G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.

SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. PARAS, J.:p We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied) The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides: There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied) Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. Black defines "practice of law" as: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. ( Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.) The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrickv..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852) This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all

action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied) Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours) The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service. One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312) Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23) The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law." MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement? THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Commissioner will please proceed. MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years". To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up. MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question. MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit? MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes. MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law. MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. OPLE. Thank you. ... ( Emphasis supplied) Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied) Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15). At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.). The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.). The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and nonlitigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending

more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687). By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.). Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.). In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law. We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making. Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "modelmaking" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts. In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom. Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity. Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making. Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary

step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry. Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems inhouse. A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law. At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.) In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business. Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4). This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues. Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself. These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning. Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied) The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied) Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes. In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied) Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos: First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied) Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied) Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point. [Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus: Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work. Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with

an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions. This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4). The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 197273. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo) After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former CoChairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied) Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member. In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing

Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied) After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13). In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied) Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).( Emphasis supplied) A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265). Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied) No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,

subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied) The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200) The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides: The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent. Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined. Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers. Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President? We now proceed: The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. Additionally, consider the following: (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative. (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate. Finally, one significant legal maxim is: We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall flow from his veins. When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement. In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent. DECISION DE LEON, JR., J.: Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui. The relevant facts are: On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982. Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end. However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company. A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during

one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.[4] In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her. It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent. In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads: Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989. It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same. From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178). It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation. WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8] Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos

Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar. In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),[15] respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession. Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely: (i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and (ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.[17] In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.[18] On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter. Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21] to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.

In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date. In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent. Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that: In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience. Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men. The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. TeodoroBonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl. x..........................x..........................x" Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty." We agree with the findings aforequoted. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are: a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines; b. a resident thereof; c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character; e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court; f. possess the required educational qualifications; and g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied) Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26] In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him. Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him. Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her. All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[28] We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships x xx but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of

flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to do. On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable. Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZASpetitioners, vs. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNINGrespondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent QuintinMuning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case. The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. BinalbaganIsabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and VictorinoTenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. AtanacioPacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer. The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. AtanacioPacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent QuintinMuning. On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows: Attys. Cipriano Cid ............................................. 10% & Associates

QuintinMuning ......................................................................... 10% Atty. AtanacioPacis ................................................................. 5% The award of 10% to QuintinMuning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition. Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review. 2 The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief. 3 Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case. The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel ... is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence. thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar. The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing Sec. 24.Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ... imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and VictorinoTenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public. On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated: But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5 No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time. 6 The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; 7 that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of

necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10 And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney.11 The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception. The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated. We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides: Sec. 6.Unfair Labor Practice cases Appeals. Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ..., since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations. Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law. WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent QuintinMuning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning. Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ. concur. G.R. Nos. 102526-31. May 21, 1998 Sps. LORENZO V. LAGANDAON and CECILIA T. LAGANDAON and OVERSEAS AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Sps. MELITON BANOYO and ASUNCION P. BANOYO, Sps. DEMETRIO B. BATAYOLA and ANITA A. BATAYOLA, BONIFACIO VASQUEZ, Sps. ROMEO M. GOMEZ and ESTER M. GOMEZ, AURORA GOMEZ, Sps. CARLOS V. DAVID and MANUELA C. DAVID, Sps. LEONIDO D. BONGCO and FE V. BONGCO, Sps. RAFAEL S. SOLIDUM and LUCENDA M. SOLIDUM, Sps. RAYMUNDO SITJAR and LUCIA SITJAR AND Sps. BENJAMIN V. VIVA and GILDA VIVA, Respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Questions of fact, as a general rule, may not be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45. This is especially true where - as in this case - such questions have already been disposed of by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. The failure of the petitioner to justify a departure from this rule warrants the dismissal of the petition. The Case

This doctrine is used by the Court in denying this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 promulgated on August 30, 1991 in CA-G.R. Nos. 2667126676, which disposed as follows: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by deleting the award of attorneys fees in favor of the defendant[s]-appellees. The Court of Appeals actually affirmed, with the slight modification of deleting the award of attorneys fees, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172,3 in Civil Case Nos. 3188-V-89 to 3192-V-89, the dispositive portion of which reads:4 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Complaints have to be as they are hereby ordered DISMISSED, including their claims for attorneys fees and costs of litigation. On defendants/purchasers counterclaims, defendant Spouses Demetrio Batayola et al. in Civil Case No. 3188-V-89 are awardedP10,000.00attorneys fees in resisting this case; and all defendants in the rest of the cases are awarded P10,000.00 in each case as attorneys fees, likewise for resisting these claims. Hence, this petition for review.5 The Facts The uncontested facts6 are narrated by Respondent Court of Appeals, as follows:7 On different dates specified herein below, Pacweld Steel Corporation (Pacweld) a now defunct domestic corporation executed in favor of present defendants herein a Contract to Sell pieces of lots payable in installment [for] which payments started to be made. For a better perspective, the following are herein reflected: Defendants/Purchasers Dates of Contracts MelitonBanoyo Feb. 6, 1967 Batayola Spouses Nov. 25, 1967 Romeo M. Gomez Feb. 27, 1968 Carlos V. David March 4, 1968 LeonidoBongco March 15, 1968 Bonifacio Vasquez May 31, 1967 Purchasers / Total Total Payments Last Defendants Consideration Payments Dates Banoyo P10,000.00 P4,303.43 Nov. 23, 1971 Batayola 7,271.92 7,232.24 Romeo Gomez 6,945.68 8,669.55 April 24, 1972 David 11,430.00 7,221.13 Nov. 22, 1972 Bongco 11,700.00 8,855.18 Jan. 22, 1974 + 303.20 Vasquez 8,730.00 7,505.37 Aug. 9, 1972 On or about the year 1972[,] the above-mentioned defendant[s]purchasers deferred/refused further payments on their amortization to Pacweld because of [the] refusal of Lorenzo V. Lagandaon, then President of Pacweld officials [sic] to undertake the development of the areas bought. Defendants/Purchasers, together with other lot buyers filed an action for Specific Performance with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXVII, docketed as Civil Case No. 87763 entitled Rolando Fadul et al., Plaintiffs vs. Pacweld Steel Corporation et al. On October 12, 1976 the said Court promulgated its decision stating therein the following. From all the foregoing evidence introduced by theplaintiffs, as well as the stipulation of facts entered into by the defendants with the former, the Court is fully convinced that defendants indeed have not lived up to the conditions of its [sic] contract particularly paragraph 6-A thereof. The roads which were supposed to be cemented in fact, had been constructed as clearly shown in Exhibits B, B-1, B-2 and B-3. So also, with the big

holes existing on the roads. For this reason, the Court further concludes that plaintiffs have adequately proven their cause of action by clear preponderance of evidence. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows: Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows: 1. Ordering the defendants to strictly comply with their obligations under the contract to sell (par. 6-a) within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof, in the event of defendants failure to comply with said undertakings, the plaintiffs are authorized to avail of the services of a contractor to undertake the cementing of the roads, gutters and concrete curbs including the drainage system, all at the expense of the defendants; 2. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the sum of P35,000.00 as and by way of moral damages, which amount is considered just and reasonable considering the sufferings of the plaintiffs; 3. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages; 4. Ordering the plaintiffs who have not up-dated their accounts and/or have not complied with their undertakings in the contract to sell to comply with same also within sixty days from receipt of this decision; 5. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiffsattorneys fees in the sum of P4,000.00 with costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED. To be mentioned in connection with this case are the following separate facts and incidents. Pursuant to real estate mortgages constituted on the entire Pacweld [s]ubdivision lots by Pacweld Steel Corporation (Pacweld) in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines to secure a loan of P1.5 million, the said DBP foreclosed the mortgaged properties including the properties sold to defendants/purchasers at public auction on June 2, 1975 due to the failure of Pacweld to pay its loan at maturity. As there were no bidders, the DBP as creditor participated in the bidding and thereafter, owing to the non-redemption of the properties, titles to the Pacweld Subdivision lots were consolidated in the name of DBP. On May 12, 1980, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by DBP in favor of herein plaintiffs [now petitioners] covering 69 parcels of land known as Pacweld Village located at Marulas. Plaintiffs became the registered owners by virtue of said Deed of Absolute Sale, under TCT No. B-42988. Although no copy of the said Deed of Absolute Sale was furnished this Court, it appears in one of the pleadings submitted to Court that in said Deed of Absolute Sale is a typewritten condition to which plaintiffs are now bound and which is below quoted: It is hereby understood that any and all claims, liens, assessments, liabilities and/or damages whatsoever arising from any case or litigation involving the above, properties shall wholly be assumed and borne by the vendees to the exclusion of the vendor. In the similarly worded complaints in all these civil cases, plaintiffs allege that by virtue of the acquisition of ownership by DBP over the entire Pacweld [s]ubdivision lots including the lots in question and under the authority of the above-mentioned Deed of Absolute Sale executed by DBP in favor of plaintiffs, the unregistered Contract to Sell executed by Pacweld and herein defendants were rendered stale and/or inoperative and consequently, defendants lost their rights and interests over the parcels of land agreed to be sold to them by Pacweld under their respective Contract to Sell; that without necessarily recognizing the defendants rights under the Contract to Sell, but out of pure liberality and Christian compassion, the plaintiffs agreed to continue with the sale on installment of the abovementioned parcels of land, pursuant to the Contract to Sell in favor of the defendants provided that they would update their account consistent with the provisions of the said Contract to Sell and provided further that plaintiffs have the right of forfeiture and would not be bound or liable to comply with the obligation of the developer under the Contract to Sell. In all these civil cases, plaintiffs have one common prayer, which is, that defendants be declared to have unjustifiably failed to comply with their obligations under the Modified Contract to Sell, and pronouncing that said Contract to Sell over the said parcels of land

and the rights and obligations arising therefrom as rescinded and/or cancelled; that plaintiffs be declared as legally entitled to the possession of the above-described parcels of land, ordering defendants and all persons acting under them to vacate the said parcels of land and surrender them to plaintiffs; that defendants be ordered to pay damages and attorneys fees which amount they specified in each of the cases. (Decision, pp. 1-5) For the sake of clarity, we stress that there were three undisputed transactions involving the property subject of this controversy: 1. The contract to sell executed by Pacweld, then headed by Petitioner Lorenzo Lagandaon, in favor of herein private respondents; 2. The foreclosure sale by which DBP acquired ownership of the property from Pacweld; and 3. The contract of sale executed by DBP in favor of herein petitioners, the Lagandaon spouses. This case began when petitioners filed several identical complaints before the CFI to rescind the first item, i.e., the contracts to sell executed by Pacweld in favor of private respondents. In their aforesaid complaint, petitioners alleged that the contract to sell had become stale and/or inoperative by virtue of the acquisition of ownership by the DBP over the entire Pacweld Subdivision x x x.8Petitioners also averred that the relationship of petitioners and private respondents was governed by an alleged modified agreement to sell, which provided that private respondents would update their account consistent with the provisions of said [original] Contract to Sell; while petitioners have the right of forfeiture and would not be bound nor liable to comply with the obligation of the developer under the [original] Contract to Sell.9 Petitioners justified the filing of the complaints for rescission on the ground that private respondents failed to pay their outstanding account. In their answer, private respondents denied the existence of a modified contract to sell.10 They also argued that petitioners, as successors-in-interest of Pacweld, had no right to demand rescission or payment of the unpaid balance, until such time that they have completed the development of the subdivision pursuant to the provisions of the x xx Contract to Sell and the Decision of the CFI of Manila.11 In its decision, the trial court held that petitioners cannot base their acts on [an] alleged modified contract to sell, which this Court believes to be nonexistent not only physically but also legally.12 Respondent Courts Ruling Although the petitioners cause of action was premised on the existence of an alleged modified contract to sell, the Court of Appeals13 (CA) observed that petitioners did not challenge the trial courts finding that no such contract existed. The CA further ruled that petitioners could no longer raise on appeal their alleged ownership rights over the lots in litigation arising from the May 12, 1980 sale by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and from the execution sale. To do so would change their theory before the trial court that herein private respondents defaulted their obligation under the alleged modified contract to sell. Thus, the CA held that petitioners had no right to demand the rescission of the various contracts to sell on the basis of the alleged modified contracts to sell which were inexistent. Hence, it affirmed the trial courts decision dismissing the complaint, but deleted the award of attorneys fees. The Issues In their Memorandum, petitioners present the following issues:14 1. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was no modified Contract (verbal) to Sell between petitioners and respondents; 2. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was a change of theory on appeal of petitioners; 3. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioners have no right to ask for rescission of the various contracts to sell on the basis of the modified contract (verbal) to sell; and consequently, in dismissing to [sic] complaints. In the main, two principal issues are raised: (1) whether there were modified contracts to sell and (2) whether petitioners assumed the obligations of Pacweld.

The Courts Ruling The appeal has no merit. First Issue: No Modified Contracts to Sell Petitioners contend that there were modified contracts to sell between them and private respondents. Maintaining that the original contract to sell between Pacweld and private respondents became stale or inoperative when DBP acquired the disputed parcels of land, petitioners argue that they and the private respondents subsequently entered into oral modified contracts to sell. In their complaint before the RTC, they aver:15 7. By virtue of the acquisition of ownership by the DBP over the entire Pacweld Subdivision lots including the lot in question and under the authority of the above-mentioned Deed of Absolute Sale executed by DBP in favor of the plaintiffs, the unregistered Contract to Sell (Annex A) executed by and between Pacweld and the herein defendants, was rendered stale and/or inoperative; that consequently, defendants lost their rights and interests over the parcel of land agreed to be sold them by Pacweld under the Contract to Sell (Annex A). 8. Without necessarily recognizing defendants rights under their respective Contracts to Sell (Annex A, Complaint), but out of pure liberality and Christian compassion, the herein plaintiffs agreed to continue with the sales on installment in favor of the defendants, provided they would update their accounts consistent with the provisions of the Contract to Sell and provided further that plaintiffs have the right of forfeiture and would not be bound nor be liable to comply with the obligation of the previous owner-developer (Pacweld) under their respective Contract to Sell. (Underscoring supplied.) Petitioners theory rests on the existence of modified contracts to sell. Taking the place of Pacweld, petitioners seek to collect the unpaid accounts of private respondents under the original contracts to sell, but they want exemption from the concomitant obligations of Pacweld under the same contracts. Hence, they insist on a modification of these contracts. We cannot sustain petitioners. That the contracts to sell had indeed been rendered stale because of the foreclosure sale does not necessarily imply that orally modified contracts to sell were subsequently entered into between petitioners as buyers of the foreclosed property, on the one hand, and private respondents as purchasers from Pacweld Corporation, on the other. Furthermore the trial court, as observed earlier, found that the modified contracts to sell were non-existent physically and legally. It also stated that plaintiff spouses did not execute a contract with defendants different from the existing Contract to Sell between Pacweld Steel Corporation and defendant purchasers herein.16 The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court had not erred in dismissing the complaints filed by plaintiffsappellants.17 Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.18 Moreover, the existence of modified contracts to sell is a question of fact which may not be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45.19 Verily, petitioners have not given us a valid reason to depart from this rule. Indeed, the self-serving and unsubstantiated allegation in the petitioners complaint that there was an oral modification of the contracts to sell does not justify a reversal of the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. As held in Engineering & Machinery Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:20 The Supreme Court reviews only errors of law in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45. It is not the function of this Court to reexamine the findings of fact of the appellate court unless said findings are not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. The Court has consistently held that the factual findings of the trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Among the exceptional circumstances where a reassessment of facts found by the lower courts is allowed are when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. After a careful study of the case at bench, we find none of the above grounds present to justify the re-evaluation of the findings of fact made by the courts below.

We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the appellate court. x xx (I)t is not the function of this Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties, particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide. (italics supplied). Second Issue: Petitioners Assumed Pacwelds Obligations Petitioners contend that they could not have assumed the obligations of Pacweld because they were buyers in good faith and for value. When the deed of absolute sale in favor of DBP was signed, the title to the foreclosed property was clean; i.e., the subject contracts to sell were not duly annotated at the back of Pacwelds certificate of title.21 Hence, petitioners insist that they likewise acquired from DBP a clean title free from any encumbrance. Petitioners liability, if at all, is limited to their unpaid subscriptions to Pacweld Steel Corporation as stockholders thereof. Petitioners add that Republic Act No. 6652, otherwise known as the Maceda Law, should have been applied by Respondent Court. As a general rule, every buyer of a registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate.22 It has been held, however, that where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. The torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud.23 In this case, Petitioner Lorenzo Lagandaon had actual knowledge of the contracts to sell made by Pacweld in favor of herein private respondents. He was not only the president of Pacweld at the time, he himself signed those contracts.24 Hence, when he acquired the title of DBP, he was aware of the preexisting contracts to sell between Pacweld and private respondents. More significantly, petitioners also assumed all liens and liabilities arising from any case involving the said properties. Even assuming arguendo that petitioners were buyers in good faith and for value, their subsequent actions indisputably show that they assumed the obligations of Pacweld under the original contracts to sell. When they acquired title over the property on May 12, 1980, they sought to collect payment from private respondents under the said contracts. In their demand letter dated April 28, 1989, petitioners through counsel required Private Respondents Rafael Solidum and LeonidoBongco to settle with them the latters unpaid accounts under the original contracts to sell.25 Likewise, the subsequent letter of Lagandaons counsel to Private Respondent RaymundoSitjar unequivocally declared that the demand was made pursuant to the original contract to sell between Pacweld and private respondents. 26In these demand letters, petitioners made no mention of any alleged modified contracts to sell; rather, they referred to the original contracts to sell without invoking any qualification or modification of the terms and conditions thereof. In fact, the notion of a modified contract to sell was a mere afterthought which surfaced for the first time in the petitioners complaint before the RTC. Because petitioners assumed the obligations of Pacweld when they purchased the disputed properties on May 12, 1980, they should be liable for all the undertakings of Pacweld with respect to private respondents under the contracts to sell, as clearly provided under such deed. The Maceda Law has no application to the present case. The policy of that law, as embodied in its title, is to provide protection to buyers of real estate on installment payments. As clearly specified in Section 3, the declared public policy espoused by Republic Act No. 6552 is to protect buyers of real estate on installment payments against onerous and oppressive conditions. In this case, petitioners did not buy the property on installment; private respondents did. And thus, if the Maceda Law has any relevance at all, it is to protect the said respondents, not the petitioners. Furthermore, Section 3(b)27 of the same law does not grant petitioners any legal ground to cancel the contracts to sell; rather, it prescribes the responsibility of the seller in case the contract[s are] cancelled. Clearly, Respondent Court was correct in refusing to apply the Maceda Law and in not cancelling the contracts to sell. As held by the trial court: Plaintiffs prayer that defendant/purchasers be made to vacate the lots and surrender to plaintiffs cannot be granted, not only because of the foregoing reasons but also because to do so would be contrary to other existing laws, specifically Republic Act 6552 (Maceda Law) which is an Act To Provide Protect[ion] to Buyers of Real Estate on Installment Payments, which took effect on August 6, 1972. By virtue thereof, considering that all defendants/purchasers appear to have complied with Section 3 thereof, this second remedy applied for by plaintiff is not legally feasible. Neither can plaintiff exercise the right under said law because it is not the subdivision owner or developer envisioned in said law.

The Alleged Dormant Judgment: Petitioners as Developers Petitioners argue that they cannot be compelled to assume the obligations of [Pacweld] corporation as x xx real estate developers, because the CFIs decision dated October 12, 1976 was already dormant, more than ten (10) years having elapsed after the finality of judgment.28 Further, petitioners are not licensed and qualified real estate developers. Hence, petitioners could not have assumed the obligations of Pacweld to develop the subject subdivision.29 These arguments are bereft of merit. It is irrelevant whether the CFI Decision -- which ordered Pacweld to perform its obligations under the contracts to sell -- has become dormant. As discussed above, petitioners themselves assumed the said obligations of Pacweld. That petitioners were not qualified or licensed as developers does not justify their failure to comply with the obligations under the contracts to sell which they assumed. Whether a license is necessary is likewise irrelevant. In any event, their obligations were personal to them and were not undertaken in pursuance of any real estate business. We also hold that the express condition in the deed of absolute sale, which petitioners as buyers accepted as part of the consideration of the sale, cannot be considered mere surplusage with no legal significance.30 Petitioners themselves contradicted this by their admission that it was placed there, as a safety valve, to protect DBP from legitimate third party claims.31 Attorneys Fees Deleted Private respondents pray that the trial courts award of attorneys fees, which the Court of Appeals deleted, be restored. They contend that, to resist petitioners claims, they had to retain a lawyer and pay for his fees. In any event, they plead that the amount of P10,000 as attorneys fees was only minimal or nominal,32 and should thus be restored. We are not persuaded. Parties who have not appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative reliefs other than those granted, if any, in the decision of the lower court. Appellees can advance only such arguments as may be necessary to defeat the appellants claims or to uphold the appealed decision. They can assign errors on appeal if such are required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. Such assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision. But appellees cannot ask for modification of the judgment in their favor in order to obtain other affirmative reliefs.33 Since herein private respondents did not appeal from the assailed Decision, they are not entitled to any award of affirmative relief. Besides, the award is addressed to the sound discretion of courts.34 And absent any showing of abuse or palpable error, as in this instance, such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal. Epilogue In the main, the Lagandaon Spouses have consistently maintained in their various pleadings that they agreed to continue with the sale on installment of the disputed parcels of land under a modified contract without necessarily recognizing defendants rights under the [original] Contract to Sell, but out of pure liberality and Christian compassion. The difficulty with this contention is that it has no factual leg to stand on. The Lagandaon Spouses did not even inform the private respondents of this alleged modification when they attempted to collect the installment payments. Instead, they merely insisted on collecting under the original contracts. It was only after they filed their complaint in the RTC that they alleged modifications in the contracts, the modifications being that they were not bound by Pacwelds obligations to develop the subdivision over which they wanted to collect installments from the buyers (private respondents). They insist only on exercising Pacwelds rights to collect installments due but deny the obligations to build roads, water system, etc. Aside from the basic unfairness of this stance, it is not supported by any evidence as found by both lower courts. To reiterate, the petition of the Lagandaon Spouses assails the findings of the trial and the appellate courts on the aforesaid two principal issues. The Lagandaon Spouses, however, presented no substantial argument or evidence to warrant a reversal or modification of these factual findings. In this light, the remand of this case, as prayed for by the petitioners, is unnecessary. After all, a re-trial is needed only where some factual issues are unresolved. And there are none in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur. A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990 ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts: 1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and EdithaFortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation. 2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490; 3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q15143, while the case was still pending; 4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City; 5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936; 6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client; 7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City; 8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings; 9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either." Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder. In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.

On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice. On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts of misconduct: a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case where the properties were involved; b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404]. Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings. I.Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that: This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed. The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation. Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353]. Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will

result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years. Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against him. II.The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista. After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power. The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)]. However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility. This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him. Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided

in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that: ... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied]. It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement was implemented. Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971. Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part. The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517]. Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement. Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xeroxcopyattached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee

contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that: We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees. is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions. The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No.Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him. The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution. The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to harass complainant. Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds. The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales. SO ORDERED.