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UIWt.h STATW MiIzttmT

~~vrfk~Ry GI+OUP TO .~rn stwt@~IC OP !fto~u


82OM

Au. \ Office of the chief , .I AI'0 701 \ / *


5 c/o%Mrlaster San F2+ancisco)cd if 1 Mar& 1961 I

+.

(i

AIWT !$Xt?J S HAVB

Ok
and reference with

1. This handbook ie prbliahed for your gu2&en& the purpose:

a. TO g!.vethe functions, objectiv.98, mias%on and standards


of the United states MiS.itary Adaisory Group to thy Xeuublic of 'Porea

(SWAG).

To provide a complete picture of the organizational strut- *


b. ture of the IlorqanArmy and of KKAG,

c. TO shcw certain internal functions of +G, par)icularly


adminfstrative procedures,.internal cupply system, and the interpreter_
eervice,

d, To furnfzh certa5n functioning and procedures of thm staff as&Son8 ae explaSned in f&u staff annsxls.
2. Thorough familiarization with this handbook and strict compliance
with the pres.or?b?d p~ocedur?e shouridexpedite the efficient accomplish-
ment of the KMAG miseion and the successful termination of this campaign.

LHD8.X ----

Adviror*s Handbosk Part I -GF Skction I - ORIEYTATIOP qriginal ObJectivea P'unction Pnd.Mission Comnnd Relationship rc\ \. Wssfon, XMAG Off&era Sfxmti8rf-b for Advisor6
I

Z-6 x-3 1 2
3

%
I

4 5

2 2

Section If - ORGAFIZATIOF OF PHn: 3-OR~ATf AWY AM) OF KMAG Organieetion of the Worenn Army 6
7

3-i
3
I

Or@nleation of KMAG Section III - In=& FXAG ?J'LWC!TIGBS, ~Al?JWWERS Imporhnt A*mblatrative Frocehree
J

3'

46
% 9

Internal L3u$ply !%A!? Iaterpret9r Qvvhe Part II - srAp'pl ASWEXW El G-2 G3 G-4
r* ,-

KMAG

10

??l #2
#3 #4 #5 Apps??SiX _____-_

PRrt

I?TDlX
----A D V I -WW?:.+573'~~~ 0 0K - rr-p$_ __._ --_-----w_; _ ._
9

PARAGRAPH
Advieorls Handbook

Part

PAGX
I
I-6
1-3

I -GEVEiUI,

Section I - ORIE?~'l%TIO~
Original Objectives
Function Pnd.Wlsalon
Command Relationship
Niasion, KMAG Officers
Stand8tb for Advisors
Section II'- ORGA~?IZATfOF OF '?Ha: FORTAN ARMYAEDO1pKMAG Organlaetibn of the Xore~a rirmy Organization of KMAG Section III - IN~AL ??UWTIGPS, RMAff !-naIQYARms Import~tit Afiminfatrative Procecbres
Internal Supply

-1

2
3
4
5

1
8

2
2

3-4 6. 7

3
3

.46 a 9 SO 4 .5 5

?!l.!AG
KMAG

Interpretsr~ Service Part


II -STAFFAN??EX?B El G-2 G-3 G-4 SQ!nal-~-<~$~c%%ons Part
III - APPxFDIcx~

**

,_

APP3zwX w.__--_

UNITEDfJTA!t'%SMZLfTAW

AIYVISORP

GROUP TO !lTR R?PU%IC

OF KOR?3

82026 AU
Office of the Chief
APO 301
c/o Postmaster
. San Y'xinciaco,Calif
1 ?4qkch1951
SUBJ9CT: Advieor's Handbook

TO:

All KMAG Adviaore


PARTI_GEQ?R.AL __--

SEcTIOlVI. __._._ 03'Z%TTATIO"r _."~_* ___



1. Origiaal Ob:isctiv6_i

Prior t.o25 June 1950 when the "orth'Forean agqessor crossed


the 380 North I'a%ilal. into Sks PqFrb'iicof F:brga,the United States
Elilitav Advis,oi*.v of Y~rea (IWAG) waa ac;sisi;ing
G~up to the Xsp~.b;.iu th2 infant rq,dbSic in t'heox.pil:>zation p atiixistratiun, cquiaaina, and training of the Toreen Arci:? hiice_ aad.?'a%;ion~l An initini major objective of lW.G xas the trpxning Jf the vo-;eGnArmy to perform canably
the mission: ?kfctgeaof th+ V3Q Woxth Ptirallalagainst aggression.

Prssentf.y, FMAfiis an intsqral, pert in the combat effort of tha


Wzhth U.S. ATW;VKorea (Y'USAF), It is thq advisory amncy (with opera-
tional, liaison, and eur,ervborv functions) of t& Comm6nding Mnaral, VJSAK with the Department of "atione! IMeaae of the %nu'bSic of Porea. The primary mission of FLAG is to ~fi_vis+, in accordencc! with ?US.N?ordsre and directivea, the Torean commanj.ere sd ei,affe in ths combat operation8 wagad,by Rt?publicof For<+3(X&j Army u;clj.ts<.
Xflsun73ort of ths conibat
operations, YMAG aeeiets the torma':mil.itPryfunction@ of'the ?O? Army
(See Charts I, 2 and 3, Inciosurse 1, 2 and'3).
3. Command. RslationshA.

a. mini, FMAG>is rsa~an~il~ls to the Commandine: G%firal, ?VSA? for advice to th* ROY Army in organization, afiminiotration, WRining, equipping, and combat onerations; analfor advice to ths vor~an ?ational Police. !
b. Zach United Statsei Army Officer, WAG is rseponeibls to his immediate Unite8 Stats8 Army military aupo!rior and to Chiaf, n"AG.

4,
_

&Iission; KMAG Off&era: The mission of all WC

Officersis:

aa To advisethe Koreancounterparts so as to-provide them with the benefits of the militaryexpesiense of the KMAG officers in order to accomplish successfully the overallcombatmission. gathering and reportingagency
b. To functionas an information so that accurateand timelyreports on all phases of the militaryoperation
can be forwarded through UnitedStateschannelsto Chief, -K&G.
3. Standards,for Advisory,

8. In the executionof his advisorymission,the advisorbegins with considerable prestigewhich he must continually endeavorto maintain* ?iith finesseand intelligence many advisors have made recommendations to their counterparts so logic;olLy and
effectively that UnitedStatesmilitary doctrinestands out clearlyin the issuanceand executionof orders
aordialrelationships
by Korean countc:parts.kdviscrs shouldestatkish . with their counter-perts; and
are cautioned to avoid issuesover autharity.
They will insure tile taamwarkfa p:epmatdokl of plans,in checkson exe-
cution of orders,and in cocrdinstion of logistical supportessential to the accomplishment of the opcretional mission. Wenever hot spots occur, and assist in the coordination
they will go there with their coizn+erparts of attacks,defense,and counterattacks; especiallythe air, artillery,

and naval gun fire support.

of his information gathering and rePorti% b. In the performance mission,, the unit field advisoris chargedwith rendering periodicand attention to their accur?.icular flash reportsas prescribed and with pa responsible ts racylandtimelirEss. SeniorFieid Advisorsare directly their kited StatessuperioroffLcers fcrr the accomplishment of the above mission. They alone are responsible that communications are &,%qy~_oZ~, under whichradio Ever closedd_oz~~ They must know the normal procedties trafficis hondisdand rn-~~ give important outgoing mescege sufficiently ciassificetion encodingand transmission, high precedeno?: ,toinsuretimeL!y Accordingly, the signaiperscnneland the communications net must be attuned to meet the exigent-its of the tacticalsituation, t'ne movement.of commandpasts,and the changesin the compositi@l of forces, A backlog of ..-..*_-__ inconning messagesmust be anticipated and,, v:hen necessary, normalproceduresmuat be modifiedand the signalperscnnel plsced on en overtime hasiso SeniorAdvisze must insistthat 31.1 membersof their staffsknow , the capabiLities, and workingr*&es of the communications
lifii-t.sLions teams necessaryfor cif:e L41entexecutionof the timelytransmission

and receipt Of Official messages.
ce SeniorAdvisorswill maintainin their crganizations the
same high standards of discipline requiredin -anyUnitedStates hrmy
ccmaand, In an isoiatedunit such as an advisorygroqp high standards
in performance of duty and in individual conductare of the utmost
importance, SeniorAdvisorswill devote particular attention to the
nalntaln the high moraledisting$&ing
sr13
welfare of the individucll all UnitedStates &my units.
t .,
2

SSCTION II. ORG~IZATIO)iT OP Tp? POEA?? ARMY AXD OF KMAG.


6. Organization -_
of the Korean Army.

The organization of the Forean Army is shown in &arts #l, 2, and 3, fnclosurnsl With a Department of Vational Defense organized along KS; lines, but also exercising the functions of our Department of the Army, the ZCo1'ean channal of reauonsibility goes directly to the Chief of Staff, voroan Army. Prom the Chisf of Staff the chain of responsibility proceeds directly to Forean Corps Commanders. (There is no intorvcning field Army Commander or headquarters and.,hence, Eeadquartars Porean Army exercises the usual operational functions of the U.S. Field Army Headquartersj. In th? vorean Corns and Divisions Haadauaters, the orcenizationel structure is based unon and closely parallels thr!structurn Of UC& W.&a!%~ayt%on~. The organization of the Division is bpsed uuon U.S. organization but lpcks thn fire newer of the U.S. unit. The principal shortegs in fire power is apparent upon analyzing the Division . Artillery structure:,. Insterad of P Division Artillery of three 105.mm gun batterifisand cnn l%mm Xowitzer battery, the Korean Division has Only one batta'lfon of l!Xmm Artiliery. Also tha Division doss not have within the Infantry rflpiaouts, tqnks, heavy mortars, or r+coilloss wna- hesent plans, how'Vnr, call for an augp:mntPtion pans. in each Division of onn heavy tank company, ons battery of 155mm artillery, and r~coilless weapons at the company'lovsls where arsscribnd in th? U.S, organization-
__ al structure.
7. Ths organization of KMAG is shown in Charts #4, 5, and 6, Inclo-
sure6 #4, 5, and 8, to G-3 Annex #3.
a- Chart #4, mted Stptss M$lfterv A_dv~soryJroup. trz._t_ha_Re=_
-._c._ _-
Public of Korea shows the IWiG tIeedauert_rs orgenizetional structura; par-
ticularly the corrallnting advisory agnncy to Bach vorsan Staff Division.
Chart #5, J!MAG Corps Rnadq_uart;lrs __ _._.__L__J portrays thq JWG zation functioning wtth ROILCorps Headq.uerters.

I-8.

organi-

c. Chart #S, RMAG Division ??eadouartsrs_., illustratns the KVAG


-_._ _.__-.
organization prescribed to function with the Eeadquartirs of ROT Divi-
sions.
Staff S-?ctions of J%AG
d. thornthe Ordn.anceand 'Quartarmaster Headquarters, advisors are assigned to Ordnance and Quartermaster Army
Service Troops supportiv combat operations.
Ir summary, lVL$G advisors function from the HsaclquMers 8. r?battalion leas1 in combat units, Korean Army level down to includ? th. Bhrt ,X&mm -Am.y. y%i&v%~ fEBk&+b. and down to &&IQ&$ 2fiTg&e :*~f Also see Section Ii, Crganization, G,3 Annex $3.
ROm: SXXTIOD III. --_-_L..__-T_'_..__

IJVm23, 'JV'CTIONS GAG -.LW* _-..-I-_ _- HMDC'UART~S

a. OFFICIAL OFFJC~S R~GIST%X: The official officers rclgistar


is maintained in the Adjutant Wnnral1s Seotion, Offfcers will sign in
and/or out when ramainingat, or being absent from, this hendo.unrters
for periods in excess of twenty-four (24) hours.

PA=: b. Personml of all sections within RMAG me paid by a Class A Agent, %i,i use ehould bo made of Rllotments of pay, sinc,e
fRcilitie6 for obtaining monpy orders or US Treasury Check& are not rea-
dily aPRilable to most un?ts ii1the field.

d.

POSTAL PlZ'8U$2?IOJ: (1) Th. e mailing Address for perc;oxncl

(b) Be deposited for mailing in a U,S. Al?0 in Korea,


(c) Have in the uuper left corner of the address side nom- * the bend wr%tt:n na:? of the sender, s?rv!.cs her :( gmds, unit designation and complete militarj address. (d) Hz?vein the!upper right corner of the
aildre33

side,

(e) Be normal size letters weighing one (1) ounce or


lese.

knives
(4) At present w2r souvenirs such as @IX. srr;ords, for mailing by any APO in etc, 9 ltiiii not 'bs~uzr:~ted thtiFilrX-SC Conmaud.
e, PXf?SONAL YZYECTS: Under no circwnstencras will the effects 811 of personnel K3'Aor MIA tr; forvnr30a to i;h* nsxt-of -kXl dixct, for dispoaition through
such effects will be forwardpi!to this heatdquartara proper channels,

-4

f, SETTER OF IFJJJIRfi Letters of inquiry from the relative


or a friend af an individual casualty addressed to a commander of Chaplain
by name or official designation will be referred to this office for re-
PlY. If the addreseee is-a personal friend of the writer the letter of
inquiry may be answered direct. Any statement relative to a casualty how-
ever, Will be cleared with this office to ensure that any information
given in reply is in accord with the official report of casualty.

9.

Internal Supply,. XUG -.--

The supply of KMAG field personnel is R matter of particular concern to Chief, SNAG, Dispersion of detacments, poor roads, limited transportation facilities, end prolorged periods of bad.weather complicate the problem of logistical support,, To overcome'these obstacles, the internal supply of IlMAGis placed under the Eeadquarters Commandant, of %pply, acting as the exscri;crr with an operating agency, tha Dirnc.;;or for all logistical matters, To facilitate and expedite lo&tic& x@port of field insta!.l.a?icns, thsre Is attached to each Corps Advisory Betachment, a Corps Sn-Ji.7 i._ D~~tschmPntconsisting of one (1) officer and of this section to insure that one (1) enlisted ma3, 3.txs the f-a,ction requisitions are properly and promptly submitted to this headqusr%ers: that supplies are promptly drawn acd dalivt;rnd to using units, and that effective liaison is maintainad with t'heLirnctor of Supply to insure continuing prompt and adequate logistical support of field personnel, Details of this internal supply are prescribed in letter this headquarters, subject: SOP for Internal Supply, KMAG, dated 26 December 1950. 10. Interureter Service WAG -___-_,..~.z _._.

Of the utmost importance to an Advisor is the interpreter. Interpreters will be provided by this IIeadcuarters(AC of S, Gl) 'to newly arrived field advisors prior tc their departure from this Headouarters. Recruited from civilian life, with little military experience, interpreters are entitled to the pay, allowances, and privileges of first lietenants but have no command status, They must meet prescribed physical, educational, and lo,yaltyclearance stand_ards, Interpretars arc entitled to the same consideration given other officers, and mania1 jobs will not be imposed upon them. The supuort of the interpreter is a resnonsibility of the ROY unit whers he is ettached. Advisors are morally resnonsible that their interpreters have the necessary items of clothing and individual eauipment. Reassignments of interureters will be promptly reported to this headquarters (AC of S, Gl) giving name, rank, and serial number of the interpreter, the circumstances of tha reassignment, ana the name and assignment of the losing, or gaining, advisors. 11. Referents.

R. For your reference, five (5) staff annexes are uublishad as Part II, and two (2) KMG Standing Operating Procedures, and.one (1) letter are Published as Part III of this handbook.
I

b, The Advisor's Handhook is supplemnnted by other nublications of this Headquarters,'and it .$s planned to keQi3t)lPJ nresant'Fbd%boks
up tc date by issuance of appropriate KM?G letters, memorandums, and
SOP'S.

-5-
.

-- - -

-c

..---..---

-__,_

-_---

-,

..-.

I-

CAPITOL

DlVl51CI&$ ,. KWIMENT
RE$I MENT

FIRST

D~viS~or\l
--

CAY 1st

26th RE$I MENT


10the~iy DAZ~Liti

THIRD

PlVlS&d_

I. _.

.,:..;

<..^

i.

_.I_

-s.-.-

--.

----

__

. .

. . .

;,
~7 ,

.,.

\,

(2) Assist G-l in planning,coordinating, and expediting


overall Gil functions

* in suppcert of the Army mLssi~~~-

(3) Effect necessary coordination of approkiate personnel

mattersbetween G*l Kk and EUSAK. b. At Corps and Divisionlevel the mission of the G-l Advisorsis
to advise and assist counterparts in planningand coordinating activities
pertaining to the G-l functions(See par 15, FM 1Ol-5, Staff Organization --- and
Procedure, dated July 1950).

4.

Hints to Corps and Ltivision G-1 Advisors.

a* Check daily the personnsl daily summaryreport. Keep the Senior


Advisorsinformedof strengths, casualties, etc.

b. Assist in th0 allocating and assignment of replacements to, and


within,divisions; coordinate the necessary transportation.

0. Coordinate with the coun';erparts, Corps and Division Provost


Marshals,and field team frm the officeof Advisorto the FMG on mattersof discipline, law and order. F!?.aca particular emphasison the collecting and disposition of stragglers.

d. Infarmthe counterparts and Provost%arshaIsof the policiesof


UnitedNationsHeadquarters pertaining to the care and treatmentof prisoners
Of war.
er Assist SeniorAdvisorsin the preparation of recommendations for

U.S. Army decorations far KoreanArmy personnel.


f. Assist,when directed, in the distribution of U.N. relief supplies and coordinate the necessarytransportation. Cccr$_nii% site loc&?lOLl and internal ::ith ca~nterparts in t,he garrangement of commandposts, Secure adsquat, 0 accommodations to meet the needs
of the KMAG Group at the locationof the Corps and Divisioncommandposts.

5:

Biscellaneous.

for the administration (records, pay, etc) of Korean a* Arrangements by the Army personnel integrated into the T3 Forcesin Korea are coordinated Army G-l Advisor.

b. The Army G-l Advisoris responsible for the final preparation .and
processing of recommendations for awards and decorations for personnelof KMAG.
El
functionperformed by the G-l Advisor. All other
(This is the only KIVIAG KwrAG personnel mattersare handledby the KMAG Adjutant Generaland Deputy
Chief of Staff).

4 Inclosures: Incl

Incl #l, marked #!+, Chart Organization of G-1


#2, marked #5, Chart Organization, AdvisorG-l, IQ
Incl #3, marked #6, Chart Proouremnt of EnlistedPersonnel
Incl #4, marked $7, Chart Procurement of Officers

ORCN: Unit Organization., 1JnitReorganization, Unit


InsctiYation, Organization Control, Organization

StGltlsc.cs *

Trans-
R3.E; Procurement, Allocation, Ijriorities, . Replacement Battalion, Processing %pply, pl-'thtlOrI, Rate TableD
fiSC".l?"
#$I. Ap~intment;Assignment, Classification, Transfers, Promotion, Demotion, Reclassification, Discharge, Retirement. CCXSCRIFTION: Conscription, Military Services, RTC Control, NDA Matters. CIV: Frocurement,Appointment, Assignment, Wages,
Norking Conditions, Population.

A.___._

OFFIC2 OF AEBISOR Gl

_.__.____.~___-^-..I

ASSIST.QB AnVISOR

.__l___._
Statistics

--

_..__A-.-

---

A--.--L
Specie.1

-@

Service Reports

ma
/ Reports
?E!?E!u

-i--iCoordination
Graves Registration

---__.A____,
Military Police Reports
Prisoner of ?"lar Data
Stragglers
Military Justice sirmyPrison A ?. 0. L. Civil Assistance

Inclosure Ko 5

I -

. _! .

1.
INCLCjSURE r40 6

_-_

--_

-.._. --.

-----we.

-.

--_

--

_ ___. =
= t
TI _= .-

.-----_.-___...

_,

1,

Functions of E.XG GJ-2Section _w


The functions of the XXG G-2 Section are:

3. To keep C5iof I(I%Gznd all intcrosted agencies and sections


fully inforked of the enemy situntion and capzbilties, ,andof wcnthor
. and terrain,;,
To advise the Korean counferparts so as to provide them b. with the Ijcnefitof the milikry eqerimce of the EXG officers in order to accomplish succcrnf srgully tiw o-w5~11 ac0mbat missiony fl To assir;tS;hcChief of Gt?ff in the coordiwtion of functions
intclliecnce and ~onntcri~telli~~ence.
tr,%.ningof tile~2 d. To plan and supervise inte?_li~cnoc within IG;1G,
tion and) in caordiwtion with G-3, such trairL:lp; 21 Organi$trtion of corps gnd DitieiofisG-2 --_Sections -_PwI_-_-__
Sec-

The G2 functions are ?erfor?odet KEG Corps levels by one officcx"ansiened as Ea2., At divieign ltirels,the G-2 fwctions are executed by L?nofficer asslgod as G2/'G-3, %erc is no officer provided irlthe ICIIIc2 T/O as S-2/S-3 nt r@_mental and bzttzlion le~zels.,Hw:ever, the -5.3
Ctical advisors assQncd to the regimcct? and battalions hzve an nddition~z.1
duty of advising in S-2 functiow (ztthe regimtintnl lc-,-cl RLc 3aGtt::Lion
lcvcls, respectively,
*3. .At Corps 2nd Division lcvcls, the G2 mission rks: a. To advise the Korean G-2 coktcrparts so as to cn;?Xo them
to accomplish their mission, and
zz.thering and roportin.5 qczcy so
b. To act as an irform,?tion that accurate, tincly, and prescribed G-2'rcports on the enemy situation and capabilities may be fonr-rdcd through American channels to Chief E-AC . and all intcrestcd qcncies and sectionsi 4, Dctailcd Instructions
the follo?ting ;Yssion

Tho G-2 field advisor should supervise or pcrfon activities,

b, flenL@pe Captured Am~~r Zquipmnt: Rm ty-pe cngturcd cneq~ erluipnont should be immdirtcly rcportcd and held in spccinl custody pendin instructions for its disposition by this Headqumtors. C. Captured Documents: All docur;lcnts collected from enemy -dead and from POYs should be cxmir,ed for tirlelyaildiqyortnnt informtion. Such information should be classifidd secret and, if affectin:; adjment units 2nd higher headqucrters, reported ?iiththe utmost practicable speed. d. lkil:;Tntclli~cnco Plan: A daily Intelligence Plan till
be prepared at division, level. Thjx plan should.contnin detailed in-
structions to the Xorean collection qencies, mong the most important
of which are ground pztrols,, Zffective ground patrolling, difZ_cult to
achieve in any 2.q~~ is psrticul?rly so ir,the Korean I'imqbemuse of its
lack of training aildthe l~k of sypreci4ion by KorOzn comandeys of
the vital nature of ground ~trcll~_n~;, Iknce, the advisor must constant-
ly stress to the Sorcan co~-mFier the importance aY;dnecessit;?of ground
patrolling, must activcY7
t!:eprnpnrctior,of patrol plars and
I) In (. aesiat of det,?iled instructions for pytrols,, and do everything in his power to
assure the actuc?lexecut.lor_ missions.
Advisors nust assure
of pc,";rol that information fron all sources nust be reported to hi$wr he::_dquartcrs
and affected adjacent head?unrtcru with the utmost practicable speed.
e. Intelligence Xstimkc: (372Jd\&ors till keep cor,tirmous-
ly abreast of the ta,~~~~-7---'" 1 eltua-tz.on
will be prcprred to present
and an intelligence estimtO~-of-the-situationat any time

__

a8 Prescribed T~xT%s: IC.ly Unit intelligence Reports, -_-


Special SituAion Eeports, 2nd Spot Reports should 3c submitted by the
nest expeditious means,
b. TYF'Z RIZGRT Unit Report Report Schedule: (ITOT",: Code rrherenecessitated),
IIIVSTO CORPS 2030 COW3 TO I:',lG
2100 24 hour period ending
1800, Report h=l.s
approyi%tc pm?,r;raphs
rcl-tF-~0to intclli-

~OncO

Speck.1 Report

0800

0900

Spot Report

At

once

At

once

Brief general picture of situqtion with nc~ativo information being reported in absence of positisc i:IPomation. Includes 17h0,tilat, t-rhen, r,%cre,<Ti:d Trhy, qm-
tith an eT.-zlw.ti.on 301 (see pamzraph 8 bclos-r).

portine:
a. 3. c. 8. The numhsr of POWs carryine s&render leaflets,
.
Defueef3movem3nt trenf3.s.
Siv5.l ian nttT_tu~esin areas of proba?le revolt.

Tva1up.t ,ion Yet ---~. --I_ -.- em i-a


WCCL?ACY -.---

Annex # 2

%ction I

-__.._-_-

1.

Functions of YIQG_+_3__S~.cJioz1: _.____.-__ _...._.~ - _ -The furztions of the IDfAG G-3 Cection are: '.
*

r an?
stmsroise tilefunctiom n.qrixinir.6z c. To plan, cocrcI.m;~t;~ to combat oDerPticns, .toinciu?? pre?,mrtion of opsrptiona nlans, orfiers,
directives, renorts, and bx it3finm.

e. In eqori'inptiJ)n with the KA CL-3 Sactim, Dream


the tr?ini>p nroEcramfor the For?,-nbrzr,

ix

Ftmlyze VPF~ ??-I+ frisnQ tr\ctics with P visw of rlsvp.lomQff"ctive tactical floctrina rlnfi tr?ininp m4hoA.s.
CT.

To

h.

TO net

PS

C-,7 c?ir for tha vorp,nnAmy.

To enrcisp pensral staff su?ervision of mvchql~g-fcal warfms i. nctivitil>sin the Porem, kmy.
.j .

To coQr?inps_ts tZleOffQrts of ths T'orem nmy

nnflthe %tiond

Police.

nil renr
k. To cor?r?inpte officer ?USAF.
1. 5-1pssist thl Chief of
n0rtPining to G-3 nctivities.

.n. To emrcise o?eratiand control of the FLAG Lipht Aircraft


Seu_$fo:~.

Army hns Yepn estR?liahei! qt


1. 'The troon b~eis for the 'ICoraqn 250,000, Gen%relly, the >rs~&down of this figure is 135,000 trr)oTscom-
prising 10 Infantry Divisions, 64,000 troons con73risine Army suqorting
troop units, Arms an? Corps YsPdquarters, ;Inil ., the trsininr Cndr=s of the
vr.riousservice schools en8 rqlec?mant trpinina crjntsrs. Ths remainder
are trainees in ths RTcrs, students in ths sqrvica schools an? Dptisnts
in the hos7oitals.

2 The ROR Inf Division is similar in structup to thq A?ericPn Xvision, al though certnin suny,X>rtiny
units, armor, AAA, Artfl1er.yand Y~vy
MOrt;lrunits, or&%nic to the AmOricRn Division prr?not indud!?& (SW Tnsl 79
#lJ.

I.

units
to sun?ort P 13
4. A coaDl?te orppnization of Army sunr,ortin+? division Army has been &~~elor)~~ enc7 is onPr?,tinE. This Qrpnnizztign in-
cluclss%gr, (29,Sign21, ?idfi tirtillerv, OrfinRficCR,
Yilitary Polics$ Nedical,
CIC and IIIDunits. (SN Incle $3 and #3 to Pprt I).
5. Ths MilitRrg Advisory Group to the Q.prublicof Porea @MAa) has a
total strength of RnBrqximetdy 1,000 officers and men. Both dvisors and
administrative personnel pre inclu?ad in this figure. WAG ngrallels the
orKpnizetion of the Horeen Rrmv with Ac%isors Rssipnsfi(at ~11 1~3~~1s)
ifWJ?2 to Bzttdion in tactical units an8 trrcnmpnrnyin 6nme of ths sF?rvicf?
slenQnts, The structure of Fb??Gorganization is shown in Incls 4, 5, and 6.
S4CTIO" III
_ _~._______.___
TRAI?YI1% _.--__-

Prior to the!war thp Porepn Army asta%lishsP a r?nlRcamF?nt ani!


school systAplsinilzr to that utilize+ in tha U.S. Armv. This system oDerRt-
to trfiin officers an< enlisted
ed at maximum efficiency en+ was r'clsi.gnPrJ
nersonnel in thP j&s en8 toch?iorl snccielities necsssPr,v to s?J?aort a
iOO,OOO men hrmy. The schnt?l syRtsm coniluctec?
%esic an? advencoirofficers
tr;riningin ppch brsnch of th? service an6 incluPed n Command ana General
'Staff Co!_lege which was or+ratine rt full cpaacity. Vitalthe outhrrek of
hostilities ani!E ra3ii!withr'rcwelto the souk;ti;
schnol and rpdncement
tha the school 3rd rqbcennnt system uti-
system va6 disruntec?. Adfiitionelly, lized nrior to the war hecane imnrecticd as r7result of the Army's increase
from 100,800 to 25C,OOO anC the necessity for m?intainine increase8. rsylaae-
ments. In Septem?3er 1950, 69ven (7) renlPcensnt traininr centers were or-

ganiser-7 for the pur-noae of trnininp hc?sicenlister!ronlacem~nts, Rnc?the oaricus branch school3 ware 4~eacl under central control Rt th? KoraEn Army Ground.GenFtral School. ?+re officer r,RndiBates were trains8 for Rll arms ana services.

/-

7 To C7?vel0n R higher stanFar of non-cqmmissir,ned oific*r a Lmaders Schoo;'wns orpaniz.?i! an8 began ocq-atir)ne 1 ?brch 1951 with a ca-oacity of
7200. (See Incl +7),

G-3 me

listed ~8 f01lows: a.
3.

To pepere

Omratiqns nlans, orders end instructions.


of ~11

corn3pt units

To mdntain en 0nerPtiona oa~roflectinp the lomtion V??En8 ROPA em~loger?fn Farm,

c. To receWe, evaluate, ~3.~33 rm70rt to 7USAK thn tpcticfd


situation of ROU units, and to rmna$n cQntinudly ??riefedon the comlete
tactical situation with partimlnr enyMsis on ROXA units.
cl.. To 3e nrsmrc?r tn n&e _
the followine:

mung and-tiooly recmmsrd8ti9ns on

(11 Cmmitment of reserv*s: rin?chmps

in bmnrJar,ynnA. task orflanizatinns to facilitate ~ccomlishmnt of the assimec'. missim.

(2) 30m3linttchanges (To JOC), in relztim tr,fr0nt 'line


uriitg.
(3) Issuance of efi?itional frnbzmentary oraars ani!instructifm@
moiilifying the etssictred missions for mm
effective F~cCCCW
plishrmnt.
e. To maintain R cemnlete kn~rx?n2,journd. establish where necessdtiy, nrior1t.vfor air

tl?r?V,-h ,07.

f. To mapest, RM supTort for RgWmft s-

and-mbise

c. To naintnin clqse coqrfiination with PA G-3 onerations officer, him?\dnthe nsrformance of his i'utiss,

a.

kneral:

All o?erPtiqnal directives, normd.y vrr?nPrd! in the form of en oprations dan, orfisror instructlm, are '?asef? on ?tEAF onerationel fiirect ivas an8 instructions. Owr~tiona officw, KA CWT, is Fri.efe!C? on
all pr0:asd operationid directivss, his conmsnts an?.cmcurrmce, o7?tainclc'
Rnd tmrallel publisatione in K,rs?anend.?nzlish arP r'istributsc?
sbultan
SOUsly to all units concerneii_. with sdbor9inate units e.reenjoined
ACl.visora
to follow this sane arocedure in issuinz instzmctims within units to which
thev tireassi+zned. This drmztice insuree nmimm cmr3imtion an? mutual
un?erstandine between Advisore e.ndthe+Forean chuntnrdts.

h,

memtion

Plans!

Plms am ?resord? on mr)r)lns~P a7mdinns ,PI~ rJistri+uted to

Yield Commn~ers Fin?iidviwrs as Etiarly as nossi%le TV Demit r?axim27tipe


in preparations for new operations. To nrPsr the nlcln into execution, an
"Opernti7ns Instructi0n11 is m~118kert ks8_esiemting the TlRn as m order
an6 d.irectinp the order 3e oxecuteP,
4

Ord.ers pro bu'?lisheat? asnicn onerationpl tTme missbns


to fillcornhat units under ooerptional cqntrol of Chief of Staff ROKA.
when the 9Qer-p,11 P~rmnll.y,or&x-s ~rs issued 01%I.y mission 0f the najoriey
of units unfleropsrntionel control of the Chief of StRff ?OKA is affected.

a.. berations Instructions: --_II--._


OTer::tionsInstructions are 'nuMishe3 PS P vehicle to amend
the operations.order in effect fin+normnlly effects minor chances in the
'aenerrl operatioml miss%zn Qf the majority of units udsr onerntiqnal cqn-
tr01 of Chief 0f Staff RCRA.

7.

OP%?AT IfV3 .__ PTPORTS --__-.__._<___ .-..__.___*

B. -

Generd:
--_

The Cox_~andiap General TJ$AV +enenPs uv0n Chief WAG to pravide him with information an* ~fiviceconcerning the tactical enDlo.pent of ROKA uqit;s. One of the most important i'utie.s of the TWB ac?visoris to keep the next hiczh2rKMAG hea?auarters informed of the current C.acticp> situP,tion. Periodic onerations renorta auMi.ttefi hy this h?a&uartsrs b. to ZUSAK, is R consolidfition of evduatefl inforr?Ption rsoeiver' fr9m fielc? Rrbisors in the form of "e~ot" an-3Veriofiic renorts. These reports are submitted.to XWK as the official neriodic onerations report of the Korean Army. c. PerioiCic0nerPtions rqxrts will 3e subnittsrl to this headquarters 3.y Senior Lrlvisorsof all units pssicne+ or nttachefito ?ed.quarters Stanr9inr OneratYoreEn Army for oDoro.tiozlal antrol. ?c?fPrence: TRcticd ing Procefiure,this he&ouRrters, detsP 16 r)ecember lcj50. (Incl +8).

CL Periodic operetlons renorts will Ye su7Tlsmentecl ?y %rief, sBot rsnorts RS necessRry to ~QW=Jthis hepd-0uartars a\reAst 0f the current situation.

4.

AIR STJPRW?;: -.__


Air sunnort for the Korean Army is nroviAe? 357 ?ifth US Air 'force in the same manner RS for US units. In vIp.w of the lc?nguRPe harrier and lack of knowle+e in the tecticnl emnloyment qf Rir suT%rt by the majority of ROK.4Officers, the PMAG Ativisoris G-3 Air tq the unit tr,which he is assign&. As such, he is resg0nsihls for the,locp.tion0f th? f)om?lineen? for requesting air support RR required, %r r)roce?urwsin reauestinc nnr! controlling tactichl air su?bort f?r ?OKA units, eee "@erntiona SOP for 150800 JRn 1951 (1x1 $9)
Tactical Air Sunport", this he&.auRrtsrs, ii.ptg? and letter "Tpctical Air CoorfiinPtor(.Air%rnn), this hendqunrters, &teP.
15 'Fe%1951 (Incl +lO).

Annex #3

Ten (13) Inclosuree:


Crgmizationd Chmt
The Infantry Division
Orgmiwtion ?hart
JCorem Corps Seadouprt+rs
Organization Chart
Porem Urmy
Organiz9tiond Chart

W4Ar,

Ltr, K?JIAG, Lssigment

of Pie18 Afivisors,P tc! ?? %?F, 51

Divisions, 8t? 1 Mar 51 Ltr, XXQG, Assipnmnt of Yield Aciviflors, Chmt Replace:JentSchool System, I(A Ltr, FMAG, Tactiwl Stan$.i~~ Onemtinlz Pmcer'ure, ritil 16 Dee 80

Ttr, KMAG, Omrations SO3 fQr Tmticpl Air Sunnort, Jtd 15 Jnn 51 +lO Ltr, RMAG, Tecticel Air Coordimtor (Air%orne), ?t?
1 lar 51.

Annex #3

-_
1

_~

The.Infaritrv Division OrEanizational Chart

_,,*. .: ,,. ..: ,. __ I . ,.x.

-.^.-.___-_____._._,

Infantry Division

Engr Ccmbat Eln

TD En L
I , . ,

ORGANIZATIONAL C'H~T

KOREANCORPS E-IEADn~J~~RT~$

-HP1
.3 AIDES. I J 6 I CG I -2

,,..:
.

pq-STAFT
6 G3
J.

fJ
c1

..__ STVF ,_..

1T-------

I,-8
I

3
t

:I_ 1 3 PM SEC
.

I 4 QMC SEC
1

-11

10

,a1

Ir

ORD SEC
1 c

SIG SEC
4

SPS szc

Inclclgure #2
:

_ ____..
9

y--

-* ~

ORG4NIZBTIONAL CH;RT
- I* KORINN AREY

26
t

DND

C&i?

- Includes 21,000 Detachm.ent


Jnclnsure #7

ORG-:NIZATION,u, CHLfi'f

UNITEDSTATESYILIT:&Y,",DyISGRY
GROUP TO THE RX'UBLICOF ~&a:,

LEGmD:
Denotesdual functions
Inclosure #f!+

WIT'ZD STATbS MILITARY ADVISOT;YG9CTP TO mu 820?8 AU


Office of th+ "Ihief
APO 301

c/a SRn

RqtBftr':0" ~'ORQ

??etnpstsr

PrRnciSc0, Cdif. 32 Pe3rmry 1951 SuBJSC?'* . Assignment of ?'ielfi ArWisars

TO:

Senior Advimr 1.

3ach Cor'm

visory

The policy governing the msiamnt of narsmnel within the d-


structure of erch 2or:)sis 88 folio-0:

A.

5. c.

a.
::

CT.

h.

. 1. 3.
Ir -.
1. m. n. 0. n. 9. r. 8.

In dfiition to the L)~OW, conmunic~tim teRDs including mr'l9-crypt9 per-


sonnel an8 equi_omnt will he F?ttAc'her' to
Corns Feadouarters fro? KMAb Sip-
nal Detachment.
2, %rxdly the Detachment Suplg OffS.cer will ~180 aerfor- the func-.
tions of PPadquartw8 Commanr'cnt an3 "lnl!si;ai'
3et~chnent ?xmm~_er.

7 The Si,anL ArLvisnr'e orimrry miSsion is to nPviSs the SimsI. Officer oh-the Corn3 on d-I_nni-.ters ?ertPininr to Sip301 corvnuni.c-~ti0n. Twr,
Yiel3 Communication ITI!Oio p.renssiznai!to pssiSt the Cnr~s 3ig:nal Aiivieor,

tr,?rovirIecommunicative fw 4. The rac?iqteens ;ra c"ttachaJ vimry ,:nrs~.rm@l nnP will nqrm-ol1.v m~r&te under thm Pimct mntml Signal Arlvism.

Ihs ad-
of the

5. The orzmization end n~licy outliner?in nrecedinfr vr"rngrsvhs will be considered stanflare extent under exce-tionei circtistances. It m%y '5ernodifiefi in certain cases At the r?iscratio,n of the Senior Corns Ail-
visor. These exceptional circumstnnces inc1uir.e:

a. The necessity for close liRi,son with djncent units or


su\orMnRte units.

h,.

The necasdity for close cov+imtinn

with suvnortinc tr90ns.

C.

Difficulties with normal communicdion chnnnds.


then

An inexverience? l?q,reRn sbff reidring more daice 6. would normally be expectefl.

However such adjustments ehouli! he cansirtrred tnmnorRrg measures tq meet the requirements qf the tacticnl situntion. The orgRnizati5n p.8outlined. is considereir PdequEte t? flccomvlishthe Came Mvisory mission.

.-

-UiiL

MA_TTIC'T . 1-f ., . :;_.1.; 61 Chigf-of Staff

1st Lt AGC <_,Actg Adjutant General

,,

ORQANIZATION CHART
KMAG CORPS HEt4~UART"rJzs

f--l
c-L--

KMAG
HQ COTYDT

1-I
ADVISOR

-.

, TACP: Mr*r-

?+?EDICAL
. 7 -F-LI --c---e : RAD.TEXM 1 1 I --e--c-c--h
I

a-e-w-* I
I
l RADTFm
I I -- r-iL_
.'
,

't
I TRANS

I
SUPPLY
t

Incl*sure

.
.;_ J
. . . .

c/o Postmeeter r Calif 9a.n4'3x0~i.a~ 1 E'arch1351


SUBJ3CT: Assignment of Field Advisors i I)ivisions
!I?@:

Senior Advisor each Xvision

.i:

a,
e. f. E* h. .
1.

C.

3.

The necessity for coordirption with sunnortine troops.

~ISTTZWTION
______-
1 -1 -3 -110 20 20 -12 -3 -2 -Chief of Staff
e9 Staff Section
ea C0rtx1
ea Di&l.sion
Tncr
Signal
FA
O-3 Pile
AG File

Incl:
Orpnimtior Chart
I!XAGDivision lieadmarters

ORGANIZ~'ffON CHART
KMAG DIVISfON HEXQUX3TERS

#--4dvi3r

Gl -G4 Advisor

REF'LACEMENT &
SCHOOLSYSTEJ4
KORE:W ARMY

C/FIN

i I

Inclosure #7

WIT%

STATES MILITARY AIJVISORYGROUP TO TN? RRR'UBLICOF K0R.Q


8202d AU
Office of the Chief.
APO ?XJl
c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, Calif.
1& lkcem'C,sr 1950

RMAG
-ical Standing Onerat ing Procedure --

1.

General.

a. This Standine OWrating Frocefkre ia agnlica3le to Senior


Advisors of all units aseignei! er attached to Readquartars, PA for onera-
tional control.

35. This StnnP%ng Cpratina Procedure hctcomeseffective on

recebt nreviousiy 33liaher' directioeo concerning operating uro-

2. Iiaison.
Senior Advisors of Sor?s, Divisions PEA separate com*at units
a. of regim@ntal size oberatine C'irnetly undbr this headquertars-will rerpest
counternarts to furnish at least one liaison officer @oraan) to 3% Head-
quarters.

h. .

RA Readauartnrs will furnish liaison officers to sukordinate

units

as requir-d,
7 . *

Command Fasts.

Prior to movement of cam~and Posts, Senior Advisors with ma.jx su3-


ordinate com?7at units will rsuort a general araa to %a occu7ied. Vnon eeta-
?,gthe most ?lishment of ths new CF the exact location will ke rslsor,i;ed
expeditious means, -__ Will nO+ hr! C134d. UYItil COI?Imni.Tha Ow _-- c?, @MA&-A) ____._.___~~~.--~
tione from this %adouartnre to the&w C? heve Wan esta?liaheP.
-4. Orcters. cjoniea (Porean and %irlish) of all a-oerational type orders issued >y na.jorsukdinate units will3e forwarder' to this Peakuarters (Attn G3). Ouerations Se~orts 5. -_I-.,-_--__._*

a. Period& Onerations RaTorts will 3e su%itteS thre- times daily Senior Advisors of Corns, Divisions, snnaratn Task t'oroesan*.setx?.rate Seeiments oseratine under r'ircctcontrol of this headauarters. mese renorts will 30 su%itt.r!ti ns of 0~0, 1600 and WOO so ae to &ch this %w%maM~re not later then 0500, MOO and 2400. Re33ert.e will
ha forwar&M ?y l%fliOe
3y

3nolokire #8

..a

..

*r-

:. ;NCL~SSIFIED

teletype, telephone (using tsleohone cotie)or messenger. ?legatiVeremrts will 3e au3mittefl. For format anP coatents see inclo%r+%, 1. An overly to cover locatiorbof su3or*i~ste 3n4ta frownto an5 incluflina 3Rttalions nnfl This overly will 3e separate compa&"les w?il he ~rfqa7xi.ee of 2200 ilpiiy, forwarded by first i3Vail&ls cou-rier. 3. situation. 6. XntPlliebnc~__~_e~orts __.~~_ _*

fntnlliesn~e Ibx,rts of mp.jorsu~orr?inats euhmittefi hy Ssn-ior A&ieox AS t'ollowa: Report -- a.
h. spot %TOT tE

cial raporteas r&csssarg

Period9.c opqationb ?X?pOitB will. 1f? su~alemnnt4 ?g khf, Sp+ tc~ keep this he&+artfrs ahred, of the currant

tactical units will be Time


-II At once Daily a.8df 1800

uow f3.l%?litt??c? -__-_-_-_-.__.____

l!OBT -. RmeC?f tiOUk3 g-iep,na

Intelligence Summary

Pairs;,TeietpP, Tela~hone

BY CCMFAKD OF BRIG~IDI73

":I J.
W. MAR?
j Mrjor, AGC
AdjutantGenerid

Inclosure #Tl,Tactic31 CveratinF Procedure.


Fcrnat and Con!-ek, P er%o(qic Operations %port

Periodic Operations Report Vo, For Pkrior?.


1.

Compos?t.icn cf Pr:.:!naily klorces:

c?lc:hr~3

a. Eirt ncy .mente, etc.),

i.3

som>::s;tion of units (attachments, r'.etach-

2.

Operatio;l:; ?la*;te~::
_..--___.. Outline FQ:!oparations which are in the planning stam only.

3.

0Perati.os7.s Cs&xcif:

List ali operations ori'ercddurinfrthq. period?remrdless of the


degree of conp~et:ion,,
4. Results of Cperatbns:

(2200 repkt
c.

Vnit strnn&h exeressad in percc3ntaEeof author'iz& streneth


o&j),
Morale Pxpresssd. as 2xceXlent, Good,.F&fr or Poor II2200 report

only).
Ccn?at efficiency c~atessed as Txcellent, Good, Fair or Poor
(2200 repod;tonlyj.

Inclustire .#8

P -------_..__

!,tNCUlSSlFlED

UnTI'I'ED STATW FILITA?P ADTTISORvG?OUP TO TUY RFUDLIC


OF KO???SA
8202 AU
Office of the Chief
BP0 301

c/o Postmaster
San Zbncisco, Celif 150806 Jan 1951
03?Fw
-_c

A1

IOV

sop
T'orTflcticelAir Su3Tort

~-----____-...-__--L-~__1. IYirdose, - TO provi.de WAG Personnel with ROK tactice units the
standard procEFi!ure for reaues~<.n~ ta:,
1;icei eir support end to 7xovid.eassist-
pnce in proper util,isRtianqf ?.tt,~c.h~~,ir
Air Control -Perti?s (TACP).
%cZiceI.

_-

7
C.

Requestin~..Proce~~e.-

pL, Request for rrre-planned tacticrl nir missions will be su?7mittctd


to this Readquarters (ATTN C-3) through Advlooq ~VX&S 24
to time mission is to be flown, Such r+qussts bill incluPc:
&sireP, by rrii!cf7~irinrte8 (1) Target areas, in ar-iar-ity (plus overlay when request is forwnrded. Sy courier). (2) Locution of forward slx~snts of friendly troons 3y
coard.fnPtes (Dins overlay if reauest is forwarded by
courier) in relntian to tarret urea.
(3) Type targets in tRrjzstitreeand.lacption (i.e., troop
concentrrtion, &u~)pl,y
dumps, CP:9,tta%x1, vehicle con-
centretbns, etc).
(4) Time nissS.onis desired (indicate time mission is to end,
if in conjunction with fr.ieni!ly
attacks).
(5) To wh,-,m aircraft is tQ revart pnd.whsthor r)rnot TACP
end/or Masaui~tocan control.
sircrnft, other tbn that covered in nnra3, Request far trsctical Fcrenh2 abve, v!ill, ?e foFdet&d thou Mvisorv channels 3v most eqeditious WILL IP'C;U?!7: meens. ALL R%p%iTS .----__--^-__ (1) Tps tarpts (toe., tr9qn concentr~ti9ns, enemv sunobrt Pums, tanks, ate), wesnons, surely (2) lioc&ian of tercrste by coordinates.

Inclosure 69

(3) To whom aircreft ia

ta rebort (TAW - Moequito).

(4) Whether or not !?ACPad/or Mosquito will control.


C. Mosquito Rircrtiftcrlnoften 0btRin tRcticR1 abcreft by request-
fiirectly from Vosquito contra; Fq.
Tactiml -_Proceflurea -v._ _.-_.._!_.___.P
R. ThPs

will be kent 8s close RS noseihl9 to cu$2-entfront linss

5,
Txtrsct if 5th .hirForce SOD for Tecticd Air Control "firtie is
infomE$ion Rnirprlrt~ncs.
attache& for

Ehm MATTIE
071 'inf
Cil1ef of %aff

(.'lSt; IJt
h%

Inclosure #9
2

- UNCLASSIFIED '
UKJTED .!%'ATES

i!ti.ITARY ADW%RY

GROUP TO IRE

REPUBLICCF KC!FGA

8202d Atr Office of the Chief APO 301 c/O Postmaster


San Francisco, Calif
1March 1951
SUBJECT: TacticalM.r Caordinatw (Airborng)

TO:

See Mstribution

Procedure Nunber55-26,
1. Reference is mada to *sandingOperating Headquarters 5th bir Force, dated 26 Jacuary1551, attachedas inclosure
nunberl.
2. Reference SOP is forwarded for your informatigl and guidancein
conduct of future operations.
BY CCMMAXDCF BRIGADIER GENZRALFARRELkt

1 Incl: 5th 26 AF Jan SOP, No. 51


55-26 dtd (True cy)

_*Lxi~k&v c
1st Lt. -+iGC
Actg d*djutant General

Inclosure #!LO

CLASSIFIED

'

5A.F StandingC@erating) Procedure

OPRRATIOKS

NO.

HQFIFTRUIR FCRCZ
APO 970
26 January1951

55-26:)

StandingOpaating Procedure for Tacticalair Coordinator (Airborne)

1; loss - To prescribethe functions, duties and procedures of Tattical dir Cmznators (Airbarns).

2. @nsr&_ - To obtainmaximumeffectimness from tacticalair power


of inflicting damage on friendly
and eliminatethe possibj.lity troops, Tat-
are prmided to controland coordi-na+&
tical &r Coordinatcrs (+ijrScrne) attacksof tacticalairczeftin the vicinityof the frorlt lines,aRd to maintain other tact&i air ocmtrol. as directedby the Joint OpersMons Center. These instructions apply to those Fifth &r Force units actively engsged in airbornecontrolof ta::ticai sfrcraft.
3. ReouSremg&g - Each TacticalCoordinator (Airborne) team will con-
sist of:
a. Personnel - One pilot and one observer(@my Officerif available.)
havingreciprocating engine, full visi-
b. Equipent - An aircraft and reducedupead and equipped
bility, tandem seats,capableof' long end~rrnnce, with VHF ccmmunications, identification rockets,
and an externalfuel tank,
- Vhile airbclrns, the
Tactical lir Coordinata (Air-
4. Resnonsibili$y willbe responsible to the i'ivision Air
LiaisonOfficer(ALO)through
are
the DivisionTactic;@1 Mr ControlParty {TACT)in whose area operations being conducted, Targetswill not be attackedinsidethe 'on53 line uniess
both the T&P end the Taztictil I& Coordiaatul* (dSrbarne)
(TAG)agree on the
identity, "Reredoubt exists on the part of eitherthe TsCP or the TAC, the
targetwill not be attacked,

bmne)

AFT Coordinator (Airborne) 5: &nctions_- The functionsof a Tactics1 controlling and coordinating close supportstrikesgenerally include: a0 Receivingand evaluating target locations for air strikesfrun the ground controllers. b, Searching for targetsof opportunity, to includespecified route
and area reconnaissance, and directing tsctica1afrcraf%on such targets.
co Advising the TXP and/orDivisionALO of all observed losations, inrrtsllat?.ons, and disposltfons,
moveactivity,. positions, ooncentraY_ons, ments of the enemy io his area of responsibility.
strikesto Reportingthe resultsof controlled Division ",io.
the

TACP end/orthe

e. Performing specialmissionsOS directed by the Joint Operations


and locatingfriendlyelements,
Center (JOG);such as, cclumncmer, identifying monitoring and relayingmessagesto the Tactical hir CartroiCenter (T&C),
assistingsnd guidingdowned crews end escapedPrisonersof War (P!Vs).

-~ ~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6. Procedure- a* Tacticaltir Coordinators (Airborne) will be as-


signedcall si;nFas follows: the name of the T&P preceded by the word
W osqulto;" a .second aircraftto the same TBCP will use the same call sign
with word "Special" added. &ample: l'Mosquito
Cobalt", and Mosquito
ColbaltSpecial.)

b. TX% are assigneddailyby the Fifth Air Force Operations


Order to operatein designa%d area ar in the vM.ntLtyof the front line
with a designated TACP. These stations continuously
will be nai.ntafned
betweenthe hours indicated in the Operations Order by relievingon station
unless otherwise specified.

c* ,J%on depar%irgfrom theirhcme base, all Ti,C's till report to


the TACC givingeirl;3~ne times and a~~sigaad TI:GP's.In the vicitityof their
assignedL!ivi.Eion artiep each TAC will report in to the Evislon TACP for tar-
get icfarmation a& Iratr:l.c:i;i.obs~
T5is KtlLston TRf2 will normally designate
a ForwardTAC;P ~JT' an ar3a
to raconnciter,After reporting in to the Forward
TSZ, the T&2 d.17, orhnt h'a33l.f in re:istlsn to friandlyand enemy posittons
an imr:leS ate sear;+Car tare 5s. ShouLd tarGt.sbe unuvsilable
and ccumxence in the vicinityof IY_S froflt:ii~c 8e3~0~, TAC wi:!l recoanoiter planned the routes and areasrepo?ting back pric&osrlYg to the ForwardTACP far continued controlof strikesa&net close sumort ta2:getso and makingde-
d. An altitudewill be flown conduciveto sesrching effi>rte mi_il b3 mad3 to detectcamoufleg3d
tailed observations.Speoip.1. objects. The resulting tar+ infcrmeticn wiil 1~epaszed to the Forward
to %be Div:',.sion T&P or, if eppli_zahi3F T4FD
The 'MC till corxxltwith
of targetsfor ard
9&93~5_on these control13rs concsrning the .M.tebil.i~y possibleair action. ?'!~a Lxafi cm d app Cp4.c te targef;s fcr air attackwill be designated by referenceto the Universal Transverse MercatorGrid used by tacticalaircraftand TAC;Fs, e. Tacticsiflightsreport in to the Mvi&.on TACP and/or the Forward TACP who may aszignthem to the contrclof a TAG. After visual contaot

the TAG wiil pass to them


has been established wi$h the tactical aircrst't, and iden%iffcetion of the
the following information: an accuratedescription target,its.locatLon And/orpositionrel,aS_ve to.pominen+landmerkc, any
potential targethazardsand any other psrtimnt irfcrmation. y?ne=verfriend-
proxirity of the tergat area, the TAG will ally troops are in tie immed!,ate
ways infzm the tactiaalaircraftaccor.?ingly, bn required, for target identificaticn, t&e TAG wiii l3ad the tacticalaircraftto the targetusing rockets when available to pinpointits location. f. A TAG will not cell tacticalflLghtsto its area which have been assignedto other ereas. However,shoulda fl.i&tbe unableto contacta a TAC operating in anothararea aware wedesignatedforwardair controLler, of this fact may assumecontrolof the flight to attackimmediatetargetsif available. g, Each TAG will check out with his IXvisionTACP giving the folenemy disposition and lowing information: resliits of the controlled strikes, movements, and condition of T&P radio.

wmmunicetione.

QFFICIAL:

/s/James L. O'Corlnor /t/JAMESL. O'slx~ z


Major, USAF
Adjutantee~el~~12

15 - ea Ftr ?g
1;; -$&L TAC Eq
20 - 5AF (Operations)

10 - 6160th M xg 10 - 3l4th Air Div

12 - CCMNAVFE 1: -FEAF - 1 MAw


?O - 6347th TAC Sq 15 - ea Bmr Yg 10 - 5Cad TAG GP
5 - 6146th u;

..-._

Inclto Operation33P fm TacticalAir Support.


Following is extracted frcm 5th AF Regulations nunber55-5 for informa-
tion and guidanceOf KMAG Advisors.
sop for TACTIC& CONTROLPARTIES (TACP~
SECTICHI
Introduction

1. PWDO8e - To providea consolidated manual of instructions defining


the responsibilities and duties of Tactical Air ControlParties,to prescribe
operational procedures for close suppmt missions , and to clarifySCUB of the
problemsencountered when embarkingupon field duty with army unitso

2. General- The TacticalAir ControlParty is an operations ccmbatteam engaged in close supFt of ground that by use of voice radio aontrolsaircraft forces who are in contactwith the enemy. Each team is attacheddirectlyto a Corps,Division,or regimentand acccmpanies that unit ciherever it goes. This
assignment may be changedby the nir LiaisonOfficerwho has oprational con+
fro1 of the TACP, when tactical requirements so dictate.

3. Graanization - The commander 0; the TACP is the Forward Air Controller (FAC) td10 tdii be a pilot who has had ccmbatexperience in close supportin this theater, Each team will be organized as follows:

PERSONAL

EGDIPMENT

One (1) ForwardAir Controller (FAC) Two (2) VRC-1 Radio Jeepswith Om (1) SCR-522and 0~ (1) SCR-191each. Ons (1) Radio Mechanic (648) or(V54) One (1) spare 93-522.
One (1) Radio Operator(766) ~4: (776) One (1) Remote systemfor SCR-522.
carrierjeep.
one (1) personnel Portable VHF radio.
One (1) AN/TRC-7, 4. Tour of Duty - The ForwardAir Controller is furnishedon a rotational basis by an activecombatwing and dusinghis period of duty in the fieldhe .. will be on TDY cr DS to the TAC Squadron. MormaXQ, but not alnays,he will be relievedby a pilot from his ol*vn group and squadronto his parent organiza-
tion. Airmen orew membersare selectedfrom a TACP pool of men who are perma-
nentlyassigned to the detachment, and axe rotatedwith the FAC,
SCTION II
SOP for Tactical hir ControlParties
5. Dutieq- 'Ibe TACP in the field will be under the operational control
In his area of responsibility the FAC will
of the Army Air LiaisonQE'ficer. maintaincognizance of tarpts and their priorityss dets.rmined by
the Mvi-
sion or Corps Advise or his representative.

- .TheFAC will determinathe extent of damage dona 6. &3snonsibilitv by our aircraftand maintaina retard in the daily log. This inform&b Radio QP will also be reportedto the Air LhaisonOfficerby High Frequency telephone. He will maintaina journalof daily events to include: call signs of flightsworki& end times in the area; resultsof attacks;failure mmements of the T&P; pertinent remarks. The journal of ccmununicetions; Headquarters, FifthAir will be forwarded by him to the Directorof Liaison, Force on Wednesdays. a site to operatethe M@RC-1 Tactic& Procedure -..-
- a, In selecting consideration muzs given to the limitations of the equipment. The VHF in so far as pracradios operateon the %.na of sightnprincipletherefore, tical they shouldbe iocatedvhere there is least obstruction fran terrain featuresin crderthat transmissions betxeenaircraftand controller may obon the
high frequency band rmg3. The SC-191 opertites. tain maximumposs.2'itlc and is not serfons3.y
haRpred by terrainfeatures, howver it has very low-
out and awhip an+&nnais mer!.yalaays nscessary to obtainrange. One further
precaution; Do not operaba the transmitter unlessthe engine generator is
operating, as the tram' ,,a.nltter draws high wattage and will discharge a fully chargedbatteryin a few seconds.

7.

must keep a current to oprate the controller b. When be ia F;"opared list of targetsmarked on his map and continually evaluatethem in orderto advise as to their suitabiiity with reference to the weaponsthat he will have plan in his mind just how he will describeeach available. He must constantly target and how he will directhis aircraftaga3.nst it so that when his planes is made, report in statingtheir armament load, and the final targetselection his dirkctions will be prompt and as brief as claritywill permit. He should anticipate the arrivalof his scheduled flightsand be monitoring the "'reparting" frequency. Monitorjng the reportingfreqlancy is very important in arder that the flightleadermay obtairprompt inattuctions.&hen the controller is in on the spare Working a flight,he sh0Ql.d hove his radio operator listening equipment, if available, or on the AE/TRC-7,in order that he can inform the The, controller can switah controller tien a flight calls in far 'instzucti0as. frequencies munentarily to give a "standby:' or directthe flightback to the next higher controller.Even when there are no targetsit is impcrtant to m@nitor the "reporting" net in order to be able to redirectaircraftprcanptly. c* After the targethas been described it will be initially located
by referenceto UIM Grid Coordinates. As the aircraft begin their attack,he
must carefully scrutinize the final approach, giving continuous directions
with referenceto prominent landmarks and if it ap.pzars that the wrong target
in
some will be structk, he must call off the attack? It may be n3cessar-y cases to requiree dry run, and in many cases the mosquitoaircraft must be called upon to assistin findingthe target or to point the way, Army Liaison type aircraft(L-5) (L-17)will not be used for controlling our planesexcept under very exceptional conditicns and when such cases do occur,the circunstanceswill be reportedto the ALO who will make a report to this headquarters. The ForwardAir Controller must be an AI? pilot thoroughly familicrwith our aircraft. The liaisonpiiots are not adapt in ovr procedures, are not familiar with cunacnications problems, and in their enthusiasm have been known to s. call aircraftaww from a vital targefto attack a less lucrativeone selected by the liaisonobserver. Homver, their rcdiced adviceis valuable to the army and is used extensively by them in targetselection. The army when requested,will assistin markingtargetsby smoke,and friendlytroopsby panela.

d. The reasons for being prctnptand con&iSe are apparent when it is realized that the f3.ghter, particularly a jet is,Limited in ehdurence. He has only a short time to stay in the area before it becomes necessary to return to his base. If he begins to run lov on fuel his w@k becomes hasty and haphaThen, to, wasting time over zard with resulting inaccuracy against the emmy. the target is inefficient use of the aircraft, adds extra, tiring time to the Pilots flying, and keeps him unnecessarily long circling at low altitude where he is a cripple for light flfikand hostile fighters. Xhen it is necessary to have aircraft circle to keep the enemy pinned, that type of mission will heve been requested instead of close support. Our present VW-l's are equipped with the SCR-522 radio which permits 4 radio channels only for voice canmunications. This is an additional reason fcr stressing brevity and clear instructions. No unnecessary chatter should take place, such as long congratulstory
or abusive messages or inquiries about the boys back in the group.
Ccmmunice&ions - Communications frequencies will be established by 8. ^--.-
FAF COI, ---Fr
will also establish call signs, voice and 071,for each army
The CdL unit, these tail signs to be assumed by the TACP assigned.
9. Mainten.a_nc? - ab
The condition of automotive and radioequipment determines whether a TACP can operate. The automotive equinment must be well
maintained (the jeep engine provides power for the radio) and ready to move
immediately when the Command Post moves. Field maintenance ~5.11be difficult
and many hours must be spent on it. Ercrusted mud must be removed and vehicles
washed to allow lubrication and inspection for defects. The army regiments
or divisions, although not required to do so, will assist on maintenance and
repair and will supply such parts as tires, spark plugs, and batteries, but
for the most part, needed supplies must be procured thru the Air Liaison Offi-
cer.
b. Operative radio equipment is vital. Mechanics must be thoroughly
qualified to install the radios, align frequencies, change tubes, trace circuits, and ma& other minor repairs. He must have a frequency meter and other tools for performing these functions as the frequencies will nearly always go out of alignment after driving the AN/VRC-1 even for a short distance* Driving the jeep over roqh terrain may also cause internal damage. It is therefore exceedingly important that the equiument be moved only when it is mandatory to move it and never purely for personal. conveniences. A small stock of spares should be kept on hand and when new sets are required, the sir Liaison Officer will arrange to have this equipment brought by an L-5. 10. Summary - The responsibilities of the TAG3 cannot be over-stressed, The success of one mission may result in the winning of important objectives; its failure mayresult in the loss of important positions and in the unnecessary loss of many lives. Constant vigilance, patience, endurance, initiative and courage are necessary to insure the successof our mission in close support.

1.

Functions of YFAG G-4 Section, The functions of tha KMAG G-4 Section are:

a. To keep Chief KMAG <andall interested azencies and socrtions


fully informed of Korean Army (KA) logistics in the functions nerteining to
supnly, evacuation: and.hos9italization, transnortstion, service, and
miscellaneous related subjects.
To insure that the Yorean Army (KA) receives arescribed lo&+
b. ticel supuort from TUSAY,
To advise the Korean countsrnarts so as to brovidr!them with
C. ths benefits of i;h?mi?_itar.y axnqrience of the YVAG officers in order to
accomplish successYui_lg the logistical sup-oort necessary in the over-s11
combat effort.

To nlan, coordinate, and sunarvise the logistical supuort d. measures end operations necesserv to implement the flow of sunnlies and equinment to the using sgencp in a timely and efficient manner.

e. TO assist the Chief of Tteff in the coordinetion of functions perteining to lo&stics. To plan and sunervise the logistical training of his own SWf. tion and, in coordinction bli.tF G-3, such training within WAG.
To assist and sunervise salvae: 9 and.
reclamation onerfltions, eb and to encourage the recovery of ceFturefi enemy materiel.

h. To review the FIUdgetaryrequirements for items or services


to be procured wit% Yorean funds and.to-assure thet the necessary funds
will be available to cover the requisition.
2. Or,eanization of ?oros and Division L4 Sections.

The G-4 functions are narformed et,YMAG Sorns 1~~1s ?y one officer assigned as G-4. At division levels, the F-4 functions ere ex?cutnd 5y an officer assizned as G-l/G-4. There is no officer nrovided in th,? KMAG T/O as S-l/S-4 Pt reeimentel levsls; However, the tectice!. advisors asSipnd to the Peftb&its anO 'batt&~ibiS--+&Q&?~TI srjd5t*6n& &ity+jf $6=?-. rezimental level anA bttelion levels, res?ec~is~ng-fn~SS4~Flt~~~~ Bt-3Ghe tively. 3. ?4ission.
At Corps and Division lbvels, thm r-4 mission is:
a. To advise the Korean G-4 countnmarts so as to nrqvirb them
with t?-tE! benefit of the military eqerieqce of the WAG
G-4.

4.

nptpilei!Instrvcti(~~ls --.A- ---_'



The P-4 field rdvisor is charse? with the following major funotione:

e,, To pre!pc?rp v~qkly KMAG hsadouarters.

ywio?.ic

logistic resorts for submission to

pnd su9srvise measures for enforcement


f. To afivise,coori?ir*te, of supply discinilzle.

To advise, coor?ir*ix, RIX?suT)ervise, in coord$wtion with G* Technical Services pnc!G-.71$?7iF3rs,"-3 ~~i~i_q~nsnt of loeistlcal suwort
units, inclufiing of
~!~i2iitr~ptiw r,rZsrs,
She fir~ftin::

h. To R8visa, ir,coorfiiwti9n 1631 othw- w3visow sections, lopis-


their imnlemsntation,

ticnl noZicfns pnd t)rocofiums;PII?tq z?u~~~rvis~

5.

Fints to_.C-4 -I-_ - -.... _. _ AClpisors. a. GenQral:


--_-

(6)
(7)

03) CoorrJinfit,ion: ---

3.

(1)

qf the snnmy can+ R rI_irect bearing tha aaunt of vour 8. Bossible chznges

(?I

(3)

(41

(5)

(6) Coordinate with the m Advisor of the suunortirq ser-


vice unit. Freauently he has trucks under his control
which he may use to eliminate bottlenecks in ammunition
resupply. Keen informed of the POL levels and keeo the
C-3 informed of this matter.
(7) Maintain close liaison with G-3 and insura proper
security for sqqorting installations.
(8) On attachment of ROT units to u. s. units,s$tablis?V_i~h_ contact with thn,G-4 of the U.S. unit without delay, (9) In airdrouarequests, comalg'with normal airdrop pro-
cedure nrescribed in K%G Administrative SOP.
C. %~x~ly Disciuline.
The pro>er a&ministration, safezuarding, accounting, renort-
inp, and maintenance of sup3iies rests in ir.rgemeasures uuon the impetus
of the.KXAG G4. Property arod'i, he o.?OT)ATl:V cared for, Tronerly used and
priodically maintainad. Advisors must encourap? Korean counteruarts to cause frequent insnections of clothing, eauinment, an3 suu~liss. Repair and reissue, in lieu of renlacemant, must 3e the rule.
Sunply 6.

References.

Administrative ?tanding_ Onoratincr ?( Lstter, WAG, Subject: Procedure, currently being revised, Ordnance Section, PA ____ b. 1s t r a. t lve s~~n_r?ln~__~~_r_~~~~_~_~~~Adm in -.-._I _._. ceil.ure dtd.26 Aug 1950. c. Lsttsr, PEAG, Subject: Mnintsnanoe and.?vacuat_ion of Or+
nance Materiel, dtd 17 Se? 1950,
d. Current Latter, YVAG, Subject: Ammunition Surly, QOFA, dtd 7 Fab 19s. e, Letter, TNQLG, Subject: b%inted~nce and Sunply Disciqline -With Relation to Ordnance Materiel .-.._L__ _-_-A __.___9 dtd 27 Feb 1951. f; Letter, YMAG, Subject: Ammunition Used --._____-_----.__-'for Stina.1 _
?urnosos

-_ With Launching Dtlvices,dtd 20 ?eb 1951.


B. Memo, KMAG, To All AA.visorson~ch$lo__ns $o!sfntenancz, dtd.
29 Nov 1350.

PDVISORrS

FTAFD3OOK ~~_1..._..-.... _ ______.-_.__

1.

The functions of the K?JAG Sinal


a. To .dvis?

S.?ction Are:

Chief KYAG findstaff on sizzirlmatters. includ.tiP; the

3.

To

plan an5 suprvise si+znal oraptions,

(1) InstellRtion, operation, Rnd.nRintenRnce of signal systex


(2) Photoxrwhlc S?rvic*S,

(3) *sw.tion of sLgnd maintnnanc9 and rTair facilities.


(4) Tecbicai inmection of signd eauimsnt an8 orcaniza-
tiona'l naintsnanw of such equipment,
c.
d..

To exercise operational control of the signal section.


To OperRte a
Sigm31 6Umlp

agency.

9.
siFtT_al troops

To make reconmsnddi~ns for procurement 2nd employment of


pn.8their allotmant to su?or?inate units.

2.

KYAG (US) C?rpPnizEtion ___._-_ -_~__~_. _.a*

2nd a6
The Gpnior Advisor, Signel is Sknal Officer of PI'IAG the 6TlQCiP1 str?ffof the fiiaf, WAG, is fesTonsi.ble for +he
of $hs KMAG 6iz&d mission,

a. a mem??erof
RCCOE!771iSh?9nt

The Siznel Officer util_izpsthe oreanizwtion shown in the %. PMAG Sign=11Communiantions &qctionpl Chart (Incl, -#l)end %he ?XXS FZaaio Nets Chart (Incl 92) to flischar~e his r~sr)onsibilities~
?. CORPS A?rDDIVIS'iOF AEf11304.S. At dvi~ory heaflqu~rtsra of Cor'96 t -I_ _-___-_-.. ._ --_ _-. -____.._1-_'
Rnd Divisiona the Si?nal &+vi~or; in nfiiiition to
his Puties as Signal Advisor, his the ac?Pitiond ijutyof Simal Officer on thq stnff of the Senior These &tins aret A&isor.

a. To kee? the Senior &visor currently inform4 of ths status


of the KMAG comrzxnlcations et his unit h%-d.quarters.

h.

To ndvise the Senior Advinor and his Rdvisory stnff on sigw!l

matters. c. To recomm?nP ~2~6 of sisal com?unicotion ?u-d. location of oom-


mand pO6t6 to th_,Senior Afivisor.
th- inatPll?tion, naintsnxxs end.onsration of
h. To supc?rYisf? the RNAG sipd system Rt ths unit heRdaunrtnrs.

P . . Every effort will be exerted to mainbin communice.tione twenty-four hours a dey. DurinP the movemant qf d.ivisirjn command no&$ continuous onerstion mry 5~ im9rncticehl e Secr?use0nl.y9ne redio set (SC?1%) iS iSSUei! to thm Pivfsbn siirnpldetachment. The radio set shquld 1e moved to predesignet?d_ nointa on 19nc moves in order to 0Den u? tsnnor~rflg.

b. When the commnd nest moves, ind.icpte the general desired-location of the future comaand post pnd request the Sienel Advisor's recommendctions on conmunicrticns. Adeoueto edvence notice to the Signal Advisor Prior tc the move will im>rovF! signal communications during movements.. The Senior Advisor will notify the Chief 73jA.G of the neriod af time the station will ?IPoff the Rir. c. ?k+?nnrncticable com!unicetions should ha in operation in the
new commend post ?fore the commend pour, fiisrlaces. This will ?e accom-
plished by the ltjumn nethod'f where two rbdib sets sre assigned to the unib.
n. All Messiahs should F,ccleared, or relnyed to the new com-
mend post, before P station is closer! dmwn for P move to a new looetion.
pn out.33ing messeee is not cleared ?romntly
5. WZSSAG?!DXI,i+P:If -(maximum delay four hours) the writer will >e notifie* %y the communicn-
tions center. When traffic cqnfrsstiQn occurs the senior advisor will con-
sult with his signal officer tr,nscsrtein thl status of nrecedence of mess-
eges. Failure tq do this mny result in traffic, which the senior edvisor
ureently desires ta be trensmitted, Seine held u? by nssn~~es of higher,
prec(?dence,incoming and outgolag.
S;. XTSSAGE WLAYS %smnle.

- - &gsF_sJ?..nd to
3ne or several
msy b 9 e.ttri%utei! P %. Cous9s: Messege ae1FLys of the following CPUSPS.
(1) -0vercl~ssific~tionin the category of qrscedence,.
(2) The limitation qf the &20? cinher device,

POT"j: A hunilre?groun (word) messp~r3rnauires e3out


two hours from the tins it is received in plain
text ?~ythe 10~1 crpto sectbn until it is re-
ceived 7ni'svniln519 for Aelivery in plsin text
et the distant crynto section.
(3) At Division (with rnsnect tr,FIhigher hesdausrters):

4R.) The limitntbn innessd. )?yminimti onoretion nersonnql, tacet)ler with the iknl ,jcbassignments (rzAi(3 onerrtor snd cry-W3 clerk).

(3)

Annex 95'

The necessrrily prescrl\ed signnl standing oneratin resyect to messe,?esof qua.1 ing l3rscedure: Tmt, precedence clessificetion, the station zt the higher headausrtsrs trnnsmits its messace 3efore the lower hePdauRrt_rs transmits. 2

e : Recently m b. ~xa.ml imnortmt nessaEe sipped at a division a'Sout2300 hm& WPS not trmemitted by 0830 hmrw ths follo%ina day. Check disclosed. thRt seven incminc ~OSSRBW., of between 700 an+ 800 code eroum , were received from t'hnhiphmr hsad.c+prtcrF during the period; that only'onp of the two o~e:r-ziors (crgato men) was en ilutg;that the mm on duty imnedfately be,gn decinherbg the inconing mess~ge5 after their receint (such nction was nropr 'b+c;nase of their cfnssificetion); Chat these messages Secausi:of their length were not~dscinhm~?? >y 0830 hours of "the following d~v" nca~;io:leci. awve; That tklewriter was not notified. -
c mention&
in m~agrznki 5, above - of this de-
in accardznce with the ru';~? lay; ani!that the irr,portant oubgoing .m?ssag~ had not besn comletaly
en-
ciphered F)t0830 hours of "the folllowing dq"_~enfionnd r?ovs.

Conclusion: It is believed.that the seveml correc.tivP C. :


--._-_.___-_. mensures necessary in the above exmmle are mmrent. The sxmmle is cited
in the hoTe of ninimSzing such occurrences.

2 Incls:

Annex #5 3 -

KMAG SIGNAL COMPUNICATIONS

FUidCTIObJAL CHKRT

-_..--

- ..--.-.--

. - _. _

-1
f
i

Senior Advisor Sipal Signal Officer KlJQG

ra.de..e_

_WI_-_._L

w.... _, -_.-..

I
KXAG

h,-.-__.,.J

Fh0tL.o

Corimunications
O.ffi32r
--l'fL--m. .4
_ --

1 AdminTstration

r------Y
Operst.dm

_-_I

L ----_...-.-

KNA_G RADIO PPS _.~__._~--_

Note a.

a.

BrlTTAT:IO,d AbVI=RS

AIR-GXWND LIAISON

Note
a, -

Radio te,amsfrom the KMflGsignal section are assi.g;ied at KMAG Headquarters and lower echelons to FncLlde division headquarters, Teams at Corps include red-Looperators, crypt0 perscL.;lel.and, whei:the
a radio repairrrtll
powerman.
and availability of personnel _oermi.ts, Teams at division level are usually limited to one radio operator
who also performs crypt0 functions.

Incl #2

UNITTD STAT% MSLIT_G?YADVISOW GSOIP TO TW 8;?02?AU


Office of the Chief
APO 701

RTWIC

OF PCR7A

c/o ?cslx?!.sster
San Franciscor Salif
1950 20 Decsm7?fi?

he conilitionp unbar which fieliiar%isc!ry p~sonn~l of this croup 1. ,m serve are varid, anr!tRctica1 conditions make In ~ornasitu3tionsl irist;,ncqs it relatively sir2nlrfcr ths Director of ';CLn,niJr to satisfy r?llrnauirEm?nts
of th? fiel? a$_visory ?~~~~:c~i~~?ts, In
otl;+r~ituati~7ns, rtistances, lack of
communications, anfit'??<~,rctS. it f92sih19 %t 8ifficul.t cgi situation rn~\kn to
supply fioIF installal;l~ns, Ddc?r stdi oth.lrcircumstances, pistances or the tactical sitwtiqn mkt-! it innrssihle f(\rthe Dirnc$bQrof Surj-dytq furnish logistical sunport, In this ca.sn,snpcial firranp::nnts nust % l&e for the sup?ly of fielr! afivisory&tacbe~ts,, Genlr&ly thpss ~etac~lnonts will ?e attache? to US units for lod.s*.icalSU~GT~, 7!';:lnn such arrsngeaents are
necessary, separate instructions trillhi: issud '?ythis headquarters.

G3RRAL : I? generpLl,l, the Birnctor of Sun?;-' will requisition, mceive, star- 7,) an+ issue 011 classps qf su-031 ins
to all. nmm%rs or units of thq group. It is the resnonsi?ility offthe seniQr advisor of each field a?visorg
detachment to insure th.?following:

P,. That all TJSpercome properly sup~lisfl.

3 -,.

assicmed or attached to his fletachment are

That there is no misuse, waste, or 8ccumulPtion of axcess su~01ips 3. in his detachment. c. That informal rocors?s of ~11 non-exoFnflnFle property in his de-
tackTent nre m&ibtained.

7. .

COPPS

SUPPLY

STCTIOV:

ORPA%TI?ATI@P. '3mnly sections RS list?fihelow are hpre'l?y autho-


a. rizeclfor eech Corps zs an ad.+itiontc,the stnff of the senior pbisor. These
units w-illdeal ilirsctly with the 3irector of Sundy on surely technical mat-
ters. It must ?-JO clearly understood, however, th_e.t thq RFL!not an inteaal
part of the Director of Sunnly organization hut are a psrt of tklestaff of the
senior aevisor,

1 1, ieut

ernnt -- Su-~nlv Officer

1 set l/cl

-- Sur3ly %TCO

(1) gJF)TLYO?IC73:

The COFX Su~nly Officer is resnqnsi?le for the proper oneratiQn of the Car-Jssupqly section. Ye will assist the senior,advisor on all m&tars prtaining

&pen?

ix #1

t0 SUpply of US nersonnel, Ve is resnonsFle that informal recorfis qf all non-emendable property in the Cerps are maintainer'. UP will con?ly with procetires an? scheduals as outline? 5y his sunplying apency.

(2) SUPPLY VCO: The S?~ply 'JCO'willefiitan? consolidate requests from Soms units and nersonnel, HP will receive, store, anclissue su3131ips, maintain recor?s, and uerform additional duties as mRy ?a required,

a. W-.--&d OS",k~TI~~IOP* Th.? Senior APvisor is resoonsi>le for compliance


with procedures an? schefltiae ?rescri%c! herein. Ye may aanoint a Suunly
Officer or a Supnlg ?TCOtc assist him in mentin? this rssnqnsi7-ilitv. ue
will uso assigned personnel for this uurTr)se and such duties will constitute
an additional duty for personnr?lso apuointed.

T",o '?rsicunit for su~Jy numosss is tha division advisory a. Petachment. PPers3nnql assiznsr! or attache3 tn divisions will requisition weekly on the r?ivision advisory ilrtadhmsnt CusUlv O"ficnr or "X0, T:?sDivi.

Officer or XC0 will su%~it &.e co>y of his requisition to the Cor?s Sunnly
Officer (or appropriate sunply azency, in the case qf divisions not attached
to a ROR Corps), retaining one copy for his own use in issuinir items when
received..
-b The Crrns %Dply ; fficer will nranare his requisition for the personnelLLssigned_ or attached to the Corbs Advisory Detechment in the manner d.escri?ed a3ove. Iipwill then consolidate that requisition with those sutmjtted hy the Suuply Officers of the attached Division Advisory Detachments. The final consolidation will he submitted to the aeency sunnlyinz ths Corps as a formal requisition. Ore copy of the requisition will \e retained hy the Corps Supply Officer for his use in making issue of sunulies received,

a, Units based on an agency other than IWAG for supply will comply
with schedules and nrocec'uresas diractnd hy the sunuortinc agency.

3.

Tha followinP nroceciureis urcscri?ed.for units C~~efl on YMAG

for supply:
(1) Requests will 30 consolidated weQkly ky Corps, Se-aarate
Division, Senarate ?eEimnnts, Pnd other senarata units anfi
forwardad, ATT??: Director of Supuly, so as to reach this
headquarters on or Yefore Tussr?ay. Sunnlies will Ye ready
for issUe at the Director of Supnly warehouse on Friday of
the same week.

Appendix #l'
2

._.

(4) Bonafide enercencles will Ye processed at any time.

ply and will not ,e ezx&ed


3~ fol.lowiw ere the e.Ilthor! eed levels of supa%_ L~3",T..~_: 7. AUT'VORI vifhO'c?t srjscif3.c annrou'a'i from this headauartera:

A---

fiftoerr (i5T gags c,neday .- '!A(' cr 'rBtr. ratbns,


a. Class I (P.a';ionsj condiments, one by "OFaraki3ne'l 'Irations,- (5 in 1 or rC~~racionsj for 75s of troops served.

b.
c_

Class II (Cicthke and.eaui?xej - seven (7)


Class

days.

oil III (Tst;roieu?m,

nnir icihr:cztts

for motor vehicles)

one (1) day.

OT?ICIAL:

UNITED STATES MTLITARY .aDVISQKYGROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA


8202d AU
Offioe of the Chief
APO 301
o/o Postmaster
San Franoisoo, Calif
2 February 1951

KIGGCG 350.05 SUBJECT: Suggestions for Unit Advisors

TO:
.

Field Advisors

for the infcrmati_on and


1. The attaohed memorandum is fcfivarded guidanoe of personnel concerned.
2. The oontents shouid be oarefully read and osnsidered by all field
advisors. They are the ocmments of a veteran advisor with both prewar and
war experienoa. These suggestions should not be oonsidered as solutions to
all the problems ,Jonfronting advisors. flowever they illustrate prinaiples
that have been applied with exoellent results.
3. Partioular attention should be direoted ta the oomments regarding
leadership, Though field advisors do not exeroise oommand in any sense,
an example of leadership may influen;e the Korean cffioers to the extent
that an over-all improvement may be effected.
4. The prinoiples outlined in this memorandum should be studied oare-
fully and applied whenever and wherever praotioable.

Chief

Appendix #2

BE an American Advisor with units of the Korean Army your mission is to provide your Forean officers with the Benefits of your Fast military experience. This requiremnnt ?ooe not apply to tact ical operations clone. It anFlies to all phases of military operations such as loeistics, n~rsonnel, trainin?, medical sunnort, &Tend., is

Your function twofold. First,

your mission is to act as an information Eath=rine acrenrgso that accurate, timely reports on all phases of the military oDeration can 3e forwarder'. through Anerican channels to the Chief I;TtAG. From this informption accurate reports can be prepared and submitted to the Army Commander. h order to perform these twq functions, you must have an und-erstandinc of the type of people wtth whom you are wTrkinc. YOU must realize fhat the Korean Army is a new army, +;hs'; there is ngt an old esta?lishsc? system. YOU must also rmalize t,kLqt the P;:rnansare very much aware of their inexperience and are 19oki;lgfor eood advice. Remamher thqt yc;uare not dealing with a group of unin:elligsnt pecpls, On the contrary thny are ex?,remely
intelligent and easily 2~c3-1l*ze 33 difference hetweox ~0~3. ; ,4vice, iq?i:ferent advice, .and ?a(! ad7,i,ce, Tha manner in which you prov+de advice 5r, ycur unit officers is er::r6SI_y important. If you give ad-vice in an inc?ifferent , lackadaisical macn:+T:, thy wili z.ccept it ad such and react to it in the same manner. Therefcrt it can he sair?t:latyour first .joh, is to stuay YOUr officers, learn to l;nderstandthem, and iend every effort to ecta?lish You should consider the a spirit of mutual trust, res;)pct, and cooneration. lack of experience and training of your >ersonnel a challange rather than an 03stacle. YOU must approach the securing of accurate information in much the same manner as giving advice. You must attempt to develop, a willingness on the The alternative to part of your officers to Sring Mxmation to vou. dig it out yourself - is uncertain and far too s?_ow. You will find it eood

practice to require cerbin resorts each;mornin< or each week denendinc on the su?jact and the sitwtion. An S-1 revert each morxing shcwing the
strengths of each unit, and. the number of casualties is invalu&le. Information on ?attle casualties can ??e utilized in various wa.ys. First of all it provides a check on the efficiency of your unit in com3a.t. From this report you may note that B Comrany h.assuffered serious casualties in an

action the previous day. Take thisinformption to tha S-3 an8 determine just what took place. Check with the commadrler concerned tr,find out the circumstances. Often in this way you spcure information that you miaht otherwise have overlooked, Corrective action can then ?e taken immediately that may prevent future difficulties, A second use of the S-1 report is to determine the number of non-?attlc cr.sualti?s. When these are excess?ve, yuu can often make apnroprinte recommendations to the medical officer or unit officers to eliminate the CPUS~ of these losses, $xamQle: l?if teen
men are listed as non-battle casualties. Check with the r+Wmental aifl. station and determine the reason. It may 36 dysentery, frost%ite, or any in th$s OEG~, let us say frostF\ite was the of a number of other reasons, cause. Immediately Sring this to the attention of the riletocn lead.ers. Have them conduct foot inspection twice daily, have them suqerviae the changing of socks, have them nrovide means of drying the mens socks and shoes. Recommend qeriodic massaging of the feet using the hudiry system. and check the front line nlatcons to 8.etarmine Finally go forward yourseif what is being done. YQU may find thet the casualties are not due to faulty This conilit ion can %cF? hroucrhtto the atequipment 5ut due to lack of it.

tention of S-4. Necessary action can at least he started to eliminate the shortage. The most im%rtant thing is to show interest and to 8.0something
constructive.
Appendix # 2 1

There ?re other types of reports thnt you should receive periodically;
They will assist you in pilvisinm unit officers properly. They will eid
you in rendorine eccurete r"?crts to hich@r heedauertsrs. They include
the following:
Ammunitix Status Be3oyt_: This is P necessitv! In order to pre-
Qent the stockpiling of rmmuniti3n fPr beyond co&at renuirsments you must
al~~ev~ >e up to fiTto on whzt is on hand. You must nlweys rnmem?er thn capacity of your tr9,nsnortPtion end keep ycur supnly of emmunition at p.
level that cm 11e hnndled.. %cess ive 0uTJlies usunllv must ?e f?estroyed or R?andoned.
_%~_g~s_of Weapons Re;iort: Ym must r~lweysshow much concern Rhout
tb_f? loss of weP?Dons. ?ecq>;meilr! some svstem whereby
the weapons of cc7suel-
ties ;Iresnlv~grer'
remover? ;~nd tr,F,safe star,?EG place for reissue ct :!later
dnte. Constrntly work on mezne of controlling the loss of wee7)ons. You
will find this one of ycur CreRtest prohlsms.
S-4 Qport:
This ra?ort ,qtlcrst once n we+ should shr)~shr?rtrees
_-_I_of clothing and equi-i:ren.t..
%t9?,lish T.qstr9 of checking all reauisitions
for resupply of food, clothin:, PCL, equ_Lzent, etc. In t%is wpy YT.Ikeep
aSreast of the supply situation pnc'eliminate wcste pnP ~ov9rClrPwing.
Oper::tions_~_~~__I_n_t~~l_l_~~ence__~sn?rt 5: V-U cpn
best secure this type of informatinn thraueh "~son;l o?serv~tirn .onPky persone.1cnntsct Judith the S-2 and S-X. Q'tlow whet information vvouwent! T~'rc" 2n interpreter an? mest ion the approprintp staff officer until v7u -?p.t thnt information. This informetion, coupled brithyour p=rsoc~l ohservgtian, will eive vou r?working kn7wled;e of the situation pt $3 times. Fers?ne11Q ._ conduct PI" interroerti9ns t
thrqurh friendly lines, talk to our personnel who
interview civilinns c?,rr.ing
asca.ped. This P,oes not tnk,?lone and the results mqre then justify the ef-
fort 2nd time ex-oanded.
YOU will note the term "pers?nel ol?servetion" has ?een use?. Assume
th,otyou are the commsndar of any size unit of the America Army engaged
in com%,-lt.%W $0 you keep yourself informed? You do so thrauch ::series
of reports from your staff officers, followed hy freauent personel in-
spections. In your position es Fn rdvisor to P unit-of the HqrefinArmy the
same system applies. These inspections must include both the edainistrstive
end tPcticP1 sitmtisn. Dose inspecti,9ns ;rreessential if you are to PC-
comnlish your missinn succ~ssfullv.
The folIowinE sucpstions pre offered 3s 13ossi?lernePnsof m&ing vnur joF)an easier r)neto perform. They may result in greatly imnr?vinp your strtus in your unit. over!. th?uzh you are not in a nosition of canmnnd, tr.y to be a leader - set finexemale for your Qfficers. Yau must \e. neat, cleen, sn~~eoldierly in a3Denrance 8t 2l.Itimes no mRtter how irifficult it nily>e to maintain yourself so. R-rneEY9rthat no one respects a sloven. If you find 8.woundefisolcf.ier from your unit, t&e
him to the rid station in your stetiqn periodicrllv cqncernina care of the l+lounded.
jeep. Check the ~?id. Show an interest in the soldiers ~nilofficers, A-k auestigns c?%ut their
clothing. Are they werm enouch? ?o they hF.vegloves or socks? If dis-
crepancies are found - do something alout it.

Appendix # 2
2

Skm

c9,nfiirence

in your

unit.

hlva:m

trr

tQ build

Ysprit

3e

Corps.

DO not evidence fiefeatism or fear in front, of your officers or your in-


terpreters no matter how strQn.:l:i you EP~ 39 tempteil to do SO.
Yx-plaintezticel failurps to :WI~ officers in such a WY that they
feel you arc?sincerely tr;vine to help them, Do nqt con?.emn them for their

failure. Instruct ther so such fr,ilwes c70 not recur.


D9 vat karc:ssthen constantly. you feel forceful cgrrectil-e %zn L action is necessary, stop ani!shink , then ;ict i2 such F!way that you are sure to o?tain results.

Be sufficiently awc?reof the situation so that you l7TY vhen ailVj_Oe ne9C?eA..Then z3.ve it frcdp. VOX must know enor4Th<ifthe situation ?t all times to be capa+le flfriving pt)Vic't. If you I% nqt know, 30 not
is

Five i3r'Yice.
The Americ,nn aC1,Vis;r in may !:e is fPcC$ -liln ngq my the p??epr 11~~: Of take the fiel?, Or in P hegdOua.rters, Or wh,erPVer
d.if?ia~lti.Ps. Fe solution to some qf these imhC:ssitj1R. Rs a rnsult of this feeline, advkors IeAst reeistpnce. T!?is nttitde $oes not fyet the

he

*ifficulties often

jo? done, To ad: is tn l=t drwn t;:?e other AC?Visors iz i RlAS, thgt there pre A'sricPn nf:Picsrs rnd Tpan s~rrir;;r in 911 levds

?e?e+er of the

Forear,Army. The77r?re f;lcec' -,rnl-l~~s with the SZITIP thzt ?V_Iare. The amount of effort exnen(7~?ii hy ;TJU C?S ,on id j.x-xfW91 to secilre itccurr2tP, timely information will i.nci g;lse the effect.k2zf,ers Of the 2fivis9rs owrati3g nc?jacent to you. Americnn lives. Th? lsorti0n.d tc the liack cf effort aa.;y rrsuii, -in anecessary co&at effscti;ren~Ss of 2 Toreen unit is nr,d. enthusiasm of the &iericm Loss of
rlirectly pm-

efficiency

aclvisor.

ADnendix # 2