G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010 ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Facts: Comelec refused to recognize AngLadlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application. Issue: Whether or not AngLadlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list. Ruling: AngLadlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted. Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation of the non -establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws or by any international laws by which we adhere.

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001 BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec Facts Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the parti cipation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court. Issue: 1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper. 2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections. 3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. Ruling: 1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable. 2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system. 3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts. However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists. AGONG BAYANI vs COMELEC G.R. No. 147589 - June 26, 2001 Facts: BagongBayani and andAkbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petitionunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by theCOMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and

parties,including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system wasintended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream politicalparties , the none-marginalized or overrepresented. Issues: a.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections b.Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors and organ izations. Held: The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELECwhich will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties andorganizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of theConstitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC to refrainproclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after theCOMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance .a.Yes b.No. Rationale: a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-listelections . Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannotbedisqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system . For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x xx." Section 3 expressly statesthat a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." b. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- maydo so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistentwith the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The provision on the party-list system is not self-executory . It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "inaccordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress tosculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution . Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Penera, Rosalinda A. vs. COMELEC and Edgar T. Andanar Supreme Court En BancG.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009 FACTS: Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the MunicipalityofSta.Monica, Surigaodel Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former filed her certificate of candidacy on the day before the prescribed campaign period. When shewent to the COMELEC Office for filing she was accompanied by her partymates.Thereafter, they had a motorcade which was consist of two trucks and ten motorcyclesrunning around the municipality convincing the residents to vote for her and the other candidates of their political party.Due to this, private respondent filed a petition against her alleging prematurecampaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says: Electionor partisan political activity outside campaign period. --- It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, toengage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period. She argued that she is not guilty since she was not yet a can didate at that timeand the campaign period has not yet started when the motorcade was conducted.While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, she was voted as mayor andtook her office thereafter. The COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of thecomplainant and found her guilty of premature campaigning. Likewise, when sheappealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision was affirmed.Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which decided against her. It heldthat the conduct of the motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan politicalactivity, falling under Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code which says:*h+olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting

votes and/or undertaking any campaign orpropaganda for or against a candidate*.+ Furthermore, it was held that she should vacatethe position. Now, she comes for a motion for reconsideration using the same arguments. ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of premature campaigning? RULING: No, she is not.Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough thatCongress stated that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall takeeffect only upon the start of the campaign period. So, it is lawful if done before the startof the campaign period. This plain language of the law need not be construed further.Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As whatwas decided in the Lanot Case which says that prior to the campaign period, even if thecandidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy, he/she is not yet considered as acandidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to talk about. What shedid was an exercise of her freedom of expression. JUDGMENT: WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc,respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta.Monica, Surigaodel Norte. DISSENTING OPINIONS:Chico-Nazario, J: It is obvious that the motorcade was planned to gain more votes from their constituents. Even if she was not yet a candidate at that time, she can he held guilty of premature campaigning as an ordinary citizen committing the prohibited act. Abad, J: But the fact that Penera was not yet a candidate before she actually handed in her certificate of candidacy to the designated COMELEC official does not exempt her fromthe prohibition against engaging in premature election campaign. Section 80 whichimposes the ban ensnares any person, even a non-candidate. x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Penera vs. Comelec: Decriminalizing Premature Campaigning The case of Penera vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009) has effectively voided a section of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) on premature campaigning. The Supreme Court reinstated Rosalinda Penera as mayor of the municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte as it granted her motion for reconsideration and set aside its earlier decision affirming her disqualification by the Comelec for premature campaigning. Peneras disqualification stemmed from her alleged premature campaigning wh en she and her supporters had a motorcade a day before the start of the authorized campaign period for the 2007 elections. For one to commit a violation of premature campaigning under Section 80 of the OEC, the following elements must exist: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.[2] Clearly, the second element requires the existence of a candidate. Under Section 79(a) of the OEC, a candidate is one who has filed a certificate of candidacy to an elective public office. This is further qualified by Section 15 of R.A. 8436, which p rovides that the person who filed a CoC shall only be co nsidered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. In other words, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. Ac cording to the Supreme Court, the law is clear as daylight any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. I believe that Penera vs. Comelec has made partisan political activities, in whatever form, lawful before the start of the official campaign period. Since the Supreme Court has declared that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, premature campaigning is effectively decriminalized. Thus, any partisan political activity, provided they are lawful (i.e. not violative of any other law), done by a person who has already filed his COC before the official campaign period, is legal.

The term partisan political activity is defined by the OEC[3] as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include: (1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate; (2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate; (3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office; (4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or (5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate. Thus, because partisan political activities done before the campaign period are now lawful, the acts enumerated above are also lawful. The effect is that candidates could be punished only for unlawful acts or omissions committed during the campaign period. Consequently, if candidates take campaign funds from a foreign government or bribe voters outside campaign period, they cannot be prosecuted. A candidate can freely commit election offenses so long as he commits them before the start of the campaign period.[4] The ruling has in a sense extended the campaign period. Under the law, the campaign period for candida tes running for national posts starts three months before May 10, or election day. The campaign period for local posts is even shorter. But because premature campaigning is now an impossible offense, one can campaign even before the start of this period. The effect is that you have two periods wherein partisan political activities are legal: (1) from the filing of COCs to the start of the official campaign period, wherein one is still not a candidate, and therefore cannot be liable for premature campai gning; (2) the official campaign period where a candidate can now engage in actual campaigning. This means that airing of infomercials, posting of tarpaulins and streamers, and even conducting gatherings of all sorts are lawful. Even saying vote for me should be considered lawful. After all, if you are still not a candidate, then directly or indirectly soliciting votes, which does not promote any particular candidate, is perfectly legal. x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Quinto vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) G.R. No. 189698; 1 December 2009 Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners, who held appointive positions in government and who intended to run in the 2010 elections, assailed Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678,* which deemed appointed officials automatically (ipso facto) resigned from office upon the filing of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC). Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369.** The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of Batas PambansaBlg. 881.*** Petitioners averred that they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already considered as candidates. (Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 provides that any person filing his certificate of candidacy within the period set by COMELEC shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.) Petitioners further averred that the assailed provision is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Representing the COMELEC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the petition was premature and petitioners had no legal standing since they were not yet affected by the assailed provision, not having as yet filed their CoCs. The OSG also argued that petitioners

could not avail the remedy of certiorari since what they were questioning was an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of its rule-making power. The OSG further averred that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of its Resolution No. 8678 since it merely copied what was in the law. The OSG, however, agreed that there is no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned upon filing their CoCs because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Issues: Main Issue: 1. Whether or not Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678 and the laws upon which it was based (second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 and Section 66 of Batas PambansaBlg. 881) are unconstitutional. Other Issues: 2. Whether or not certiorari is petitioners proper remedy. 3. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to file the case, and whether or not there is an actual controversy. Ruling: 1. On the Constitutionality of the Assailed ProvisionsThe second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of Batas PambansaBlg. 881 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 were declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from thei r posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. There are 4 requisites for a valid classification that will justify differential treatment between classes: (a) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (b) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (c) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. (W)hether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. An appointive official could wield the same dangerous and coercive influence on the electorate as the elective official. Both may be motivated by political considerations rather than the publics welfare, use their governmental positions to promote t heir candidacies, or neglect their duties to attend to their campaign. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The challenged provision is also overbroad because: (a) It pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not (It would be absurd to consider a utility worker in the government as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC; it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.); and (b) It is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. 2. On the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be availed of because what petitioners assailed in their petition was a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Prohibition is also an improper remedy, because what petitioners actually sought was the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights thereunder. What they filed was a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court does not exercise original jurisdiction.However, the Supreme Court decided to resolve the petition considering that: (a) it challenged the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of the COMELEC Resolution and the law; (b) the transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised; (c) the compelling state interest involved in the early resolution of the issues (considering that the period for filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections had started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for

elective offices were to lose their employment and the governments manpower might be crippled); and (d) the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure and resolve the merits of a case, otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. 3. On the Legal Standing of Petitioners to File the Case and the Existence of an Actual Controversy While petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the legal standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged provisions, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. Both candidates and voters may question challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed provisions, on grounds of equal protection, because of its impact on voting rights. At any rate, the Supreme Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and ru lings. There is an actual case or controversy between petitioners and the COMELEC. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would file their CoCs for the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provisions provide for automatic resignation upon filing the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners candidacy. * Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections ** An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas PambansaBlg. 881, as amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes *** The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines Ponente: J. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura Vote: 8-6 x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x