MID SEMESTER EXAMINATION- CASE NOTES HARISH CHANDRA TIWARI V.

BAIJU Facts + earlier procedural background- Harish Chandra Tiwari enrolled as advocate with Bar Council at UP- Baiju engaged him for a land acquisition (compensation claiming) matter- Baiju is very poor, helpless and illiterate- State deposited compensation in court- advocate withdrew this- did NOT return to the client or inform him of the receipt of the amount- client found out much later and tried to get it back from lawyer- failed- filed complaint with Bar Council of State- Advocate replied saying he had returned amount to client after deducting his fees and expenses and later produced an affidavit purported to be from his client saying matter was settled between them and these proceedings need not be further pursued- when Bar Council DC checked with client, client denied the affidavit and denied having received any amount from the advocate. Proceedings were later transferred to Bar Council of India under section 36B(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961, and the DC of the BCI found- affidavit fabricated and the claims made under it false- advocate failed to pay compensation to poor helpless client for 11 years- advocate was held to have committed wrong professional conduct+ breach of trust for client+ maligned reputation of noble profession and so advocate was suspended for a period of three years. Advocate appealed under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (Appeal to the Supreme Court where aggrieved by order of DC of BCI under sections 36 or 37) The appeal- advocate first said that he is not liable to be punished at all- then alternatively said that he had given money to client subsequently- failed to prove this. Issue- Quantum of punishment awarded for professional misconduct. Held- finding does not require interference. Issue then becomes one of quantum of punishment- - court felt punishment was not in proportion to gravity of misconduct- SC is empowered under Section 38 to pass any order including one varying punishment by the DC of the BCI if it so deems fit- the only condition is that appellant should be given opportunity of being heard and interests should not be prejudiced- court asked advocate to show cause why the punishment should not be enhanced. Court said in considering one of three punishments (reprimand, suspension or removal of name from roll) under Section 35, the DC should weigh factors including the need to cleanse profession from those who are prone to misappropriating money of the clients- deterrence is a prominent consideration, especially when there is no filtering at the admission stage- also need to consider keeping professional standards so people dont have the impression that once youre in the profession youre free from punitive measures. Misappropriation of clients money is one of the gravest types of misconduct - where money reaches his hand it is a trust- if public servant were to misappropriate in this manner, he would be punishable under PoCA with dismissal and imprisonment- if advocate misappropriates, no justification to de-escalate the gravity of the misdemeanour- only mitigating factor would be if action was temporary and money was returned before disciplinary proceedings had commenced- this had not happened in this case and is in fact aggravated by the filing of the false affidavit. Retention of this advocate= unsafe for profession. Court distinguished this case from earlier cases cited by advocate on basis of facts and said this case is a graver misconduct. Appeal disposed- punishment of removing advocates name from roll of advocates awarded- he is therefore debarred from practising in any court or before any authority or person in India.

SHAMBU RAM YADAV V. HANUMAN DAS KHATRY Facts + earlier procedural background-Complaint was filed by Shambu Ram against Hanuman (advocate) before BC of Rajasthan and referred to the DC- Hanuman while appearing as counsel had written a letter to his client wherein he stated that another client of his had told him that the concerned judge accepted bribes and in the past he had obtained favourable orders from him- if client could influence judge through someone else, then another matter, else client was to send him Rs. 10,000/- so that through the other client the suit would get decided in his favour. The advocate in question said that the letter was not disputed- instead said that he had followed the norms of professional ethics and informed his client to protect his interests, especially that the services of the judge in question had been terminated on account of illegal gratification. Further said client had not sent him money. Therefore, no professional misconduct committed. State BC said interests of litigating public and legal profession being in mind, suspended him from practice for a period of two years- Challenged before DC of the BCI. So what did the DC of the BCI do? 1. Enhanced punishment- directed name be struck off from roll of advocates- debarred permanently from practice- high standing (advocate)- not expected to act like this- his actions are enough to make him unfit to be a lawyer 2. Cost of Rs. 5, 000 which should be paid by the appellant to the Bar Council of India which has to be paid within two months. Advocate filed review petition under Section 44 of the Advocates Act, 1961- allowed- punishment modified to a reprimandmitigating factors were that this was the first time in his career spanning decades that he had conducted himself in such an irresponsible manner, even though he had no intention to bribe. The appeal- Meanwhile there had been this appeal, which had been stayed pending the review. Appeal now allowed. IssueHeld- on various issues, the court held as under: 1. Whether the review was conducted properly? NO! the review was not conducted keeping in mind well settled principles governing the exercise of such power. All the facts considered in the review as mitigating had already been considered earlier by the DC, especially given that the letter was not disputed. His age and his experience had also been noted by the DC earlier. Nothing in the record to suggest advocate had no intention to bribe the judge. Exercise of review does NOT empower DC to modify earlier punishment by taking a different view of the facts. 2. Nature of the Legal Profession- noble. Not a trade/business. Members to strive to secure justice for clients, if legally possiblenot to be dishonest and corrupt. Credibility and reputation of profession depends on conduct of members. Heavy responsibility on those whom duty has been vested under the Advocates Act, 1961 to take disciplinary action when this credibility comes under a cloud by acts or omissions by ANY member. Members are officers of the court. Duty to court and to society (society has vital interest in the administration of justice)- this has to be protected by those who have the power to take disciplinary action (guardians)- power + duty to supervise conduct and inflict appropriate penalties, commiserate with the misconduct.

3. Guilt of advocate in question- Guilty of serious misconduct. Earlier order could not be modified while deciding review petition. Earlier order took into account all relevant facts and considered a high standard of morality from lawyers, especially one with so much experience. Restored original order. R.D.SAXENA V. BALARAM PRASAD SHARMA Facts + earlier procedural background- the appellant enrolled with BC at MP- legal advisor to MP State Cooperative Bank Ltd.retainer- later terminated and request to return case files relating to Bank- instead he forwarded a consolidated bill for legal remuneration and said files will be returned only after dues are settled- lots of correspondence between them regarding amountBank disclaimed outstanding liability- meanwhile, cases were pending and Bank wanted the files back to continue the cases, but at the same time found terms of advocate very unreasonable- filed a complaint before MP State Bar Council- professional misconduct since files not returned to client. Advocate replied saying he had a right to retain them by exercising his right of lien and offered to return as soon as the payment was made to him- State Bar Council DC failed to dispose off on time- transferred to DC of BCI under Section 36(b) of the Advocates Act, 1961. So what did the BCI DC do? 1. Enquiry conducted- guilty of professional misconduct- liable for punishment- The complainant is a public institution. It was the duty of the advocate to return the briefs to the Bank. No such attempt was made by him. Duty of the advocate to appear before the committee to revert his allegations No such attempt was made by him. 2. Debarred from practice for a period of 18 months, and fined Rupees 1000/3. Directed to return all case bundles to Bank without any further delay. The appeal- Advocate appealed under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. Contended that BCI DC failed to consider the singular defence of right of lien over files for unpaid dues- result is of grave miscarriage of justice. The Bank contended that there was no fee payable to the appellant and the amount shown by him was on account of inflating the fees. Alternatively, the Bank contended that an advocate cannot retain the files after the client terminated his engagement and that there is no lien on such files. Issue- Has the advocate a lien for his fees on the litigation papers entrusted to him by his client?. Held- on various issues, the court decided as under: 1. Does an advocate have right of lien on the files entrusted to him by the client?- NO! a. referred section 171 of the ICA- bankers, factor, harbingers, attorneys of a HC and policy brokers may retain, in the absence of contract to the contrary- for security- any goods bailed to them. REFUSED to equate files containing copies (or originals) of the records with goods referred to in the aforesaid section and keeping files does not amount to goods bailedthe essentials of bailment as expressed in section 148 of the ICA have not been fulfilled (no delivery in giving litigation papers to advocate and also no contract that they will be returned or otherwise disposed off). Further, goods in section 171 refer to those as defined in the SoGA, 1930 Section 2(7)- saleable goods- case files cant be converted into money. Reliance on section 171 of ICA is useless.

b. Went on to discuss various pre independent cases about right of lien over case files- differing views across HCs- BUT clarified after the Bar Council of India Rules (framed under empowerment from Advocates Act)- Such Rules contain provision specifically prohibiting an advocate from adjusting the fees payable to him by a client against his own personal liability to the client. As a rule an Advocate shall not do anything whereby he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client (vide Rule 24). Also referred Rules 28 and 29 and said even after providing this right to an advocate to 15. Thus, even after providing a right for an advocate to deduct the fees out of any money of the client remaining in his hand at the termination of the proceeding for which the advocate was engaged, it is important to notice that no lien is provided on the litigation files kept with him. c. Indian conditions- illiterate people as litigants- not advisable to allow retaining for unpaid fees- potential for abuse and exploitation. Cause in a court/tribunal- more important than right of legal practitioner to his remuneration- if need arises to change counsel pendente lite, the former should have its even course unimpeded- retention of records for unpaid remuneration impedes this- medical practitioner analogy (said might be extreme but not too far fetched)- No professional can be given the right to withhold the returnable records relating to the work done by him with his clients matter on the strength of any claim for unpaid remuneration. d. The alternative is that the professional concerned can resort to other legal remedies for such unpaid remuneration. e. Professional requirement consistent with the dignity of the profession that he should return the brief to the client. It is time to hold that such obligation is not only a legal duty but a moral imperative. f. Referred State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shobharam and ors. (AIR 1966 SC 1910 1966 Indlaw SC 92) to say that - the right of the accused to change an advocate whom he once engaged in the same case, cannot be whittled down by that advocate by withholding the case bundle on the premise that he has to get the fees for the services already rendered to the client. g. If a party terminates the engagement of an advocate before the culmination of the proceedings that party must have the entire file with him to engage another advocate- refusal to return by former advocate would turn this into a dangerous situation 2. What is misconduct as envisaged under section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961?- Not defined- relative term- consider with reference ot the subject matter and context- literally means wrong or improper conduct- Corpus Juris Secundum, contains the following passage at page 740 (vol.7): "Professional misconduct may consist in betraying the confidence of a client, in attempting by any means to practise a fraud or impose on or deceive the court or the adverse party or his counsel, and in fact in any conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to alienate the favourable opinion which the public should entertain concerning it." The expression professional misconduct was attempted to be defined by Darling, J., in In re A Solicitor ex parte the Law Society [(1912) 1 KB 302] in the following terms: It it is shown that an Advocate in the pursuit of his profession has done something with regard to it which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency, then it is open to say that he is guilty of professional misconduct. This definition secured approval by the Privy Council in George Frier Grahame vs. Attorney-General, Fiji,(1936 PC 2241936 Indlaw PC 65). We are also inclined to take that wide canvass for understanding the import of the expression misconduct in the context in which it is referred to in S. 35 of the Advocates Act. 3. Is refusal to return files to client when the same has been demanded misconduct under Section 35? YES! Hence, the appellant in the present case is liable to punishment for such misconduct. 4. Quantum of punishment-took into account the aspects that so far there was no pronouncement on the question of retaining files for fees and that the appellant genuinely believed he had a right to lien- therefore not required to inflict harsh punishment-

reprimand is enough- punishment accordingly altered- if repeat offence- liable to punishment as determined by BC and lesser punishment will not be precedent. PRAVIN C. SHAH V K. A. MOHAMMED ALI AND ANOTHER Facts + earlier procedural background- advocate practising in Kerala- hauled up for contempt of court on two occasions- Kerala HC found him guilty of criminal contempt in both cases (Section 12, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971) and fined him both timesattempted appeal- failed. Apology tendered in SC- not accepted. Even after this conviction and sentencing, advocate continued to appear in cases in courts. Pravin C. Shah brought this to the notice of the BC at Kerala- disciplinary proceedings- punishmentdebarred from acting/pleading in any court till he got himself purged of this offence by an order of appropriate court- Rule 11 of the Kerala HC Rules famed under Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 applied. Rule 11 states no advocate who has been found guilty of contempt of Court shall be permitted to appear, act or plead in any Court unless he has purged himself of the contemptadvocate challenged this in appeal to BCI DC. So, what exactly did the BCI DC do?(this was given in the SC judgment) 1. BCI DC set aside the interdict imposed on him. 2. The DC of the BCI had said that the issue was whether rule 11 was binding on the State BC DC. 3. The BCI DC had also said that the exercise of disciplinary powers over advocates vests exclusively with the BC and this cannot be taken away by the HC either by making a judicial order or a rule (in context of Rule 11- discussed earlier) 4. Rule 11 is usurpation of powers of Bar Council- there cannot be an automatic deprivation of the right of an advocate to appear, act, plead in a court since this would be unfair and be a violation of Arts. 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of Constitution of India and the FRs therein. 5. Purging yourself happens after you have apologised to the court- DC of BCI had cited absence of mode of purging of guilt in Rules as a reason for not following the interdict contained in Rule 11 The appeal- Pravin C. Shah filed appeal in SC against the said BCI order. Issue- When an advocate was punished for contempt of court can he appear thereafter as a counsel in the courts, unless he purges himself of such contempt? If he cannot, then what is the way he can purge himself of such contempt? Held- On various points, the court held as under: 1. Rule 11 is a self operating rule- not necessary for the DC of the Kerala BC to impose the interdict as punishment for misconduct since in any case the disability of Rule 11 would have operated on the advocate- the only condition is the advocate being found guilty of contempt of court, and it would continue to operate until the contemnor had purged himself of the contempt. It is not necessary for there to have been sentencing for punishment for the interdict to operate, being found guilty is the only requirement. The court then examined if the conditions were satisfied in this case, and said first is satisfied, difficulty arises with the second. 2. Whether Rule 11 was binding on the State BC (DC)- The DC of the BCI had said that the issue was whether rule 11 was binding on the State BC DC- SC says this is an incorrect and unnecessary question to be framed since there is nothing in the said rule involving the BC in any manner and at the same time there is nothing wrong for the BC informing a

delinquent advocate of the existence of and bar under Rule 11. 3. Who has power to exercise disciplinary control over advocates?- Court upheld the stance of the DC where it said that the exercise of disciplinary powers over advocates vests exclusively with the BC 4. Can the power to exercise disciplinary control over advocates be taken away?- SC upheld BCI DC view- cannot be taken away by the HC either by making a judicial order or a rule (position taken by CB in SCBA v. UOI). 5. Is Rule 11 usurpation of powers of the Bar Council? NO! SC said that the BCI DC made an unnecessary proposition on a misplaced apprehension when it said the independence and autonomy of the BC cannot be surrendered under Rule 11. SC said BCI DC has overlooked the position of the SC CB in the earlier mentioned case where the court said where advocate has been found guilty of C of C he may also be guilty of committing professional misconduct, depending upon the gravity or nature of his contumacious conduct, but the two jurisdictions are separate and distinct and exercisable by different forums by following separate and distinct procedures. The power to punish an advocate by suspending his licence or by removal of his name from the roll of the State Bar Council for proven professional misconduct vests exclusively in the statutory authorities created under the Advocates Act, 1961, while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of court vests exclusively in the courts. In the same case, the CB also said that it may be possible for the SC/HC to prevent the contemnor advocate from appearing before it till he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practise as an advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate on Record, this Court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate on Record because that privilege is conferred by this Court and the power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practice as an advocate in other courts or tribunals. Court went on to state that Rule 11 was not intended for DCs and concerned only the dignity and orderly functioning of courts. Court said right of advocate to practise envelopes other rights including consultation, drafting, legal opinions conferences etc and Rule 11 had nothing to do with these. Rule 11 concerned appearing in court which concerns court and BC cannot claim that what happens inside court should also be regulated by them in exercise of disciplinary powers. Right to practice is the genus and right to appear is the specie. Court has major supervisory power and control over appearance in court. Courts are structured to evoke reverence to the majesty of law and justice. Proceedings in court are to be held in dignified and orderly manner, and the presence of an advocate found guilty of contempt of court on the previous hour, standing in the court and arguing a case or cross examining a witness on the same day, unaffected by the contemptuous behaviour he hurled at the court, would erode the dignity of the court and even corrode the majesty of it besides impairing the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the institution of the courts. This necessitates vesting of power with the High Court to formulate rules for regulating the proceedings inside the court including the conduct of advocates during such proceedings. That power should not be confused with the right to practise law. Relied on judgment of Lord Denning in Hadkinson vs. Hadkinson {1952 (2) All England Law Reports 567}: I am of the opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed an order of the court is not of itself a bar to his being heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the court may in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or good reason is shown why it should not be removed. 6. Kinds of Contempt- Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act categorises contempt of court into two categories. The first category is civil contempt which is the willful disobedience of the order of the court including breach of an undertaking

given to the court. But criminal contempt includes doing any act whatsoever which tends to scandalise or lowers the authority of any court, or tends to interfere with the due course of a judicial proceeding or interferes with, or obstructs the administration of justice in any other manner. 7. What is purging?- Purging is a process by which an undesirabl e element is expelled either from ones own self or from a society- it is a cleansing process- exonerate from some charge or imputation of guilt, or from a contempt. 8. How does one purge himself of contempt?- It is preposterous to suggest that if the convicted person undergoes punishment or if he tenders the fine amount imposed on him the purge would be completed. Obeying the orders of the court would be a mode by which one can make the purging process in a substantial manner when it is a civil contempt. Even for such a civil contempt the purging process would not be treated as completed merely by the contemnor undergoing the penalty imposed on him unless he has obeyed the order of the court or he has undone the wrong. If that is the position in regard to civil contempt the position regarding criminal contempt must be stronger. For criminal contempt- need something more for purging than just carrying out sentence, since this position is especially problematic if punishment is mere payment of fine. Merely because the Rules did not prescribe the mode of purging oneself of the guilt it does not mean that one cannot purge the guilt at all- first thing to do is to infuse remorse in the mind of the contemnor- then seek pardon from the court concerned on the grounds that he is truly truly sorry and genuinely repents and that he promises never to repeat this in the future. Apology alone not enough- it should impress the court to be genuine and sincere- if court accepts- contemnor has purged himself of the guilt. 9. Specific Application of the Law to this case- Court said the advocate in question has repeated offence presumably because he was let off lightly the first time when his apology was hollow with no remorse or regret and only tendered to escape the rigour of the law- the advocate said that he has in fact apologised to the court- court said unable to accept apology at belated juncture- admonish him for his conduct under plenary powers under the constitution- said in future whenever an advocate is convicted by HC for contempt of court, the Registrar of that HC shall intimate that fact to all the courts within the jurisdiction of that HC so that the presiding officers of all courts would get the information that the particular advocate is under the spell of the interdict contained in Rule 11 of the Rules until he purges himself of the contempt. Court said that it was still open to the advocate in question to purge himself of the contempt in the manner indicated above, but until that process is completed respondent advocate cannot act or plead in any court situated within the domain of the Kerala High Court, including the subordinate courts there under. The Registrar of the High Court of Kerala shall intimate all the courts about this interdict as against the respondent advocate. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA V. HIGH COURT OF KERALA Facts + earlier procedural background- The Bar Council of India is a statutory body constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961 ("the Act"). In terms of Section 34(1) of the Act, the High Court of Kerala framed rules; Rule 11 whereof reads as under: "No advocate who has been found guilty of contempt of court shall be permitted to appear, act or plead in any court unless he has purged himself of the contempt." Contending that the said provision is violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India as also Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act on the ground that it seriously impinges upon and usurps the powers of adjudication and punishment conferred on the Bar Councils under the Act as also the principles of natural justice as application thereof is automatic, this writ petition has been filed by the Petitioner. Issue- Constitutionality of Rule 11 of the Rules framed by the High Court of Kerala forbidding a lawyer from appearing, acting or pleading in any court till he got himself purged of the Contempt by an order of the appropriate court is in question in this writ

petition. Argued- relying on SCBA v. UOI, argued by petitioners that as in terms of the provisions of the Advocate Act, the Bar Council of India is entitled to punish an Advocate counsel for commission of misconduct whether professional or otherwise in terms of Section 35 thereof; Rule 11 framed by the High Court of Kerala cannot be sustained. No prohibition can be imposed on a lawyer to practice following and consequent upon a decision of a court holding him guilty of commission of contempt. No time limit for debarment of an advocate having been prescribed under Rule 11 of the Rules, the same is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In applying the provisions of Rule 11, the principles of natural justice is violated as no other or further opportunity of hearing is to be given therefor and in that view of the matter too the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Respondents argue that decision of the CB in the aforesaid case is enough to uphold validity of the said Rule- courts have the right to regulate conduct of advocates within the court and to prescribe conditions subject to which they can practice before them and this isnt subservient to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Council. This view has been upheld in the Harish Uppal Case. Further, advocate can start pleading as soon as he purges himself of contempt- demonstrate real and genuine remorse as first step and then seek pardon from court concerned. Held- on various issues, the court held as under: 1. Contempt Jurisdiction of the Court- inherent power of the court- universally recognised. Governed by Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and other statutes (IPC, CrPC)- powers of superior courts under Arts. 129 and 215 of Constitution. Disobedience of court- strikes the core of rule of law. Advocate- considerable freedom to conduct his case- not questioned so long as conduct does not amount to insult to the court. Summary power for punishing for contempt- used sparingly and only in serious cases. This power is exercised when it becomes imperative to uphold the rule of law. 2. The Fundamental Rights argument- when punished by superior court, the right to freedom of speech conferred under 19(1)(a) cannot stand as a bar to the power under Article 129 and Article 215. These are independent and not subject to 19(1)(a). 3. Extent of acting in course of professional duties- advocate does not enjoy absolute privilege when acting in this regard. Need to maintain dignity of court in all situations. Dont be vulgar. Right to practice is under 4. Relevant Statutory Provisions- Section 30 and section 34 empowers HCs to make rules laying down conditions subject to which you have right to practice. Conduct of advocates has been prescribed under section 35 (punishment for misconduct). Disciplinary powers of the BCI are under Section 36. Section 345 of the CrPC states that where an offence as prescribed under a given set of sections is committed in the view or in presence of any civil, criminal or revenue court, the offender may be detained + cognizance taken- give reasonable opportunity of showing case why should not be punished for fine of Rs. 200/- or imprisonment in default for one month. Section 346 provides for the procedure where the Court is of the opinion that the offender should be imprisoned otherwise than in default of payment of fine or that a fine exceeding two hundred rupees should be imposed on him or such court is for any reason of opinion that the case should not be disposed of under Section 345, such court after recording the facts constituting the offence and the statement of the accused may forward the case to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same, and may require security to be given for the appearance of such person before such Magistrate or if sufficient security is not given, shall forward such person in custody to such Magistrate. Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with five classes of contempt, namely, (i) Intentional omission to produce a document by a person

5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

legally bound to do so; (ii) refusal to take oath when duly required to take one; (iii) refusal to answer questions by one legally bound to state the truth; (iv) refusal to sign a statement made to a public servant when legally required to do so; and (v) intentional insult or interruption to a public servant at any stage of a judicial proceeding. Difference between Contempt of Court and Professional Misconduct- their punishment vary. NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRACTICE IN ANY COURT. THIS IS A STATUTORY RIGHT UNDER THE ADVOCATES ACT AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO FULFILLING THE CONDITIONS THEREIN. Court CANNOT punish advocate for professional misconduct in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 129 BUT relying on the SCBA case said that professional misconduct of the advocate concerned is not a matter directly in issue in the matter of contempt case. Power to punish for professional misconduct vests exclusively in the statutory authorities created under the Advocates Act, 1961, while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of court vests exclusively in the courts. (SCBA case)- same funda (discussed in the PC Sharma case)- cant appear before court until you purge yourself of the contempt and what exactly does purging yourself mean. Also same funda that courts control and it is within their jurisdiction to control the right of appearance in courts + right to practice includes very many things etc. The power to frame such rules should not be confused with the right to practise law. While the Bar Council can exercise control over the latter, the Courts are in control of the former. This distinction is clearly brought out by the difference in language in Section 49 of the Advocates Act on the one hand and Article 145 of the Constitution of India and Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act on the other. Section 49 merely empowers the Bar Council to frame rules laying down conditions subject to which an Advocate shall have a right to practice i.e. do all the other acts set out above. However, Article 145 of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to make rules for regulating this practice and procedure of the Court including inter alia rules as to persons practising before this Court. Similarly Section 34 of the Advocates Act empowers High Courts to frame rules, inter alia to lay down conditions on which an Advocate shall be permitted to practice in Courts. Article 145 of the Constitution of India and Section 34 of the Advocates Act clearly show that there is no absolute right to an Advocate to appear in a Court. An Advocate appears in a Court subject to such conditions as are laid down by the Court. It must be remembered that Section 30 has not been brought into force and this also shows that there is no absolute right to appear in a Court. Even if Section 30 were to be brought into force control of proceedings in Court will always remain with the Court. Thus even then the right to appear in Court will be subject to complying with conditions laid down by Courts just as practice outside Courts would be subject to conditions laid down by Bar Council of India. There is thus no conflict or clash between other provisions of the Advocates Act on the one hand and Section 34 or Article 145 of the Constitution of India on the other." Also discussed all the points of and upheld the P C Shah case discussed above. BCI has no fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) since it is not a citizen Natural justice- before punishing for contempt- bound to give opportunity for hearing him- Even under the penal laws some offences carry minimum sentence. The gravity of such offences, thus, is recognized by the Legislature. The courts do not have any role to play in such a matter. Rule 11 framed by the Kerala High Court is legislative in character. As validity of the said rule has been upheld, it cannot be said that the same by itself, having not provided for a further opportunity of hearing the contemnor, would attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. "The principles of natural justice, it is well-settled, cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula. Its application will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a given case the party should not only be required to show that he did not have a proper notice resulting in violation of principles of natural justice but also to show that he was seriously prejudiced thereby..." The principles of natural justice, it is well-settled, must not be stretched too far." Furthermore, the contemnor could also get an opportunity of hearing while purging his conduct. Rule 11 of the Rules, therefore, is not also ultra vires Article 12 of the Constitution.