetoric [cf. Bk. I, 2, 1356a 2, 1356a 14; Bk. III, 1, 1403b 12]. And so the consideration of the species of speech mentioned, which pertains to the ordination of the hearer toward something, falls to the consideration of rhetoric or poetics by reason of its sense; but to the consideration of the grammarian as regards a fitting construction of the vocal sounds is considered in them.3

We see, then, that in this perspective there is also a consideration of speech proper to the grammarian. Now as is clear from elsewhere in St. Thomas commentary, the subject of the grammarians consideration is oratio perfecta, perfect speech, which we call a sentence, being that which completes a thought [perfectae orationis, quae complet sententiam], and make[s] perfect sense in the soul of the hearer [(facit) perfectum sensum in animo audientis] (cf. In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 4).4
1

Simplicius of Cilicia, Comm. in Arist. Cat. 10, 24-25 (In: Michael Chase [trans.], Simplicius. On Aristotles Categories 1-4. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 25-26). 2 Aristotle, De Int. (On Interpretation) I. 4 (17a 2-7) (tr. E. M. Edghill; slightly rev. B.A.M.). 3 In I Peri Herm., lect. 7, n. 6. (tr. B.A.M.): sed enunciativa oratio praesentis considerationis est. cuius ratio est, quia consideratio huius libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrativam, in qua animus hominis per rationem inducitur ad consentiendum vero ex his quae sunt propria rei; et ideo demonstrator non utitur ad suum finem nisi enunciativis orationibus, significantibus res secundum quod earum veritas est in anima. sed rhetor et poeta inducunt ad assentiendum ei quod intendunt, non solum per ea quae sunt propria rei, sed etiam per dispositiones audientis. unde rhetores et poetae plerumque movere auditores nituntur provocando eos ad aliquas passiones, ut philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. et ideo consideratio dictarum specierum orationis, quae pertinet ad ordinationem audientis in aliquid, cadit proprie sub consideratione rhetoricae vel poeticae, ratione sui significati; ad considerationem autem grammatici, prout consideratur in eis congrua vocum constructio. 4 Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm. ii. 4. 14 (tr. B.A.M.): Oratio est ordinatio dictionum congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans; Speech is a fitting ordering of words, expressing a complete thought. Note that in the foregoing definition, sententiam means thought, whereas the imposition of the name sentence as we

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Seeing, then, that there are several considerations of speech, to which does the investigation of categorematic and syncategorematic words properly pertain? As we have seen, Simplicius, writing in the 6 th cent. A.D., had occasion to advert to this distinction in his commentary on the Categories, wherein he informs us that
qua expressions, they have other fields of study, which are dealt with by Theophrastus in his work on the elements of speech, [10,25] as well as by his followers, who wrote [on such topics as] whether nouns and verbs are the [sole] elements of speech, or whether articles, conjunctions, and other such things are also these, too, are parts of vocabulary ( lexis {= language}), but the parts of speech (logos) are nouns and verbs.1

Then, quoting Porphyrys citation of Boethus of Sidon (2nd cent. B.C.),2 he adds:
...[B]ut [{the Categories} deals with these] qua significant of primary and simple beings, and not in so far as they decline or are transformed in order to accord [with certain words], or undergo such-and-such modifications ( path) and have such-and-such forms ( ideai), all of [35] which <is> the domain of the investigation of expressions qua expressions.3

That is to say, lexis or language and its parts, considered as lexis, or as such,4 have a consideration of their own, a position we observe him to have taken from the much earlier writer Boethus of Sidon by way of Porphyry, it being ultimately traced back to Theophrastus and his followers. But, as we have also seen, a place where the consideration of this division of words has a place is Aristotles work the Peri Hermeneias, or On Interpretationthat is, on interpretative speech, the latter term being understood as speech in which the true or false is foundwhich is to say, the enunciation (or proposition, or statement, as the word is also translated), inasmuch as one is there concerned with that particular form of perfect or complete speech, and so requires a distinction to be made between words sufficient for producing it and those which are not. In fact, as we have seen, there are three forms of consignification discussed in Aristotles work: that of the verb, since it additionally signifies time (De Int. I. 3, 16b 6); that of the copula, since it signifies with another (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri., lect. 5, n. 19), and that of negations and other syncategorematic terms, i.e. determiners like every and no, since they additionally signify nothing other than that they affirm or deny about the name (taken) universally (De Int. 5. 10, 20a 13). On the other hand, the reconstruction of Aristotles definition of the conjunction that has been lost from the Poetics (for which, see my preceding paper) demonstrates decisively that the foregoing distinction was introduced by the Philosopher in that work, a conclusion the present paper has endeavored to establish beyond all doubt.

understand it is of later origin. See my separate discussion. 1 Simplicius of Cilicia, op. cit., pp. 25-26. 2 Not to be confused with the later philosopher, Boethius (The Last of the Romans), quoted further below. 3 ibid., p. 27 4 Lexis being understood as articulate vocal sound, whereas logos is such sound insofar as it signifies something by itself, and hence is a part of it.

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23. The principal doctrines investigated in this paper in sum. (1) That, since these two alone by themselves when conjoined produce complete speech, the name and the verb are reputed to be the sole parts of speech, but the rest, being as it were their supports, or joints, or bonds, are parts of language rather than speech. (Boethius, Priscian, et alia) Hence, although what the grammarians call the parts of speech (tou merou logou) are various, (Ammonius) in the De Interpretatione Aristotle teaches only these, the name and the verb, the reason being that these alone, without all the others, can produce enunciative speech, as when we say man [flourishes].1 (2) That the sole parts of speech signify by themselves, but the conjunction, the preposition, and the like only when conjoined to the others; the former being called interpretations (Boethius), the latter, syncategoreumata, that is, consignificantia, or cosignifying words (Priscian): interpretation being understood as articulate vocal sound signifying by itself; the other kind, as such sound not signifying by itself, but only when conjoined to the others (Boethius). (3) And by our remark vocal sound not significative [by itself] here [is understood]...vocal sounds which, when conjoined to the others consignify as syncategorematic words, not...vocal sounds like the [syllables and] letters [composing names], seeing as how vocal sounds significative separately, <being either simple, or> composed from many vocal sounds, whether <two or> three or four or more according to the [various] arrangements of the composition of the syllables, are the name and the verb (Averroes); and these are parts of speech, which signify by themselves, whereas syllables and conjunctions are parts of language, of which the syllables as syllables signify nothing at all. But conjunctions in fact can consignify, but signify nothing by themselves. (Boethius) (4) Hence we see that syllables agree with conjunctions in not signifying anything by themselves, but that, whereas the former, occurring as parts of compound names, may be said to signify, they do not do so as parts of such a name, while the latter only signify when conjoined to the others. (composite doctrine) (5) Accordingly, [o]f words, some are significative, others consignificative. A significative word is one which in itself and without the addition of another signifying word signifies something, as this word man. A consignificative one is one which not through itself, but together with another adjoined signifying word, signifies something, such as prepositions and conjunctions, and similarly the verb is according as it only implies composition: for as such it is infinite [infinitum, i.e. indefinite] and it has to be made finite [finiri] through those things which it composes. (Anon., On Significant Words) (6) But with respect to their function in speech, the noun and the verb may be compared to the sides, the rudder, and the sail of a ship, whereas the other words are more like the pitch, the tow, and the nails. (Scholion on Dionysius Thrax) [I]n the same way in a ship, its parts are the sides, the rudder and the sail; wax, tow and nails are not parts but things that bind and glue the parts together. (Priscian)
1

As with Luhtalas translation, I have had to change Blanks is healthy to flourishes here, since the presence of the copula is constitutes a proposition tertii adiacentis, as Ammonius explains above.

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Hence, just as the planks [or sides] of a ship are properly speaking its parts, while bolts [or nails], [tow] and pitch are also added to hold them together and for the unity of the whole, in the same way in speech conjunctions, articles, prepositions, and adverbs themselves do the work of bolts, but they would not correctly be called parts inasmuch as they cannot be put together and on their own produce complete speech. So these are not parts of speech, but they are parts of lexis, of which speech itself also is a part, as has been said in [the books] About the Poetic Art [e)n toi=j Peri\ poihtikh=j ei)/rhtai , ed. Busse]. And these are useful for the specific sorts of composition ( sunthesis) and construction (suntaxis) of the parts of speech with one another, just as a bond (is useful) for adding unity to things bound and glue to things joined by it. But these are not parts of the things bound or glued, and neither are conjunctions, articles, prepositions or adverbs particles (moria) of speech. (Ammonius Hermias) (7) For [i]t is said that the Peripatetic philosophers recognized two parts of speech, the noun and the verb, and claimed that the others are not parts of speech, but are merely used for the sake of binding and gluing. Moreover, just as a boat can be made of a single piece of wood, without glue or binding agent, so [speech] can consist of just a noun and a verb, without words of any other type. But [speech] cannot be formed with no noun or with no verb, just as, by implication, no boat can consist just of pitch, tow and nails. Just as there are ships made of one piece of wood only, [the Scholiast] argues, similarly there are [speeches] which need no binding, e.g. Swkra/thj peripatei=, Swkra/thj u(giai/nei Socrates [walks], Socrates flourishes (GG I.3, 515, 28-29). There is a certain natural union between the noun and the verb, it is claimed, comparable to that between form and matter; this is why they do not need binding. (Scholion to Apollonius Dyscolus) Hence, whereas the name and the verb may be considered the principal parts of speech, the others are more bonds of the parts of speech, signifying the relationship of one thing to another, than parts of speech [themselves], just as spikes [or nails] and other things of this kind are not parts of a ship, but conjunctions of the parts of a ship. (St. Thomas Aquinas) (8) Moreover, some words which when spoken signify something by themselves, whereas others do not (as opposed to the more familiar distinction between words which signify by themselves without further qualification and those which do not; examples of the former being particular kinds of adverbs, whereas examples of the latter are the name and the verb). For, as both Apollonius and Priscian make clear, the completion of the meaning of such expressions as Right! or Well done! (as occurring in their respective languages) depends on their context: utterances like this are understood in reference to something previously stated (and hence are elliptical); whereas the name and the verb are said to signify by themselves because, as one may gather from Aristotle on the verb, for the one who speaks establishes the understanding [sc. of the hearer] and he who hears [sc. what is said] rests [sc. in what is said] (De Int. I. 4 16b 19-20, tr. B.A.M.); hence they deter-mine the first operation of the intellect with respect to some nature, and so bring the under-standing to rest. Accordingly, as the vowel is to the consonant, so is the categorematic word to the syncategorematic; for in the case of vocal sounds, the vowel makes an utterance or sound on its own, while the latter does so only when joined with the former; whereas in the case of words, the categorematic signifies by itself, while the syncategorematic does so only when conjoined to the former; the categorematic words being the name or noun and the verb; the syncategorematic being the conjunction, the preposition, and the article, and the like. 122

(9) And finally, let us conclude by remarking that conjunctions cannot be understood without the substance of the words they conjoin (Apollonius Dyscolus), according to which their signification varies, as some are found conjunctive, but others, disjunctive. (Priscian) (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All Rights Reserved. See also: Poetics Chapter 20: The Elements of Language (Papers In Poetics 9) Sundesmos and Arthron: Aristotle on the Connective Parts of Speech (Papers In Poetics 11)

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