Bill of Rights 2

Boy Scouts of America vs.
Dale
Manotok Realty vs CLT

EN BANC
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, Petitioners,
G.R. No. 123346
Present:
PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, - versus CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO BRION, and PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 31, 2009 x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., Petitioner,
G.R. No. 134385
- versus -
HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING

SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In the Courts Resolution dated 14 December 2007, the Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the instant case on remand. The Special Division was composed of three Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, with Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member. We instructed the Special Division to proceed as follows:
[1]
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to make the following determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it, to wit:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government and whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by the Government through expropriation.
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
[2]
The Special Division proceeded to conduct hearings in accordance with the Resolution. The parties to these cases, namely CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT), Manotok Realty Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (the Manotoks), the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson (Heirs of Dimson), and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta), were directed by the Special Division to present their respective evidence to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Special Division rendered a 70-page Report (Report) on 26 November 2008. The Special Division submitted the sealed Report to this Court.
[3]

Before taking action on the Report itself, we dispose of a preliminary matter. On February 17, 2009, the Manotoks filed a motion beseeching that copies of the report be furnished the parties so that they may submit their comments and objections thereon in accord with t he principle contained in Sec. 10, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court. We deny the motion.
It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence was strictly in accordance with Rule 32. Notably, Section 1 of said Rule authorizes the referral o f the case to a commissioner by written consent of both parties, whereas in the cases at bar, the Court did not endeavor to secure the consent of the parties before effectuating the remand to the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, our earlier advertence to Rule 32 remains proper even if the adopted procedure does not hew strictly to that Rule, owing to our power under Section 6, Rule 135 to adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which appears conformable to the spirit of the Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary processes and other means necessary to carry our jurisdiction into effect.
Moreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report would not serve any useful purpose. It would only delay the promulgation of the Courts action on the Sealed Report and the adjudication of these cases. In any event, the present Resolution quotes extensively from the sealed Report and discusses its other substantive segments which are not quoted.
The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of the issues referred to the Special Division. It is a more than adequate basis for this Court to make the following final dispositions in these cases.
I.
We adopt the succeeding recital of operative antecedents made by the Special Division in its Report.
THE PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS
DIMSON v. ARANETA CA-G.R. CV. NO. 41883 & CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 [SC-G.R. No. 134385]

On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed with the then Court of First Instance *CFI+ of Rizal a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against ARANETA. On 7 May 1980, DIMSON amended his complaint and included Virgilio L. Enriquez *ENRIQUEZ+ as his co-plaintiff.
In said Amended Complaint, DIMSON claimed that he is the absolute owner of a 50-hectare land located in Bo. Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manila covered by TCT No. R-15169, [Lot 25-A-2] of the Caloocan Registry of Deeds. Allegedly, DIMSON had transferred the subject property to ENRIQUEZ by way of an absolute and irrevocable sale on 14 November 1979. Unfortunately though, DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ discovered that the subject property was being occupied by ARANETA wherein an agricultural school house is erected and that despite repeated demands, the latter refused to vacate the parcel of land and remove the improvements thereon.
ARANETA, for its part, refuted said allegations and countered that it is the absolute owner of the land being claimed by DIMSON and that the real properties in the Araneta Compound are properly documented and validly titled. It maintained that it had been in possession of the subject parcel of land since 1974. For this reason, the claims of DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ were allegedly barred by prescription.
During the trial, counsel for ARANETA marked in evidence, among others, certifications from the Land Registration Commission attesting that TCTs Nos. 13574 and 26538, covering the disputed property, are in the names of ARANETA and Jose Rato, respectively. ARANETA also offered TCT No. 7784 in evidence to prove that it is the registered owner of the land described therein.
On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision upholding the title of DIMSON over the disputed property xxx
Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, which was later consolidated with CA-GR. SP No. 34819 in view of the inter-related issues of the two cases.
In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, sustained the RTC Decision in favor of DIMSON finding that the title of ARANETA to the disputed land in a nullity. In CA-GR. SP No. 34819, the Court of Appeals likewise invalidated the titles of ARANETA, relying on the Supreme Court ruling inMetropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals, which declared null and void the certificates of title derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 may 1917. It was also held that ARANETA failed to sufficiently show that the Order sought to be nullified was obtained through extrinsic fraud that would warrant the annulment thereof.
Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion for Reconsideration And/Or New Trial espousing therein as basis for its entreaty the various letters from different government agencies and Department order No. 137 of the Department of Justice, among others.

On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of ARANETA were denied by the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court ordered DIMSON to maintain status quo until the finality of the aforesaid judgment.
Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition before the Supreme Court. Refuting the factual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, ARANETA contended that there in only one OCT 994 covering the Maysilo Estate issued on 3 May 1917 pursuant to the Decree No. 36455 issued by the Court of Land Registration on 19 April 1917 and added that there were subsequent certifications issued by the government officials, notably from the LRS, the DOJ Committee Report and the Senate Committees Joint Report which attested that there is only one OCT 994, that which had been issued on 3 May 1917.
CLT v. MANOTOK CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255 [SC-G.R. No. 123346]
On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the Regional Trial Court *RTC+ A COMPLAINT FOR Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages against the MANOTOKS and the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II (Calookan City, Metro Manila) *CALOOCAN RD+.
In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate located in Caloocan City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 177013, a derivative title of OCT No. 994. As a basis of its proprietary claim, CLT averred that on 10 December 1988, it had acquired Lot 26 from its former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito *HIPOLITO+, by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage. HIPOLITOs title was , in turn, a direct transfer from DIMSON, the regist ered owner of TCT No. 15166, the latter having acquired the same by virtue of a Court Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557.
On the other hand, the MANOTOKS maintained the validity of their titles, which were all derivatives of OCT No. 994 covering over twenty (20) parcels of land located over a portion of Lot 26 in the Maysilo Estate. In substance, it was contented that the title of CLT was an offspring of an ineffective grant of an alleged undisputed portion of Lot26 by way of attorneys fees to its predecessor-in- interest, Jose B. Dimson. The MANOTOKS, in this connection, further contended that the portion of Lot 26, subject of the present controversy, had long been disposed of in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio and hence, there was nothing more in said portion of Lot 26 that could have been validly conveyed to Dimson.
Tracing the legitimacy of their certificates of titles, the MANOTOKS alleged that TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT No. 994, had been issued in the names of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio on Sept ember 1918 by virtue of an Escritura De Venta executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Lopes on 21 August 1918. TCT No. 4210 allegedly covered an approximate area of 19,565.43 square meters of Lot 26. On even date, TCT No. 4211 was transferred to Francisco Gonzales on the strength of an Escritura de Venta dated 3 March 1920 for which TCT No. T-5261, covering an area of 871,982 square meters was issued in the name of one Francisco Gonzales, married to Rufina Narciso.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-35485, canceling TCT No. T-5261, was issued to Rufina Narcisa Vda. de Gonzales which was later replaced with the names of Gonzales six (6) children. The property was then subdivided and as a result of which, seven (7) certificates of titles were issued, six (6),under the names of each of the children while the remaining title was held by all of them as co-owners.
Eventually, the properties covered by said seven certificates of title were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines. These properties were then later subdivided by the National Housing Authority *NHA+, into seventy -seven (77) lots and thereafter sold to qualified vendees. As it turned out, a number of said vendees sold nineteen (19) of these lots to Manotok Realty, Inc. while one (1) lot was purchased by the Manotok Estate Corporation.
During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, approved the creation of a commission composed of three commissioners tasked to resolve the conflict in their respective titles. Accordingly, the created Commission convened on the matter in dispute.
On 8 October 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San Buenaventura submitted an exhaustive Jo int Final Report *THE MAJORITY REPORT+ finding that there were inherent technical infirmities or defects on the face of TCT No. 4211, from which t he MANOTOKS derived their titles (also on TCT No. 4210), TCT No. 5261 and TCT No. 35486. Teodoro Victoriano submitted his Individual Final Report *THE MINORITY REPORT+ dated 23 October 1993.
After the conduct of a hearing on these reports, the parties filed their respective comments/objections thereto. Upon order of the trial court, the parties filed their respective memoranda.

Adopting the findings contained in the Majority Report, the RTC, on 10 May 1994, rendered a Decision, in favor of CLT and ordered, among others, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of the MANOTOKS.
The MANOTOKS elevated the adverse RTC Decision on appeal before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 28 September 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision, except as to the award of damages which was deleted. The MANOTOKS then moved for reconsideration, but said motion was denied by said appellate court in its Resolution dated 8 January 1996. After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, the MANOTOKS filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners for Review, separately filed by the MANOTOKS, ARANETA and Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc., *STO. NIO+, were consolidated.
Also submitted for consideration of the Supreme Court were the report of the Fact Finding Committee dated 28 August 1997 and the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 which concluded that there was only one OCT No. 994 issued, transcribed and registered on 3 May 1917.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In its Decision dated 29 November 2005 *THE SUPREME COURT 2005 DECISION+, the Supreme Court, through its Third Division, affirmed the RTC Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, which declared the titles of CLT and DIMSON as valid.
In invalidating the respective titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, the Supreme Court, in turn, relied on the factual and legal findings of the trial courts, which had heavily hinged on the imputed flaws in said titles. Considering that these trial court findings had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that the same were accorded the highest degree of respect and, generally, should not be disturbed on appeal.
Emphasis was also made on the settled rule that because the Supreme Court was not a trier of facts, it was not within its function to review factual issues and examine, evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.

THE SUPEME COURT RESOLUTION
Expectedly, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court 2005 Decision.
Resolving said motions for reconsideration, with the Office of the Solicitor General *OSG+ intervening on behalf of the Republic, the Supreme Court, in its Resolution of 14 December 2007 *THE SUPREME CCOURT 2007 RESOLUTION+ reversed and nullified its 2005 Decision and categorically invalidated OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, which was the basis of the propriety claims of CLT and DIMSON. However, the Supreme Court resolved to remand the cases to this Special Division of the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence.
To guide the proceedings before this Special Division of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court made the following binding conclusions:
First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the ate of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 * resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on (19) April 1917, although such dated cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 casts doubt on the
validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates appearing on their respective titles.
Third. The decision of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting [4] the same as or similar to that at bar.
II.
The parties were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence before the Special Division. The Report names the evidence submitted to the Special Division for its evaluation:
CLT EVIDENCE
In its Offer of Evidence,[ ] CLT adopted the documentary exhibits and testimonial evidence of witnesses submitted in the case filed by CLT against STO. NIO in Civil Case No. C-15491, *CLT-STO NIO CASE+. These pieces of evidence include, among others, the Majority and Minority Reports, the Formal Offer of Evidence in the presentation of the evidence-in-chief and rebuttal evidence in the CLT-STO NIO CASE consisting of various certificates of titles, plans by geodetic engineer, tax declarations, chemistry report, specimen signatures and letters of correspondence.
[5]
MANOTOKS EVIDENCE

The MANOTOKS sought admission of the following evidence: Senate and DOJ Committee Reports; certificates of title issued to them and their vendees/assignees, i.e., Republic of the Philippines, the Gonzalezes, Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio, Isabel Gil del Sola and Estelita Hipolito; deeds of absolute sale; contracts to sell; tax declarations and real property tax receipts; the Formal Officer of Evidence of Philville Development & Housing Corporation; *PHILVILLE+, in Civil Case No. 15045; this Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV. No. 52606 between CLT and PHILVILLE; the Orders of Judge Palma dated 13 June 1966 and 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557 and the billing statements of SSHG Law Office. They also submitted in evidence the Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavits of Rosa R. Manotok and Luisa T. Padora; Affidavits of Atty. Felix B. Lerio, Atty. Ma. P.G. Ongkiko and Engineer Jose Marie P. Bernabe; a copy of a photograph of BM No. 9; certified true copy of coordinates and [6] reference point of L.M. No. 1 and BM No. 1 to 10 of Piedad Estate and TCT No. 177013 of CLT.[ ]
DIMSON EVIDENCE
In their Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence,[ ] DIMSON submitted the previous decisions and resolutions passed relative to these cases, various certifications of different government agencies, OCT 994, subdivision plan of Lot 25-A-2, observations of Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia showing the relative positions of properties within Lot 25-A; the Novation of Contract/Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated 15 January 1948 between Rato, Don Salvador Araneta and Araneta Institute of Agriculture; copies of various certificates of titles to dispute some of the titles held by ARANETA; several letter-requests and official receipts.
[7]
ARANETA EVIDENCE
ARANETA, in turn, offered in evidence various certificates of title, specifically, OCT No. 994, TCT No. 8692; TCT No. 21857; TCT No. 26538; TCT No. 26539; TCT No. (7784)-738 and TCT no. 13574. It also marked in evidence the certified true copies of Decree No. 36577; the DOJ and Senate Reports; letters of correspondence to the Land Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Malabon City; survey plans of Lot 25-A and TCT r-15169 of Dimson and; the affidavit of Engineer Felino M. Cortez and his curriculum vitae. ARANETA also offered the certified true copy of TCT No. 6196 in the name of Victoneta, Inc.; TCT No. 13574 in the name of ARANETA; certifications issued by Atty. Josephine H. Ponciano, Acting Register of Deeds of Malabon city-Navotas; certified true copy of Judge Palmas Order dated 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557; Circular No. 17 (which pertains to the rules on reconstitution of titles as of 19 February 1947) and its official receipt and; the owners duplicate copy of [8] [9] OCT No. 994.[ ]
III.
We now turn to the evaluation of the evidence engaged in by the Special Division. To repeat, the Special Division was tasked to determine the following issues based on the evidence:

i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 dated 3 May 1917:
ii.
Whether the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the Supreme Court 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence. Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat said claims?
iii.
Whether the factual and legal bases of the 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of the Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv.
Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so, what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government, and is any of the parties able to trace its title acquired by the government through expropriation?
v.
Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
The ultimate purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court of Appeals was to ascertain which of the four groups of claimants were entitled to claim ownership over the subject properties to which they claimed title thereto. One set of properties was disputed between CLT and the Manotoks, while the other set was disputed between Araneta and the Heirs of Dimson.
As can be gleaned from the Report, Jose Dimson was able to obtain an order in 1977 issued by Judge Marcelino Sayo of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City on the basis of which he was able to register in his name properties belonging to the Maysilo Estate. Judge Sayos order in turn was sourced from a 1966 Order issued by Judge (later Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cecilia Muoz-Palma of the CFI of Rizal. Dimsons titles reflected, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.
[10]
Among these properties was a fifty (50)-hectare property covered by Transfer

[11]
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 151169, which apparently overlapped with the property of Araneta covered by TCT No. 13574 and 26538.
Araneta was
then and still is in possession of the property. The Araneta titles state, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Consequently, Dimson filed an action for recovery of possession against Araneta.
Another property in Dimsons name, apparently taken from Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, was later sold to Estelita Hipolito, who in turn sold the same to CLT. Said property was registered by CLT under TCT No. T-177013, which also reflected, as its mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April

1917.
[12]
Said property claimed by CLT encroached on property covered by titles in the name of the Manotoks. The Manotoks traced their titles to TCT
Nos. 4210 and 4211, both issued in 1918 and both reflecting, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.
It is evident that both the Heirs of Dimson and CLT had primarily relied on the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 as the basis of their claim of ownership. However, the Court in its 2007 Resolution held that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 was inexistent. The proceedings before the Special Division afforded the Heirs of Dimson and CLT alike the opportunity to prove the validity of their respective claims to title based on evidence other than claims to title the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994. Just as much was observed by the Special Division:
Nonetheless, while the respective certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT refer to OCT 994 issued on 19 April 1917 and that their previous postulations in the present controversies had been anchored on the supposed validity of their titles, that which emanated from OCT 994 of 19 April 1917, and conversely the invalidity of the 3 May 1917 OCT 994, the Supreme Court has yet again allowed them to substantiate their claims on the basis of other evidentiary proofs:
Otherwise stated, both DIMSON and CLT bear the onus of proving in this special proceedings, by way of the evidence already presented before and such other forms of evidence that are not yet of record, that either there had only been an error in the course of the transcription or registration of their derivative titles, or that other factual and legal bases existed to [13] validate or substantiate their titles aside from the OCT No. 994 issued on 19 April 1917.
Were they able to discharge such burden?
A.
We begin with the Heirs of Dimson. The Special Division made it clear that the Heirs of Dimson were heavily reliant on the OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.
[DIMSON], on the strength of Judge Sayos Order dated 18 October dated 18 October 1977, was issued separate certificates of title, i.e., TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, 15168 and 15169, covering portions of the Maysilo Estate. Pertinently, with respect to TCT No. 15169 of DIMSON, which covers Lot 25-A-2 of the said estate, the following were inscribed on the face of the instrument.
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19 day of April in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA page NA , as Original Certificate of Title No. 994 pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429 Record No. ______
th
This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. 994/NA, which is cancelled by virtue [14] hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.[ ]
From the above accounts, it is clear that the mother title of TCT no. 15169, the certificate of title of DIMSON covering the now disputed Lot 25-A-2, is OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Manifestly, the certificate of title issued to

DIMSON, and as a matter of course, the derivative title later issued to CLT, should both be voided inasmuch as the OCT [15] which they emanated had already been declared inexistent.
The Special Division noted that the Heirs of Dimson did not offer any explanation why their titles reflect the erroneous date of 19 April 1917. At the same time, it rejected CLTs explanation that the transcription of the erroneous date was a typographical error.
As can be gleaned from the records, both DIMSON and their successor-in-interest CLT, had failed to present evidence before this Court to prove that there had been a mere typographical error in the transcription of their respective titles with regard to the date of registration of OCT No. 994. CLT specifically harps on this assertion that there had only been a typographical error in [16] the transcription of its title.[ ] On the other hand, while DIMSON had refused to categorically assert that there had been such a typographical error causing the invalidity of their title, their failure to proffer any reason or argument which would otherwise justify why their title reflects 19 April 1917 and not 3 May 1917 leads this Court to conclude that they simply had no basis to support their proprietary claim.
Thus, without proffering any plausible explanation as to what led to the erroneous entry of the registration dated of OCT 994, DIMSON are left without any recourse but to substantiate their claim on the basis of other evidence not presented during the proceedings below, which would effectively prove that they had a valid proprietary claim over the disputed properties. This is specifically true because DIMSON had previously placed reliance on the MWSS doctrine to prove the validity of [17] their title.
Absent such explanation, the Heirs of Dimson were particularly constrained to rely on the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo, which was allegedly sourced from the 1966 Order of Judge Muoz Palma. On that issue, the Special Division made the following determinations:
It should be recalled that in their appellees brief in CA-G.R.CV No. 41883, therein appellee Jose Dimson specifically denied the falsity of TCT No. R-15169 alleging that the contention is already moot and can be determined by a [18] controlling decision.* ] Jose Dimson expounded on his reliance as follows:
In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (for brevity MWSS) case, Jose B. Dimsons (as private respondent) title TCT No. 15167 issued for Lot 28 on June 8, 1978 derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, is overlapping with MWSS title TCT No. 41028 issued on July 29, 1940 derived from the same OCT 994, registered on May 3, 1917.

(Same facts in the case at bar; Jose B. Dimson (plaintiff -appellee) title TCT No. R-15169 issued for Lot 25-A-2, on June 8, 1978, is overlapping with defendant-appellants title TCT Nos. 13574 and 21343, not [19] derived from OCT No. 994.[ ]
So viewed, sans any proof of a mechanical error in the transcription or annotation on their respective certificates of title, the present inquiry then hinges on whether the Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by then Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557 *PALMA ORDER+ and Judge Sayos Order dated 18 October 1977 *SAYOS 18 OCTOBER 1977 ORDER+, can be validated and authenticated. It is so since the brunt of the proprietary claims of both DIMSON and CLT has its roots on said Orders.
Perforce, in consideration of the foregoing, this leads Us to the THIRD ISSUE as presented by the Supreme Court, to wit:
Whether the factual and legal bases of Palmas 13 June 1966 Order and Sayos 18 October 1977 Order are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?
As it is, in contending that their certificates of title could be validly traced from the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994, DIMSON point out that their title was issued pursuant to a court order issued by Judge Palma in Case No. 4557 and entered in the memorandum of Encumbrance of OCT No. 994. DIMSON also insist that TCT Nos. 8692, 21857 and 26538 were mere microfilmed or certified copies and, therefore, inadmissible. Lastly, DIMSON reiterated the flaws and irregularities which voided the titles of the ARANETA in the previous proceedings and focused on the burden of ARANETA to present evidence to defeat their titles.
The foregoing contentions of DIMSON find to factual and legal basis. As we see it, Sayos 18 October 1977 Order, which apparently confirmed Palmas 13 June 1966 Order, raised serious questions as to the validity of the manner by which it was arrived at.
It is worthy to note that as early as 25 August 1981, counsel for the ARANETA applied for a subpoena duces tecum addressed to the Clerk of Court of CFI Pasig for the production of the records of LRC Case No. 4557 for purposes of determining the genuineness and authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma and also of her Order granting the confirmation. A certain Atty. Contreras, Officer-in-Charge of the said court, appeared and manifested in open court that the records pertaining to the petition for Substitution of names of Bartolome Rivera, et al. could no longer be located inasmuch as they had passed hands from one court to another.

What is perplexing to this Court is not only the loss of the entire records of Case No. 4557 but the admission of Judge Sayo that he had not seen the original of the Palma Order. Neither was the signature of Judge Palma on the Order duly proven because all that was presented was an unsigned duplicate copy with a stamped notation of original signed. Equally perplexing is that while CFI Pasig had a Case No. 4557 on file, said file pertained not to an LRC case but to a simple civil [20] case.[ ] Thus:
Atty. Directo:
The purpose of this subpoena duces tecum is to present your Honor the Order Order (sic) of Judge Palma in order to determine the genuineness and authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma in this court order and which order was a basis of a petition in this court to be confirmed. That is the reason why we want to see the genuineness of the signature of Judge Palma.
COURT:
No signature of Judge Palma was presented in this court. it was a duplicate copy not signed. There is a stamp only of original signed.
Atty. Directo:
That is the reason why we want to see the original.
Court:
I did not see the original also. When the records of this case was brought here, I checked the records, there were so many pages missing and the pages were re-numbered but then I saw the duplicate original and there is a certification of a woman clerk of Court, Atty. Molo.
Atty. Directo: That is the reason why we want to see this document, we are surprised why it is missing.
Court:

We are surprised also. You better ask Judge Muoz Palma.
Atty. Contreras:
May I make of record that in verifying our records, we found in our original vault LRC application no. N4557 but the applications were certain Feliciano Manuel and Maria Leao involving Navotas property because I was wondering why they have the same number. There should be only one.
Atty. Directo:
Aside from that, are there other cases of the same number?
Atty. Contreras:
No, there should be only number for a particular case; that must be a petition after decree record.
Atty. Ignacio:
This 4557 is not an LRC Case, it is a simple civil case. x x x x x x
Moreover, both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA insist that Palmas 13 June 1966 Order had been recalled by a [21] subsequent Order dated 16 August 1966, *RECALL ORDER+,* ] wherein the trial court dismissed the motion filed by DIMSON on the courts findings that x x x whatever portion of the property covered by OCT 994 which has not been disposed of by the previous registered owners have already been assigned and adjudicated to Bartolome Rivera and his assignees, as a result of which there is no portion that is left to be given to the herein supposed assignee Jose Dimson.

However, We are reluctant to recognize the existence and due execution of the Recall Order considering that its original or even a certified true copy thereof had not been submitted by either of the two parties relying on it despite having been given numerous opportunities to do so.
Be that as it may, even if We are to consider that no Recall Order was ever issued by then Judge Palma, the validity of the DIMSON titles over the properties in the Maysilo Estate becomes doubtful in light of the fact that the supposed share went beyond what was actually due to Jose Dimson under the Compromise Agreement with Rivera. It should be recalled that Palmas 13 June 1966 Order approved only the conveyance to Jose Dimson of 25% of whatever share of Bartolome Rivera has [22] over Lots 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of OCT 994 x x x subject to availability of undisposed portion of the said lots.* ]
In relation to this, We find it significant to note the observations contained in the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 that, based on the assumption that the value of the lots were equal, and (C)onsidering that the share of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal was only 1-189/1000 percent of the Maysilo Estate, the Riveras who claimed to be the surviving heirs of Vidal [23] will inherit only 197, 405.26 square meters (16,602,629.53 m2 x 1.1890%) or 19.7 hectares as their share.[ ] Even if we are to base the 25% of Jose Dimson on the 19.7 hectares allotted to the Riveras, it would appear that Jose Dimson would only be entitled to more or less five (5)hectares of the Maysilo Estate. Obviously, basing only on TCT No. 15169 of Dimson which [24] covered a land area of 50 hectares (500,000 square meters),[ ] it is undisputable that the total properties eventually transferred to Jose Dimson went over and beyond his supposed 25% share.
What is more, Palmas 13 June 1966 Order specifically required that x x x whatever title is to be issued herein in favor of Jose Dimson, the same shall be based on a subdivision plan duly certified by the Land Registration Commission as correct and in accordance with previous orders issued in this proceedings, said plan to be submitted to this court for final approval.
Interestingly however, despite such requirement, DIMSON did not submit Survey Plan LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 4429 SWO-5268 which allegedly was the basis of the segregation of the lands, if only to prove that the same had been duly approved and certified correct by the Land Registration Commission. What was submitted before the RTC and this Court was only the Subdivision Plan of Lot 25-A-2 which notably does not bear the stamp of approval of the LRC. Even an inspection of the exhibit for CLT does not bear this Survey Plan, which could have, at the very least, proven the authenticity of the DIMSON title.
Indeed, We find the absence of this piece of evidence as crucial in proving the validity of the titles of DIMSON in view of the allegation of contending parties that since the survey plan upon which the land titles were based contained the notation SWO, meaning that the subdivision plan was only a product of a special work order, the same could not have passed the [25] LRC. Neither was it duly certified by the said office.
In addition, the Special Division took note of other irregularities attending Dimsons TCT No. R-15169.
[Firstly], OCT No. 994 showed that Lot 25-A of the Maysilo Estate was originally surveyed on September 8-27, 1911, October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911. Yet, in said TCT No. R-15169, the date of the original survey is reflected as Sept. 8-27, [26] 1911 and nothing more.* ] The variation in date is revealing considering that DIMSONs titles are all direct tra nsfers from OCT No. 994 and, as such, would have faithfully adopted the mother lots data. Unfortunately, no explanation for the variance was ever offered.
Equally worthy of consideration is the fact that TCT No. 15169 indicates that not only was the date of original registration inexistent, but the remarks thereon tend to prove that OCT No. 994 had not been presented prior to the issuance of the said transfer certificate. This manifest from the notations NA on the face of DIMSONs title meaning, not available. It bears emphasizing that the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to the purchaser without the production of the owners duplicate is illegal (Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 826) and does not confer any right to the purchaser (Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, 61 Phil. 448 [1935]). The Registrar of Deeds must, therefore, deny registration of any deed or voluntary instrument if the owners duplicate is not presented in connection therewith. (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 40 Phil. 19 [1926]; Hodges vs. [27] Treasurer of the Phil. 50 Phil. 16 [1927].[ ]
In has also been held that, in cases where transfer certificates of title emanating from one common original certificate of title were issued on different dates to different persons or entities covering the same land, it would be safe to conclude that the transfer certificate issued at an earlier date along the line should prevail, barring anomaly in the process of [28] registration.[ ] Thus, (w)here two certificates purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. X x x. In successive registration, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder or whose claim is derived directly from the person who was the holder of the [29] earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. x x x[ ]
xxx Still another indication of irregularity of the DIMSON title over Lot No. 25-A is that the issuance of the Sayo Order allegedly confirming the Palma Order was in itself suspect. Gleaning from the records, DIMSON filed the Motion only on 10 October 1977, or eleven (11) years after obtaining the supposed sanction for the issuance of titles in this name. Besides, what was lodged by Jose Dimson before the sala of then Judge Palma was not a simple land registration case wherein the only purpose of Jose Dimson was to establish his ownership over the subject parcels of land, but, as reflected in the Palma Order, the subject of the case was the confirmation of Jose Dimsons claim over the purported rights of Rivera in the disputed properties. The c ase did not partake of the nature of a registration proceeding and thus, evidently did not observe the requirements in land registration cases. Unlike in a land registration case, therefore, Jose Dimson needed to file an action before Judge Sayo to seek confirmation of Palmas Order dated 13 June 1966.

So viewed the general rule proscribing the application of laches or the statute of limitations in land registration [30] cases,[ ] as well as Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to its provisions on revival of judgment applies only to ordinary civil actions and not to other or extraordinary proceedings such as land registration cases, is clearly not applicable in the present case. The legal consequences of laches as committed by DIMSON and their failure to observe the provisions of Rule 39 should, therefore, find application in this case and thus, the confirmation of DIMSONs title, if any, should fail.
Parenthetically, the allegations of DIMSON would further show that they derive the validity of their certificates of title from the decreased Jose Dimsons 25% share in the alleged hereditary rights of Bartolome Rivera *RIVERA+ as an alleged grandson of Maria Concepcion Vidal *VIDAL+. However, the records of these cases would somehow negate the rights of Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification Report of the Land Registration Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera was 65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the records of Civil [31] Case Nos. 4429 and 4496).[ ] It can thus be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old in 1963, then he must have been born around 1898. On the other hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she could have been born only on 1905. This alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal, Riveras alleged grandmother, was seven ( 7) years younger than her alleged grandson. Serious doubts existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to [32] claim a share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.
These findings are consonant with the observations raised by Justice Renato Corona in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion on our 2007 Resolution. To wit:
TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate with an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. It was a transfer from TCT No. R-17994 issued in the name of Estelita I. Hipolito. On the other hand, TCT No. R-17994 was a transfer from TCT No. R-15166 in the name of Jose B. Dimson which, in turn, was supposedly a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917.
Annotations at the back of Hipolito's title revealed that Hipolito acquired ownership by virtue of a court order dated October 18, 1977 approving the compromise agreement which admitted the sale made by Dimson in her favor on September 2, 1976. Dimson supposedly acquired ownership by virtue of the order dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal, Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 4557 awarding him, as his attorney's fees, 25% of whatever remained of Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29 that were undisposed of in the intestate estate of the decedent Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one of the registered owners of the properties covered by OCT No. 994. This order was confirmed by the CFI of Caloocan in a decision dated October 13, 1977 and order dated October 18, 1977 in SP Case No. C-732.
However, an examination of the annotation on OCT No. 994, particularly the following entries, showed:
AP-6665/0-994 Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certificado en cuanto a una extencion superficial de 3,052.93 metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros cuadrados, y descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No; 4210, pagina 163 Libro T-22.
Fecha del instrumento Agosto 29, 1918

Fecha de la inscripcion September 9, 1918 10.50 AM
AP-6665/0-994 Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certficado el cuanto a una extencion superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No 4211, pagina 164, Libro T-22.
Fecha del instrumento Agosto 25, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion September 9, 1918
10:50- AM
Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in OCT No. 994, it has an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. which corresponds to the total area sold in 1918 pursuant to the above-cited entries. Inasmuch as, at the time the order of the CFI of Rizal was made on June 13, 1966, no portion of Lot No. 26 remained undisposed of, there was nothing for the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal to convey to Dimson. Consequently, Dimson had nothing to convey to Hipolito who, by logic, could not transmit anything to CLT.
Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152 covering Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate described in Hipolito's certificate of title was not approved by the chief of the Registered Land Division as it appeared to be entirely within Pcs-1828, Psd-5079, Psd5080 and Psd-15345 of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. How Hipolito was able to secure TCT No. R-17994 was therefore perplexing, to say the least.
All these significant facts were conveniently brushed aside by the trial and appellate courts. The circumstances called for the need to preserve and protect the integrity of the Torrens system. However, the trial and appellate courts simply [33] disregarded them.

The Court thus adopts these findings of the Special Division on the validity of Jose Dimsons titles, which he obtained conse quent to the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo. Consequently, we cannot give due legal recognition to any and all titles supposedly covering the Maysilo Estate obtained by Dimson upon the authority of either the purported 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma or the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo.
B. Indubitably, as between the titles of ARANETA and the MANOTOKS and their predecessors-in-interest, on one hand, and those of DIMSON, on the other, the titles held by ARANETA and the MANOTOKS must prevail considering that their titles were issued much earlier than the titles of the latter.
Our findings regarding the titles of Jose Dimson necessarily affect and even invalidate the claims of all persons who seek to derive ownership from the Dimson titles. These include CLT, which acquired the properties they laid claim on from Estelita Hipolito who in turn acquired the same from Jose Dimson. Just as much was concluded by the Special Division as it evaluated CLTs claims.
For its part, CLT contended that even at the trial court level, it maintained that there was only one OCT No. 994 from where its claim emanates. It argued that its case against the MANOTOKS, including that of STO. NIO, was never decided based [34] on the doctrines laid down in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals[ ] and Heirs of Gonzaga v. [35] Court of Appeals.[ ]
Before this Special Division, CLT insists that the MANOTOKS failed to submit new competent evidence and, therefore, dwelling on the alleged flaws of the MANOTOKs titles, the findings and conclusions of the court-appointed commissioners as adopted by the trial court, then upheld by the Honorable Court in its Decision dated 28 September 1995 and finally affirmed in the Supreme Courts Decision dated 29 November 2005, therefore stand, as there is no reason to disturb them.
Furthermore, CLT contends that the Orders of Judge Palma and Judge Sayo are no longer open to attack in view of their finality. Lastly, CLT asserts that the properties covered by the MANOTOKS titles and those covered by the expropriation proceedings did not property pertain to and were different from Lot 26 owned by CLT. Thus, it maintains that the MANOTOKS cannot use as basis for the validity of their titles the expropriation undertaken by the Government as a means of staking their claims.
To restate, CLT claims the 891,547.43 square meters of land covered by TCT No. T-177013[ ] located in Malabon, Caloocan City and designated as Lot 26, Maysilo Estate, LRC Swo-5268. TCT No. T-177013 shows that its mother titles is OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Tracing said claim, Estelita Hipoloto executed a Deed of Sale with Real Estate [37] Mortgage in favor of CLT on 10 December 1988. By virtue of this transfer, Hipolitos TCT No. R-17994[ ] was cancelled and in lieu thereof, CLTs TCT No. 223677/R-17994 of TCT No. R-17994. Hipolito, on the other hand, was a transferee of the deceased Dimson who was allegedly the registered owner of the subject land on the basis of TCT No. 15166.
[36]

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, invalidating the titles of DIMSON, the title of CLT should also be declared a nullity inasmuch as the nullity of the titles of DIMSON necessarily upended CLTs propriety claims. As earlier highlighted, CLT had anchored its claim on the strength of Hipolitos title and that of DIMSONs TCT No. 15166. Remarkably and curiously though, TCT No. 15166 was never presented in evidence for purposes of tracing the validity of titles of CLT. On this basis alone, the present remand proceedings remain damning to CLTs claim of ownership.
Moreover, considering that the land title of CLT carried annotations identical to those of DIMSON and consequently included the defects in DIMSONs title, the fact that whatever typographical errors were not at anytime cured by subsequent compliance with the administrative requirements or subjected to administrative correction bolsters the invalidity of the CLT title [38] due to its complete and sole dependence on the void DIMSON title.
IV.
The task of the Special Division was not limited to assessing the claims of the Heirs of Dimson and CLT. We likewise tasked the Special Division to ascertain as well the validity of the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta, titles which had been annulled by the courts below. Facially, these titles of the Manotoks and Araneta reflect, as their valid mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Nonetheless, particular issues were raised as to the validity of the Manotok and Araneta titles independent of their reliance on the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 vis--vis the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994.
A.
We begin by evaluating the Araneta titles. The Special Division quoted the observations of the trial court, which upheld Dims ons claim over that of Araneta, citing the following perceived flaws of TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, from which Araneta derived its titles, thus:
Let us now examine TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato from where defendant was said to have acquired TCT 13574 and TCT 7784 now TCT 21343 in the name of Araneta and the other documents related thereto:
1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that its Decree No. and Record No. are both 4429. In the same vein, TCT 26539 also shows that it has Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
However, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela (Exhibit I) and Record No. 4429, issued for Ordinary Land Registration Case, was issued on March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhibit 8, 8-A Bartolome Rivera et al.)

How then could TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both have Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, which were issued in Court of First Instance,Province of Isabela and issued in Laguna, respectively.
2) TCT no. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of Jose Ma. Rato are not annotated in the Original Certificate of Title 994, where they were said to have originated.
3) The Escritura de Incorporacion de Philippine Land Improvement Company (Exhibit I) executed on April 8, 1925 was only registered and was stamped received by the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission only April 29, 1953 when the Deed of Sale & Mortgage was executed on August 23, 1947 (Exh. 5 defendant) and the Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale and Mortgage executed on November 13, 1947 (Exh. M0. So, that when Philippine Land Improvement was allegedly given a special power of attorney by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the said two (2) documents, the said Philippine Land Improvement Company has not yet been duly registered.
4) TCT 26538 and 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato, both cancel 21857 which was never presented in Court if only to have a clear tracing back of the titles of defendant Araneta.
5) If the subject matter of the Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit 5 defendant) is TCT 26539, why is it that TCT 13574 of defendant Araneta cancels TCT 6196 instead of TCT 26539. That was never explained. TCT 6196 was not even presented in Court.
6) How come TCT 26538 of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of 593,606.90 was cancelled by TCT 7784 with an area of only 390,282 sq.m.
7) How was defendant Araneta able to have TCT 7784 issued in its name, when the registration of the document entitled Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit M) was suspended/denied (Exhibit N) and no title was received by the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on March 4, 1948 (Exhibit N and N-1).
Under Sec. 55 of Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) now Sec. 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, no new certificate of title shall be entered, no memorandum shall be made upon any certificate of title by the register of deeds, in pursuance of any deed or other voluntary instrument, unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented for such endorsement.
8) The sale by Jose Ma. Rato in favor of defendant Araneta is not reflected on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT 26538 (Exhibit 7-defendant) meaning that TCT 26538 still exists and intact except for the encumbrances annotated in the Memorandum of Encumbrances affecting the said title (Exhibits 16, 16-A and 16-N David & Santos)
9) In the encumbrances annotated at the back of TCT 26539 (Exhibit 4-defendant) there appears under entry No. 450 T 6196 Victoneta, Incorporated covering parcel of land canceling said title (TCT 26539) and TCT 6196 was issued ( x x x) which could have referred to the Deed (sic) of Sale and Mortgage of 8-23-47 (Exhibit 5-defendant) entered before Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company, with Date of Instrument: 1-10-29, and Date of Inscription: 9-21-29.
In TCT 26838 this Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but the document, Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated November 13, 1947 (Exhibit M) does not appear.
Entry marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT 26538 shows only the extent of the value of P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma. Rato in the Philippine Land Improvement Company. Said entry was also entered on TCT 26539.
The Court also wonders why it would seem that all the documents presented by defendant Araneta are not in possession of said defendant, for according to witness Zacarias Quintan, the real estate officer of the said defendant Araneta since 1970, his knowledge of the land now in possession of defendant Araneta was acquired by him from all its documents [39] [40] marked in evidence which were obtained only lately when they needed for presentation before this Court.[ ]
The Special Division then proceeded to analyze these factual contentions, and ultimately concluded that the Araneta claim to title was wholly valid. We adopt in full the following factual findings of the Special Division, thus:
As for the proprietary claim of ARANETA, it maintains that it has established by direct evidence that its titles were validly derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. With regard to the imputed flaws, it asseverates that these were unfounded and thus, labored to refute all of them. ARANETA further expounded on the nullity of the Palma and Sayo Orders which was the basis of DIMSONs titles.
The documentary exhibits it proffered traced its certificates of title to OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. From the titles submitted, its predecessor-in-interest was Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon *RATO+, one of the co -heirs named in OCT No. 994, who was allotted the share of nine and five hundred twelve one thousandths (9-512/1000) percent share of the Maysilo [41] Estate.[ ] For this reason, to ascertain the legitimacy of the derivative title of ARANETA, the origin and authenticity of the title of RATO need to be reassessed.
Verily, attesting to RATOs share on the property, Entry No. 12343/O-994 of the Owners Duplicate Copy of OCT no. 994, records the following:
12343/O-994 Auto: Jose Rato y Tuason - - - Queda cancelado el presente seartificado en cuanto a una estension superficial de 1,405,725.90 metro Cuadrados mas o menos descrita en el Lote No. 25-A-3, an virtud del auto dictado por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Riza, de fecha 28 de Julio de 1924, y que en au lugar se had expedido el Certificados de Titulo No. 8692, folio 492 del Tomo T-35 del Libro de Certicadads de Transferencia.

Date of Instrument Julio 28, 1924.
Date of Inscription Agosto 1, 1024 10:19 a.m.
SGD. GLICERIO OPINION, Register of deeds Agosto 19, 1924[

[42]
In accordance with the decree, RATO was issued on 1 August 1924, TCT No. 8692[ + which covers Lote No. 25 A-3 del plano del subdivision, parte del Lote No. 25-A, plano Psu-(not legible), Hacienda de Maysilo, situado en el Munisipio de [44] Caloocan, Provincia del Rizal x x x.[ ] The parcel of land covers an approximate area of UN MILLION CUATROCIENTOS CINCO MIL SETECIENTOS VEINTICINCO metros cuadrados con NOVENTA decimetros cuadrados (1,405,725.90) mas o menos . As [45] reflected under Entry No. 14517.T-8692,[ ] the parcel of land covered under this certificate of title was subdivided into five (5) lots under subdivision plan Psd-6599 as per Order of the court of First Instance of Rizal. Consequently, TCT Nos. 21855, 21856, 21857, 21858 and 21859 were issued.
[43]
Focusing on TCT No. 21857 issued on 23 May 1932, this certificate of title issued in RATOs name,* ] cancelled TCT [47] [48] No. 8692[ ] with respect to the property it covers. On its face, TCT No. 21857,[ ] was a derivative of OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. It covers Lot No. 25 A-3-C of subdivision plan Psd-6589, being a portion of Lot No. 25-A-3, G.L.R.O Record [49] [50] No. 4429. Thereafter, TCT No. 21857 was cancelled by TCT No. 26538[ ] and TCT No. 26539[ ] which were both issued in the name of Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon on 17 September 1934.
[46]
With respect to TCT No. 26539, the certificate of title showed that it covered a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of the subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an approximate area of 581,872 square [51] [52] meters.[ ] Thereafter, TCT No. 26539 was cancelled by TCT No. 6196[ ] whose registered owner appears to be a certain Victoneta, Inc. This parcel of land has an area of 581,872 square meters designated as section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C.
As shown on its face, TCT No. 6196 issued on 18 October 1947 in the name of Victoneta, Inc. and its mother title were traced from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. Later, TCT No. 6196 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 13574 was [53] issued in favor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture on 20 May 1949.[ ] It covers a parcel of land designated as section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C. It has an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters.
On the other hand, appearing under Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 of TCT No. 6196 is the following:
Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 SALE in favor of the ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, vendee: Conveying the property described in this certificate of title which is hereby cancelled and issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13574, page 74, Book T-345 in the name of the vendee. (Doc. No. 149, page 98, Book II, S. of 1949 of Notary Public for Manila, Hospicio B. Bias).

Date of Instrument May 18, 1949 Date of the Inscription May 30, 1949 at 11:00 a.m.[
[54]
TCT No. 26538[ ] in turn showed on its face that it covers a parcel of land designated as Section 1 of subdivision plan [56] Psd-10114 being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an area of 592,606.90 square meters.[ ]
[55]
On 4 March 1948, TCT No. 26538 was cancelled by TCT No. 7784, which was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of [57] Agriculture. TCT No. 7784 covers four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,282 square meters.[ ] It would appear from the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 that TCT No. 7784 was eventually cancelled [58] by TCT No. 21343.[ ] As per attachment of ARANETA in its Answer dated 6 march 1980 filed in Civil Case No. 8050, a mere copy of TCT No. 21343 showed that it covers a parcel of land designated as Lot 6-B of the subdivision plan Psd-24962 being a portion of Lot 6, described as plan Psd-21943, G.L.R.O. Record No. 4429 with an approximate area of 333,377 square [59] meters.[ ] However, for reasons unknown, a copy of TCT No. 21343, whether original or certified true copy thereof, was not submitted before this Court.
In summation, ARANETA had shown that RATO, as one of the co-owners of the property covered by OCT NO. 994, was assigned Lot No. 25-A-3. His evidence of ownership is reflected on TCT No. 8692 issued in his name. RATO held title to these parcels of land even after its subdivision in the 1930s. Further subdividing the property, RATO was again issued TCT No. 21857, and later TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, still covering Lot No. 25 A-3-C. In all his certificates of title, including those that ultimately passed ownership to ARANETA, the designation of the lot as either belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3 was retained, thereby proving identity of the land.
More importantly, the documentary trail of land titles showed that all of them were derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. For purposes of tracing ARANETAs titles to Oct No. 994, it would appear that the evidence presented ultimately shows a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574 to said mother title. Suffice it to state, the origin and legitimacy of the proprietary claim of ARANETA had been well substantiated by the evidence on record and on this note, said titles deserve validation.
Under the guidelines set, we shall now proceed to evaluate the imputed flaws which had been the previous bases of the trial court in invalidating ARANETAs titles.
One of the flaws observed on the titles of ARANETAs predecessor -in-interest was that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in Ratos name refer to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, as basis of their issuance. This is being questioned inasmuch as Decree No. 4429 refers to a decree issued by the CFI of Isabela while Record No. 4429 was issued for ordinary Land Registration Case No. 31 March 1911 in CLR No. 5898 of Laguna.
Explaining this discrepancy, ARANETA insisted that the same was a mere typographical error and did not have any effect on the validity of their title. It further contended that the number 4429 was the case number of Decree No. 36455 and was used interchangeably as the record number.
This Court finds that the incorrect entry with respect to the Decree and Record Number appearing on the title of ARANETAs predecessor-in-interest cannot, by itself, invalidate the titles of ARANETAs predecessors-in-interest and ultimately, that of ARANETA. To the mind of this Court, the incorrect entries alluded to would not have the effect of rendering the previous titles void sans any strong showing of fraudulent or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the person making such entries. Fraud [60] is never presumed but must be established by clear and convincing evidence.[ ] The strongest suspicion cannot sway judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity. The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without [61] rudder or compass.[ ]
The Supreme Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.[ ] acknowledged that certain defects on a certificate of title, specifically, the interchanging of numbers, may occur and it is certainly believable that such variance in the copying of entries could be merely a typographical or clerical error. In such cases, citing with approval the decision of the appellate court, the [63] technical description in the title should prevail over the record number.[ ]
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Thus, what is of utmost importance is that the designation and the technical description of the land, as stated on the face of the title, had not been shown to be erroneous or otherwise inconsistent with the source of titles. In ARANETAs case, all the titles pertaining to Lot No. 25 had been verified to be an offshoot of Decree No. 36455 and are all located in Tinajeros, Malabon. At any rate, despite the incorrect entries on the title, the properties, covered by the subject certificates of title can still be determined with sufficient certainty.
It was also opined that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of RATO had not been annotated on OCT No. 994 from which said titles had supposedly originated. It should be stressed that what partially cancelled OCT No. 994 with respect to this subject lot were not TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539 but TCT No. 8692 issued on1 August 1924. In fact, TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539 are not even the immediate predecessors of OCT No. 994 but were mere derivatives of TCT No. 21857. Logically therefore, these two certificates of title could not have been annotated on OCT No. 994, they not being the preceding titles.
In any case, a perusal of OCT No. 994 shows an entry, which pertains to Jose Ma. Rato but, on account of the physical [64] condition of the copy submitted to this Court, the entry remains illegible for us to make a definite conclusion.[ ] On the other hand, Entry No. 12343/O-994 found on the Owners Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 994 specifically recorded the issuance of TCT [65] No. 8692 over Lot No. 25-A-3.[ ]
The other flaws noted on ARANETAs certificates of title pertained to its failure to present TCT Nos. 21857, 6196 and 21343. As we have discussed, ARANETA offered in evidence a certified microfilm copy of TCT No. 21857 and a certified true copy of TCT No. 6196 marked as Exhibits 5-A1A and 19-A1A, respectively. However, it failed to submit a copy of said TCT No. 21343. Be that as it may, we will not hasten to declare void TCT No. 7784 as a consequence of such omission, especially so since TCT

No. 21343 appears to be a mere derivative of TCT No. 7784. Given that the validity of TCT No. 7784 had been preponderantly proven in these proceedings, the authenticity of said title must be sustained. Besides, ARANETAs failure to submit TCT No. 21343 had never been put into issue in these proceedings.
With respect to the difference in the area of more than 200,0000 square meters between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538, we find that the trial court failed to consider the several conveyances of portions of TCT No. 26538 before they finally passed on to ARANETA. Thus, on the Memorandum of Encumbrance of TCT No. 26538, it is apparent that portions of this piece of land had been sold to various individuals before the same were transferred to ARANETA on 4 march 1948. Naturally, since the subject land had been partially cancelled with respect to the portion disposed of, it could not be expected that the area of TCT No. 26538 will remain the same at the time of its transfer to ARANETA. Even assuming that the entire area covered by TCT No. 26538 had been disposed of, this fact alone, cannot lend us to conclude that the conveyance was irregular. An anomaly exists if the area covered under the derivative title will be much more than its predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this is not so in the case before us.
The trial court, relying on Exhibit N, further asserted that ARANETA should not have been issued TCT No. 7784 considering that the registration of the Novation of Contract, deed of Sale & Mortgage was suspended/denied and no title was received by the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on march 4, 1948. A perusal of Exhibit N submitted before the trial court, shows that the suspension or denial was merely conditional considering that the person seeking registration had give days within which to correct the defects before final denial thereof. As we see it, the Notice merely contained a warning regarding the denial of the registration of the voluntary deed but, in no way, did it affect the vested rights of ARANETA to be land. The fact that the title to the land was subsequently issued free from any notation of the alluded defect creates a reasonable presumption that ARANETA was in fact able to comply with the condition imposed. This is especially true since the notice itself contained a note, Just Completed, written across the face of the letter.
Records also reveal the RTCs observation with regard to Aranetas failure to disprove the result of the plotting made on the subject land (Exhibit K) to the effect that TCT 26538 overlaps portion of TCT 15159 and TCT 26539 also overlaps the other portion of said TCT R-15169. The trial court further noted that TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) and TCT 26539 (Jose Rato) and TCT 21343 (Araneta) are overlapping each other within Lot 25-A. That portion of TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) along bearing distance [66] points to 17 to 18 to 19 to 20 to 21 to 1 and 2 shaded in yellow color in the Plan is not covered by TCT 21343 (Araneta) .* ]
Scrutinizing Exhibit K, it becomes apparent that the said evidence relied upon was only a private survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands and was based only on [67] photocopies of relevant land titles.[ ] What is more, said geodetic engineer also failed to adequately explain his observations, [68] approach and manner of plotting the relative positions of the lots.[ ] From all indications, the conclusions reached by said geodetic engineer were anchored on unfounded generalizations.
Another defect cited on ARANETAs title was the absence of any entry on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the alleged sale between RATO and ARANETA. As pointed out by ARANETA, the copy of TCT No. 26538 submitted to the trial court contained entries only up to the year 1947, thus, explaining the (1) lack of entry with regard to the issuance of TCT No. 7784 in favor of ARANETA considering that the same was issued a year later and; (2) entry pertaining to Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company which was entered way back on 21 August 1929.
Nonetheless, it still cannot be denied that Rato and ARANETA together with Don Salvador Araneta, entered into a voluntary agreement with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property. Moreover, no conclusion should have been reached regarding the total cancellation of TCT No. 26538 inasmuch as TCT No. 7784 cancelled the former certificate of title to the extent only of Three Hundred Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Two (390,282) square meters.
Notably also, with the evident intent to discredit and refute the title of ARANETA, DIMSON submitted TCT [69] [70] Nos. 26538[ ] and 21857,[ ] which are both derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 and cover parcels of land located in Malabon, Rizal. However, these certificates of title reflect different registered owners and designation of the land covered.
Pertinently, Exhibit M-Dimson relating to TCT No. 26538, registered on 12 June 1952, points to one Angela Bautista de Alvarez as the registered owner of a 240 square meter of land designated as Lot No. 19, Block 14 of the subdivision plan Psd-5254 being a portion of Lot No. 7-A-1-A. This certificate of title cancels TCT No. 14112/T-348 and refers to a certain TCT No. 30473 on the inscriptions.
Exhibit N-Dimson, on the other hand, pertaining to TCT No. 21857 was issued on 30 March 1951 to one Angela I. Tuason de Perez married to Antonio Perez. This certificate of Title covers a parcel of land described as Lot No. 21, Block 16 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-140, G.L.R.O. Record No. 4429. It ahs an area of 436 square meters and cancels TCT No. 21856.
Exhibit Q-Dimson* ] consisting of TCT No. 8692 covers two parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Block No. 44 of the consolidation Subdivision Plan Pcs-188 with a total area of 3,372 square meters. It was issued to Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated on 7 May 1948. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 46118.
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Comparing these titles to those of the ARANETA, it is apparent that no identity of the land could be found. The Supreme [72] Court, in the case of Alonso v. Cebu City Country Club, Inc.[ + agreeing with the Court of Appeals dissertation in said case, ruled that there is nothing fraudulent for a certificate of title to bear the same number as another title to another land. On this score, the Supreme Court elucidated as follows:
On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-1151) bears the same number as another title to another land, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is nothing fraudulent with the fact that Cebu Country Club, Inc.s reconstituted title bears the same number as the title of another parcel of land. This came about because under General Land Registration Office (GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated February 19, 1947, and Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 6, RD 3, dated August 5, 1946, which were in force at the time the title was reconstituted on July 26, 1946, the titles issued before the inauguration of the Philippine Republic were numbered consecutively and the titles issued after the inauguration were numbered also consecutively starting with No. 1, so that eventually, the titles issued before the inauguration were duplicated by titles issued after the inauguration of the Philippine Republic x x x.
Parenthetically, in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution dated 30 October 2008, DIMSON objected to the admissibility of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A on the ground that ARANETA failed to submit the original copies of these [73] certificates of title and contended that the originals contain different contents from their own Exhibits M, N and Q.[ ] The fact that the entries contained in ARANETAs pieces of evidence are different from that of DIMSONs do not automatically make ARANETAs exhibits inferior replications or a confirmation of their falsity. Interestingly, the objection regarding the nonsubmission of the original copy had not been raised by DIMSON in their Comments/Objections to Consolidated Formal Offer of [74] Evidence (Of Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.).[ ] In any case, we find the objections unwarranted considering that certified true copies or certified microfilm copies of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A had been submitted by ARANETA in these proceedings.
Lastly, on the alleged non-registration of Philippine Land Improvement Company at the time the special power of attorney was executed by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the deed of conveyances, the same only proves that Philippine Land Improvement Company was not yet registered and this does not go as far as proving the existence or nonexistence of the company at which time it was executed. In effect, the company was not precluded to enter into contracts and be bound by them but it will do so at the risk of the adverse effects of non-registration under the law.
Ultimately, the question of whether the aforesaid certificates of title constitute as clouds on ARANETAs titles are not for this Court to rule upon for purposes of the present remand. Needless to state, it is not for the Heirs of Dimson to rely on the weakness of ARANETAs titles and profit from it. Rather, they should have focused on the strength of their own titles since it is not within our office to decide in whose hands the contested lands should go, our task being merely to trace back the parties [75] claims to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.
There is no question that the Araneta titles were derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917, particularly from the share of Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon, one of the co-heirs named in OCT No. 994. The Special Division correctly assessed, among others, the reference to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429 in some of the antecedent titles of Araneta
[76]
as mere clerical errors that could not have invalidated said titles, 4429 being the case number
of Decree No. 36455, and the designation and the technical description of the land on those titles not having been shown to be erroneous or variant

with the source title. The Special Division also correctly considered that the trial court had failed to take into account the several conveyances of TCT No. 26538 before it was ultimately transferred to Araneta in 1948, which explain the difference in area between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538. The imputed overlap of TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 with the titles held by Dimson was based on a private survey which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands. The alleged absence of any entry on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the sale of the property between Rato and Araneta did not, according to the Special Division, discount the fact that Rato and Araneta entered into a voluntary agreement with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property. Finally, the Special Division noted that the titles derived from OCT No. 994, which Dimson had submitted as evidence to discredit the Araneta claim, pertain to properties wholly different from those covered by the Araneta titles.
There is no cause to dispute the factual findings and conclusions of the Special Division on the validity of the Araneta titles, and we affirm the same.
B.
It appears that the claim to title of the Manotoks is somewhat more controversial. The Special Division did not discount the fact that there could have been flaws in some of the intervening titles between the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 and the present titles of the Manotoks. However, the significant event was the expropriation proceedings undertaken by the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947. At least some of the titles in the name of the Manotoks were sourced from the titles issued to and subsequently distributed by the Republic. The Special Division explained the milieu in full:
VALIDITY OF THE MANOTOK TITLES
The notation under Entry No. 6655/O-994, found on page 17 of OCT 994 of the Owners Duplicate Copy, shows that Lot [77] No. 26 had been a subject of sale in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio.[ ] The notations reads:
Ap. 6655/O-994 Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente Certificado en cuanto a una extension superficial de 3,052.93 Metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros Cuadrados y descrita en elLote No. 26 vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruis y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primar casado con Diogracias Quinones y el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido el Certificado de Titulo No. 4210, Pagina 163, Libro T-22.
Date of the Instrument Aug. 29, 1918 Date of Inscription Sept. 9, 1918 10:50 a.m. (GD) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds

Ap. 6665/O-994-Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente Cerficiado en cuanto a una extension superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el Lote No. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primar casado con Deogracias Quinones y el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido el Certificado de Titulo No. 4211, Pagina 164, Libro T-No. 22.
Date of Instrument Aug. 21, 1918 Date of Inscription Sept. 9, 1918 10:50 a.m. (SGD.) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds
As a result, TCT No. 4211 was cancelled by TCT No. 5261 which was issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales. Inscribed on the Memorandum of the Incumbrances Affecting the Property Described in this Certificate was the sale executed in favor of Francisco Gonzales dated 3 March 1920. Thus, on 6 April 1920, TCT No. 5261 was issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales.[
[78]
On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in the names of Jose Gonzales y Narciso married to Maria P. Gutierrez, Consuelo Susana Gonzales y Narciso married to Alfonso D. Prescilla; Juana Francisco Gonzales y Narciso married to Fortunato de Leon; Maria Clara Gonzales y Narciso married to Delfin Hilario; Francisco Felipe Gonzales y Narciso married to Pilar Narciso, and Concepcion Andrea Gonzales y Narciso married to Melquiades M. Virata, Jr.
Appearing on the Memorandum of TCT No. 5261 is NOTA: Ap 2111 which reads as follows:[
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A/2111 Adjudicado el torreno descrito en este certificado de titulo, a Rufina Narciso Vda. de Gonzales, a cuenta de la participacion de osia esta en (not legible) los tienes de la eseledad de genanciales. Habida entre la misma y el finado Francisco J. Gonzales, per una orden del Hon. Fernando Jugo, Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila Sala II, dienada el 20 de Septiembre de 19 (not legible), en el Expidiente de intestado del nombrado Francisco J. Gonzales, No. 49034, se cancela el presente certificado de tituto y se expide otre a hombre decha Rufina Narciso, con (not legible) No. 35486, folio 86, Tomo T-168 del libro de transferencias, archivando se la copia de dicha orden da que se ha heche referencia en al Legajo T-No. 35486.
(SGD) TEODORO GONZALES, Registrado de Titulos.
The property was later subdivided into seven lots in accordance with subdivision plan Psd-21154.[ ] Partitioning the lots among the co-owners, TCT No. 35486 was eventually cancelled and in lieu thereof six (6) certificates of titles were [81] individually issued[ + to Francisco Gonzaless six (6) children, specifically, TCT Nos. 1368 -1373 while TCT No. 1374 was issued in [82] favor of all the children.[ ]
[80]
As previously mentioned, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368-1374 were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines and were eventually subdivided and sold to various vendees. Eighteen (18) lots were obtained by MRI from the years 1965 to 1974, while it acquired the lot covered by TCT No. 165119 in 1988. On the other hand, MEC acquired from PhilVille Development Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-B by virtue of Deed of Exchange executed in its favor for which, TCT No. 232568 was issue don 9 May 1991.
The 20 certificates of titles were traced by the MANOTOKS, as follows:
1) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an area of 4,988 square meters. MRI purchased this lot from one Basilio Caina who was issued TCT No. 7526 [83] which cancelled TCT Nos. 36657-62 registered in the name of the Republic of thePhilippines.[ ]
2) TCT No. 7762, covering Lot 1-C, was obtained by MRI from one Narcisa Buenaventura. The Parcel of land has an [84] approximate area of 2,876 square meters.Buenaventuras ownership was evidenced by TCT No. 7525,[ ] deriving the [85] same from TCT No. 36657-63.[ ]
3) TCT No. 8012 in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters.[ ] This certificate of title was traced from one Filemon Custodio who held TCT No. 7792. Custodio was in turn a transferee of Guillermo Rivera, the latter having been issued TCT No. 7760 by virtue of sa le between him and then Peoples Homesite and Housing [87] Corporation *PHHC+. The latter title eventually cancelled TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.[ ]
[86]
4) TCT No. 9866 issued to MRI covers Lot No. 21 and has an approximate area of 23,979 square meters. MRIs certificate of title was derived from TCT No. 9854 registered in the name of Filemon Custodio, a transferee of Jose Dionisio, [88] who was issued TCT No. 9853. Dionisios title in turn cancelled the Republics TCT No. 36657-63.[ ]
5) TCT No. 21107 issued to MRI covers Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters. MRI acquired the same by virtue of sale between him and Francisco Custodio, holder of TCT No. 21040. Francisco Custodio was a transferee of Lorenzo Caina, registered owner of TCT No. 21039 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale between Caina and the PHHC, the [89] latters certificate of title canceling TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.[ ]

6) TCT No. 21485 was issued to MRI by virtue of sale between it and Francisco Custodio, registered owner of TCT No. 21484. The certificate of title covers Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters Custodio was in turn a transferee of Lorenzo Caina, the latter being the registered owner of TCT No. 21013 by reason of sale between him and [90] PHHC.[ ] Under Entry No. 6277/T-21485, it would appear that portions of the property covered under TCT No. 21485 and TCT No. 232568 had been subject of an expropriation proceedings to which the Manotok Estate Corporation, et [91] al. interposed no objections subject to the payment of just compensation.[ ]
7) TCT Nos. 26405[ ] and 26406,[ ] both registered in the name of MRI, cancelled TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774, respectively. TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774 were registered in the names of Romulo, Rosalina, Lucila, Felix and Emilia all surnamed Jacinto, *JACINTOS+, before the same were transferred to MRI by reason of sale in favor of the latter. The JACINTOS certificates of title were in turn derived from TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015 issued in the name of Filemon [94] Custodio[ ] Both TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015 cancelled TCT 7792/T-39. However, for purposes of tracing TCT No. 7792/T-39 to the Republics certificate of titles, this certificate of title was not submitted in evidence.
[92]
[93]
8) TCT No. 26407[ ] issued to MRI was traced back to the title of Lourdes Mercado Cloribel who was the registered owner of TCT No. 8404 by virtue of sale between the two, thereby transferring ownership to MRI. On the fact of TCT No. 8404, it would show that it cancelled TCT No. 8013/T41 but there is no showing in whose name TCT No. 8013 was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.
[95]
9) TCT No. 33904[ ] of MRI cancelled TCT No. 8017 of Filemon Custodio by virtue of sale between the latter and [97] MRI.[ ] We note that TCT No. 8017 cancelled TCT No. 7792/T-39 but there is no showing whether the same could be traced back to the Republics certificates of title.
[96]
10) TCT No. 34255, covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters, reflects MRI as the [98] registered owner. This certificate of title cancels TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.[ ]
11) TCT No. 254875[ ] bears MRI as the registered owner of Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 41956 which covers Lot 55, also registered in the name of MRI. It would
[99]

appear that MRI acquired the lot covered under TCT No. 41956 from one Joaquin Caina who was the registered owner of [100] TCT No. 25715 being a vendee of PHHC.[ ]
12) TCT No. 53268 of MRI covered Lot No. 15,[ ] which was purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta who held TCT No. 53155. Villacorta in turn acquired the same land from one Eufrocina Mackay whose TCT No. 7827 was eventually [102] cancelled by Villacortas land title.* ] It would appear that TCT No. 7827 cancelled TCT No. 7826/T-40 but there is no trace to whom the latter title was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.
[101]
13) TCT No. 55897 shows MRI as the registered owner of Lot 3 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 53122 in the names of MRI (19,531 square meters) and one Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). TCT No. 53122 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21347 registered in the names of Jesus Hipona (19,531 square meters) and Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). Notably, TCT No. 21347 cancelled TCT No. 21315/T-107 but there is no indication to whom TCT No. 21315 [103] was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.[ ]
14) TCT No. C-17272 reflects MRI as the registered owner of Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters. MRIs certificate of title cancelled TCT No. C-17234 registered in the names of MRI (27,750 square meters), Roberto S. David (3,0000 square meters) and Jose Madulid (500 square meters). It would appear that TCT No. C-17234 cancelled [104] TCT No. 53124 registered in the names of MRI, Spouses Priscila and Antonio Sebastian and Jose Madulid.[ ] MRI also submitted in evidence a Deed of Partition between itself, Roberto David and Madulid thereby subdividing the property into [105] Lots 6-A, 6-B and 6-C as per subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-277091.[ ] Again, we note that TCT No. 53124 cancelled TCT No. 21350/T-107 but the records are bereft of any indication what certificate of title it cancelled and to whom the same was registered.
15) TCT No. C-35267, covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters, was a by-product of TCT No. 25146, also registered in the name of MRI, after the same was subdivided into two lots, namely, Lot Nos. 56-A and 56-B. TCT No. 25146 cancelled TCT No. 25145 registered in the name of Quirino Labing-isa [106] by virtue of sale in favor of MRI. In turn, TCT No. 21545 cancelled TCT Nos. (36557) 12836 to (36563) 12842.[ ]
16) TCT No. T-121428, registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315272 which has an approximate area of 4,650 square meters. It was previously registered in the names of MRI (4,650 square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters) under TCT No. 53123 by order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, Branch XII and as per agreement of the parties in Civil Case No. C-424. TCT No. 53123 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21346 whose registered owners were Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 [107] square meters) and Jesus Hipona (4,650 square meters).[ ] Like some of the other titles, TCT No. 21346 cancelled TCT No. 21316 but there is no trace of this latter certificate of title.
17) TCT No. 163902, registered in the name of MRI, covers Lot No. 4-B-2 and has an area of more or less 6,354 square meters and a by-product of TCT No. 9022, also in the name of MRI, after the same was subdivided under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-334454. TCT No. 9022, in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S. Custodio [108] whose ownership thereon was transferred to MRI by virtue of a voluntary sale.[ ] TCT No. 8894 cancelled TCT No. 8846/T-45 but this latter certificate of title was not submitted in evidence for purposes of tracing back to the Republics title.
18) TCT No. 165119[ ] was issued to MRI by virtue of a Deed of Sale between Spouses Francisca Labing-isa and Juan [110] Ignacio [SPOUSES IGNACIO] and MRI, as a result of which, TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO was cancelled.[ ] It would appear that TCT No. C-39690 cancelled TCT No. 35266/T-173 but TCT No. 35266/T-173 was not submitted in evidence.
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19) TCT No. T-232568 of the Manotok Estate Corporation, covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters, was derived from the certificate of title held by PhiVille Development and Housing Corporation under TCT No. 197357. MEC acquired the subject parcel of land by virtue of Deed of Exchange between it and [111] PHILVILLE DATED 9 May 1991.[ ] TCT No. 197357 cancelled TCT No. 195730/T-974 but there is no trace what certificate of title the latter title cancelled.
By and large, all the certificates of title submitted by the MANOTOKS, including their derivative titles, were all traced to OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. Likewise, they declared all the lots covered by such titles for taxation purposes. Without doubt, MRI had successfully traced back some of their certificates of title to the valid OCT No. 994, they having acquired the lots from some of the vendees of the PHHC after the same were expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes.
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Jose Leon Gonzales, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph r of the Majority Report noted that the seven properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes.
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose Leon Gonzaels, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph r of the Majority Report noted that the seven properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation which were lat er consolidated and [112] subdivided into 77 lots for resale to tenants. No sign of protest was ever raised by CLT on this point.
The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles acquired by the State by way of expropriation are deemed cleansed of whatever previous flaws may have attended these titles. As Justice Vitug explained in Republic v. Court of Appeals, Justice) Puno reiterated in Reyes v. NHA:
[114] [113]
and then Associate Justice (now Chief
In an rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is
in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. then Chief Judge (now U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer in Cadorette v. U.S., Court in U.S. v. Carmack
[117] [116] [115]
This doctrine was derived from the opinion of
which in turn cited the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme
that *b+y giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securi ng
[118]
better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged defects of TCT No. 4211 issued in September of 1918. However, TCT No. 4211 was issued decades before the property was expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may have attended that particular title would have been purged when the property covered by it was subsequently acquired by the State through eminent domain. The Special Division noted as much:
As it is, the validity of most of MRIs certificates of title should be upheld because they were derived from the Republics valid certificates of title. In fact, some of the MANOTOKS titles can be traced back to the Governments titles as a result of the expropriation in 1947.
Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-interest of the MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of their acquisition resulting from the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain that need not be granted even by the fundamental law. Thus, the alleged flaws concerning the certificates of title issued previous to the exercise of the State of its inherent power did not affect or render invalid the subsequent transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any [119] impairment of the estate or title acquired or any reversion to the former owner.
The Special Division also took exception to the majority report of the Commissioners (Majority Report) who had been tasked by the trial court to examine the validity of the Manotok titles. The Majority Report
had arrived at several conclusions with respect to the TCTs from which the Manotok titles were derived.
[120]
The Special Division, however, concluded
that such report was in fact tainted by the fact that it was determined outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties. To wit:
In meeting the issue, the MANOTOKS disproved the opinion with regard to the alleged defects of their titles inasmuch as the majority report submitted before the trial court was made outside the scope of the tasks which the trial court confined them to perform. The MANOTOKS also argued that before this proceeding on remand, CLT failed to introduce evidence of such flaws neither were the concerned geodetic engineers presented as witnesses. Moreover, the MANOTOKS further maintained that CLT failed to submit any factual or legal bases to prove the authenticity and validity of the Palma and Sayo Orders. They insisted that the Palma Order was a void one for being conditional and having resulted to the issuance of duplicate certificates of land title.
With respect to the imputed flaws on the MANOTOKS titles which were based on the Majority Report, we find that the bases of the alleged defects proceeded from unreliable sources thus, tainting the veracity of the said report.
The records of the case between CLT and the MANOTOKS reveal that the parties approved the creation of a commission to resolve only these two issues, to wit:
x x x
These issues to be resolved by the 3 Commissioners are as follows:
1) Whether or not the property covered by the Transfer Certificates of Title of defendants pertain to or involve Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate presently titled in the name of the plaintiff; and
2) Whether or not the property covered by the title of the plaintiff and the property covered by the [121] titles of the defendants overlap.[ ]
Scrutinizing the Majority Report upon which the trial courts conclusions were based, it would appear that the findings therein were outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties. Specifically, the deductions with regard to the technical infirmities and defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261 and 35486 do not involve the question of whether or not the subject properties were identified as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo estate or whether there was overlapping of titles. Records bear out that the MANOTOKS took exception to the procedure taken citing therein the ultra vires acts of the two Commissioners.
In addition, the majority report focused on the alleged flaws and inherent technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, ranging from the language of the technical descriptions, absence of subdivision plan, lot number and survey plan. Evidently, these defects go only as far as the certificates of title issued prior to those of the Republic. Remarkably, no specific flaw was found on the MANOTOKS titles indicating any irregularity on their issuance. In fact, the Commissioners who [122] signed the majority report even concluded that only TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261, 35486, 1368 thru 1324 (sic)[ ] were
irregularly and questionably issued without any reference to the MANOTOKS certificates of title.* ] Otherwise stated, the imputed flaws affect only those certificates of title issued prior to those registered in the name of the Republic. No flaw had been specifically identified or established in the proceedings below, which would taint the titles held by the MANOTOKS in so far as the [124] regularity of their issuance is concerned.
[123]
At the same time, the Special Division was not prepared to uphold the validity of all of the Manotok titles. It took issue with the particular titles which could not be retraced to the titles acquired by the Republic of the Philippines by way of expropriation.
Although the MANOTOKS had traced their title from the vendees of PHHC, there are, however, some certificates of title which could not be traced back to the titles previously held by the Republic specifically, MRIs TCT Nos. 26405 and 26406, 26 407, 33904, 53268, 55897, C-17272, T-121428, 163903, 165119 and MECs TCT No. T-232568. As to these certificates of title, the MANOTOKS failed to make any specific reference to the preceding certificates of title which they cancelled and to whose names [125] they were subsequently transferred and registered. Thus, we find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their origins.
V.
The Special Division supplied the following precise and concise summary of its conclusions:
In prcis, the factual milieu of the present controversy and the evidence on record clearly establish the failure of DIMSON and CLT to substantiate their titles and overcome the onus of proving that said titles are derivatives of OCT 994 registered on 3 May 1917, and not 19 April 1917, as what is reflected in their titles. In contrast, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, both of which had consistently anchored their proprietary claims on OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917, have, in this remand proceeding, been able to support their claims of ownership over the respective portions of the Maysilo Estate. Except in the case of the MANOTOKS which had failed to substantiate the validity of some of their certificates of title, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA presented evidence proving the identity, the extent and the origin of their titles.
Answering the issues assigned by the Supreme Court relative to the tenability of the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA and whether such flaws are sufficient to defeat said claims, this Court finds that, as discussed above, such flaws are inconsequential and ineffectual in invalidating the MANOTOKS and ARANETA titles.
Significantly, since the respective certificates of title of herein contending parties are contradictory to each other and stand to refute the validity of their opposing titles, it cannot be gainsaid that said certificates of title have correspondingly been subjected to dispute on the basis of separate and distinct imputed flaws. Still, the crucial difference between the imputed flaws allegedly tainting said contending titles, DIMSON and CLT on one hand, and the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, on the other, is that the imputed flaws purportedly beleaguering the respective certificates of title of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA relate to the mechanical and technical aspect of the transcription of their titles and are therefore inconsequential to the import and validity

thereof. Said imputed flaws do not depart from the fact that the predecessors-in-interest of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA had been clothed with the right of ownership over the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.
On the other hand, the flaws attending the titles of DIMSON and CLT primarily stem from infirmities attending or otherwise affecting the very crux of their claim of ownership. Having derived their titles from RIVERA, whose title is questionable and dubious to the core, DIMSON and CLT cannot rightly insist on the validity of their titles. Such flaws are hard to overcome as they delve into the substance of their proprietary claims. As stated, DIMSON and CLT miserably failed to overcome their onus and instead opted to hap on the supposed flaws of the adverse parties. For these reasons, the titles of DIMSON and CLT should be declared a nullity.
xxx
From the foregoing evaluation and in conformity with the Supreme Court 2007 Resolution, this Court arrived at the following conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances:
1. As categorically declared by the Supreme Court, there is only one OCT 994, the registration date of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not19 April 1917. OCT 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void.
2. In view thereof and in addition to other grounds we have already discussed, the certificates of title of the deceased Jose Dimson and his successor-in-interest, CLT, having been traced back to OCT 994 dated 19 April 1917, are NULL and VOID and thus vest no legal right or claim in favor of DIMSON and CLT.
3. The 13 June 1966 Palma Order and the 18 October 1977 Sayo Order, on which DIMSON and CLT anchor the validity of their respective titles, do not substantiate their proprietary claims. While the existence of said Orders are admitted, the legal import thereof nonetheless fails to confer a semblance of legality on the titles of DIMSON and consequently, of CLT, more so, a superior right to defeat the titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, respectively.
4. Portions of Lot No. 26 pertinent to this controversy, particularly that being disputed by the MANOTOKs and CLT, were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to tenants. The MANOTOKS, thus as successor-in-interest of the Republic, were able to establish that some of their certificates of title had indeed originated or were derived from said expropriated parcels of land.
5. The evidence on record confirm that the certificates of title covering the land being claimed by ARANETA were derived from OCT NO. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 thereby ultimately showing a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574 to

said mother title. By reason of which, that is either belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3 as previously owned by RATO, had been well substantiated and proven to be superior to that of DIMSON.
6. For reasons above-stated and in view of the established rights of ownership of both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA over the contested properties, we find that the imputed flaws on their titles cannot defeat the valid claims of the MANOTOKS [126] and ARANETA over the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.
Inasmuch as we agree with the factual findings and evaluation of the Special Division, we likewise adopt the above conclusions. As we earlier stated, it was incumbent on the Heirs of Dimson and/or CLT to establish their claim to title for reasons other than the fact that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 is extant. They failed to do so. It should be noted that the instant cases arose from separate actions filed by Jose Dimson and CLT seeking the recovery of possession and/or annulment of title against Araneta and the Manotok Group. Thus, the burden of evidence was on Dimson and CLT to establish the strength of their respective claims of ownership, and not merely to rely upon whatever weaknesses in the claims of the Manotoks and Araneta for their causes of action to prosper. The well-settled legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.
[127]
In an
action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.
[128]
We now proceed to tackle the recommendations submitted by the Special Division. They are as follows:
RECOMMENDATIONS
Apropos to said conclusions, this Court hereby respectfully makes the following recommendations regarding the validity of the conflicting proprietary claims as interposed by the herein contending parties:
1. To declare with finality that the certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT including other derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest, if any, are NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land.
2. To declare LEGAL and VALID the proprietary claims the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title:
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs1828 which has an area of 4,988 square meters.
b)
TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate area of 2,287 square meters.

c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters.
d)
TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and has an approximate area of 23,979 square meters.
e)
TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters.
f)
g)
TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters.
h)
TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters.
i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters.
With regard to the following certificates of title, namely:
3.A. MANOTOK REALTY INC.
a)
TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of 1,0000 square meters.
b)
TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of 1,000 square meters.
c)
TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of 1,000 square meters.
d)
TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of 1,802 square meters.
e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area of 3,163 square meters.

f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters.
g)
TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters.
h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has an approximate area of 4,650 square meters.
i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of more or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product of TCT No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S Custodio.
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of Sale between said Spouses and MRI.
3.B. MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION
a) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters.
The foregoing certificates of title (3.A and 3.B), failing to make specific references to the particular certificates of title which they cancelled and in whose name they were registered, may be declared NULL and VOID, or in the alternative, subject the same to further technical verification.
4. To declare LEGAL and VALID the title of ARANETA respecting parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title:
a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters;
b)
TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,383 square meters.
[129]

The first, second and fourth recommendations are well taken as they logically arise from the facts and conclusions, as determined by the Special Division, which this Court adopts.
The third recommendation that eleven (11) of the titles held by the Manotoks be declared null and void or subjected to further technical verification warrants some analysis.
The Court has verified that the titles mentioned in the third recommendation do not, as stated by the Special Division, sufficiently indicate that they could be traced back to the titles acquired by the Republic when it expropriated portions of the Maysilo Estate in the 1940s. On the other hand, the Manotok titles that were affirmed by the Special Division are traceable to the titles of the Republic and thus have benefited, as they should, from the cleansing effect the expropriation had on whatever flaws that attached to the previous titles. However, although the Special Division did not concede the same benefit to the other Manotok titles named in the third recommendation, at the same time it did not conclude that such titles were false or fraudulently acquired. Absent such a finding, we are disinclined to take the ultimate step of annulling those titles.
Said titles have as their origin what we have acknowledged to be a valid mother title OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. This is in stark contrast with the titles of CLT, the oppositors to the Manotoks, which all advert to an inexistent mother title. On their face, the Manotok titles do not reflect any error or fraud, and certainly the Special Division do not point to any such flaw in these titles. Nothing on the face of the titles gives cause for the Court to annul the same.
It is worth mentioning that the Special Division refused to adopt the Majority Report earlier rendered in the case between the Manotoks and CLT, said report having exhaustively listed the perceived flaws in the antecedent TCTs from which the Manotoks derived their claim. The Special Division concluded that such findings had been reached by the Commissioners in excess of their original mandate and, thus, ultra vires. Assuming that such flaws were extant, they existed on the titles and anteceded the expropriation of the properties by the Government. As stated earlier, such expropriation would have cleansed the titles of the prior flaws. But even if the Manotok titles enumerated in the third recommendation could not be sourced from the titles acquired by the Republic through expropriation, still the rejection of the Majority Report signifies that the flaws adverted to therein could not form the basis for the annulment of the titles involved. Indeed, the Special Divisions rejection of the Majority Report further diminishes any ground to annul the Manotok titles referred to in the third recommendation.
Yet, the Court is cognizant that the inability to trace the Manotok titles specified in the third recommendation to those titles acquired by the Government through expropriation puts such titles in doubt somehow. In addition, the Court is aware that the ground utilized by the Special Division in rejecting the Majority Report that the determinations were made outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties -- does not categorically refute the technical findings made therein. Those circumstances, while insufficient for now to annul the Manoto ks titles listed in the third recommendation, should be sufficiently made public.
Hence, in lieu of annulling the Manotok titles per the Special Divisions third recommendation, the Court deems it sufficient to require the Registers of Deeds concerned to annotate this Resolution on said titles so as to sufficiently notify the public of their unclear status, more particularly the inability of the Manotoks to trace the titles without any gap back to OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. If there should be any cause for the annulment of those titles from a proper partys end, then let the proper case be instituted before the appropriate court.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the Special Division and issues the following reliefs:
1) The certificates of title of the DIMSONs and CLT including other derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest, if any, are declared NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land;
2. The proprietary claims of the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title are declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit:
a)
TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an area of 4,988 square meters.
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate area of 2,287 square meters.
c)
TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters.
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and having an approximate area of 23,979 square meters.
e)
f)
g)
TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters.
h)
TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters.
i)
TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters.
3)
The following certificates of titles in the name of ARANETA are hereby declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit:
a)
TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters;
b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,383 square meters.
4)
On the following titles in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc. or Manotok Estate Corporation, to wit:
a)
TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of 1,0000 square meters;
b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of 1,000 square meters;
c)
TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of 1,000 square meters;
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of 1,802 square meters;
e)
TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area of 3,163 square meters;
f)
TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters;
g)
TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters;
h)
TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has an approximate area of 4,650 square meters;
i)
TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of more or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product of TCT No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S. Custodio;
j)
TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of Sale between said spouses and MRI;
k)
TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters.
the Registers of Deeds concerned are ordered to annotate that as determined in the foregoing Resolution, the registered owners of the said titles failed to make any specific reference to the preceding certificates of title which they cancelled and to whose names they were subsequently transferred and registered, thereby leading the Supreme Court to find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their origins.
[130]
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Ortega vs. City of Cebu

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 181562-63 October 2, 2009
SPOUSES CIRIACO and ARMINDA ORTEGA, Petitioners, vs. CITY OF CEBU, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 181583-84 CITY OF CEBU, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CIRIACO and ARMINDA ORTEGA, Respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega (Spouses Ortega) in G.R. Nos. 181562-63 and petitioner City of Cebu (Cebu City) in G.R. Nos. 181583-84 assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the similarly consolidated petitions 1 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80187 and CA-G.R. SP No. 00147, respectively. The facts, summarized by the CA, follow. Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega x x x are the registered owners of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 310-B, situated in Hipodromo, Cebu City, with an area of 5,712 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 113311, issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu. One-half of the above described land is occupied by squatters. On September 24, 1990, [the Spouses Ortega] filed an ejectment case against the squatters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Cebu City, which rendered decision in favor of [the spouses Ortega]. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the MTCC. The decision of the MTCC became final and executory, and a writ of execution was issued on February 1, 1994. On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of [Cebu City] enacted City Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to expropriate onehalf (1/2) portion (2,856 square meters) of [the spouses Ortegas+ land (which is occupied by the squatters), and appropriating for that purpose the amount of P3,284,400.00 or at the price of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P1,150.00) per square meter. The amount will be charged against Account No. 8-93-310, Continuing Appropriation, Account No. 101-8918-334, repurchase of lots for various projects. The value of the land was determined by the Cebu City Appraisal Committee in Resolution No. 19, series of 1994, dated April 15, 1994. Pursuant to said ordinance, [Cebu City] filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain [before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City] against [the spouses Ortega], docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16577. On March 13, 1998, the [RTC] issued an order declaring that [Cebu City] "has the lawful right to take the property subject of the instant case, for public use or purpose described in the complaint upon payment of just compensation." Based on the recommendation of the appointed Commissioners (one of whom was the City Assessor of [Cebu City], the [RTC] issued another Order dated May 21, 1999, fixing the value of the land subject to expropriation at ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P11,000.00) per square meter and ordering [Cebu City] to pay [Spouses Ortega] the sum of THIRTY ONE MILLION AND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P31,416,000.00) as just compensation for the expropriated portion of Lot No. 310-B. The Decision of the *RTC+ became final and executory because of *Cebu Citys+ failure to perfect an appeal on time, and a W rit of Execution was issued on September 17, 1999 to enforce the courts judgment. Upon motion of *the Spouses Ortega+, the *RTC+ issued an Order dated M arch 11, 2002, quoted as follows:

"Reading of the aforestated resolution shows that the City Council of Cebu approved Ordinance No. 1519 appropriating the sum of P3,284,400.00 for payment of the subject lot chargeable to Account No. 101-8918-334. "In view thereof, the above-mentioned sum is now subject for execution or garnishment for the same is no longer exempt from execution." [Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal of the Case, contending that the price set by the [RTC] as just compensation to be paid to [the Spouses Ortega] is way beyond the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its socialized housing program. The motion was denied by the *RTC+. *Cebu Citys+ Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. By virtue of the Order of the [RTC], dated July 2, 2003, x x x Sheriff Benigno B. Reas[,] Jr. served a Notice of Garnishment to Philippine Postal Bank, P. del Rosario and Junquera Branch Cebu City, garnishing *Cebu Citys+ bank deposit therein. Hence, [Cebu City] filed the instant Petition for Certiorari before [the CA] (CA-G.R. SP NO. 80187). During the pendency of x x x CA-G.R. SP NO. 80187, [Cebu City] filed before the [RTC] a Motion to Dissolve, Quash or Recall the Writ of Garnishment, contending that Account No. 101-8918-334 mentioned in Ordinance No. 1519 is not actually an existing bank account and that the garnishment of *Cebu Citys+ bank account with Philippine Postal Bank was illegal, because government funds and properties may not be seized under writ of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, on obvious reason of public policy. The [RTC] issued an Order dated March 8, 2004, denying said motion. *Cebu Citys+ Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. [The Spouses Ortega] filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the New Manager of Philippine Postal Bank to Release to the Sheriff the Garnished Amount, which was granted by the [RTC]. [Cebu City] filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, [Cebu City] filed another Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP NO. 00147) [with the Court of Appeals]. Ruling on the petitions for certiorari, the CA disposed of the cases, to wit: WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the instant Petitions for Certiorari are hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the [RTC] [Assailed Orders dated March 11, 2002 and July 2, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R SP NO. 80187] are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE insofar as they denied *Cebu Citys+ Motion to Stay Execution, but they are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as they denied *Cebu Citys+ Motion to Modify Judgment and Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings. Furthermore, the assailed Orders of the [RTC dated March 8, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 00147] are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Let the Decision of the [RTC] be executed in a manner prescribed by applicable law and jurisprudence. SO ORDERED.
3 2
Hence, these consolidated appeals by petitioners Cebu City and the Spouses Ortega positing the following issues: 1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs denial of Cebu Citys Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be Allowed to W ithdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings. 2. Whether the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank, appropriated for a different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be subject to garnishment as payment for the expropriated lot covered by City Ordinance No. 1519. We deny both petitions. On the first issue, the CA did not err in affirming the RTCs Order that the expropriation case had long been final and executory. Consequently, both the Order of expropriation and the Order fixing just compensation by the RTC can no longer be modified. In short, Cebu City cannot withdraw from the expropriation proceedings. Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on Expropriation provides: SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.

After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. Plainly, from the aforequoted provision, expropriation proceedings speak of two (2) stages, i.e.: 1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. This ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation [or order of expropriation] declaring that the plaintiff has the lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint; and 2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. We held in the recent case of Republic v. Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation that: [A]n order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of expropriation. Its end then paves the way for the second stagethe determination of just compensation, and, ultimately, payment. An order of expropriation puts an end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the petitioner to condemn the respondents properties. Because an order of expropriation merely determines the authority to exercise the power of emine nt domain and the propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not hinge on the payment of just compensation. After all, there would be no point in determining just 6 compensation if, in the first place, the plaintiffs right to expropriate the property was not first clearly established. Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an order by the trial court fixing just compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation. As applied to the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the judgment, much less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation proceedings. Cebu City is adamant, however, that it should be allowed to withdraw its complaint as the just compensation fixed by the RTC is too high, and the intended expropriation of the Spouses Ortegas property is dependent on whether Cebu City would have sufficient funds to pay for the same. We cannot subscribe to Cebu Citys ridiculous contention. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative. In Export Processing Zone Authority v. 8 Dulay, we declared: The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation. We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the courts discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place. Likewise, in the recent cases of National Power Corporation v. dela Cruz and Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways, we emphasized the primacy of judicial prerogative in the ascertainment of just compensation as aided by the appointed commissioners, to wit: Though the ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid reasons; that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all." As regards the second issue raised by the Spouses Ortega, we quote with favor the CAs disquisition thereon, to wit: While the claim of [the Spouses Ortega] against [Cebu City] is valid, the [RTC] cannot, by itself, order the City Council of [Cebu City] to enact an appropriation ordinance in order to satisfy its judgment. The proper remedy of [the Spouses Ortega] is to file a mandamus case against [Cebu City] in order to compel its Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact an appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction of *the Spouses Ortegas+ claim. This remedy is provided in the case of Municipa lity of Makati v. Court of Appeals, which provides:
9 10 7 5 4

Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason[s], to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor. x x x. xxxx The Sangguniang Panglungsod of [Cebu City] enacted Ordinance No. 1519, appropriating the sum ofP3,284,400.00 for payment of just compensation for the expropriated land, chargeable to Account No. 101-8918-334. Pursuant to such ordinance, the [RTC] issued an order dated March 11, 2002, which was the basis for the issuance of the Writ of Garnishment, garnishing *Cebu Citys+ bank account with Philippine Postal Bank. However, Philippine Postal Bank issued a Certification dated February 7, 2005, certifying that Account No. 8-93-310 (Continuing Account) and Account No. 101-8918-334 intended for purchase of lot for various projects are not bank account numbers with Philippine Postal Bank. It is a settled rule that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on obvious consideration of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. In Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, x x x where the Municipality of Makati enacted an ordinance appropriating certain sum of money as payment for the land the municipality expropriated, chargeable to Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 deposited in PNB Buendia Branch, the Supreme Court held that the trial court has no authority to garnish the Municipalitys other bank account (Account No. S/A 263-530850-7) in order to cover the deficiency in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, even if both accounts are in the same branch of the PNB. In said case, the Supreme Court held: Absent any showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum ofP99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7. The foregoing rules find application in the case at bar. While the Sangguniang Panglungsod of petitioner enacted Ordinance No. 1519 appropriating the sum of P3,284,400.00 for payment of just compensation for the expropriated land, such ordinance cannot be considered as a source of authority for the *RTC+ to garnish *Cebu Citys+ bank account with Philippine Postal Bank, which was already appropriated for another purpose. *Cebu Citys+ account with Philippine Postal Bank was not specifically opened for the payment of just compensation nor was it specifically appropriated by Ordinance No. 1519 for such purpose. Said account, therefore, is exempt from garnishment.1avvphi1 Since the [RTC] has no authority to garnish *Cebu Citys+ other bank accounts in order to satisfy its judgment, consequently, it has no authority to order 11 the release of *Cebu Citys+ other deposits with Philippine Postal Bank x x x. Even assuming that Cebu City Ordinance No. 1519 actually appropriated the amount of P3,284,400.00 for payment of just compensation thus, within 12 the reach of a writ of garnishment issued by the trial court there remains the inescapable fact that the Philippine Postal Bank account referred to in the ordinance does not actually exist, as certified to by the Bank. Accordingly, no writ of garnishment may be validly issued against such non-existent account with Philippine Postal Bank. This circumstance translates to a situation where there is no valid appropriation ordinance. WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 181562-63 and 181583-84 are hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 80187 and 00147 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Tiongson vs. National Housing Authority
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 140377 July 14, 2008
PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, SPS. EDUARDO GO and PACITA GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, ELISA MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. * NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: The present petition for review on certiorari raises the question of from what date should just compensation of the subject properties sought to be expropriated be reckoned whether it is from the taking of the property or on the filing of the complaint. Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) took possession in 1978 of properties belonging to petitioners Patricia L. Tiongson, et al. pursuant to P.D. No. 1669, "An Act Providing for the Expropriation of the Property Known as the Tambunting Estate Registered Under TCT Nos. 119059, 122 450, 122459, 122452 And Lot Nos. 1-A, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-F, 1-G And 1-H Of (LRC) PSD-230517 (Previously Covered By TCT No. 119058) of the Register of Deeds of Manila and for The Sale at Cost of the Lots Therein to the Bona Fide Occupants and Other Squatters Families and to Upgrade the Same, and Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds For The Purpose" (underscoring supplied), and of properties belonging to Patricia Tiongson, et al. pursuant to P.D. No. 1670, "An Act Providing For The Expropriation of the Property Along the Estero De Sunog-Apog Formerly Consisting of Lots Nos. 55-A, 55-B And 55-C, Block 2918 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-11746, Covered by TCT Nos. 49286, 49287 and 49288, Respectively, of the Register of Deeds of Manila and for The Sale at Cost of the Lots Therein to the Bona Fide Occupants and Other Squatter Families and to Upgrade The Same, and Authorizing The Appropriation of Funds For The Purpose" (underscoring supplied). In G.R. Nos. L-55166, "Elisa R. Manotok, et al.v. National Housing Authority et al.," and 55167, "Patricia Tiongson et al. v. National Housing Authority, et 1 al.," this Court, by Decision of May 21, 1987, held that "Presidential Decree Numbers 1669 and 1670, which respectively proclaimed the Tambunting Estate and the Estero de Sunog-Apoy area expropriated, are declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void," they being violative of the therein petitioners right to due process of law. The decision had become final and executory. Subsequently or on September 14, 1987, NHA filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-42018, which was later amended, for expropriation of parcels of land part of those involved in G.R. No. L-55166. By Order of April 29, 1997, Branch 41 of the Manila RTC to which the complaint for expropriation was raffled brushed aside a previous order dated 4 June 15, 1988 of the then Presiding Judge of said branch of the RTC and held that the determination of just compensation of the properties should be reckoned from the date of filing of NHAs petition or on September 14, 1987. The NHA moved to reconsider the said April 29, 1997 Order of the trial court, contending that the determination of the just compensation should be reckoned from the time it took possession of the properties in 1978. The 5 trial court, by Order of August 5, 1997, denied NHAs motion for reconsideration. The NHA assailed the above-stated trial courts Orders of April 29, 1997 and August 5, 1997 via petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The 6 appellate court, by the challenged Decision of June 16, 1999, reversed and set aside the trial courts orders and held that the just compensation should be "based on the actual taking of the property in 1978." Thus it disposed: WHEREFORE, the lower courts Order dated April 29, 1997 ruling that the amount of just compensation should be based on the da te of the filing of the complaint in 1987, as well as the Order dated August 5, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and the appointed commissioners are ordered to re-convene and submit to the court a recommendation on the amount of just compensation of subject property based on the actual taking of the property in 1978. (Underscoring supplied)
2 3
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision but the same was denied by Resolution of October 7, 1999, hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. In its Petition for Expropriation filed before the RTC on September 14, 1987, the NHA alleged, inter alia, that: xxxx 9. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1669 providing for the expropriation of the subject properties and granting the plaintiff the authority to immediately take possession, control and disposition, with power of demolition of the subject properties, plaintiff took and had been in possession of the subject properties, until Presidential Decree No. 1669 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case entitled Patricia Tiongson, et 8 al. vs. National Housing Authority and Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 5516[6]. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) x x x, and prayed as follows: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that: 1. An order be issued provisionally fixing the value of said properties in the amount equal to the assessed value of the same and authorizing the plaintiff to enter or take possession and/or placing the plaintiff in possession of the parcels of land described above; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) xxxx In the present petition, petitioners argue that since P.D. No. 1669 pursuant to which NHA took possession of their properties in 1978 was declared unconstitutional, "[n]ecessarily, in thereafter resurrecting the filing of another (sic) complaint for expropriation of the same properties," it would be unlawful . . . to fix the reckoning period for purposes of computing the just compensation . . . based on *NHAs+ previous un lawful taking of said properties in 1978." They thus maintain that the trial courts Order of April 29, 1997 holding that the determination of the just compensatio n of their properties should be reckoned from the date NHA filed the petition before the RTC on September 14, 1987 is in order. The petition is impressed with merit. In declaring, in its challenged Decision, that the determination of just compensation should be reckoned from NHAs taking of the properties in 1978, the appellate court simply relied on Annex "C" of NHAs petition before it, the Order dated June 15, 1988 of the then Presiding Judge of the trial court reading: In this condemnation proceedings, by agreement of the parties, the total value of the properties to be condemned is hereby fixed at P14,264,465.00, provisionally, and considering the admission of the parties that plaintiff has taken possession of the properties in question sometime in 1978, or long before the complaint in this case was filed, plaintiff is hereby authorized to retain possession thereof upon its depositing with the City Treasurer of Manila the aforesaid sum of P14,264,465.00 subject to the Orders of this Court and forthwith submit the Official Receipt of the said deposit to this 9 Court, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), and thus concluded that "the parties admitted that [NHA] took possession of the subject properties as early as 1978." The appellate court reached that conclusion, despite its recital of the antecedents of the case including herein petitioners sustained moves, even before the trial court, in maintaining that the reckoning of just compensation should be from the date of filing of the petition for expropriation on September 14, 1987. The earlier-quoted allegations of the body and prayer in NHAs Petition for Expropriation filed before the RTC constitute judicial admiss ions of NHA that it possessed the subject properties until this Courts declaration, in its above-stated Decision in G.R. No. L-55166 promulgated on May 21, 1987, that P.D. No. 1669 pursuant to which NHA took possession of the properties of petitioners in 1978 was unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. These admissions, the appellate court either unwittingly failed to consider or escaped its notice. Petitioners even brought to the appellate courts attention, in their Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision of June 16, 1999, the fact that they had called the trial courts attention to NHAs allegation-admissions in the body and prayer of its petition. But the appellate court, by Resolution of October 12 7, 1999, denied petitioners motion upon the ground that it raised substantially the same issues that were already considered and passed upon in arriving at its decision. The appellate courts June 16, 1999 decision glaringly shows, however, that the matter of judicial admissions of NHA in the body and prayer in its petition were not considered by it. Following then Rule 67, Section 4 of the Rules of Court reading: SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
11 10

take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), vis a vis the factual backdrop of the case, the just compensation of petitioners properties must be determined "as of the date of . . . the filing of *NHAs+ complaint" on September 14, 1987." WHEREFORE, the challenged June 16, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the April 29, 1997 Order of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 87-42018 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
Republic vs CA
FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 160379
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BERSAMIN, JJ.
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS and ROSARIO RODRIGUEZ REYES, Respondents. x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Promulgated: August 14, 2009
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 15 November 2002 and Resolution dated 17 September 2003 in CAG.R. CV No. 50358. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the Amended Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19 (RTC). The Antecedent Facts Private respondent Rosario Rodriguez Reyes is the absolute owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot 849-B and covered by TCT No. T-7194. The 1,043-square meter lot is situated on Claro M. Recto and Osmea Streets, Cagayan de Oro City. On 6 November 1990, private respondent received a letter from petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), requesting permission to enter into a portion of private respondents lot consisting of 663 sq uare meters, and to begin construction of the Osmea Street extension road. On 20 December 1990, petitioner took possession of private respondents pro perty without initiating expropriation proceedings. Consequently, on 4 and 7 January 1991, private respondent sent letters to the DPWH stating her objection to the taking of her property. On 16 May 1991, private respondent sent a letter to the City Appraisal Committee (CAC) rejecting the latters appraisal of th e [3] subject property, to wit: Declared Owner Rosario Reyes Tax Declaration No. 90066 Market Value 1981 Schedule P400/sq.m. Recommended Appraised Value P4,000/sq.m. P3,200/sq.m. Description 1 to 20 meters from Claro M. Recto Super Highway 21 to 40 meters from Claro M. Recto Super Highway
[1]
[2]
Republic vs CA
P2,400/sq.m. 41 to 60 meters from Claro M. Recto Super Highway
[4]
In the same letter, private respondent requested the City Assessor for a reappraisal of her property, but said request was denied.
On 17 March 1992 , private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City a complaint claiming just compensation and damages against petitioner. On 30 June 1993, the RTC appointed three commissioners to determine the subject propertys fair market value, as well as the consequential benefits and damages of its expropriation. On 15 September 1993, one of the three commissioners, Provincial Assessor Corazon Beltran, submitted to the RTC a separate report, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the undersigned deems it only to be just, fair and reasonable to adopt the market value of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) per square meter as the highest price obtaining and prevailing in 1990, the time of the taking of the property subject of the above entitled case, and fairly reasonable also to impose an additional value equivalent to 5% of the market value as [6] fixed for severance fee.
[5]
On 13 April 1994, the scheduled hearing was reset to 19 May 1994, to give private respondent (plaintiff) time to consider the offer of petitioner (defendant) to amicably settle the case and to accept the just compensation of P3,200 per square meter, or a total of P2,212,600, for the 663-square meter portion of private respondents lot.
[7]
On 16 May 1994, private respondent filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to Deposit The Amount of P2,121,600 in Court, alleging that petitioners counsel previously manifested in open court that the amount of P2,121,600 was ready for release should the amount be acceptable to [8] private respondent, and praying that said amount of P2,121,600 be deposited by petitioner with the trial court. The RTC granted the motion in an [9] Order dated 16 June 1994. However, it was only on 21 October 1994 that petitioner deposited with the RTC Clerk of Court a Landbank check [10] amounting to P2,121,600 as just compensation. On 16 June 1994, the RTC ordered the commissioners to submit their report as soon as possible, but until the scheduled hearing on 15 July 1994, the commissioners still failed to submit their report. Upon motion of private respondent, the RTC issued an order appointing a new set of [11] commissioners. On 11 October 1994, the new commissioners submitted their report, the pertinent portions of which provide, thus:
COMMISSIONERS REPORT xxx The property litigated upon is strategically located along Recto Avenue (National Highway) which is a commercial district. Fronting it across the national highway is the Cagayan Coca Cola Plant and the Shell Gasoline Station. It adjoins an establishment known as the Palana Grocery Store and after it is the Northern Mindanao Development Bank. Three Hundred (300) meters to the west of plaintiffs property is the gig antic structure of the Gaisano City department store along Recto Avenue and Corrales Avenue Extension. Towards the eastern direction of the property are banking institution buildings and the Ororama Superstore along the national highway (Recto Avenue) and the Limketkai Commercial Complex. For purpose of affording a fair assessment of the market value of plaintiffs property, the herein Commissioners have divided the whole parcel of land into three parts, viz: 1. Front portion along Recto Avenue measuring 21.52 meters from south to north ------------- 347.66 SQM Middle portion with a measurement of 21.52 meters ---------------------------------------------- 347.66 SQM Rear/back portion with a measurement of 21.52 meters ------------------------------------- 347.66 SQM
2. 3.
TOTAL AREA: ------- 1,043 SQM
Republic vs CA
Taking into consideration, among others, the location of the property and a research of the prevailing prices of lots proximate to and/or near the vicinity of plaintiff's property, the undersigned Commissioners respectfully recommend to the Honorable Court the following valuation, to wit: (CURRENT VALUE) 1. Front portion along Recto Avenue with a measurement of 21.52 meters from south to north with an area of 347.66 square meters at P18,000.00 toP20,000.00 per square meter; Middle portion with a measurement of 21.52 meters containing an area of 347.66 square meters at P16,000.00 to P18,000.00 per square meter; Rear/back portion measuring 21.52 meters with an area of 347.66 square meters at P14,000.00 to P16,000.00 per square meter;
2.
3.
VALUATION AS OF 1990 1. 2. 3. Front Portion - P10,000.00 to P12,000.00 per square meter; Middle Portion- P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 per square meter; Rear Portion - P6,000.00 to P8,000.00 per square meter;
The undersigned Commissioners would however like to bring to the attention of the Honorable Court that in the subdivision plan prepared by the City Engineers Office, the whole of plaintiffs property was subdivided into three (3) lots designated as follows:
Lot 849-B-1 (Road Lot)-83 square meters; Lot 849-B-2 (Road Lot traversed by the RCDP Osmea Extension Lot 849-B-3 remaining portion with an area of 297 square meters; In effect, what has been taken over and used by the defendant is not only 663 square meters but 746 square meters, more or less, which includes Lot No. 849-B-1. On the other hand, the remaining portion left to the plaintiff, Lot No. 849-B-3 will not actually be 297 square meters. If we deduct the setback area from Osmea Extension Street, the usable/buildable area left to the plaintiff would only be a little over 50 square meters. This portion would not command a good price if sold. Neither is it ideal for purposes of any building construction because aside from its being a very small strip of land, the [12] shape is triangular. Street)-663 SQM;
The Trial Courts Ruling
On 2 June 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the former as having the right to retain 590 square meters of the property covered by TCT No. T-7194, and ordering the latter to return 210 square meters of the 663 square meters taken; that defendants are solidarily liable to pay the sum ofP5,526,000.00, the fair market value of 1990 (sic), as just compensation for the 536 square meters taken for the Osmea street extension; to pay P185,000.00 representing damages for 37 months computed at the rate of P5,000.00 per month from the filing of this case; and Attorneys fees of P10,000.00 plus costs of suit. Plaintiff herein is ordered to forthwith defray the expenses to be incurred in undertaking the road construction of the 210 square meters which the defendants will later on provide along the right portion of her property. SO ORDERED.
[13]
On 15 June 1995, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision with the following dispositive portion, thus:
Republic vs CA
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the former as having the right to retain 590 square meters of the property covered by TCT No. T-7194, and ordering the latter to return 293 square meters of the 746 square meters taken; that defendants are solidarily liable to pay the sum ofP4,696,000.00, the fair market value of 1990 (sic), as just compensation for the 453 square meters taken for the Osmea Street extension; to pay P185,000.00 representing damages for 37 months computed at the rate of P5,000.00 per month from the filing of this case; and Attorneys fees of P10,000.00 plus costs of suit. Plaintiff herein is ordered to forthwith defray the expenses to be incurred in undertaking the road construction of the 293 square meters which the defendants will later on provide along the right portion of her property. SO ORDERED.
[14]
The Court of Appeals Ruling
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment,
[15]
affirming with modifications the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals
found that the commissioners recommendations on just compensation were not supported by valid documents. Also, it was unclear in the RTC decision whether the trial court merely adopted the commissioners recommendations or the court made its own independent valuation of the subject property. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that a reconvening of the commissioners or an appointment of new commissioners to determine just compensation was necessary. The appellate court further held that the trial courts order for petitioners return of the 293-square meter lot had no legal basis and was no longer feasible since the lot was already part of the completed Sergio Osmea extension road. Moreover, consequential damages should be awarded in lieu of actual damages for private respondents alleged loss of income from the remaining 297 -square meter lot. We quote the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision below. WHEREFORE , the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED. 1. The case is REMANDED to the trial court which is ordered to reconvene the commissioners or appoint new commissioners to determine, in accordance with this Decision, the amount of just compensation due to plaintiff-appellee Rosario Rodriguez Reyes for the 746 square meters of land taken from her and consequential damages to the 297-square meter portion left. 2. Defendant-appellant DWPH
[16]
is ordered to pay plaintiff-appellee the following amounts:
a. the balance, if any, of just compensation to be finally determined after deducting the amount [17] of P2,161,600.00 DPWH previously advanced and deposited with the trial court; b. 6% legal interest per annum on the amount it provisionally deposited from the time of taking up to the time it is deposited with the trial court on October 21, 1994; and on the balance, if any, from the time of taking on December 20, 1990 until fully paid; c. attorneys fees of P20,000.00. 3. Defendant-appellant City Government of Cagayan de Oro is relieved from any liability; 4. The award of P185,000.00 as actual damages is deleted; 5. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
[18]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 17 September 2003.
[19]
Republic vs CA
Hence, this appeal.
The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues: 1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case to the trial court, to order the reconvening of the commissioners or appointment of new commissioners to determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297- square meter lot; and attorneys fees.
2.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering petitioner to pay
The Courts Ruling We find the appeal unmeritorious.
On whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case to the trial court to order the reconvening of the commissioners or appointment of new commissioners to determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297-square meter lot
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment ofjust compensation. compensation.
[21] [20]
The Constitution provides that, *p+rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated.
[22]
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at
the fair market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker.
[23]
The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss.
[24]
To be just,
[25]
J ust compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government.
[26]
However, if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the
time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
[27]
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that *u+pon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disin terested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property so ught to be taken. However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals
[28]
that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such
complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule
Republic vs CA
67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation.
[29]
In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
[30]
we clarified
that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable, thus: In this case, NPC appropriated Pobres Property without resort to expropriation proceedings. NPC dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just compensation and damages that NPC had to pay Pobre. This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just [31] compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.
In this case, petitioner took possession of the subject property without initiating expropriation proceedings. Consequently, private respondent filed the instant case for just compensation and damages. To determine just compensation, the trial court appointed three commissioners pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. None of the parties objected to such appointment. The trial courts appointment of commissioners in this particular case is not improper. The appointment was done mainly to ai d the trial court in determining just compensation, and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the trial court is not bound by the commissioners recommended valuation of the subject property. The court has the discretion on whether to adopt the comm issioners valuation or to substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the records.
[32]
However, we agree with the appellate court that the trial courts decision is not clear as to its basis for ascertaining just compensation. The trial court mentioned in its decision the valuations in the reports of the City Appraisal Committee and of the commissioners appointed pursuant to Rule 67. But whether the trial court considered these valuations in arriving at the just compensation, or the court made its own independent valuation based on the records, was obscure in the decision. The trial court simply gave the total amount of just compensation due to the property owner without laying down its basis. Thus, there is no way to determine whether the adjudged just compensation is based on competent evidence. For this reason alone, a remand of the case to the trial court for proper determination of just compensation is in order. In National Power Corporation v. [33] Bongbong, we held that although the determination of just compensation lies within the trial courts discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or [34] capriciously. The decision of the trial court must be based on all established rules, correct legal principles, and competent evidence. The court is [35] proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and surmises.
Petitioner questions the appellate courts decision to remand the case to determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297 -square meter lot of private respondent. Petitioner contends that no consequential damages may be awarded as the remaining lot was n ot actually taken by the DPWH, and to award consequential damages for the lot which was retained by the owner is tantamount to unjust enrichment on the part of the latter. Petitioners contention is unmeritorious. No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot (i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of private respondent suffers from an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to private respondent. On the other hand, if the expropriation results to benefits to the remaining lot of private respondent, these consequential benefits
[36]
may be deducted from the awarded consequential damages, if any, or from the market value of
[37]
the expropriated property. We held in B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals
that:
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in every case.
Republic vs CA
Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: x x x The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.
An award of consequential damages for property not taken is not tantamount to unjust enrichment of the property owner. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
[38]
Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that *e+very person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at anothers expense or damage. will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.
[40] [39]
There is no unjust enrichment when the person who
As stated, consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. Thus, there is a valid basis for the grant of consequential damages to the property owner, and no unjust enrichment can result therefrom.
On whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering petitioner to pay attorneys fees.
The Court of Appeals did not err in granting attorneys fees to private respondent. Article 2208(2) of the New Civil Code provides that attorneys fees may be awarded: xxx (2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. xxx
Attorneys fees may be awarded by a court if one who claims it is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect ones interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought.
[41]
In this case, petitioner took possession of private
respondents real property without initiating expropriation proceedings, and over the latters objection. As a result, private respondent was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect her interests over her property. Thus, the appellate courts award of attorneys fees is proper, viz: We find, however, the award of attorneys fees in plaintiff-appellees favor justified. x x x It is admitted that defendantappellant DPWH neglected to file the appropriate expropriation proceedings before taking over plaintiff-appellees land. That their road contractor no longer has any portion to work on except on plaintiff-appellees property is no justification for the precipitate taking of her lot. It is incumbent upon defendant-appellant DPWH to foresee whether private lands will be affected by their project
Republic vs CA
and to file appropriate expropriation proceedings if necessary. They did not do so. Thus, plaintiff-appellee was constrained to [42] institute the instant suit to protect her rights.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of Appeals Decision dated 15 November 2002 and Resolution dated 17 September 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 50358.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs Lim
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA, COMMODORE EDGARDO GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO MANTOS & FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS, petitioners, vs. VICENTE G. LIM, respondent. RESOLUTION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Justice is the first virtue of social institutions. When the state wields its power of eminent domain, there arises a correlative obligation on its part to pay the owner of the expropriated property a just compensation. If it fails, there is a clear case of injustice that must be redressed. In the present case, fifty-seven (57) years have lapsed from the time the Decision in the subject expropriation proceedings became final, but still the Republic of the Philippines, herein petitioner, has not compensated the owner of the property. To tolerate such prolonged inaction on its part is to encourage distrust and resentment among our people the very vices that corrode the ties of civility and tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise shun. A revisit of the pertinent facts in the instant case is imperative. On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164 square meters. After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948. In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it denied knowledge of the matter. Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said claim. On September 6, 1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time. For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors -in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and [2] Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208. In the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and 939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the phrase subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporat ion to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value. On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In view of the differences in money value from 1940 up to the present, the court adjusted the market value at P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment. After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount in controversy, [3] directly to this Court. The case was docketed as No. L-21032. On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to show that the Republic paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the CFI decision. While it deposited the amount of P9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly disbursed, however, the payees could not be ascertained. Notwithstanding the above finding, this Court still ruled that Valdehueza and Panerio are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value, ratiocinating as follows:
[1]
Republic vs Lim
Appellants would contend that: (1) possession of Lots 932 and 939 should be restored to them as owners of the same; (2) the Republic should be ordered to pay rentals for the use of said lots, plus attorneys fees; and (3) the court a quo in the present suit had no power to fix the value of the lots and order the execution of the deed of sale after payment. It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the Government. The records do not show that the Government paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the 1940 CFI decision although, as stated, P9,500.00 was deposited by it, and said deposit had been disbursed. With the records lost, however, it cannot be known who received the money (Exh. 14 says: It is further certified that the corresponding Vouchers and pertinent Journal and Cash Book were destroyed during the last World War, and therefore the names of the payees concerned cannot be ascertained.) And the Government now admits that there is no available record showing that payment for the value of the lots in question has been made (Stipulation of Facts, par. 9, Rec. on Appeal, p. 28). The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the Government. In fact, the abovementioned title certificates secured by plaintiffs over said lots contained annotations of the right of the National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and acquire them. It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated but only to demand the fair market value of the same. Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name. On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the complaint to implead the Republic. On May 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Vicente Lim and against all defendants, public and private, declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. The monetary claims in the complaint and in the counter claims contained in the answer of defendants are ordered Dismissed. Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. CV No. 72915. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, the Appellate Court sustained the RTC Decision, thus: Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of paying what was due to the landowners. The expropriation proceedings had already become final in the late 1940s and yet, up to now, or more than fifty (50) years after, the Republic had not yet paid the co mpensation fixed by the court while continuously reaping benefits from the expropriated property to the prejudice of the landowner. x x x. This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more, in this case more than 50 years, before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. To allow the taking of the lando wners properties, and in the meantime leave them empty-handed by withholding payment of compensation while the government speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for government to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the landowners, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be sanctioned. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404). x x x x x x
[5] [4]
An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property, which is the subject matter of the action. Also the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as cloud on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of the foregoing discussion, clearly, the claim of defendant-appellant Republic constitutes a cloud, doubt or uncertainty on the title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente Lim that can be removed by an action to quiet title. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the appealed May 4, 2001 Decision of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said decision is UPHELD AND AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Republic vs Lim
Undaunted, petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the [6] Republic has remained the owner of Lot 932 as held by this Court in Valdehueza vs. Republic. In our Resolution dated March 1, 2004, we denied the petition outright on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error. Petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration but we denied the same with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004. On May 18, 2004, respondent filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an entry of judgment. We only noted the motion in our Resolution of July 12, 2004. On July 7, 2004, petitioners filed an urgent plea/motion for clarification, which is actually a second motion for reconsideration. Thus, in our Resolution of September 6, 2004, we simply noted without action the motion considering that the instant petition was already denied with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004. On October 29, 2004, petitioners filed a very urgent motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated September 6, 2004 (with prayer to refer the case to the En Banc). They maintain that the Republics right of ownership has been settled in Valdehueza. The basic issue for our resolution is whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents predecessorsin-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940. Initially, we must rule on the procedural obstacle. While we commend the Republic for the zeal with which it pursues the present case, we reiterate that its urgent motion for clarification filed on July 7, 2004 is actually a second motion for reconsideration. This motion is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides: Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. Consequently, as mentioned earlier, we simply noted without action the motion since petitioners pet ition was already denied with finality. Considering the Republics urgent and serious insistence that it is still the owner of Lot 932 and in the interest of justice , we take another hard look at the controversial issue in order to determine the veracity o f petitioners stance. One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public [7] use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors -in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is accompanied by bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondents predecessors-in-interest were given a run around by the Republics officials and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the two lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of respondents predecessors-in-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite the payment, failed in granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened. The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated [8] as a trespasser ab initio. Corollarily, in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya, similar to the present case, this Court expressed its disgust over the governments vexatious delay in the payment of just compensation, thus: The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their land which was taken for use as a public h igh school. As a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to supply all required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation. The imposition of unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent with government. There should be some kind of swift and effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower level bureaucrats. We feel the same way in the instant case. More than anything else, however, it is the obstinacy of the Republic that prompted us to dismiss its petition outright. As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16,248.40 as reasonable market value of
[9]
Republic vs Lim
the two lots in question. Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall [10] be attended by compensation. From the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied [11] promise to compensate the owner for his loss. Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment o f the individuals rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the [12] property owner. Ironically, in opposing respondents claim, the Republic is invoking this Courts Decision in Valdehueza, a Decision it utterly defied. How could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small Landowners in the [13] Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, thus: Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the jud gment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnors title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioners report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. (Emphasis supplied.) In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniform to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, it was held that actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State albeit not to the appropriation of it to public use. In Rexford v. Knight, the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that both on principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him. Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, that: If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that t he method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid...(Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, [14] the Republics acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time. Significantly, in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia
[15]
this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit:
x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the propert y sought to be taken. This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment [16] Corporation, we ruled that, the process is not completed until payment of just compensation. Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete. The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots. This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of [17] [18] Appeals, et al., and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority. However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the firstwas in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-
Republic vs Lim
seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republics failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had [19] when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or where a rightful [20] entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon; or fails or refuses to have the [21] compensation assessed and paid. The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions being used by the military, as in this case, public interest demands that the present suit should not be sustained. It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the public convenience. [23] the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we ruled:
[22]
In Association of Small Landowners in
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right. The right covers the persons life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The Republics assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave danger if we shall order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an airport. What remains in the site is just the National Historical Institutes marking stating that Lot 932 is the former location of Lahug Airport. And second, there are only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight (8) of which are residence apartments of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are actually used as training centers. Thus, practically speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent will only affect a handful of military personnel. It will not result to irreparable damage or damage beyond pecuniary estimation, as what the Republic vehemently claims. We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. Unless this form of swift and effective relief is granted to him, the grave injustice committed against his predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or negligence on their part, will be perpetuated. Let this case, therefore, serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must comply with the Constitutional limitations. This Court, as the guardian of the peoples right, will not stand still in the face of the Republics oppressive and confiscatory taking of private property, as in this case. At this point, it may be argued that respondent Vicente Lim acted in bad faith in entering into a contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio despite the clear annotation in TCT No. 23934 that Lot 932 is subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation [to acquire said parcels of land] x x x upon previous payment of a reasonable market value. The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is immaterial considering that the Republic did not complete the expropriation process. In short, it failed to perfect its title over Lot 932 by its failure to pay just compensation. The issue of bad faith would have assumed relevance if the Republic actually acquired title over Lot 932. In such a case, even if respondents title was registered first, it would be the Republics title or right of ownership that shall be upheld. But now, assuming that respondent was in bad faith, can such fact vest upon the Republic a better title over Lot 932? We believe not. This is because in the first place, the Republic has no title to speak of. At any rate, assuming that respondent had indeed knowledge of the annotation, still nothing would have prevented him from entering into a mortgage contract involving Lot 932 while the expropriation proceeding was pending. Any person who deals with a property subject of an expropriation does so at his own risk, taking into account the ultimate possibility of losing the property in favor of the government. Here, the annotation merely served as a caveat that the Republic had a preferential right to acquire Lot 932 upon its payment of a reasonable market value. It did not proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from exercising their rights of ownership including their right to mortgage or even to dispose of their [24] property. In Republic vs. Salem Investment Corporation, we recognized the owners absolute right over his property pending completion of the expropriation proceeding, thus: It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is only u pon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner.Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation. It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never did. Such title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled in Valdehueza that: It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the Government.
Republic vs Lim
For respondents part, it is reasonable to conclude that he entered into the contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio fully aware of the extent of his right as a mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an accessory contract intended to secure the performance of the principal obligation. One of its characteristics is that it is inseparablefrom the property. It adheres to the property regardless of who its owner may subsequently [25] be. Respondent must have known that even if Lot 932 is ultimately expropriated by the Republic, still, his right as a mortgagee is protected. In this regard, Article 2127 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements, growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with the declarations, amplifications, and limitations established by law, whether the estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor or it passes in the hands of a third person. In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover [26] [27] possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in [28] consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court [29] of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED in toto. The Republics motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated March 1, 2004 is DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings will be allowed. Let an entry of judgment be made in this case. SO ORDERED.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Lozada

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 176625 MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, Petitioners, vs. BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., and the HEIRS OF ROSARIO MERCADO, namely, VICENTE LOZADA, MARIO M. LOZADA, MARCIA L. GODINEZ, VIRGINIA L. FLORES, BERNARDO LOZADA, JR., DOLORES GACASAN, SOCORRO CAFARO and ROSARIO LOZADA, represented by MARCIA LOZADA GODINEZ, Respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse, annul, and set aside the Decision dated February 28, 2 2006 and the Resolution dated February 7, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) (Cebu City), Twentieth Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 65796. The antecedent facts and proceedings are as follows: Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017 square meters, more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881. As early as 1947, the lots were already occupied by the U.S. Army. They were turned over to the Surplus Property Commission, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the National Airport Corporation and then to the CAA. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9045 was issued in Lozadas name. On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per square meter, with consequential damages by way of legal interest computed from November 16, 1947the time when the lot was first occupied by the airport. Lozada received the amount of P3,018.00 by way of payment. The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office (ATO), formerly CAA, proposed a compromise settlement whereby the owners of the lots affected by the expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or withdraw their respective appeals in consideration of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be resold at the price they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport, pursuant to an established policy involving similar cases. Because of this promise, Lozada did not pursue his appeal. Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and registered in the name of the Republic under TCT No. 25057. The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued. Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr., requesting to repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement. The CAA replied that there might still be a need for the Lahug Airport to be used as an emergency DC-3 airport. It reiterated, however, the assurance that "should this Office dispose and resell the properties which may be found to be no longer necessary as an airport, then the policy of this Office is to give priority to the former owners subject to the approval of the President." On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to the Department of Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the closure of the Lahug Airport. Sometime in 1990, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6958, entitled "An Act Creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, Transferring Existing Assets of the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug Airport to the Authority, Vesting the Authority with Power to Administer and Operate the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug Airport, and For Other Purposes."
1

From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, the old airport was converted into a commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became 3 the site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Complex, while a portion thereof was occupied by squatters. The old airport was converted into what is now known as the Ayala I.T. Park, a commercial area.1avvphi1 Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-18823 and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Cebu City. The complaint substantially alleged as follows: (a) Spouses Bernardo and Rosario Lozada were the registered owners of Lot No. 88 covered by TCT No. 9045; (b) In the early 1960s, the Republic sought to acquire by expropriation Lot No. 88, among ot hers, in connection with its program for the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport; (c) A decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance in favor of the Government and against the land owners, among whom was Bernardo Lozada, Sr. appealed therefrom; (d) During the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into a compromise settlement to the effect that the subject property would be resold to the original owner at the same price when it was expropriated in the event that the Government abandons the Lahug Airport; (e) Title to Lot No. 88 was subsequently transferred to the Republic of the Philippines (TCT No. 25057); (f) The projected expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport did not materialize; (g) Plaintiffs sought to repurchase their property from then CAA Director Vicente Rivera. The latter replied by giving as assurance that priority would be given to the previous owners, subject to the approval of the President, should CAA decide to dispose of the properties; (h) On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino, through a Memorandum to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), directed the transfer of general aviation operations at the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority; (i) Since the public purpose for the expropriation no longer exists, the property must be returned to the plaintiffs.
4
In their Answer, petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof. After pretrial, but before trial on the merits, the parties stipulated on the following set of facts: (1) The lot involved is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 of the Banilad Estate, situated in the City of Cebu, containing an area of One Thousand Seventeen (1,017) square meters, more or less; (2) The property was expropriated among several other properties in Lahug in favor of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of a Decision dated December 29, 1961 of the CFI of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-1881; (3) The public purpose for which the property was expropriated was for the purpose of the Lahug Airport; (4) After the expansion, the property was transferred in the name of MCIAA; [and] (5) On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Department of Transportation and Communication to transfer general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority and to close the Lahug Airport after such 5 transfer[.] During trial, respondents presented Bernardo Lozada, Sr. as their lone witness, while petitioners presented their own witness, Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority legal assistant Michael Bacarisas. On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr., and the heirs of Rosario Mercado, namely, Vicente M. Lozada, Marcia L. Godinez, Virginia L. Flores, Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores L. Gacasan, Socorro L. Cafaro and Rosario M. Lozada, represented by their attorney-in-fact Marcia Lozada Godinez, and against defendants Cebu-Mactan International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office (ATO): 1. ordering MCIAA and ATO to restore to plaintiffs the possession and ownership of their land, Lot No. 88 Psd-821 (SWO-23803), upon payment of the expropriation price to plaintiffs; and 2. ordering the Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the Certificate of Title from defendant[s] to plaintiffs on Lot No. [88], cancelling TCT No. 20357 in the name of defendant MCIAA and to issue a new title on the same lot in the name of Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. and the heirs of Rosario Mercado, namely: Vicente M. Lozada, Mario M. Lozada, Marcia L. Godinez, Virginia L. Flores, Bernardo M. Lozada, Jr., Dolores L. Gacasan, Socorro L. Cafaro and Rosario M. Lozada. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
6
Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal to the CA. After the filing of the necessary appellate briefs, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dated February 28, 2006, denying petitioners appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu City. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied in the questioned CA Resolution dated February 7, 2007. Hence, this petition arguing that: (1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase agreement or compromise settlement between them and the Government; (2) the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to the Republic; and (3) the respondents claim of verbal assurances from government officials violates the Statute of Frauds. The petition should be denied. Petitioners anchor their claim to the controverted property on the supposition that the Decision in the pertinent expropriation proceedings did not provide for the condition that should the intended use of Lot No. 88 for the expansion of the Lahug Airport be aborted or abandoned, the property 7 would revert to respondents, being its former owners. Petitioners cite, in support of this position, Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, which declared that the Government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If x x x land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. x x x. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. x x x. When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no right in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate 8 or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. x x x. Contrary to the stance of petitioners, this Court had ruled otherwise in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport 9 Authority, thus Moreover, respondent MCIAA has brought to our attention a significant and telling portion in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 validating our discernment that the expropriation by the predecessors of respondent was ordered under the running impression that Lahug Airport would continue in operation As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be doubted. Although Mactan Airport is being constructed, it does not take away the actual usefulness and importance of the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to show how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and whether the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other departments of the Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot substitute its judgment for those of the said departments or agencies. In the absence of such showing, the Court will presume that the Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation (emphasis supplied).

While in the trial in Civil Case No. R-1881 [we] could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation." Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer "in operation." This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis--vis the expropriated Lots Nos. 916 and 920 as between the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and (b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of the Decision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallo thereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as 10 contained in the body thereof. Indeed, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety, wherein it is apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition not having materialized because the 11 airport had been abandoned, the former owner should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property. On this note, we take this opportunity to revisit our ruling in Fery, which involved an expropriation suit commenced upon parcels of land to be used as a site for a public market. Instead of putting up a public market, respondent Cabanatuan constructed residential houses for lease on the area. Claiming that the municipality lost its right to the property taken since it did not pursue its public purpose, petitioner Juan Fery, the former owner of the lots expropriated, sought to recover his properties. However, as he had admitted that, in 1915, respondent Cabanatuan acquired a fee simple title to the lands in question, judgment was rendered in favor of the municipality, following American jurisprudence, particularly City of Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore 12 13 14 & M.S. RY. Co., McConihay v. Theodore Wright, and Reichling v. Covington Lumber Co., all uniformly holding that the transfer to a third party of the expropriated real property, which necessarily resulted in the abandonment of the particular public purpose for which the property was taken, is not a ground for the recovery of the same by its previous owner, the title of the expropriating agency being one of fee simple. Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for public use without 15 just compensation. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake 16 of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity. In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent 17 domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. Even without the foregoing declaration, in the instant case, on the question of whether respondents were able to establish the existence of an oral compromise agreement that entitled them to repurchase Lot No. 88 should the operations of the Lahug Airport be abandoned, we rule in the affirmative. It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu and the CA have passed upon this factual issue and have declared, in no uncertain terms, that a compromise agreement was, in fact, entered into between the Government and respondents, with the former undertaking to resell Lot No. 88 to the latter if the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport would not be pursued. In affirming the factual finding of the RTC to this effect, the CA declared Lozadas testimony is cogent. An octogenarian widower-retiree and a resident of Moon Park, California since 1974, he testified that government representatives verbally promised him and his late wife while the expropriation proceedings were on-going that the government shall return the property if the purpose for the expropriation no longer exists. This promise was made at the premises of the airport. As far as he could remember, there were no expropriation proceedings against his property in 1952 because the first notice of expropriation he received was in 1962. Based on the promise, he did not hire a lawyer. Lozada was firm that he was promised that the lot would be reverted to him once the public use of the lot ceases. He made it clear that the verbal promise was made in Lahug with other lot owners before the 1961 decision was handed down, though he could not name the government representatives who made the promise. It was just a verbal promise; nevertheless, it is binding. The fact that he could not supply the necessary details for the establishment of his assertions during cross-examination, but that "When it will not be used as intended, it will be returned back, we just believed in the government," does not dismantle the credibility and truthfulness of his allegation. This Court notes that he was 89 years old when he testified in November 1997 for an incident which happened decades ago. Still, he is a competent witness capable of perceiving and making his perception known. The minor lapses are immaterial. The decision of the competency of a witness rests primarily with the trial judge and must not

be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear that it was erroneous. The objection to his competency must be made before he has given any testimony or as 18 soon as the incompetency becomes apparent. Though Lozada is not part of the compromise agreement, he nevertheless adduced sufficient evidence 19 to support his claim. As correctly found by the CA, unlike in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, cited by petitioners, where respondent therein offered testimonies which were hearsay in nature, the testimony of Lozada was based on personal knowledge as the assurance from the government was personally made to him. His testimony on cross-examination destroyed neither his credibility as a witness nor the truthfulness of his words. Verily, factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed. A 21 petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law and not of fact. Not one of the exceptions to this rule is present in this case to warrant a reversal of such findings. As regards the position of petitioners that respondents testimonial evidence violates the Statute of Frauds, suffice it to s tate that the Statute of Frauds operates only with respect to executory contracts, and does not apply to contracts which have been completely or partially performed, the rationale thereof being as follows: In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud. However, if a contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already delivered by him from the transaction in 22 litigation, and, at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him thereby. In this case, the Statute of Frauds, invoked by petitioners to bar the claim of respondents for the reacquisition of Lot No. 88, cannot apply, the oral compromise settlement having been partially performed. By reason of such assurance made in their favor, respondents relied on the same by not pursuing their appeal before the CA. Moreover, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the fact of Lozadas eventual confor mity to the appraisal of Lot No. 88 and his seeking the correction of a clerical error in the judgment as to the true area of Lot No. 88 do not conclusively establish that respondents absolutely parted with their property. To our mind, these acts were simply meant to cooperate with the government, particularly because of the oral promise made to them. The right of respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88 may be enforced based on a constructive trust constituted on the property held by the government in favor of the former. On this note, our ruling in Heirs of Timoteo Moreno is instructive, viz.: Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is correct in stating that one would not find an express statement in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 to the effect that "the [condemned] lot would return to [the landowner] or that [the landowner] had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport." This omission notwithstanding, and while the inclusion of this pronouncement in the judgment of condemnation would have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary nor is it fatal to the cause of petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could be readily justified as the manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial courts underlying presumption that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation" when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities. The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied trust referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, "If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him." In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots No. 916 and 920 to the government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the government can be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. Although the symmetry between the instant case and the situation contemplated by Art. 1454 is not perfect, the provision is undoubtedly applicable. For, as explained by an expert on the law of trusts: "The only problem of great importance in the field of constructive trust is to decide whether in the numerous and varying fact situations presented to the courts there is a wrongful holding of property and hence a threatened unjust enrichment of the defendant." Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are bound by no unyielding formula when they are used by courts as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest. In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees sole duty is to transfer the title a nd possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of course, the "wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive trust must himself do equity." Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion in deciding what acts are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has the obligation to reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the plaintiff-beneficiary would if he proceeded on the theory of rescission. In the good judgment of the court, the trustee may also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in sustaining the property, his fixed costs for improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his services in managing the property to the extent that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit from his acts.
20

The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this case, respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, "When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have received x x x In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is bound to return x x 23 x." On the matter of the repurchase price, while petitioners are obliged to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents, the latter must return to the former what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of the property, plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case runs from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to respondents. Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the necessary expenses they may have incurred in maintaining Lot No. 88, as well as the monetary value of their services in managing it to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby. Following Article 1187 of the Civil Code, petitioners may keep whatever income or fruits they may have obtained from Lot No. 88, and respondents need not account for the interests that the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime. In accordance with Article 1190 of the Civil Code vis--vis Article 1189, which provides that "(i)f a thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x," respondents, as creditors, do not have to pay, as part of the process of restitution, the 26 appreciation in value of Lot No. 88, which is a natural consequence of nature and time. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the October 22, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Cebu City, and its February 7, 2007 Resolution are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows: 1. Respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioners the just compensation they received for the expropriation of Lot No. 88, plus legal interest, in the case of default, to be computed from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to reconvey Lot No. 88 to them; 2. Respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioners the necessary expenses the latter incurred in maintaining Lot No. 88, plus the monetary value of their services to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby; 3. Petitioners are ENTITLED to keep whatever fruits and income they may have obtained from Lot No. 88; and 4. Respondents are also ENTITLED to keep whatever interests the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime, as well as the appreciation in value of Lot No. 88, which is a natural consequence of nature and time; In light of the foregoing modifications, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Cebu City, only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the amounts that respondents will have to pay petitioners in accordance with this Courts decision. No costs. SO ORDERED.
25 24
Vda. De Ouano vs. Republic

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 168770, February 09, 2011] ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ, AND CIELO OUANO MARTINEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CEBU, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 168812] MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO L. INOCIAN, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF OLYMPIA E. ESTEVES, EMILIA E. BACALLA, RESTITUTA E. MONTANA, AND RAUL L. INOCIAN; AND ALETHA SUICO MAGAT, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF PHILIP M. SUICO, DORIS S. DELA CRUZ, JAMES M. SUICO, EDWARD M. SUICO, ROSELYN SUICO-LAWSIN, REX M. SUICO, KHARLA SUICO-GUTIERREZ, ALBERT CHIONGBIAN, AND JOHNNY CHAN, RESPONDENTS. DECISION VELASCO JR., J.: At the center of these two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the issue of the right of the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City to repurchase or secure reconveyance of their respective properties. In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168770, petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez [1] (the Ouanos) seek to nullify the Decision dated September 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027, affirming the Order dated December 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 in Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-20743, a suit to compel the Republic of the Philippines and/or the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey to the Ouanos a parcel of land. The second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168812, has the MCIAA seeking principally to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution dated January 14, 2005 and June 29, 2005, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 64356, sustaining the RTC, Branch 13 in Cebu City in its Decision of October 7, 1988 in Civil Case No. CEB-18370. Per its October 19, 2005 Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases. Except for the names of the parties and the specific lot designation involved, the relevant factual antecedents which gave rise to these consolidated [4] [5] petitions are, for the most part, as set forth in the Court's Decision of October 15, 2003, as reiterated in a Resolution dated August 9, 2005, in G.R. No. 156273 entitled Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority(Heirs of Moreno), and in [6] other earlier related cases. In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA's predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport, which included Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later claim, the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right of repurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the aforementioned lots, refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way below market, forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947, among others, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881 entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al. On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered judgment for the Republic, disposing, in part, as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring the expropriation of Lots Nos. 75, 76, 76, 89, 90, 91, 92, 105, 106, 107, 108, 104, 921-A, 88, 93, 913-B, 72, 77, 916, 777-A, 918, 919, 920, 764-A, 988, 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 762-A, 763-A, 951, 942, 720-A, x x x and 947, included in the Lahug Airport, Cebu City, justified in and in lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain. xxxx 3. After the payment of the foregoing financial obligation to the landowners, directing the latter to deliver to the plaintiff the corresponding Transfer
[2] [3]

Certificates of Title to their respective lots; and upon the presentation of the said titles to the Register of Deeds, ordering the latter to cancel the same [7] and to issue, in lieu thereof, new Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the plaintiff. In view of the adverted buy-back assurance made by the government, the owners of the lots no longer appealed the decision of the trial [8] court. Following the finality of the judgment of condemnation, certificates of title for the covered parcels of land were issued in the name of the [9] Republic which, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958, were subsequently transferred to MCIAA. At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to MCIAA, Lahug Airport completely ceased operations, Mactan Airport having opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights. On the ground, the expropriated lots were never utilized for the purpose they were taken as no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. This development prompted the former lot owners to formally demand from the government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right to repurchase. The demands went unheeded. Civil suits followed. G.R. No. 168812 (MCIAA Petition) On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L. Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga who originally owned six of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and seven others, successors-in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of two (2) of the condemned lots (collectively, the Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a complaint for reconveyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-18370, was eventually raffled to Branch 13 of the court. On September 29, 1997, one Albert Chiongbian (Chiongbian), alleging to be the owner of Lot Nos. 761-A and 762-A but which the Inocians were now claiming, moved and was later allowed to intervene. During the pre-trial, MCIAA admitted the following facts: 1. That the properties, which are the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, are also the properties involved in Civil Case R-1881; 2. That the purpose of the expropriation was for the expansion of the old Lahug Airport; that the Lahug Airport was not expanded; 3. That the old Lahug Airport was closed sometime in June 1992; 4. That the price paid to the lot owners in the expropriation case is found in the decision of the court; and 5. That some properties were reconveyed by the MCIAA because the previous owners were able to secure express waivers or riders wherein the government agreed to return the properties should the expansion of the Lahug Airport not materialize. During trial, the Inocians adduced evidence which included the testimony of Ricardo Inocian (Inocian) and Asterio Uy (Uy). Uy, an employee of the CAA, testified that he was a member of the team which negotiated for the acquisition of certain lots in Lahug for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport. He recalled that he acted as the interpreter/spokesman of the team since he could speak the Cebuano dialect. He stated that the other members of the team of negotiators were Atty. Pedro Ocampo, Atty. Lansang, and Atty. Saligumba. He recounted that, in the course of the negotiation, their team assured the landowners that their landholdings would be reconveyed to them in the event the Lahug Airport would be abandoned or if its operation were transferred to the Mactan Airport. Some landowners opted to sell, while others were of a different bent owing to the inadequacy of the offered price. Inocian testified that he and his mother, Isabel Lambaga, attended a meeting called by the NAC team of negotiators sometime in 1947 or 1949 where he and the other landowners were given the assurance that they could repurchase their lands at the same price in the event the Lahug Airport ceases to operate. He further testified that they rejected the NAC's offer. However, he said that they no longer appealed the decree of expropriation due to the repurchase assurance adverted to. The MCIAA presented Michael Bacarizas (Bacarizas), who started working for MCIAA as legal assistant in 1996. He testified that, in the course of doing research work on the lots subject of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, he discovered that the same lots were covered by the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881. He also found out that the said decision did not expressly contain any condition on the matter of repurchase. Ruling of the RTC On October 7, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. CEB-18370, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered directing defendant Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey (free from liens and encumbrances) to plaintiffs Ricardo Inocian, Olimpia E. Esteves, Emilia E. Bacalla, Restituta E. Montana and Raul Inocian
[6]

Lots No. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 762-A, 747, 761-A and to plaintiffs Aletha Suico Magat, Philip M. Suico, Doris S. dela Cruz, James M. Suico, Edward M. Suico, Roselyn S. Lawsin, Rex M. Suico and Kharla Suico-Gutierrez Lots No. 942 and 947, after plaintiffs shall have paid MCIAA the sums indicated in the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881. Defendant MCIAA is likewise directed to pay the aforementioned plaintiffs the sum or P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses. Albert Chiongbian's intervention should be, as it is hereby DENIED for utter lack of factual basis. With costs against defendant MCIAA.
[10]
Therefrom, MCIAA went to the CA on appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64356. Ruling of the CA On January 14, 2005, the CA rendered judgment for the Inocians, declaring them entitled to the reconveyance of the questioned lots as the successorsin-interest of the late Isabel Limbaga and Santiago Suico, as the case may be, who were the former registered owners of the said lots. The decretal portion of the CA's Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case andAFFFIRMING the decision rendered by the court a quo on October 7, 1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-18370. SO ORDERED. The CA, citing and reproducing excerpts from Heirs of Moreno, virtually held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 was conditional, stating "that the expropriation of [plaintiff-appellees'] lots for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport was ordered by the CFI of Cebu under the impression [12] that Lahug Airport would continue in operation." The condition, as may be deduced from the CFI's decision, was that should MCIAA, or its precursor agency, discontinue altogether with the operation of Lahug Airport, then the owners of the lots expropriated may, if so minded, demand of MCIAA to make good its verbal assurance to allow the repurchase of the properties. To the CA, this assurance, a demandable agreement of repurchase by itself, has been adequately established. On September 21, 2005, the MCIAA filed with Us a petition for review of the CA's Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 168812. G.R. No. 168770 (Ouano Petition) Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997, the Ouanos instituted a complaint before the Cebu City RTC against the Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20743. Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the Ouanos no longer have enforceable rights whatsoever over the condemned Lot No. 763-A, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 not having found any reversionary condition. Ruling of the RTC By a Decision dated November 28, 2000, the RTC, Branch 57 in Cebu City ruled in favor of the Ouanos, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez and against the Republic of the Philippines and Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to restore to plaintiffs, the possession and ownership of their land, Lot No. 763-A upon payment of the expropriation price to defendants; and 2. Ordering the Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the Certificate of Title from defendant Republic of the Philippines on Lot 763-A, canceling TCT No. 52004 in the name of defendant Republic of the Philippines and to issue a new title on the same lot in the names of Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez. No pronouncement as to costs.
[13] [11]
Acting on the motion of the Republic and MCIAA for reconsideration, however, the RTC, Branch 57 in Cebu City, presided this time by Judge Enriqueta [14] L. Belarmino, issued, on December 9, 2002, an Order that reversed its earlier decision of November 28, 2000 and dismissed the Ouanos' complaint.

Ruling of the CA In time, the Ouanos interposed an appeal to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78027. Eventually, the appellate court rendered a Decision September 3, 2004, denying the appeal, thus:
th [15]
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated December 9, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, 7 Judicial Region, Branch 57, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-20743, is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Explaining its case disposition, the CA stated that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 did not state any condition that Lot No. 763-A of the Ouanos-and all covered lots for that matter--would be returned to them or that they could repurchase the same property if it were to be used for purposes other than for the Lahug Airport. The appellate court also went on to declare the inapplicability of the Court's pronouncement in MCIAA v. Court of [16] Appeals, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, Melba Limbago, et al., to support the Ouanos' cause, since the affected landowners in that case, unlike the Ouanos, parted with their property not through expropriation but via a sale and purchase transaction. The Ouanos filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision, but was denied per the CA's May 26, 2005 Resolution. petition in G.R. No. 168770. The Issues G.R. No. 168812 GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
[17]
Hence, they filed this
l. THE ASSAILED ISSUANCES ILLEGALLY STRIPPED THE REPUBLIC OF ITS ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL TITLE TO THE SUBJECT EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES. ll. THE IMPUNGED DISPOSITIONS INVALIDLY OVERTURNED THIS HONORABLE COURT'S FINAL RULINGS IN FERY V. MUNICIPALITY OF CABANATUAN, MCIAA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND REYES V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY. lll. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THIS HONORABLE COURT'S RULING IN MORENO, ALBEIT IT HAS NOT YET ATTAINED [18] FINALITY. G.R. No. 168770 Questions of law presented in this Petition Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the petitioners proving the promises, assurances and representations by the airport officials and lawyers are inadmissbale under the Statute of Frauds. Whether or not under the ruling of this Honorable Court in the heirs of Moreno Case, and pursuant to the principles enunciated therein, petitioners herein are entitiled to recover their litigated property. Reasons for Allowances of this Petition Respondents did not object during trial to the admissibility of petitioners' testimonial evidence under the Statute of Frauds and have thus waived such objection and are now barred from raising the same. In any event, the Statute of Frauds is not applicable herein. Consequently, petitioners' evidence is [19] admissible and should be duly given weight and credence, as initially held by the trial court in its original Decision. While their respective actions against MCIAA below ended differently, the Ouanos and the Inocians' proffered arguments presented before this Court run along parallel lines, both asserting entitlement to recover the litigated property on the strength of the Court's ruling in Heirs of Moreno. MCIAA has, however, formulated in its Consolidated Memorandum the key interrelated issues in these consolidated cases, as follows: I

WHETHER ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE FOR WHICH THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE EXPROPRIATED ENTITLES PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. TO REACQUIRE THEM. II WHETHER PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. ARE ENTITLED TO RECONVEYANCE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES SIMPLY ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED VERBAL PROMISE OR ASSURANCE OF SOME NAC OFFICIALS THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WILL BE RETUNRED IF THE AIRPORT PROJECT WOULD BE ABANDONED. The Court's Ruling The Republic and MCIAA's petition in G.R. No. 168812 is bereft of merit, while the Ouano petition in G.R. No. 168770 is meritorious. At the outset, three (3) fairly established factual premises ought to be emphasized: First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for [20] development as a commercial complex. Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected [21] landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes. "No less than Asterio Uy," the Court noted in Heirs of Moreno, "one of the members of the CAA Mactan Legal Team, which interceded for the acquisition of the lots for the Lahug Airport's expansion, affirmed that persistent assurances were given to the landowners to the effect that as soon as the Lahug Airport is [22] abandoned or transferred to Mactan, the lot owners would be able to reacquire their properties." In Civil Case No. CEB-20743, Exhibit "G," the [23] transcript of the deposition of Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering the assurance made had been formally offered in evidence and duly considered in the initial decision of the RTC Cebu City. In Civil Case No. CEB-18370, the trial court, on the basis of testimonial evidence, and later the CA, [24] recognized the reversionary rights of the suing former lot owners or their successors in interest and resolved the case accordingly. In point with respect to the representation and promise of the government to return the lots taken should the planned airport expansion do not materialize is what the Court said in Heirs of Moreno, thus: This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with there exists an undeniable historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of the properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airport's venue. Some acted on this assurance and sold their properties; other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of eminent domain to take its course until finally coming to terms with respondent's predecessors that they would not appeal nor block further judgment of condemnation if the right of repurchase was extended to them. A handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when [25] they parted with ownership of their land. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) For perspective, Heirs of Moreno--later followed by MCIAA v. Tudtud (Tudtud) and the consolidated cases at bar--is cast under the same factual setting and centered on the expropriation of privately-owned lots for the public purpose of expanding the Lahug Airport and the alleged promise of reconveyance given by the negotiating NAC officials to the private lot owners. All the lots being claimed by the former owners or successors-in-interest of the former owners in the Heirs of Moreno, Tudtud, and the present cases were similarly adjudged condemned in favor of the Republic in Civil Case No. R-1881. All the claimants sought was or is to have the condemned lots reconveyed to them upon the payment of the condemnation price since the public purpose of the expropriation was never met. Indeed, the expropriated lots were never used and were, in fact, abandoned by the expropriating government agencies. In all then, the issues and supporting arguments presented by both sets of petitioners in these consolidated cases have already previously been passed upon, discussed at length, and practically peremptorily resolved in Heirs of Moreno and the November 2008 Tudtud ruling. The Ouanos, as petitioners in G.R. No. 168770, and the Inocians, as respondents in G.R. No. 168812, are similarly situated as the heirs of Moreno inHeirs of Moreno and Benjamin Tudtud in Tudtud. Be that as it may, there is no reason why the ratio decidendi in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud should not be made to apply to petitioners Ouanos and respondents Inocians such that they shall be entitled to recover their or their predecessors' respective properties under the same manner and arrangement as the heirs of Moreno and Tudtud. Stare decisis et non quieta movere(to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle [27] things which are established). Just like in Tudtud and earlier in Heirs of Moreno, MCIAA would foist the theory that the judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-1881 was without qualification and was unconditional. It would, in fact, draw attention to the fallo of the expropriation court's decision to prove that there is
[26]

nothing in the decision indicating that the government gave assurance or undertook to reconvey the covered lots in case the Lahug airport expansion project is aborted. Elaborating on this angle, MCIAA argues that the claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians regarding the alleged verbal assurance of the [28] NAC negotiating team that they can reacquire their landholdings is barred by the Statute of Frauds. Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same or some note of the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party charged. Subject to defined exceptions, evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of its contents. MCIAA's invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced primarily because the statute applies only to executory and not to completed, executed, or [29] partially consummated contracts. Carbonnel v. Poncio, et al., quoting Chief Justice Moran, explains the rationale behind this rule, thusly: x x x "The reason is simple. In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they may be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute has been precisely been enacted to prevent fraud." x x x However, if a contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already derived by him from the transaction in litigation, and at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by [30] him thereby. (Emphasis in the original.) Analyzing the situation of the cases at bar, there can be no serious objection to the proposition that the agreement package between the government and the private lot owners was already partially performed by the government through the acquisition of the lots for the expansion of the Lahug airport. The parties, however, failed to accomplish the more important condition in the CFI decision decreeing the expropriation of the lots litigated upon: the expansion of the Lahug Airport. The project--the public purpose behind the forced property taking--was, in fact, never pursued and, as a consequence, the lots expropriated were abandoned. Be that as it may, the two groups of landowners can, in an action to compel MCIAA to make good its oral undertaking to allow repurchase, adduce parol evidence to prove the transaction. At any rate, the objection on the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised. Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not, as the Ouanos and the Inocians posit, object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its commitment to allow the former landowners to repurchase their respective properties upon the occurrence of certain events. In a bid to deny the lot owners the right to repurchase, MCIAA, citing cases, points to the dispositive part of the decision in Civil Case R-1881 which, as couched, granted the Republic absolute title to the parcels of land declared expropriated. The MCIAA is correct about the unconditional tone of the dispositive portion of the decision, but that actuality would not carry the day for the agency. Addressing the matter of the otherwise absolute tenor of the CFI's disposition in Civil Case No. R-1881, the Court, in Heirs of Moreno, after taking stock of the ensuing portion of the body of the CFI's decision, said: As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be doubted. Although Mactan Airport is being constructed, it does not take away the actual usefulness and importance of the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic of both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to show how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and whether the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other departments of the Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot substitute its judgments for those of the said departments or agencies. In the absence of [32] such showing, the court will presume that the Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation. (Emphasis supplied.) We went on to state as follows: While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of the Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that `Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation'. Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer `in operation'. This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis- -vis the expropriated lots x x x as between the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably adjusted; and (b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of theDecision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallothereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as contained in the body [33] thereof. Not to be overlooked of course is what the Court said in its Resolution disposing of MCIAA's motion to reconsider the original ruling in Heirs of Moreno. In that resolution, We stated that the fallo of the decision in Civil Case R-1881 should be viewed and understood in connection with the entire text, which contemplated a return of the property taken if the airport expansion project were abandoned. For ease of reference, following is what the Court wrote:
[31]

Moreover, we do not subscribe to the [MCIAA's] contention that since the possibility of the Lahug Airport's closure was actually considered by the trial court, a stipulation on reversion or repurchase was so material that it should not have been discounted by the court a quo in its decision in Civil Case No. R-1881, if, in fact, there was one. We find it proper to cite, once more, this Court's ruling that the fallo of the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 must be read in reference to the other portions of the decision in which it forms a part. A reading of the Court's judgment must not be confined to the dispositive portion alone; rather it should be meaningfully construed in unanimity with the ratio decidendi thereof to grasp the true intent and meaning [34] of a decision. The Court has, to be sure, taken stock of Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, observations:
[35]
a case MCIAA cites at every possible turn, where the Court made these
If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned, the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. x x x If, upon the contrary, however the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator x x x and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings x x x. Fery notwithstanding, MCIAA cannot really rightfully say that it has absolute title to the lots decreed expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881. The correct lesson of Fery is captured by what the Court said in that case, thus: "the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties." In light of our disposition in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud, the statement immediately adverted to means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. But as has been determined below, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project. To borrow from our underlying decision inHeirs of Moreno, "[n]o doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could readily be justified as the manifest legal effect of consequence of the trial court's underlying presumption that `Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation' when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport [36] discontinued its activities." Providing added support to the Ouanos and the Inocians' right to repurchase is what inHeirs of Moreno was referred to as constructive trust, one that is [37] [38] akin to the implied trust expressed in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, the purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment. In the case at bench, the Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, they would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price. Constructive trusts are fictions of equity that courts use as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of the legal title, MCIAA in this case, may not, in good conscience, retain the beneficial interest. We add, however, as in Heirs of Moreno, that the party seeking the aid of equity--the landowners in this instance, in establishing the trust--must himself do equity in a manner as the court may deem just and reasonable. The Court, in the recent MCIAA v. Lozada, Sr., revisited and abandoned the Feryruling that the former owner is not entitled to reversion of the property even if the public purpose were not pursued and were abandoned, thus: On this note, we take this opportunity to revisit our ruling inFery, which involved an expropriation suit commenced upon parcels of land to be used as a site for a public market. Instead of putting up a public market, respondent Cabanatuan constructed residential houses for lease on the area. Claiming that the municipality lost its right to the property taken since it did not pursue its public purpose, petitioner Juan Fery, the former owner of the lots expropriated, sought to recover his properties. However, as he had admitted that, in 1915, respondentCabanatuan acquired a fee simple title to the lands in question, judgment was rendered in favor of the municipality, following American jurisprudence, particularly City of Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore & M.S. RY. Co., McConihay v. Theodore Wright, andReichling v. Covington Lumber Co., all uniformly holding that the transfer to a third party of the expropriated real property, which necessarily resulted in the abandonment of the particular public purpose for which the property was taken, is not a ground for the recovery of the same by its previous owner, the title of the expropriating agency being one of fee simple. Obviously,Ferywas not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same . Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity. In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent [39] domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. (Emphasis supplied.) Clinging to Fery, specifically the fee simple concept underpinning it, is no longer compelling, considering the ensuing inequity such application entails. Too, the Court resolved Fery not under the cover of any of the Philippine Constitutions, each decreeing that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The twin elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by themselves, direct limitations to the exercise [40] of eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple title. The fee does not vest until payment of just compensation. In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or [41] what is productive of general benefit [of the public]." If the genuine public necessity--the very reason or condition as it were--allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government's retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen's own private gain, is offensive to [42] our laws. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play, The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable. We suggested as much in Heirs of Moreno and in Tudtud and more recently inLozada, Sr. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the "fee simple concept" if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received. To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter pill to swallow for the owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield ownership to the government which reneges on its assurance that the private property shall be for a public purpose may be too much. But it would be worse if the power of eminent domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit another with influence and power in the political process, including development firms. The mischief thus depicted is not at all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery. Even as the Court deliberates on these consolidated cases, there is an uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas in question to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added dimension to abandon Fery. Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run from the time MCIAA [43] complies with the reconveyance obligation. They must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary expenses it might have incurred in sustaining their respective lots and the monetary value of its services in managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as private owners, were benefited thereby.

In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the Ouanos and Inocians need not require the accounting of interests earned by the amounts they received as just [44] compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that "[i]f the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x," the Ouanos and Inocians do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time. Finally, We delete the award of PhP 50,000 and PhP 10,000, as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, respectively, made in favor of the Inocians by the Cebu City RTC in its judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-18370, as later affirmed by the CA. As a matter of sound policy, no premium should be set on the [45] right to litigate where there is no doubt about the bona fides of the exercise of such right, as here, albeit the decision of MCIAA to resist the former landowners' claim eventually turned out to be untenable. WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 168770 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated September 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is ordered to reconvey subject Lot No. 763-A to petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz, and Cielo Ouano Martinez. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to effect the necessary cancellation of title and transfer it in the name of the petitioners within fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment. The petition of the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority in G.R. No. 168812 isDENIED, and the CA's Decision and Resolution dated January 14, 2005 and June 29, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 64356 are AFFIRMED, except insofar as they awarded attorney's fees and litigation expenses that are hereby DELETED. Accordingly, Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is ordered to reconvey to respondents Ricardo L. Inocian, Olympia E. Esteves, Emilia E. Bacalla, Restituta E. Montana, and Raul L. Inocian the litigated Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 762-A, 747, and 761-A; and to respondents Aletha Suico Magat, Philip M. Suico, Dolores S. dela Cruz, James M. Suico, Edward M. Suico, Roselyn S. Lawsin, Rex M. Suico, and Kharla Suico-Gutierrez the litigated Lot Nos. 942 and 947. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to effect the necessary cancellation of title and transfer it in the name of respondents within a period of fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment. The foregoing dispositions are subject to QUALIFICATIONS, to apply to these consolidated petitions, when appropriate, as follows: (1) Petitioners Ouano, et al. in G.R. No. 168770 and respondents Ricardo L Inocian, et al. in G.R. No. 168812 are ordered to return to the MCIAA the just compensation they or their predecessors-in-interest received for the expropriation of their respective lots as stated in Civil Case No. R-1881, within a period of sixty (60) days from finality of judgment; (2) The MCIAA shall be entitled to RETAIN whatever fruits and income it may have obtained from the subject expropriated lots without any obligation to refund the same to the lot owners; and (3) Petitioners Ouano, et al. in G.R. No. 168770 and respondents Ricardo L. Inocian, et al. in G.R. No. 168812 shall RETAIN whatever interests the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime without any obligation to refund the same to MCIAA. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 168770, February 09, 2011] ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ, AND CIELO OUANO MARTINEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CEBU, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 168812] MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO L. INOCIAN, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF OLYMPIA E. ESTEVES, EMILIA E. BACALLA, RESTITUTA E. MONTANA, AND RAUL L. INOCIAN; AND ALETHA SUICO MAGAT, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF PHILIP M. SUICO, DORIS S. DELA CRUZ, JAMES M. SUICO, EDWARD M. SUICO, ROSELYN SUICO-LAWSIN, REX M. SUICO, KHARLA SUICO-GUTIERREZ, ALBERT CHIONGBIAN, AND JOHNNY CHAN, RESPONDENTS. DECISION VELASCO JR., J.: At the center of these two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the issue of the right of the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City to repurchase or secure reconveyance of their respective properties. In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168770, petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez [1] (the Ouanos) seek to nullify the Decision dated September 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027, affirming the Order dated December 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 in Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-20743, a suit to compel the Republic of the Philippines and/or the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey to the Ouanos a parcel of land. The second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168812, has the MCIAA seeking principally to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution dated January 14, 2005 and June 29, 2005, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 64356, sustaining the RTC, Branch 13 in Cebu City in its Decision of October 7, 1988 in Civil Case No. CEB-18370. Per its October 19, 2005 Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases. Except for the names of the parties and the specific lot designation involved, the relevant factual antecedents which gave rise to these consolidated [4] [5] petitions are, for the most part, as set forth in the Court's Decision of October 15, 2003, as reiterated in a Resolution dated August 9, 2005, in G.R. No. 156273 entitled Heirs of Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority(Heirs of Moreno), and in [6] other earlier related cases. In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA's predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport, which included Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later claim, the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right of repurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the aforementioned lots, refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way below market, forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947, among others, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881 entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al. On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered judgment for the Republic, disposing, in part, as follows:
[2] [3]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring the expropriation of Lots Nos. 75, 76, 76, 89, 90, 91, 92, 105, 106, 107, 108, 104, 921-A, 88, 93, 913-B, 72, 77, 916, 777-A, 918, 919, 920, 764-A, 988, 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 762-A, 763-A, 951, 942, 720-A, x x x and 947, included in the Lahug Airport, Cebu City, justified in and in lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain. xxxx 3. After the payment of the foregoing financial obligation to the landowners, directing the latter to deliver to the plaintiff the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title to their respective lots; and upon the presentation of the said titles to the Register of Deeds, ordering the latter to cancel the same [7] and to issue, in lieu thereof, new Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the plaintiff. In view of the adverted buy-back assurance made by the government, the owners of the lots no longer appealed the decision of the trial [8] court. Following the finality of the judgment of condemnation, certificates of title for the covered parcels of land were issued in the name of the [9] Republic which, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958, were subsequently transferred to MCIAA. At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to MCIAA, Lahug Airport completely ceased operations, Mactan Airport having opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights. On the ground, the expropriated lots were never utilized for the purpose they were taken as no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. This development prompted the former lot owners to formally demand from the government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right to repurchase. The demands went unheeded. Civil suits followed. G.R. No. 168812 (MCIAA Petition) On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L. Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga who originally owned six of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and seven others, successors-in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of two (2) of the condemned lots (collectively, the Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a complaint for reconveyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-18370, was eventually raffled to Branch 13 of the court. On September 29, 1997, one Albert Chiongbian (Chiongbian), alleging to be the owner of Lot Nos. 761-A and 762-A but which the Inocians were now claiming, moved and was later allowed to intervene. During the pre-trial, MCIAA admitted the following facts: 1. That the properties, which are the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, are also the properties involved in Civil Case R-1881; 2. That the purpose of the expropriation was for the expansion of the old Lahug Airport; that the Lahug Airport was not expanded; 3. That the old Lahug Airport was closed sometime in June 1992; 4. That the price paid to the lot owners in the expropriation case is found in the decision of the court; and 5. That some properties were reconveyed by the MCIAA because the previous owners were able to secure express waivers or riders wherein the government agreed to return the properties should the expansion of the Lahug Airport not materialize. During trial, the Inocians adduced evidence which included the testimony of Ricardo Inocian (Inocian) and Asterio Uy (Uy). Uy, an employee of the CAA, testified that he was a member of the team which negotiated for the acquisition of certain lots in Lahug for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport. He recalled that he acted as the interpreter/spokesman of the team since he could speak the Cebuano dialect. He stated that the other members of the team of negotiators were Atty. Pedro Ocampo, Atty. Lansang, and Atty. Saligumba. He recounted that, in the course of the negotiation, their team assured the landowners that their landholdings would be reconveyed to them in the event the Lahug Airport would be abandoned or if its operation were transferred to the Mactan Airport. Some landowners opted to sell, while others were of a different bent owing to the inadequacy of the offered price. Inocian testified that he and his mother, Isabel Lambaga, attended a meeting called by the NAC team of negotiators sometime in 1947 or 1949 where he and the other landowners were given the assurance that they could repurchase their lands at the same price in the event the Lahug Airport ceases to operate. He further testified that they rejected the NAC's offer. However, he said that they no longer appealed the decree of expropriation due to the repurchase assurance adverted to. The MCIAA presented Michael Bacarizas (Bacarizas), who started working for MCIAA as legal assistant in 1996. He testified that, in the course of doing
[6]

research work on the lots subject of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, he discovered that the same lots were covered by the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881. He also found out that the said decision did not expressly contain any condition on the matter of repurchase. Ruling of the RTC On October 7, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. CEB-18370, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered directing defendant Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to reconvey (free from liens and encumbrances) to plaintiffs Ricardo Inocian, Olimpia E. Esteves, Emilia E. Bacalla, Restituta E. Montana and Raul Inocian Lots No. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 762-A, 747, 761-A and to plaintiffs Aletha Suico Magat, Philip M. Suico, Doris S. dela Cruz, James M. Suico, Edward M. Suico, Roselyn S. Lawsin, Rex M. Suico and Kharla Suico-Gutierrez Lots No. 942 and 947, after plaintiffs shall have paid MCIAA the sums indicated in the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881. Defendant MCIAA is likewise directed to pay the aforementioned plaintiffs the sum or P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses. Albert Chiongbian's intervention should be, as it is hereby DENIED for utter lack of factual basis. With costs against defendant MCIAA.
[10]
Therefrom, MCIAA went to the CA on appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64356. Ruling of the CA On January 14, 2005, the CA rendered judgment for the Inocians, declaring them entitled to the reconveyance of the questioned lots as the successorsin-interest of the late Isabel Limbaga and Santiago Suico, as the case may be, who were the former registered owners of the said lots. The decretal portion of the CA's Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case andAFFFIRMING the decision rendered by the court a quo on October 7, 1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-18370. SO ORDERED. The CA, citing and reproducing excerpts from Heirs of Moreno, virtually held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 was conditional, stating "that the expropriation of [plaintiff-appellees'] lots for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport was ordered by the CFI of Cebu under the impression [12] that Lahug Airport would continue in operation." The condition, as may be deduced from the CFI's decision, was that should MCIAA, or its precursor agency, discontinue altogether with the operation of Lahug Airport, then the owners of the lots expropriated may, if so minded, demand of MCIAA to make good its verbal assurance to allow the repurchase of the properties. To the CA, this assurance, a demandable agreement of repurchase by itself, has been adequately established. On September 21, 2005, the MCIAA filed with Us a petition for review of the CA's Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 168812. G.R. No. 168770 (Ouano Petition) Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997, the Ouanos instituted a complaint before the Cebu City RTC against the Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20743. Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the Ouanos no longer have enforceable rights whatsoever over the condemned Lot No. 763-A, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 not having found any reversionary condition. Ruling of the RTC By a Decision dated November 28, 2000, the RTC, Branch 57 in Cebu City ruled in favor of the Ouanos, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez and against the Republic of the Philippines and Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to restore to plaintiffs, the possession and ownership of their land, Lot No. 763-A upon payment of the expropriation price to defendants; and
[11]

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of the Certificate of Title from defendant Republic of the Philippines on Lot 763-A, canceling TCT No. 52004 in the name of defendant Republic of the Philippines and to issue a new title on the same lot in the names of Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz and Cielo Ouano Martinez. No pronouncement as to costs.
[13]
Acting on the motion of the Republic and MCIAA for reconsideration, however, the RTC, Branch 57 in Cebu City, presided this time by Judge Enriqueta [14] L. Belarmino, issued, on December 9, 2002, an Order that reversed its earlier decision of November 28, 2000 and dismissed the Ouanos' complaint. Ruling of the CA In time, the Ouanos interposed an appeal to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78027. Eventually, the appellate court rendered a Decision September 3, 2004, denying the appeal, thus:
th [15]
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated December 9, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, 7 Judicial Region, Branch 57, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-20743, is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Explaining its case disposition, the CA stated that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 did not state any condition that Lot No. 763-A of the Ouanos-and all covered lots for that matter--would be returned to them or that they could repurchase the same property if it were to be used for purposes other than for the Lahug Airport. The appellate court also went on to declare the inapplicability of the Court's pronouncement in MCIAA v. Court of [16] Appeals, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, Melba Limbago, et al., to support the Ouanos' cause, since the affected landowners in that case, unlike the Ouanos, parted with their property not through expropriation but via a sale and purchase transaction. The Ouanos filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision, but was denied per the CA's May 26, 2005 Resolution. petition in G.R. No. 168770. The Issues G.R. No. 168812 GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
[17]
Hence, they filed this
l. THE ASSAILED ISSUANCES ILLEGALLY STRIPPED THE REPUBLIC OF ITS ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL TITLE TO THE SUBJECT EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES. ll. THE IMPUNGED DISPOSITIONS INVALIDLY OVERTURNED THIS HONORABLE COURT'S FINAL RULINGS IN FERY V. MUNICIPALITY OF CABANATUAN, MCIAA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND REYES V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY . lll. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THIS HONORABLE COURT'S RULING IN MORENO, ALBEIT IT HAS NOT YET ATTAINED [18] FINALITY. G.R. No. 168770 Questions of law presented in this Petition Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the petitioners proving the promises, assurances and representations by the airport officials and lawyers are inadmissbale under the Statute of Frauds. Whether or not under the ruling of this Honorable Court in the heirs of Moreno Case, and pursuant to the principles enunciated therein, petitioners herein are entitiled to recover their litigated property. Reasons for Allowances of this Petition Respondents did not object during trial to the admissibility of petitioners' testimonial evidence under the Statute of Frauds and have thus waived such

objection and are now barred from raising the same. In any event, the Statute of Frauds is not applicable herein. Consequently, petitioners' evidence is [19] admissible and should be duly given weight and credence, as initially held by the trial court in its original Decision. While their respective actions against MCIAA below ended differently, the Ouanos and the Inocians' proffered arguments presented before this Court run along parallel lines, both asserting entitlement to recover the litigated property on the strength of the Court's ruling in Heirs of Moreno. MCIAA has, however, formulated in its Consolidated Memorandum the key interrelated issues in these consolidated cases, as follows: I WHETHER ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE FOR WHICH THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE EXPROPRIATED ENTITLES PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. TO REACQUIRE THEM. II WHETHER PETITIONERS OUANOS, ET AL. AND RESPONDENTS INOCIAN, ET AL. ARE ENTITLED TO RECONVEYANCE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES SIMPLY ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED VERBAL PROMISE OR ASSURANCE OF SOME NAC OFFICIALS THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WILL BE RETUNRED IF THE AIRPORT PROJECT WOULD BE ABANDONED. The Court's Ruling The Republic and MCIAA's petition in G.R. No. 168812 is bereft of merit, while the Ouano petition in G.R. No. 168770 is meritorious. At the outset, three (3) fairly established factual premises ought to be emphasized: First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for [20] development as a commercial complex. Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected [21] landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes. "No less than Asterio Uy," the Court noted in Heirs of Moreno, "one of the members of the CAA Mactan Legal Team, which interceded for the acquisition of the lots for the Lahug Airport's expansion, affirmed that persistent assurances were given to the landowners to the effect that as soon as the Lahug Airport is [22] abandoned or transferred to Mactan, the lot owners would be able to reacquire their properties." In Civil Case No. CEB-20743, Exhibit "G," the [23] transcript of the deposition of Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering the assurance made had been formally offered in evidence and duly considered in the initial decision of the RTC Cebu City. In Civil Case No. CEB-18370, the trial court, on the basis of testimonial evidence, and later the CA, [24] recognized the reversionary rights of the suing former lot owners or their successors in interest and resolved the case accordingly. In point with respect to the representation and promise of the government to return the lots taken should the planned airport expansion do not materialize is what the Court said in Heirs of Moreno, thus: This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but just solution. To begin with there exists an undeniable historical narrative that the predecessors of respondent MCIAA had suggested to the landowners of the properties covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme that they could repurchase their properties at the termination of the airport's venue. Some acted on this assurance and sold their properties; other landowners held out and waited for the exercise of eminent domain to take its course until finally coming to terms with respondent's predecessors that they would not appeal nor block further judgment of condemnation if the right of repurchase was extended to them. A handful failed to prove that they acted on such assurance when [25] they parted with ownership of their land. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) For perspective, Heirs of Moreno--later followed by MCIAA v. Tudtud (Tudtud) and the consolidated cases at bar--is cast under the same factual setting and centered on the expropriation of privately-owned lots for the public purpose of expanding the Lahug Airport and the alleged promise of reconveyance given by the negotiating NAC officials to the private lot owners. All the lots being claimed by the former owners or successors-in-interest of the former owners in the Heirs of Moreno, Tudtud, and the present cases were similarly adjudged condemned in favor of the Republic in Civil Case No. R-1881. All the claimants sought was or is to have the condemned lots reconveyed to them upon the payment of the condemnation price since the public purpose of the expropriation was never met. Indeed, the expropriated lots were never used and were, in fact, abandoned by the expropriating government agencies. In all then, the issues and supporting arguments presented by both sets of petitioners in these consolidated cases have already previously been passed
[26]

upon, discussed at length, and practically peremptorily resolved in Heirs of Moreno and the November 2008 Tudtud ruling. The Ouanos, as petitioners in G.R. No. 168770, and the Inocians, as respondents in G.R. No. 168812, are similarly situated as the heirs of Moreno inHeirs of Moreno and Benjamin Tudtud in Tudtud. Be that as it may, there is no reason why the ratio decidendi in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud should not be made to apply to petitioners Ouanos and respondents Inocians such that they shall be entitled to recover their or their predecessors' respective properties under the same manner and arrangement as the heirs of Moreno and Tudtud. Stare decisis et non quieta movere(to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle [27] things which are established). Just like in Tudtud and earlier in Heirs of Moreno, MCIAA would foist the theory that the judgment of condemnation in Civil Case No. R-1881 was without qualification and was unconditional. It would, in fact, draw attention to the fallo of the expropriation court's decision to prove that there is nothing in the decision indicating that the government gave assurance or undertook to reconvey the covered lots in case the Lahug airport expansion project is aborted. Elaborating on this angle, MCIAA argues that the claim of the Ouanos and the Inocians regarding the alleged verbal assurance of the [28] NAC negotiating team that they can reacquire their landholdings is barred by the Statute of Frauds. Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same or some note of the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party charged. Subject to defined exceptions, evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or secondary evidence of its contents. MCIAA's invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced primarily because the statute applies only to executory and not to completed, executed, or [29] partially consummated contracts. Carbonnel v. Poncio, et al., quoting Chief Justice Moran, explains the rationale behind this rule, thusly: x x x "The reason is simple. In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they may be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute has been precisely been enacted to prevent fraud." x x x However, if a contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep the benefits already derived by him from the transaction in litigation, and at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by [30] him thereby. (Emphasis in the original.) Analyzing the situation of the cases at bar, there can be no serious objection to the proposition that the agreement package between the government and the private lot owners was already partially performed by the government through the acquisition of the lots for the expansion of the Lahug airport. The parties, however, failed to accomplish the more important condition in the CFI decision decreeing the expropriation of the lots litigated upon: the expansion of the Lahug Airport. The project--the public purpose behind the forced property taking--was, in fact, never pursued and, as a consequence, the lots expropriated were abandoned. Be that as it may, the two groups of landowners can, in an action to compel MCIAA to make good its oral undertaking to allow repurchase, adduce parol evidence to prove the transaction. At any rate, the objection on the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be waived if not timely raised. Records tend to support the conclusion that MCIAA did not, as the Ouanos and the Inocians posit, object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its commitment to allow the former landowners to repurchase their respective properties upon the occurrence of certain events. In a bid to deny the lot owners the right to repurchase, MCIAA, citing cases, points to the dispositive part of the decision in Civil Case R-1881 which, as couched, granted the Republic absolute title to the parcels of land declared expropriated. The MCIAA is correct about the unconditional tone of the dispositive portion of the decision, but that actuality would not carry the day for the agency. Addressing the matter of the otherwise absolute tenor of the CFI's disposition in Civil Case No. R-1881, the Court, in Heirs of Moreno, after taking stock of the ensuing portion of the body of the CFI's decision, said: As for the public purpose of the expropriation proceeding, it cannot now be doubted. Although Mactan Airport is being constructed, it does not take away the actual usefulness and importance of the Lahug Airport: it is handling the air traffic of both civilian and military. From it aircrafts fly to Mindanao and Visayas and pass thru it on their flights to the North and Manila. Then, no evidence was adduced to show how soon is the Mactan Airport to be placed in operation and whether the Lahug Airport will be closed immediately thereafter. It is up to the other departments of the Government to determine said matters. The Court cannot substitute its judgments for those of the said departments or agencies. In the absence of [32] such showing, the court will presume that the Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation. (Emphasis supplied.) We went on to state as follows: While the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1881 could have simply acknowledged the presence of public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain regardless of the survival of the Lahug Airport, the trial court in its Decision chose not to do so but instead prefixed its finding of public purpose upon its understanding that `Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation'. Verily, these meaningful statements in the body of the Decision warrant the conclusion that the expropriated properties would remain to be so until it was confirmed that Lahug Airport was no longer `in operation'. This inference further implies two (2) things: (a) after the Lahug Airport ceased its undertaking as such and the expropriated lots were not being used for any airport expansion project, the rights vis- -vis the expropriated lots x x x as between the State and their former owners, petitioners herein, must be equitably
[31]

adjusted; and (b) the foregoing unmistakable declarations in the body of theDecision should merge with and become an intrinsic part of the fallothereof which under the premises is clearly inadequate since the dispositive portion is not in accord with the findings as contained in the body [33] thereof. Not to be overlooked of course is what the Court said in its Resolution disposing of MCIAA's motion to reconsider the original ruling in Heirs of Moreno. In that resolution, We stated that the fallo of the decision in Civil Case R-1881 should be viewed and understood in connection with the entire text, which contemplated a return of the property taken if the airport expansion project were abandoned. For ease of reference, following is what the Court wrote: Moreover, we do not subscribe to the [MCIAA's] contention that since the possibility of the Lahug Airport's closure was actually considered by the trial court, a stipulation on reversion or repurchase was so material that it should not have been discounted by the court a quo in its decision in Civil Case No. R-1881, if, in fact, there was one. We find it proper to cite, once more, this Court's ruling that the fallo of the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 must be read in reference to the other portions of the decision in which it forms a part. A reading of the Court's judgment must not be confined to the dispositive portion alone; rather it should be meaningfully construed in unanimity with the ratio decidendi thereof to grasp the true intent and meaning [34] of a decision. The Court has, to be sure, taken stock of Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, observations:
[35]
a case MCIAA cites at every possible turn, where the Court made these
If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned, the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. x x x If, upon the contrary, however the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator x x x and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings x x x. Fery notwithstanding, MCIAA cannot really rightfully say that it has absolute title to the lots decreed expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881. The correct lesson of Fery is captured by what the Court said in that case, thus: "the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties." In light of our disposition in Heirs of Moreno and Tudtud, the statement immediately adverted to means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. But as has been determined below, the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project. To borrow from our underlying decision inHeirs of Moreno, "[n]o doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could readily be justified as the manifest legal effect of consequence of the trial court's underlying presumption that `Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation' when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport [36] discontinued its activities." Providing added support to the Ouanos and the Inocians' right to repurchase is what inHeirs of Moreno was referred to as constructive trust, one that is [37] [38] akin to the implied trust expressed in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, the purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment. In the case at bench, the Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, they would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price. Constructive trusts are fictions of equity that courts use as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of the legal title, MCIAA in this case, may not, in good conscience, retain the beneficial interest. We add, however, as in Heirs of Moreno, that the party seeking the aid of equity--the landowners in this instance, in establishing the trust--must himself do equity in a manner as the court may deem just and reasonable. The Court, in the recent MCIAA v. Lozada, Sr., revisited and abandoned the Feryruling that the former owner is not entitled to reversion of the property even if the public purpose were not pursued and were abandoned, thus: On this note, we take this opportunity to revisit our ruling inFery, which involved an expropriation suit commenced upon parcels of land to be used as a site for a public market. Instead of putting up a public market, respondent Cabanatuan constructed residential houses for lease on the area. Claiming that the municipality lost its right to the property taken since it did not pursue its public purpose, petitioner Juan Fery, the former owner of the lots expropriated, sought to recover his properties. However, as he had admitted that, in 1915, respondentCabanatuan acquired a fee simple title to the lands in question, judgment was rendered in favor of the municipality, following American jurisprudence, particularlyCity of Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore &

M.S. RY. Co., McConihay v. Theodore Wright, andReichling v. Covington Lumber Co., all uniformly holding that the transfer to a third party of the expropriated real property, which necessarily resulted in the abandonment of the particular public purpose for which the property was taken, is not a ground for the recovery of the same by its previous owner, the title of the expropriating agency being one of fee simple. Obviously,Ferywas not decided pursuant to our now sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same . Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity. In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent [39] domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. (Emphasis supplied.) Clinging to Fery, specifically the fee simple concept underpinning it, is no longer compelling, considering the ensuing inequity such application entails. Too, the Court resolved Fery not under the cover of any of the Philippine Constitutions, each decreeing that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The twin elements of just compensation and public purpose are, by themselves, direct limitations to the exercise [40] of eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee simple title. The fee does not vest until payment of just compensation. In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or [41] what is productive of general benefit [of the public]." If the genuine public necessity--the very reason or condition as it were--allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government's retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen's own private gain, is offensive to [42] our laws. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play, The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable. We suggested as much in Heirs of Moreno and in Tudtud and more recently inLozada, Sr. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the "fee simple concept" if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation received. To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter pill to swallow for the owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good and yield ownership to the government which reneges on its assurance that the private property shall be for a public purpose may be too much. But it would be worse if the power of eminent domain were deliberately used as a subterfuge to benefit another with influence and power in the political process, including development firms. The mischief thus depicted is not at all far-fetched with the continued application of Fery.

Even as the Court deliberates on these consolidated cases, there is an uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas in question to Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added dimension to abandon Fery. Given the foregoing disquisitions, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run from the time MCIAA [43] complies with the reconveyance obligation. They must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary expenses it might have incurred in sustaining their respective lots and the monetary value of its services in managing the lots in question to the extent that they, as private owners, were benefited thereby. In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the Ouanos and Inocians need not require the accounting of interests earned by the amounts they received as just [44] compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that "[i]f the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor x x x," the Ouanos and Inocians do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time. Finally, We delete the award of PhP 50,000 and PhP 10,000, as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, respectively, made in favor of the Inocians by the Cebu City RTC in its judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-18370, as later affirmed by the CA. As a matter of sound policy, no premium should be set on the [45] right to litigate where there is no doubt about the bona fides of the exercise of such right, as here, albeit the decision of MCIAA to resist the former landowners' claim eventually turned out to be untenable. WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 168770 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated September 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78027 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is ordered to reconvey subject Lot No. 763-A to petitioners Anunciacion vda. de Ouano, Mario P. Ouano, Leticia Ouano Arnaiz, and Cielo Ouano Martinez. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to effect the necessary cancellation of title and transfer it in the name of the petitioners within fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment. The petition of the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority in G.R. No. 168812 isDENIED, and the CA's Decision and Resolution dated January 14, 2005 and June 29, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 64356 are AFFIRMED, except insofar as they awarded attorney's fees and litigation expenses that are hereby DELETED. Accordingly, Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority is ordered to reconvey to respondents Ricardo L. Inocian, Olympia E. Esteves, Emilia E. Bacalla, Restituta E. Montana, and Raul L. Inocian the litigated Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 762-A, 747, and 761-A; and to respondents Aletha Suico Magat, Philip M. Suico, Dolores S. dela Cruz, James M. Suico, Edward M. Suico, Roselyn S. Lawsin, Rex M. Suico, and Kharla Suico-Gutierrez the litigated Lot Nos. 942 and 947. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to effect the necessary cancellation of title and transfer it in the name of respondents within a period of fifteen (15) days from finality of judgment. The foregoing dispositions are subject to QUALIFICATIONS, to apply to these consolidated petitions, when appropriate, as follows: (1) Petitioners Ouano, et al. in G.R. No. 168770 and respondents Ricardo L Inocian, et al. in G.R. No. 168812 are ordered to return to the MCIAA the just compensation they or their predecessors-in-interest received for the expropriation of their respective lots as stated in Civil Case No. R-1881, within a period of sixty (60) days from finality of judgment; (2) The MCIAA shall be entitled to RETAIN whatever fruits and income it may have obtained from the subject expropriated lots without any obligation to refund the same to the lot owners; and (3) Petitioners Ouano, et al. in G.R. No. 168770 and respondents Ricardo L. Inocian, et al. in G.R. No. 168812 shall RETAIN whatever interests the amounts they received as just compensation may have earned in the meantime without any obligation to refund the same to MCIAA. SO ORDERED.
NAPOCOR vs Tiangco
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 170846 February 6, 2007
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. AURELLANO S. TIANGCO, LOURDES S. TIANGCO and NESTOR S. TIANGCO, Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks the annulment and 1 2 setting aside of the Decision dated March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 53576, as reiterated in its Resolution of December 2, 2005 which denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision modified that of the Regional Trial C ourt (RTC) of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80, by increasing the amount of just compensation due the respondents in an expropriation case filed against them by the petitioner. The facts: Herein respondents Aurellano, Lourdes and Nestor, all surnamed Tiangco, are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 152,187 square meters at Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal and registered in their names under TCT No. M-17865 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. On the other hand, petitioner NPC is a government-owned and controlled corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the development and generation of power from whatever source. NPCs charter (Republic Act No. 6395) authorizes the corporation to acquire private property and exercise the right of eminent domain.1awphi1.net NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents aforementioned property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project 3 will traverse. NPCs Segregation Plan for the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents land, in such a manner that 33,392 square meters thereof will be left separated from 99,372 square meters of the property. Within the portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-bearing tress, such as mango, avocado, jackfruit, casuy, santol, calamansi, sintones and coconut trees. On November 20, 1990, after repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents, NPC filed with the RTC of Tanay, Rizal a complaint for 4 expropriation against them. In time, the respondents filed their answer. On March 14, 1991, the trial court issued a Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take possession of the area sought to be expropriated. In the same Order, the court directed the parties to nominate their respective commissioners, with a third member to be nominated and appointed by the court itself, to determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid to the respondents. As constituted in the manner thus indicated, the board of commissioners was composed of the following: for NPC, Atty. Restituto Mallo of its Legal Department; for the respondents, Mr. Basilio Afuang, a geodetic engineer and a real estate broker by profession; and for the court, Clerk of Court V Ms. Amelia de Guzman Carbonell. On April 5, 1991, the trial court issued an order directing NPC to pay and deposit with the Rizal Provincial Treasurer the amount of P81,204.00, representing the temporary provisional value of the area subject of the expropriation prior to the taking of possession thereof. On April 22, 1991, with NPC having complied with the deposit requirement, a writ of possession was issued in its favor. Thereafter, an ocular inspection of the premises was conducted and hearings before the board of commissioners were held, during which the Municipal Assessor of Tanay, Rizal was presented. He submitted a record of the Schedule of Values for taxation purposes and a certification to the effect that the unit value of the respondents property is P21,000.00 per hectare. On August 7, 1993, commissioner Basilio Afuang for the respondents filed his report. He pegged the price of the area sought to be expropriated 5 at P30.00 per square meter or P582,690.00 in the aggregate; and for the improvements thereon, Afuang placed a valuation of P2,093,950.00. The figures are in contrast with the respondents own valuation of P600,600.00, for the area, and P4,935,500.00, for the improvements. On September 14, 1993, NPC filed an amended complaint to acquire only 19,423 square meters of the respondents property. The original area of 20,220 square meters initially sought to be expropriated under the original complaint turned out to be in excess of the area required.
NAPOCOR vs Tiangco
For its part, NPC made it clear that it is interested only in acquiring an easement of right-of-way over the respondents property and that ownership of the area over which the right-of-way will be established shall remain with the respondents. For this reason, NPC claims that it should pay, in addition to the agreed or adjudged value of the improvements on the area, only an easement fee in an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the market value of the property as declared by the respondents or by the Municipal Assessor, whichever is lower, as provided for under Section 3-A of Republic 6 Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938. The court-appointed commissioner, Ms. Amelia de Guzman Carbonell, found that the risk and dangerous nature of the transmission line project essentially deprive the respondents of the use of the area. Nonetheless, she recommended that the determination of just compensation should be 7 relegated to "expert appraisers." From the evidence before it, the trial court made a determination that the market value of the property is P2.09 per square meter, or P40,594.07 for the entire 19,423 square meters needed by NPC, and not the P30.00 per square meter claimed by the respondents. Neither did the trial court consider NPCs reliance on Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938, the court placing more weight on the respondents argument that expropriation would result in the substantial impairment of the use of the area needed, even though what is sought is a mere aerial right-of-way. The court found as reasonable the amount of P324,750.00 offered by NPC for the improvements, as the same is based on the official current schedule of values as determined by the Municipal Assessor of Tanay, Rizal. Hence, in its decision of February 19, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Expropriating in favor of [NPC] a parcel of land covering a total area of 19,423 sq.m. covered by TCT No. M-17860 owned by the [respondents]; 2. Ordering the amount of P40,594.07 as just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of land affected by the expropriations; and the amount of P324,750.00 as reasonable compensation for the improvements on the land expropriated with legal interest from the time of possession by the plaintiff. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets supplied.) The respondents moved for reconsideration, presenting for the first time a document entitled "Bureau of Internal Revenue Circular of Appraisal," which shows that for the year 1985, lands in Barangay Sampaloc were valued atP30.00 per square meter; for the year 1992, at P80.00 per square meter; and for year 1994, at P100.00 per square meter. Respondents maintain that the price of P30.00 per square meter for the needed area of 19,423 square meters is the reasonable amount and should be the basis for fixing the amount of just compensation due them. The trial court denied the motion, stating that the BIR circular in question was belatedly filed and therefore NPC could not have opposed its presentation. From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, both NPC and the respondents went on appeal to the CA whereat the separate appeals were consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 53576. The appellate court found merit in the respondents appeal, and disregarded th e P2.09 per square meter valuation of the trial court, which was based on a 1984 tax declaration. Instead, the CA placed reliance upon a 1993 tax declaration, "being only 9 two years removed from the time of taking." The appellate court determined the time of taking to be in 1991. Thus, the greater value of P913,122.00 as declared in Tax Declaration No. 011-2667 dated July 23, 1993 should be the basis for determining just compensation. With regard to the value of improvements, the appellate court found NPCs valuation more favorable, being based on the current (1991) schedule of values for trees in the 10 provinces of Rizal and Laguna. Hence, in its decision of March 14, 2005, the CA rendered judgment, to wit: WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80 dated February 19, 1996 is hereby MODIFIED and the compensation awarded for the 19,423 square meters of land affected is increased to P116,538.00, and the reasonable compensation for the improvements thereon is likewise increased to P325,025.00, with legal interest from the time of possession by the plaintiffappellee NAPOCOR. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. NPC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the appellate court in its resolution of December 2, 2005. Hence, NPCs instant petition for review, submitting for our resolution only the following issues with respect to the amount of just compensation that must be paid the respondents for the expropriated portion (19,423 square meters) of their property: 1. Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation?
11 8
NAPOCOR vs Tiangco
2. Should NPC pay for the value of the land being taken, or should it be limited to what is provided for under P.D. 938, that is, ten per cent (10%) of its market value as declared by the owner or the assessor (whichever is lower), considering that the purpose for which the property is being taken is merely for the establishment of a safe and free passage for its overhead transmission lines? There is no issue as to the improvements. Since the P325,025.00 valuation therefor is the very price set by the NPC commissioner, to which the corporation did not object but otherwise adopts, the Court fixes the amount ofP325,025.00 as just compensation for the improvements. We now come to the more weighty question of what amount is just by way of compensation for the 19,423 square-meter portion of the respondents property. In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just compensation due the 12 respondents. So it is that in National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., we ruled: Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too, where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. The trial court fixed the value of the property at its 1984 value, while the CA, at its 1993 worth. Neither of the two determinations is correct. For purposes of just compensation, the respondents should be paid the value of the property as of the time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking the property. It was certainly unfair for the trial court to have considered a property value several years behind its worth at the time the complaint in this case was filed on November 20, 1990. The landowners are necessarily shortchanged, considering that, as a rule, land values enjoy steady upward movement. It was likewise erroneous for the appellate court to have fixed the value of the property on the basis of a 1993 assessment. NPC would be paying too much. Petitioner corporation is correct in arguing that the respondents should not profit from an assessment made years after the taking. The expropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated by NPC on November 20, 1990, property values on such month and year should lay the basis for the proper determination of just compensation. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian 13 Reform, the Court ruled that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be substantial, full, ample and, as must apply to this case, real. This must be taken to mean, among others, that the value as of the time of taking should be the price to be paid the property owner. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. In this case, this simply means the propertys fair market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, or "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an 14 owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the 15 provincial or city appraisal committee; these values consist but one factor in the judicial valuation of the property. The nature and character of the 16 land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner All the facts as 17 to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. Neither of the two determinations made by the courts below is therefore correct. A new one must be arrived at, taking into consideration the foregoing pronouncements. Now, to the second issue raised by petitioner NPC. In several cases, the Court struck down NPCs consistent reliance on Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 18 938. True, an easement of a right-of-way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither 19 more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken. While the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and 20 possession. However, if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land, in accordance with our ruling in NPC v. Manubay Agro-Industrial:
NAPOCOR vs Tiangco
As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, 21 which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. The evidence suggests that NPCs transmission line project that traverses the respondents property is perpetual, or at least indefinite, in nature. Moreover, not to be discounted is the fact that the high-tension current to be conveyed through said transmission lines evidently poses a danger to life 22 and limb; injury, death or destruction to life and property within the vicinity. As the Court held in NPC v. Chiong, it is not improper to assume that NPC will erect structures for its transmission lines within the property. What is sought to be expropriated in this case is, at its longest extent, 326.34 meters, and through it may be built several structures, not simply one. Finally, if NPC were to have its way, respondents will continue to pay the realty taxes due on the affected portion of their property, an imposition that, among others, merits the rejection of NPCs thesis of paym ent of a mere percentage of the propertys actual value. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED in part in that the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 14, 2005 vis a vis the award of P116,538.00, as and by way of just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of the respondents property, is SET ASIDE, and t he case is ordered REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper determination of the amount of just compensation for the portion thus taken, based on our pronouncements hereon. The same decision, however, is AFFIRMED, insofar as it pertains to the award of P325,025.00 for the improvements, with legal interest from the time of actual possession by the petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
NAPOCOR vs Ibrahim
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 183297 December 23, 2009
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. OMAR G. MARUHOM, ELIAS G. MARUHOM, BUCAY G. MARUHOM, MAMOD G. MARUHOM, FAROUK G. MARUHOM, HIDJARA G. MARUHOM, ROCANIA G. MARUHOM, POTRISAM G. MARUHOM, LUMBA G. MARUHOM, SINAB G. MARUHOM, ACMAD G. MARUHOM, SOLAYMAN G. MARUHOM, MOHAMAD M. IBRAHIM, CAIRORONESA M. IBRAHIM, and LUCMAN IBRAHIM, represented by his heirs ADORA B. IBRAHIM, NASSER B. * IBRAHIM, JAMALODIN B. IBRAHIM, RAJID NABBEL B. IBRAHIM, AMEER B. IBRAHIM and SARAH AIZAH B. IBRAHIM, Respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking to nullify the May 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02065-MIN, affirming the Order dated November 13, 2007 issued by Hon. Amer R. Ibrahim, which granted respondents motion for issuance of a writ of execution. The antecedents. Lucman G. Ibrahim and his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom, Lumba G. Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G. Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom, Mohamad M. Ibrahim and Cairoronesa M. Ibrahim (respondents) are owners of a 70,000-square meter lot in Saduc, Marawi City. Sometime in 1978, NPC, without respondents knowledge and consent, took possession of the subterranean area of the land and constructed therein underground tunnels. The tunnels were used by NPC in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NPCs Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City. Respondents only discovered the existence of the tunnels sometime in July 1992. Thus, on October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NPC pay damages and vacate the subterranean portion of the land, but the demand was not heeded. Hence, on November 23, 1994, respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession of land and damages against NPC with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 1298-94. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Denying *respondents+ prayer for *NPC+ to dismantle the underground tunnels constructed beneath the lands of *respondents+ i n Lots 1, 2, and 3 of Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278; 2. Ordering [NPC] to pay to [respondents] the fair market value of said 70,000 square meters of land covering Lots 1, 2, and 3 as described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 less the area of 21,995 square meters at P1,000.00 per square meter or a total of P48,005,000.00 for the remaining unpaid portion of 48,005 square meters; with 6% interest per annum from the filing of this case until paid; 3. Ordering [NPC] to pay [respondents] a reasonable monthly rental of P0.68 per square meter of the total area of 48,005 square meters effective from its occupancy of the foregoing area in 1978 or a total ofP7,050,974.40. 4. Ordering [NPC] to pay [respondents] the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and 5. Ordering [NPC] to pay the further sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs. SO ORDERED.
3 2 1
NAPOCOR vs Ibrahim
Respondents then filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal. On the other hand, NPC filed a Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, it filed a vigorous opposition to the motion for execution of judgment pending appeal with a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. On August 26, 1996, NPC withdrew its Notice of Appeal to give way to the hearing of its motion for reconsideration. On August 28, 1996, the RTC issued an Order granting execution pending appeal and denying NPCs motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the RTC was executed pending appeal and the funds of NPC were garnished by respondents. On October 4, 1996, Lucman Ibrahim and respondents Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. 4 Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, asserting as follows: 1. They did not file a motion to reconsider or appeal the decision within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of judgment because they believed in good faith that the decision was for damages and rentals and attorneys fees only as prayed for in the complaint; 2. It was only on August 26, 1996 that they learned that the amounts awarded to the respondents represented not only rentals, damages and attorneys fees but the greatest portion of which was payment of just compensation which, in effect, would make the petitioner NPC the owner of the parcels of land involved in the case; 3. When they learned of the nature of the judgment, the period of appeal had already expired; 4. They were prevented by fraud, mistake, accident, or excusable negligence from taking legal steps to protect and preserve their rights over their parcels of land insofar as the part of the decision decreeing just compensation for respondents properties; 5. They would never have agreed to the alienation of their property in favor of anybody, considering the fact that the parcels of land involved in this case were among the valuable properties they inherited from their dear father and they would rather see their land crumble to dust 5 than sell it to anybody. After due proceedings, the RTC granted the petition and rendered a modified judgment dated September 8, 1997, thus: WHEREFORE, a modified judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Reducing the judgment award of [respondents] for the fair market value of P48,005,000.00 by [P]9,526,000.00 or for a difference [of] P38,479,000.00 and by the further sum of P33,603,500.00 subject of the execution pending appeal leaving a difference of [P]4,878,500.00 which may be the subject of execution upon the finality of this modified judgment with 6% interest per annum from the filing of the case until paid. 2. Awarding the sum of P1,476,911.00 to herein [respondents] Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mahmod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Portrisam G. Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom as reasonable rental deductible from the awarded sum of P7,050,974.40 pertaining to [respondents]. 3. Ordering [NPC] embodied in the August 7, 1996 decision to pay [respondents] the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and further sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs. SO ORDERED.
6
Lucman Ibrahim and NPC then filed their separate appeals with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57792. On June 8, 2005, the CA rendered a 7 Decision, setting aside the modified judgment and reinstating the original Decision, amending it further by deleting the award of moral damages and reducing the amount of rentals and attorneys fees, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein Appeals are hereby partially GRANTED, the Modified Judgment is ordered SET ASIDE and rendered of no force and effect and the original Decision of the court a quo dated 7 August 1996 is hereby RESTORED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED and the amounts of rentals and attorneys fees are REDUCED to P6,887,757.40 and P50,000.00, respectively. In this connection, the Clerk of Court of RTC Lanao del Sur is hereby directed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by Plaintiff-Appellant IBRAHIM taking into consideration the total amount of damages sought in the complaint vis--vis the actual amount of damages awarded by this Court. Such additional filing fee shall constitute as a lien on the judgment. SO ORDERED
8
NAPOCOR vs Ibrahim
The above decision was affirmed by this Court on June 29, 2007 in G.R. No. 168732, viz.: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 57792 dated June 8, 2005 is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
9
NPC moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but this Court denied it on August 29, 2007. To satisfy the judgment, respondents filed with the RTC a motion for execution of its August 7, 1996 decision, as modified by the CA. On November 13, 2007, the RTC granted the motion, and issued the corresponding writ of execution. Subsequently, a notice of garnishment was issued upon NPCs depositary bank. NPC then filed a Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 02065-MIN. It argued that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it granted the motion for execution without ordering respondents to transfer their title in favor of NPC. By allowing the payment of just compensation for a parcel of land without the concomitant right of NPC to get title thereto, the RTC clearly varied the terms of the judgment in G.R. No. 168732, justifying the issuance of a writ of certiorari. NPC also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and notice of garnishment. On November 29, 2007, the CA granted NPCs prayer and issued a TRO, enjoining the implem entation of the writ of execution and the notice of garnishment. On May 30, 2008, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision, dismissing NPCs petition for certiorari. Rejecting NPCs argument, the CA declared that this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 168732 intended NPC to pay the full value of the property as compensation without ordering the transfer of respondents title to the land. According to the CA, in a plethora of cases involving lands traversed by NPCs transmission lines, it had been consistently ruled that an easement is compensable by the full value of the property despite the fact that NPC was only after a right-of-way easement, if by such easement it perpetually or indefinitely deprives the land owner of his proprietary rights by imposing restrictions on the use of the property. The CA, 11 therefore, ordered NPC to pay its admitted obligation to respondents amounting to P36,219,887.20. NPC is now before us faulting the CA for dismissing the formers petition for certiorari. It also prayed for a TRO to enjoin respondents and all persons 12 acting under their authority from implementing the May 30, 2008 Decision of the CA. In its July 9, 2008 Resolution, this Court granted NPCs prayer, and issued a TRO enjoining the execution of the assailed CA Decision. In the main, NPC insists that the payment of just compensation for the land carries with it the correlative right to obtain title or ownership of the land taken. It stresses that this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 168732 is replete with pronouncements that the just compensation awarded to respondents corresponds to compensation for the entire land and not just for an easement or a burden on the property, thereby necessitating a transfer of title and ownership to NPC upon satisfaction of judgment. NPC added that by granting respondents motion for execution, and consequently is suing the writ of execution and notice of garnishment, the RTC and the CA allowed respondents to retain title to the property even after the payment of full compensation. This, according to NPC, was a clear case of unjust enrichment. The petition lacks merit. It is a fundamental legal axiom that a writ of execution must conform strictly to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. A writ of execution may not vary from, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. When a writ of execution does not conform strictly to a 13 decisions dispositive portion, it is null and void. Admittedly, the tenor of the dispositive portion of the August 7, 1996 RTC decision, as modified by the CA and affirmed by this Court, did not order the transfer of ownership upon payment of the adjudged compensation. Neither did such condition appear in the text of the RTC decision, and of this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 168732. As aptly pointed out by the CA in its assailed Decision: [NPC], by its selective quotations from the Decision in G.R. No. 168732, would have Us suppose that the High Court, in decreeing that [NPC] pay the full value of the property as just compensation, implied that [NPC] was entitled to the entire land, including the surface area and not just the subterranean portion. No such inference can be drawn from *the+ reading of the entirety of the High Courts Decision. On the contrary, a per usal of the subject Decision yields to this Court the unmistakable sense that the High Court intended [NPC] to pay the full value of the subject property as just compensation without ordering the transfer o*f+ respondents title to the land. This is patent from the following language of the High Court as quoted by [NPC] itself:
10
NAPOCOR vs Ibrahim
In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Based upon the fo regoing, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that [NPC] only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation 14 which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Clearly, the writ of execution issued by the RTC and affirmed by the CA does not vary, but is, in fact, consistent with the final decision in this case. The assailed writ is, therefore, valid. Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term 15 expropriation. As we explained in Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
16
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. The Supreme Court, in Republic v. PLDT thus held that: "Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way." However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires. 1avvphi1 The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just 17 compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property. It is, therefore, clear that NPCs acquisition of an easement of right-of-way on the lands of respondents amounted to expropriation of the portions of the latters property for which they are entitled to a reasonable and just compensation. The term just compensation had been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that 18 the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development 20 Corporation, this Court sustained the award of just compensation equivalent to the fair and full value of the property even if petitioners only sought the continuation of the exercise of their right-of-way easement and not the ownership over the land. There is simply no basis for NPC to claim that the payment of fair market value without the concomitant transfer of title constitutes an unjust enrichment. In fine, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of execution and the notice of garnishment to satisfy the judgment in favor of respondents could not be considered grave abuse of discretion. The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of passion and hostility. The word capricious, usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the 21 corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative. In this case, NPC utterly failed to demonstrate caprice or arbitrariness on the part of the RTC in granting respondents motion for execution. Accordingly, the C A committed no reversible error in dismissing NPCs petition for certiorari. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong 22 them. We, therefore, write finis to this litigation.
19
NAPOCOR vs Ibrahim
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02065-MIN is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on July 9, 2008 is LIFTED. SO ORDERED.
NAPOCOR vs Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 141447 May 4, 2006
HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY, namely, CEBU BATOWA-AN, SAYANA, NASSER, MANTA, EDGAR, PUTRI, MONKOY and AMIR, all surnamed MACABANGKIT, Petitioners, vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Respondent. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 54889 which set aside the Special 2 Order dated September 7, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 61 in Civil Case No. 4094, as well as the Resolution dated November 12, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The said Special Order of the RTC granted the Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by plaintiffs therein of its Decision and Supplemental Decision, thus obliging the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) to pay plaintiffs P79,472.750.00 as just compensation. The antecedents are as follows: Macabangkit Sangkay was the owner of a 227,065-square-meter parcel of land located in Iligan City. When he died intestate, the property was subdivided into nine parcels and subsequently titled to his heirs, namely: Name 1) Edgar Macabangkit 2) Nasser Macabangkit 3) Sayana Macabangkit 4) Manta Macabangkit 5) Cebu Macabangkit 6) Batowa-an Macabangkit 7) Amir Macabangkit 8) Monkoy Macabangkit 9) Putri Macabangkit Title No. - OCT No. P-1003 - OCT No. P-1004 - OCT No. P-1005 - OCT No. P-1007 - OCT No. P-1008 - OCT No. P-1010 - OCT No. P-1012 - OCT No. P-1027 - OCT No. P-1028
3 1
The said Heirs declared their properties for taxation purposes in their respective names.
In 1979, NAPOCOR constructed an underground three-kilometer long tunnel traversing the properties of the Heirs, about 100 meters beneath the surface. The tunnel was used to siphon water and divert the flow of the Agus River for the operation of NAPOCORs Hydro -Electric Project in Agus V, VI, and VII, at Ditucalan and Fuentes, Iligan City. A transmission line also traversed the property. The Heirs were not informed that such underground 5 tunnel had been constructed; neither did NAPOCOR compensate them for the use of their property. The Heirs filed a complaint for damages and recovery of possession of the property with alternative prayer for just compensation against NAPOCOR before the RTC of Iligan City, alleging the following in their complaint: 8. In the early part of 1996, plaintiffs entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation for the sale of their property. On July 5, 1996, plaintiffs received a letter from the Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation, re fusing the plaintiffs land

due to the presence of defendants underground tunnel. Copy of the Memorandum of Agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation, from the agreement are attached herewith as ANNEXES "W" and "X,"forming as part hereof; 9. On October 10, 1996, plaintiffs offered their land as collateral for a loan applied with the Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines, Iligan City Branch, and again the said parcels of land were not accepted as collateral due to the presence of defendants undergroun d tunnel, copy of the letter of the said Bank, dated October 10, 1996 is herewith attached and marked as ANNEX "Y," forming as part hereof; 10. That the act of defendant is equivalent to unlawful taking and condemnation of plaintiffs parcels of land, without just compensation and/or reasonable rental since 1979. Written and oral demands were made for defendant to vacate and remove its tunnel, or, in the alternative, to pay just compensation and rental of plaintiffs parcels of land, but defendant refused and continuously refuses, sans any valid ground. Copy of plaintiffs demand letter is attached herewith as ANNEX "Z" forming as part hereof. Also, the answer of defendant to plaintiffs demand l etter is also attached herewith and marked as ANNEX "Z-1," forming as part hereof; 11. That, as a consequence of defendants unlawful taking and condemnation of plaintiffs properties and the illegal construction of defendants underground tunnel, the defendant were deprived of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land aforesaid; So also, by the same reason aforestated, the surface of plaintiffs land became unsafe for habitation as the defendants tunn el will someday collapse, and the surface will be carried by the current of the water. Those of plaintiffs and workers with houses on the surface were forced to transfer to a safer site in 1996, as they were continuously disturb day and night, because of fear and the danger, coupled by the sound being produce by the water flow and which sometime shake the surface; 12. That the current aggregate assessed value of plaintiffs, parcels of land as indicated in their respective Tax Declarations is ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED TEN (P106,710.00) PESOS, more or less; 13. That defendant must be held liable for damages in the form of rental and other damages starting *from+ 1979 when the defendants underground tunnel was constructed up to the present, plus additional damages beyond 1997, should defendant continue to illegally stay on plaintiffs land, in such amount as may be determined and deemed just and equitable by the Honorable Court; 14. That it is necessary for defendant to dismantle its underground tunnel illegally constructed beneath the lands of plaintiffs and to deliver possession of the same to plaintiff the subterrain illegally occupied by defendant; 15. The construction of the tunnel by defendant beneath plaintiffs parcels of lands have caused danger to their lives and pr operties; sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and shock, thereby entitling them to recover moral damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOSUAND (P200,000.00) PESOS. And by way of example to deter persons similarly minded and for public good, defendant may be held liable for exemplary damages, also in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS. Or in both cases, in such amount as may be determined by the Honorable Court; 16. That to protect the interest of the plaintiffs and for purposes of filing the instant case, they were compelled to engage the services of counsel, in the amount equivalent to TWO [HUNDRED] THOUSAND (P200,000.00), plus court appearance fee of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00), as and by way of 6 attorneys fees. They prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor after due proceedings, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered as follows: 1. Directing defendants to remove and dismantle its underground tunnel constructed beneath the land of plaintiffs and to deliver possession of the subterrain area illegally occupied by defendant; 2. To pay plaintiffs a monthly rental from 1979 up to the time the defendant vacates the subterrain of the land of plaintiffs, in such amount as may be considered reasonable by the Honorable Court; 3. In the alternative, if and when the removal of defendants underground tunnel is not legally possible, to pay plaintiffs o f the just compensation of their land in the amount as may be deemed reasonable by the Honorable Court. But, in either case, (either by the removal of the tunnel or by paying just compensation) to pay plaintiffs a reasonable rental; 4. To pay moral damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,00.00) PESOS and exemplary damages of another TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, or in such respective amount as may be determined by the Honorable Court; 5. Pay attorneys fees in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00), plus appearance fee of ONE THOUSAND (P1,0000.00) PESOS, as and by way of attorneys fees;

6. Such other relief deemed just and equitable under the circumstance.
In its answer to the complaint, NAPOCOR interposed the following special and affirmative defenses: 6. That while it is true that under Article 437 of the New Civil Code, the owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and everything under it and can therefore construct thereon any work or make any plantation and excavation which he may deem proper, yet, such exercise of right is without detriment to servitude and is subject to other limitations imposed either by special law or ordinances; 7. That under Section 3, paragraph (f) of Republic Act 6395, as amended, which, by its nature, is a special law, defendant herein is authorized to take water from any public stream, river, creek, lake, spring or waterfall in the Philippines for the purposes specified therein; to intercept and divert the flow of water from lands of riparian owners and from persons owning or interested in water which are or may be necessary to said purposes, upon payment of just compensation therefor; to alter, straighten, obstruct or increase the flow of water in streams or water channels intersecting or connecting therewith or continuous to its works or any part thereof; thus, the construction of tunnel by defendant is legal and sanctioned by law; 8. That assuming arguendo, without admitting, that a tunnel was indeed constructed in 1979 under the land claimed by the plaintiffs, their cause of action against the defendant is barred not only by prescription but also byestoppel and laches. Under our laws and jurisprudence, easement of aqueduct canals and tunnels are apparent and continuous easement and any action arising therefrom prescribes in five (5) years which prescriptive period is to be reckoned from its accrual. In the instant case, the cause of action of the plaintiffs, if any, has accrued in 1979 and yet they only filed the 8 complaint in 1997 or after the lapse of almost eighteen (18) years; The Heirs adduced in evidence the Certificate issued by the City Assessors Office stating that the property had an assessed value of P400.00 to P500.00 per square meter. Witnesses testified that the adjacent parcels of land were sold at P700.00 and P750.00 per square meter and that the area where the 9 property is located is classified as industrial, and residential and adjacent to subdivisions with industrial classification. On August 13, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Heirs. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered: 1. The prayer for the removal or dismantling of defendants tunnel is denied*.+ However, defendant is hereby directed and ord ered: a) To pay plaintiffs land with a total area of 227,065 square meters, at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS per square meter, or a total of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P113,532,500.00) PESOS, plus interest, as actual damages or just compensation; b) To pay plaintiffs a monthly rental of their land in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum; c) To pay plaintiffs the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages; d) To pay plaintiffs, the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, as exemplary damages; e) To pay plaintiffs, the sum equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded, as attorneys fees, and to pay the cost. SO ORDERED.
10
The RTC declared that the construction of the underground tunnel affected the entire area of the Heirs property. Consequentl y, plaintiffs lost the agricultural, industrial, commercial and residential value of the land. On August 18, 1999, the RTC rendered a Supplemental Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: Therefore, paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion of the original decision should read, as follows: a) To pay plaintiffs land with a total area of 227,065 square meters, at the rate of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS per square meter, or a total of ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P113,532,500.00) PESOS, plus interest, as actual damages or just compensation; Consequently, plaintiffs land or properties are hereby condemned in favor of defendant National Power Corporation, upon payment of the aforesaid sum;

This supplemental decision shall be considered as part of paragraph 1(a) of the dispositive portion of the original decision.
11
Before NAPOCOR was served with a copy of said Decision, the Heirs filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal, alleging that execution pending appeal was justified, considering the trial courts finding that it (NAPOCOR) had acted in bad faith in con structing the tunnel. They pointed out that it had been illegally occupying their land for a long period of time without any compensation or rental having been paid to them, and that to prolong the execution of the decision would likewise prolong its illegal act. The Heirs pointed out that once they received their share of the money judgment, they would be able to purchase safer lands and build new houses thereon. They insisted that any appeal which may be taken by NAPOCOR would be dilatory and frivolous. The Heirs appended to their motion their Joint Affidavit wherein they alleged that they constantly feared that an earthquake could happen at any time, 12 and that the tunnel could collapse or cave in, which would necessarily cause serious injuries or even death. NAPOCOR opposed the motion. It contended that the Heirs failed to prove that it acted in bad faith when it constructed the tunnel; hence, there was no justification to grant their motion. It pointed out that the Heirs were never deprived of the beneficial use of their land; in fact, there was no evidence on record that they ever attempted to use the affected portion of the property. NAPOCOR claimed that the Heirs dema nd for rentals was without factual and legal basis. NAPOCOR further alleged that the Heirs claim that the tunnel exposed them to danger was belied by the testimony of Nasser Macabangkit. On cross examination, he testified that only two of his siblings, Sayana and Edgar Macabangkit, starter to reside in the subject property in 1998, after the complaint was filed on November 21, 1987. It further alleged that it had already filed an appeal, which, as gleaned from the evidence and the 13 applicable jurisprudence, was not a mere dilatory tactic. On September 7, 1997, the trial court issued the Special Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and awarded 70% of the money judgment, or P79,472,750.00, upon the filing of a P1,000,000.00 bond. The dispositive portion of the Order reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal is therefore granted, but only for the amount equivalent to SEVENTY PERCENT (70%) of the amount awarded as fair market value of plaintiffs land or for a total of SEVENTY-NINE MILLION FOUR-HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY (P79,472,750.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, subject to the condition that plaintiffs shall file an execution bond duly approved by this Court, either in cash, surety or property in the amount of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS, which bond is in addition to plaintiffs land already condemned in favor of the defendant, to answer for any damage that defendant may suffer as a result of the execution of the decision pending appeal, should it later on be ruled on appeal that plaintiffs be not entitled to it and the decision be reversed. Monthly rentals, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fee and cost are excluded from the execution pending appeal. Let the corresponding Writ of Execution Pending appeal be issued upon the posting and approval of the aforesaid execution bond. Mr. Montoy Lomondot, Sheriff-IV, RTC, Lanao del Norte is hereby commanded to cause the implementation and execution of the portion of the aforesaid decision in accordance with the Rules of Court, together with his lawful fees for the service of the Writ. He shall be assisted by the other deputy sheriffs assigned to this Court or in another branch after securing the consent of the presiding Judge thereof. He shall likewise be assisted by Atty. Cairoding Maruhom, Ex-officio Provincial/City Sheriff of Lanao del SurMarawi City, and Palao Diamla, Sheriff-IV, RTC, Lanao del Sur, subject to the consent of the Presiding Judge concerned. The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to assess and collect the corresponding additional filing fee from the judgment award. SO ORDERED.
14
The trial court declared that among the good reasons to grant the motion for execution pending appeal was the fact that NAPOCOR had occupied the property and had used it in bad faith since 1979 without having paid just compensation therefor. Moreover, the construction of the tunnel rendered the subject property unfit for industrial, residential, or commercial use because of the danger it posed; neither could the Heirs dispose of the property. Thus, they had the right to compel NAPOCOR to pay the price of the land or the proper rent under Article 450 of the New Civil Code. The trial court also declared that the appeal of defendant was dilatory and frivolous, which was resorted to so that it could continue enjoying and using the property for free. It also stated execution of judgment pending appeal would not cause prejudice or irreparable damage to defendant, since the amount of just compensation sought to be executed was equivalent to the fair market value of the Heirs land, while the rentals were for NAPOCORS use of the land. 15 It also ruled that the Heirs could file their motion for execution pending appeal even before NAPOCOR received a copy of the decision. The RTC thereafter issued the Writ of Execution on September 9, 1999. NAPOCOR assailed the trial courts Special Order and Writ of Execution before the CA via petition for review on certiorar i under Rule 65, claiming that respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion in granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and
16
issuing the concomitant writ despite the absence of compelling reasons therefor. It cited Aquino v. Santiago to support its argument. It claimed that it was not in danger of being insolvent as would justify execution of the decision pending appeal. It further posited that since Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, was a special law which recognized the construction of water pipes to divert the flow of water for purposes of generating electricity as a limitation to ownership of property. NAPOCOR further claimed that the assailed Special Order rendered nugatory its right to appeal the decision sought to be executed. It insisted that it should not be obliged to pay the alleged market value of the property since it was not entirely affected by the support tunnel. For their part, the Heirs averred that execution pending appeal is a matter addressed to the second discretion of the trial court and cannot be nullified by the appellate court unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown. They claimed that NAPOCOR failed to prove that the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion in granting their motion for execution pending appeal. They pointed out that it was justified by good reasons, and that they adduced proof of the fair market value of the property and posted the requiredP1,000,000.00 bond. The Heirs cited the 19 20 ruling of the CA in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim and Municipality of Bian, Laguna v. Court of Appeals. The appellate court heard the parties on oral argument. On November 12, 1999, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and set aside the 21 assailed orders of the trial court. According to the appellate court, even assuming NAPOCORs bad faith in constructing its tunnel beneath the surface of the property, it was not an urgent and compelling reason to grant the motion for execution pending appeal. The matter goes into the merits of the case, which the CA should resolve on appeal. Moreover, it was not for the trial court to rule on whether NAPOCORs appeal was dilatory; the merits of the appeal should be resolved first, considering the other matters involved in the appeal aside from the fact that the total amount of the award was P113,532,500.00. According to the CA, under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, the act revising the charter of NAPOCOR, any action by any person claiming compensation and/or damages shall be filed within five (5) years after the right-of-way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have been established; after the said period, no suit can be brought to question the same. It stressed that the effect of this proviso on the decision of the trial court can be better addressed in the appeal. The Heirs filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied for lack of merit on January 13, 2000; hence, the instant petition. Petitioners allege that the CA erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent NAPOCOR on its finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the Special Order. Petitioners maintain that the trial courts finding that respondent NAP OCOR acted in bad faith and that its appeal was dilatory was supported by the evidence on record and the pleadings of the parties. They insisted that the appellate court should not substitute its findings for those of the trial court. Its reliance on Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 was misplaced because the law does not apply to the construction of a tunnel underneath the surface of their property. Petitioners further aver that the CA should have applied its ruling in National 24 Power Corporation v. Ibrahim. By its decision, the CA condoned the unjust enrichment of private respondent at their expense. The issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in granting petitioners motion for execution pending appeal of its decision and supplemental decision in the amount of P79,472,750.00. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The rule is that execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceedings upon the 25 expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been perfected. However, the trial court may grant execution before the expiration of the period to appeal upon motion of the prevailing party provided that it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, and there are good reasons for such execution to be stated in a special order after due hearing. The rule does not proscribe the prevailing party from filing such motion even before the losing party has received his copy of the decision or final order of the trial court. Such motion for execution pending appeal may be filed by the prevailing party at any time before the expiration of the period to appeal. It may happen that, upon service on the prevailing party of a copy of the decision or final order of the trial court, he files a motion for execution pending appeal but the losing party files a motion for reconsideration of the decision or final order within the required 15-day period under Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. In such a case, the motion of the prevailing party for execution pending appeal may be held in abeyance pending final resolution of the losing partys motion for reconsideration of the decision or final order. Upon the other hand, if the losing party doe s not appeal the decision or final order, the execution of the decision becomes a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party. In such case, the motion for execution pending appeal becomes moot and academic, as the prevailing party may file a motion for a writ of execution of the decision or final order. As provided in Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, execution of the judgment or final order pending appeal is discretionary. It is the exception to the rule that only a final judgment may be executed, hence, must be strictly construed. Execution pending appeal should not be granted 26 routinely but only in extraordinary circumstances. However, if the trial court grants execution pending appeal in the absence of good reasons 27 therefor, it is incumbent upon the CA to issue a writ of certiorari; failure to do so would constitute grave abuse of discretion on its part. The CA ruled correctly when it held that the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it granted private respondents motion for execution pending appeal in the absence of good reasons to justify the grant of said motion.
22 23
17
18
The Rules of Court do not enumerate the circumstances which would justify the execution of the judgment or decision pending appeal. However, this Court has held that "good reasons" consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment or final order. Were the rule otherwise, execution pending appeal may well become a tool of 29 oppression and inequity instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice. The existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. These reasons must be stated in the order granting the same. Unless they are divulged, it would be difficult to determine whether judicial discretion has been properly exercised in the case. The mere posting of a bond will not justify execution pending appeal. Furthermore, a combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution. The requirement of a bond is imposed merely as an additional factor for the protection 30 of the defendants creditor; otherwise, execution pending appeal could be obtained through the mere filing of such bond. Petitioners insist that, as gleaned from their Joint Affidavit, when they discovered the existence of respondents tunnel in 1996, they were impelled to transfer their residence; they then lived with one of their brothers-in-law, Camama Ibrahim in Mahayahay, Iligan City. They assert that there is nothing in the testimony of petitioner Nasser Macabangkit which would negate the urgency to buy properties located in a safe area. The relevant portion of the Joint Affidavit reads: 4. That we constantly fear that an earthquake may happen at any time which would could cause the collapse or caving in of the tunnel with the resultant violent destruction of our houses, and would necessarily cause us serious injuries, or even our death or those of the members of our family. The recent incident of erosion and landslide at Cherry Hills, Antipolo City, is not remote possibility, that it may had happen to us. May God forbid. 5. That our fear has been aggravated by the fact that we often feel the vibration of the area beneath our houses whenever the volume of the water that passes through the tunnel increases, especially at midnight. Thus, we have been suffering from sleepless nights or, at least troubled sleep, for countless times ever since the tunnel was illegally constructed by the defendant; 6. That as a result of the very real danger that we have been exposed to, we have long decided to leave our houses and reside at the residence of our brother-in-law, one Camama Ibrahim, at Mahayahay, Iligan City, and suffered a humiliating condition, as well as the congestion. As soon as we have the financial means, we have to liberate our family from the same humiliation and congestion, by purchasing a lot1avvphil.net and construct a house. We are entitled to a humane, dignified and decent shelter which commensurate to our social standing in the community. 7. That we, therefore, need money very badly right now and, if we received our share in the damages awarded to us in the decision, we would readily use it for a suitable land far from the area where the tunnel exists, and build our houses thereon, so that we may be freed from the ever-present fear of a very real danger to ourselves, our families and our properties, which we have been subjected to for many years due to the illegal acts of the National 31 Power Corporation. On the other hand, in their Complaint filed before the RTC on November 11, 1997, petitioners alleged that the construction of the tunnel by the respondent caused danger to their lives and properties, and gave them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock. The Court rules, however, that this claim of petitioners was merely an afterthought and is barren of merit. Petitioner Nasser Macabangkit testified before the trial court on December 1, 1998, and declared that only two of the petitioners, Edgar and Sayana Macabangkit, resided in the property starting only in 1998: Q Was there anyone of your brothers and sisters who have actually visited/resided in this land in question? A As of now, there is, Sir. Q Will you tell us the name of your brother or sister who is now residing in this land of yours? A Edgar and Sayana Macabangkit. Q Do you know when was it when they started residing in that land of yours? A This year, Sir. COURT: Q This year 1998?
28

A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, December 1, 1998, pp. 21-23)
32
What the Court cannot fathom is the fact that shortly after filing their complaint on November 11, 1997, petitioners Edgar and Sayana Macabangkit still dared to establish their residence in the property. Indeed, it is incredible that after discovering the existence of the tunnel and finding the area "very dangerous," petitioners would still choose to live therein. If petitioners truly believed that the tunnel posed danger to their property and their very lives, any decision to stay on would be short of suicidal on their part. Thus, the Court holds that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the execution of its Decision and Supplemental Decision pending appeal, compelling respondent to remit P70,472,750.00 to petitioners simply because petitioners Edgar and Sayana Macabangkit needed their share (P11,353,370.00 each) just so they could buy land and establish their new homes. Petitioners insist, however, that the "good reasons" cited by the trial court for granting their motion for execution pending appeal are based on the trial courts findings of facts, i.e, respondent acted in bad faith in constructing a three-kilometer long tunnel underneath petitioners property without their knowledge and consent; respondent had not compensated the petitioners for its use of the property since 1979; respondent profited from its use of their properties; the existence of the tunnel rendered petitioners property unfit for industrial, residential or commercial use due to the danger posed by it, and no one was willing to buy the property; and the fair market value of the property had been amply proved by evidence. For its part, respondent avers that, it acted in good faith based on Section 3(f) and (g) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended. Respondent posits that it is incredible that petitioners failed to discover the tunnel when it was constructed in 1979; hence, petitioners slept on their rights for 18 years or so. It further averred that the precise amount due to petitioners for the respondents use of the tunnel, by way of compensation, is another contentious issue on appeal. Even assuming that petitioners are entitled to compensation or reasonable rentals for the portion appropriated by respondent, the 34 appellate court still has to resolve the issue of whether, as claimed by the respondent, petitioners claim is barred by Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395. The well-established rule is that it is not for the trial court to determine the merits of the decision it rendered and use the same as basis for its order allowing execution pending appeal. The authority to determine the merits of the appeal and the correctness of the findings and conclusions of the trial court is lodged in the appellate court. The trial court cannot preempt the decision of the appellate court and use its own decision as basis for affirming 35 the trial courts order of execution pending appeal. Neither is the trial court justified to order execution pending appeal, on its assertion that the appeal of the respondent is a dilatory tactic. As the Court 36 held in Manacop v. Equitable PCI Bank: Besides, that the appeal is merely dilatory is not a good reason for granting execution pending appeal. As held in BF Corporation v. Edsa Shangri-la Hotel: it is not for the trial judge to determine the merit of a decision he rendered as this is the role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not within competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for execution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as basis for finding good reasons to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can appreciate the dilatory intent of an appeal as an additional good reason in upholding an order for execution pending appeal Petitioners reliance on the ruling of the CA in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, is misplaced. We agree with the following ratiocination of the CA in its decision: We note that in support of its case, private respondents cited the case of National Power Corporation v. Hon. Amer Ibrahim, et al. (CA-G.R. SP No. 41897) which was decided by the Special Seventeenth Division of this Court. In the said case, the discretionary execution granted by the public respondent was upheld. While we are not unmindful of the findings in the said case, it is our opinion that based on the circumstances obtaining in this case, it would best serve the ends of justice if the appeal on the merits of the case is first resolved without any execution pending appeal, not only because the total amount involved is quite substantial - ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE 38 HUNDRED PESOS (P113,532,500.00), but also because of the other matters involved in the appeal.(citation omitted) IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
37 33
Lepanto vs. WMC Resources

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 162331 November 20, 2006 LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., Petitioner, vs. WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD., WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC., Respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 2 SP No. 74161, dated 21 November 2003, which dismissed herein petitioners Petition for Review of the Decision of the Office of the President dated 3 23 July 2002 affirming in totothe Order of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated 18 December 2001 approving the application for and the consequent registration of FTAA No. 02-95-XI from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. On 22 March 1995, the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned subsidiary of WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio FTAA No. 02-95-XI (Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large scale exploration, development, and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in an initial contract area of 99,387 hectares located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991. The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under various Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called the Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the Tampakan Option Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the Tampakan Companies on 25 April 1991, as amended by Amendatory Agreement dated 15 July 1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato. The Option Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims covering the area subject of the agreement. WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the Columbio FTAA, and on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with petitioner Lepanto over its entire shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of the Tampakan Companies e xercise of their right of first refusal to purchase the subject shares. On 28 August 2000, petitioner sought the approval of the 12 July 2000 Agreement from the DENR Secretary. In an Agreement dated 6 October 2000, however, the Tampakan Companies sought to exercise its right of first refusal. Thus, in a letter dated 13 October 2000, petitioner assailed the Tampakan Companies exercise of its right of first refusal, alleging that the Tampakan Companies failed to match the terms and conditions set forth in the 12 July 2000 Agreement. Thereafter, petitioner filed a case for Injunction, Specific Performance, Annulment of Contracts and Contractual Interference with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, against WMC Resources, WMC Philippines, and the Tampakan Companies. WMC Philippines and the Tampakan Companies moved for the dismissal of said case. Said Motion to Dismiss having been denied, WMC Philippines challenged the order dismissing the 5 Motion on appeal before the Court of Appeals which subsequently ordered the dismissal of the case on the ground of forum shopping in this wise: Nevertheless, the Court finds that private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. In this case, petitioners argue that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping for having lodged the complain before respondent Court pending action by the Secretary of the DENR through the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) on its approval of the Sale and Purchase Agreement dated July 12, 2000. Private respondent on the other hand, opposes the foregoing contention arguing that the MGB will be merely exercising its administrative not quasi-judicial power.
4 1

The action before respondent court was filed by private respondent to compel petitioner WMC Resources to convey its equity in WMC Phils. and Hillcrest to the former. Meanwhile, in the case before the MGB, private respondent sought the approval of Sale and that the MGBs authority over the case is purely administrative, but further review shows that private respondent raised contentious issues which need resolution by the MGB before it can recommend any approval to the Secretary of the DENR. Particularly, in its letter dated October 13, 2000 to the Secretary of the DENR, private respondent posed its objection to the approval of the Sales and Purchase agreements between WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies, asserting that the latter failed to validly exercise its right of first refusal. Also, in its letter to the Director of the MGB dated December 8, 2000, private respondent spelled out in detail its reasons for objecting to the agreement between WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies, and in the same breath, argued for the approval of its own contract. And because of the opposing claims posited by private respondent and petitioners, the MGB was constrained to require the parties to submit their respective comments. At the juncture, the MGBs authority ceased to be administrative. Evidently, the MGB has to review all these opposing contentions and resolve the same. A resolution of the MGB on which contract to recommend or endorse to the Secretary of the DENR for approval will necessarily include a declaration on the validity of the different Sale and Purchase Agreements executed between the disagreeing parties, as well as on the exercise of the Tampakan Companies exercise of its right of first refusal and its qualification as a contractor under the FTAA. Even the MGB is aware that the dispute revolves around these sales and purchase agreements. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the MGB will be exercising its quasi-judicial powers in resolving the conflict before it. Whether the MGB can validly exercise such jurisdiction over the controversy is another issue but nonetheless immaterial in determining whether private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping. What is determinative is the filing of two (2) separate actions in different for a based principally on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Thus, it is not highly unlikely that respondent Court and MGB will come up with conflicting pronouncements on the dispute, thereby creating a quandary as to which one will prevail. Private respondents act undisputably constitutes a clear case of forumshopping, a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice of the action. The respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to 6 dismiss Civil Case No. 01-087 on ground of forum-shopping. With the denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the case was elevated to this Court. In a Decision dated 24 September 2003, the Court affirmed the Decision of the appellate court and dismissed the petition. In said Decision, the Court elucidated that: True, the questioned agreements of sale between petitioner and WMC on one hand and between WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the other pertain to transfer of shares of stock from one entity to another. But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining rights or interest in mining agreements. Hence, the power of the MGB to rule on the validity of the questioned agreements of sale, which was raised by petitioner before the DENR, is inextricably linked to the very nature of such agreements over which the MGB has jurisdiction under the law. Unavoidably, there is identity of reliefs that petitioner seeks from both the MGB and the RTC. Forum shopping exists when both actions involve the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances and raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues. Such elements are evidently present in both the proceedings before the MGB and before the trial court. The case instituted with the RTC was thus correctly ordered dismissed by the appellate court on the ground of forum shopping. Besides, not only did petitioner commit forum shopping but it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by opting to go ahead in seeking reliefs from the court even while those same 8 reliefs were appropriately awaiting resolution by the MGB. In the interim, on 10 January 2001, contending that the 12 July Agreement between petitioner and WMC Philippines had expired due to failure to meet the necessary preconditions for its validity, WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed another Sale and Purchase Agreement, where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate vehicle which would acquire the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA activities. On 15 January 2001, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. increased its authorized capitalization to P250 million. Subsequently, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Shares of Stocks on 23 January 2001. After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical qualifications of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in the assailed Order. According to said Order, pursuant to Section 66 of Department Administrative Order No. 96-40, as amended, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. meets the qualification requirements as Contractor-Transferee of FTAA No. 02-95-XI, and that the application for transfer of said FTAA went thru the procedure and other requirements set forth under the law. Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office of the President. Petitioner assails the validity of the 18 December 2001 Order on the ground that: 1) it violates the constitutional right of Lepanto to due process; 2) it preempts the resolution of very crucial legal issues pending with the regular courts; and 3) it blatantly violates Section 40 of the Mining Act. In a Decision dated 23 July 2002, the Office of the President dismissed the petition in this wise: At the outset, it bears emphasis that quite contrary to the argument of petitioner Lepanto, the above Order of the DENR Secretary is not violative of the Mining Law. Since the subject Columbio FTAA was granted in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63 on 22 March 1995, or prior to the effectivity of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, especially as it highlights the nonimpairment of existing mining and/or quarrying rights, under Section 14.1 (b) thereof, only the consent of DENR Secretary is required. To hold otherwise would be to unduly impose a burden on transferor WMC and thereby restrict its freedom to dispose of or alienate this property right without due process. Thus, under the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, Chapter XXX thereof expressly echoes the guaranty:
7

"Section 272. Non-Impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying Rights.- All valid and existing mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases pending renewal, Mineral Production Sharing Agreements, FTAA granted under Executive Order No. 279, at the date of the Act shall remain valid, shall not be impaired and shall be recognized by the Government x x x. x x x Provided, finally, That this provision is applicable only to all FTAA/MPSA applications filed under Department Administrative Order No. 63 prior to the effectivity of the act and these implementing rules and regulations." As correctly stated by the MGB Director and affirmed by the DENR Secretary, Section 14.1 of the Columbio FTAA provides that the FTAA may be transferred provided that the Secretary consents to the same. Pursuant to Section 112 of the Mining Act and Section 272 of DAO No. 96-40, as amended, on non-impairment of existing mining rights, the subject application for transfer of the Columbio FTAA to Sagittarius requires only the approval of the DENR Secretary. Moreover, there is no merit in petitioner Lepantos argument that the DENR Secretary and consequently, this Office, has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in issue. The assailed Order of the DENR Secretary was pursuant to the latters exercise of the well-entrenched doctrine of primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies. By virtue of the operation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, "courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact and where a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes regulatory statute administered." (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 549 [2000]; Factoran v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 530 [1999]; Brett v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 687 [1990]; Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. v. Royal Class Limousine Service, 179 SCRA 569 [1989]). Thus, even though an action may be lodged in court that is ostensibly for annulment or "rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court," the doctrine of primary jurisdiction still applies. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 426 [1990]). Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 specifies the powers and functions of the DENR. Also, the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that the DENR "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the States mineral resources including those in reservations, watershed areas, and lands of the public domain. The Se cretary shall have the authority to enter into mineral agreements on behalf of the Government upon the recommendation of the Director, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the intent and provisions of this Act." (Chapter II, Section 8). Since an FTAA is "a contract involving financial or technical assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources" (Ibid., Chapter 1, Section 3 [r]), any issue affecting the same is indubitably within the primary jurisdiction of the DENR, as in fact, the government enters into FTAAs through the DENR (Ibid., Chapter VI, Section 33). There is no dispute that the instant case involves and requires the special technical knowledge and expertise of the DENR. In the determination by the DENR of a "qualified person" pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, such person must possess the technical and financial capability to undertake mineral resources development". (Chapter I, Section 3 [aq]) Obviously, this determination peculiarly lies within the expertise of the DENR. The validity of the successive transfers is not a civil issue, contrary to the allegation of petitioner Lepanto, because validity of transfer depends on technical qualifications of the transferee and compliance with the DENR requirements on qualifications, all of which require administrative expertise. Notably, petitioner Lepanto is estopped from assailing the primary jurisdiction of the DENR since petitioner Lepanto itself anchored its Petition (cf. pp. 4-5) on the contention that, allegedly, "the Tampakan Companies failed to match the terms and conditions of the July 12 Agreement with petitioner Lepanto in that they did not possess the financial and technical qualifications under the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules". Petitioner Lepantos objections therefore go into the very qualifications of a transferee which is a technical issue. This contention is a recognition by petitioner Lepanto itself of the fact that the crucial and determinative issue in the instant case is grounded on the financial and technical qualifications of a transferee, which issue, indisputably, is within the exclusive domain and expertise of the DENR and not of the courts. xxxx Moreover, petitioner Lepanto, by its conduct, is again estopped from assailing the DENRs jurisdiction after actively participating in the proceedings therein and seeking affirmative relief. A party who invoked the jurisdiction [of] a tribunal and actively participated in the proceedings therein cannot impugn such jurisdiction when faced with an adverse decision. (cf. Briad Agro Development Corporation v. dela Serna, 174 SCRA 524 9 [1989]). [Emphasis ours] With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner lodged an appeal before the Court of Appeals which was consequently dismissed by the appellate court in the herein assailed Decision. According to the Court of Appeals:

Petitioner forcefully argues that the DENR Secretary had usurped the power of the President of the Philippines to approve the transfer of FTAA, as under the provision of Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, any transfer or assignment of an FTAA has to be approved not by the DENR Secretary but by the President. The argument does not wash. The issue hinges on the applicability of Section 40 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which took force on 14 April 1995, on the transfer of FTAA from WMC to the Tampakan Companies, particularly the Sagittarius Mines, Inc. The said law provides: "Sec. 40. Assignment/Transfer A financial or technical assistance agreement may be assigned or transferred, in whole or in part, to a qualified person subject to the prior approval of the President: Provided, that the President shall notify Congress of every financial or technical assistance agreement assigned or converted in accordance with this provision within thirty (30) days from the date of approval." However, the above provision does not apply to the Columbio FTAA which was entered into by and between the Philippine Government and WMCP on 22 March 1995, or prior to the effectivity of RA No. 7942. Section 14.1 of the Columbio FTAA, under which the Tampakan Companies claim their rights to first refusal, reads: "14.1 Assignment "The Contractor may assign, transfer, convey or otherwise dispose of all or any part of its interest in the Agreement provided that such assignment, transfer, conveyance or disposition does not infringe any Philippine law applicable to foreign ownership: (a) to an Affiliate provided that it gives notice of such assignment to the Secretary within 30 days after such assignment; or (b) to any third party provided that the Secretary consents to the same, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld." Section 10, Article III of the Philippine Constitution enjoins Congress from passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts. It is axiomatic that a law that impairs an obligation of contract also violates the due process clause. The obligation of an existing contract is impaired when its terms and conditions are changed by law, ordinance, or any issuance having the force of law, thereby weakening the position or diminishing the rights of a party to the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligations or dispensing with any part of its force. Impairment has also been predicated on laws which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual rights. The condition of RA No. 7942 requiring the further approval of the President, if made to apply retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would impair the obligation of contracts simply because it constitutes a restriction on the right of the contractor to assign or transfer its interest in an FTAA. In other words, it diminished the vested rights of the contractor to assign or transfer its interests on mere approval of the DENR Secretary. The restriction is therefore substantive, and not merely procedural, contrary to the contention of petitioner. xxxx Likewise militating against the petitioners side is the doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospect ive operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. At any rate, even if RA No. 7942 be accorded a retroactive effect, this does notipso facto permit the application of the requirement of securing a prior presidential consent to the transfer of FTAA, for, to iterate, this would impair the obligation of contract. In such a case, the correct application of RA No. 7942 is for the provisions to [be] made to apply on existing FTAAs only if the same would not result in impairment of obligation of contracts. This is as it should be. To hold otherwise would be to unduly impose a burden on transferor WMC and thereby restrict its freedom to dispose of or alienate its property right without due process. It constitutes impairment of obligation of contracts, which the Fundamental Law enjoins, and 10 contravenes the doctrine of prospective application of laws. Hence, the instant Petition. The pivotal issue to be resolved herein involves the propriety of the application to the Columbio FTAA of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40 thereof requiring the approval of the President of the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements. Petitioner maintains that respondents failed to comprehend the express language of Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the President on the transfer or assignment of a financial or technical assistance agreement.

To resolve this matter, it is imperative at this point to stress the fact that the Columbio FTAA was entered into by the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines on 22 March 1995, undoubtedly before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 took effect on 14 April 1995. Furthermore, it is undisputed that said FTAA was granted in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991, which does not contain any similar condition on the transfer or assignment of financial or technical assistance agreements. Thus, it would seem that what petitioner would want this Court to espouse is the retroactive application of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 to the Columbio FTAA, a valid agreement concluded prior to the naissance of said piece of legislation. This posture of petitioner would clearly contradict the established legal doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the contrary is expressly stated or necessarily implied from the language used in the law. As reiterated in the case of Segovia v. 11 Noel, a sound cannon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that: "Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." According to this provision of law, in order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be 12 understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that a law is a rule established to guide our actions without no binding effect until it is enacted, wherefore, it has no application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the 13 future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions. In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively, therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply only prospectively, in view of the rule that a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be 14 annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. Be that as it may, assuming for the sake of argument that We are to apply the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 retrospectively to the Columbio FTAA, the lack of presidential approval will not be fatal as to render the transfer illegal, especially since, as in the instant case, the alleged lack of presidential approval has been remedied when petitioner appealed the matter to the Office of the President which approved the Order of the DENR Secretary granting the application for transfer of the Columbio FTAA to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. As expounded by the Court in the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in the La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos [15]case, involving the same FTAA subject of the instant case: x x x Moreover, when the transferee of an FTAA is another foreign corporation, there is a logical application of the requirement of prior approval by the President of the Republic and notification to Congress in the event of assignment or transfer of an FTAA. In this situation, such approval and notification are appropriate safeguards, considering that the new contractor is the subject of a foreign government. On the other hand, when the transferee of the FTAA happens to be a Filipino corporation, the need for such safeguard is not critical; hence, the lack of prior approval and notification may not be deemed fatal as to render the transfer invalid. Besides, it is not as if approval by the President is entirely absent in this instance. x x x That case involved the review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 21, 2003 in CA G.R. SP No. 74161, which affirmed the DENR Order dated December 31, 2001 and the Decision of the Office of the President dated July 23, 16 2002, both approving the assignment of the WMCP FTAA to Sagittarius. (Emphasis ours.) Furthermore, if petitioner was indeed of the mind that Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is applicable to the Columbio FTAA, thus necessitating the approval of the President for the validity of its transfer or assignment, it would seem contradictory that petitioner sought the approval of the DENR Secretary, and not that of the President, of its 12 July 2000 Sale and Purchase Agreement with WMC Resources. Hence, it may be glimpsed from the very act of petitioner that it recognized that the provision of the Columbio FTAA regarding the consent of the DENR Secretary with respect to the transfer of said FTAA must be upheld. It is engrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in 17 existing laws, and to fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be 18 19 substantial. Substantial impairment as conceived in relation to impairment of contracts has been explained in the case of Clemons v. Nolting, which stated that: a law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the President with respect to assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would be tantamount to an impairment of the obligations under said contract as it would effectively restrict the right of the parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA. By imposing a new condition apart from those already contained in the agreement, before the parties to the Columbio FTAA may assign or transfer its rights and interest in the said agreement, Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, if made to apply to the Columbio FTAA, will effectively modify the terms of the original contract and thus impair the obligations of the parties thereto and restrict the exercise of their vested rights under the original agreement. Such modification to the Columbio FTAA, particularly in the conditions imposed for its valid transfer is equivalent to an impairment of said contract violative of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 74161 dated 21 November 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Re: Query of Roger C. Prioreschi

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC
Present:
PUNO, CJ, QUISUMBING , YNARES-SANTIAGO , CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO , and ABAD , JJ.
** ** * *
Promulgated: August 19, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote: The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is very grateful for your 1rst. Indorsement to pay a nominal fee of Php 5,000.00 and the balance upon the collection action of 10 million pesos, thus giving us access to the Justice System previously denied by an up-front excessive court fee. The Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of complying with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves this privilege to indigent persons. While judges are appointed to interpret the law, this type of law seems to be extremely detailed with requirements that do not leave much room for interpretations. In addition, this law deals mainly with individual indigent and it does not include Foundations or Associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons. As seen in our Article of Incorporation, since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. reached-out to the poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned babies, to children who never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions, to broken families who returned to a normal life. In other words, we have been working hard for the very Filipino people, that the Government and the society cannot reach to, or have rejected or abandoned them. Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same option granted to indigent people? The two Executive Judges, that we have approached, fear accusations of favoritism or other kind of attack if they approve something which is not clearly and specifically stated in the law or approved by your HONOR. Can your Honor help us once more? Grateful for your understanding, God bless you and your undertakings. We shall be privileged if you the Spiritual Retreat Center in Antipolo City. find time to visit our orphanage the Home of Love and
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus: Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor.
[1]

In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court, which respectively state thus: Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
[2] [3]
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. (22a)
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of legal fees. The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides. To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigants affidavit. Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
[5] [4]
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer.
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the exemption from legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and underprivileged people.
SO ORDERED.
Dickerson vs. US
Dickerson v U.S. 530 U.S. 428 [2000] Author: Sam Biers Federal Power to Regulate Private Conduct under the 14 - Interpretive Power Relevant Facts: Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, on the grounds that he had not received "Miranda warnings" before being interrogated. Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 3501. Legal Issue(s): Whether the Miranda decision, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may be overruled by a legislative Act of Congress?
th
Courts Holding: No Procedure: Defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit bank robbery and other offenses. D. ct. granted suppression of confession. Govt motioned for reconsideration; denied, govt then appealed. Ct. of App reversed and remanded. S. Ct. Reversed Law or Rule(s): The Congress has supervisory authority over the federal cts, and may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedures that are not required by the Constitution and are therefore binding. Congress may not legislatively supercede out decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. Court Rationale: In Miranda the ct opined that the Constitution would not preclude legilative solutions that differed from the warning, but which were at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence. The additional remedies within the Act are insufficient to meet the constitutional minimums. The Act abandons the requirement of pre-interrogation warnings. The Act or the test thereunder to determine voluntariness is more difficult than Miranda for officers to conform to, and for cts. to apply in a consistent manner. Congress may not legislatively supercede judicial decisions that are in line with the Constitution without violating the Constitution itself. Plaintiffs Argument:(resp US) The act complies with the requirement that a legislative alternative to Miranda has to be equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions. Defendants Argument:(pet/df) Act effectively eliminates the strictures of Miranda, and substitutes inadequate alternatives to determine voluntariness.
People vs. Ting Lan Uy

FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
G.R. No. 157399
Present: Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), - versus Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted), ERNESTO GAMUS y SOTELO, JAIME OCHOA, all of the National Power Corporation, and RAUL GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas, Alias George Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo (At large), Accused.
Promulgated:
JAIME OCHOA, Appellant. November 17, 2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus, Jaime Ochoa and Raul Gutierrez were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined and penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in an amended Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 19558, which alleges
[2] [1]
That sometime in July 1990, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public accountable officer, being the Treasurer of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa, both public officers being the Manager of the Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader Analyst, respectively, also of NAPOCOR, and accused Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias George Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo, a private individual being a foreign exchange trader, said public

officers taking advantage of their official positions, with grave abuse of authority and committing the offense in relation to their office, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with their private co-accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified the NPCs application for managers checks with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), NPC Branch in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25), Philippine Currency, intended for the purchase of US dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), by inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4, when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew that the Payment Instructions (PI) when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate the account number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning, and with the use of the said falsified commercial documents, accused succeeded in diverting, collecting and receiving the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.75), Philippine Currency from the National Power Corporation, which they thereafter malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the National Power Corporation in the aforementioned sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not guilty to the charge, while Gutierrez has remained at large.
On pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated
1.
That accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a Treasurer at the NPC;
2.
That accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in the information was ( sic) the Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED);
3.
That accused Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst, LOMAFED, at the time mentioned in the information;
4.
That accused Gamus does not have any custody to (sic) public funds;
5.
That accused Ochoas position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not require him to take custody or control of public funds;
6.
That the application forms for cashiers check or Managers check are not accountable forms of the NAPOCOR.
[3]
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision,
[4]
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jaime B. Ochoa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation thru falsification of Commercial Document and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed which is ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr. Accused Ochoa shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification. Costs against the accused.
On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused JOSE TING LAN UY, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial Document. However, because of preponderance of evidence, he is CIVILLY LIABLE for the damages suffered by the NPC in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jaime Ochoa. The Hold Departure Order against the accused embodied in this Courts Resolution dated April 18, 2002 is recalled.
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias George Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo with last known address at 1348 A. Mabini Street, Ermita, Manila or Suite 603 VIP Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila.
SO ORDERED.
[5]
Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the Sandiganbayan erred in
1.
convicting him based on the allegations in the information;
2.
admitting and considering his alleged sworn statements;
3.
considering the alleged transcripts of stenographic notes and the NBI Report.
[6]
The factual antecedents of the case, as summed by the Sandiganbayan, are not disputed by the parties:
In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC) became embroiled in a controversy involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds which were originally on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, NPC Branch (PNB) but wer e subsequently used to purchase two (2) managers/cashiers checks (the first check was in the amount of P70,000,000.00 while t he second was for P113,805,291.25) in order to comply with its loan obligations to the Asian Development Bank (ADB). As NPCs debt in favor of ADB was in yen, NPC was obligated to follow an intricate and circuitous procedure of buying US dollars from a local bank (in this case, United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch), which local bank was supposed to remit the US dollars to an off-shore bank. This off-shore bank (in this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then supposed to remit the yen equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this case, the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch) which would then credit the funds to the account of the ADB. The contracts of NPC with the concerned banks (embodied in three *3+ Payment Instructions) included a value date

(which was July 13, 1990), the mere arrival of which would trigger the above-mentioned procedure, culminating in the payment to ADB of the NPC obligation in the foreign currency agreed upon.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank) remitted Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch. Likewise, per routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to have remitted on said value date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M. Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the PNB had already issued two (2) managers/cashiers checks (Managers check for brevity) for such purpose, did not make the agreed remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais received no payment for the funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the accused have offered explanations for the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25 to [7] Credit Lyonnais. Both explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed.
The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds covered by the two PNB Managers checks by falsifying a commerc ial document called an Application for Cashiers Check (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C #111 -1212-04) of a private individual after the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Managers check to be charged to NPCs savings accoun t did not contain any account number. Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez @ Raul Nicolas @ George Aonuevo @ Mara Aonuevo, who is still at large.
In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no evidence that he committed any of the acts alleged in the information, particularly the intercalation on the ACC; that he deposited the checks subsequently issued or that he received the proceeds thereof; or that he conspired with any of his co-accused. He claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the NPC personnel and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Appellant maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the Philippine Heart Center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit.
To be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:
a.]
The offender is a public officer;
b.]
He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
c.]
The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and

d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the [8] taking by another person of, such funds or property.
Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the information without violating his constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. He points out that the information alleges willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of while the judgment found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to malice.
Appellants contention lacks merit. Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such misappropriation. criminal intent or criminal negligence
[10] [9]
To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be
and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it
will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense.
[11]
Explicitly stated
Even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode [12] proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper.
The question of whether or not an information charging the commission of the crime by means of deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of first impression. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, et al., intentional falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:
[13]
we ruled that an accused charged with willful or
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful

falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal.
....
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.
In People v. Consigna, et al.,
[14]
we ruled that the afore-stated rationale also applies to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused charged
with willful malversation, in an information containing allegations similar to the present case, can be validly convicted of the same offense of malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.
Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based on his sworn statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn statement was taken and the NBI Report, which are incompetent evidence. He contends that his sworn statement was taken without the benefit of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that
Section 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The investigation under the above-quoted provision refers to a custodial investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody
[15]
and the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect.
[16]
More
specifically

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating [17] statements.
Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. where
[18]
Such a situation contemplated has been more precisely described thus
After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive [19] presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence....
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-appellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture.
[20]
Thus we held in one case
[21]
that admissions made during the course of an administrative investigation by Philippine
Airlines do not come within the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a private individual,
[22]
or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the investigation,
[24]
[23]
or even to a
mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity.
Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped interview showing the accused unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen is not covered by the provision although in so ruling, we warned trial courts to take extreme caution in further admitting similar confessions because we recognized the distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television.
[25]
Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime, audit examination because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.
[27] [26]
nor to a person undergoing an
Thus, the flaw in appellants argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis--vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPCs audit team
[28]
and before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was
still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect.
Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was confined at the time at the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police authorities.
[29]
Appellant can hardly claim that, under the prevailing circumstances at the time, whatever
degree of compulsion may have existed went beyond the borders of the unobjectionable where impermissible levels of duress would force him into making false and incriminating declarations against his interest. While he may have been persuaded into doing so, he cannot feign that he was intimidated in such a way as to bring his statements within the ambit of the exclusionary constitutional provision.
The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the time the sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his predicament. The essence of the constitutional safeguard is protection from coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC personnel for the NPCs administrative investigation. Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.
Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran
[30]
in insisting that the constitutional safeguard should have been applied notwithstanding that he was
[31]
not yet arrested or under detention at the time. He also invites our attention to the pronouncements of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas counsel is available if a person is in custody, even if he is not a suspect; or even if not yet in custody but he is a suspect.
that the right to
The contention is tenuous. Although we held in Galman that the constitutional protection covers not only confessions but admissions as well, we qualified the ruling with the statement that what is b eing eschewed is the evil of extorting a confession from the mouth of the person being interrogated. As defined, extortion is an act or practice of taking or obtaining anything from a person by illegal use of fear, whether b y force, threats or any undue exercise of power.
[32]
In the context of obtaining an admission, extorting means compelling or coercing a confession or information by
[33]
any means serving to overcome his power of resistance, or making the confession or admission involuntary. to support appellants claim that his statements were extorted from him.
In this case, we find nothing on record

Furthermore, while indeed Galman taken together with the 1986 deliberations on what was later to become Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution may lead to the conclusion that the rights are available when the person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is a suspect even if he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty, Fr. Bernas
[34]
qualified this statement by saying that *J+urisprudence under the 1987
Constitution, however, hasconsistently held, following Escobedo, the stricter view, that the rights begin to be available only when the person is already in custody.
[35]
Appellant next advances the argument that even if his sworn statement were admissible in evidence, the contents thereof may not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. He contends that although his statement was supposedly gathered from the transcript of stenographic notes of the conversation between him and Atty. Bagcal, neither Atty. Bagcal nor the person who actually prepared the sworn statement was presented. Therefore, the sworn statement is hearsay.
The argument is puerile. It bears stressing that the prosecution presented as witness Atty. Lamberto P. Melencio who saw appellant at the hospital to show him the prepared statement and to verify from him the truth of its contents. over the document before affixing his signature thereto. statement was taken. statements,
[40] [38] [37] [36]
Atty. Melencio testified that he asked appellant to go
He also inquired whether or not appellant was coerced or intimidated by anybody when the
[39]
Appellant denied that he was coerced or intimidated,

[41]
affirmed the contents of the document as a true reflection of his
and signed the same.
It need not be overemphasized that the sworn statement is a duly notarized document which has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and, thus, it can be contradicted only by clear and convincing evidence. Without that sort of evidence, the presumption of regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its execution, as well as the statements and the authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand.
[42]
In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn statement, appellant insists that at the time he signed the document, he was confined in the hospital and therefore not physically and mentally fit to assess the significance of his signature. This pretext however collides with the testimony of his own witness, Dr. Teresita Sadava, who stated that appellant was confined for three days and, who, when queried whether ischemic heart disease had any emotional or psychological effect, gave the inconclusive reply that it may or may not. M oreover, as aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan, although supposedly violated and repulsed as he was by the alleged falsity of the affidavit, it is strange that appellant, who is supposedly astute in business matters as he then occupied the position of Foreign Trader Analyst of the NPC, nevertheless felt it unnecessary to execute another affidavit retracting the same after his recovery from illness. Verily, evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
[43]

Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report and the transcript of stenographic notes are hearsay for having been made extra-judicially. The record, however, shows that the prosecution presented the team leader of the NBI investigators who conducted the investigation, although his testimony was dispensed with as the parties stipulated on the existence and due execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit without admitting the truth of its contents. If at all, the admission of the reports existence is an acknowledgment that it is neither spurious nor counterfeit.
All told, given the paucity of substance in the arguments advanced by appellant to prop up his cause, his appeal must fall.
WHEREFORE, the May 28, 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Reyes
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 178300 March 17, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO, Accused-Appellants. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: For review is the Decision, dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution, dated 18 October 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 3 affirming with modifications the Decision, dated 26 February 2002, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99 finding herein accused-appellants Domingo Reyes y Paje (Reyes), Alvin Arnaldo y Avena (Arnaldo) and Joselito Flores y Victorio (Flores) guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and imposing upon each of them the capital punishment of death. The facts culled from the records are as follows: On 11 August 1999, an Information was filed before the RTC charging appellants with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The accusatory portion of the information reads: The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice hereby accuses Domingo Reyes y Paje, Alvin Arnaldo y Avena and Joselito Flores y Victorio of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows: That on or about 11:00 p.m. on July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together with Juanito Pataray y Cayaban, Federico Pataray y Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes y Acejo, who are still at large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and with use of firearms, carry away and deprive Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs in such amount as may be awarded to them by this Honorable Court. During their arraignment, appellants, assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not guilty" to the charge. Trial on the merits thereafter followed. The prosecution presented as witnesses Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan), Robert Yao (Robert), Yao San, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Alberto, PO3 Roberto Jabien, Atty. Florimond Rous (Atty. Rous) and Atty. Carlo Uminga (Atty. Uminga). Their testimonies, taken together, attest to the following: The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping Sim (mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren), and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids). The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took the drivers seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging 6 tape.
5 4 1 2
People vs. Reyes

After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and 7 Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their male companions. Appellant Flores, 8 with the other male companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao family inside the vehicle. Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left, 9 Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought the help of relatives. Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male 10 companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night. On the morning of the following day, at around 4:00 a.m., appellants and their cohorts tried to contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter could not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for Yao San in the poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male companion escorted Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein, Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Thereafter, appellants Reyes and Arnaldo 11 and their male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went back to the safe-house. In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Robert and appellants left the safe-house, and after 30 minutes of trekking, appellants abandoned Robert. Robert then ran towards the poultry farm. Upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. Robert also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and 12 Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts. On 18 July 1999, appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao 13 San acceded to appellants demand. Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim. On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00 p.m., but 14 none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellants call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left. On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon City. Both died of asphyxia by 16 strangulation. On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant 17 Arnaldo also described the physical features of his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts. Subsequently, appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Thereafter, appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were identified in a 18 police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as their kidnappers. On 10 August 1999, agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in Balayan, Batangas. Afterwards, appellant Flores, with the assistance of Atty. Rous, executed a written extra-judicial confession detailing his participation in the incident. Appellant Flores identified appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Flores was subsequently identified in a police line-up by Yao San, 19 Robert and Abagatnan as one of their kidnappers. The prosecution adduced documentary evidence to bolster the aforesaid allegations, to wit: (1) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Abagatnan (Exhibit A); (2) 21 22 Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San (Exhibit B); (3) sketch made by Abagatnan (Exhibit C); (4) death certificates of 23 24 Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond (Exhibits D & E); (5) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Robert (Exhibit F); (6) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Yao San (Exhibit 25 26 H); (7) joint affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Loreto P. Delelis and PO3 Roberto Jabien (Exhibit I); (8) joint affidavit of PO3 Alex Alberto and PO3 27 28 Leonito Fermin (Exhibit J); (9) written extra-judicial confession of appellant Flores (Exhibit K); (10) written extra-judicial confession of appellant 29 30 Arnaldo (Exhibit L); and (11) sketch made by appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit M). For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, Marina Reyes, Irene Flores Celestino, Wilfredo Celestino, Jr., Rachel C. Ramos, and Isidro Arnaldo. Appellants denied any liability and interposed alibis and the defense of frame-up. Their testimonies, as corroborated by their witnesses, are as follows:
20 15
People vs. Reyes

Appellant Arnaldo testified that he was an "asset" of the PAOCTF. He narrated that on 25 July 1999, while he was at the tricycle terminal of Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, a police officer named Liwanag of the PAOCTF approached and invited him to go to Camp Crame to shed light on a kidnapping case allegedly committed by a certain Brgy. Captain Ramos and by members of the Aguirre and Bautista families. He accepted the invitation. Subsequently, he proceeded to Camp Crame and met therein Colonel Cesar Mancao III (Colonel Mancao) of the PAOCTF. Colonel Mancao told him that the PAOCTF would arrest Brgy. Capt. Ramos and certain persons named Gerry Bautista and Dadie Bautista. Colonel Mancao instructed him to identify said persons as responsible for the kidnapping of the Yao family. He refused to do so because he feared Brgy. Capt. Ramos. The day after, Colonel Mancao called appellant Arnaldo to his office. Upon arriving thereat, the latter saw Yao San. Yao San promised him that if their kidnappers would be apprehended through his cooperation, he would give himP500,000.00. He accepted Yao Sans offer under the condition that he would identify a 31 different set of suspects. Later, Colonel Mancao gave him P30,000.00. Subsequently, he pointed to appellants Reyes and Flores as his cohorts in kidnapping the Yao family. He implicated appellants Reyes and Flores to get 32 even with them, since the two had previously mauled him after he sold their fighting cocks and failed to give them the proceeds of the sale. He denied having met with Atty. Uminga. He was not assisted by the latter when he was forced by the PAOCTF to make a written extra-judicial confession on the kidnapping of the Yao family. Further, he claimed that while he was under the custody of PAOCTF, a certain Major Paulino utilized him as a drug pusher. Upon failing to remit the proceeds of the drug sale, he was beaten up by PAOCTF agents and thereafter included as accused with 33 appellants Reyes and Flores for the kidnapping of the Yao family. On the other hand, appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with his family from 6:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999 until the morning of the next day; that on the early morning of 26 July 1999, five policemen barged into his house and arrested him; that the policemen told him that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family; that he was mauled by the policemen outside his house; that the policemen forcibly brought him to Camp Crame, where he was subsequently tortured; that he knew the Yao family because he worked as a carpenter in the familys poultry farm at Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that he had no involvement in the kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping 34 of the family because appellant Arnaldo held a grudge against him. For his part, appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sisters house at Antipolo City from 12 July 1999 up to 30 Jul y 1999; that he went to her house on 12 July 1999 because it was the birthday of her child; that he worked as a construction worker during his stay in his sisters house; that he was arrested in Batangas and thereafter brought to Camp Crame, where he was beaten up by policemen for refusing to admit involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao family; that after three days of beating, he was forced to sign a document which he later found out to be a written extra-judicial confession; that he never met nor did he know Atty. Rous; that he knew the Yao family because he lived near the familys poultry farm, and he used to work therein as a welder; that he had no participation in the kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of 35 the family because he and appellant Reyes had mauled appellant Arnaldo several years ago. The defense proffered documentary and object evidence to buttress their foregoing claims, to wit: (1) prayer booklet of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit 1 for 36 37 appellant Arnaldo); (2) calling card of Colonel Mancao (Exhibit 2 for appellant Arnaldo); and (3) pictures allegedly showing appellant Flores working 38 as a carpenter in Antipolo City (Exhibits 1 & 2 for appellant Flores). After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Appellants were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao family P150,000.00 as civil indemnity,P500,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the proceedings. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA, and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged, they are hereby sentenced each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH as mandated by law, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of deceased Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), and all the private offended parties or victims, including the heirs of the deceased, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages, subject to the corresponding filing fee as a first lien, and to pay the costs 39 of the proceedings. By reason of the death penalty imposed on each of the appellants, the instant case was elevated to us for automatic review. However, pursuant to our 40 ruling in People v. Mateo, we remanded the instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. On 14 August 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the RTC Decision. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC on each of the appellants from death penalty to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. It also decreased the amount of civil indemnity fromP150,000.00 to P100,000.00. Further, it directed appellants to pay jointly and severally the Yao familyP100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12, dated February 26, 2002, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99 convicting accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with (Double) Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:
People vs. Reyes

1) accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; 2) the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby reduced to P100,000; and 3) accused-appellants are further ordered to pay private complainants the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
41
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision but this was denied. Hence, appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006. In their separate briefs, appellants assigned the following errors: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN APPELLANTS; III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF APPELLANT ARNALDO AND APPELLANT FLORES; IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY IGNORING THE CORROBORATED EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE; V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVEN APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Anent the first assigned error, appellants assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San. In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who 44 testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness. After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case, we found no c ogent reason to overturn the RTCs ruling finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. Prosecution witnesses Abagatnan, Robert, and Yao San positively identified appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers during a police line-up and also during trial. Abagatnan specifically testified during the trial that after appellants and their cohorts forcibly entered the van where she and the Yao family were, appellant Flores drove the van away from the poultry farm; that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded her, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house; and that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo accompanied her in going to the poultry farm to search for Yao San and remind him about the ransom 45 demanded. Robert confirmed that appellants and their cohorts blindfolded them inside the van during the incident. He also recounted that appellants and their cohorts detained him and Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond and Abagatnan in a safe-house. He was later instructed by appellants to find Yao San 46 and remind him about the ransom. Yao San declared that during the incident, appellant Reyes and Pataray approached him, poked their guns at him, and dragged him into the van. Appellant Flores took the drivers seat and drove the van. Appellant Flores and his male compan ion told him to 47 produce P5 million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the trial. Their respective testimonies were consistent with one another. They were steadfast in recounting their ordeal despite the grueling cross examination of the defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in harmony with the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their testimonies credible and trustworthy. Both courts also found no ill motive for Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to testify against appellants. Appellants, nonetheless, maintain that Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San could not have identified their kidnappers, because (1) the incident occurred in the darkness of the night; (2) they were blindfolded then; and (3) the heads of the kidnappers were covered by T-shirts.
43 42
People vs. Reyes

It appears that the crime scene was well-lighted during the incident. At that time, there was a light from a fluorescent bulb hanging above the gate of 48 the poultry farm wherein Yao San was held at gunpoint by appellant Reyes and Pataray. The headlights of the van were also turned on, making it 49 possible for Abagatnan and Robert to see the faces of appellant Reyes and Pataray as the two approached and poked their guns at Yao San. Further, there was a bulb inside the van, which turned on when the doors van was opened. This bulb lighted up when appellants and the ir cohorts forcibly 50 boarded the van, thus, allowing Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to glance at the faces of appellants and their cohorts. Although the Yao family was blindfolded during the incident, it was, nevertheless, shown that it took appellants and their cohorts about 10 minutes 51 before all members of the Yao family were blindfolded. During this considerable length of time, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San were able to take a good look at the faces of appellants and their cohorts. In addition, Abagatnan and Robert narrated that their respective blindfolds loosened several 52 times, giving them the opportunity to have a glimpse at the faces of appellants and their cohorts. Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified that even though the heads of appellants and their cohorts were covered by T-shirts, their faces were, 53 nonetheless, exposed and uncovered, allowing them to see their faces. Robert and Yao San also declared that they recognized the faces of appellants during the incident because the latter resided near the poultry farm of the Yao family, which used to hire them several times in the farm as 54 carpenters/welders. Appellants, however, insist that the testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San that they were able to recognize the kidnappers -- because although the kidnappers heads were covered with T-shirts, their faces were nevertheless exposed or uncovered -- are incredible. Appellants argue that it is against human nature and experience that kidnappers would cover only their heads and not their faces in concealing their identities. It is not illogical or against human nature for appellants and their cohorts to cover their heads with T-shirts, while leaving their faces exposed and uncovered when they kidnapped the Yao family. Perhaps, appellants and their cohorts thought that putting T-shirts on their heads without covering their faces was sufficient to conceal their identities. Regardless of their reason, the fact remains that Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San positively identified appellants as their kidnappers, and their said identification and testimonies were found by the RTC, the Court of Appeals and by this Court to 55 be credible. In People v. Barredo, the victim testified that he was able to identify the accused as his assailants because the latter took off their masks during the assault. The accused argued that the victims testimony was incredible because persons who wore masks would not ta ke them off so casually in the presence of their victims, as doing so would reveal their identities. The trial court, nonetheless, ruled that the victims testimony was credible and truthful. We sustained such ruling of the trial court and ratiocinated: Appellants dispute the plausibility of Enrico Cebuhanos claim that he was able to identify the assailants because they took off their masks. Persons who wear masks would not take them off so casually in the presence of their victims, as doing so would thereby reveal their identities. x x x. The above arguments are untenable. In his testimony, Enrico Cebuhano clearly stated that the men who entered his home removed their masks when he was brought downstairs. Why they did so was known only to them. It is possible that they thought that there was no one in the vicinity who could identify them, or that they wanted Enrico to see who they were so as to intimidate him. It is also possible that they felt secure because there were 14 of them who were all armed. In any event, what is important is that the trial court found Enrico Cebuhanos testimony to be both credible and believable, and that he was able to positively identify appellants herein, because the men who entered his home removed their masks, x x x. It is significant to note that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were brutally killed as a result of the kidnapping. It is difficult to believe that Robert and Yao San would point to appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers if such were not true. A witness relationship to the victim of a crime makes his testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a crime done to their family to accuse somebody other than the 56 real culprit. Relationship with a victim of a crime would deter a witness from indiscriminately implicating anybody in the crime. His natural and usual 57 interest would be to identify the real malefactor and secure his conviction to obtain true justice for the death of a relative. Appellants put in issue the failure of Robert and Yao San to immediately report the incident and identify appellants to authorities despite their common claim that they recognized appellants, as the latter used to work in the poultry farm. Robert and Yao San cannot be blamed for not immediately reporting the incident to the authorities. Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts when the ransom was demanded for their release. Appellants and their cohorts were armed and dangerous. Appellants and their cohorts also threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond if Yao San and Robert would report the incident to the 58 authorities. Understandably, Yao San and Robert were extremely fearful for the safety of their loved ones, and this caused them to refrain from reporting the incident. Robert and Yao San cannot also be blamed for not reporting the incident to the police even after the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond had already been found, and appellants and their cohorts had cut their communication with them. Certainly, the killings of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond had a chilling/paralyzing effect on Robert and Yao San. Also, appellants and their cohorts were still at large then, and the possibility that they would harm the remaining members of the Yao family was not remote, considering that appellants and their cohorts were familiar with the whereabouts of the Yao family. At any rate, we have held that failure to immediately report the kidnapping incident does not diminish the 59 credibility of the witnesses. The lapse of a considerable length of time before a witness comes forward to reveal the identities of the perpetrators of 60 the crime does not taint the credibility of the witness and his testimony where such delay is satisfactorily explained. Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired in kidnapping the Yao family.
People vs. Reyes

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy 61 presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective among the accused. When the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part as to complete the crime, with a view to the attainment of the same 62 object, conspiracy exists. As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao, appellant Reyes and Pataray approached and poked their guns at Yao San, and thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores then took the drivers seat and drove the van, while each member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter, appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safehouse. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. 64 Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions how they planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their extra-judicial confessions also detailed the particular role/participation played by each of appellants and their cohorts in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual acts of appellants and their cohorts demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose of extorting ransom. Appellants, however, challenge the legality and admissibility of the written extra-judicial confessions. Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based solely on the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. He maintains, however, that said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence, because they were obtained in violation of his co-appellants constitutional right to have an independent counsel of their own choice during custodial investigation. Appellant Reyes alleges that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation whether they had a lawyer of their own choice, and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer; that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to his coappellants; and that Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous were associates of the PAOCTF. Appellant Reyes also asseverates that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be utilized against him. Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was elicited through force, torture and without the assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the purported confession; that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who, according to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation. Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as evidence, as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer; and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to him. An extra-judicial confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a person under custodial investigation, stating 65 or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime. In order that an extra-judicial confession may be admitted in 66 evidence, Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the following safeguards be observed : Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.1awphi.zw+ (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) 67 it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense 68 although not yet in custody. The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather 69 than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Such right contemplates effective communication which 70 results in the subject understanding what is conveyed.
63
People vs. Reyes
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or 72 confessions or admissions from the accused. The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is one furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must be willing to fully 73 safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. A competent and independent counsel is logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that the person under investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of 74 his extra-judicial confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights. However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel should never prevent an 75 accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations. The Pasubali of appellants Arnaldo and Floress written extra-judicial confessions clearly shows that before they made their respective confessions, the PAOCTF investigators had informed them that the interrogation about to be conducted on them referred to the kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereafter, the PAOCTF agents explained to them that they had a constitutional right to remain silent, and that anything they would say may be used against them in a court of law. They were also told that they were entitled to a counsel of their own choice, and that they would be provided with one if they had none. When asked if they had a lawyer of their own, appellant Arnaldo replied that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be represented by Atty. Rous. Thereafter, when asked if they understood their said rights, they replied in the affirmative. The appraisal of their constitutional rights was done in the presence of their respective lawyers and in the Tagalog dialect, the language spoken and understood by them. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores and their respective counsels, Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, also signed and thumbmarked the extra-judicial 77 confessions. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous attested to the veracity of the afore-cited facts in their respective court testimonies. Indeed, the appraisal of appellants constitutional rights was not merely perfunctory, because it appeared certain that appellants had understood and, in fact, exercised their fundamental rights after being informed thereof. Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations. As regards appellant Arnaldo, Atty. Uminga testified that prior to the questioning of appellant Arnaldo about the incident, Atty. Uminga told the PAOCTF investigators and agents to give him and appellant Arnaldo space and privacy, so that they could freely converse. After the PAOCTF investigators and agents left them, he and appellant Arnaldo went to a cubicle where only the two of them were present. He interviewed appellant Arnaldo in the Tagalog language regarding the latters personal circumstances and asked him why he was in the PAOCTF office a nd why he wanted a lawyer. Appellant Arnaldo replied that he wanted to make a confession about his participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereupon, he asked appellant Arnaldo if the latter would accept his assistance as his lawyer for purposes of his confession. Appellant Arnaldo agreed. He warned appellant Arnaldo that he might be sentenced to death if he confessed involvement in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo answered that he would face the consequences because he was bothered by his conscience. He inquired from appellant Arnaldo if he was harmed or intimidated into giving selfincriminating statements to the PAOCTF investigators. Appellant Arnaldo answered in the negative. He requested appellant Arnaldo to remove his shirt for him to check if there were torture marks on his body, but he found none. He also observed that appellant Arnaldo s appearance and movements were normal. His conference with appellant Arnaldo lasted for 15 minutes or more. Thereafter, he allowed the PAOCTF investigators to question 78 appellant Arnaldo. Further, Atty. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and listened to the latters entire confession. After t he taking of appellant Arnaldos confession, Atty. Uminga requested the PAOCTF investigators to give him a copy of appellant Arnaldos confession. Upon obtaining such copy, he read it entirely and thereafter gave it to appellant Arnaldo. He instructed appellant Arnaldo to read and comprehend the same carefully. He told appellant Arnaldo to ask him for clarification and comment if he did not agree or understand any part of his written confession. Appellant Arnaldo read his entire written confession and handed it to him. Atty. Uminga asked him if he had objections to it. Appellant Arnaldo replied in the negative. He then reminded appellant Arnaldo that the latter could still change his mind, and that he was not being forced to sign. Appellant Arnaldo manifested 79 that he would sign his written confession. Later, he and appellant Arnaldo affixed their signatures to the written confession. With respect to appellant Flores, Atty. Rous declared that before the PAOCTF investigators began questioning appellant, Atty. Rous interviewed him in Tagalog inside a room, where only the two of them were present. He asked appellant Flores about his personal circumstances. Appellant Flores replied that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family, and he wanted to give a confession regarding his involvement in the said incident. He asked appellant Flores whether he would accept his assistance as his lawyer. Appellant Flores affirmed that he would. He asked appellant Flores why he wanted to give such confession. Appellant Flores answered that he was bothered by his conscience. Atty. Rous warned appellant Flores that his confession would be used against him in a court of law, and that the death penalty might be imposed on him. Appellant Flores told him that he wanted to tell the truth and unload the burden on his mind. He requested appellant Flores to lift his shirt for the former to verify if there were torture marks or
76
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People vs. Reyes

bruises on his body, but found none. Again, he cautioned appellant Flores about the serious consequences of his confession, but the latter maintained 80 that he wanted to tell the truth. Thereafter, he permitted the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Flores. Additionally, Atty. Rous stayed with appellant Flores while the latter was giving statements to the PAOCTF investigators. After the taking of appellant Flores statements, he instructed appellant Flores to read and check his written confession. Appellant Flore s read the same and made some minor 81 corrections. He also read appellant Flores written confession. Afterwards, he and appellant Flores signed the latters writt en confession. It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Nonetheless, this does not automatically imply that their right to counsel was violated. What the Constitution requires is the presence of 82 competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients defense without any intervening conflict o f interest. There was no conflict of interest with regard to the legal assistance rendered by Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Both counsels had no interest adverse to appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Although Atty. Uminga testified that he was a former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent, he, nevertheless, clarified that 83 he had been separated therefrom since 1994 when he went into private practice. Atty. Uminga declared under oath that he was a private practitioner 84 when he assisted appellant Arnaldo during the custodial investigation. It appears that Atty. Uminga was called by the PAOCTF to assist appellant Arnaldo, because Atty. Umingas telephone number was listed on the directory of his former NBI officemates detailed at the PA OCTF. Atty. Rous, on the other hand, was a member of the Free Legal Aid Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City at the time he rendered legal 85 assistance to appellant Flores. Part of Atty. Rous duty as member of the said group was to render legal assistance to the indigents including suspects under custodial investigation. There was no evidence showing that Atty. Rous had organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. In fact, he proceeded 86 to the PAOCTF office to assist appellant Flores, because he happened to be the lawyer manning the office when the PAOCTF called. In People v. 87 Fabro, we stated: The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Atty. Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration. Nor is there any evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the accused. The indelible fact is that he was president of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and not a lackey of the lawmen. Further, as earlier stated, under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an accused is entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense. Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting 88 a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the counsels appointment during the course of the 89 investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during their custodial investigation. Prior to their questioning, appellants Arnaldo and Flores conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be counseled by Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively. Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and 90 conscience. Consequently, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and 91 Flores. In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of proving that they were forced or coerced to make their respective confessions. Other than their self-serving statements that they were maltreated by the PAOCTF officers/agents, they did not present any plausible proof to substantiate their claims.lawphil.netThey did not submit any medical report showing that their bodies were subjected to violence or torture. Neither did they file complaints against the persons who had allegedly beaten or forced them to execute their respective confessions despite several opportunities to do so. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores averred that they informed their family members/relatives of the alleged maltreatment, but the latter did not report such allegations to proper authorities. On the contrary, appellants Arnaldo and Flores declared in their respective confessions that they were not forced or harmed in giving their sworn statements, and that they were not promised or given any award in consideration of the same. 92 Records also bear out that they were physically examined by doctors before they made their confessions. Their physical examination reports certify 93 94 that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were noted during their examination. In People v. Pia, we held that the following factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession: (1) where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; (2) where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; (3) where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; (4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and (5) where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim.
People vs. Reyes

It should also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores are replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was committed, thereby ruling out the possibility that these were involuntarily made. Their extra-judicial confessions clearly state how appellants and their cohorts planned the kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before, during and after its occurrence. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its 95 integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused. With respect to appellant Reyess claim that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be used in evidence against him, we have ruled that although an extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative 96 97 evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. In People v. Alvarez, we ruled that where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against a co-accused. In 98 People v. Encipido we elucidated as follows: It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS extrajudicial confessions were independently made without collusion, are identical with eac h other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores stated in their respective confessions that appellant Reyes participated in their kidnapping of the Yao family. These statements are, therefore, admissible as corroborative and circumstantial evidence to prove appellant Reyes guilt. Nevertheless, even without the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, evidence on record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability of appellant Reyes. As earlier found, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao positively identified appellant Reyes as one of their kidnappers. They specifically testified that during the incident, appellant Reyes (1) approached and pointed a gun at Yao San and dragged the latter inside the van; and (2) accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. The RTC, Court of Appeals and this Court found such testimonies credible. Appellants argue that their alibis cast reasonable doubt on their alleged guilt. Appellant Reyes avers that he could not have been one of those who kidnapped the Yao family on the night of 16 July 1999 at around 11:00 p.m., because he was sleeping with his family in their residence during such time and date. Likewise, appellant Flores asseverates that he could not have been present at the crime scene on such date and time, as he was already sleeping in his sisters house at Antipolo City. For his part, appellant Arnaldo asserts that he is a victim of a police frame-up. He alleges that he was an asset of the PAOCTF, but was later utilized as a drug pusher by the said agency. Upon failing to remit the proceeds of a shabu sale to the PAOCTF officers, he was beaten up and included as accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible 99 for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In 100 order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. It should be observed that the family residence/house of appellant Reyes where he claimed to have slept when the incident occurred is located within 101 Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. This is the same barangay where the Yao familys poultry farm is situated. Appellant Reyes, in fact, 102 admitted that the poultry farm is near his residence. There is a huge possibility that appellant Reyes slept for a while, woke up before 11:00 p.m., and thereafter proceeded to the Yao familys poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family. The same is true with appellant Flores. Wilfredo, appellant Flores nephew, testified that he and appellant went to bed and slept together in the house of appellants sister i n Antipolo City at about 8:00 103 p.m. of 16 July 1999. It is greatly possible that Wifredo did not notice when appellant Flores woke up later at 9:00 p.m. and immediately proceeded to the Yao familys poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family, arriving therein at about 11:00 p.m. It is a fact that a person coming from Antipolo City may reach San Jose del Monte, Bulacan in two hours via a motor vehicle, considering that there was no more heavy traffic at that late evening. Obviously, appellants Reyes and Flores failed to prove convincingly that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene during the incident. Appellant Flores submitted two pictures which, according to him, show that he worked as a construction worker from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999 while staying in his sisters house at Antipolo City. These pictures, however, do not clearly and convincingly support such c laim, because (1) the pictures were undated; (2) the shots were taken from a far distance; and (3) the face of the man in the pictures which appellant Flores claims as his is blurred, unrecognizable and almost hidden, as such person is wearing a cap and is in a position where only the right and back portions of his head and body are visible.
People vs. Reyes

Appellant Arnaldo also failed to prove with convincing evidence his defense of frame-up. Aside from his self-serving testimony that he was a former PAOCTF agent and that he was beaten and included as accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family by the PAOCTF agents because he failed to remit to the PAOCTF officers the proceeds of his sale of shabu, he did not present convincing proof to support said allegations. He submitted the calling card of Colonel Mancao, which appears to have been signed by the latter at the back portion, but there is nothing on it which indicates or verifies that appellant Arnaldo was indeed a former PAOCTF agent. He also submitted a prayer book containing his handwritten narration of torture he allegedly experienced at the hands of the PAOCTF agents, but this does not conclusively show that he was beaten by the PAOCTF agents. As we earlier found, appellant Arnaldo did not produce any medical records/certificates or file any complaint against the PAOCTF agents to bolster his claim of maltreatment. It is true that the alibis of appellants Reyes and Flores and the defense of frame-up of appellant Arnaldo were corroborated on some points by the testimonies of some of their relatives/friends. We have, however, held that alibi and the defense of frame-up become less plausible when they are 104 corroborated only by relatives and friends because of perceived partiality. Indeed, the positive and credible testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San prevail over the alibis and defense of frame-up of appellants.
105
We shall now determine the propriety of appellants conviction for the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the corresponding penalties imposed. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is committed with the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him 106 are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. All of the foregoing elements were duly establish by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bar. First, appellants and their cohorts are private individuals. Second, appellants and their cohorts kidnapped the Yao family by taking control of their van and detaining them in a secluded place. Third, the Yao family was taken against their will. And fourth, threats to kill were made and the kidnap victims include females. Republic Act No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if any of the two qualifying circumstances is present in the commission of the kidnapping: (1) the motive of the kidnappers is to extort ransom for the release of the kidnap victims, although none of the circumstances mentioned under paragraph four of the elements of kidnapping were present. Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption 107 of a captured person that would release him from captivity. Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no 108 109 moment. It is sufficient that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of exacting ransom; and (2) the kidnap victims were killed or died as a consequence of the kidnapping or was raped, or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. Both of these qualifying circumstances are alleged in the information and proven during trial. As testified to by Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San, appellants and their cohorts demanded the amount of P5 million for the release of Chua Ong Pong Sim and Raymond. In fact, Yao San went to the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City, to hand over the ransom money to appellants and their cohorts, but the latter did not show up. It was also apparent that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were killed or died during their captivity. Yao San declared that appellants and their cohorts called up and told him that they would kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond who were still under their custody, because they heard the radio report that the incident was already known to the police. True to their threats, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were later found dumped in La Mesa Dam. Their respective death certificates show that they died of asphyxia by strangulation. Withal, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants in view of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 on 24 June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines. In accordance with Sections 2 and 3 thereof, the penalty that should be meted out to the appellants is reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals, therefore, acted accordingly in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole on each of the appellants. The Court of Appeals was also correct in ordering appellants to jointly and severally pay civil indemnity and exemplary damages to the Yao family. 110 Nonetheless, their corresponding amounts should be modified. In People v. Quiachon, we explained that even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 was still proper, as the said award was not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As earlier stated, both the qualifying circumstances of demand for ransom and the double killing or death of two of the kidnap victims were alleged in the information and proven during trial. Thus, for the twin deaths of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond, their heirs (Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew and Charlene) are entitled to a total amount of P150,000.00 as civil indemnity. Exemplary damages are 111 imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be recovered when the crime was 112 committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying. Since both the qualifying circumstances of demand for ransom and the killing or death of two of the kidnap victims (Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond) while in captivity were alleged in the information and proven during trial, and in order to deter others from committing the same despicable acts, the award of exemplary damages is proper. The total 113 amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages should be modified. In several cases, we awarded an amount of P100,000.00 to each of the kidnap victims. As in this case, the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages should be awarded each to Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea. This makes the total amount of exemplary damages add up to P700,000.00.
People vs. Reyes

The appellate court aptly held that the award of moral damages is warranted. Under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury. Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. There is no doubt that each member of the Yao family suffered physical and/or psychological trauma because of the ordeal, especially because two of the family members were ruthlessly killed during their captivity. Pursuant to 114 prevailing jurisprudence, Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea should each receive the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages. Per computation, the total amount of moral damages is P700,000.00 and not P500,000.00 as fixed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Finally, we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the crime committed by appellants in the present case as the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with double homicide since two of the kidnap victims were killed or died during the kidnapping. The word "double" should be deleted therein. Regardless of the number of killings or deaths that occurred as a consequence of the kidnapping, the appropriate denomination of the crime should be the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution, dated 18 October 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the total amount of civil indemnity is P150,000.00; (2) the total amount of exemplary damages is P700,000.00; (3) the total amount of moral damages is P700,000.00; and (4) the appropriate denomination of the crime committed by appellants is the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. SO ORDERED.
People vs Malngan
E N B A NC
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, Ap p e l l e e ,
G . R . No . 1 7 0 4 7 0 Present:
P A NG A NI B A N, C . J . , P U NO , - versus QU I S U M B I N G , Y NAR E S - S A NT I AG O , S AN D O V AL - G U T I E R R E Z , C AR P I O , AU ST R I A - M AR T I NE Z , EDNA MALNGAN y MAYO, Ap p e l l a n t . C O R O N A, C AR P I O M O R AL E S, C AL L E J O , SR . , AZ C U NA , T I N G A, C H I C O - N AZ AR I O , G AR C I A, a n d V E L AS C O , J R . , J J .
Promulgated:
Se p t e m b e r 2 6 , 2 0 0 6 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
People vs Malngan
The Case
F o r r e v i e w i s t h e D e c i s i on
[1]
o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s i n C A - G . R . C R H C No . 0 1 1 3 9 p r o m u l g a t e d o n 2 S e p t e m b e r
[2]
2005, affirming with modification the Judgment
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Bran ch 41, in Crimina l
C a s e No . 0 1 - 1 8 8 4 2 4 p r o m u l g a t e d o n 1 3 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 3 , f i n d i n g a p p e l l a n t E d n a M a l n g a n y M a y o ( E d n a ) g u i l t y b e y o n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t o f t h e c r i m e o f A r s o n w i t h M u l t i p l e H o m i c i d e o r Ar s o n r e s u l t i n g t o t h e d e a t h o f s i x ( 6 ) p e o p l e , a n d sentencing her to suffer the penalty of death.
The Facts
As summarized
[3]
by the Court of Appeals,
the antecedent facts are as follows:
From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the area, as well as the personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2 , 2 0 0 1 w h e n R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o a n d h i s t a n o d s s a w t h e a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A, o n e h i r e d a s a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the h o u s e o f h e r e m p l o y e r a t N o . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a St r e e t , B a l u t , T o n d o , M a n i l a . S h e w a s s e e n t o h a v e b o a r d e d a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab d r i v e r t o h a v e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t s h e b e b r o u g h t t o Ni p a S t r e e t , b u t u p o n h e r a r r i v a l t h e r e , s h e c h a n g e d her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after paying for her fare. Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire. When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he s a w a w o m a n ( t h e h o u s e m a i d ) c o m i n g o u t o f t h e h o u s e a t No . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a St r e e t , B a l u t , T o n d o , M a n i l a and he received a call from his wife telling him of a woman (the same housemaid) who was acting s t r a n g e l y a n d s u s p i c i o u s l y o n B a l a s a n St r e e t . B a r a n g a y C h a i r m a n B e r n a r d o , R o l a n d o G r u t a a n d t h e other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who was later identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta po sitively identified the woman as the same person who left No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified the w o m a n a s a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A w h o w a s t h e h o u s e m a i d o f R o b e r t o Se p a r a , S r . U p o n i n s p e c t i o n , a d i s p o s a b l e l i g h t e r w a s f o u n d i n s i d e a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A s b a g . T h e r e a f t e r , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she want ed to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home.
People vs Malngan
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by S [ F ] O 4 D a n i l o T a l u s a n , w h o b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e Sa n L a z a r o Fi r e St a t i o n i n S t a . C r u z , M a n i l a w h e r e s h e was further investigated and then detained. W h e n M e r c e d i t a M e n d o z a w e n t t o t h e Sa n L a z a r o Fi r e St a t i o n t o g i v e h e r s w o r n s t a t e m e n t , s h e h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o a s k a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D NA a t t h e l a t t e r s d e t e n t i o n c e l l w h y s h e d i d t h e burning of her employers house and accused -appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire because when she asked permission to go home to her province, the wife of her employer Roberto Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa (sic) shouted at her: Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na. S u m a k a y k a s a w a l i s , p a g d a t i n g m o m a p u t i k a n a ( T S N, J a n u a r y 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , p . 6 ) ( G o a h e a d , w h e n y o u arrive your color would be fair already. Ride a broomstick, when you arrive your color would be fair already.) And when Mercedita Mendoza asked accused -appellant EDNA how she burned the house, a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A t o l d h e r : N a g l u k ot a k o n g m a r a m i n g d i y a r y o, s i n i n d i h a n k o n g d i s p o s a b l e l i g h t e r a t h i n a g i s k o s a i b a b a w n g l a m e s a s a l o ob n g b a h a y ( T SN, J a n u a r y 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , p . 7 . ) ( I c r u m p l e d newspapers, lighted them with a disposable lighter and threw them on top of the table inside the house.) W h e n i n t e r v i e w e d b y C a r m e l i t a V a l d e z , a r e p o r t e r o f AB S - C B N N e t w o r k , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D NA w h i l e u n d e r d e t e n t i o n ( s i c ) w a s h e a r d b y SFO 4 ( s i c ) D a n i l o T a l u s a n a s h a v i n g a d m i t t e d t h e c r i m e a n d e v e n n a r r a t e d t h e m a n n e r h o w s h e a c c o m p l i s h e d i t . S FO 4 ( s i c ) D a n i l o T a l u s a n w a s a b l e t o h e a r t h e s a m e confession, this time at his home, while watching the television program True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABS -CBN Network. T h e f i r e r e s u l t e d i n [ t h e ] d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e h o u s e o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , Sr . a n d o t h e r a d j o i n i n g h o u s e s a n d t h e d e a t h o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , Sr . a n d V i r g i n i a S e p a r a t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r f o u r ( 4 ) c h i l d r e n , namely: Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.
On 9 January 2001, an Information
[4]
was filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 41, charging accused-appellant
w i t h t h e c r i m e o f A r s on w i t h M u l t i p l e H om i c i d e . T h e c a s e w a s d o c k e t e d a s C r i m i n a l C a s e No . 0 1 - 1 8 8 4 2 4 . T h e a c c u s a t o r y portion of said Information provides:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said ac cused, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire u p o n t h e t w o - s t o r e y r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f R O B E R T O SE P AR A a n d f a m i l y m o s t l y m a d e o f w o o d e n m a t e r i a l s located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, To ndo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said buildin g, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire, the following, namely, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. R o b e r t o S e p a r a , Sr . , 4 5 y e a r s o f a g e Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age Michael Separa, 24 years of age Daphne Separa, 18 years of age Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age
[5]
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately thereafter.
W h e n a r r a i g n e d , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t w i t h a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l d e of i c i o, p l e a d e d charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.

[7]
[6]
No t G u i l t y t o t h e c r i m e
People vs Malngan
T h e p r o s e c u t i o n p r e s e n t e d f i v e ( 5 ) w i t n e s s e s , n a m e l y , SP O 4
[8]
Danilo Talusan, Rolando Gruta, Remigio
Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and Rodolfo Movilla to establish its charge that accused -appellant Edna committed the crime of arson with multiple homicide.
SPO4 Danilo Talusan, arson investigator, testified that he was one of those who responded to the fire that occurred on 2 January 2001and which started at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. He stated that the fire killed Roberto Separa, Sr. and all the other members of his family, namely his wife, Virginia, and his children, Michael, Daphne, Prisc illa and Roberto, Jr.; the fire also destroyed their abode as well as six neighboring houses. He likewise testified that he twice heard accused -appellant once while the latter was being interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS -CBN, and the oth er time when it was shown on channel 2 on television during the airing of the t e l e v i s i o n p r o g r a m e n t i t l e d T r u e C r i m e h o s t e d b y G u s Ab e l g a s c o n f e s s t o h a v i n g c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d , t o wit:
Pros. Rebagay: Based on your investigation, was there any occasion when the accused Edna Malngan admitted t o t h e b u r n i n g o f t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y ?
x x x x Witness: Yes, sir. Pros. Rebagay: When was that? A: On January 2 she was interviewed by the media, sir. The one who took the coverage was Carmelita Valdez of Channel 2, ABS -CBN. They have a footage that Edna admitted before them, sir. And where were you when Edna Malngan made that statement or admission to Carmelita Valdez of ABS-CBN? I was at our office, sir. Was there any other occasion wherein the accused made another confession relative to the admission of the crime? Yes, sir. When was that? L a s t F r i d a y , s i r . I t w a s s h o w n i n T r u e C r i m e o f G u s Ab e l g a s . S h e w a s i n t e r v i e w e d a t t h e C i t y J a i l and she admitted that she was the one who authored the crime, sir.
Q:
A: Q:
A: Q: A:
Pros. Rebagay: And where were you when that admission to Gus Abelgas was made? A: I was in the house and I just saw it on tv, sir.
People vs Malngan
Q: What was that admission that you heard personally, when you were present, when the accused made the confession to Carmelita Valdez? N a g l u k ot p o s i y a n g p a p e l , s i n i d i h a n n i y a n g l i g h t e r a t i n i l a g a y n i y a s a i b a b a w n g m e s a y u n g m g a d i y a r y o a t s i n u n og n i y a . x x x x Q: A: Aside from that statement, was there any other statement made by the accused Edna Malngan? Y e s , s i r . K a y a p o n i y a n a g a w a y on g a l i t p o s i y a s a k a n y a n g a m o n a s i V i r g i n i a , h i n d i s i y a p i n a s u w e l d o a t g u s t o n a p o n i y a n g u m u w i n a ( s i c ) a y a w s i y a n g p ay a g a n . N a g s a l i t a p a p o s a k a n y a n a , S u m a k a y k a n a l a n g s a w a l i s . P a g b a l i k m o d i t o m a p u t i k a n a . ( s i c ) Y on p o a n g sinabi ng kanyang amo.
A:
Atty. Masweng: That was a statement of an alleged dead person, yo ur Honor. Court: Sabi ni Valdes, ha? Pros. Rebagay: Sabi ni Edna Malngan kay Carmelita Valdez, Your Honor. Court: D ou b l e h e a r s a y n a y on . Pros. Rebagay: No, Your Honor, the witness was present, Your Honor, when that confession was made by the [9] accused to Carmelita Valdez.
Rolando Gruta, the pedicab driver and one of the barangay tanods in the area, testified:
Pros. Rebagay: Mr. Witness, what is your profession?
A:
Sidecar driver, sir.
Q:
On January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the morning, do you recall where were (sic) you?
A:
I was at the corner of Moderna Street, sir.
Pros. Rebagay: A n d w h i l e y o u w e r e a t t h e c o r n e r o f M o d e r n a St . , w h a t h a p p e n e d i f a n y , M r . W i t n e s s ?
A:
I saw Edna coming out from the door of the house of Roberto Separa, sir.
People vs Malngan
Q: D o y o u k n o w t h e n u m b e r o f t h e h o u s e o f t h e Se p a r a F a m i l y ?
A:
172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
x x x x
Q:
A n d y o u s a i d y o u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e Se p a r a Fa m i l y . H o w f a r i s t h a t h o u s e f r o m t h e p l a c e w h e r e y o u w e r e w a i t i n g a t t h e c o r n e r o f M o d e r n a a n d P a u l i n o St r e e t s ?
A:
About three meters from Moderna and Paulino Streets where my pedicab was placed. My distance was about three meters, sir.
x x x x
Q:
And how did you know that the house where Edna came out is that of the house of the Separa Family?
A:
M i s m on g n a k i t a p o n g d a l a w a n g m a t a k o n a d o on s i y a g a l i n g s a b a h a y n g S e p a r a Fa m i l y .
Q:
How long have you known the Separa Family, if you know them?
A:
About two years, sir.
Q:
How about this Edna, the one you just pointed (to) awhile ago? Do you know her prior to January 2, 2001?
A:
Yes, sir. I knew(sic) her for two years.
Court: Why?
Witness: Madalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking pedicab.
People vs Malngan
Pros. Rebagay: How about the Separa family? Why do you know them?
A:
They were the employers of Edna, sir.
Q:
Y o u s a i d y o u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y . W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n y o u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e Se p a r a F a m i l y ?
A:
W a l a p a p on g a n o y a n n a i s a k a y k o n a s i y a s a s i d e c a r .
Q:
A n d w h a t d i d y o u o b s e r v e f r o m E d n a w h e n y o u s a w h e r c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e Se p a r a family?
A:
Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga -linga.
x x x x
Q:
After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
A:
Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
Q:
Where?
A:
To Nipa Street, sir.
Q:
Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?
A:
Yes, sir.
x x x x
People vs Malngan
Q: Y o u s a i d t h a t y o u b r o u g h t h e r t o N i p a S t r e e t . W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n y o u g o ( s i c ) t h e r e a t Ni p a Street, if any?
A:
N a g p a h i n t o p o s i y a d o on n g s a g l i t , m g a t a t l o n g m i n u t o p o .
Q:
What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?
A:
After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan Street, sir.
x x x x
Q:
What happened after that?
A:
When we arrived there, she alighted and pay (sic) P5.00, sir.
And then what transpired after she alighted from your pedicab?
Witness: I went home and I looked for another passenger, sir.
Pros. Rebagay: After that, what happened when you were on you way to your house to look for passengers?
N a k i t a k o n a n g a p o n a p a g d a t i n g k o s a M od e r n a , n a g l a l a g a b l a b n a a p oy .
Q:
From what place was that fire coming out?
A:
F r o m t h e h o u s e o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a Fa m i l y , s i r .
x x x x
People vs Malngan
Pros. Rebagay: A f t e r y o u n o t i c e d t h a t t h e r e w a s a f i r e f r o m t h e h o u s e o f R o b e r t o Se p a r a F a m i l y , w h a t d i d y o u d o if any?
A:
S i y e m p r e p o, i s a n g B a r a n g a y T a n od p o a k o, n a g r e s p on d e n a p o k a m i s a s u n og . B i n u k s a n n a p o n g C h a i r m a n n a m i n g y u n g t a n g k e , b i n o m b a n a p o n a m i n g y u n g a p oy n g t u b i g .
Q:
A f t e r t h a t i n c i d e n t , M r . W i t n e s s , h a v e y o u s e e n E d n a Ag a i n ( s i c ) .
A:
No, sir.
Pros. Rebagay: And after that incident, did you come to know if Edna was apprehended or not?
x x x x
A:
I was called by our Barangay Chairman in order to identify E dna, sir.
x x x x
[10]
Remigio Bernardo, Barangay Chairman of the area where the fire occurred, stated:
Pros. Rebagay:
On January 2, 2001, do you recall if there is a fire that occurred somewhere in your area of jurisdiction, particularly Moderna Street?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Now, where were you when this incident happened?
People vs Malngan
A: Kasi ugali ko na po tuwing umagang -umaga po ako na pupunta sa barangay Hall mga s i g u r o 6 : 0 0 o r 5 : 0 0 o c l oc k , m e s u m i g a w n g s u n og n i r e s p on d e h a n n a m i n i y on g s u n og e h m e d a l a kaming fire.
Court: You just answer the question. Where were you when this incident happened?
Witness: I was at the Barangay Hall, Your Honor.
Pros. Rebagay: And you said that there was a fire that occurred, what did you do?
Witness: I y on n g a n a g r e s p on d e k a m i d o on s a s u n og e h n a k i t a k o i y on g s u n og m u k h a t a l a g a n g a r s o n d a h i l n a p a k a l a k i k a a g a d , m e r on p on g m g a t i p on g I y on g n a m a t a y p o c on t r a c t or p o i y on e h kaya siguro napakaraming kalat ng mga pintura, mga c on t a i n e r , kaya hindi p o n a m i n n a a p u l a k a a g a d i y on g a p oy , n a s u n og u l t i m o i y on g f i r e t a n k n a m i n s a l a k a s , s i r .
Pros. Rebagay: Now, will you please tell us where this fire occurred?
A:
At the house of the six victims, sir.
Q:
Whose house is that?
A:
The house of the victims, sir.
x x x x
Pros. Rebagay: You said that you responded to the place, what transpired after you responded to the place?
People vs Malngan
A: I y on n g a p o a n g n a g s a b i m a y l u m a b a s n a i s a n g b a b a e p o n o on s a b a h a y n a n a g m a m a d a l i h a b a n g m a y s u n og , m e i s a n g b a r a n g a y t a n od p o a k on g n a g s a b i m a y h u m a h a n g o s n a i s a n g b a b a e n a m a y d a l a n g b a g p a p u n t a p o r o on p a l a b a s n g s a s a k y a n , s i r .
Q:
And so what happened?
A:
S i y e m p r e h i n d i n a m a n a k o n a g t a n on g k u n g s i n o n g a y on m a y d u m a t i n g g a l i n g n a s a b a h a y n a m i n g , m a y t u m a w a g , t u m a w a g p o s i K on s e h a l a A l f on s o n a m a y i s a n g b a b a e n a h i n d i m a p a k a l i d o on s a C a l l e P e d r o A l f on s o, k e k on s e h a l n a b a k a i t o s a b i n i y a i y on g g a n i t o g a n o on n i r e s p on d e h a n k o p o, s i r .
Q:
Where did you respond?
A:
At Balasan, sir, but its not the area of my jurisdiction.
x x x x
Q:
What happened when you reached that place?
A:
S i y a p o a n g n a h u l i k o d o on , s i r .
Court: Witness pointing to accused Edna Malngan.
Pros. Rebagay: And what happened?
A:
I brought her to the barangay hall, sir.
Q:
And what happened at the barangay hall?
A:
I n e m b e s t i g a h a n k o, k i n u h a n a m i n g i y on g b a g n i y a , m e l i g h t e r s i y a e h . I n a m i n n i y a p o s a a m i n n a k a y a n i y a s i n u n og h i n d i s i y a p i n a s a s a h od n g m or e o r l e s s i s a n g t a on n a e h . N g a y on s a b i k o b a k i t e h g u s t o k o n g u m u w i n g p r ob i n s y a a n g s a b i s a a k i n n g a m o k o s u m a k a y n a l a n g d a w p o a k o n g walis tingting para makauwi, sir.
People vs Malngan
Atty. Herman: We would like to object, Your Honor on the ground that that is hearsay.
Pros. Rebagay: That is not a hearsay statement, Your Honor, straight from the mouth of the accused.
Atty. Herman: Its not under the exemption under the Rules of Court, Your Honor. He is testifying according to what he has heard.
Court: Thats part of the narration. Whether it is true or not, thats another matter. Let it remain.
Pros. Rebagay: Now, who were present when the accused are telling you this?
A:
I y on n g a i y on g m g a t a n od k o, m a m a m a y a n d o on n a k a p a l i g i d , s i y e m p r e m a y s u n og n a g k a k a g u l o , gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa n g m a y n a m a t a y e h a n i m n a t a o a n d n a m a t a y , k a y a i y on g m g a t a o k i n ok on t r o l s i y a m a d i d i s g r a s y a s i y a d a h i l p i n - p o i n t e d p o s i y a , Y o u r H on or , i y on g d a m i n a i y on l i b o i y on g n a k a p a l i g i d d o on s a b a r a n g a y h a l l n a p a k a h i r a p a w a t i n . G u s t on g - g u s t o s i y a n g k u n i n n g m g a [11] t a on g - b a y a n , n a g a l i t d a h i l a n g d a m i n g b a h a y h on g n a s u n og .
F o r h e r p a r t , M e r c e d i t a M e n d o z a , o n e o f t h e n e i g h b o r s o f t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y a n d w h o s e h o u s e w a s o n e o f t h o s e destroyed by the fire, recounted: Pros. Rebagay: Madam Witness, on January 2, 2001, do you recall where were you residing then?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Where were you residing at?
People vs Malngan
A: At No. 170 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
Q:
W h y d i d y o u t r a n s f e r y o u r r e s i d e n c e ? Aw h i l e a g o y o u t e s t i f i e d t h a t y o u a r e n o w r e s i d i n g a t 1 4 7 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila?
A:
Because our house was burned, sir.
Q:
More or less, how much did the los s incurred on the burning of your house (sic)?
A:
More or less, P100,000.00, sir
Q:
Do you know the accused in this case Edna Malngan?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Why do you know her?
A:
She is the house helper of the family who were (sic) burned, sir.
Q:
What family?
A:
Cifara (sic) family, sir.
Q:
Who in particular do you know among Cifara (sic) family?
A:
The woman, sir.
Q:
What is the name?
A:
Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic), sir.
People vs Malngan
Q: Are you related to Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)?
A:
My husband, sir.
Q:
What is the relationship of your husband to the late Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)?
A:
They were first cousins, sir.
Q:
How far is your house from the hous e of the Cifara (sic) family?
A:
Magkadikit lang po. Pader lang ang pagitan.
Q:
You said that Edna Malngan was working with the Cifara (sic) family. What is the work of Edna Malngan?
A:
N a n g a n g a m u h a n p o . H ou s e h e l p e r , s i r .
Q:
How long do you know Edna Malngan as house helper of the Cifara (sic) family?
A:
I cannot estimate but she stayed there for three to four years, sir.
Q:
Do you know who caused the burning of the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
Witness: Edna Malngan, sir.
Pros. Rebagay: Why do you know that it was Edna Malngan who burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
A:
W h e n t h e f i r e i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e d , s i r , o n J a n u a r y 3 , w e w e n t t o Sa n L a z a r o F i r e S t a t i o n a n d I s a w Edna Malngan detained there, sir.
People vs Malngan
Q: And so what is your basis in pointing to Edna Malngan as the culprit or the one who burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
A:
I talked to her when we went there at that day, sir.
Q:
What transpired then?
A:
I talked to her and I told her, Edna, bakit mo naman ginawa yung ganun?
Q:
And what was the answer of Edna?
A:
S h e a n s w e r e d , K a s i p a g n a g p a p a a l a m a k o s a k a n y a n g u m u w i n g p r ob i n s y a , n a g p a p a a l a m p o s i y a n g u m u w i n g p r ob i n s y a a n g s i n a s a b i d a w p o s a k a n y a n i B a b y C i f a r a ( s i c ) n a , (sic)Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis pagdating mo maputi ka na.
Pros. Rebagay: What is the basis there that she was the one who burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
A:
I a l s o a s k e d h e r , P a a n o m o g i n a w a y u n g s u n og ? S h e t o l d m e , N a g l u k ot a k o n g m a r a m i n g d i y a r y o, s i n i n d i h a n k o n g d i s p o s a b l e l i g h t e r a t h i n a g i s n i y a s a i b a b a w n g l a m e s a s a l o ob n g [12] bahay. (sic)
Lastly,
the
prosecution
presented
Rodolfo Movilla,
owner
of
the
house
situated
beside
that
of
t h e S e p a r a f a m i l y . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s h o u s e w a s a l s o g u t t e d b y t h e f i r e t h a t k i l l e d t h e Se p a r a f a m i l y a n d t h a t h e t r i e d to help said victims but to no avail.
The prosecution presented other documentary evidence
[13]
and thereafter rested its case.
People vs Malngan
When it came time for the defense to present exculpatory evidence, instead of doing so, accused -appellant f i l e d a M ot i on t o A d m i t D e m u r r e r t o E v i d e n c e
[14]
and the corresponding Demurrer to Evidence
[15]
with the former

[16]
expressly stating that said Demurrer to Evidence was being filed x x x without express leave of court x x x.
In her Demurrer to Evidence , accused-appellant asserts that the prosecutions evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following reasons:
[17]
(a) that she is charged with crime not defined
and penalized by law; (b) that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (c) that the testimonies given by the witnesses of the prosecution were hearsay, thus, inadmissible in evidence against her.
T h e p r o s e c u t i o n f i l e d i t s C om m e n t / O p p o s i t i on t o a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s D e m u r r e r t o E vi d e n c e .
On 13 October 2003, acting on the Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC promulgated its Judgment
[18]
wherein it
proceeded to resolve the subject case based on the evidence of the prosecution. The RTC considered accused -appellant to have waived her right to present evidence, having filed the Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court.
In finding accused-appellant Edna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide, the RTC ruled that:
The first argument of the accused that she is charged with an act not defined and penalized by law is without merit. x x x the caption which charges the accused with the crime of Arson with Multi ple H o m i c i d e i s m e r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e o f t h e c h a r g e o f Ar s o n t h a t r e s u l t e d t o M u l t i p l e H o m i c i d e . T h e f a c t i s that the accused is charged with Arson which resulted to Multiple Homicide (death of victims) and that charge is embodied and stated in the body of th e information. What is controlling is the allegation in t h e b o d y o f t h e I n f o r m a t i o n a n d n o t t h e t i t l e o r c a p t i o n t h e r e o f . x x x.
x x x x
The second and third arguments will be discussed jointly as they are interrelated with eac h o t h e r . x x x.
x x x x
[W]hile there is no direct evidence that points to the accused in the act of burning the house or actually starting the subject fire, the following circumstances that show that the accused intentionally caused or was responsible for the subject fire hav e been duly established:
People vs Malngan
1. that immediately before the burning of the house, the accused hurriedly and with head turning in different directions (palinga -linga) went out of the said house and rode a pedicab apparently not knowing where to go x x x;
2. t h a t i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e f i r e , u p o n a r e p o r t t h a t t h e r e w a s a w o m a n i n B a l a s a n St . w h o appears confused and apprehensive (balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his tanods went there, found the accused and apprehended her and brought her to the barangay hall as shown by the testimony of Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and
3. that when she was apprehended and investigated by the barangay officials and when her bag was opened, the same contained a disposable lighter as likewise shown b y the testimony of the Barangay Chairman.
[T]he timing of her hurried departure and nervous demeanor immediately before the fire when she left the house and rode a pedicab and her same demeanor, physical and mental condition when found and apprehended at the same place where she alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter in her bag thereafter when investigated indisputably show her guilt as charged.
If there is any doubt of her guilt that remains with the circumstantial evidenc e against her, the same is removed or obliterated with the confessions/admissions of the commission of the offense and the manner thereof that she made to the prosecution witnesses Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and to the media, res pectively.
x x x x
[H]er confessions/admissions are positive acknowledgment of guilt of the crime and appear to have been voluntarily and intelligently given. These confessions/admissions, especially the one given to her neighbor Mercedita Mendoza and the media, albeit uncounselled and made while she was already under the custody of authorities, it is believed, are not violative of her right under the Constitution.
The decretal part of the RTCs Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby denied and judgment is hereby rendered f i n d i n g t h e a c c u s e d E D N A M A L N G A N Y M AY O g u i l t y b e y o n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t o f t h e c r i m e o f A r s o n w i t h Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6) people and sentencing her to suffer the m a n d a t o r y p e n a l t y o f d e a t h , a n d o r d e r i n g h e r t o p a y t h e h e i r s o f t h e v i c t i m s R o b e r t o Se p a r a , S r . a n d V i r g i n i a S e p a r a a n d c h i l d r e n M i c h a e l , D a p h n e , P r i s c i l l a a n d R o b e r t o , J r . , t h e a m o u n t o f Fi f t y T h o u s a n d (P50,000.00) Pesos for each victim and the amount o f One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as t e m p e r a t e d a m a g e s f o r t h e i r b u r n e d h o u s e o r a t o t a l o f Fo u r H u n d r e d T h o u s a n d ( P 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) P e s o s and to Rodolfo Movilla the amount of One Hundred [Thousand] (P100,000.00) Pesos.
People vs Malngan
Due to the death penalty imp osed by the RTC, the case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic r e v i e w . C o n f o r m a b l y w i t h o u r d e c i s i o n i n P e op l e v. E f r e n M a t e o y G a r c i a , records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. On 2 September 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, the fallo of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed October 13, 2003 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, finding accused -appellant Edna Malngan y Mayo g uilty beyond reasonable d o u b t o f A r s o n w i t h m u l t i p l e h o m i c i d e a n d s e n t e n c i n g h e r t o s u f f e r t h e D E AT H P E NAL T Y i s h e r e b y AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that she is further ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the victims who perished in the fire, to be paid to their heirs. She is ordered to pay Rodolfo Movilla, one whose house was also burned, the sum of P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s e xe m p l a r y d a m a g e . Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Crim inal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals, after rendering judgment, hereby refrains from making an entry of judgment and forthwith [20] c e r t i f i e s t h e c a s e a n d e l e v a t e s t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d o f t h i s c a s e t o t h e Su p r e m e C o u r t f o r r e v i e w .
[19]
however, we referred the case and its
It is the contention of accused -appellant that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to e s t a b l i s h h e r g u i l t b e y o n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t a s t h e p e r p e t r a t o r o f t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . I n s u p p o r t o f s a i d e xc u l p a t o r y proposition, she assigns the following errors
[21]
I.
T H E H O N O R A B L E C O U R T E R R E D I N R U L I N G T H AT T H E C I R C U M ST ANT I AL E V I D E N C E P R E SE NT E D B Y T H E P R O S E C U T I O N I S S U F F I C I E N T T O C O N V I C T T H E AC C U SE D ; a n d
II.
T H E H O N O R A B L E C O U R T E R R E D I N A L L O W I N G A N D G I V I NG C R E D E NC E T O T H E H E AR SAY E V I D E N C E AN D U N C O U N S E L L E D A D M I S S I O N S A L L E G E D L Y G I V E N B Y T H E A C C U SE D T O T H E W I T NE S SE S B AR AN G A Y C H A I R M A N R E M I G I O B E R N A R D O , M E R C E D I T A M E N D O Z A A ND T H E M E D I A.
T H E R E I S N O C O M P L E X C R I M E O F A R S O N W I T H (M U L T I P L E ) H O M I C I D E .
People vs Malngan
T h e I n f or m a t i on i n t h i s c a s e e r r o n e o u s l y c h a r g e d a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t w i t h a c o m p l e x c r i m e , i . e . , Ar s on w i t h Multiple Homicide. Presently, there are two (2) laws that govern the crime of arson where death results therefrom Ar t i c l e 3 2 0 of t h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C od e ( R P C ) , a s a m e n d e d b y R e p u b l i c Ac t ( R A) N o. 7 6 5 9 , P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e ( P D ) N o. 1 6 1 3
[23] [22]
a n d S e c t i on 5 o f
, quoted hereunder, to wit:
Revised Penal Code:
ART. 320. Destructive Arson. x x x x I f a s a c on s e q u e n c e o f t h e c o m m i s s i on o f a n y of t h e a c t s p e n a l i z e d u n d e r t h i s Ar t i c l e , d e a t h results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Presidential Decree No. 1613:
S E C . 5 . W h e r e D e a t h R e s u l t s f r om Ar s on . I f b y r e a s on of or on t h e oc c a s i on o f t h e a r s on d e a t h r e s u l t s , t h e p e n a l t y o f r e c l u s i on p e r p e t u a t o d e a t h s h a l l b e i m p o s e d . [ E m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d . ]
Ar t . 3 2 0 of t h e R P C , a s a m e n d e d , w i t h r e s p e c t t o d e s t r u c t i v e a r s o n , a n d t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f P D N o . 1 6 1 3 r e s p e c t i n g o t h e r c a s e s o f a r s o n p r o v i d e o n l y on e p e n a l t y f or t h e c om m i s s i on of a r s on , w h e t h e r c on s i d e r e d d e s t r u c t i ve or ot h e r w i s e , w h e r e d e a t h r e s u l t s t h e r e f r o m . T h e r a i s on d ' t r e i s t h a t a r s o n i s i t s e l f t h e e n d a n d d e a t h i s s i m p l y t h e c o n s e q u e n c e .
[24]
Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant death or will have to be a separate crime altogether, the joint discussion
[25]
o f t h e l a t e M r . C h i e f J u s t i c e R a m o n C . A q u i n o a n d M m e . J u s t i c e C a r o l i n a C . G r i o - Aq u i n o , o n t h e
subject of the crimes of arson and murder/homicide, is highly instructive:
Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire shoul d be [26] purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main object o f the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime [27] of arson.
People vs Malngan
x x x x
If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were killed, fire would not be a qualifying circumstance. The accused would be liable for the separate offenses of murder or homicide, as the case [28] may be, and arson.
Ac c o r d i n g l y , i n c a s e s w h e r e b o t h b u r n i n g a n d d e a t h o c c u r , i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t c r i m e / c r i m e s w a s / w e r e perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the o c c a s i o n o f a r s o n , t h e c r i m e i s s i m p l y a r s on , a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g h o m i c i d e i s a b s o r b e d ; ( b ) i f , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e m a i n objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particula r person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then t h e r e a r e t w o s e p a r a t e a n d d i s t i n c t c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d h o m i c i d e / m u r d e r a n d a r s on .
Where then does this case fall under?
From a reading of the body of the Information:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to cause da mage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire u p on t h e t w o - s t o r e y r e s i d e n t i a l h ou s e o f R O B E R T O SE P AR A a n d f a m i l y m o s t l y m a d e o f w o o d e n m a t e r i a l s located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, t o g e t h e r w i t h s o m e s e v e n ( 7 ) a d j o i n i n g r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e s , w e r e r a z e d b y f i r e ; t h a t b y r e a s on a n d on t h e oc c a s i on of t h e s a i d f i r e , t h e f o l l o w i n g , n a m e l y , 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age Michael Separa, 24 years of age Daphne Separa, 18 years of age Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age were the direct cause of their death immediately
sustained burn injuries which [29] thereafter. [Emphasis supplied.]
accused-appellant is being charged with the crime of arson. It it is clear from the foregoing that her intent was m erely to destroy her employers house through the use of fire.
People vs Malngan
We now go to the issues raised. Under the first assignment of error, in asserting the insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused -appellant argues that the prosecution w a s o n l y a b l e t o a d d u c e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e h a r d l y e n o u g h t o p r o v e h e r g u i l t b e y o n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . Sh e ratiocinates that the following circumstances:
1.
That immediately before the burning of the house , the accused hurriedly and with head turning in different directions (palinga -linga) went out of the said house and rode a pedicab a p p a r e n t l y n o t k n o w i n g w h e r e t o g o f o r s h e f i r s t r e q u e s t e d t o b e b r o u g h t t o Ni p a S t . b u t u p o n r e a c h i n g t h e r e r e q u e s t e d a g a i n t o b e b r o u g h t t o B a l a s a n St . a s s h o w n b y t h e t e s t i m o n y o f prosecution witness Rolando Gruta;
2.
That immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a woman in Balasan St. who appears confused and apprehensive ( balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his tanods went there, found the accused and apprehended her and brought her to the barangay hall as shown by the testimony of Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and
3.
That when she was apprehended and investigated by the barangay o fficials and when her bag was opened, the same contained a disposable lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the [30] Barangay Chairman.
fall short of proving that she had any involvement in setting her employers house on fire, much less show guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given that it is a fact that housemaids are the first persons in the house to wake up early to perform routine chores for their employers,
[31]
one of which is preparing and cooking the morning meal for the
members of the household; and necessity require s her to go out early to look for open stores or even nearby marketplaces to buy things that will complete the early meal for the day.
[32]
She then concludes that it was normal for
her to have been seen going out of her employers house in a hurry at that time of the day and to look at all directions to insure that the house is secure and that there are no other persons in the vicinity.
[33]
We are far from persuaded.
True, by the nature of their jobs, housemaids are required to start the day early; however, contrary to said assertion, the actuations and the demeanor of accused -appellant on that fateful early morning as observed firsthand by Rolando Gruta, one of the witnesses of the prosecution, belie her claim of normalcy, to wit:
People vs Malngan
Q: Y o u s a i d y o u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y . W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n y o u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e Se p a r a F a m i l y ?
A:
W a l a p a p on g a n o y a n n a i s a k a y k o n a s i y a s a s i d e c a r .
Q:
A n d w h a t d i d y o u o b s e r v e f r o m E d n a w h e n y o u s a w h e r c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e Se p a r a family?
A:
Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga -linga.
x x x x
Q:
After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
A:
Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.
Q:
Where?
A:
To Nipa Street, sir.
Q:
Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?
A:
Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q:
Y o u s a i d t h a t y o u b r o u g h t h e r t o N i p a S t r e e t . W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n y o u g o ( s i c ) t h e r e a t Ni p a Street, if any?
A:
N a g p a h i n t o p o s i y a d o on n g s a g l i t , m g a t a t l o n g m i n u t o p o .
Q:
What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?
People vs Malngan
A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan Street, sir.
x x x x
We quote with approval the pronouncement of the RTC in discrediting accused -appellants aforementioned rationale:
[O]bviously it is never normal, common or ordinary to leave the house in such a disturbed, nervous and agitated manner, demeanor and condition. The timing of her hurri ed departure and nervous demeanor immediately before the fire when she left the house and rode a pedicab and her same demeanor, physical and mental condition when found and apprehended at the same place where she alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter in her bag thereafter when investigated indisputably show [34] her guilt as charged.
All
the
witnesses
are
in
accord
that
accused-appellants
agitated
appearance
was
out
of
the
ordinary. Remarkably, she has never denied this observation.
We give great weight to the findings of the RTC and so accord credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as it had the opportunity to observe them directly. The credibility given by trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe them, particularly their demeanor, conduc t, and attitude, during the direct and cross -examination by counsels. Here, Remigio Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and Mercedita Mendoza are disinterested witnesses and there is not an iota of evidence in the records to indicate that they are suborned witnesses. The records of the RTC even show that Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman, kept accused-appellant from being mauled by the angry crowd outside of thebarangay hall:
Pros. Rebagay: Now, who were present when the accused are (sic) telling you this?
People vs Malngan
A: I y on n g a i y on g m g a t a n od k o, m a m a m a y a n d o on n a k a p a l i g i d , s i y e m p r e m a y s u n og n a g k a k a g u l o , gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa n g m a y n a m a t a y e h a n i m n a t a o a n d n a m a t a y , k a y a i y on g m g a t a o k i n ok o n t r o l s i y a m a d i d i s g r a s y a s i y a d a h i l p i n - p o i n t e d p o s i y a , Y o u r H on or , i y on g d a m i n a i y on l i b o i y on g n a k a p a l i g i d d o on s a b a r a n g a y h a l l n a p a k a h i r a p a w a t i n . G u s t i n g - g u s t o s i y a n g k u n i n n g m g a [35] t a on g - b a y a n , n a g a l i t d a h i l a n g d a m i n g b a h a y h on g n a s u n og .
Accused-appellant has not shown any compelling reason why the witnesses presented would openly, publicly and deliberately lie or concoct a story, to send an innocent person to jail all the while knowing that the real malefactor remains at large. Such proposition defies logic. And where the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the presu mption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith and credence.
[36]
While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused-appellant actually starting the fire that burned several houses and killed the Separa family, her guilt may still be established through circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the in ferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
[37]
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.
[38]
It is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a

[39]
connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.
In order to bring about a
conviction, the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and r e a s o n a b l e c o n c l u s i o n p o i n t i n g t o t h e a c c u s e d , t o t h e e xc l u s i o n o f o t h e r s , a s t h e g u i l t y p e r s o n .
[40]
In this case, the interlocking testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, taken together, exemplify a case where c o n v i c t i o n c a n b e u p h e l d o n t h e b a s i s o f c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . Fi r s t , p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s R o l a n d o G r u t a , t h e d r i v e r of the pedicab that accused-appellant rode on, testified that he knew for a fact that she worked as a housemaid of the victims, and that he po sitively identified her as the person hurriedly leaving the house of the victims on 2 January 2001 at 4:45 a.m., and acting in a nervous manner. That while riding on the pedicab, accused-appellant was unsure of her intended destination. Upon reaching the place where he originally picked up accused -appellant only a few minutes after dropping her off, Rolando Gruta saw the Separas house being gutted by a blazing fire. Second, Remigio Bernardo t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e a n d h i s t a n od s , i n c l u d i n g R o l a n d o G r u t a , w e r e t h e o n e s w h o p i c k e d u p a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E d n a at Balasan Street (where Rolando Gruta dropped her off) after receiving a call that there was a woman acting strangely a t s a i d s t r e e t a n d w h o a p p e a r e d t o h a v e n o w h e r e t o g o . T h i r d , SP O 4 D a n i l o T a l u s a n o v e r h e a r d a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t a d m i t t o C a r m e l i t a V a l d e z , a r e p o r t e r o f C h a n n e l 2 ( AB S - C B N) t h a t s a i d a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s t a r t e d t h e f i r e , p l u s t h e f a c t
People vs Malngan
that he was able see the telecast of Gus Abelgas show where accused -appellant, while being interviewed, confessed to the crime as well. The foregoing testimonies juxtaposed with the testimony of Mercedita Mendoza validating the fact t h a t a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t c o n f e s s e d t o h a v i n g s t a r t e d t h e f i r e w h i c h k i l l e d t h e Se p a r a f a m i l y a s w e l l a s b u r n e d s e v e n houses including that of the victims, convincingly form an unbroken chain, which leads to the unassailable conclusion pinpointing accused-appellant as the person behind the crime of simple arson.
In her second assigned error, accused -appellant questions the admissibility of her uncounselled extrajudicia l c o n f e s s i o n g i v e n t o p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s , n a m e l y R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o , M e r c e d i t a M e n d o z a , a n d t o t h e m e d i a . Ac c u s e d appellant Edna contends that being uncounselled extrajudicial confession, her admissions to having committed the c r i m e c h a r g e d s h o u l d h a v e b e e n e xc l u d e d i n e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r f o r b e i n g v i o l a t i v e o f Ar t i c l e I I I , Se c t i o n 1 2 ( 1 ) o f t h e Constitution.
Particularly, she takes exception to the testimony of prosecution witnesses Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita Mendoza for being hearsay and in the nature of an uncounselled admission.
W i t h t h e a b o v e v i t a l p i e c e s o f e v i d e n c e e xc l u d e d , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t i s o f t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e m a i n i n g p r o o f of her alleged guilt, consisting in the main of circumstantial evidence, is ina dequate to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We partly disagree.
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with o n e . T h e s e r i g h t s c a n n o t b e w a i v e d e xc e p t i n w r i t i n g a n d i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f c o u n s e l .
x x x x
(3) A n y c o n f e s s i o n o r a d m i s s i o n o b t a i n e d i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s Se c t i o n o r Se c t i o n 1 7 h e r e o f shall be inadmissible in evidence.
People vs Malngan
We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
[41]
S a i d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e h a s a l s o b e e n e xt e n d e d t o s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h a n i n d i v i d u a l h a s n o t b e e n
[42]
formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning.
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
it must be voluntary; it must be made with the assistance of competent and indepen dent counsel; it must be express; and it must be in writing.
[43]
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed a s law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, S ection 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Ac c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s confession
toBarangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted without first i nforming accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused -appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag ar e inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused -appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not aut omatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby th e accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused -appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the n e i g h b o r s o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r . , t o h a v i n g s t a r t e d t h e f i r e i n t h e Se p a r a s h o u s e . T h e t e s t i m o n y o f M e r c e d i t a
People vs Malngan
Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused -appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is n o t c o v e r e d b y t h e a f o r e s a i d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e . Ar t i c l e I I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , o r t h e B i l l o f R i g h t s , s o l e l y g o v e r n s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e i n d i v i d u a l o n o n e h a n d a n d t h e St a t e ( a n d i t s a g e n t s ) o n t h e o t h e r ; i t d o e s n o t concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private individual as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are.
[44]
Here, there is no evidence on record to show that
said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellants uncounselledextrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.
A c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t l i k e w i s e a s s a i l s t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h e t e s t i m o n y o f SP O 4 D a n i l o T a l u s a n . C o n t e n d i n g t h a t *w+hen SPO4 DaniloTalusan testified in court, his story is more of events, which are not within his personal knowledge but based from accounts of witnesses who derived information allegedly from the accused or some other persons x x x. In other words, she objects to the testim ony for being merely hearsay. With this imputation of inadmissibility, we agree with what the Court of Appeals had to say:
Although this testimony of SFO4 Danilo Talusan is hearsay because he was not present when G u s A b e l g a s i n t e r v i e w e d a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A, i t m a y n e v e r t h e l e s s b e a d m i t t e d i n e v i d e n c e a s a n independently relevant statement to establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t w a s m a d e [ P e o p l e v . M a l l a r i , G . R . No . 1 0 3 5 4 7 , J u l y 2 0 , 1 9 9 9 , 3 1 0 S C R A 6 2 1 c i t i n g People v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L -20986, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.]. In People vs. Velasquez , G.R. Nos. 132635 & 143872 -75, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court ruled that: Under the doctrine of independently relevan t statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but p rimary, for the statement itself may c o n s t i t u t e a f a c t i n i s s u e o r b e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l l y r e l e v a n t a s t o t h e e xi s t e n c e o f s u c h a [45] fact.
As regards the confession given by accused -appellant to the media, we need not discuss it further for the reporters were never presented to testify in court.
A s a f i n a l a t t e m p t a t e xc u l p a t i o n , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t a s s e r t s t h a t s i n c e t h e i d e n t i t i e s o f t h e b u r n e d b o d i e s w e r e never conclusively established, she cannot be responsible for their deaths.
Such assertion is bereft of merit.
People vs Malngan
In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are immaterial in that intent to kill them particularly is not one of the elements of the crime. As we have clarified earlier, the killing of a person is absorbed in the charge of arson, simple or destructive. The prosecution need only prove, that the burning was intentional and that what was i n t e n t i o n a l l y b u r n e d i s a n i n h a b i t e d h o u s e o r d w e l l i n g . A g a i n , i n t h e c a s e o f P e op l e v. S or i a n o ,
[46]
we explained that:
A l t h o u g h i n t e n t m a y b e a n i n g r e d i e n t o f t h e c r i m e o f Ar s on , i t m a y b e i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e a c t s o f the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce [47] further evidence of his wrongful intent.
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused -appellant guilty of?
A s p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d , t h e r e a r e t w o ( 2 ) c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e c r i m e o f a r s o n : 1 ) d e s t r u c t i ve a r s on , u n d e r A r t . 3 2 0 o f t h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e , a s a m e n d e d b y R e p u b l i c Ac t No . 7 6 5 9 ; a n d 2 ) s i m p l e a r s on , u n d e r P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on th e kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused,
[48]
to wit:
A r t i c l e 3 2 0 o f T h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C od e , a s a m e n d e d b y R A 7 6 5 9 , c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e m a l i c i o u s b u r n i n g o f s t r u c t u r e s , b o t h p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e , h o t e ls , b u i ld i n g s , e d if i c e s , t r a in s , ve s s e ls , a ir c r a f t , f a c t o r i e s a n d o t h e r m i l i t a r y , g o ve r n m e n t o r c o m m e r c ia l e s t a b li s h m e n t s b y a n y p e r s o n o r g r o u p o f [49] persons.[ ] T h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s t y p e o f c r i m e i s k n o w n a s D e s t r u c t i ve Ar s on , w h i c h i s p u n i s h a b l e b y r e c l u s i on p e r p e t u a t o d e a t h . T h e r e a s o n f o r t h e l a w i s s e l f - e v i d e n t : t o e f f e c t i v e l y d i s c o u r a g e a n d deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration le aves only destruction and despair in its w a k e ; h e n c e , t h e S t a t e m a n d a t e s g r e a t e r r e t r i b u t i o n t o a u t h o r s o f t h i s h e i n ou s c r i m e . T h e e xc e p t i o n a l l y severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater imp act on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation. [Emphasis supplied.] I f a s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f a n y o f t h e a c t s p e n a l i z e d u n d e r Ar t . 3 2 0 , d e a t h s h o u l d result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326 -B of The Revised Penal Code r e m a i n s t h e g o v e r n i n g l a w f o r S i m p l e A r s on . T h i s d e c r e e c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e m a l i c i o u s b u r n i n g o f p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e s t r u c t u r e s , r e g a r d l e s s o f s i z e , n o t i n c l u d e d i n Ar t . 3 2 0 , a s a m e n d e d b y R A 7 6 5 9 , a n d c l a s s i f i e d a s o t h e r c a s e s o f a r s o n . T h e s e i n c l u d e h o u s e s , d w e l l in g s , g o ve r n m e n t b u il d in g s , f a r m s , m i l ls , [50] p l a n t a t i o n s , r a i l w a y s , b u s s t a t i o n s , a ir p o r t s , w h a r ve s a n d o t h e r i n d u s t r ia l e s t a b l is h m e n t s . [ ] Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity of punishment comme nsurate to the act or acts committed, depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied.]
To emphasize:
People vs Malngan
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity o r v i c i o u s n e s s o f t h e c r i m i n a l o f f e n d e r . T h e a c t s c o m m i t t e d u n d e r Ar t . 3 2 0 o f t h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e ( a s a m e n d e d ) c o n s t i t u t i n g D e s t r u c t i v e Ar s o n a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s h e i n o u s c r i m e s f o r b e i n g g r i e v o u s , odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or man ifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency [51] and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness th at the l a w p u n i s h e s w i t h a l e s s e r p e n a l t y . I n o t h e r w o r d s , Si m p l e Ar s o n c o n t e m p l a t e s c r i m e s w i t h l e s s significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may neverthele ss be converted into Destructive Arson [52] depending on the qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.]
P r e s c i n d i n g f r o m t h e a b o v e c l a r i f i c a t i o n v i s - - vi s t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c r i m e a s s t a t e d i n t h e a c c u s a t o r y p o r t i o n o f t h e I n f o r m a t i o n , i t i s q u i t e e v i d e n t t h a t a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h t h e c r i m e o f S i m p le Ars o n f o r h a v i n g d e l i b e r a t e l y s e t f i r e u p on t h e t w o - s t o re y r e s id e n t ia l h o u s e of R O B E R T O S E P AR A a n d f a m i l y x x x k n ow i n g t h e s a m e t o b e a n i n h a b i t e d h ou s e a n d s i t u a t e d i n a t h i c k l y p op u l a t e d p l a c e a n d a s a c on s e q u e n c e t h e r e of a c on f l a g r a t i on e n s u e d a n d t h e s a i d b u i l d i n g , t og e t h e r w i t h s o m e s e ve n ( 7 ) a d j o i n i n g r e s i d e n t i a l h ou s e s , w e r e r a z e d b y fire. *Emphasis supplied.+
T h e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e a t b a r i s s o m e w h a t s i m i l a r t o t h e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e o f P e op l e v. S or i a n o .
[53]
The
accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1
[54]
o f A r t . 3 2 0 o f t h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e , a s a m e n d e d b y R e p u b l i c Ac t No . 7 6 5 9 . T h i s C o u r t , t h r o u g h M r .
Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the a f o r e s a i d l a w . T h e d e s c r i p t i o n s a s a l l e g e d i n t h e s e c o n d Am e n d e d I n f o r m a t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y r e f e r t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s a s h o u s e s r a t h e r t h a n a s b u i l d i n g s o r e d i f i c e s . T h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e Se c . 3 , Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well -settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused. The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or d welling. Incidentally, these elements concur [55] in the case at bar.
People vs Malngan
As stated in the body of the Information, accused -appellant was char ged with having intentionally burned t h e t w o - s t o r e y r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f R o b e r t S e p a r a . Sa i d c o n f l a g r a t i o n l i k e w i s e s p r e a d a n d d e s t r o y e d s e v e n ( 7 ) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein.
[56]
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged
or the particular law or part there of allegedly violate, x x x, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.
[57]
T h e r e i s , t h u s , a n e e d t o m o d i f y t h e p e n a l t y i m p o s e d b y t h e R T C a s S e c . 5 o f P D No . 1 6 1 3 c a t e g o r i c a l l y p r o v i d e s that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:
S E C . 5 . W h e r e D e a t h R e s u l t s f r o m Ar s on . - I f b y r e a s o n o f o r o n t h e o c c a s i o n o f a r s o n d e a t h results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the imposable penalty on a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t i s r e c l u s i on p e r p e t u a .
A p r op o s t h e c i v i l l i a b i l i t i e s o f a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t , c u r r e n t j u r i s p r u d e n c e from accused-appellant is P50,000.00 for the death of each of the victims.

[59]
[58]
dictate that the civil indemnity due
However, the monetary awards for moral
and exemplary damages given by the Court of Appeals, both in the a mount of P50,000.00, due the heirs of the victims, h a v e t o b e d e l e t e d f o r l a c k o f m a t e r i a l b a s i s . S i m i l a r l y , t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a w a r d o f e xe m p l a r y d a m a g e s t o Rodolfo Movilla in the amount of P50,000.00 for the destruction of his house, also has to be deleted, but in this instance for being improper. Moral damages cannot be award by this Court in the absence of proof of mental or physical suffering on the part of the heirs of the victims.
[60]
Concerning the award of exemplary damages, the reason
for the deletion being that no aggravating circumstance had been alleged and proved by the prosecution in the case at bar.
[61]
To summarize, accused -appellants alternative plea that she be acquitted of the crime must be rejected. With the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. It is i n d u b i t a b l e t h a t a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t i s t h e a u t h o r o f t h e c r i m e o f s i m p l e a r s o n . Al l t h e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e presented before the RTC, viewed in its entirety, is as convincing as direct evidence and, as such, negates accused appellants innocence, and when considered concurrently with her admission given to MerceditaMendoza,
the formers guilt beyond reasonable doubt is twice as evident. Hence, her conviction is effectively justified. More so, as it is propitious to note that in stark contrast to the factual circumstances presented by the prosecution, accused appellant neither mustered a denial nor an alibi except for the proposition that her guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
People vs Malngan
I N V I E W W H E R E O F , t h e D e c i s i on o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s d a t e d 2 Se p t e m b e r 2 0 0 5 , i n C A G . R . C R H C No . 0 1 1 3 9 , i s h e r e b y A F F I R M E D i n s o f a r a s t h e c o n v i c t i o n o f a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A M A L NG A N Y M AY O i s c o n c e r n e d . T h e s e n t e n c e t o b e i m p o s e d a n d t h e a m o u n t o f d a m a g e s t o b e a w a r d e d , h o w e v e r , a r e M O D I FI E D . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S e c . 5 o f P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e N o . 1 6 1 3 , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t i s h e r e b y s e n t e n c e d t o R E C L U S I O N P E R P E T U A . Ac c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t i s hereby ordered to pay the heirs of each of the victims P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO O R D E R E D .
People vs Lauga
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant. DECISION PEREZ, J.: Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter. Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, the real name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision. The Facts In an Information dated 21 September 2000, the appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did 3 then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will. On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old 5 when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the appellant. On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, 6 7 8 namely: victim AAA; her brother BBB; and one Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following: In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. AAAs father, the appellant, was having a drinking spree at the neighbors place. Her 11 mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother. Her only brother BBB also went out in the 12 company of some neighbors. At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and 14 15 16 underwear; warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with his fist; and told her that he had a knife placed above her head. He 17 proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her vagina." Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out late. BBB decided to take AAA with him. While on 21 their way to their maternal grandmothers house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father. Upon reaching their grandmothers 22 23 house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He invited appellant to the police station, to which appellant obliged. 26 At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself. The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads: hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2 to an alleg ed raping incident
28 27 24 25 18 19 20 13 9 10 4 2 1
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically 29 30 abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary measure. He went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
People vs Lauga
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime. Shortly after, AAA arrived. She answered back when 33 34 confronted. This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks. Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the afternoon. Finding nobody at home, he prepared his dinner and went to 37 sleep. Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises Boy Banting. They asked him to go with them to 39 40 discuss some matters. He later learned that he was under detention because AAA charged him of rape. On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant 42 guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to indemnify 43 AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary damages of P25,000.00. On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 0045645 MIN. The appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00 46 to P75,000.00. On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants notice of appeal. This Court required the parties to simultaneously file 48 49 their respective supplemental briefs, but both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings. The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the 50 prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother 51 52 BBB; (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; and 53 (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated. Our Ruling Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay bayan" and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan" Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he 54 was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement. The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus: Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accusedappellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.1avvphi1 [But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case 58 at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant]. (Emphasis supplied) Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a " bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents 60 living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP." Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay 61 level." The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang
59 55 56 57 47 44 41 38 35 36
31
32
People vs Lauga
Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime 62 or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community. This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence. Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial 63 confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her sister to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned of the incident. Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals, appellant argues that "where the testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable 65 conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and their story a mere concoction." The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could not simply stand together because: On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking incident since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with Vicente at that time. Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident. At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies. In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that 67 such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed. Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded 68 from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals: Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that would not only bring shame and 69 humiliation upon them and their families but also bring their fathers into the gallows of death. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her 70 private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not in fact committed. No person, much less a woman, could attain such height of cruelty to 71 one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness. Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to 72 jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. It is highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is 73 entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were directed against a close relative. Elements of Rape Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 to the case at bar.
74 66 64
People vs Lauga
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat or 75 intimidation." The death penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, "[w]hen the victim is 76 under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent." The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating with the penetration of appellants penis into her v agina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to 77 show that rape was committed. Further, when such testimony corresponds with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the 78 essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential when the accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his 79 superior moral ascendancy or influence substitutes for violence and intimidation. At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant with his fist 80 and a knife allegedly placed above AAAs head. It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule 81 that, "alibi is an inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate." "Alibi and denial must be supported by strong 82 corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility." Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish two elements (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its 83 commission. Appellant failed in this wise. Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in the instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference, and testified to by both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It provides: Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Penalty Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect that where, as here, the rape is committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances warranting the 84 85 imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and P75,000.00 as moral damages. However, the 86 award of exemplary damages should have been increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. Also, the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant would have been appropriate were it not for the enactment of 87 Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. We further affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellants non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole." WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay AAAP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.
Hongkong vs. Olalia

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. The facts are: On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void. On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001. Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
Hongkong vs. Olalia

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus: In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is grant ed subject to the following conditions: 1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government; 2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court; 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and 4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. SO ORDERED. On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus: Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail. In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario 1 Batacan Crespo, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus: x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" ( De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Hongkong vs. Olalia

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law. On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now 2 recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community . Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in granting 3 bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process. The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order. First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. 4 Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights. The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
6 7 5
Hongkong vs. Olalia

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a 8 crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal 9 proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, 10 11 even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It 12 is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in 13 character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for 14 the purpose of trial or punishment. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the " immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently." Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a 15 fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should dimini sh a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
Hongkong vs. Olalia

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. SO ORDERED.
Alejano vs Cabuay
EN BANC
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO, Petitioners,
G.R. No. 160792
Present: Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, - versus Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ, Respondents. August 25, 2005
Promulgated:
Alejano vs Cabuay
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review seeks to nullify the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 September 2003 and Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael Pulido (petitioners) on behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN -Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon (PNMarines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA), and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) (detainees).
[1]
[2]
Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay (Gen. Cabuay), Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of t he Philippines (ISAFP), who has custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso Abaya (Gen. Abaya), Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who a re respectively the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Secretary of National Defense and National Se curity Adviser, because they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.
Antecedent Facts
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the
Alejano vs Cabuay
security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gera rdo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12 August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURN of the writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings and decision thereon, after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days from promulgation [3] of the decision.
Alejano vs Cabuay
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court considered the petition submitted for decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition. Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees right to exercise for two hours a day.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.
The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances.
The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation of his right t o privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpusproceedings.
Alejano vs Cabuay
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered
Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he made in open court to uphold the
visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two hours a day. The dispositive portion of the appellate court s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the constitutional rights of the detainees in accordance with the Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04 regarding visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two (2) hours a day.
SO ORDERED.
[4]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution: A. B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT; THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED JUNIOR OFFICERS [5] DETENTION.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the Courts Order had already foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their petition.
Alejano vs Cabuay
Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the Court referred to the Court of App eals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers detention. Had the Court ruled for the detainees release, the Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released the detainees had the Court upheld petition ers cause.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention.
[7]
[6]
The
However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on
the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirm ation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person.
[8]
The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.
[9]
If the inquiry reveals that the detention
is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use ofhabeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error.
[10]
Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
[11]
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a persons constitut ional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.
[12]
However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.
[13]
Whatever situation
[14]
the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.
Alejano vs Cabuay
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the detainees their clients any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees right to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 (RA 7438).
[15]
Petitioners claim that the regulated visits made it difficult for them to
prepare for the important hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy of commu nication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (Maestrecampo). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees right against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP offici als prevented the detainees from having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detainees cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. their rights more limited than those of the public.
[17]
[16]
However, the fact that the detainees are confined makes
RA 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly
recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:
Section 4. Penalty Clause. a) x x x
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00). The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape . (Emphasis supplied)
True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a detainee client at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night. However, the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the express qualification that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention officer has the power to undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.
The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The regulations governing a detainees confinement must be reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and prevent his escape. Thus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the governments
Alejano vs Cabuay
objective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to undertake such reasonable measures or regulations.
Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees right to effective representation when petitioners visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees rights entitle them to be released from detention.
Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the detainees indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees release from detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases are instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial confinement are permissible.
In Bell v. Wolfish,
[18]
the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that regulations must be reasonably related to maintaining security and
[19]
must not be excessive in achieving that purpose. Courts will strike down a restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless. Wolfish expressly discouraged courts from skeptically questioning challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities.
[20]
However, Bell v.
The U.S. Supreme Court

[21]
commanded the courts to afford administrators wide-ranging deference in implementing policies to maintain institutional security.
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention centers allowable: such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainees safety and prevent his e scape. In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.
The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Felicia no
Alejano vs Cabuay
Commission,
[22]
petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.
[23]
Thus, at no point were the
detainees denied their right to counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a d etainees desire to live comfortably.
[24]
The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does not convert those
[25]
restrictions into punishment.
It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish.
[26]
Courts will also infer
intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose.
[27]
Jail officials are thus not required to use the least restrictive security measure.
[29]
[28]
They must only refrain from implementing a restriction
that appears excessive to the purpose it serves.
We quote Bell v. Wolfish:
One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that the essential objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees presence at trial. While this interest undoubtedly justifies the original d ecision to confine an individual in some manner, we do not accept respondents argument that the Governments interest in ensuring a detainees presence at trial is the only objective that may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a person. If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of detention. The Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at trial. For example, the Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are reasonably related to the institutions interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental interests that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of [30] conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.
An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or disability, and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. discomforts of confinement.
[31]
Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent
[32]
Alejano vs Cabuay
Block v. Rutherford,
[33]
which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as this practice was reasonably related
to maintaining security. The safety of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal conviction. hostage to effect escapes.
[35] [34]
Contact visits make it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff
[36]
Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other contraband.
The
restriction on contact visits was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and weapons.
[37]
The security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the
detainees.
[38]
Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate goal of internal security.
[39]
This
case reaffirmed the hands-off doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in deference to administrative expertise.
[40]
In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, nonpunitive response to valid security concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees are treated well and given regular meals. The Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to the conditions now prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are congested with detainees. The Court of Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the ISAFP Detention Center is a high-risk detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New Peoples Army (NPA) member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in the ISAFP Detention Center.
We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to priv acy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out
Alejano vs Cabuay
that the letters were not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizens privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters. Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and outgoing mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison facility and to avert coordinated escapes.
[41]
Even in the absence of statutes specifically allowing prison

[42]
authorities from opening and inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based on the principle of civil deaths.
Inmates were deemed to have no
right to correspond confidentially with anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison authorities was that the right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications between the inmate and his lawyer.
[43]
Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials received respect. could not be censored. rights.
[46] [45]
[44]
The confidential correspondences
The infringement of such privileged communication was held to be a violation of the inmates First Amendment
A prisoner has a right to consult with his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison
[47]
authorities in the administration of the institution.
Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will conspire in plots that threaten prison security.
[48]
American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case ofPalmigiano v. Travisono
[49]
recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in communication.
Censorship of pre-trial detainees mail addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or read at all.
In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,
[50]
involving convicted prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prison officials could open
in the presence of the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates. However, prison officials could not read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:
The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail from attorneys to inmates, has been considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation. The prison regulation under challenge provided that (a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be read and inspected, and no exception was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x
Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but contend that they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. The narrow issue thus presented is whether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection techniques fail to indicate contraband.
xxx
Alejano vs Cabuay
x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be imposed. We think it entirely appropriate that the State require any such communications to be specially marked as originating from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if they are to receive special treatment. It would also certainly be permissible that prison authorities require that a lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner, first identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters marked privileged are actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such communications, since the inmates presence insures that prison officials will not read the mail. The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials opening the letters. We disagree with the Court of Appeals that this should only be done in appropriate circumstances. Since a flexible test, besides being unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to a rule whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have [51] done all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires.
In Hudson v. Palmer,
[52]
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy inside his cell. The U.S.
Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. These constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence [53] and retribution are factors in addition to correction.
The later case of State v. Dunn,
[54]
citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made no distinction as to the detainees
limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted the considerable jurisprudence in the United States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such as security or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v. Dunn:
[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoners expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered a paramount interest in institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our society that *l+oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.
Alejano vs Cabuay
The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted inmate has been blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally pose an even greater security risk than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals who are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and may therefore pose a greater risk of escape than convicted inmates.
[55]
Valencia v. Wiggins
[56]
further held that it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners
and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security.
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security.
[57]
Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible
[58]
inspection by jail officials.
A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail.
[59]
However, incoming mail from
lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents without violating the inmates right to correspond with his lawyer. verbal contraband.
[61] [60]
The inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to
Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees letters in the present case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights
[62]
is a guarantee that is available only to the public
at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.
In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators. review of such regulations stems from the principle that:
[63]
The deferential
Alejano vs Cabuay
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their [64] ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.
[65]
The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a
civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War.
[66]
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.
[68] [67]
The writ of habeas
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008
Re: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 121, CALOOCAN CITY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR CHILD ABUSE DECISION NACHURA, J.: Before this Court is yet another administrative case confronting respondent Adoracion G. Angeles (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial 1 Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City (sala) filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommending that she be suspended pending the outcome of this administrative case. The Facts On July 17, 2006, the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City rendered a Decision in Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-69655-56 convicting respondent of violation of 3 4 Republic Act (RA) No. 7610. The criminal cases are now on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). On July 25, 2006, Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote a letter to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban inquiring whether it is possible for this Court, in the public interest, motu proprio to order the immediate suspension of the respondent in view of the aforementioned RTC Decision. SSP Velasco opined: 1. Judge Angeles now stands convicted on two counts of a crime, child abuse under Republic Act 7610, which involves moral turpitude. Until she clears her name of such conviction, her current moral qualification to do the work of a judge is under a dark cloud. Litigants seeking justice in our courts are entitled to a hearing by judges whose moral qualifications are not placed in serious doubt. 2. Although her conviction is not yet final, the presumption of innocence that Judge Angeles enjoyed during the pendency of the trial has already been overcome by its result. The presumption today is that she is guilty and must clear her name of the charges. xxxx It simply would not be right to have a person presumably guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude to hear and adjudicate the cases of others. 3. Under section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, since the RTC of Quezon City convicted Judge Angeles of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, she no longer has a right to bail and, therefore, should ordinarily be held in prison pending adjudication of her appeal. That the RTC of Quezon City chose to exercise its discretionary power to nonetheless grant her bail does not change the fact that, except for the bail, Judge Angeles' rightful place by reason of conviction is within the confinement of prison. It would seem incongruous for the Supreme Court to allow convicted felons out on bail to hear and adjudicate cases in its courts. 4. Finally, as a sitting judge who wields power over all persons appearing before her and has immeasurable influence within the judicial system as one of its members, Judge Angeles could definitely cause pressure to bear, not only on the members of the Court of Appeals and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but also on the Office of the Solicitor General that prosecutes her case on appeal. Only temporary suspension from official function, pending resolution of her case, will neutralize her judicial clout and clear the air of any kind of suspicion that justice is not going well in her case. On July 27, 2006, the matter was referred to the OCA for comment and recommendation.
6 5 2
On the basis of SSP Velasco's letter and by virtue of this Court's Resolution dated March 31, 1981, the OCA submitted to this Court a Report dated 9 August 25, 2006 with an attached Administrative Complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this administrative complaint be given due course and, respondent be ordered to file her Comment within ten (10) days from receipt. Considering the evidence is prima facie strong, it is respectfully recommended that she be INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED pending the outcome of the instant case or until further orders from this Court. It is further recommended that after the Comment is filed, the administrative proceeding be suspended to await the final outcome of the criminal cases filed against her. In a Resolution dated September 18, 2006, this Court's Second Division approved all of these recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from performing her judicial functions while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases or until further orders from this Court. On October 6, 2006, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution. Respondent claimed that the suspension order was wielded against her without affording her the opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Thus, respondent submitted that her suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent manifested that the two criminal cases against her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt. On the other hand, on October 11, 2006, SSP Velasco filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation to the Court En Banc on the alleged unethical conduct of respondent, seeking the immediate implementation of this Court's Resolution dated September 18, 2006. On October 16, 2007, SSP Velasco filed an 13 Opposition to the said Motion for Reconsideration, manifesting that respondent continuously defied this Court's Resolution dated September 18, 2006 as she did not desist from performing her judicial functions despite her receipt of said Resolution on October 6, 2006. SSP Velasco stressed that an order of suspension issued by this Court is immediately executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Moreover, SSP Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two counts of child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in order to erase any suspicion that she is using her influence to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Correlatively, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Caloocan, Malabon, Navotas Chapter (IBP-CALMANA Chapter), through its Public Relations Officer 14 (PRO) Atty. Emiliano A. Mackay, wrote a letter dated October 18, 2006 addressed to the Second Division of this Court inquiring as to the effectivity of the Resolution suspending the respondent so as not to sow confusion among the legal practitioners and party litigants with pending cases before the respondent's sala. Likewise, the IBP-CALMANA Chapter manifested that respondent did not cease to perform her judicial functions as evidenced by a 15 16 Commitment Order issued by respondent on October 16, 2006, and handwritten manifestations of some party litigants attesting that on various 17 dates they attended hearings before respondent's sala. In the same vein, in an undated letter addressed to Associate Justice Angelina SandovalGutierrez, the Concerned Trial Lawyers in the City of Caloocan raised the same concern before this Court. In her Reply to SSP Velasco's Opposition, respondent admitted that she continued discharging her bounden duties in utmost good faith after filing her motion for reconsideration. She averred that she did not have the slightest intention to defy or ignore this Court's Resolution which did not categorically state that the said suspension is immediately executory. Respondent reiterated her arguments against the suspension order on the grounds that she was deprived of due process; that her conviction is not yet final; and that the crimes for which she was convicted have nothing to do with the discharge of her official duties. Lastly, respondent claimed that the instant case is but another harassment suit filed against her by SSP Velasco because she earlier filed an administrative complaint against the latter for maliciously indicting respondent with respect to another case of child abuse. On October 25, 2006, respondent filed a Manifestation of Voluntary Inhibition stating that she is voluntarily inhibiting from handling all cases scheduled for hearing before her sala from October 25, 2006 to November 13, 2006. On October 27, 2006, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in respondent's sala. Per Report of the judicial audit team, it was established that from October 6, 2006 to October 23, 2006, respondent conducted hearings, issued orders, decided cases and resolved motions, acting as if the order of suspension which the respondent received on October 6, 2006 was only a "mirage." The Report was brought to the attention of Chief Justice Reynato S. 21 Puno by Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (CA Lock). On October 30, 2006, SSP Velasco filed an Administrative Complaint against respondent for violation of the Court's Circulars, the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and for Gross Misconduct, asseverating, among others, that the suspension order was 22 immediately executory and that integrity as mandated by the New Code of Judicial Conduct is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges. In her Comment, respondent, in addition to her previous contentions, argued that the Resolution dated September 18, 2006 ordering her suspension was issued only by a Division of this Court contrary to Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that " the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon."
23 20 19 18 12 11 10
On November 9, 2006, SSP Velasco filed a Supplement to the Opposition to Respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 25 September 18, 2006. Thereafter, numerous pleadings were filed by both parties practically repeating their previous allegations. Subsequently, in a Resolution dated February 19, 2007, this Court lifted the suspension of respondent on the ground that: Upon verification, it appears that the Office of the Clerk of Court, Second Division, indeed failed to attach a copy of the OCA complaint to the copy of our resolution dated September 18, 2006 sent to Judge Angeles. Due process requires that Judge Angeles be accorded the opportunity to answer the complaint. Respondent was then given a fresh period of ten (10) days from the receipt of the OCA Administrative Complaint within which to file her comment. On March 15, 2007, respondent filed her Comment with the following material assertions: (1) that CA Lock as Court Administrator and who in behalf of the OCA stands as the complainant in this case, has no personal knowledge of the facts, issues and evidence presented in the criminal cases; (2) that the instant case, filed eleven (11) years after the criminal charges for child abuse were filed by Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay, smacks of malice and bad faith on the part of CA Lock; (3) that CA Lock is a friend and former subordinate of then National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Epimaco Velasco (Director Velasco), father of herein party SSP Velasco, thus, CA Lock's ill motive against respondent is clear; (4) that CA Lock should not use the OCA to harass a member of the judiciary; (5) that the decision in the aforementioned criminal cases has not yet become final; (6) that the acts for which she was convicted are totally alien to her official functions and have nothing to do with her fitness and competence as a judge; (7) that there is no wisdom in the imposition of the suspension which in this case is preventive in character because respondent cannot do anything through her office that could possibly cause prejudice to the prosecution of the child abuse case; (8) that the lifting of the suspension order retroacts to the date of its issuance; (9) that the instant case should be struck down because the judgment of conviction was contrary to law and jurisprudence; and (10) that under the circumstances, all the charges were merely concocted by respondent's detractors in order to embarrass, humiliate and vex her. In his Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated February 19, 2007, SSP Velasco argued that respondent's deprivation of her right to due process was cured when she filed her motion for the reconsideration of the suspension order; thus, there is no need to lift such order. He reiterated his previous statement that "as a sitting judge who wields power over all persons appearing before her and thus has immeasurable influence within the judicial system as one of its members, Judge Angeles could definitely cause pressure to bear, not only on the members of the Court of Appeals and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but also on the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that prosecutes her case on appeal. Only her suspension from official function, pending resolution of her case, will neutralize her judicial clout and clear the air of any kind of suspicion that justice is not going well in 28 her case." In response, respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to the said motion with a Motion to Declare SSP Velasco in contempt of Court due to this aforementioned statement. Respondent argued that such statement betrays SSP Velasco's cheap and low perception of the integrity and independence of this Court, of the CA and of the OSG. It also shows his utter lack of respect for the judicial system. Moreover, respondent added that since she was not furnished a copy of the OCA Administrative Complaint, the issuance of the suspension order deprived her of her right to due process and prevented her from fully ventilating her arguments. Respondent, likewise, questioned SSP Velasco's legal personality in this case as it was the OCA which, motu proprio, initiated the filing of the said case. In a Resolution dated July 4, 2007, this Court, among others, directed SSP Velasco to file his comment on respondent's motion to cite him for contempt. On August 21, 2007, SSP Velasco filed his Comment claiming that he has legal personality to file pleadings before this Court because it was he who initiated the filing of this case through his letter to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban on July 25, 2006. He admitted that the allegedly contemptuous statements were merely lifted from said letter. He argued that the former Chief Justice or the Court for that matter, did not find any contemptuous statement in the letter. Taking the letter in its entire context, SSP Velasco posited that he did not commit any act of disobedience to the orders of this Court; neither did he bring the Court's authority and the administration of law into disrepute nor did he impede the due administration of justice. Nowhere in the letter was it stated that this Court, the CA and the OSG could be pressured; the letter merely stated that respondent could cause pressure. SSP Velasco pointed that the letter to the then Chief Justice, in itself, shows his respect for the judiciary and the promotion of the administration of justice. In her Reply to said Comment, respondent argued that it cannot be said that somebody could cause pressure if no one is believed to be susceptible to pressure. Thus, the use of this kind of language tends to degrade the administration of justice and constitutes indirect contempt. She stressed that SSP Velasco's act of misrepresenting himself as the complainant in this case while it is clear from the Resolution of this Court that the OCA motu propriofiled the same, is per se contemptuous. Meanwhile in its Memorandum, the OCA reiterated its earlier position that respondent should be suspended pending the outcome of this administrative case. The OCA opined that the Resolution lifting the suspension order was basically premised on the ground that respondent was not accorded her right to due process. By filing her Comment raising arguments against her suspension, respondent has fully availed herself of such right. However, the OCA submitted that respondent's arguments are devoid of merit on the following grounds: (1) the Court Administrator need not personally know about the criminal cases of respondent because the instant case is based on a public document, i.e., the decision of the RTC convicting the respondent of child abuse; (2) the fact that said decision has not attained finality is of no moment for what is being sought is merely preventive
31 30 29 27 26
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suspension. Thus, in the event that respondent is acquitted in the criminal cases of which she stands accused, she will receive the salaries and other benefits which she would not receive during her suspension; (3) even if the acts of child abuse have no connection with respondent's official functions as a judge, it is established that the private conduct of judges cannot be dissociated from their official functions; (4) respondent's preventive suspension shall serve an important purpose: it will protect the image of the judiciary and preserve the faith of the people in the same; and (5) citing the case of Leonida Vistan v. Judge Ruben T. Nicolas, the RTC decision convicting respondent of child abuse is prima facie evidence that respondent committed the said crime which indicates the moral depravity of the offender and, as such, warrants the punishment of dismissal from the service. Thus, the OCA recommended that respondent be suspended pending the outcome of this administrative case and that the CA be directed to resolve the criminal cases with dispatch. The Issues There are two ultimate issues in this case: First, whether or not grounds exist to cite SSP Velasco for indirect contempt of Court; and Second, whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the respondent pending the resolution of this administrative case. The Court's Ruling We resolve the first issue in the negative. In Pilar Barredo-Fuentes v. Judge Romeo C. Albarracin, we held: Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses during litigation. There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt. In her Comment/Opposition with Motion to Declare SSP Velasco in contempt of Court, respondent espoused the view that SSP Velasco is guilty of indirect contempt for using language which tends to degrade the administration of justice. But if this were so, respondent should have availed herself of the remedy in accordance with Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, viz: SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. - Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned . . . . (Emphasis supplied) A charge of indirect contempt must be filed in the form of a verified petition if it is not initiated directly by the court against which the contemptuous act was committed. On previous occasions, we clarified that such petition is in the nature of a special civil action. Certified true copies of related documents must be submitted with the petition and appropriate docket fees must be paid. The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. As Justice Florenz D. Regalado has explained: This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, 34 which is now required in the second paragraph of [Section 4]. On the charge of indirect contempt of court, we therefore find that SSP Velasco's statement, while irresponsible, did not necessarily degrade the administration of justice as to be considered contumacious. The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. A lawyer's remarks explaining his position in a case
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under consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contempt that justifies the court's exercise of the power of contempt. We note that SSP Velasco's statement was made in support of his argument for the imposition of preventive suspension, i.e., to prevent the respondent from using her current position to alter the course of the investigation and the disposition of the appealed criminal cases. Nevertheless, SSP Velasco must bear in mind that as a lawyer, he must be circumspect in his language. We remind him of our admonition to all lawyers to observe the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read: Canon 8. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. A lawyer is an officer of the Court. It is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not unnecessarily destroy the people's high esteem and regard for the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice. A lawyer's language may be forceful but should always be dignified; emphatic but respectful, as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel, and 36 should use such language as may be properly addressed by one person to another. We likewise resolve the second issue in the negative. The Court cannot fully agree with the recommendation of the OCA. Pertinent is our ruling in Emmanuel Ymson Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, which involved the same parties and where we held: An act unrelated to a judge's discharge of judicial functions may give rise to administrative liability even when such act constitutes a violation of penal law. When the issue is administrative liability, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. Conversely, conviction in the criminal case will not automatically warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative case . We emphasize the well-settled rule that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to it. In Nuez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga, the Court held that the mere existence of pending criminal charges against the respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them. By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption 39 40 of innocence continues. InMangubat v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that respondent Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion, correctible by certiorari, when it ruled that despite her convictions, "Preagido has still in her favor the constitutional presumption of innocence x x x (and until) a promulgation of final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate prevails." The Court therein further held that such ruling is not bereft of legal or logical foundation and cannot, in any sense, be characterized as a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment. So also must we hold in this case. Moreover, it is established that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its 41 consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges may be used as tools to harass them and may in the long run create adverse consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove that other than the fact that a judgment of conviction for child abuse was rendered against the respondent, which is still on appeal, there are other lawful grounds to support the imposition of preventive suspension. Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the accused to be 42 presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of 43 Court, are amorphous at best. Likewise, we consider respondent's argument that there is no urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she cannot, by using her present position as an RTC Judge, do anything to influence the CA to render a decision in her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also been rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this administrative case. However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds to warrant the imposition of preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in respondent's pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but also against former CA
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Lock. To reiterate our previous ruling involving the respondent, her use of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly below the standard expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed position of a magistrate of the law demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in conduct and 44 45 in language. Illustrative are the following statements: "CA Lock's hostile mindset and his superstar complex"; "In a frenzied display of arrogance and 46 47 power"; "(CA Lock's) complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the trial court"; and "when (CA Lock) himself loses his objectivity and 48 misuses the full powers of his Office to persecute the object of his fancy, then it is time for him to step down." In the attempt to discredit CA Lock, respondent even dragged CA Lock's son into the controversy, to wit: It is noteworthy to mention that CA Lock's hostile attitude was aggravated by his embarrassment when the undersigned mentioned to him that she knew how he used his influence to secure a position for his son at the RTC Library of Pasay City which was then managed by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that his son be assigned to the library to enable the latter to conveniently adjust his schedule in reviewing for the bar examination. Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the respondent said: "A reading of the motion for reconsideration readily discloses that it is mainly anchored on SSP Velasco's malicious speculations about the guilt of the undersigned.Speculations, especially those that emanate from the poisonous intentions of 49 attention-seeking individuals, are no different from garbage that should be rejected outright"; and "His malicious insinuation is no less than a revelation of his warped mindset that a person's position could cause pressure to bear among government officials. This brings forth a nagging question. Did SSP Velasco use his position at the DOJ to 'cause pressure to bear' and obtain a favorable disposition of the administrative cases lodged 50 against him by the undersigned? Is he afraid of his own ghost?" It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. She must maintain composure and equanimity. The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of 51 restrictions. This is the price that judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice. One final word. The parties herein have admitted in their various pleadings that they have filed numerous cases against each other. We do not begrudge them the prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their opinion, may have wronged them. But it is well to remind them that this privilege must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give them the right to institute shotgun charges with reckless abandon, or allow their disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of two irresponsible children. Judge Angeles and SSP Velasco should bear in mind that they are high-ranking public officers whom the people look up to for zealous, conscientious and responsive public service. Name-calling hardly becomes them. Cognizant of the adverse impact and unpleasant consequences this continuing conflict will inflict on the public service, we find both officials wanting in the conduct demanded of public servants. WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Nevertheless, respondent Adoracion G. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby REPRIMANDED for her use of intemperate language in her pleadings and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall merit a more severe sanction. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of the Department of Justice is hereby WARNED that he should be more circumspect in the statements made in his pleadings and that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. The motion to cite him for contempt is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resolve CA-G.R. CR No. 30260 involving respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles with dispatch. SO ORDERED.
People vs Abulon
EN BANC THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174473 Appellee, Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, - versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO-MORALES, AZCUNA, ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA, TINGA, Appellant. CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: August 17, 2007 x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION Tinga, J.: For automatic review is the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 28 April 2006, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial 3 Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, dated 27 December 2000, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of qualified rape and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness. In three (3) separate Informations for Criminal Cases No. SC-7422, SC-7423 and SC-7424 all dated 16 June 1999, appellant was indicted before the RTC 5 for three (3) counts of qualified rape against his minor daughter AAA. The accusatory portions in all the Informations are identical, except as regards the date of commission of the crime. The Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7422 reads:
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People vs Abulon
At the instance of the private complainant [AAA] with the conformity of her mother [BBB] in a sworn complaint filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lumban-Kalayaan (Laguna), the undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna hereby accuses ALVIN ABULON Y SALVANIA, of the crime of "RAPE," committed as follows: "That on or about March 14, 1999, in the Municipality of Kalayaan, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd designs, with grave abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness, and with force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his legitimate minor daughter, [AAA], who at the [ sic] time was thirteen (13) years of age, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice." CONTRARY TO LAW. After appellant pleaded not guilty, trial ensued with AAA herself, as the first prosecution witness, testifying to the following facts: AAA is the oldest of five (5) legitimate children born to appellant and BBB. On 14, 15, and 16 March 1999, appellant raped AAA. The first rape incident occurred at around 1:30 in the morning of 14 March 1999. AAA was home, fast asleep next to her brother and sister when she suddenly woke up to the noise created by her father who arrived drunk, but who likewise soon thereafter returned to the wedding festivities he was attending. Abiding by their 7 fathers instructions, AAA and her siblings went back to sleep. AAA was next awakened by the weight of her father lying naked on top of her. Appellant had removed her underwear while she slept. He poked a knife on AAAs waist and threatened to kill her and her siblings if she reported the incident to anyone. She begged him to stop but he proceeded to kiss her 8 mouth, vagina, and breast, and to have carnal knowledge of her. Although they witnessed the ongoing ordeal, AAAs siblings could do nothing but cry 9 10 as appellant likewise poked the knife on them. The following morning, AAA found a whitish substance and blood stains on her panty. On 15 March 1999, at around 10:30 in the evening, AAA and her siblings were awakened as appellant came home drunk. He told them to eat first as 11 they had not taken their supper yet. After dining together, appellant left and AAA, her brother, and her sister went back to sleep. As in the previous evening, appellant roused AAA in mid-sleep. This time, she woke up with her father holding her hand, covering her mouth and lying on top of her. He undressed AAA, then mounted her. Repeatedly, he inserted his penis into her vagina, and AAA felt pain in her private parts. Appellant also kissed and 12 fondled AAA on different parts of her body. Again, AAAs siblings could only cry as they saw appellant rape their sister. AAAs sister, however, took a pen and wrote her a note which read: "Ate, let us tell what father was doing to the police officer." After appellant had raped AAA, the latters sister asked their father why he had done such to AAA. In 13 response, appellant spanked AAAs sister and threatened to kill all of them should they report the incidents to the police. The sisters nonetheless 14 related to their relatives AAAs misfortune, but the relatives did not take heed as they regarded appellant to be a kind man. The third rape episode happened at around 3:30 in the morning of 16 March 1999. Although appellant did not insert his penis into AAAs vagina on this 15 occasion, he took off her lower undergarments and kissed her vagina. On cross-examination, AAA asserted that her father inserted his tongue into the 16 hole of her vagina and she felt pain because of this. To corroborate AAAs testimony, the prosecution presented BBB and AAAs 6-year old brother CCC. BBB testified that she was a stay-in housemaid working in Las Pias on the dates that her daughter was raped by appellant. On 26 March 1999, she went home and stayed with her family. However, it was only on 4 May 1999 that BBB learned of the rape, when CCC told her that appellant had raped AAA three (3) times and that he had seen his father on top of his sister during those occasions. BBB then verified the matter with AAA herself, and the latter affirmed the incidents. BBB thus took AAA with 18 her to the barangay and police authorities to report the incidents, and later to the provincial hospital for medical examination. CCC testified that on three (3) separate occasions, he saw his father lying naked on top of AAA, who was likewise naked.
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The prosecution also presented SPO1 Bayani G. Montesur (SPO1 Montesur) and Dr. Gloria Cabael (Dr. Cabael). SPO1 Montesur identified the Police 20 Blotter of 4 May 1999 which recorded the complaints of rape against appellant and the report of the latters arrest. Dr. Cabael, on the other hand, testified that she examined AAA on 4 May 1999 upon the request of Police Officer Gallarosa. She identified the Rape Case Report she prepared 21 thereafter. Appellant testified as the sole witness on his behalf, proffering denial and alibi as his defenses. According to appellant, he was hired by his aunt, Raquel Masangkay, to deliver hogs and that at 1:30 in the morning of 14 March 1999, he was in Calamba, Laguna pursuant to such employment. He averred 22 that he went home at 7:00 in the morning of the following day and thus could not have raped his daughter as alleged. Likewise denying the second rape charge, appellant testified that on 15 March 1999, he attended a wedding ceremony in Sityo Kalayaan, San Antonio, Kalayaan, Laguna. He went 23 home drunk at 6:00 that evening and promptly went to sleep. Similarly, at 3:00 in the morning of 16 March 1999, appellant claimed to have been 24 asleep with his children and could not have thus committed the rape as charged.
People vs Abulon
Finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant of the crime of qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 and the crime of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. SC-7424, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Judgment against appellant and sentenced him accordingly, thus: WHEREFORE: Under Criminal Case No. SC-7422, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of CONSUMMATED QUALIFIED RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7639, otherwise known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW, and hereby sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY of DEATH and to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the following sums: P 75,000.00 - as civil indemnity 50,000.00 - as moral damages; and 50,000.00 - as exemplary damages. Under Criminal Case No. SC-7423, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of CONSUMMATED QUALIFIED RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7639, otherwise known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW, and hereby sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY of DEATH and to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the following sums: P 75,000.00 - as civil indemnity 50,000.00 - as moral damages; and 50,000.00 - as exemplary damages. Under Criminal Case No. SC-7424, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for SIX (6) MONTHS of ARRESTO MAYOR as MINIMUM to SIX (6) YEARS of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as MAXIMUM. The accused is further ordered to pay the costs of the instant three (3) cases. SO ORDERED.
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With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. However, pursuant to th is Courts ruling 26 in People v. Mateo, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. On 28 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its decision affirming appel lants conviction, but with modification as to damages awarded to the victim. The dispositive portion of the decision states: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 finding appellant Alvin S. Abulon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of qualified rape, and in Criminal Case No. SC-7424, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, are hereby AFFIRMED. The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: In Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422-7423, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of [P]50,000.00 is reduced to [P]25,000.00. In Criminal Case No. SC-7424, appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of [P]30,000.00 as moral damages. We affirm in all other respects. Pursuant to A.M. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004, this case is elevated and certified to the Supreme Court for its automatic review. SO ORDERED.
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In his Brief, appellant assails his conviction and imputes grave error to the trial court for giving weight and credence to the testimony of AAA. In particular, he makes capital of AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother. He likewise impugns the trial courts a lleged bias in propounding inappropriate leading questions to private complainant AAA. Finally, he maintains that the Informations against him are defective as they failed to 29 allege the key element of force and/or intimidation.
People vs Abulon
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with modifications. The duty to ascertain the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial court, because it has the unique position of observing the witnesss deportment on the stand while testifying. Absent any compelling reason to justify the reversal of the evaluatio ns and conclusions of the 31 trial court, the reviewing court is generally bound by the formers findings. In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainants 32 testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. Her testimony is most vital 33 and must be received with the utmost caution. When a rape victims testimony, however, is straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. Once found credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a 34 conviction. The court a quo found the testimony of AAA in its entirety to be credible, made in a candid, spontaneous, and straightforward manner and never 35 shaken even under rigid cross-examination. We agree that AAAs narration of her harrowing experience is worthy of credence, thus: Criminal Case No. SC-7422 Trial Prosecutor: Q : Tell us what happened at around 1:30 in the morning of March 11, [sic] 1999 to you? A : My brother and sister and I were already asleep when my father who was drank [sic] came home. We told him to just sleep. My father told us that he would still return to the wedding celebration (kasalan). xxxx Q : What happened next when you continued sleeping? A : I was awakened when I felt my father already on top of me, sir. Q : Tell us exactly what was [sic] your position then at that time you woke up? A : I was still lying straight down, sir. Q : How about your father in relation to you, where was he at the time you woke up? A : He was on top (nakadagan) of me, sir. Court: Q : Was he naked? A : Already naked, Your Honor. Q : How about you, do [sic] you have your clothes on? A : I have [sic] my lady sando on, Your Honor. Trial Prosecutor: Q : Are [sic] you still wearing your panty when you were awakened? A : No more, sir. xxxx Q : What did your father do aside from placing his body on top of you?
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People vs Abulon
A : He poked a knife on [sic] me, sir. Court: Q : Did he say something? A : Yes, Your Honor. Q : What did he say? A : He said that if he [sic] report her [sic] to anybody he would kill us, Your Honor. xxxx Trial Prosecutor: Q : What else did he do aside from telling you "huag kang magsusumbong"? A : He also poked the knife on [sic] my brother and sister, sir. Q : They were already awakened at that time? A : Yes, sir. Q : What else did he do aside from poking a knife on [sic] you and your brother and sister? A : No more, sir. Court: Q : While your father according to you is [sic] on top of you, what did he do if any? A : "Kinayog na po niya ako." Q : What do you mean by telling [sic] "kinayog na po niya ako"? A : He was moving, Your Honor. Q : While your father was moving, what else was happening at that time? A : I felt pain, Your Honor. Trial Prosecutor: Q : From where did you feel that pain? A : From my private part, sir. xxxx Q : Do you know if you know why you felt the pain on the lower portion of your body? A : Yes, sir. Q : Please tell us if you know?
People vs Abulon
A : Something whitish coming out from it, sir. Court: Q : From where did it come from [sic]? That whitish substance? A : From my fathers private part, Your Honor. Q : Why, what happened to the private part of your father? A : I do not know, Your Honor. Q : When you felt pain, what was your father doing then? A : He repeated what he told [sic] previously not to tell to [sic] anybody. Q : At that time, did you see the private part of your father? A : Yes, Your Honor. Q : When you felt pain. Do you know what is [sic] happening to the private part of your father? A : Yes, Your Honor. Q : What was happening? A : His private part stiffened or hardened (tumirik), Your Honor. Q : Where was it placed if any? A : Into my private part, Your Honor. Q : Did the private part of you father actually penetrate your vagina? A : Yes, Your Honor. Q : What did you feel at the time the penis of your father entered your vagina? A : It was painful, Your Honor. Q : At that time was your father making any movement? A : Yes, Your Honor. Q : Will you describe the movement made by your father? A : (Witness demonstrating an upward and downward stroke by placing her right palm over her left hand) Trial Prosecutor: Q : Did he kiss you? A : Yes, sir. Q : In what part of your body?
People vs Abulon
A : On my mouth, sir. Q : Aside from your mouth, what other part or parts of your body did he kiss? A : On my private part, sir. Q : When did he kiss you private part, before inserting his penis or after? A : After he inserted his penis, sir. Q : What other part of your body did he kiss? A : On my breast, sir. xxxx Criminal Case No. SC-7423 TP. Arcigal, Jr.: Q : Now, you said that the second incident happened [on] March 15, 1999, am I correct? A : Yes, sir. Q : And where and what time said [sic] second incident happened? A : 10:30 in the evening, sir, also in our house, sir. xxxx Q : And what were you doing when your father returned at around 11:00 oclock in the evening? A : We were all asleep, sir. Q : And how did you come to know that he returned at around 11:00 P.M.? A : My father suddenly held my hand, sir. Q : And because of that, you were awakened? A : Yes, sir. Q : And what happened when you were awakened because your father held your hand? A : He covered my mouth, sir. Q : And after covering your mouth, what else did he do? A : He removed the lower portion of my clothes. "Hinubuan po niya ako." xxxx Q : After removing your lady sando, what else did he do? A : He laid himself on top of me, sir.
36
People vs Abulon
xxxx Q : Now, what did he do to you when he was already on top of you? A : He was "kinakayog niya po ako." Q : Aside from "kinakayog," what else did he do? A : He kissed my breast, sir. Q : Aside from that, what else? A : He likewise touched my private part, sir. Q : When he was on top of you, do you know where was [sic] his penis at that time? A : Yes, sir. Q : Where? A : Into my vagina, sir. Q : How did you come to know that the penis of your father was inside your vagina? A : I felt pain in my private part, sir. Q : And do you know why you felt pain in your private part? A : Yes, sir. Q : Why? A : His private part . (Thereafter witness is crying while uttering words: "I am afraid I might be killed by my father.") He held his penis into my vagina. Thereafter, inserted it repeatedly into mine, sir. Q : And you were able to actually feel his penis inside your vagina? A : Yes, sir. xxxx Criminal Case No. SC-7424 TP. Arcigal, Jr.: Q : Now, you said also that you were raped on March 16, 1999, am I correct? A : Yes, sir. Q : What time? A : It was 3:30 oclock in the morning, sir. xxxx TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
37
People vs Abulon
Q Now, how did it happen, that third incident? A I was able to run downstairs but when I was about to open the door, he was able to hold my dress, sir. Q : Was your father drunk at that time? A : Yes, sir. Q : How did you come to know? A : His eyes were red and he was laughing at me while telling me: "It is your end." (Witness crying while answering the question.) Q : Now, what happened when your father was able to hold your dress? A : He carried me upstairs, sir. Q : Was he able to carry you upstairs? A : Yes, sir. Q : What did he do, if any, when you were upstairs? A : He removed my panty and shortpants, sir. Q : After removing your shorts and panty, what else did he do? A : No more but he kissed my vagina. Q : Which part of your vagina did he kiss? A : That part of my vagina with hold [sic]. Court: Q : What about your upper garments at that time? A : He did not remove it, Your Honor. Q : What else did he do, aside from that? A : Nothing more, just that. Q : After kissing your vagina, what else happened, if any? A : He again poked the knife on us, Your Honor. Q : At that time, was your father naked or not? A : Still with his clothes on, Your Honor. xxxx Q : For clarification, what else, if any, did your father do after your father kissed your vagina? A : Nothing more, merely that act, Your Honor.
People vs Abulon
Q : You mean your father did not insert his penis to [sic] your vagina anymore? A : No more, Your Honor. xxxx TP. Arcigal, Jr.: Q : Now, what did he use in kissing your clitoris? A : His tongue, sir. Q : How did you come to know that it was his tongue that he used? A : It is because I saw him put out his tongue, sir.
38
Verily, it is inconceivable and contrary to human experience for a daughter, who is attached to her father by the natural bond of love and affection, to 39 40 accuse him of rape, unless he is the one who raped and defoliated her. As we have pronounced in People v. Canoy: It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of her most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity or even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence to the very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not have been aggrieved. Nor do we believe that the victim would 41 fabricate a story of rape simply because she wanted to exact revenge against her father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating her. In stark contrast with AAAs convincing recital of facts, supported as it was by the testimonies of BBB and CCC, are appellants uncorroborated and shaky defenses of denial and alibi. Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and 42 categorical testimony and identification of the complainant. Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily 43 44 be fabricated. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. The records disclose that not a shred of evidence was adduced by appellant to corroborate his alibi. Alibi must be supported by credible corroboration 45 from disinterested witnesses, otherwise, it is fatal to the accused. Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was physically 46 impossible for appellant to be present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. By his own testimony, appellant clearly failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the crime when the rapes were alleged to have occurred. Except for the first incident, appellant was within the vicinity of his home and in fact alleged that he was supposedly even sleeping therein on the occasion of the second and third incidents. Appellants contention that AAAs accusations are clouded by her failure to report the alleged occurrences of rape is unmeritorious. To begin with, AAA categorically testified that she told her fathers niece about the incidents. However, the latter doubted her, believing inst ead that appellant was not that kind of man. AAAs subsequent attempt to report the incidents to the barangay turned out to be futile as well as she was only able to spea k with the barangay driver, who happened to be appellants brother-in-law. She was likewise disbelieved by the latter. Her disclosure of the rapes to a certain 47 Menoy did not yield any positive result either. Fearing for the lives of her grandparents, AAA decided not to tell them about the incidents. A child of thirteen years cannot be expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to the authorities. Indeed, We see how AAA must have felt absolutely hopeless since the people around her were relatives of her father and her attempts to solicit help from them were in vain. Thus, AAAs silence in not reporting the incidents to her mother and filing the appropriate case against appellant for over a month is sufficiently explained. The 49 charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. It is not beyond ken that the child, living under threat from appellant and having been turned away by trusted relatives, even accused by them of lying, would simply opt to just suffer in silence thereafter. In 50 People v. Gutierrez, we held: Complainants failure to immediately report the rape does not diminish her credibility. The silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault on their virtues because of the rapists threat on their lives, more so when the offende r is someone whom she 51 knew and who was living with her. Appellant brands the trial judge as partial against him for propounding leading questions to AAA. According to him, were it not for the lower courts and 52 the prosecutions biased leading questions, AAA would not have proven the elements of the crimes charged. Appellants argument is not well-taken. It is the judges prerogative to ask clarificatory queries to ferret out the truth. It cannot be taken against him if 54 the questions he propounds reveal certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party. After all, the judge is the arbiter and ought
53 48
People vs Abulon
to be satisfied himself as to the respective merits and claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands of due process. Also, being the 56 arbiter, he may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite proceedings and prevent unnecessary waste of time. Besides, jurisprudence explains that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of the judges questions is determined by their quality and not necessaril y by their quantity and, in 57 any event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning or not. In the instant case, the Court finds that on the whole, the questions propounded by the judge a quo were but clarificatory in nature and that, concomitantly, appellant failed to satisfactorily establish that he was prejudiced by such queries. The matter of the purportedly defective Informations was properly addressed by the Court of Appeals, pointing out that a close scrutiny of the 58 Informations would reveal that the words "force and/or intimidation" are specifically alleged therein. Even if these were not so, well-established is the rule that force or intimidation need not be proven in incestuous cases. The overpowering moral influence of a father over his daughter takes the 59 place of violence and offer of resistance ordinarily required in rape cases where the accused is unrelated to the victim. Now, we turn to the determination of the crime for which appellant under the third charge is liable and the corresponding penalty therefor. In the Brief for the People, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that all three (3) charges of rape, including the rape committed on 16 March 1999 subject of Criminal Case No. SC-7424, were proved beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that it was clear from the evidence that appellant merely kissed the vagina of AAA and made no attempt of penetration, meaning penile penetration, and for that reason found him guilty of acts of 60 lasciviousness only. Yet, in affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals did not find any categorical testimony on AAAs part that appellant had inserted his tongue in her vagina, stressing instead that the mere probability of such insertion cannot take the place of proof required to establish the 61 guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt for rape. The automatic appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case for review, as in this case. Thus, this Court is mandated to re-examine the vital facts established a quo and to properly apply the law thereto. The two courts below were both mistaken, as we note that AAA unqualifiedly testified on cross-examination to appellants insertion of his tongue into her vagina, viz: Court: Q : On the third time you are [sic] allegedly raped, you said it happened at 3:30 in the morning of March 16, 1999. A : Yes, sir. Q : And you said yesterday that he did not insert his pennies [sic] to [sic] your vagina on March 16? A : Yes, sir. Q : What he did is he kissed your vagina? A : Yes, sir. Q : For how long did he kiss your vagina? A : Two minutes, sir. Q : What did he actually do when he kissed your vagina? A : He kissed my vagina, thereafter he laughed and laughed. Q : You mean to tell the court when he kissed your vagina he used his lips? A : His lips and tongue, sir. Q : What did he do? A : He put out his tongue thereafter he "inano" the hole of my vagina. Court:
62
55
People vs Abulon
Q : What did your father do with his tongue? A : He placed it in the hole of my vagina. Q : Did you feel pain? A : Yes, sir. Q : By just kissing your vagina you felt pain? A : Yes, Your Honor.
63
Notwithstanding the explicit testimony of AAA on the matter, this Court cannot find appellant guilty of rape as proved, but of acts of lasciviousness only. In reaching this conclusion, we take a route different from the ones respectively taken by the courts below. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (R.A. No. 8353), otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the concept of rape was revolutionized with the new recognition that the crime should include sexual violence on the womans sex-related orifices other than her organ, and be expanded as 65 well to cover gender-free rape. The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of 66 rape by "sexual assault" as differentiated from the traditional "rape through carnal knowledge" or "rape through sexual intercourse." Section 2 of the law provides: Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 9815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows: Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. Rape Is Committed 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise is unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Paragraph 1 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8353, which is now Paragraph 1 of the new Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, covers rape through sexual intercourse while paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault. Rape through sexual intercourse is also denominated as "organ rape" or "penile rape." 67 68 On the other hand, rape by sexual assault is otherwise called "instrument or object rape," also "gender-free rape," or the narrower "homosexual 69 rape." In People v. Silvano, the Court recognized that the fathers insertion of his tongue and finger into his daughters vaginal orifice would have subj ected him to liability for "instrument or object rape" had the new law been in effect already at the time he committed the acts. Similarly, in People v. 71 Miranda, the Court observed that appellants insertion of his fingers into the complainants organ would have constituted rape by sexual assault had it been committed when the new law was already in effect. The differences between the two modes of committing rape are the following: (1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a man or a woman; (2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended party may be a man or a woman;
70 64
People vs Abulon
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the second is committed by inserting the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and (4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second. In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was proven, without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Said provisions read: Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily included in rape.
72
In light of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the penalty of death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty meted out to appellant for rape through sexual intercourse in Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423 is 74 reduced in each case from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. We affirm the conviction of appellant in Criminal Case No. SC7424 for acts of lascivousness but modify the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals instead to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum as neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime. With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award in Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423 in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Therefore, appellant is ordered to indemnify AAA, for each count of qualified rape, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral 75 damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of damages in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is affirmed. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 01926 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423, appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim, AAA, in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs. In Criminal Case No. SC-7424, appellant is found guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 plus costs. SO ORDERED.
73
Re: Petition for Television and Radio Coverage of Multiple Murder Cases Against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan
EN BANC RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., x ----------------------------------- x RE: PETITION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT COURT HANDLING THE TRIAL OF THE MASSACRE OF 57 PERSONS, INCLUDING 32 JOURNALISTS, IN AMPATUAN, MAGUINDANAO INTO A SPECIAL COURT HANDLING THIS CASE ALONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING GENUINE SPEEDY TRIAL and FOR THE SETTING UP OF VIDEOCAM AND MONITOR JUST OUTSIDE THE COURT FOR JOURNALISTS TO COVER AND FOR THE PEOPLE TO WITNESS THE TRIAL OF THE DECADE TO MAKE IT TRULY PUBLIC AND IMPARTIAL AS COMMANDED BY THE CONSTITUTION, x ---------------------------------x A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC
A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC
Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.
*
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III FOR THE LIVE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE TRIAL.
Promulgated: June 14, 2011
A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of m urder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City.
Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe
[1] [2] [3]
filed a petition before
this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
[4]
The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.
In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside the court.
[7]
[5]
[6]
The Court docketed the petition as A.M.
No. 10-11-6-SC.
President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010
[8]
addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out in support of those who
have petitioned [this Court] to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The President expressed earnest hope that *this Court+ will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic deliberation,
attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition merits. SC.
[9]
The Court docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-
By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010, a separate Resolution A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.
[10]
the Court consolidated A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. The Court shall treat in
Meanwhile, various groups
[11]
also sent to the Chief Justice their respective resolutions and statements bearing on these matters.
The principal accused in the cases, Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan), filed a Consolidated Comment of December 6, 2010 in A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC and A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. The President, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and NUJP, et al. filed their respective Reply of January 18, 2011and January 20, 2011. Ampatuan also filed a Rejoinder of March 9, 2011.
On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case
[12]
and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request

[13]
Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada
which rulings, they
contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter
[14]
to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to
discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however, that matters concerning media coverage should be brought to the Courts attention through appropriate motion.
[15]
Hence, the present petitions which assert the
exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings , subject to the guidelineswhich shall be enumerated shortly.
Putts Law
[16]
states that technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand what they do not manage, and those who
manage what they do not understand. Indeed, members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the experts gown, so to speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or risks from the use of technology inside the courtroom.
A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once again faced with the same task of striking that delicate balance between seemingly competing yet certainly complementary rights.
The indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage to the accuseds right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information.
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations.
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm *a+ trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment[, and t]o so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. The observation that *m+assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino: Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper. Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage [17] of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.
The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case. It held that *t+he propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s] the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. The Court disposed: The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
[18]
In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by Resolution of September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, under the following conditions: x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and [19] exhibition in accordance with law.
Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas
[20]
which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited, was borne out of the dynamics of a jury system,
where the considerations for the possible infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose members are not necessarily schooled in the law, are different from that of a judge who is versed with the rules of evidence. To petitioners, Estes also does not represent the most contemporary position of the United States in the wake of latest jurisprudence
[21]
and statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all 50 states, except the District of Columbia,
allow television coverage with varying degrees of openness.
Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage. Almost all the proceedings of United Kingdoms Supreme Court are filmed, and sometimes broadcast.
[22]
The International Criminal Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in the internet.
[23]
On the media coverages influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out that Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the sustained conclusion. They point out errors of generalization where the conclusion has been mostly supported by studies on American attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study on the particular matter dealing with Filipinos.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. Desierto,
[25] [24]
and Estrada v.
that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of
an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically discusses: An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the [26] proceedings. (underscoring supplied)
Even before considering what is a reasonable number of the public who may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the s ubject criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the followingguidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada: (a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting. (b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment. No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court. (c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court. The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment. (d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical glitches. If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds. At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted. (e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof [27] where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness). The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or both. (f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and during portions of the proc eedings wherein the public is ordered excluded. (g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court; (h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court; (i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law. (j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of the grant of application by the media entities.
(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication technology. (l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court ( i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.
Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined.
SO ORDERED.
Martinez vs. Mendoza

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 153795 August 17, 2006 MA. ESTRELITA D. MARTINEZ, Petitioner, vs. Director General LEANDRO MENDOZA, Chief Superintendent NESTORIO GUALBERTO, SR., Superintendent LEONARDO ESPINA, SR., Superintendent JESUS VERSOZA, and JOHN DOES,Respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, CJ.: When respondents deny custody of an allegedly detained person, petitioners have the duty of establishing the fact of detention by competent and convincing evidence; otherwise, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued. Nonetheless, when the disappearance of a person is indubitable, the law enforcement authorities are duty-bound to investigate it with due diligence and to locate the missing person. When the wrongdoing is attributable to the police agencies and/or their agents, the aggrieved may secure the assistance of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board or the Commission on Human Rights. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the March 22, 2002 Decision and the May 30, 2002 3 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 68170. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is REVERSED and the petition for habeas corpus is DISMISSED." The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration. The Facts The antecedent facts are narrated by the CA in this wise: "Petitioners are the mother and wife, respectively, of Michael Martinez, a resident of 4570 Cattleya Road, Sun Valley Subdivision, Paraaque City, who was allegedly abducted and taken away by seven (7) persons around 7:30 in the morning of November 19, 2001 while he was walking along Magnolia Street, on his way to his mother's house at 3891 Marigold Street of the same subdivision. The abduction was reported by petitioners to the Barangay, the Paraaque Police and the Anti-Kidnapping Task Force at Camp Crame. "It appears that in the evening of November 19, 2001, the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) presented before the media a certain Phillip Medel, Jr., who allegedly executed a statement confessing to his participation in the killing of Dorothy Jones, a.k.a. Nida Blanca, naming Michael Martinez as the person who introduced him to Rod Lauren Strunk, the husband of Nida Blanca and alleged mastermind in her killing. In a televised interview with a media reporter on November 26, 2001, Medel narrated that he saw Michael Martinez at the CIDG at Camp Crame where he was being detained, and which the former allegedly reiterated when he talked to Robert Paul Martinez, a brother of Michael, on November 27, 2001 and he even described the clothes Michael was then wearing, which were the same clothes worn by him when he was abducted. Petitioners then made representations with CIDG for the release of Michael Martinez or that they be allowed to see him, but the same were not granted. "In view thereof, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Quezon City against respondents PNP Director General Leandro Mendoza; Chief Superintendent Nestorio Gualberto, Sr., Chief of the CIDG; Senior Superintendent Leonardo Espina, Sr. and Senior Superintendent Jesus Versoza of the CIDG and members of Task Force Marsha, which is investigating the Nida Blanca murder case, for them to produce before said court the person of Michael Martinez or to justify the continued detention of his liberty. "In an Order dated November 29, 2001, the court a quo set the petition for hearing on December 3, 2001 and directed respondents to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus should not issue.
4 1 2

"At the hearing on December 3, 2001, respondents submitted a RETURN wherein they vehemently and categorically denied any participation or involvement in the alleged abduction or disappearance of Michael Martinez as the latter was never confined and detained by them or in their custody at any given time. Respondents thus prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus. "At the hearing conducted by the court a quo, respondents reiterated their claim that Michael Martinez is not and was never in their custody. On the other hand, petitioners presented Phillip Medel, Jr. who insisted that he saw Michael Martinez inside a room at the CIDG where he was brought before midnight of November 19, 2001 or the wee hours of November 20, 2001, that Sr. Supts. Verzosa (sic) and Espina were also in said room and that the latter even boxed Michael in the stomach. "Finding that respondents denial pale beside Medel's positive assertion that Michael Martinez is in their custody, the court a quo, in a Decision dated December 10, 2001 directed respondents to produce the body of Michael Martinez before it on December 11, 2001 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. A copy of said decision was received by respondents on December 10, 2001 "On December 11, 2001, respondents filed a notice of appeal on the ground that the Decision is contrary to law and the evidence." Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA agreed with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that Medels credibility was highly suspect. The appellate court opined that he had contradicted himself as to material facts. Further negating his testimony was Superintendent Espinas positive testimony that he was at home between midnight of November 19, 2001, and early morning of November 20, 2001. The CA relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. It held that, "[a]s aptly pointed out b y respondents, the CIDG itself is equally concerned with the safety of Michael Martinez relative to the final resolution of the Nida Blanca slay. For he is definitely a vital witness to his 6 case. The PNP-CIDG has no motive whatsoever to abduct him as it never did." Hence, this Petition. Issue Petitioner has failed to make a categorical statement of the issues for the Courts consideration. She has also failed to sta te what relief she prays for. Nonetheless, the Court will resolve the case on the issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial court and dismissing the Petition for habeas corpus. The Courts Ruling The present Petition for Review has no merit. Sole Issue: Reversible Error of the Court of Appeals Petitioner contends that it is the evaluation of the RTC -- not the CA -- that should be upheld, because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to determine whether they were telling the truth when they testified. On the other hand, respondents aver that their candor and the veracity of their denial of the custody or detention of Michael cannot be doubted by the Court. Their argument is even strengthened in the face of the incredible and contradictory testimony of petitioners witness, Phillip Medel Jr. Propriety of Habeas Corpus At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioners anchor for the present case is the disappearance of Michael. The matter of his alleged detention is, at best, merely consequential to his disappearance. Ostensibly, his disappearance has been established. However, the grant of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance of a person, but on his illegal detention. Habeas corpus generally applies to "all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is 8 deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
7 5

Said this Court in another case: "The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is devised as a speedy relief from unlawful restraint. 9 It is a remedy intended to determine whether the person under detention is held under lawful authority." If the respondents are neither detaining nor restraining the applicant or the person on whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus has been filed, then it should be dismissed. This Court has ruled that this remedy has one objective -- to inquire into the cause of detention of a person: "The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas 10 corpus is thus very limited." Habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. When respondents making the return of the writ state that they have never had custody over the person who is the subject of the writ, the petition must be dismissed, in the absence of definite evidence to the contrary. "The return of the writ must be taken on its face value considering that, unless it 12 is in some way [convincingly] traversed or denied, the facts stated therein must be taken as true" for purposes of the habeas corpus proceedings. Forcible Taking and Disappearance When forcible taking and disappearance -- not arrest and detention -- have been alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and proceedings. Abduction or kidnapping is a crime punishable by law. Investigations with regard to crimes are first and foremost the duty of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), not the courts. There are instances when members of the PNP -- the agency tasked with investigating crimes -- are suspected of being responsible for the disappearance of a person, who is the subject of habeas corpus proceedings. This fact will not convert the courts into -- or authorize them through habeas corpus proceedings to be -- forefront investigators, prosecutors, judges and executioners all at the same time. Much as this Court would want to resolve these disappearances speedily -- as in the present case, when it is interested in determining who are responsible for the disappearance and detention of Michael (if, indeed, he is being detained) -- it would not want to 13 step beyond its reach and encroach on the duties of other duly established agencies. Instead of rendering justice to all, it may render injustice if it resorts to shortcuts through habeas corpus proceedings. In fine, this proceeding for habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a thorough criminal investigation. The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), specifically the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), is tasked to investigate abuses or wrongdoings by members of the PNP. Thus, if they or the NBI abuse or fail to perform their duties, as indicated in this case, people may refer their complaints to the PLEB, which should be part of their arsenal in the battle to resolve cases in which members of the PNP are suspected of having caused the disappearance of anyone. Removing criminals from the ranks of those tasked to promote peace and order and to ensure public safety would be a big axe blow to the mighty oak of lawlessness. Let each citizen contribute a blow, puny though it may be when done alone; but collectively we can, slowly but surely, rid our society of disorder and senseless disappearances. Going back to the present case, petitioner must establish by competent and convincing evidence that the missing person, on whose behalf the Petition was filed, is under the custody of respondents. Unfortunately, her evidence is insufficient to convince the Court that they have Michael in their custody. 15 Moreover, "a writ of habeas corpus should not issue where it is not necessary to afford the petitioner relief or where it would be ineffective." Considering that respondents have persistently denied having Michael in their custody, and absent any decisive proof to rebut their denial, the Court is constrained to affirm the CAs dismissal of the Petition for habeas corpus. In view of the established fact of Michaels suspiciously felonious disappearance, we exhort the NBI and the National Anti -Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF) to continue their investigation into the matter, so that all persons responsible can be prosecuted for whatever crime they have committed. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs in this instance. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights and the Department of Interior and Local Government for appropriate action. SO ORDERED.
14 11
Manalo vs. Calderon

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007] SPO2 GERONIMO MANALO, SPO2 LEO MORCILLA, PO3 RICO M. LANDICHO, PO2 ROMEO MEDALLA, JR., SPO2 WILLIAM RELOS, JR., P/INSP. ROBERTO N. MARINDA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. PNP CHIEF OSCAR CALDERON, HON. P/DIR. GEARY BARIAS, DIRECTORATE FOR INVESTIGATION AND DETECTIVE MANAGEMENT, CAMP CRAME, HON. REGIONAL DIRECTOR, POLICE CHIEF SUPT. NICASIO J. RADOVAN, HON. POLICE SR. SUPT. AARON DEOCARES FIDEL, HON. POLICE SR. SUPT. LUISITO DE LEON, RESPONDENTS. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: ANG isang petisyon para sa habeas corpus ay bibigyan daan lamang kung ito ay nagpapakita na ang nagpepetisyon ay ipinipiit o pinipigilan ang kalayaan nang labag sa batas. Ang mahigpit na pangangalaga at ang pag-monitor ng galaw o kinaroroonan ng mga pulis na sumasailalim sa imbestigasyon ng kanilang pamunuan ay hindi isang uri ng ipinagbabawal na pagpiit o pagpigil sa kanilang kalayaan. A petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. Filed on August 7, 2007, this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpusassails the restrictive custody and monitored movements of petitioners SPO2 Geronimo Manalo, PO3 Leo Morcilla, PO3 Rico M. Landicho, PO2 Romeo Medalla, Jr., SPO2 William Relos, Jr., PInsp. Roberto D. Marinda, by the Philippine National Police (PNP), Region 4-A, after they were implicated in the burning of an elementary school in Taysan, Batangas at the height of the May 2007 national and local elections. Petitioners were formerly police operatives assigned at the Regional Special Operations Group, PNP Region 4-A, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba City, Laguna. When their petition was filed, they were detailed at the Regional Headquarters Support Group at the same Camp under a restrictive custody status. Respondents Oscar Calderon, Geary Barias, Nicasio Radovan, Aaron Deocares Fidel, and Luisito De Leon were, at the time of filing of the petition, the Chief of the PNP, the Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management, the Regional Director and Police Sr. Superintendents, respectively. The Facts The facts, as reflected in the petition and its annexes, are as follows: On May 15, 2007, at around 3:00 a.m., five unidentified malefactors bearing high-powered firearms suddenly appeared at the Barangay Pinagbayanan Elementary School in the Municipality of Taysan, Province of Batangas. Earlier, the entire school grounds were converted into a polling area for the 2007 national and local elections. The five armed men forcibly entered Polling Precinct 76-A, and poured gasoline over a ballot box. Then they fired [1] several rounds of ammunitions at the premises, setting it ablaze. The conflagration caused the death of a school teacher, Ritchel (Nellie) Banaag, who was then acting as an election supervisor. A poll watcher in the [2] person of Leticia (Letty) Ramos also perished while nine others were reportedly injured as a result of the fire. In the investigation that ensued, several eye-witnesses identified some of petitioners as the perpetrators of the school burning. The investigation also yielded that all six petitioners, who are all members of the PNP Regional Special Operations Group (PNP-RSOG), failed to timely respond to the incident [4] at the Pinagbayanan Elementary School. Acting on the report, the PNP hierarchy issued three successive memoranda dated May 18, May 22 and June 28, 2007, to wit: A. MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: TDPRM TDIDM Order for Restrictive Custody of PCINSP ELPIDIO RAMIREZ, et al.
[3]
Manalo vs. Calderon

DATE: May 18, 2007 -------------------------------------------------------------
1.
Reference: Memo from TDIDM with subject: Special Report re Alleged Arson in Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas which was approved by the C, PNP.
2.
This pertains to the investigation being conducted regarding the reported involvement of personnel from PRO 4A-RSOG in the fire incident in Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas on May 15, 2007 resulting in the death of two (2) teachers and wounding of several others.
3.
In this connection, request issue orders putting in restrictive custody the following PNP personnel:
PCINSP ELPIDIO A RAMIREZ PINSP RUEL C DELA CRUZ PINSP ROBERTO N MARINDA SPO2 William Relos, Jr. (SGD.) GEARY L. BARIAS [5] Police Director B. MEMORANDUM To From Subject Date : GD, RHSG : Regional Director : Monitoring of PCOs and PNCOs : May 22, 2007 ------------------------------------------------------------1. References:
a.
Verbal instruction of RD, PRO, CALABARZON, dated May 22, 2007; and
b.
S.O. No. 274 dated May 17, 2007, PRO, CALABARZON.
2.
Above references pertains to the relief of PINSP ROBERTO D. MARINDA, SPO2 William D. Relos, SPO2 Leo V. Morcilla, SPO2 Geronimo R. Manalo, PO3 Rico M. Landicho and PO2 Romeo E. Medalla, Jr, from their respective unit assignment and subsequent reassignment to that office.
3.
In connection thereof, subject PCO and PNCOs should be properly accounted from time to time taking into consideration the following:
Manalo vs. Calderon
a.
All their movements within camp should be monitored;
b.
When situation warrants their movement outside camp, they should be properly escorted on one-on-one basis; and
c.
A logbook should be maintained to record the accounting of said PCO and PNCOs, their place of destination, name of escort, Estimated Time of Departure (ETD) and Estimated Time of Return to Station (ETRS).
4.
Further inform the Regional Director and the Command Group thru Chief, Regional Directorial Staff of any unusual incident or movement involving subject PCOs and PNCOs.
5.
This Order takes effect immediately.
BY AUTHORITY OF PCSUPT RADOVAN, JR.: (SGD.) AARON DEOCARES FIDEL, CSEE Police Senior Superintendent (DSC) [6] Chief, Regional Directorial Staff C. MEMORANDUM FOR FROM SUBJECT : GD, RHSG 4A : Chief, RPHRDD : Order for Restrictive Custody of PINSP ROBERTO NAZ MARINDA and SPO2 William Dizon Relos, Jr.
DATE : June 28, 2007 -----------------------------------------------------1. References
a.
Memorandum from TDPRM dated May 23, 2007;
b.
Memorandum from Chief, RLS 4A June 19, 2007 noted by RD, PRO 4A
2.
This is in connection with the reported involvement of PRO 4A-RSOG personnel to the fire incident on May 15, 2007 at Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas
Manalo vs. Calderon
3.
Please be informed that pursuant to reference 1.a., orders are being issued by this Office placing following named PNP personnel under Restrictive Custody (in view of the investigation being conducted against them) effective this date, namely: PINSP ROBERTO NAZ MARINDA SPO2 William Dizon Relos, Jr.
4.
In this regard, inform concerned personnel and adjust your records accordingly.
5.
For information and be guided accordingly.
(SGD.) IRENEO DIZON BORDAS Police Senior Superintendent DSG [7] Chief, RPHRDD Petitioners contend that the May 22, 2007 Memorandum defines and circumscribes the scope of petitioners restrictive custody [8] status; that although technically speaking, petitioners as PNP officer are not detained or imprisoned, their physical movements ar e, however, limited only within Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba City, Laguna; they cannot go home to their respective families and if they would leave Camp Vicente [9] Lim they need to be escorted; that petitioners restrictive custody status is illegal and not sanctioned by any existing provision of [10] our constitution and laws; that it is degrading, summarily and arbitrarily imposed on the basis of mere suspicion and it actually [11] makes PNP members enjoy lesser rights than what are actually enjoyed by ordinary citizens. Petitioners further posit that what is only sanctioned is preventive suspension under which they can enjoy liberty and go home to their families pending administrative investigation. Hence, they urge, this practice by the PNP organization should be put to a stop. In support of their petition, petitioners principally rely on the case of Moncupa v. Enrile, et al., where it was essentially held that the writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. The ruling holds true even if petitioners are released but continue to be denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom, originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary. They also cite Villavicencio v. Lukban, where certain women were illegally transported against their will from Manila to Davao. There they were forced to change their domicile and some of them returned to Manila. Yet, this Court condemned the involuntary restraints on petitioners, fined the City Mayor of Manila and hoped the decision would serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment. Petitioners thus pray that a writ of habeas corpus be issued, commanding the respondents to produce the bodies of petitioners before the Court, to explain the lawful cause of their detention and deprivation of physical liberties and, thereafter, for this Court to adjudge their restrictive custody status as illegal and to set them free. Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court required respondents to comment. In lieu of a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that by Memorandum Order of August 30, 2007, respondent Radovan, Director of PNP Regional Office 4-A, has recalled, effective immediately, the assailed restrictive custody order embodied in the two Memoranda dated May 22 and June 28, 2007. In view of the recall, it is prayed that the petition be dismissed on ground of mootness. Issues Two critical issues are thus posed for our determination. One, by petitioners, on whether or not they are unlawfully detained or restrained of their liberty under their restrictive custody status. Two, by respondents, on whether the Court should dismiss the petition on the sole ground of mootness, the assailed orders having been recalled, or proceed to decide the petition on the merits. We shall resolve them in the reverse order, dealing with the procedural ahead of the substantive question.
[14] [13] [12]
Manalo vs. Calderon

Our Ruling I. This Court, By Way Of Exceptions, Decides Moot Issues
Notwithstanding the mootness of the issues on restrictive custody and monitoring of movements of petitioners, We opt to resolve them given (a) the paramount public interest involved, (b) their susceptibility of recurring yet evading review and (c) the imperative need to educate the police community on the matter. Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa mahigpit na pangangalaga (restrictive custody) at pagmonitor ng galaw (monitoring of movements) ng nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sa nangingibabaw na interes ng madla na nakapaloob dito, (b) dahil sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang maturuan ang kapulisan tungkol dito. The release of petitioners by respondents in a petition for habeas corpus does not automatically abate a decision on the case. Similarly, a recall of the custody order challenged by petitioners will not necessarily call for a dismissal on the ground of mootness alone. Although the general rule is mootness of the issue warrants a dismissal, there are well-defined exceptions. In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, twenty-six (26) petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew during the pendency of the petition. The fact that the petition was rendered moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever. Even petitioners cite Tibo v. The Provincial Commander and Toyoto, et al. v. Ramos, et al., where respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that petitioners had been temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become moot and academic. This Court, as in Moncupa, chose to decide the said cases. The Court sustained petitioners plea that their case be considered moot and academic only if their release would be permanent. In Acop, et al. v. Guingona, Jr., petitioning PNP officers questioned, via petition for injunction, the legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz into the Witness Protection Program. Petitioners contended that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers like the said SPO2 are disqualified from being admitted into the program, though they may be testifying against other law enforcement officers. In its comment, the OSG claimed that the petition lacked merit and that the same was rendered moot and academic because the coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under the program was already terminated on December 3, 1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced by the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to the OSG, dated February 10, 1999. In their comment, private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz agreed with the OSG. Denying the OSG motion, this Court held: Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from the coverage of the Program. However, we find it necessary to resolve the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper disposition of prayer c) and for future guidance of both bench and bar as to the application of Sections 3(d) and 4 of R. A. No. 6981. As we have ruled in Alunan III vs. Mirasol, and Viola vs. Alunan III, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. (Emphasis supplied) This Court then sustained the RTC observation that law enforcement officers may be admitted into the Witness Protection Program in cases where they are witnesses in legislative investigations. In the recent landmark cases of David, et al. v. Arroyo, et al., involving seven petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the President lifted the declaration of a state of national emergency during the pendency of the suits. In effect, Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 were withdrawn. The OSG thus moved and prayed for the dismissal of the petitions, arguing there is no more justiciable controversy as the issue has been mooted. This Court denied the motion and proceeded to declare the constitutional infirmity of the Presidential issuances. On the issue of mootness, the Court summed up the four exceptions to the rule, thus: The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petit ioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
[19] [18] [16] [17] [15]
Manalo vs. Calderon

controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. (Emphasis supplied). Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of Our ruling are justified under the foregoing exceptions. Every bad, unusual incident where police officers figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be done or not done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken against them erode public confidence in the police institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved now for the education and guidance of all concerned. II. There Is No Illegal Restraint In The Restrictive Custody and Monitored Movements Of Police Officers Under Investigation
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve [20] persons from unlawful restraint and as the best and efficient defense of personal freedom. Ang mataas na pinapahalagahang writ of habeas corpus, na ang pinagmulan ay nuon pa mang matandang panahon, ay ginawa at umiiral bilang kagyat at mabisang lunas upang paalpasin ang tao sa labag sa batas na pagkakapigil at bilang pinakamaigi at mahusay na sanggalang ng sariling kalayaan. The main thrust of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. More specifically, its vital purpose is to obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause and to deliver them from unlawful [21] custody. Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully restrained of his liberty will a petition for habeas corpus be granted and the person detained [22] released from confinement. If respondents are not detaining nor restraining the applicants or the person in whose behalf the petition for habeas [23] corpus is filed, the petition should perforce be dismissed. Ang kahilingan para sa habeas corpus ay maari lamang pagbigyan at ang taong pinipigilan ay pawawalan sa pagkapiit kung masisiyahan ang Hukuman na labag sa batas ang pagkakait sa kanya ng kalayaan. Kung hindi ipinipiit o pinipigilan ang mga taong naghain ng kahilingan para sahabeas corpus o ang mga kinakatawan nila, ang petisyon ay dapat pawalang saysay. Measured by the foregoing yardstick, the petition, on its face, fails to convince us that petitioners are actually and unlawfully detained and restrained [24] of their liberty.Sombong v. Court of Appeals, et al. teaches us that for the writ of habeas corpusto issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. More importantly, the prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is [25] an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. To the mind of the Court, petitioners are not illegally and involuntarily deprived of their freedom of action. Walang illegal na pagpipigil o pagkakait ng kalayaan sa nagpepetisyon. Firstly, the assailed memoranda dated May 22, 2007, June 28, 2007 and May 18, 2007, decreeing the monitoring of their movements cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered as a form of curtailment of their freedom guaranteed under our Constitution. Ang ipag-utos na subaybayan ang kanilang mga kilos ay hindi maituturing na pagbabawas ng kanilang kalayaan na ginagarantiyahan sa ilalim ng ating Konstitusyon. Perusing the assailed memoranda, it is evident that petitioners are not actually detained or restrained of their liberties. What was ordered by the PNP is that their movements, inside and outside camp be monitored in the following manner, to wit: a. All their movements within camp should be monitored;
[26] [27] [28]
b.
When situation warrants their movement outside camp, they should be properly escorted on one-on-one basis; and
Manalo vs. Calderon

c. A logbook should be maintained to record the accounting of said PCO and PNCOs, their place of destination, name of escort, Estimated Time [29] of Departure (ETD) and Estimated Time of Return to Station (ETRS).
It is crystal-clear that petitioners are free to go in and out of Camp Vicente Lim as they please. The only limitation imposed upon them is that their movements within the premises of the camp shall be monitored; that they have to be escorted whenever the circumstances warrant that they leave the camp; and that their estimated time of departure and arrival shall be entered in a logbook. Even petitioners themselves admit they are not [30] actually detained or imprisoned. Secondly, the restrictive custody complained of by petitioners is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. Ang restrictive custody o mahigpit na pangangalaga, na inirereklamo ng mga nagpetisyon, ay bahagyang paghihigpit lamang na labas sa saklaw ng habeas corpus. Itoy hindi aktuwal o mabisang pagpigil para mangailangan ng remedyong hinihiling. Itoy isang pinapayagang hakbang ng pag-iingat upang makatiyak ang pamunuan ng PNP na ang mga naturang pulis ay maaring iprisinta anumang sandali. If said custodial procedure were not taken, respondent police superiors themselves would have been exposed to charges of conspiracy, negligence or laxity in the enforcement of internal discipline. If petitioners get lost or are able to go abroad or figure in another untoward incident, respondents would have to explain why they did not observe the needed precaution, else they would also be administratively liable. Thirdly, petitioners reliance on Moncupa is misplaced. In said case, petitioner was ordered released by respondent but his release was saddled with restrictions. There, petitioner was required to secure prior approval for: (a) any travel outside Metro Manila; and (b) a change in residence. His freedom of speech was likewise muffled by a prohibition on granting interviews to local or foreign media. He was likewise ordered to report regularly [32] to respondent. In the case at bench, no restrictions in the nature of those imposed in Moncupa exist. To reiterate, petitioners are merely held to account for their movements inside and outside the camps premises. They are not required to secure prior approval befor e they can move out of the camp, only that each of them be accompanied by an escort and their time of departure and arrival noted. Ang mga nagpepetisyon ay pinipigil lamang upang masubaybayan ang kanilang ikinikilos sa loob at labas ng kampo. Hindi nila kailangan ang permiso bago makalabas ng kampo, kailangan lang na may kasamang bantay at ang kanilang pag-alis at pagbalik ay nakatala. Fourthly, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), as amended by R.A. No. 8551 (PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline, to wit: (b) Internal Discipline. On dealing with minor offenses involving internal discipline found to have been committed by any regular member of their respective commands, the duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP shall, after due notice and summary hearing, exercise disciplinary powers as follows: (1) Chiefs of police or equivalent supervisors may summarily impose the administrative punishment of admonition or reprimand; restriction to specified limits; withholding of privileges; forfeiture of salary or suspension; or any of the combination of the foregoing: Provided, That, in all cases, the total period shall not exceed fifteen (15) days; (2) Provincial directors or equivalent supervisors may summarily impose administrative punishment of admonition or reprimand; restrictive custody; withholding of privileges; forfeiture of salary or suspension, or any combination of the foregoing: Provided, That, in all cases, the total period shall not exceed thirty (30) days; (3) Police regional directors or equivalent supervisors shall have the power to impose upon any member the disciplinary punishment of dismissal from the service. He may also impose the administrative punishment of admonition or reprimand; restrictive custody; withholding of privileges; suspension or forfeiture of salary; demotion; or any combination of the foregoing: Provided, That, in all cases, the total period shall not exceed sixty (60) days; (4) The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days: Provided, further, That the chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the [33] filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel. (Emphasis supplied) It can be gleaned from the memoranda issued by the PNP hierarchy that an investigation is being conducted on the reported involvement of police personnel from PRO 4A-RSOG in the fire that gutted the Pinagbayanan Elementary School, Taysan, Batangas during the wee hours of May 15, 2007. The initial investigation report appended to the petition discloses that all petitioners are members of the Region 4 Special Operations Group who failed to timely respond to the incident. Some are even tagged by key eyewitnesses as the primary suspects in the burning of the school. As a result of the blaze,
[31]
Manalo vs. Calderon

two persons, including a school teacher performing election duties, were killed. The incident sparked a national uproar, and rightly so, considering that it was a direct attack on the countrys already much-maligned electoral process. Evidently, the PNP is well within its authority to relieve petitioners from their former positions and place them under tight watch, at least until the termination of the said investigation. Clearly, placing police officers facing a grave administrative case under restrictive custody is a disciplinary measure authorized under the PNP law. Malinaw na ang paglalagay sa mahigpit na pangangalaga sa mga pulis na nahaharap sa isang grabeng kasong administratibo ay isang pandisiplinang hakbang na pinahihintulutan ng batas ng PNP. Thus, petitioners claim that their restrictive custody is an illegal practice not sanctioned by any existing provision of our constitution and laws is not true. It must necessarily fail. Lastly, petitioners contend that by placing them under restrictive custody, they are made to suffer lesser rights than those enjoyed by private citizens. [34] On this score, the Courts pronouncement in Canson, et al. v. Hidalgo, et al. is categorical. It was held there that although the PNP is civilian in character, its members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Chief, Philippine National Police, under the National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by injunction, review, overrule or otherwise interfere with valid acts of police officials. The police organization must observe self[35] discipline and obey a chain of command under civilian officials. Elsewise stated, police officers are not similarly situated with ordinary civil service employees. The PNP has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism different from those of other government employees. Sa ibang salita, ang kapulisan ay hindi katulad ng karaniwang kawani ng pamahalaan. Ang PNP ay may sariling mekanismo ng pagdisiplina na kaiba sa ipinatutupad sa ibang empleyado ng gobyerno . In Fianza v. The Peoples Law Enforcement Board, et al., we ruled: x x x although respondent policemen continue to be citizens, as public respondents contend, they are not the private citizens referred to in the laws cited above. Clearly, the term private citizens does not ordinarily include men in uniform, such as the respondent PNP men. This is particularly evident in the PNP law which uses the term members of the PNP as well as private citizens to refer to different groups of persons and not interchangeably. The plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this situation. When the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its interpretation. The term private citizen in the PNP Law and PLEB Rules is used in its common signification and was not meant to refer to the members of the PNP, such as respondent policemen. In sum, petitioners are unable to discharge their burden of showing that they are entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for. The petition fails to show on its face that they are unlawfully deprived of their liberties guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution. No unlawful restraint is foisted on them by the PNP authorities under the questioned memoranda. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person fromunlawful restraint. The writ cannot and will not issue absent a showing that petitioners are deprived of their liberty. Neither can it relieve petitioners, who are police officers, from the valid exercise of prescribed discipline over them by the PNP leadership. Ang pangunahing layunin ng writ o utos ng habeas corpus ay ang pagsaklolo sa isang tao mula sa pagkapiit o pagkapigil nang lisya sa batas. Ang writ ay hindi makakamit kung walang pagkakait ng kalayaan. Hindi rin ito mapanghahawakan ng mga nagpepetisyong kapulisan upang makaiwas sa takdang paraan ng pagdisiplina sa kanila ng mga pinuno ng PNP. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
[36]
Secretary of National Defense vs Manalo

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents. DECISION PUNO, C.J.: While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court. This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents." This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, 3 Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, 4 5 or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as AmparoPetition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and 6 Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 26 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by 7 8 the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs. On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the AmparoRule and further resolved, viz: WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with 9 the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz: ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED. The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED: 1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file herein;
2 1

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision. 3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision. The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive. SO ORDERED.
10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents: Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of theirbarangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were 11 not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall. On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought 12 near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house 13 two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men. The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a 14 bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old. The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many 15 soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him. In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas 16 corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction. While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at 17 night, usually with left-over and rotten food. On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same 18 ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him. The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. 19 He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay. He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him

and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to 20 see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained. For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture 21 resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk. Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen 22 23 people had been detained in thatbartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself. For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They 24 were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU." At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of 25 them. One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed 26 with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men. From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded 27 that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man. Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz: Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?" Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..." Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at 28 lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno." Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would 29 never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, 30 Hilario and Cabalse. When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they 31 32 would not be given another chance. During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture. One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose 33 of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who 34 abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians. After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24 Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put 35 on him and he was kept in the barracks. The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During 36 the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his th men in the 24 Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their 37 families would all be killed. On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military th 38 trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24 Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit. On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24 Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered 39 enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock. Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The 40 soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who 41 was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes. From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed 42 in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007. In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz: Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy. Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas. Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito. Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy. May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
th th

xxx xxx xxx Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel. Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi. Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong 43 buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena. On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) 44 and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna. Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them. There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping 45 guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity. Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain. At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw 46 the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson." Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were 47 reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination. Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz: 13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents th before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24 Infantry Battalion; th Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7 Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7 Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that 48 the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter. Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that: 7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines; 8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the AmparoRule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP: (1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; (3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance; (4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; (5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and (6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
49
th
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following: 3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners. 3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit. 3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ ofAmparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters. 3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme Court. 3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that 50 may be gathered in the process. Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately went to th the 24 IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive; 11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24 IB in Limay, Bataan; 12) After going to the 24 IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office; 13) I also directed Company Commander 1 Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse 51 was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino. It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be 52 subsequently submitted. Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7 Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, 53 th th 54 Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan. The 24 Infantry Battalion is part of the 7 Infantry Division. On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran, through his 56 Assistant Chief of Staff, to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the 57 CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any. Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, 58 and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction. Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 59 60 2006. The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening. The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor 61 62 were there other witnesses summoned and investigated as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons. Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet 64 them. During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single 65 question to the six persons. Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the 66 jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006. When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally 67 wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006. He then gave his report to the 68 Office of the Chief of Personnel. As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted: III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
63 th 55 th st th th
th

b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU. c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers. d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers. e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers. f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member. IV. DISCUSSION 5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation. Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned. V. CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge. VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case. 8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.
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In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO 70 THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007. The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning. The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a 71 broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances," hence "representatives from all sides of the 72 political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system" participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis. On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden 74 appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to 75 threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the 76 protection of law." The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish. In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became 78 available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. One of 79 them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz: The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the 80 statute or regulation that motivated the violation. Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore
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the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting 82 individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation. The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each 83 country. It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the 84 world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived." What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of 85 administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process. In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of 86 constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights. Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the 87 protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights. In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 88 Constitution. The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. 89 Madison. While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of 90 Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive 91 proceedings. The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order" to stop petitioners and/or their 93 officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007, prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion. With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz: The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, 94 and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo. In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz: Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
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The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied) Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz: Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims bysubstantial evidence. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied) Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si 96 97 Manuel." "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel." "May 98 naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas." "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung 99 saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena." "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko 100 gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar." We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz: ...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by th the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7 Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries. We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners. The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost th Marshall of the 7 Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated... Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause. In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52) However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they

were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture. It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established. xxx xxx xxx As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their 101 participation is overwhelming. We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of 102 evidence. Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports 103 prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay 104 such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. In Ortiz v. Guatemala, a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, 106 written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took 107 when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained. She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture 108 she suffered while in detention. With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise. We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they 109 are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word" as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten 110 respondents' rights to life, liberty and security." (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, 111 kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person. Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary 112 detention places fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the 113 right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there 114 is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty" such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to 115 116 a deprivation of liberty" or being put under "monitoring and surveillance." In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security. Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
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Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge... At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person - houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy 117 118 and sanctity of the person himself. The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and 119 reasons. (emphases supplied) While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades 122 the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to 123 the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but 124 essentially an individual international human right. It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from 125 fear." Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
126 120 121
(emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz: 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied) The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR. In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, acause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of 127 the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security . Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution 128 guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical 129 injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human

person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz: (2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed. Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations. An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 130 the recent case of Popov v. Russia. In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz: ...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances in question. xxx xxx xxx ... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective 131 investigation into his allegations. (emphasis supplied) The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz: ...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of 132 person. Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government . In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is 133 a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of 134 investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz: (The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the 135 government. This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights 136 137 Committee in not a few cases involving Article 9 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need 138 not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia, a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:

The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally 139 ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant. (emphasis supplied) The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia, which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar 141 import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that 142 state;Tshishimbi v. Zaire, involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. 143 Angola, involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the 144 murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia, involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving 145 liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" 146 under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey. In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz: ... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective 147 investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since . (emphasis supplied) Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security. First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security. While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him. This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz: Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay 148 dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi. The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others. Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, 149 liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
140

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of th the 7 Infantry Division. The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents. In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected 150 offenders before a competent court. Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide 151 results of the investigations to respondents. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo. Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government. In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question. First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with the court. Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas . Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007. With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge 152 after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown. Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents. Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz: Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control... In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad, the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoenapertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..." Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters." With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ ofAmparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death. On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary. In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed. SO ORDERED.
153
Razon vs. Tagitis

EN BANC GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
G.R. No. 182498 Present:
PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA,
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR.,
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.
NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
December 3, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION BRION, J.:
Razon vs. Tagitis

We review in this petition for review on certiorari the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals ( CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.
[2] [1]
This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition
of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an enforced disappearance within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exertextraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action of respondents.
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget.
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, [3] liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determinesresponsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored. We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in [4] ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate. THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below. The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no [5] longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with the
Razon vs. Tagitis

desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis whereabouts [7] and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait. On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor [8] at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to [9] what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance. More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her [10] Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla. The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group ( CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners+. After reciting Tagitis personal circumstances and the facts outlined above, the petition went on to state: xxxx 7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong; As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and was surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also around and his room was closed and locked; Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open the room of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell phones, documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside the room; When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency; Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the government; Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband; All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men;
[6]
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15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; xxxx 17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but *respondents+ request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results;
Razon vs. Tagitis

18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the *petitioners+ refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband; The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis to his family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subjects whereabouts, and/or allow *the respondent+ to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights and serious anxieties; Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying [sic] to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time; In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the [respondent], informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach, but assured her not to worry because her husband is [ sic] in good hands; The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the *petitioners+ to the *respondents+ request for help and failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession and custody of *respondents+ husband, Engr. Tagitis; xxxx 25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the *petitioners+, their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]
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On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and [11] directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ. In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were [12] baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have any personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been designated by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE USIG, to address concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia, coordinated with the [13] investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these cases; and gave the following summary: xxxx 4. a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report on the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the victim checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days when the said victim did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu PPO conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing person, but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation that will lead to the immediate findings of the whereabouts of the person. b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The said report stated among others that: subject person attended an Education Development Seminar set on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a Prof. Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 oclock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis
Razon vs. Tagitis

reportedly arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY Pension House. At about 6:15 oclock in the morning of the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about 10:00 oclock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as stated by the cashier of the said pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the ticket arrived at the pension house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a continuous case build up and information gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search, records show that no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions. 5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions available under the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them before the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.
The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting [14] that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following: xxxx That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG] to conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced Tagitis. That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October 28, 2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around six oclock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by his student identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the participants of the said seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [ sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified companion. At around six oclock in the morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to the police. The CIDG is not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an enforced disappearance which presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the government. That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions. That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [ sic] alleged enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible therefore. Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER xxxx That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction or illegally [ sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact, nowhere in the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER nor was there any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally detained ENGR. TAGITIS.
[15]
Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espinas affidavit which alleged that:
[16]
Razon vs. Tagitis

That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR. MORCED in my capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our society is a respondent in kidnapping or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers and charge them in court and to abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission. That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER Mindanao Oriental (PACERMOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the subject, identify and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the disappearance and to determine the cause, manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the disappearance. That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to submit a written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED. That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report. That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with Police Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial Office (PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the instruction not to leave any stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in the instant case are brought to the bar of justice. That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just issued.
Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao ( Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his affidavit detailing the actions that he [17] had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis disappearance, viz: xxxx 3) For the record: 1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident; xxxx 4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced disappearances and when they are being alluded to my office; 5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship coordinator of Islamic Development Bank, Manila; 6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the Philippine National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at Kakuyagan Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction or arrest; 7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar, was requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the student returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he immediately inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic+, the person in charge in the counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 oc lock p.m. and never returned back to his room;
Razon vs. Tagitis

8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [ sic] to determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning his disappearance, to determine the cause and manner of his disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the disappearance so that they shall be brought before a competent court; 9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I have caused the following directives: a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter; Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to expedite compliance to my previous directive; Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of directives for investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative statements regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said personality; Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize efforts to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily submit for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds of doubt that they may somehow have knowledge or idea to his disappearance; Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting assistance to investigate the cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it is within their area of operational jurisdiction; Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete investigation report regarding the case of Engr. Tagitis;
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation [sic] on the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his disappearance and submitted the following: a) b) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-2007; Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis; Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu PPO; 11. a) This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:
c)
Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of the disappearance and the action being taken by our office; Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation and Detection Management, NHQ PNP; Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;
b)
c)
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our office is continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination for the immediate solution of the case.
Razon vs. Tagitis
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far taken on the disappearance, the CA [18] directed Gen. Goltiao as the officer in command of the area of disappearance to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS. Task Force Tagitis On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK FORCE TAGITIS. The CA subsequently set [20] three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was exerting extraordinary efforts in handling the disappearance of Tagitis. As planned, (1) the first hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to mobilize intelligence with Abu Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and [21] other police operatives. In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report from PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of [22] Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis disappearance. The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated January 4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines and [23] an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program in the Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu that: *Based+ on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken and carried away m ore or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his *personal+ bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which *was+ intended for the IDB Scholarship Fund. In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he personally went to the CIDG office in [24] Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation, particularly of their detention cells. PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while [25] helping TASK FORCE TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction. He further testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized and given specific instructions to their supporting units to perform their [26] respective tasks; that they even talked to, but failed to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo. In his submitted investigation report dated [27] January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded: 9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had no participation neither [ sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic Development Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic] be done by resentment or sour grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and were denied which was allegedly conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program.
[19]
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest and wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic student scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy among them. xxxx It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed considering on [ sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their efforts and religiously doing their tasked [ sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring and investigation for the early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination with other law-enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously conducting our investigation for the resolution of this case. On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that TASK FORCE TAGITIS did not appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts in [28] resolving Tagitis disappearance on the following grounds: (1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should have been standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was for the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for
Razon vs. Tagitis

dissemination to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of Engr. Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month since the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three (3) weeks when battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It was only on January 28, 2008 when the Task Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitis claim that they already had an all points bulletin, since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How could the police look for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated? (2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirims replacement in the latters official designated po st. Yet, P/Supt KASIMs subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioners unofficial source of the military intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par. 15 of the Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this courts subpoena and COL. KASIM could have c onfirmed the military intelligence information that bad elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went to Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga holding a high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her [29] information that allowed her to specify her allegations, particularly paragraph 15 of the petition. This friend also told her that her husband [30] *was+ in good hands. The respondent also testified that she sought the assistance of her former boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch [31] Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that PNP CIDG is holding *her husband+, Engineer Morced Tagitis. The respondent recounted that she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to her and her friends (who were then with her) a highly confidential report that contained the alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis and informed h er that her husband was [32] abducted because he is under custodial investigation for being a liaison for J.I. or Jemaah Islamiah. On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis second wife, and they have been married for thirteen [33] years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife. She last communicated with her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text [34] messaging; Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City. The respondent narrated that she learned of her husbands disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her stepdaughter, Zaynah Tag itis [35] (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father since the time they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007. The respondent explained that it took her a few days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husbands disappearance to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression that her husband could not communicate with her because his cellular phone s battery did not [36] have enough power, and that he would call her when he had fully-charged his cellular phones battery. The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found in paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. [37] Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal, Zamboanga through her boss. She also testified that she was with three other people, namely, Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read to them the contents of the highly confidential report at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent further narrated that the report indicated that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group and that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic [38] taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to give him his medication. On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports, signed by the respondent, detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her [40] meeting with Col. Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz: On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight from Davao City is 9:00 oclock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00 oclock. We [were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM). On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got information about the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he revealed to us the contents of text messages
[39]
Razon vs. Tagitis

they got from the cellular phone of the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit. While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the said meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the mall to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007. When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were discussing some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and hes last looked *sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my husband, because I contacted some of my friends who have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact location of my husband and who held him but he refused. While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not give me any information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that Sana ngayon alam mo na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo. When I was in Zamboanga, I was thinking of dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief of Police of Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine days. I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet failed to do so.
The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows: On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr. Rudy Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections in the military in Jolo, Sulu where the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp Katitipan located in Davao City looking for high-ranking official who can help me gather reliable information behind the abduction of subject Engineer Tagitis. On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short conversation. And he assured me that hell do the best he can to help me find my husband. After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal. On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that Col. Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different terrorist [groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a Balik Islam. It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier. These are the two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us. He asked a favor to me that Please dont quote my Name! Because this is a raw report. He assured me that my husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told him to please take care of my husband because he has aliments and he recently took insulin for he is a diabetic patient. In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim. On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin ( Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate her testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the information she received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the [42] respondent when she went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim.
[41]
Razon vs. Tagitis

In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a report and that he showed them a [43] series of text messages from Tagitis cellular phone, which showed that Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on Octo ber 30, 2007. She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together with two other companions, namely, [44] Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col. Kasim. The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis was under custodial investigation because he was being charged with terrorism; Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a Balik Islam charged with terrorism. Col. Kasim also told [45] them that he could not give a copy of the report because it was a raw report. She also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them exactly Prof.,lalabas din yan.[50] where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu. Prof. Matli also emphasized that despite what his January [51] [52] 4, 2008 affidavit indicated, he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money entrusted to him. Prof. Matli [53] confirmed, however, that that he had received an e-mail report from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila that the IDB was [54] seeking assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis personal account. On cross-examination by the respondents counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008 affidavit was already prepared when P S Supt. [55] Pingay asked him to sign it. Prof Matli clarified that although he read the affidavit before signing it, he was not so much aware of *its+ [56] contents. On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the respondents testimony, particul arly the [57] allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of either the military or the PNP. Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the respondent in her narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he merely said to the respondent that your husband is in good hands and is probably taken cared of by his armed abductors; and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG [58] Zamboanga City. Col. Kasim emphasized that the informal letter he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the [59] custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided to the respondent was merely a raw report sourced from barangay [60] intelligence that still needed confirmation and follow-up as to its veracity. On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given to him by his informant, who was a c ivilian [61] asset, through a letter which he considered as unofficial. Col. Kasim stressed that the letter was only meant for his consumption and not for [62] reading by others. He testified further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the respondent and her companions because it was [63] not important to him and also because the information it contained had no importance in relation with the abduction of Tagitis. He explained that he did not keep the letter because it did not contain any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s) responsible for his [64] abduction. In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent Jose Volpane Pante ( Col. Pante), Chief [65] of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondents allegation that Tagitis was in the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City. Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was the investigative arm of the PNP, and that the CIDG investigates and prosecutes all cases involving violations in the Revised Penal Code [66] particularly those considered as heinous crimes. Col. Pante further testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved in the [67] disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since they did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis report ed disappearance. Col. Pante added that the four (4) personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any operation, since they we re only assigned to [68] investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation. He denied that his office conducted any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latters [69] disappearance. Col. Pante further testified that his investigation of Tagitis disappearance was unsuccessful; the investigation was still facing a [70] blank wall on the whereabouts of Tagitis. THE CA RULING On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an enforced disappearance under the [72] United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondents testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis abduction came from no less than the military an independent agency of government. The CA thus greatly relied on the raw report from Col. Kasims asset, pointing to the CIDGs involvement in Tagitis abduction. The CA held that raw reports from an asset carried great weight in the intelligence world. It also labeled as suspect Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
[71]
Razon vs. Tagitis

The CA characterized as too farfetched and unbelievable and a bedlam of speculation police theories painting the disappearance as intentional on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife, on the basis of the respondents testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was no issue at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for payment of ransom the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups. Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, TASK FORCE TAGITIS heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved. On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008. THE PETITION In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CAs March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparopetition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden [74] of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial evidence. THE COURTS RULING
[73]
We do not find the petition meritorious.
Sufficiency in Form and Substance
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondents Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners allege that the respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security; 2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsibl e for his disappearance, and the respondents source of information; 3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners instructions or with their consent; 4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her husband; 5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations; 6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in the investigation of Tagi tis disappearance; and 7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her husband. A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):
[75]
Razon vs. Tagitis

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details.
[76]
In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule atoken gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security were violated when he was forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, and then taken into custody by the respondents police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups.
[77]
Razon vs. Tagitis

These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about Tagitis disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiants direct te stimony.
[78]
This
requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation with the reported disappearance.
[79]
We reject the petitioners argument that the respondents petition did not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his companions immediately reported Tagitis disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared . The police, however, gave them the ready answer that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups. The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a complaint with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband was having a good time with another woman. The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondents personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for her petition.
[80]
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police authorities, and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondents frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the petition forward.
Razon vs. Tagitis

Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition that otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action as a means to fish for evidence.
[81]
The petitioners contend that the respondents petition did not specify what legally
available efforts were taken by the respondent, and that there was an undue haste in the fili ng of the petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Courts intervention.
We do not see the respondents petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege the actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or om ission. The following allegations of the respondents petition duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus compelling her to file her petition. xxxx 7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong; xxxx 10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency; Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the government; Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
11.
12.
13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxxx 15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx 17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but *the respondents+ request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results
Razon vs. Tagitis

20. xxxx Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [ sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time; xxxx 25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondents petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration of the case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an enforced disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.
[82]
The Third Reichs Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories
endangering German security; they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons.
[83]
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have disappeared during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and systematic use by State security forces in that continent under Operation Condor
[84]
and during the Dirty War
[85]
in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly
arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the term disappearance to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced disappearances were called the desaparecidos, cases:
[86]
which literally means the disappeared ones.
[87]
In general, there are three different kinds of disappearance
1)
those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting agents and are never found again;
Razon vs. Tagitis

2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and those of victims of salvaging who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered.
[88]
3)
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories,
[89]
and 855 cases were recorded during the period of
martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquinos term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human Rights records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined status.
[90]
Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance

[92]
[91]
reports 619 outstanding cases of
enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.
Enforced Disappearances Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
[93]
We note
that although the writ specifically covers enforced disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this j urisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:
[94]
JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific definition [for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same. CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances so initially also we have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and disappearances will define the jurisdiction of the courts . So well have to agree among ourselves about the nature of killings and disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an element incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the concept includes acts and omissions not only of state actors but also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in the case of the Philippines for instance, should these rules include the killings, the disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist organizations and others. So, again we need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and enforced [95] disappearances that will be covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied]
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives
[96]
and in the Senate
[97]
on extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on
Razon vs. Tagitis

the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts.
[98]
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.
[99]
The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the
corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the countrys constitutional scheme and power structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
[100]
since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose,
constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
Enforced Disappearance Under International Law
Razon vs. Tagitis

From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human rights.
[101]
It does
not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information regarding the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be a double form of torture, with doubly paralyzing impact for the victims, as they are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases fol low the disappearance of the household breadwinner.
[102]
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of Disappeared Persons in December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assemblys deep concern arising from reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or i nvoluntary disappearances, and requested the UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearanc es with a view to making appropriate recommendations.
[103]
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration). provided in its third preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows: Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty , which places such persons outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
[104]
This Declaration, for the first time,
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention).
[105]
The Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007.
[106]
Article 2 of
the Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows: For the purposes of this Convention, enforced disappearance is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance that this right is non-derogable.
[108]
[107]
and
It provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war,
[109]
internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law. It also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to
[110]
know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation.
Lastly, it classifies enforced

[111]
disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are established.
Binding Effect of UN Action on the Philippines
Razon vs. Tagitis
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamen tal freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion.
[112]
Although no universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent

[113]
of the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed to all by the Charter, disappearance, and this Declaration states:
[114]
it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
[116] [115]
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]
We characterized generally accepted principles of international law as norms of general or customary international law that are binding on all states. We held further:
[117]
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.
[118]
The material sources of custom
include State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General
Razon vs. Tagitis

Assembly.
[119]
Sometimes referred to as evidence of international law,
[120]
these sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of

[121]
States and are indicative of the State practice and opinio juris requirements of international law.
We note the following in these respects:
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States ( OAS) General Assembly adopted the InterAmerican Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June 1994.
[122]
State parties undertook under this Convention not to practice, permit,

[123]
or tolerate the forced disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of individual guarantees.
One of the key provisions
includes the States obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their respective national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and when the alleged criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed to extradite him, which can be interprete d as establishing universal jurisdiction among the parties to the InterAmerican Convention.
[124]
At present, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted separate laws in accordance with the Inter[125]
American Convention and have defined activities involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with the protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected by enforced disappearance through the Conventions Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on th e prohibition of torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,
[126]
where the ECHR found a violation of the right
to liberty and security of the disappeared person when the applicants son disappeared after being taken into custody by Turk ish forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared persons mother) to be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities and the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack of any meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13.
[127]
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of customary international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third,
[128]
which provides that *a+ State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it
[129]
practices, encourages, or condones (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals.
We significantly note that in a related matter that
finds close identification with enforced disappearance the matter of torture the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
[130]
that the prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary international law. The court further elaborated on the
significance of UN declarations, as follows: These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote. Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is, according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated. Accordingly, i t has been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of binding treaty against nonbinding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the international community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States." Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law. [Citations omitted]
Razon vs. Tagitis
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated that the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime against humanity.
[131]
Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court ( ICC) also covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity,
[132]
i.e., crimes committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
[133]
population, with knowledge of the attack. While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute,
the Philippines is still merely a signatory
and has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
[134]
In addition, the implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number of national criminal
[135]
provisions also covering enforced disappearance.
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.
The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of a disappearance:
[136]
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law; 2) the right to liberty and security of the person; 3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed; 5) the right to an identity; 6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees; 7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation; 8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance. 9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
Razon vs. Tagitis

10) the right to an adequate standard of living; 11) the right to health; and 12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides: Article 2 3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity ; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR violations promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz:
[137]
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure to investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:
[138]
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice.As with failure to investigate, failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant . These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under either domestic or international law , such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (article 7), summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 7 and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important contributing element in the recurrence of the violations. When committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes against humanity (see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]
Razon vs. Tagitis
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, ones right by the government, held that:
[139]
this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice . The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz: (The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. [Emphasis supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,
[140]
where the ECHR interpreted the right to security not only as a prohibition on the State against arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court made effective on October 24, 2007. Although theAmparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of enforced disappearance, the materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that underlie every enforced disappearance. Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance
Razon vs. Tagitis

Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we shall discuss briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose involvement is alleged investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:
[141]
Experts note that abductors are well organized,
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of governmental authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are generally specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are generally directed through a separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary credentials to avoid or prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their victims to secret detention [142] centers where they subject them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other controls.
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives.
[143]
We have had occasion to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo
[144]
when we
acknowledged that where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance i.e., the corpus delicti or the victims body is usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have begun.
[145]
The problem for the victims family is the States virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence . The Inter[146]
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez
that inherent to the practice of enforced
disappearance is the deliberate use of the States power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime.
[147]
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred.
[148]
Deniability is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape
[149]
the application of legal standards ensuring the victims human rights.
Experience shows that government officials typically respond to requests for
information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented.
[150]
Razon vs. Tagitis

These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or another, in our consideration of this case. Evidence and Burden of Proof in Enforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree and burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows: Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. xxxx Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability. Section 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence , the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparopetition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or se curity, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations
[151]
provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence
required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:
Razon vs. Tagitis

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,
[152]
which was the Courts first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we recognized that the full and exhaustive
proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly requires do not need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said: The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. [Emphasis supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique difficulties presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,
[153]
the IACHR faced with a lack of direct evidence that the government of Honduras was
involved in Velasquez Rodriguez disappearance adopted a relaxed and informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes governmental responsibility for a disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general practice of enforced disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice.
[154]
The IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through
circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been made to disappear. It held: 130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision. Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the facts. 131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances, because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velsquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents who acted under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the hearsay testimony o f Zenaida Velsquez, the victims sister, who described Manfredoskidnapping on the basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian cloth es in broad daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran military official had announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the Armed Forces.
[155]
The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness who asserted that
he had been told by a Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had spoken in prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo.
[156]
Razon vs. Tagitis
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness
[157]
is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the
admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness.
[158]
These requisites for admission find
their counterpart in the present case under the above-described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the meaning of this term under the UN Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
[159]
Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:
[160]
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
Razon vs. Tagitis

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State; (c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and (d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the po lice authorities is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in her petition and testimony, as we shall discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondents allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her allegation that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody). The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who occupied a high position in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out of this claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any information about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the respondents testimony:
Q:
Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband particularly those in charge of any records or investigation?
A:
I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband is being abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly parang liason ng J.I., sir.
Q:
What is J.I.?
A:
Jemaah Islamiah, sir.
Razon vs. Tagitis

Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?
A:
Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly confidential, sir.
Q:
Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A:
Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q:
And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
A:
Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.
[161]
[Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q:
You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?
A:
Yes, maam.
Q:
And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation?
A:
Yes, maam.
Q:
And you mentioned that he showed you a report?
A:
Yes, maam.
Q:
Were you able to read the contents of that report?
A:
He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is a military report, maam.
Q:
But you were able to read the contents?
Razon vs. Tagitis

A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, maam.
Q:
How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?
A:
There were three of us, maam.
Q:
Who were your companions?
A:
Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, maam.
[162]
xxxx
Q:
When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you do?
A:
May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him Colonel, my husband is sick. He is [163] diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko na bigyan siya ng gamot, maam.
xxxx
Q:
You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?
A:
I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko because I know that they [164] would deny it, maam.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her husband was abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:
Q:
You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with you when you went there?
Razon vs. Tagitis

A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
Q:
Only the two of you?
A:
No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
Q:
Who were they?
A:
Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.
Q: A:
Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time? Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.
Q:
Were you able to talk to him?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
The four of you?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?
A:
The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He is with the military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case. He was charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he was abducted. He told us that he was under custodial investigation. As Ive said earlier, he was seen under surveillance from January. He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines. Then we asked him how long will he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he also told us that he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.
Q:
You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it in the computer or what?
Razon vs. Tagitis

A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I dont know if it was computerized but Im certain that it was typewritten. Im not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.
Q:
When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?
A:
Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.
[165]
xxxx Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?
A:
He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
Q:
After that incident, what did you do if any?
A:
We just left and as Ive mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading to us * sic] after the [166] custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied]
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the informal letter he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagit is was in the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a raw report from barangay intelligence that still needed confirmation and follow up as to its veracity.
[167]
To be sure, the respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners pointed out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a military officer who told her that her husband is being abducted because he is under custodi al investigation because he is allegedly parang liason ng J.I. The petitioners also noted that Mrs. Talbins testimony imputing certain statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would certainly know that the PNP is not part of the military.
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material points.
[168]
We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters are concerned, and confusion
Razon vs. Tagitis

between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication
[169]
and
only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.
[170]
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informants letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January 2007, was in good hands and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he wa s seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a Balik Islam charged with terrorism. The respondents and Mrs. Talbins testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasims plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his informants letter, the critical piece of ev idence that supports or negates the parties conflicting claims. Col. Kasims admitted destruction of this letter effectively, a suppression of this evidence raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent claimed. reported to the respondent to be the Kasim evidence.
[171]
For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government participation, knowledge or consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim was never quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only implies government intervention through the use of the term custodial investigation, and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence i.e., evidence whose probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the informant).
[172]
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge as the petitioners effectively suggest that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule despite its terms is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules
Razon vs. Tagitis

of evidence taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof Matli later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust, although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis personal account. Other than these pieces of evidence, no other information exists in the records relating to the personal circumstances of Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition recited that he was taken away by burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, no evidence whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 the day he arrived in Jolo and was never seen again.
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to the disappearance.
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No evidence was ever offered on whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The respondents own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not missing but was with another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on an investigation . As already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasims story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more significant part of Col. Kasims story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a Balik Islam charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipap ao, Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, TASK FORCE TAGITIS to which this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
Razon vs. Tagitis

More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and the Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial report of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results. These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion of all possible efforts. PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part, also reported negative results after searching all divisions and departments *of the CIDG+ for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and thorough research, records show that no such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its department or div isions. PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their affidavits-returns, as they essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search for Tagitis.
The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted TASK FORCE TAGITIS, with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were again replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned retraction that Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for s tudents, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction and said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature to conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his custody. As already noted above, the TASK FORCE notably did not pursue any investigation about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the IDB and the background and activities of this Bank itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the assets who are indispensable in inve stigations of this nature. These omissions and negative results were aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months after the disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated as Ajirims replacement in the latters last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned. No investigation even an internal one appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasims asset and what he indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the governments denial of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs through these developments is the governments dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnongs initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired about her husbands disappearance, and even at TASK FORCE TAGITIS itself.
As the CA found through TASK FORCE TAGITIS, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a black
Razon vs. Tagitis

operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted,
[173]
the evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government
complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international enforced disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very close to those of Timurtas v. Turkey,
[174]
a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in
that case acted on the basis of the photocopy of a post -operation report in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought a claim against Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention, including the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article 5). The applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers Party ( PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the apprehension. According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred him to another detainment facility. Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent detainment, the applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of events, including a photocopy of a post-operation report signed by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report included a description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during detention where he was accused of being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahaps enforced disappearance.
Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case we believe and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the
Razon vs. Tagitis

PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the PNP Law,
[175]
specifies the PNP as
the governmental office with the mandate to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution. The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the investigative arm of the PNP and is mandated to investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those consid ered as heinous crimes.
[176]
Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal
Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
[177]
No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by assigning the investigation of Tagitis disappearance
exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting the detailed results of its investigation to the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in this Decision and as further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its actions and recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4 quarter counted from the finality of this Decision.
th
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:
a.
Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b.
Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
c.
Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
Razon vs. Tagitis

d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court; e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his assets in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis; f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action; g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision; h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4 quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
th
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and shall b e directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, these directives particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Razon vs. Tagitis

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 182498 February 16, 2010
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact,Respondent. RESOLUTION BRION, J.: We resolve in this Resolution the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners -- Gen. Avelino I. Razon, former Chief of the Philippine National 1 2 Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, former Chief of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), PNP; Police Senior Superintendent 3 Leonardo A. Espina, former Chief of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER), PNP; and Gen. Joel Goltiao, former Regional Director of 4 the PNP-Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (petitioners) -- addressing our Decision of December 3, 2009. This Decision affirmed the Court of Appeals (CA) decision of March 7, 2008 confirming the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granting the Writ of Amparo. Our December 3, 2009 Decision was based, among other considerations, on the finding that Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim) informed the respondent Mary Jean Tagitis (respondent) and her friends that her husband had been under surveillance since January 2007 because an informant 5 notified the authorities, through a letter, that Tagitis was a liaison for the JI; that he was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism (Kasim evidence). We considered Col. Kasims information, together with the consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, the dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the disappearance, as well as the haphazard investigations conducted that did not translate into any meaningful results, to be indicative of government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis (for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo). We explained that although the Kasim evidence was patently hearsay (and was thus incompetent and inadmissible under our rules of evidence), the unique evidentiary difficulties posed by enforced disappearance cases compel us to adopt standards that were appropriate and responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. We noted that while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must also observe flexibility in considering the evidence that we shall take into account. Thus, we introduced a new evidentiary standard for Writ of Amparo cases in this wise: The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all the other pieces of adduced evidence, Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this minimum test. [Emphasis in the original] We held further that the Kasim evidence was crucial to the resolution of the present case for two reasons: first, it supplied the gaps that were never looked into or clarified by police investigation; and second, it qualified a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case by injecting the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brought into question how the State reacted to the disappearance. Based on these considerations, we held that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these 6 organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, we held Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information relating to the enforced disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability, we ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to this case. Similarly, we also held the PNP accountable for the suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries. The Motion for Reconsideration The petitioners cited two grounds in support of their Motion for Reconsideration.
Razon vs. Tagitis

First, the petitioners argue that there was no sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure unequivocally poi nts to some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the petitioners contend that this Court erred in unduly relying on the raw information given to Col. Kasim by a personal intelligence "asset" without any other evidence to support it. The petitioners also point out that the Court misapplied its cited 7 8 9 cases (Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, and Timurtas v. Turkey ) to support its December 3, 2009 decision; in those cases, more than one circumstance pointed to the complicity of the government and its agents. The petitioners emphasize that in the present case, the respondent only presented a "token piece of evidence" that points to Col. Kasim as the source of information that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for having been suspected as a "terrorist supporter." This, according to the petitioners, cannot be equated to the substantial evidence 10 required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Second, the petitioners contend that Col. Kasims death renders impossible compliance with the Courts directive in its Decem ber 3, 2009 decision that Col. Kasim be impleaded in the present case and held accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" on the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. The petitioners alleged that Col. Kasim was killed in an encounter with the Abu Sayaff Group on May 7, 2009. To prove Col. Kasims death, the petitioners attached to their motion a copy of an article entitled " Abus kill Sulu police director" published by the Philippine 11 Daily Inquirer on May 8, 2009. This article alleged that "Senior Supt. Julasirim Kasim, his brother Rosalin, a police trainee, and two other police officers were killed in a fire fight with Abu Sayyaf bandits that started at about 1 p.m. on Thursday, May 7, 2009 at the boundaries of Barangays Kulasi and Bulabog in Maimbung town, Sulu." The petitioners also attached an official copy of General Order No. 1089 dated May 15, 2009 issued by the PNP National Headquarters, indicating that "PS SUPT [Police Senior Superintendent] Julasirim Ahadin Kasim 0-05530, PRO ARMM, is posthumously retired 12 from PNP service effective May 8, 2009." Additionally, the petitioners point out that the intelligence "assets" who supplied the information that Tagitis was under custodial investigation were personal to Col. Kasim; hence, the movants can no longer comply with this Cour ts order to disclose any information known to Col. Kasim and his "assets." The Courts Ruling We hold that our directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case has been rendered moot and academic by his death. Nevertheless, we resolve to deny the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Paragraph (e) of the dispositive portion of our December 3, 2009 decision directs: e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis; Undisputably, this directive can no longer be enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's demise. His intervening death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Col. Kasim may have left behind, particularly the network of "assets" he utilized while he was in the service. Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an interwoven network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and the military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing the extraordinary diligence 13 that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, can still access or reconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from his "asset" or network of assets during his lifetime. The extinction of Col. Kasims personal accountability and obligation to disclose material information, known to him and his assets, does not also erase the burden of disclosure and investigation that rests with the PNP and the CIDG. Lest this Court be misunderstood, we reiterate that our holding in our December 3, 2009 Decision that the PNP -- through the incumbent PNP Chief; and the PNP-CIDG, through its incumbent Chief -- are directly 14 responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Tagitis; and that the conduct of proper investigation using extraordinary diligence still subsists. These are continuing obligations that will not truly be terminated until the enforced disappearance of the victim, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, is fully addressed by the responsible or accountable parties, as we directed in our Decision. We now turn to the petitioners substantial challenge to the merits of our December 3, 2009 decision. We see no merit in the petitioners submitted position that no sufficient evidence exists to support the conclusion that the Kasim evidence unequivocally points to some government complicity in the disappearance. Contrary to the petitioners claim that our conclusi ons only relied on Col. Kasims report, our Decision plainly and pointedly considered other evidence supporting our conclusion, particularly the consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis; the dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the disappearance; and the conduct of haphazard investigations that did not translate into any meaningful results. We painstakingly ruled: To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case.
Razon vs. Tagitis

xxx The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to the disappearance. xxx We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the governments denial of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs through these developments is the governments dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnongs initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired about her husbands disappe arance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself. As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a "black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. [Emphasis in the original] Likewise, we see no merit in the petitioners claim that the Kasim evidence does not amount to substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is not a new issue; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved it in our December 3, 2009 Decision. At this point, we need not go into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the case. We also cannot agree with the petitioners contention that we misapplied Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, and 17 Timurtas v. Turkey to support our December 3, 2009 decision. The petitioners make this claim with the view that in these cases, more than one circumstance pointed to the government or its agents as the parties responsible for the disappearance, while we can only point to the Kasim evidence. A close reading of our December 3, 2009 Decision shows that it rests on more than one basis. At the risk of repetition, we stress that other pieces of evidence point the way towards our conclusion, particularly the unfounded and consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance; the dismissive approach of the police to the report of the disappearance; and the haphazard handling of the investigation that did not produce any meaningful results. In cruder but more understandable language, the run-around given to the respondent and the government responses to the request for meaningful investigation, considered in the light of the Kasim evidence, pointed to the conclusion that the Tagitis affair carried a "foul smell" indicative of government complicity or, at the very least, an attempt at cover-up and concealment. This is the situation that the Writ of Amparo specifically seeks to address. Manalo, Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas, read in proper perspective, fully support our findings and conclusions in this case. Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced disappearance was no longer a problem in that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively ended when they escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and remains missing more than two years after his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo, however, because of the continuing threat to the brothers right to security; the brothers claimed that since the persons responsible for their enforced disappearance were still at large and had not been held accountable, the former were still under the threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which threat constituted a direct violation of their right to security of person. In ruling that substantial evidence existed to support the conclusion that the respondents right to security had been violated, the Court not only considered the respondents affidav it and testimony which positively identified the perpetrators, but also noted other evidence showing the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. The Court significantly found that: Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
15 16
Razon vs. Tagitis

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents. In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court. Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo. Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents right to security as a 18 guarantee of protection by the government. [Emphasis supplied] Similarly in Velasquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) acknowledged that when the Honduran Government carried out or tolerated enforced disappearances, the police customarily used a distinctive form of kidnapping. Consequently, the IACHR presumed that Velasquez disappeared at the "hands of or with the acquiescence of those officials within the framework of that practice." Moreover, the IACHR found that negative inferences may be drawn from the fact that the government failed to investigate or to inquire into his disappearance, and thwarted the attempts by the victims family to do so; these according to the Court strongly suggested the governments involvement in the disappearance, even if 19 20 there was no direct evidence indicating that the government kidnapped Velasquez. The Court thus held: 1avvphi1 iii. In the case of Manfredo Velsquez, there were the same type of denials by his captors and the Armed Forces, the same omissions of the latter and of the Government in investigating and revealing his whereabouts, and the same ineffectiveness of the courts where three writs of HABEAS corpus and two criminal complaints were brought ( testimony of Miguel Angel Pavn Salazar, Ramn Custodio Lpez, Zenaida Velsquez, press clippings and documentary evidence ). h. There is no evidence in the record that Manfredo Velsquez had disappeared in order to join subversive groups, other than a letter from the Mayor of Langue, which contained rumors to that effect. The letter itself shows that the Government associated him with activities it considered a threat to national security. However, the Government did not corroborate the view expressed in the letter with any other evidence. Nor is there any evidence that he was kidnapped by common criminals or other persons unrelated to the practice of disappearances existing at that time." 148. Based upon the above, the Court finds that the following facts have been proven in this proceeding: (1) a practice of disappearances carried out or tolerated by Honduran officials existed between 1981 and 1984; ( 2) Manfredo Velsquez disappeared at the hands of or with the acquiescence of those officials within the framework of that practice; and (3) the Government of Honduras failed to guarantee the human rights affected by that practice. Finally, in Timurtas, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) altered the prevailing jurisprudence by permitting a lesser evidentiary burden in cases 21 of enforced disappearances. The ECHR dismissed the need for direct evidence previously held necessary in the leading case of Kurt v. Turkey, and instead permitted the use of circumstantial evidence to establish a violation of the right to life. It stated that "whether the failure on the part of authorities to provide a plausible explanation as to a detainees fate, in the absence of a body, might raise issues under Ar ticle 2 of the Convention (right to life), will depend on the circumstances of the case and, in particular, on the existence of sufficient circumstantial evidence based on concrete 22 elements, from which it may be concluded to the requisite standard of proof that the detainee must be presumed to have died in custody." The ECHR 23 found that: Noting that more than six and a half years has gone by since Abdulvahap Timurtas apprehension and having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, the Court found that the disappearance of Abdulvahap Timurtas after he had been taken into detention led, in the circumstances of this case, to a presumption that he had died. No explanation having been provided by the Government as to what had happened to him during his detention, the Government was liable for his death and there was a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. [Emphasis supplied] Significantly (in the context of the present case), the ECHR also noted that the inadequacy of the investigation into the disappearance of Timurtas also constituted a violation of his right to life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in the three cited cases are applicable to the present case. There is the evidence of ineffective investigation in Manalo and Velasquez Rodriguez, while in all three was the recognition that the burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through the use of circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical inference); the requirement for direct evidence to establish that an enforced
Razon vs. Tagitis

disappearance occurred -- as the petitioners effectively suggest -- would render it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to disappear. In these lights, we emphasized in our December 3, 2009 Decision that while the need for substantial evidence remains the rule, flexibility must be observed where appropriate (as the Courts in Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas did) for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty and security. This flexibility, we noted, requires that "we should take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement ." From these perspectives, we see no error that we should rectify or reconsider. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to GRANT the motion to declare the inclusion of PS/Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim moot and academic, but, otherwise, DENY the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Let this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings as directed in our Decision of December 3, 2009. SO ORDERED.
Burgos vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila
EN BANC
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 183711
- versus -
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents. x-----------------------------------------x EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
- versus -
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT,
G.R. No. 183712

Respondents. x-----------------------------------------x EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
- versus -
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; Chief of the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 183713
Present:
CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA,

*
BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ,

MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 5, 2011 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We review, in light of the latest developments in this case, the decision consolidated petitions for Habeas Corpus,
[3] [4] [5]
[1]
[2]
dated July 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the
Contempt and Writ of Amparo filed by Edita T. Burgos (petitioner). The assailed CA decision dismissed
the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; denied the petitioners motion to declare the respondents in Contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
[6]
On June 22, 2010, we issued a Resolution referring the present case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), as the Courts directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. We found the referral necessary as the investigation by the PNP-CIDG, by the AFP Provost Marshal, and even by the CHR had been less than complete; for one, there were very significant lapses in the handling of the investigation. In particular, we highlighted the PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction.
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We held:
Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the investigation - among them the PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based on the information provided to the petitioner by no less than State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified the persons who were possibly involved in the abduction, namely:

T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP. No search and certification were ever made on whether these persons were AFP personnel or in other branches of the service, such as the Philippine Air Force. As testified to by the petitioner, no significant follow through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads provided by State Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead investigating agency in the present case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared to have been made by the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG. The records do not indicate whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a follow-up investigation to determine the identities and whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These omissions were aggravated by the CA finding that the PNP has yet to refer any case for preliminary investigation to the DOJ despite its representation before the CA that it had forwarded all pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO.
While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the AFP Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) have been less than complete. The PNP-CIDGs investigation particularly leaves much to be desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires.
Following the CHRs legal mandate, we gave the Commission the following specific directives:
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(a) ascertaining the identities of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches of the two alleged abductors as well as their whereabouts; (b) determining based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of Jonas, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP; further proceedings and investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided by State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors;
(c) inquiring into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG;
(d) determining based on records, past and present, as well as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO; and
(e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction, that may be necessary to live up to the extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CAs dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Macapagal-Arroyo, as she is entitled as President to immunity from suit.
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On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in compliance with our June 22, 2010 Resolution. below:
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In this Report, the CHR recounted the investigations undertaken, whose pertinent details we quote
On June 26, 2010, the CHR issued Resolution CHR IV No. A2010-100 to intensify the investigation of the case of the Burgos enforced disappearance; and for this purpose, created a Spec ial Investigation Teamheaded by Commissioner Jose Manuel S. Mamauag.
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In compliance with the directive mentioned in the above-quoted En Banc Resolution of the Supreme Court, the Team conducted field investigations by: (1) interviewing a) civilian authorities involved in the first investigation of the instant case; b) military men under detention for alleged violations of Articles of War; c) Security Officers of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City; d) two (2) of the three (3) CIDG witnesses; e) two (2) eyewitnesses who described to the police sketch artist two (2) faces of a male and female abductors of Jonas Burgos; f) Rebel-Returnees (RRs); g) officers and men in the military and police service; h) local officials and other government functionaries; and i) ordinary citizens; (2) inquiring into the veracity of CIDG witnesses Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (3) securing case records from the prosecution service and courts of law; (4) visiting military and police units. Offices, camps, detention centers, and jails and requesting copies of documents and records in their possession that are relevant to the instant case; (5) searching for and interviewing witnesses and informants; and (6) pursuing leads provided by them.
S. Emails Star-Struck
38. Pursuing the lead mentioned in the anonymous e-mail, which was attached to the Burgos petition as Exhibit J, that the team leader (T.L.) in the Jonas Burgos abduction was a certain Army Captain, (promotable to Major), a good looking guy (tisoy), and a potential showbiz personality known otherwise as Captain Star-struck, the Team requested the CHR Clearance Section, Legal Division for any information leading to T.L. or to all Philippine Army applicants for CHR clearance whose ranks are Captains or Majors promoted during the years 2007 to 2009.
39. Sometime in November 2010, the Team was able to track down one CHR clearance-applicant who most likely possesses and/or matches the information provided in the said lead. But when his photo/picture was presented to the eyewitnesses, they failed to identify him.
40. Undaunted with the negative identification, the Team suspected that the team leader might not have participated in the actual abduction inside Hapag Kainan Restaurant, the scene of the crime, but most probably was in one of the three cars allegedly used during the operation while giving orders or commanding the actual abductors.

41. In relation to the above suspicion, the Team has theorized that officers below the rank of Captain might have perpetrated the actual abduction.
42. The Team explored this possibility and focused its attention on the officers of the 7 ID, PA, namely: Lt. Vicente O. Dagdag, Jr., the S-4 of 65 IB who executed an affidavit relative to the alleged stolen Plate No. TAB-194; 2Lt. Rey B. Dequito of th 56 IB, the witness against Edmond Dag-Uamn for the alleged crime of murder; and 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Team Leader with th the 56 IB who issued a Custody Receipt in connection with the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed in Angeles City relative to the 2006 Emerito Lipio abduction case against the police and military personnel.
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T. Face-book account
43. Google search of the names of the above mentioned individuals yielded negative result except for 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, whose name was connected to a social networking site, the Face-book account of PMA BATCH SANGHAYA 2000.
44. In the Facebook account Sanghaya, the contents of which is categorized as PUBLIC or open to public viewing, it appears that Malik Tayaban is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Batch Sanghaya of 2000. Other leads were also discovered, such as the following: vernacular description of tisoy which was mentioned by one of the users in the comment portion of the account which incidentally was also mentioned in the anonymous e -mail as the team leader (T.L.); the picture of a man sporting a back-pack, which was also mentioned by witness Elsa. Per Elsas account, the person in the cartographic sketch was wearing a back-pack.
45. Aware of the intricacies of the above-mentioned leads, the Team caused the reproduction of all pictures in the Facebook account for future reference; and requested the NBI (Burgos) Team for a copy of the PMA Sanghaya Batch 2000 Year Book, also for future reference.
U. The PMA Year Book
46. Through the efforts of the NBI (Burgos) Team, the Team was able to get the PMA Year Book of Sanghaya Batch 2000 and the location of one important eyewitness in the abduction.
V. JEFFREY CABINTOY
47. On December 1, 2010, the Team together with the NBI Team were able to locate Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey), one of the two (2) eyewitnesses who provided the police cartographic artist with the description of two (2) principal abductors of Jonas Burgos. Jeffrey narrated in details (sic) the circumstances that happened before and during the abduction.
48. On December 7, 2010, the Team and Jeffrey went to the place of incident at Ever Gotesco Mall, Quezon City to refresh his memory and re-enact what transpired. In the afternoon of the same date, the Team invited Jeffrey to the CHR Central Office in Quezon City, where he was shown for identification twenty (20) copies of colored photographs/pictures of men and the

almost two hundred forty-four (244) photographs/pictures stored in the computer and lifted from the profiles of the Philippine Military Academy Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000.
49. Jeffrey pointed to a man in the two (2) colored group pictures/photographs, that he identified as among the 8-man group who abducted Jonas Burgos. For record and identification purposes, the Team encircled the face that Jeffrey identified in the two pictures; then he affixed his signature on each picture. Also, while leafing through the pictures of the PMA graduates in the Year Book of Sanghaya 2000 Batch, the witness identified a picture, with a bold and all-capitalized name HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA JR and the words Agawa, Besao, Mt. Province printed there under the capitalized words PHILIPPINE ARMY written on the upper portion, as the same person he pointed out in the two group pictures just mentioned above. Immediately thereafter, the Team caused the production of the photo identified by Jeffrey and asked him to affix his signature, which he also did.
50. After examining each of these pictures, Jeffrey declared that it dawned on him that based on his recollection of faces involved in the abduction of Jonas Burgos, he now remembers the face of a man, other than the two (2) faces whose description he already provided before to a police sketch artist, who was part of the 8-man group of abductors. And he also confirms it now that the person he is referring to was indeed seen by him as one of those who abducted Jonas Burgos at Hapag Kainan Restaurant of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
51. When asked how certain he was of the person he identified, considering that the printed copy of the photo lifted from the Face-book Sanghaya Account was taken sometime in the year 2010; while the picture appearing in the computer was lifted from the PMA Sanghaya 2000 Batch Year Book, Jeffrey replied Ang taong ito ay aking natatandaan sa kadahilanan na nuon g una siya ay nakaupo na katabi sa bandang kaliwa nang taong dumukot at natapos silang mag usap lumapit sa akin at pilit akong pinipigilan na wag daw makialam at ang sabi nya sa akin ay WAG KA DITONG MAKIALAM KASI ANG TAONG ITO AY MATAGAL NA NAMING SINUSUBAYBAYAN DAHIL SA DROGA kahit pa halos nagmamakaawa na nang tulong ang taong dinukot; at matapos nuon ay sapilitan na nilang binitbit sa labas ang biktima. ( I remember this man for the reason that at first he was seated at th e left side of the person abducted; and after they talked, he approached me and was preventing me forcefully saying not to interfere and he said to me: DONT YOU INTERFERE HERE SINCE WE HAVE BEEN DOING SOME SURVEILLANCE ON THIS MAN FOR SOME TIME ALREADY BECAUSE OF DRUGS despite that the man was already pleading for help, and after that, they forcibly dragged the victim outside.)
52. When asked if he could identify the picture of Jonas Burgos, Jeffrey affirmed that the person in the picture is the person referred to by him as the victim of abduction and his name is Jonas Burgos. He further stated that he learned of the victims name when he saw his picture flashed on TV and hear his name. When asked if he is willing to execute an affidavit on the facts that he has just provided, he answered yes and at that juncture the Team assisted him in the preparation of his Sinumpaang Salaysay based on his personal knowledge and in a language known to him. After which, the Team asked Jeffrey to read, examine and determine whether all the information he just provided are reflected in his Sinumpaang Salaysay and Jeffrey answered yes. Thereafter, Jeffrey affixed his signature after being sworn to before a lady CHR lawyer and a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City.
W. Daguman confirmed Tayabans and Baliagas actual affiliation with the military and their assignment at the 56 Infantry th Battalion, 7 ID
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53. On December 10, 2010, the Team went to the Bulacan Provincial Jail to visit Edmond Dag-Uman and asked him to th identify his former Company Commander at the 56 IB, 71 ID, Lt. Usmalik Tayaban and to identify the pictures.

54. Edmond Dag-uman identified the encircled in the picture as LT. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR., and the man with a receding hair as LT. USMALIK TAYABAN, his former Company Commander.
55. When asked if he was willing to reduce in writing his precious statements and those that just mentioned, he replied BAKA MAPAHAMAK AKO NYAN! (That might endanger me!). Following a lengthy discussion on the pros and cons of executing a sworn statement and the assurance of the Team to exclude his statements that are critical to the military establishment, it dawned on Dag-uman that his statement would be of help to the Commission in bringing his case to the proper authorities for review and appropriate action, that he eventually expressed his willingness to do so.
56. After which the Team immediately went to a Computer Caf nearby to encode the Salaysay, then the printed copy was presented to him for his determination whether he is in full accord with the contents therein. Edmond spent about thirty (30) minutes reading it and changed the word Charlie to Bravo and then affixed his initial on it. He also signed the Sinumpaang Salaysay after being sworn to before a team member authorized to administer oath.
X. Second visit to ELSA AGASANG and her Supplemental Sworn Statement
57. On January 26, 2011, the Team along with witness Jeffrey went to Bicol to meet witness Elsa. The aim was to help Elsa recall the faces of those she saw in the abduction by showing to her recently-acquired pictures of suspects.
58. For the first time they would re-unite, after almost four years since that fateful day of April 28, 2007, when both of them had the experience of witnessing an abduction incident, which rendered them jobless and unsafe.
59. The Team told Jeffrey to sit in front of Elsa without introducing him to her. After about half an hour into the conversation, she expressed disbelief when she realized that she was facing in person he co-worker that she knew very well.
60. On January 29, 2011, Elsa executed her Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay affirming her Salaysay given before PCI Lino DL Banaag at the CIDU, Quezon City Police District Office, Camp Karingal, Quezon City; and corroborating the material allegations contained in the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jeffrey.
On the basis of the evidence it had gathered, the CHR submitted the following findings:
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Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life liberty and security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.

Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
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The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and Elsa Agasang (Elsa), who at the time of the abduction were working as busboy and Trainee-Supervisor, respectively, at Hapag Kainan Restaurant.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart from the faces of the two abductors in the cartographic sketches that he described to the police, after he was shown by the Team the pictures in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men taken some years thereafter.
The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56 IB Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-uman (Dag-uman), who also positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Dagumans Sinumpaang Salaysay states that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as th a Company Commander in the 56 IB while he was still in the military service (with Serial No. 800693, from 1997 to 2002) also th with the 56 IB but under 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo Company. When he was arrested and brought to the th 56 IB Camp in April 2005, he did not see Lt. Baliaga anymore at the said camp. The similar reaction that the pictures elicited from both Jeffrey and Daguman did not pass unnoticed by the Team. Both men always look pensive, probably because of the pathetic plight they are in right now. It came as a surprise therefore to the Team when they could hardly hide their smile upon seeing the face of Baliaga, as if they know the man very well.
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Moreover, when the Team asked how Jeffrey how certain was he that it was indeed Baliaga that he saw as among those who actually participated in Jonas abduction, Jeffrey was able to give a graphic description and spontaneously, to boot, the blow by blow account of the incident, including the initial positioning of the actors, specially Baliaga, who even approached, talked to, and prevented him from interfering in their criminal act.
A Rebel-returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, has identified the face of the female in the cartographic sketch as a certain Lt. Fernando. While Lozada refuses to include her identification of Lt. Fernando in her Sinumpaang Salaysay for fear of a backlash, she told the Team that she was certain it was Lt. Fernando in the cartographic sketch since both of th them were involved in counter-insurgency operations at the 56 IB, while she was under the care of the battalion from March th 2006 until she left the 56 IB Headquarters in October 2007. Lozadas involvement in counter-insurgency operations together with Lt. Fernando was among the facts gathered by the CHR Regional Office 3 Investigators, whose investigation into the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph Burgos was documented by way of an After Mission Report dated August 13, 2008.
Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for what is otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some police and military elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the requested documents does not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso facto created a disputable presumption that AFP personnel were responsible for the abduction and that their superiors would be found accountable, if not responsible, for the crime committed. This observation finds support in the disputable presumption That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. (Paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules on Evidence of the Rules of Court of the Philippines).

In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has deemed that the requested documents and profiles would help ascertain the true identities of the cartographic sketches of two abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has claimed that one of the intelligence operatives involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits the description of his abductor.
As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56 IB officer Lt. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has effectively crushed the theory of the CIDG witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliagas true identity and affiliation with the military have been established by overwhelming evidence corroborated by detained former Army trooper Dag-uman.
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For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to investigate the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos as an independent body and pursuant to its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. Of particular importance are the identities and locations of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches; the allegations that CIDG Witnesses Emerito G. Lipio and Meliza Concepcion-Reyes are AFP enlisted personnel and the alleged participation of Delfin De Guzman @ Ka Baste in the abduction of Jonas Burgos whose case for Murder and Attempted Murder was dismissed by the court for failure of the lone witness, an army th man of the 56 IB to testify against him.
Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and Justice (UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch was among the raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona otherwise known as ERAP FIVE. Unfortunately, and as already pointed out above, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) turned down the request of the Team for a profile of the operatives in the so-called Erap 5 abduction on the ground of relevancy and branded the request as a fishing expedition per its Disposition Form dated September 21, 2010.
Efforts to contact Virgilio Eustaquio to secure his affidavit proved futile, as his present whereabouts cannot be determined. And due to lack of material time, the Commission decided to pursue the same and determine the whereabouts of the other members of the Erap 5 on its own time and authority as an independent body.
Based on the above-cited findings, the CHR submitted the following recommendations for the Courts consideration, viz:
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i. To DIRECT the Department of Justice (DOJ), subject to certain requirements, to immediately admit witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program under Republic Act No. 6981;
ii. To DIRECT the Department of Justice (DOJ) to commence the filing of Criminal Charges for Kidnapping/Enforced Disappearance and/or Arbitrary Detention against 1LT. HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. of the Philippine Army, as Principal by Direct Participation in the abduction of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos on April 28, 2007 from Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City;
iii. To DIRECT the Department of Justice to cause the filing of Obstruction of Justice against Emerito Lipio y Gonzales; Marlon Manuel y de Leon; and Meliza Concepcion-Reyes for giving false or fabricated information to the CIDG and for their willful refusal to cooperate with the CHR Team in the investigation of the herein enforced disappearance;
iv. To DIRECT Cavite Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco to appear before the Supreme Court and to divulge his source/informant as the same does not fall under the privilege communication rule;
v. To DIRECT the PNP-CIDG RC, NCRCIDU, Atty. Joel Napoleon M. Coronel, to explain his Memorandum to the CIDG-CIDD stating that the witnesses were reportedly turned over by the Bulacan PPO a nd Philippine Army to the CIDG for investigation, considering that said witnesses were not under police or military custody at the time of the supposed turn-over in the evening of August 22, 2007 and to identify the PNP officer who directed the CIDG operatives to fetch Emerito G. Lipio in Bulacan and the two other CIDG witnesses for tactical interrogation;
vi. To REQUIRE General Roa of the Judge Advocate General Office, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, to explain their failure and/or refusal to provide the CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas T. Burgos, particularly the following: (a) Profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt.Jason Roxas (Philippine Army) and three (3) other enlisted personnel mentioned in paragraph (1) of the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution issued on 22 June 2010 in the instant consolidated cases, including a certain 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007; (b)copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that said covert military operation, including their respective Summary of Information and individual pictures; and (c) complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to the said camps and their corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the cases filed against them, if any;
vii. To DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to comply with its mandate under paragraph (3) of the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution promulgated on 22 June 2010 in the instant consolidated cases;
viii. To DIRECT Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., the Philippine Armys 56th Infantry Battalion in Bulacan and 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija to produce the living body of the victim Jonas Joseph T. Burgos before this Court;
ix. To DIRECT the Department of Justice to review and determine the probable liability/accountability of the officers and enlisted personnel concerned of the Philippine Armys 56th IB and the 7th ID, relative to the torture and/or other forms of i lltreatment of Edmond M. Dag-uman, while he was in detention at Fort Magsaysay sometime in October 2005, as part of the collateral discoveries in the conduct of this investigation;

x. To DIRECT the Department of Justice to review the case filed against Edmond Dag-uman alias DELFIN DE GUZMAN with the Regional Trial Court Branch 10 in Malolos City docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1844-M-2005 and 186-M-2006; and the legal basis, if any, for his continued detention at the Bulacan Provincial Jail in Malolos City; and
xi. To DIRECT the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to study the probable liability of Adelio A. Asuncion, former Jail Warden of Bulacan Provincial Jail for his failure to account the records of the inmates more specifically the records of turn-over Edmond Dag-uman from the 7th ID.
Pursuant to our June 22, 2010, the CHR furnished the petitioner with the copy of its report, which the petitioner apparently relied upon in filing a criminal complaint against Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. and other members of the military.
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OUR RULING
A. Amparo
After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the CA findings and our findings in our June 22, 2010 Resolution heretofore mentioned, including the recent CHR findings that Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., (Lt. Baliaga) of the 56 Infantry Battalion, 7 Infantry Division, Philippine Army is one of the abductors of Jonas, we resolve to hold in abeyance our ruling on the merits in the Amparo aspect of the present case and refer this case back to the CA in order to allow Lt. Baliaga and the present Amparo respondents to file their respective Comments on the CHR Report within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution. The CA shall continue with the hearing of the Amparo petition in light of the evidence previously submitted, the proceedings it already conducted and the subsequent developments in this case, particularly the CHR Report. Thereafter, the CA shall rule on the merits of the Amparopetition. For this purpose, we order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the Amparo petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA). This directive to implead Lt. Baliaga is without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with respect to others whose identities and participation may be disclosed in future investigations.
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We also note that Office of the Judge Advocate General ( TJAG) failed and/or refused to provide the CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas, and thereby disobeyed our June 22, 2010 Resolution. To recall, we issued a Resolution declaring the CHR as the Courts directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. In this same Resolution, we required the then incumbent Chiefs of the AFP and the PNP to

make available and to provide copies to the CHR, of all documents and records in their possession and as the CHR may require, relevant to the case of Jonas, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
In its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR recommended, for the Courts consideration:
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vi.
To REQUIRE General Roa of the Judge Advocate General Office, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, to explain their failure and/or refusal to provide the CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas T. Burgos, particularly the following: (a) Profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army) and three (3) other enlisted personnel mentioned in paragraph (1) of the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution issued on 22 June 2010 in the instant consolidated cases, including a certain 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007; (b) copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that said covert military operation, including their respective Summary of Information and individual pictures; and (c) complete list of the officers, women and menassigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to the said camps and their corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the cases filed against them, if any.
Section 16 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court may be punished for contempt, viz:
SEC. 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine
Acting on the CHRs recommendation and based on the above considerations, we resolve to require General Roa of TJAG, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution, and then incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP,
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to show cause and explain,
within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of this Court for defying our June 22, 2010 Resolution.
B. Habeas Corpus

In light of the new evidence obtained by the CHR, particularly the Cabintoy evidence that positively identified Lt. Baliaga as one of the direct perpetrators in the abduction of Jonas and in the interest of justice, we resolve to set aside the CAs dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and issue anew the writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall immediately refer the writ to the same CA division that decided the habeas corpus petition (CA-GR SP No. 99839).
For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the habeas corpus petition and require him together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56 IB at the time of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Feliciano to produce the person of Jonas and to show cause why he should not be released from detention.
th
The CA shall rule on the merits of the habeas corpus petition in light of the evidence previously submitted to it, the proceedings already conducted, and the subsequent developments in this case (particularly the CHR report) as proven by evidence properly adduced before it. The Court of Appeals and the parties may require Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco, Jeffrey Cabintoy, Edmund Dag-uman, Melissa Concepcion Reyes, Emerito Lipio and Marlon Manuel to testify in this case. C. Petition for Contempt
In dismissing the petition, the CA held:
[17]
Undoubtedly, the accusation against respondents is criminal in nature. In view thereof, the rules in criminal prosecution and corollary recognition of respondents constitutional rights inevitably come into play. As held in People v. Godoy:
In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, assuming that there is circumstantial evidence to support petitioners allegations, said circumstantial evidence falls short of the quantum of evidence that is required to establish the guilt of an accused in a criminal proceeding, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court on contempt, in relation to a Habeas Corpus proceeding, is Section 16, Rule 102, which provides:

Sec. 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. - A clerk of a court who refuses to issue the writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a person to whom a writ is directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make return of the same according to the command thereof, or makes false return thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner, refuses to deliver to the person demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand therefor, a true copy of the warrant or order of commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, and may also be punished by the court or judge as for contempt. [emphasis supplied]
In Montenegro v. Montenegro,
[18]
we explained the types and nature of contempt, as follows:
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as "disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its 7 authority, justice and dignity." The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of justice. xxx Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made . If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil. [emphasis supplied]
We agree with the CA that indirect contempt is the appropriate characterization of the charge filed by the petitioner against the respondents and that the charge is criminal in nature. Evidently, the charge of filing a false return constitutes improper conduct that serves no other purpose but to mislead, impede and obstruct the administration of justice by the Court. In People v. Godoy,
[19]
which the CA cited, we specifically held that under
paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice constitutes criminal contempt.
A criminal contempt proceeding has been characterized as sui generis as it partakes some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, without completely falling under either proceeding. Its identification with a criminal proceeding is in the use of the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, to the extent that criminal procedure is consistent with the summary nature of a contempt proceeding. We have consistently held and established that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; that the accused is afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.
[20]

Contempt, too, is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
[21]
The presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, which means proof to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that for which it is given. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable certainty and moral certainty a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
[22]
For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the respondents in contempt for filing false returns in the habeas corpus proceedings before the CA, she has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had custody of Jonas. As the CA did, we find that the pieces of evidence on record as of the time of the CA proceedings were merely circumstantial and did not provide a direct link between the respondents and the abduction of Jonas; the evidence did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had a hand in the abduction of Jonas, and consequently, had custody of him at the time they filed their returns to the Writ of habeas corpus denying custody of Jonas.
However, the subsequent developments in this case, specifically, the investigative findings presented to us by the CHR pointing to Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors of Jonas, have given a twist to our otherwise clear conclusion. Investigations will continue, consistent with the nature of Amparo proceedings to be alive until a definitive result is achieved, and these investigations may yet yield additional evidence affecting the conclusion the CA made. For this reason, we can only conclude that the CAs dismissal of the contempt charge should be provisional, i.e., without prejudice to the re-filing of the charge in the future should the petitioner find this step war ranted by the evidence in the proceedings related to Jonass disappearance, including the criminal prosecutions that may transpire.
To adjust to the extraordinary nature of Amparo and habeas corpus proceedings and to directly identify the parties bound by these proceedings who have the continuing obligation to comply with our directives, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, the Director General of the PNP, the Chief of the PNP-CIDG and the TJAG shall be named as parties to this case without need of naming their current incumbents, separately from the then incumbent officials that the petitioner named in her original Amparo and habeas corpus petitions, for possible responsibility and accountability.
In light of the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who is no the longer the President of the Republic of thePhilippines, she should now be dropped as a party-respondent in these petitions.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, we RESOLVE to: I. IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 99839)
a.
ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals who shall immediately refer the writ to the same Division that decided the habeas corpus petition;
b.
ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 99839 and G.R. No. 183711, and REQUIRE him, together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56 IB, 7 Infantry Division, Philippine Army at the time of the disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, to produce the person of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos under the terms the Court of Appeals shall prescribe, and to show cause why Jonas Joseph T. Burgos should not be released from detention;
th
th
c.
REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the same Division of the Court of Appeals which shall continue to hear this case after the required Returns shall have been filed and render a new decision within thirty (30) days after the case is submitted for decision; and
d.
ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, separate from the original respondents impleaded in the petition, and the dropping or deletion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent.
II. IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA-G.R. SP No. 100230)
e.
AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioners petition for Contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 100230, without prejudice to the re-filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR investigation this Court has ordered; and
f.
ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent, in light of the unconditional dismissal of the contempt charge against her.
III. IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA)

g. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713, without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with respect to others whose identities and participation may be disclosed in future investigations and proceedings;
h.
DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents to file their Comments on the CHR report with the Court of Appeals, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution.
i.
REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, Gen. Ricardo David, (a) to show cause and explain to this Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of this Court for their defiance of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and (b) to submit to this Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, a copy of the documents requested by the CHR, particularly: 1) The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force); M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force); an alias T.L. - all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines - and 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007; 2) Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that said covert military operation, including their respective Summary of Information and individual pictures; and 3) Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to the said camps and their corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the cases filed against them, if any.
These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our examination to determine their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public disclosure.
j.
ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, in representation of their respective organizations, separately from the original respondents impleaded in the petition; and the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent;
k.
REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program, subject to the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981; and
l.
NOTE the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which the latter may investigate and act upon on its own pursuant to Section 21 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
SO ORDERED.
Rubrico vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010
LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY a.k.a. DARWIN REYES, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, a certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT. EDGAR B. ROQUERO, ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. 3 Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail and seek to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00003, a petition commenced under the Amparo Rule. The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this Court. After issuing the desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action. The petition and its attachments contained, in substance, the following allegations: 1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation - conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at Dasmarias, Cavite, her hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset. After Lourdes release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on at least two occasions at different places, i.e., Dasmarias, Cavite and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in bonnets, continued; 2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp. Gomez), then sub-station commander of Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, kept sending text messages to Lourdes daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing her to beaches and asking her questions about Karapatan, an alliance of human rights organizations. He, however, failed to make an investigation even after Lourdes disappearance had been made known to him; 3. A week after Lourdes release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean), was constrained to leave their house because of t he presence of men watching them; 4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with address at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Paraaque City, but nothing has happened; and the threats and harassment incidents have been reported to the Dasmarias municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations. Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes abduction went into hiding after being visited by government agents in civ ilian clothes; and 5. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes; that unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a "mission order" which was addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF. The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
1 2

circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations truth. And by way of general affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by 4 Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Attached to the return were the affidavits of the following, among other public officials, containing their respective affirmative defenses and/or statements of what they had undertaken or committed to undertake regarding the claimed disappearance of Lourdes and the harassments made to bear on her and her daughters: 1. Gen. Esperon attested that, pursuant to a directive of then Secretary of National Defense (SND) Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., he ordered the Commanding General of the PAF, with information to all concerned units, to conduct an investigation to establish the circumstances behind the disappearance and the reappearance of Lourdes insofar as the involvement of alleged personnel/unit is concerned. The Provost Marshall General and the Office of the Judge Advocate General (JAGO), AFP, also undertook a parallel action. Gen. Esperon manifested his resolve to provide the CA with material results of the investigation; to continue with the probe on the alleged abduction of Lourdes and to bring those responsible, including military personnel, to the bar of justice when warranted by the findings and 5 the competent evidence that may be gathered in the investigation process by those mandated to look into the matter; 2. P/Dir. Gen. Razon - stated that an investigation he immediately ordered upon receiving a copy of the petition is on-going vis--vis Lourdes abduction, and that a background verification with the PNP Personnel Accounting and Information System disclosed that the names Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma and one Jonathan do not appear in the police personnel records, although the PNP files carry the name of Darwin Reyes Y. Muga. Per the initial investigation report of the Dasmarias municipal police station, P/Dir. Gen. Razon disclosed, Lourdes was abducted by six armed men in the afternoon of April 3, 2007 and dragged aboard a Toyota Revo with plate number XRR 428, which plate was issued for a Mitsubishi van to AK Cottage Industry with address at 9 Amsterdam St., Merville Subd., Paraaque City. The person residing in the apartment on that given address is one Darius/Erwin See @ Darius Reyes allegedly working, per the latters house helper, in Camp Aguinaldo. P/Dir. Gen. Razon, however, bemoaned the fact that Mrs. Rubrico never contacted nor coordinated with the local police or other investigating units of the PNP after her release, although she is in the best position to establish the identity of her abductors and/or provide positive description through composite sketching. Nonetheless, he manifested that the PNP is ready to assist and protect the petitioners and the key witnesses from threats, harassments and intimidation from whatever source and, at the same time, to assist the Court in the 6 implementation of its orders. 1avvphi1 3. P/Supt. Roquero stated conducting, upon receipt of Lourdes complaint, an investigation and submitting the corresponding report to the PNP Calabarzon, observing that neither Lourdes nor her relatives provided the police with relevant information; 4. P/Insp. Gomez alleged that Lourdes, her kin and witnesses refused to cooperate with the investigating Cavite PNP; and 5. Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro - alleged that cases for violation of Articles 267 and 124, or kidnapping and arbitrary detention, respectively, have been filed with, and are under preliminary investigation by the OMB against those believed to be involved in Lourdes kidnapping; that upon receipt of the petition for a writ of amparo, proper coordination was made with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) where the subject criminal and administrative complaints were filed. Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that the return was no more than a general denial of averments in the petition. They, thus, pleaded to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. And with leave of court, they also asked to serve notice of the petition through publication, owing to their failure to secure the current address of the latter five and thus submit, as the CA required, proof of service of the petition on them. The hearing started on November 13, 2007. In that setting, petitioners counsel prayed for the issuance of a temporary protection order (TPO) against the answering respondents on the basis of the allegations in the petition. At the hearing of November 20, 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served by the courts process server on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonath an.
7

The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety of excluding President Arroyo from the petition, petitio ners motions for service by publication, and the issuance of a TPO are not of decisive pertinence in this recital. The bottom line is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case; denied the motion for a TPO for the courts want of authority to issue it in the tenor sought by petitioners; and effectively 8 denied the motion for notice by publication owing to petitioners failure to submit the affidavit required under Sec. 17, Rul e 14 of the Rules of Court. After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review, disposing of the petition but only insofar as the answering respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, in order that petitioners complaint will not end up as another unsolved case, the heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to regularly update petitioners and this Court on the status of their investigation. SO ORDERED. In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for resolution in the following wise: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent. Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The 1987 Cons titution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her 9 tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the 10 Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. x x x And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB. None of the four individual respondents immediately referred to above has been implicated as being connected to, let alone as being behind, the 11 alleged abduction and harassment of petitioner Lourdes. Their names were not even mentioned in Lourdes Sinumpaang Salaysay of April 2007. The 12 13 same goes for the respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and/or Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jean and Mary Joy. As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners. To the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were, in fact, members of the military or the police force." The two generals, the CAs holding broadly hinted, would have been accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual ma lefactors were members of the AFP or PNP. As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded because they allegedly had not exerted the required extraordinary diligence in investigating and satisfactorily resolving Lourdes disappearance or bringing to justice the actual perpetrators of wh at amounted to a criminal act, albeit there were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts constituting threats against Mary Joy.

While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis--vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact that command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed 14 forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of 15 criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes 16 committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not 18 yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification. While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that 20 doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a 21 principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other wo rds, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. 22 As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial 23 evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings." Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis: It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extra-judicial killings]. xxxx As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law 24 that only the Legislature has the power to enact. x x x If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any. Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To a concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally formed part of either the military or the police chain of command. A preliminary police investigation report, however, would tend to show a link, however hazy, between the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly used in the abduction of Lourdes and the address of Darwin Reyes/Sy, who 25 was alleged to be working in Camp Aguinaldo. Then, too, there were affidavits and testimonies on events that transpired which, if taken together, logically point to military involvement in the alleged disappearance of Lourdes, such as, but not limited to, her abduction in broad daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a vehicle blindfolded and then being brought to a place where the sounds of planes taking off and landing could be heard. Mention may also be made of the fact that Lourdes was asked about her membership in the Communist Party and of being released when she agreed to become an "asset." Still and all, the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged abductors, namely Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have yet to be established.
19 17
Based on the separate sworn statements of Maj. Paul Ciano and Technical Sergeant John N. Romano, officer-in-charge and a staff of the 301st AISS, respectively, none of the alleged abductors of Lourdes belonged to the 301st AISS based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any 28 unit of the Philippine Air Force, per the certification of Col. Raul Dimatactac, Air Force Adjutant. And as stated in the challenged CA decision, a verification with the Personnel Accounting and Information System of the PNP yielded the information that, except for a certain Darwin Reyes y Muga, the other alleged abductors, i.e., Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan, were not members of the PNP. Petitioners, when given the opportunity to identify Police Officer 1 Darwin Reyes y Muga, made no effort to confirm if he was the same Maj. Darwin Reyes a.k.a. Darwin Sy they were implicating in Lourdes abduction. Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully controverted answering respondents documentary evidence, adduced to debunk the formers allegations directly linking Lourdes abductors and tormentors to the military or the police establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when q ueried on cross29 30 examination, expressed the belief that Sy/Reyes was an NBI agent. The Court is, of course, aware of what was referred to in Razon as the "evidentiary difficulties" presented by the nature of, and encountered by petitioners in, enforced disappearance cases. But it is precisely for this reason that the Court should take care too that no wrong message is sent, lest one conclude that any kind or degree of evidence, even the outlandish, would suffice to secure amparo remedies and protection. Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes the minimum evidentiary substantiation requirement and norm to support a cause of action under the Rule, thus: Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. xxxx Sec. 18. Judgment.x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis added.) Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged; it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It means such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 32 conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise. Per the CAs evaluation of their evidence, consisting of the testimonies and affidavits of the three Rubrico women and five other individuals, petitioners have not satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar required of and assigned to them under the Amparo Rule. In a very real sense, the burden of evidence never even shifted to answering respondents. The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts determination of the answering respondents role in the alleged enforced d isappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her familys security. Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the Court notes that both Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, per their separate affidavits, lost no time, upon their receipt of the order to make a return on the writ, in issuing directives to the concerned units in their respective commands for a thorough probe of the case and in providing the investigators the necessary support. As of this date, however, the investigations have yet to be concluded with some definite findings and recommendation. As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct or indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As police officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that would include looking into the cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and obtaining statements from them; and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate number XRR 428, and securing and preserving 33 evidence related to the abduction and the threats that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s responsible. As we said in Manalo, the right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, is breached by the superficial and one-sidedhence, ineffectiveinvestigation by the military or the police of reported cases under their jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a preliminary fact-finding on petitioners complaint. They could not, however, make any headway, owing to what was perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a 34 plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses attitude, "*They+ do not trust the government agencies to protect them." The difficulty arising from a situation where the party whose complicity in extra-judicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be the same party who investigates it is understandable, though. The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. To repeat what the Court said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra -legal killings, enforced 35 disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in theVelasquez Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. (Emphasis added.)
31
26
27

This brings us to Mary Joys charge of having been harassed by respondent P/Insp. Gomez. With the view we take of this incident, there is nothing concrete to support the charge, save for Mary Joys bare allegations of harassment. We cite with approval the following self -explanatory excerpt from the appealed CA decision: In fact, during her cross-examination, when asked what specific act or threat P/Sr. Gomez (ret) committed against her or her mother and sister, Mary 36 Joy replied "None " Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners allegations about the OMB failing to act on their complaint against those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners contention, the OMB has taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. As culled 37 38 from the affidavit of the Deputy Overall Ombudsman and the joint affidavits of the designated investigators, all dated November 7, 2007, the OMB 39 40 had, on the basis of said complaint, commenced criminal and administrative proceedings, docketed as OMB-P-C-07-0602-E and OMB-P-A 07-567-E, respectively, against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The requisite orders for the submission of counter-affidavits and verified position papers had been sent out. The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA with the correct addresses of respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the petition for a writ of amparo individually addressed to each of them have all been returned unopened. And petitioners motion interposed before the appellate court for notice or service via publication has no t been accompanied by supporting affidavits as required by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA partial judgmentdisposing of the underlying petition for a writ of amparo without (1) pronouncement as to the accountability, or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents or (2) outright dismissal of the 41 same petition as to themhews to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on archiving and reviving cases. Parenthetically, petitioners have also not furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their petition for review. Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition did not allege ultimate facts as would link the OMB in any manner to the violation or threat of violation of the petitioners rights to life, liberty, or personal security. The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears 42 and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of 43 extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the Court order the impleaded respondents "to immediately desist from doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of the Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices where they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court." Petitioners, however, failed to adduce the threshold substantive evidence to establish the predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against responding respondents, as responsible for the disappearance and harassments complained of. This is not to say, howev er, that petitioners allegation on the fact of the abduction incident or harassment is necessarily contrived. The reality on the ground, however, is that the military or police connection has not been adequately proved either by identifying the malefactors as components of the AFP or PNP; or in case identification is not possible, by showing that they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe the authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual respondents. To this extent, the dismissal of the case against them is correct and must, accordingly, be sustained. Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court distinctly notes that the appealed decision veritably extended the privilege of the writ of amparo to petitioners when it granted what to us are amparo reliefs. Consider: the appellate court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military take specific measures for the protection of petitioners right or threatened right to liberty or security. The pr otection came in the form of directives specifically to Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring each of them (1) to ensure that the investigations already commenced by the AFP and PNP units, respectively, under them on the complaints of Lourdes and her daughters are being pursued with urgency to bring to justice the perpetrators of the acts complained of; and (2) to submit to the CA, copy furnished the petitioners, a regular report on the progress and status of the investigations. The directives obviously go to Gen. Esperon in his capacity as head of the AFP and, in a sense, chief guarantor of order and security in the country. On the other hand, P/Dir. Gen. Razon is called upon to perform a duty pertaining to the PNP, a crime-preventing, investigatory, and arresting institution. As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was set in its decision for the completion of the investigation and the reportorial requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razons imminent compulsory retirement from the military and police services, respectively. Accordingly, the CA directives, as hereinafter redefined and amplified to fully enforce the amparo remedies, are hereby given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the commanding general of the AFP and the PNP. At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a proper disposition of this case.

First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It 44 must be pointed out, though, that the filing of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007. Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. 46 The succeeding Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that 47 section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation. Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly 48 address the situation obtaining under the premises. Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and factfinding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective. WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and makes a decision: (1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of amparo; (2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach accountability and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is also affirmed for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and (3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent Director-General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by their respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments 49 and threats she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate officials, in particular, to do the following: (a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of this determination to the OMB with copy furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court; (b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and (c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and locating them. The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of this Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the PNP shall submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court, the CA, the OMB, and petitioners. This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations and the actions of the AFP and the PNP. Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment dated July 31, 2008 of the CA. SO ORDERED.
45
Boac vs. Cadapan

EN BANC
LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, Petitioners,
G.R. Nos. 184461-62
- versus -
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------x ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, Petitioners,
- versus -
G.R. No. 184495
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, ET AL., Respondents. x------------------------------------x
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, Petitioners,
Boac vs. Cadapan

- versus -
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, DONALD CAIGAS, A.K.A. ALAN OR ALVIN, ARNEL ENRIQUEZ AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 187109
Present:
CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD,
** *
VILLARAMA, PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ.

**
Promulgated:
May 31, 2011 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
Boac vs. Cadapan

CARPIO MORALES, J.: At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo (Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.
Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respective families scoured nearby police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing.
On July 17, 2006, spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court, docketed asG.R. No. 173228, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of July 19, 2006, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
[2]
[1]
The habeas corpus petition was docketed at the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 95303.
By Return of the Writ dated July 21, 2006, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the Return were attached affidavits from the respondents, except Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; that they had inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing; and that the military does not own nor possess a stainless steel jeep with plate number RTF 597. Also appended to the Return was a certification from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) that plate number RTF 597 had not yet been manufactured as of July 26, 2006.
[3]
Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court.
Witness Wilfredo Ramos, owner of the house where the three were abducted, recounted that on June 26, 2006, while he was inside his house in Hagonoy, he witnessed armed men wearing bonnets abduct Sherlyn and Karen from his house and also abduct Merino on their way out; and that tied and blindfolded, the three were boarded on a jeep and taken towards Iba in Hagonoy.
[4]
Witness Alberto Ramirez (Ramirez) recalled that on June 28, 2006, while he was sleeping in his house, he was awakened by Merino who, in the company of a group of unidentified armed men, repaired to his house; that onboard a stainless jeep bearing plate number RTF 597, he (Ramirez)
Boac vs. Cadapan

was taken to a place in Mercado, Hagonoy and was asked by one Enriquez if he knew Sierra, Tanya, Vincent and Lisa; and that Enriquez described the appearance of two ladies which matched those of Sherlyn and Karen, whom he was familiar with as the two had previously slept in his house.
[5]
Another witness, Oscar Leuterio, who was himself previously abducted by armed men and detained for five months, testified that when he was detained in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, he saw two women fitting the descriptions of Sherlyn and Karen, and also saw Merino, his kumpare.
[6]
Lt. Col. Boac, the then commander of Task Force Malolos, a special operations team tasked to neutralize the intelligence network of communists and other armed groups, declared that he conducted an inquiry on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino but his subordinates denied knowledge thereof.
[7]
While he denied having received any order from Gen. Palparan to investigate the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, his assistance in locating the missing persons was sought by the mayor of Hagonoy.
Major Dominador Dingle, the then division adjutant of the Philippine Armys 7 Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay, denied that a certain Arnel Enriquez is a member of his infantry as in fact his name did not appear in the roster of troops.
[8]
th
Roberto Se, a supervisor of the Equipment, Plate Number and Supply Units of the LTO, denied that his office manufactured and issued a plate number bearing number RTF 597.
[9]
On rebuttal, Lt. Mirabelle, Lt. Col. Boac and Gen. Palparan took the witness stand as hostile witnesses.
Lt. Mirabelle testified that she did not receive any report on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino nor any order to investigate the matter. And she denied knowing anything about the abduction of Ramirez nor who were Ka Tanya or Ka Lisa.
[10]
Gen. Palparan testified that during a debate in a televised program, he mentioned the names of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya as the ones involved in revolutionary tax activities; and that he ordered Lt. Col. Boac to conduct an investigation on the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
[11]
When
pressed to elaborate, he stated: I said that I got the report that it stated that it was Ka Tanya and Ka Lisa that, I mean, that incident happened in
Boac vs. Cadapan

Hagonoy, Bulacan was the abduction of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya, Your Honor, and another one. That was the report coming from the people in the area.
[12]
By Decision of March 29, 2007,
[13]
the Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition in this wise:
As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino are indeed missing, the present petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the main office or function of the habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of ones detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody of the persons subject of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have limited powers, means and resources to conduct an investigation. x x x.
It being the situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but criminal proceedings by initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a crime punishable by law. In the case of Martinez v. Mendoza, supra, the Supreme Court restated the doctrine that habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there being no strong evidence that the missing persons are in the custody of the respondents.
The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for separate investigations and appropriate actions as may be warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Boac vs. Cadapan

Petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision. They also moved to present newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion Paulino, Sherlyns mother-in-law who was allegedly threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo who allegedly met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his detention at a military camp.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo
[14]
With Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of Documents dated October 24, 2007, docketed as G.R. No.
179994. The petition impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and Donald Caigas.
Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in office.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179994 also prayed that they be allowed to inspect the detention areas of the following places:
1.
7 Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija
th
2.
24 Infantry Batallion at Limay, Bataan
th
3.
Army Detachment inside Valmocina Farm, Pinaod, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
4.
Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan
5.
The Resthouse of Donald Caigas alias Allan or Alvin of the 24 Infantry Batallion at Barangay Banog, Bolinao, Pangasinan
th
6.
56 Infantry Batallion Headquarters at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan
th
7.
Army Detachment at Barangay Mercado, Hagonoy, Bulacan
8.
Beach House [at] Iba, Zambales used as a safehouse with a retired military personnel as a caretaker;
Boac vs. Cadapan
By Resolution of October 25, 2007, the Court issued in G.R. No. 179994 a writ of amparo returnable to the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus petition.
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 002, respondents in the amparo case, through the Solicitor General, filed their Return of the Writ on November 6, 2007.
[15]
In the Return, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac and Lt. Mirabelle reiterated their earlier narrations in the habeas corpus case.
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. stated in the Return that he immediately caused to investigate and verify the identities of the missing persons and was aware of the earlier decision of the appellate court ordering the police, the Commission on Human Rights and the National Bureau of Investigation to take further action on the matter.
[16]
Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, the then battalion commander of the 24 Infantry Battalion based in Balanga City, Bataan, denied any involvement in the abduction. While the 24 Infantry Battalion detachment was reported to be a detention site of the missing persons, Lt. Col. Anotado claimed that he found no untoward incident when he visited said detachment. He also claimed that there was no report of the death of Merino per his inquiry with the local police.
[17] th
th
Police Director General Avelino Razon narrated that he ordered the compilation of pertinent records, papers and other documents of the PNP on the abduction of the three, and that the police exhausted all possible actions available under the circumstances.
[18]
In addition to the witnesses already presented in the habeas corpus case, petitioners called on Adoracion Paulino and Raymond Manalo to testify during the trial.
Adoracion Paulino recalled that her daughter-in-law Sherlyn showed up at home on April 11, 2007, accompanied by two men and three women whom she believed were soldiers. She averred that she did not report the incident to the police nor inform Sherlyns mother about the visit.
[19]
Raymond Manalo (Manalo) claimed that he met the three abducted persons when he was illegally detained by military men in Camp Tecson in San Miguel, Bulacan. His group was later taken to a camp in Limay, Bataan. He recalled that Lt. Col. Anotado was the one who interrogated him while in detention.
[20]
Boac vs. Cadapan

In his Sinumpaang Salaysay,
[21]
Manalo recounted:
xxxx
59.
Saan ka dinala mula sa Sapang?
Pagkalipas ng humigit kumulang 3 buwan sa Sapang, dinala ako sa Camp Tecson sa ilalim ng 24 IB.
th
xxxx
Sa loob ng barracks ko nakilala si Sherlyn Cadapan, isang estudyante ng UP.
Ipinapalinis din sa akin ang loob ng barracks. Sa isang kwarto sa loob ng barracks, may nakita akong babae na nakakadena[.] Noong una, pinagbawalan akong makipag-usap sa kanya. Sa ikatlo o ikaapat na araw, nakausap ko yung babaeng nagngangalang Sherlyn. Binigyan ko siya ng pagkain. Sinabi niya sa akin na dinukot si[ya] sa Hagonoy, Bulacan at matindi ang tortyur na dinaranas niya. Sabi niya gusto niyang umuwi at makasama ang kanyang magulang. Umiiyak siya. Sabi niya sa akin ang buong pangalan niya ay Sherlyn Cadapan, mula sa Laguna. Sa araw tinatanggal ang kanyang kadena at inuutusan si Sherlyn na maglaba.
x x x x.
61.
Sino ang mga nakilala mo sa Camp Tecson?
Dito sa Camp Tecson naming nakilala si Allan Alvin (maya-maya nalaman naming na siya pala si Donald Caigas), ng 24 IB, na tinatawag na master o commander ng kanyang mga tauhan.
th
Pagkalipas ng 2 araw matapos dalhin si Reynaldo sa Camp Tecson dumating sina Karen Empeo at Manuel Merino na mga bihag din. Inilagay si Karen at Manuel sa kwarto ni Allan*.+ Kami naman ni Reynaldo ay nasa katabing kwarto, kasama si Sherlyn.
xxxx
62.
xxxx
Boac vs. Cadapan

Kaming mga lalake (ako, si Reynaldo at si Manuel) ay ginawang utusan, habang sina Sherlyn at Karen ay ginawang labandera.
Si Sherlyn ang pinahirapan nina Mickey, Donald at Billy. Sabi ni Sherlyn sa akin na siyay ginahasa.
xxxx
63.
xxxx
xxxx
Kaming lima (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, si Karen at si [Merino]) ang dinala sa Limay. Sinakay ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn at si [Merino] sa isang stainless na jeep. SiKaren ay isinakay sa itim na sasakyan ni Donald Caigas. x x x x
xxxx
66.
Saan pa kayo dinala mula sa Limay, Bataan?
Mula sa Limay, kaming 5 (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, Si Karen at si Manuel) ay dinala sa isang safehouse sa Zambales, tabi ng dagat. x x x x (underscoring supplied; italics and emphasis in the original)
On rebuttal, Lt. Col. Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were called to the witness stand.
Lt. Col. Anotado denied seeing or meeting Manalo. He posited that Manalo recognized him because he was very active in conducting lectures inBataan and even appeared on television regarding an incident involving the 24 Infantry Batallion. He contended that it was impossible for Manalo, Sherlyn, Karen and Merino to be detained in the Limay detachment which had no detention area.
th
Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan, the then chief of staff of the First Scout Ranger Regiment in Camp Tecson, testified that the camp is not a detention facility, nor does it conduct military operations as it only serves as a training facility for scout rangers. He averred that his regiment does not have any command relation with either the 7 Infantry Division or the 24 Infantry Battalion.
th th [22]
Boac vs. Cadapan
By Decision of September 17, 2008,
[23]
the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 (the habeas
corpuscase) and ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in CA-G.R. SP No. 00002 (the amparo case). Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case), the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Accordingly, in both CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case) and in CA-G.R. SP NO. 00002 (Amparo case), the respondents are thereby ordered to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of Sher[lyn] Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino.
Respondent Director General Avelino Razon is hereby ordered to resume *the+ PNPs unfinished investigation so that the truth will be fully ascertained and appropriate charges filed against those truly responsible.
SO ORDERED.
In reconsidering its earlier Decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied heavily on the testimony of Manalo in this wise:
With the additional testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have been able to convincingly prove the fact of their detention by some elements in the military. His testimony is a first hand account that military and civilian personnel under th the 7 Infantry Division were responsible for the abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino . He also confirmed the claim of Oscar Leuterio that the latter was detained in Fort Magsaysay. It was there where he (Leuterio) saw Manuel Merino.
His testimony that Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be hearsay but not with respect to his meeting with, and talking to, the three desaparecidos. His testimony on those points was no hearsay. Raymond Manalo saw the three with his very own eyes as they were detained and tortured together. In fact, he claimed to be a witness to the burning of Manuel Merino. In the absence of confirmatory proof, however, the Court will presume that he is still alive.
The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and brushed aside . His narration and those of the earlier witnesses, taken together, constitute more than substantial evidence warranting an order that the three be released from detention if they are not being held for a lawful cause. They may be moved from place to place but still they are considered under detention and custody of the respondents.
His testimony was clear, consistent and convincing. x x x.
Boac vs. Cadapan

xxxx
The additional testimonies of Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were of no help either. Again, their averments were the same negative ones which cannot prevail over those of Raymond Manalo. Indeed, Camp Tecson has been utilized as a training camp for army scout rangers. Even Raymond Manalo noticed it but the camps use for purposes other than training cannot be discounted.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, there is now a clear and credible evidence that the three missing persons, [Sherlyn, Karen and th Merino], are being detained in military camps and bases under the 7 Infantry Division. Being not held for a lawful cause, they should be immediately released from detention. (italic in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection order or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found that the three detainees right to life, liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to immediately release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct the PNP to proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the three.
Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 184461-62, the first above-captioned case- subject of the present Decision.
Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo, on the other hand, filed their own petition for review also challenging the same September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court only insofar as the amparo aspect is concerned. Their petition, docketed as G.R. No. 179994, was redocketed as G.R. No. 184495, the second above-captioned case.
By Resolution of June 15, 2010, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 184495 with G.R. Nos. 1844461-62.
[24]
Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before the appellate court a Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases to comply with the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the three missing persons. By Resolution of March 5, 2009,
[25]
the appellate court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:
Boac vs. Cadapan
While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, the decision is not ipso facto executory. The use of the term immediately does not mean that that it is automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which states that a decision rendered is immediately executory. x x x.
Neither did the decision become final and executory considering that both parties questioned the Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court. x x x.
Besides, the Court has no basis. The petitioners did not file a motion for execution pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39. There being no motion, the Court could not have issued, and did not issue, a writ of execution. x x x. (underscoring supplied)
Via a petition for certiorari filed on March 30, 2009 before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo challenged the appellate courts March 5, 2009 Resolution denying their motion to cite respondents in contempt. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 187109, the last abovecaptioned case subject of the present Decision.
Only Lt. Col. Anotado and Lt. Mirabelle remained of the original respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases as the other respondents had retired from government service. whereabouts of Donald Caigas remain unknown.
[28] [26]
The AFP has denied that Arnel Enriquez was a member of the Philippine Army.
[27]
The
In G.R. Nos. 184461-62, petitioners posit as follows:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE VALUE OF THE TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND MANALO.
II
THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN EMPEO AND MANUEL MERINO ARE IN THEIR CUSTODY.
III
Boac vs. Cadapan

PETITIONERS DENIALS PER SE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THEY DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION; MOREOVER, THE SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE ON POINTS IRRELEVANT TO THE PETITION.
IV
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IS VAGUE AND INCONGRUENT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED AND FAILED TO RULE UPON THE FATAL PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES IN THE PETITION [29] FOR WRIT OF AMPARO.
In G.R. No. 184495, petitioners posit as follows:
5.
The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Inspection of Places;
6.
The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Production of Documents;
7.
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Police Director Gen. Avelino Razon did not make extraordinary diligence in investigating the enforced disappearance of the aggrieved parties
8.
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the command coming from the highest echelon of powers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine Army and the Seventh Infantry Division of the Philippine Army to enforcibly disappear [sic+ the aggrieved parties
9.
The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent in this case;
10.
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties
Boac vs. Cadapan

11. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three [30] aggrieved parties
In G.R. No. 187109, petitioners raise the following issues:
[1] Whether the decision in the Court of Appeals has become final and executory[.]
[2] Whetherthere is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus decision or in an Amparo decision*.+
[3] Whetheran appeal can stay the decision of a Habeas Corpus [case] [or] an Amparo case[.]
[31]
Essentially, the consolidated petitions present three primary issues, viz: a) whether the testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible; b) whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, as well as the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; and c) whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of the aggrieved parties.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62
Petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. contend that the appellate court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of Manalo who could not even accurately describe the structures of Camp Tecson where he claimed to have been detained along with Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. They underscore that Camp Tecsonis not under the jurisdiction of the 24 Infantry Batallion and that Manalos testimony is incredible and full of inconsistencies.
th [32]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,
[33]
an original petition for Prohibition, Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order which was
treated as a petition under the Amparo Rule, said Rule having taken effect during the pendency of the petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and veracity of the personal account of Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and Merino while on detention. Thus it held:
Boac vs. Cadapan

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalos affidavit and testimony, viz: x x x x. We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence. Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents accounts of the tortur e they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the Division Training Unit, firms up respondents story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. (citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On Manalos having allegedly encountered Sherlyn, Karen and Merino while on detention, the Court in the immediately cited cas e synthesized his tale as follows:
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with Allan whose name they later came to know as Donald th Caigas, called master or commander by his men in the 24 Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their renewed life. Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name Oscar and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted th with soldiers of the 24 Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the th 24 Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar and Billy beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.
Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed
Boac vs. Cadapan

the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. Another time, in another Operation Lubog, Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymonds eyes.
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
x x x x.
[34]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in the just cited Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
[35]
which assessed the account of
Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother Reynaldos abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the same case, of Manalos brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalos graphic description of the dete ntion area. There is thus no compelling reason for the Court, in the present case, to disturb its appreciation in Manalos testim ony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles.
Petitioners go on to point out that the assailed Decision of the appellate court is vague and incongruent with *its+ findings for, so they contend, while the appellate court referred to the perpetrators as misguided and self-righteous civilian and military elements of the 7 Infantry Division, it failed to identify who these perpetrators are. Moreover, petitioners assert that Donald Caigas and Arnel Enriquez are not members of the AFP. They furthermore point out that their co-petitioners Generals Esperon, Tolentino and Palparan have already retired from the service and thus have no more control of any military camp or base in the country.
[36] th
There is nothing vague and/or incongruent about the categorical order of the appellate court for petitioners to release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. In its discourse, the appellate court merely referred to a few misguided self-righteous people who resort to the extrajudicial process of neutralizing those who disagree with the countrys democratic system of government. Nowhere did it specifically refer to the members of the 7 Infantry Division as the misguided self-righteous ones.
th
Boac vs. Cadapan

Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that they were concerned with Manuel Merino as basis for filing the petition on his behalf.
[37]
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
[38]
provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority is not without reason to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
[39]
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus on Merinos behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.
[40]
It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merinos behalf as they are not authorized parties under the Rule.
G.R. No. 184495
Boac vs. Cadapan

Preliminarily, the Court finds the appellate courts dismissal of the petitions against then President Arroyo well -taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions were filed.
[41]
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the [42] operation of the Government. x x x
Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted, condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.
On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates in an amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of command responsibility and its application insofar as amparo cases already decided by the Court is in order.
Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo
[43]
expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability ," whereby the superior is made responsible forcrimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations [44] omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, or administrative liability.
[45]
and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal
Boac vs. Cadapan

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit.
[46]
Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to
[47]
safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.
Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis
[48]
enlightens:
[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability , for the enforced disappearancefor purposes of [49] imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes responsibility and accountability, viz:
x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the [50] disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored. (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal liability. maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.
[51]
The Court
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining theresponsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect
Boac vs. Cadapan

rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under [52] existing administrative issuances, if there be any. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue.
[53]
In such application, the amparo court does not impute
criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 9851
[54]
(RA 9851) to include command responsibility as a form of criminal complicity

[55]
in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes.
RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal
liability to those superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it appears that the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit as there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
G.R. No. 187109.
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.
Boac vs. Cadapan
The Solicitor Generals argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding.
In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings
[56]
in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis,

[57]
are immediately executory without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the Court renders the following judgment:
1. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 184461-62 and G.R. No. 184495 are DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 is AFFIRMED with modification in that respondents in G.R. No. 184495, namely Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas are ordered to immediately release Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino from detention.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino are DISMISSED.
2. The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named respondents are directed to forthwith comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court. Owing to the retirement and/or reassignment to other places of assignment of some of the respondents herein and in G.R. No. 184495, the incumbent commanding general of the 7 Infantry Division and the incumbent battalion commander of the 24 Infantry Battalion, both of the Philippine Army, are enjoined to fully ensure the release of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino from detention.
th th
Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigasshall remain personally impleaded in the petitions to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Boac vs. Cadapan

Let copies of this Decision and the records of these cases be furnished the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for further investigation to determine the respective criminal and administrative liabilities of respondents.
All the present petitions are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, directed at monitoring of the DOJ, PNP and AFP investigations and the validation of their results.
SO ORDERED.
Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners, vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSN., I XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents. RESOLUTION REYES, R.T., J.: THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the following premise: Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is the only 1 solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO." It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land titles, to wit: Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these so-called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the Government must be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political protges. If unabated would certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the possession of the Private 2 Respondents were issued untainted with frauds. what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, thus: That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be treated as such motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of 3 Amparo. We dismiss the petition. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied.) The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of
Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners

a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at all. Th e Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected. Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ. Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance. Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed outright. This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Meralco vs. Lim

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners, vs. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof? Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA 1 BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the 2 Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By Memorandum dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of " reports tha t there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security." Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this wise: xxxx I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for managements initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive 4 one. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.
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Meralco vs. Lim
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008. By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusalto provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly receivedconcerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following: a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection; b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector. By Order of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondents application for a TRO. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was 7 not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). By Decision of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures re quired. The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by p etitioners refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person. Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the 10 issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. 1avvphi1 Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a 11 petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer" and the terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction. Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the Memorandum transferring respond ents place of work 12 which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-2003 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in laborrelated cases. Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities. The petition is impressed with merit. Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Secto r, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
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Meralco vs. Lim

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy , thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty 13 or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules. Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect 16 purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment 17 constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if 18 they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
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Procunier vs. Martinez

PROCUNIER V. MARTINEZ, 416 U. S. 396 (1974) Case Preview Full Text of Case U.S. Supreme Court Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) Procunier v. Martinez No. 72-1465 Argued December 3, 1973 Decided April 29, 1974 416 U.S. 396 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Syllabus Appellees, prison inmates, brought this class action challenging prisoner mail censorship regulations issued by the Director of the California Department of Corrections and the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates. The mail censorship regulations, inter alia, proscribed inmate correspondence that "unduly complain[ed]," "magnif[ied] grievances," "express[ed] inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs," or contained matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate." The District Court held these regulations unconstitutional under the First Amendment, void for vagueness, and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process, and it enjoined their continued enforcement. The court required that an inmate be notified of the rejection of correspondence, and that the author of the correspondence be allowed to protest the decision and secure review by a prison official other than the original censor. The District Court also held that the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates abridged the right of access to the courts and enjoined its continued enforcement. Appellants contend that the District Court should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of the mail censorship regulations. Held: 1. The District Court did not err in refusing to abstain from deciding the constitutionality of the mail censorship regulations. Pp. 400-404. 2. The censorship of direct personal correspondence involves incidental restrictions on the right to free speech of both prisoners and their correspondents, and is justified if the following criteria are met: (1) it must further one or more of the important and substantial governmental interests of security, order, and the rehabilitation of inmates, and (2) it must be no greater than is necessary to further the legitimate governmental interest involved. Pp. 416 U. S. 404-414. Page 416 U. S. 397 3. Under this standard, the invalidation of the mail censorship regulations by the District Court was correct. Pp. 416 U. S. 415-416.

4. The decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter must be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards against arbitrariness or error, and the requirements specified by the District Court were not unduly burdensome. Pp. 416 U. S. 417-419. 5. The ban against attorney-client interviews conducted by law students or legal paraprofessionals, which was not limited to prospective interviewers who posed some colorable threat to security or to those inmates thought to be especially dangerous and which created an arbitrary distinction between law students employed by attorneys and those associated with law school programs (against whom the ban did not operate), constituted an unjustifiable restriction on the inmates' right of access to the courts.Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483. Pp. 416 U. S. 419-422. 354 F.Supp. 1092, affirmed. POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined and in Part II of which DOUGLAS, J., joined, post, p. 416 U. S. 422. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 416 U. S. 428. Page 416 U. S. 398 MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the constitutionality of certain regulations promulgated by appellant Procunier in his capacity as Director of the California Department of Corrections. Appellees brought a class action on behalf of themselves and all other inmates of penal institutions under the Department's jurisdiction to challenge the rules relating to censorship of prisoner mail and the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281, a three-judge United States District Court was convened to hear appellees' request for declaratory and injunctive relief. That court entered summary judgment enjoining continued enforcement of the rules in question and ordering appellants to submit new regulations for the court's approval. 354 F.Supp. 1092 (ND Cal.1973). Appellants' first revisions resulted in counter-proposals by appellees and a court order issued May 30, 1973, requiring further modification of the proposed rules. The second set of revised regulations was approved by the District Court on July 20, 1973, over appellees' objections. While the first proposed revisions of the Department's regulations were pending before the District Court, appellants brought this appeal to contest that court's decision holding the original regulations unconstitutional. We noted probable jurisdiction. 412 U.S. 948 (1973). We affirm. I First we consider the constitutionality of the Director's rules restricting the personal correspondence of prison inmates. Under these regulations, correspondence between Page 416 U. S. 399 inmates of California penal institutions and persons other than licensed attorneys and holders of public office was censored for nonconformity to certain standards. Rule 2401 stated the Department's general premise that personal correspondence by prisoners is "a privilege, not a right. . . ." [Footnote 1] More detailed regulations implemented the Department's policy. Rule 1201 directed inmates not to write letters in which they "unduly complain" or "magnify grievances." [Footnote 2] Rule 1205(d) defined as contraband writings "expressing inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs. . . ." [Footnote 3] Finally, Rule 2402(8) provided that inmates "may not send or receive letters that pertain to criminal activity; Page 416 U. S. 400

are lewd, obscene, or defamatory; contain foreign matter, or are otherwise inappropriate." [Footnote 4] Prison employees screened both incoming and outgoing personal mail for violations of these regulations. No further criteria were provided to help members of the mail room staff decide whether a particular letter contravened any prison rule or policy. When a prison employee found a letter objectionable, he could take one or more of the following actions: (1) refuse to mail or deliver the letter and return it to the author; (2) submit a disciplinary report, which could lead to suspension of mail privileges or other sanctions; or (3) place a copy of the letter or a summary of its contents in the prisoner's file, where it might be a factor in determining the inmate's work and housing assignments and in setting a date for parole eligibility. The District Court held that the regulations relating to prisoner mail authorized censorship of protected expression without adequate justification in violation of the First Amendment, and that they were void for vagueness. The court also noted that the regulations failed to provide minimum procedural safeguards against error and arbitrariness in the censorship of inmate correspondence. Consequently, it enjoined their continued enforcement. Appellants contended that the District Court should have abstained from deciding these questions. In that court, appellants advanced no reason for abstention other than the assertion that the federal court should defer to the California courts on the basis of comity. The District Court properly rejected this suggestion, noting that the Page 416 U. S. 401 mere possibility that a state court might declare the prison regulations unconstitutional is no ground for abstention. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 400 U. S. 439(1971). Appellants now contend that we should vacate the judgment and remand the case to the District Court with instructions to abstain on the basis of two arguments not presented to it. First, they contend hat any vagueness challenge to an uninterpreted state statute or regulation is a proper case for abstention. According to appellants, "[t]he very statement by the district court that the regulations are vague constitutes a compelling reason for abstention." Brief for Appellants 8-9. As this Court made plain inBaggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964), however, not every vagueness challenge to an uninterpreted state statute or regulation constitutes a proper case for abstention. [Footnote 5] But we need not decide whether appellants' contention is controlled by the analysis in Baggett, for the short Page 416 U. S. 402 answer to their argument is that these regulations were neither challenged nor invalidated solely on the ground of vagueness. Appellees also asserted, and the District Court found, that the rules relating to prisoner mail permitted censorship of constitutionally protected expression without adequate justification. In light of the successful First Amendment attack on these regulations, the District Court's conclusion that they were also unconstitutionally vague hardly "constitutes a compelling reason for abstention." As a second ground for abstention, appellants rely on Cal.Penal Code 2600(4), which assures prisoners the right to receive books, magazines, and periodicals. [Footnote 6] Although they did not advance this argument to the District Court, appellants now contend that the interpretation of the statute by the state courts and its application to the regulations governing prisoner mail might avoid or modify the constitutional questions decided below. Thus, appellants seek to establish the essential prerequisite for abstention -- "an uncertain issue of state Page 416 U. S. 403 law," the resolution of which may eliminate or materially alter the federal constitutional question. [Footnote 7] Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528, 380 U. S. 534 (1965). We are not persuaded. A state court interpretation of 2600(4) would not avoid or substantially modify the constitutional

question presented here. That statute does not contain any provision purporting to regulate censorship of personal correspondence. It only preserves the right of inmates to receive "newspapers, periodicals, and books," and authorizes prison officials to exclude "obscene publications or writings, and mail containing information concerning Page 416 U. S. 404 where, how, or from whom such matter may be obtained. . . ." (Emphasis added.) And the plain meaning of the language is reinforced by recent legislative history. In 1972, a bill was introduced in the California Legislature to restrict censorship of personal correspondence by adding an entirely new subsection to 2600. The legislature passed the bill, but it was vetoed by Governor Reagan. In light of this history, we think it plain that no reasonable interpretation of 2600(4) would avoid or modify the federal constitutional question decided below. Moreover, we are mindful of the high cost of abstention when the federal constitutional challenge concerns facial repugnance to the First Amendment. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 389 U. S. 252(1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 379. We therefore proceed to the merits. A Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration. In part, this policy is the product of various limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in state penal institutions. [Footnote 8] More fundamentally, this attitude springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons Page 416 U. S. 405 in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. [Footnote 9] Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities. But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional Page 416 U. S. 406 rights. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483, 393 U. S. 486 (1969). This is such a case. Although the District Court found the regulations relating to prisoner mail deficient in several respects, the first and principal basis for its decision was the constitutional command of the First Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 10] The issue before us is the appropriate standard of review for prison regulations restricting freedom of speech. This Court has not previously addressed this question, and the tension between the traditional policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and the need to protect constitutional rights has led the federal courts to adopt a variety of widely inconsistent approaches to the problem. Some have maintained a hands-off posture in the face of constitutional challenges to censorship of prisoner mail. E.g., McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (CA4 1964); Lee v. Tahash,352 F.2d 970 (CA8

1965) (except insofar as mail censorship rules are applied to discriminate against a particular racial or religious group); Krupnick v. Crouse, 366 F.2d 851 (CA10 1966); Pope v. Daggett, 350 F.2d 296 (CA10 1965). Another has required only that censorship of personal correspondence not lack support "in any rational and constitutionally acceptable concept of a prison system." Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (CA2 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). At the other extreme, some courts have been willing to require demonstration of a "compelling state interest" to justify censorship of prisoner mail. E.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 Page 416 U. S. 407 (CA5 1968) (decided on both equal protection and First Amendment grounds); Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F.Supp. 544 (WD Wis.1972); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F.Supp. 901 (SDNY 1970). Other courts phrase the standard in similarly demanding terms of "clear and present danger." E.g., Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670, 672-673 (CA2 1972). And there are various intermediate positions, most notably the view that a "regulation or practice which restricts the right of free expression that a prisoner would have enjoyed if he had not been imprisoned must be related both reasonably and necessarily to the advancement of some justifiable purpose." E.g., Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.Supp. 1014, 1024 (SDNY 1970) (citations omitted).See also Gates v. Collier, 349 F.Supp. 881, 896 (ND Miss.1972); LeMon v. Zelker, 358 F.Supp. 554 (SDNY 1972). This array of disparate approaches and the absence of any generally accepted standard for testing the constitutionality of prisoner mail censorship regulations disserve both the competing interests at stake. On the one hand, the First Amendment interests implicated by censorship of inmate correspondence are given only haphazard and inconsistent protection. On the other, the uncertainty of the constitutional standard makes it impossible for correctional officials to anticipate what is required of them, and invites repetitive, piecemeal litigation on behalf of inmates. The result has been unnecessarily to perpetuate the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration. Our task is to formulate a standard of review for prisoner mail censorship that will be responsive to these concerns. B We begin our analysis of the proper standard of review for constitutional challenges to censorship of prisoner mail with a somewhat different premise from that taken Page 416 U. S. 408 by the other federal courts that have considered the question. For the most part, these courts have dealt with challenges to censorship of prisoner mail as involving broad questions of "prisoners' rights." This case is no exception. The District Court stated the issue in general terms as "the applicability of First Amendment rights to prison inmates . . . ," 354 F.Supp. at 1096, and the arguments of the parties reflect the assumption that the resolution of this case requires an assessment of the extent to which prisoners may claim First Amendment freedoms. In our view, this inquiry is unnecessary. In determining the proper standard of review for prison restrictions on inmate correspondence, we have no occasion to consider the extent to which an individual's right to free speech survives incarceration, for a narrower basis of decision is at hand. In the case of direct personal correspondence between inmates and those who have a particularized interest in communicating with them, [Footnote 11] mail censorship implicates more than the right of prisoners. Communication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing words on paper. Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by the addressee. Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in securing that result, and censorship of the communication between them necessarily impinges on the interest of each. Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is

grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter, for the addressee as well as the sender of direct personal correspondence Page 416 U. S. 409 derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended communication. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965); accord, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 408 U. S. 762-765 (1972); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 319 U. S. 143 (1943). We do not deal here with difficult questions of the so-called "right to hear" and third-party standing, but with a particular means of communication in which the interests of both parties are inextricably meshed. The wife of a prison inmate who is not permitted to read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered an abridgment of her interest in communicating with him as plain as that which results from censorship of her letter to him. In either event, censorship of prisoner mail works a consequential restriction on the First and Fourteenth Amendments rights of those who are not prisoners. Accordingly, we reject any attempt to justify censorship of inmate correspondence merely by reference to certain assumptions about the legal status of prisoners. Into this category of argument falls appellants' contention that "an inmate's rights with reference to social correspondence are something fundamentally different than those enjoyed by his free brother." Brief for Appellants 19. This line of argument and the undemanding standard of review it is intended to support fail to recognize that the First Amendment liberties of free citizens are implicated in censorship of prisoner mail. We therefore turn for guidance not to cases involving questions of "prisoners' rights," but to decisions of this Court dealing with the general problem of incidental restrictions on First Amendment liberties imposed in furtherance of legitimate governmental activities. As the Court noted in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 393 U. S. 506 (1969), First Amendment Page 416 U. S. 410 guarantees must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment." Tinker concerned the interplay between the right to freedom of speech of public high school students and "the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id. at 393 U. S. 507. In overruling a school regulation prohibiting the wearing of anti-war armbands, the Court undertook a careful analysis of the legitimate requirements of orderly school administration in order to ensure that the students were afforded maximum freedom of speech consistent with those requirements. The same approach was followed in Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972), where the Court considered the refusal of a state college to grant official recognition to a group of students who wished to organize a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a national student organization noted for political activism and campus disruption. The Court found that neither the identification of the local student group with the national SDS, nor the purportedly dangerous political philosophy of the local group, nor the college administration's fear of future, unspecified disruptive activities by the students could justify the incursion on the right of free association. The Court also found, however, that this right could be limited if necessary to prevent campus disruption, id. at 408 U. S. 189-190, n. 20, and remanded the case for determination of whether the students had, in fact, refused to accept reasonable regulations governing student conduct. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), the Court dealt with incidental restrictions on free speech occasioned by the exercise of the governmental power to conscript men for military service. O'Brien had burned his Selective Service registration certificate on the steps Page 416 U. S. 411

of a courthouse in order to dramatize his opposition to the draft and to our country's involvement in Vietnam. He was convicted of violating a provision of the Selective Service law that had recently been amended to prohibit knowing destruction or mutilation of registration certificates. O'Brien argued that the purpose and effect of the amendment were to abridge free expression, and that the statutory provision was therefore unconstitutional, both as enacted and as applied to him. Although O'Brien's activity involved "conduct", rather than pure "speech," the Court did not define away the First Amendment concern, and neither did it rule that the presence of a communicative intent necessarily rendered O'Brien's actions immune to governmental regulation. Instead, it enunciated the following four-part test: "[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 391 U. S. 377. Of course, none of these precedents directly controls the instant case. In O'Brien, the Court considered a federal statute which, on its face, prohibited certain conduct having no necessary connection with freedom of speech. This led the Court to differentiate between "speech" and "nonspeech" elements of a single course of conduct, a distinction that has little relevance here. Both Tinker and Healy concerned First and Fourteenth Amendment liberties in the context of state educational institutions, a circumstance involving rather different governmental interests than are at stake here. In broader terms, however, these precedents involved incidental Page 416 U. S. 412 restrictions on First Amendment liberties by governmental action in furtherance of legitimate and substantial state interest other than suppression of expression. In this sense, these cases are generally analogous to our present inquiry. The case at hand arises in the context of prisons. One of the primary functions of government is the preservation of societal order through enforcement of the criminal law, and the maintenance of penal institutions is an essential part of that task. The identifiable governmental interests at stake in this task are the preservation of internal order and discipline, [Footnote 12] the maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners. While the weight of professional opinion seems to be that inmate freedom to correspond with outsiders advances, rather than retards the goal of rehabilitation, [Footnote 13] the legitimate governmental Page 416 U. S. 413 interest in the order and security of penal institutions justifies the imposition of certain restraints on inmate correspondence. Perhaps the most obvious example of justifiable censorship of prisoner mail would be refusal to send or deliver letters concerning escape plans or containing other information concerning proposed criminal activity, whether within or without the prison. Similarly, prison officials may properly refuse to transmit encoded messages. Other less obvious possibilities come to mind, but it is not our purpose to survey the range of circumstances in which particular restrictions on prisoner mail might be warranted by the legitimate demands of prison administration as they exist from time to time in the various kinds of penal institutions found in this country. Our task is to determine the proper standard for deciding whether a particular regulation or practice relating to inmate correspondence constitutes an impermissible restraint of First Amendment liberties. Applying the teachings of our prior decisions to the instant context, we hold that censorship of prisoner mail is justified if the following criteria are met. First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Prison officials may not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements. Rather, they must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order,

and rehabilitation. Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved. Thus, a restriction on inmate correspondence Page 416 U. S. 414 that further an important or substantial interest of penal administration will nevertheless be invalid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad. This does not mean, of course, that prison administrators may be required to show with certainty that adverse consequences would flow from the failure to censor a particular letter. Some latitude in anticipating the probable consequences of allowing certain speech in a prison environment is essential to the proper discharge of an administrator's duty. But any regulation or practice that restricts inmate correspondence must be generally necessary to protect one or more of the legitimate governmental interests identified above. [Footnote 14] Page 416 U. S. 415 C On the basis of this standard, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. The regulations invalidated by that court authorized, inter alia, censorship of statements that "unduly complain" or "magnify grievances," expression of "inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views," and matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate." These regulations fairly invited prison officials and employees to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as standards for prisoner mail censorship. Not surprisingly, some prison officials used the extraordinary latitude for discretion authorized by the regulations to suppress unwelcome criticism. For example, at one institution under the Department's jurisdiction, the checklist used by the mail room staff authorized rejection of letters "criticizing policy, rules or officials," and the mail room sergeant stated in a deposition that he would reject as "defamatory" letters "belittling staff or our judicial system or anything connected with Department of Corrections." Correspondence was also censored for "disrespectful comments," "derogatory remarks," and the like. Appellants have failed to show that these broad restrictions on prisoner mail were in any way necessary to the furtherance of a governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Indeed, the heart of appellants' position is not that the regulations are justified by a legitimate governmental interest, but that they do not need to be. This misconception is not only stated affirmatively; it also underlies appellants' discussion of the particular regulations under attack. For example, appellants' sole defense of the prohibition against matter that is "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate" is that Page 416 U. S. 416 it is "within the discretion of the prison administrators." Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants contend that statements that "magnify grievances" or "unduly complain" are censored "as a precaution against flash riots and in the furtherance of inmate rehabilitation." Id. at 22. But they do not suggest how the magnification of grievances or undue complaining, which presumably occurs in outgoing letters, could possibly lead to flash riots, nor do they specify what contribution the suppression of complaints makes to the rehabilitation of criminals. And appellants defend the ban against "inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views" on the ground that "[s]uch matter clearly presents a danger to prison security. . . ." Id. at 21. The regulation, however, is not narrowly drawn to reach only material that might be thought to encourage violence, nor is its application limited to incoming letters. In short, the Department's regulations authorized censorship of prisoner mail far broader than any legitimate interest of penal administration demands, and were properly found invalid by the District Court. [Footnote 15] Page 416 U. S. 417 D

We also agree with the District Court that the decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter must he accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards. Page 416 U. S. 418 The interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a "liberty" interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment. As such, it is protected from arbitrary governmental invasion. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,408 U. S. 593 (1972). The District Court required that an inmate be notified of the rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him, that the author of that letter be given a reasonable opportunity to protest that decision, and that complaints be referred to a prison official other than Page 416 U. S. 419 the person who originally disapproved the correspondence. These requirements do not appear to be unduly burdensome, nor do appellants so contend. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court with respect to the Department's regulations relating to prisoner mail. II The District Court also enjoined continued enforcement of Administrative Rule MV-IV-02, which provides in pertinent part: "Investigators for an attorney of record will be confined to not more than two. Such investigators must be licensed by the State or must be members of the State Bar. Designation must be made in writing by the Attorney." By restricting access to prisoners to members of the bar and licensed private investigators, this regulation imposed an absolute ban on the use by attorneys of law students and legal paraprofessionals to interview inmate clients. In fact, attorneys could not even delegate to such persons the task of obtaining prisoners' signatures on legal documents. The District Court reasoned that this rule constituted an unjustifiable restriction on the right of access to the courts. We agree. The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. This means that inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys. Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts are invalid. Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546 (1941). Page 416 U. S. 420 The District Court found that the rule restricting attorney-client interviews to members of the bar and licensed private investigators inhibited adequate professional representation of indigent inmates. The remoteness of many California penal institutions makes a personal visit to an inmate client a timeconsuming undertaking. The court reasoned that the ban against the use of law students or other paraprofessionals for attorney-client interviews would deter some lawyers from representing prisoners who could not afford to pay for their traveling time or that of licensed private investigators. And those lawyers who agreed to do so would waste time that might be employed more efficaciously in working on the inmates' legal problems. Allowing law students and paraprofessionals to interview inmates might well reduce the cost of legal representation for prisoners. The District Court therefore concluded that the regulation imposed a substantial burden on the right of access to the courts. As the District Court recognized, this conclusion does not end the inquiry, for prison administrators are not required to adopt every proposal that may be thought to facilitate prisoner access to the courts. The extent to which that right is burdened by a particular regulation or practice must be weighed

against the legitimate interests of penal administration and the proper regard that judges should give to the expertise and discretionary authority of correctional officials. In this case, the ban against the use of law students and other paraprofessional personnel was absolute. Its prohibition was not limited to prospective interviewers who posed some colorable threat to security or to those inmates thought to be especially dangerous. Nor was it shown that a less restrictive regulation would unduly burden the administrative task of screening and monitoring visitors. Page 416 U. S. 421 Appellants' enforcement of the regulation in question also created an arbitrary distinction between law students employed by practicing attorneys and those associated with law school programs providing legal assistance to prisoners. [Footnote 16] While the Department flatly prohibited interviews of any sort by law students working for attorneys, it freely allowed participants of a number of law school programs to enter the prisons and meet with inmates. These largely unsupervised students were admitted without any security check other than verification of their enrollment in a school program. Of course, the fact that appellants have allowed some persons to conduct attorney-client interviews with prisoners does not mean that they are required to admit others, but the arbitrariness of the distinction between the two categories of law students does reveal the absence of any real justification for the sweeping prohibition of Administrative Rule MV-IV-02. We cannot say that the District Court erred in invalidating this regulation. This result is mandated by our decision in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969). There, the Court struck down a prison regulation prohibiting any inmate from advising or assisting another in the preparation of legal documents. Given the inadequacy of alternative sources of legal assistance, the rule had the effect of denying to illiterate or poorly educated inmates any opportunity to vindicate possibly valid constitutional claims. The Court found that the regulation impermissibly burdened the right of access to the courts despite the not insignificant state interest in preventing the establishment of personal power structures by unscrupulous jailhouse lawyers and the attendant problems of prison discipline that Page 416 U. S. 422 follow. The countervailing state interest in Johnson is, if anything, more persuasive than any interest advanced by appellants in the instant case. The judgment is Affirmed.
Disini vs. SB
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 175730 July 5, 2010
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), and the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Respondents. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: The simultaneous availment of judicial remedies from different fora for exactly the same ultimate relief and involving the same issue constitutes forumshopping. It is a prohibited malpractice, condemned for trifling with the courts and their processes. The Case The instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to: 1. Annul the December 18, 2006 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (respondent court), which denied petitioners Motion to Lift Default Order and to Admit Answer, and consequently allowed respondent Republic to present evidence ex-parte in Civil Case No. 0013 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Herminio T. Disini, et al.;" 2. Annul the orders or declarations made by the Sandiganbayan in open court during the hearing of December 8, 2006, which prevented petitioner from commenting ad cautelam on the Republics Urgent Manifestation and Motion (hereinafter the Urgent Manifestatio n and 2 Motion) to Present Evidence Ex-Parte; 3. Prohibit the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the ex-parte proceedings and rendering a judgment by default; 4. Secure injunctive relief to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 0013 and from rendering judgment on the basis of the ex-parte proceedings; and 5. Declare null and void all the proceedings conducted as against petitioner because of lack of jurisdiction over his person, violation of his Constitutional rights to due process and fair play, and the arbitrary acts of respondent court which effectively ousted it of jurisdiction to hear 3 the case. In sum, petitioner assails the Sandiganbayans refusal to set aside its Order of Default against petitioner, as well as its acts which allegedly reveal its 4 inclination to "railroad" the proceedings and render a precipitate judgment by default against petitioner. Factual Antecedents On July 23, 1987, the Republic (through the Presidential Commission on Good Government [PCGG]) filed with theSandiganbayan a civil complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against petitioner Herminio T. Disini (Disini), spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos 5 (Marcos spouses) and Rodolfo B. Jacob (Jacob). The same was docketed as Civil Case No. 0013 and assigned to the First Division of 6 7 theSandiganbayan (respondent court). Summons for Disini was issued on July 29, 1987. Per Sheriffs Return dated September 4, 1987, the 8 summons was unserved on the ground that petitioner did not live at the given address, which was No. 92 Kennedy St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. The occupants of said address were the Roman family. On August 26, 1987, the Complaint was amended to include Rafael A. Sison (Sison) as a party-defendant.
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The Amended Complaint alleged that Disini acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through 12 the misappropriation of public funds, plunder of the nations wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption.
Disini vs. SB
The Sandiganbayan issued summons on the Amended Complaint on September 3, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the Sandiganbayan Deputy Sheriff proceeded to the same address, No. 92 Kennedy Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Again, the summons was returned unserved for the reason 14 that the Roman family occupied the said residence. In the meantime, petitioners co-defendants, Sison and Jacob, filed their respective answers, while the Marcos spouses were declared in 17 18 default for failure to file their responsive pleadings despite valid service of summons. After the lapse of two years without any progress in the case, Jacob filed an Omnibus Motion for theSandiganbayan to either set the case for pre-trial 19 or to dismiss the same with respect to Jacob for failure to prosecute. Jacob argued that there was no excuse for the delay in prosecuting the case. He reasoned that, if summons could not be served on his co-defendant Disini within a reasonable time, the prosecution should have moved to exclude Disini from the complaint so that the case could be disposed of one way or another instead of being left pending indefinitely. The Sandiganbayan denied Jacobs motion. It held that the Republic had not lacked in efforts to ascertain Disinis whereabouts; hence, there is no basis to rule that it failed to prosecute the case. Nevertheless, it ordered the Republic to furnish the court with the correct address of petitioner or to file a motion to show the reasonability of expecting Disini to be summoned. In response, the Republic filed a Manifestation that it is still in the process of securing alias summonses for the unserved defendants and will take steps 21 to serve summons by publication. On October 11, 1990, the Republic moved to drop Jacob as party-defendant considering that he will testify as a witness for the Republic in its ill-gotten 22 wealth cases both here and abroad. It also sought several times to suspend the pre-trial on various grounds such as the PCGGs vacillation regarding 23 the grant of immunity in favor of Jacob and the Republics admission that it still could not ascertain Disinis whereabouts for purposes of service of summons. The Republic explained that it was still trying to exhaust all efforts to make a personal or substituted service of summons through the help of 24 the Philippine consulate office in Austria, where Disini is believed to be residing. On August 4, 1994, the Sandiganbayan resolved to grant the dismissal of the complaint against Jacob with prejudice and ordered him dropped as party25 defendant. 1avvph!1 When it appeared that pre-trial could finally continue in 1995, the Republic again moved for several resetting of pre-trial for reasons such as looking at 26 the possibility of granting immunity to petitioners other co-defendant, Sison, and the unavailability of the solicitor assigned to the case. After displaying utmost liberality in the past as regards the postponement of the pre-trial, the Sandiganbayanissued a strongly-worded Order on January 17, 1997, on which date the Republic was still not ready to submit Sisons affidavit for the consideration of the court. The Order reads: Over the year, the matter of the affidavit [of Sison] remains unresolved. In the end, this case is sought once more to be reset with no visible product for the effort. Under the circumstances, should no action be taken thereon with finality on or before March 14, 1997, the Court will assume that the government is 27 not disposed to prosecute this matter and will dismiss the case. Heeding the Sandiganbayans warning, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Drop Rafael Sison as Party28 Defendant on March 14, 1997. A year later, on April 8, 1998, the Republic filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication. It stated that resort to service by publication was needed because they could not ascertain Disinis whereabouts despite diligent efforts to do so. While this mo tion was awaiting 30 resolution five months later, the Republic filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons. It allegedly received information that Disini had returned to the Philippines and could be served with summons at No. 92 Kennedy Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Alias summons was 31 issued but was returned unserved on the ground that Disini did not occupy the said house, which belonged to the Roman family. Receiving information that Disini was often seen at No. 35 Buchanan Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, the sheriff proceeded to the new address only to 32 find that it belonged to petitioners cousin, Jesus Disini. Failing to serve summons personally on Disini, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication on 33 October 3, 2001. While awaiting the resolution of the Urgent Motion, the Republic again received information that petitioner has been regularly seen at the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club in Mandaluyong City and at No. 57 Flamingo Street, Greenmeadows Subdivision, Quezon City. Thus, the Republic sought again the issuance of alias summons, without prejudice to the resolution of its previous Motion for Leave for Issuance of Summons by 34 Publication. The Sandiganbayan issued an alias summons for Disini, but it was returned unserved. On February 6, 2002, the Republic filed a Motion to Resolve (Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication). The same was 36 granted and on April 23, 2002, the summons and the Amended Complaint were published in Peoples Tonight, with a copy sent by register ed mail to
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Disini vs. SB
Disinis last known address, No. 92 Kennedy Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. By August 27, 2002, petitioner was declared in default for 38 failure to file his responsive pleading within 60 days from the publication of the summons. Since three of the party-defendants (Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, and petitioner) had been declared in default, while one was dropped to become state witness (Jacob), Sison remained as the sole defendant who could participate in Civil Case No. 0013. Given that there was a pending motion to drop Sison also as party-defendant, the Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to resolve the said motion so that they could proceed with the ex 39 40 parte presentation of evidence. The said motion was submitted for resolution on September 20, 2002. On February 17, 2003, with the motion to drop Sison as party-defendant still pending, the Republic asked theSandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the 41 pre-trial until the said motion had been resolved. On February 27, 2003, the Sandiganbayan clerk of court sent notice of the cancellation of the pre42 trial set for March 4, 2003. The records of the Sandiganbayan became silent from the year 2003 to 2006, revealing an inaction that would only be broken by a foreign court that imposed a deadline on the freeze orders of the Disini Swiss accounts. This development began when petitioner Disinis wife an d children filed a 43 petition in a Swiss Federal Court to remove a previously issued freeze order on their Swiss accounts. On August 18, 2006, the Swiss Federal Court 44 rendered a partial decision ordering the counsel for the Republic of the Philippines to submit a forfeiture order from a Philippine court with regard to the assets of Liliana and Herminio Disini not later than December 30, 2006; otherwise, the Swiss Federal Court would revoke the freeze order on the 45 Disini Swiss accounts. This deadline apparently spurred the Republic (through the PCGG) to file an Urgent Manifestation and Motion with the Sandiganbayan on November 47 30, 2006. The Republic prayed for the resolution of its Urgent Motion to Resolve (its motion to drop Rafael Sison as party-defendant). Should the resolution of this pending motion be favorable to the Republic, it likewise prayed for the setting of the ex parte presentation of evidence at an early date. On December 7, 2006, petitioner Disini filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and for Leave to File and Admit Attached Answer, together with an 49 Answer to Amended Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaims. He maintained that he was unaware of the civil case pending against him because he never received summons or other processes from the court, nor any pleadings from the parties of the case. His only fault, he averred, was that he was ignorant of the proceedings in the case because of the absence of a proper notice. Petitioner asked the respondent court to look at his meritorious defenses. He then invoked the liberality of the courts in lifting default orders to give both parties every opportunity to defend their cases, and pointed out that the proceedings, being in their pre-trial stage, would not be delayed by petitioners participation therein. Petitioners Answer contained affirmative defenses such as the respondent courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over his pe rson through service by publication and the failure of the Amended Complaint to state a cause of action against him. With the two motions pending before it, the Sandiganbayan heard the Republic on its Urgent Manifestation and Motion on December 8, 2006. Petitioner Disinis lawyers were present during the hearing but were not allowed to participate therein because of the prevailing default order against Disini. The Sandiganbayan issued the following Order at the end of the said hearing: This morning, the Court heard the arguments of the counsel for [respondent] regarding the latters "Urgent Manifestation and Motion" dated November 29, 2006. The Court also gave the [respondent] a non-extendible period of three days counted from today within which to file its comment on the Motion to Lift Order of Default filed by [petitioner] Disini, and the latter is given a non-extendible period of three days from December 11, 2006 or until December 14, 2006, within which to file his reply to the comment of the [respondent], after which the incident shall be considered submitted for resolution without need of oral arguments. The Court will act on the *respondent+s "Urgent Manifestation and Motion" dat ed November 29, 2006 after the Court has resolved the Motion to Lift Order of Default. xxxx
50 48 46
37
On December 11, 2006, the Republic filed its Comment/Opposition stating that it exhausted all efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of petitioner Disini. Failing to do so, the Republic resorted to service of summons by publication. This mode of service is allowed under Sections 14 and 15 of Rule 14 considering that the forfeiture case is in rem and the defendants address is unknown. The Republic explained that it filed its Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication because it received information that petitioner had already gone to Austria. Clearly then, Disini was no longer a resident of the Philippines. The Republic reiterated that the service of summons by publication is proper considering that what is involved is a forfeiture case, an action in rem, under Republic Act No. 1379, in relation to Executive Order (EO) Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A all issued by President Corazon C. Aquino. As for petitioners allegation that the Republic was aware of Disinis address as shown by the fact that summons were properl y served at his correct 52 address in two criminal cases pending before the same First Division of theSandiganbayan, the Republic pointed out that these criminal cases were filed on June 30, 2004, while respondents Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication was filed on April 8, 1998. Hence, at the time the Republic asked for service by publication, it was not yet aware of petitioners correct address. Since petitioner failed to file his answer to a validly served Amended Complaint, the motion to lift the order of default is utterly lacking merit.
51
Disini vs. SB
Petitioner Disini filed his Reply on December 14, 2006 basically expounding on the arguments he stated in his Motion to Lift. On December 15, 2006, the Sandiganbayan granted PCGGs motion to drop Sison as party-defendant in Civil Case No. 0013, leaving only the defaulted defendants (i.e., the Marcos spouses and petitioner Disini) as parties to the case. Ruling of the Sandiganbayan (Assailed Resolution) On December 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny petitioners Motion to Lift Default Order. The Sandiganbayan held that the Republic exerted diligence in ascertaining petitioners whereabouts as evidenced by the two motions it filed fo r the issuance of alias summons. The Sandiganbayan looked favorably at the Republics efforts to personally serve the summons on petitioner despite the pendency of its Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication. It held that the Republics determinati on to serve summons at the places where the petitioner was last heard of to reside belies the petitioners claim that the Republic had intended to mislead the court into service by publication all along. The Sandiganbayan likewise held that the rules for a valid service of summons by publication were observed. The Sandiganbayan did not find any indication that the Republic knew petitioners actual residence when it sought leave to serve summons by publication in 1998 and 2001. As for the argument that publication is not proper because the action is in personam, the Sandiganbayan ruled that Civil Case No. 0013 is an action in 56 rem for which service by publication is proper. The case is in rem because it involves the forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth based on EO No. 2, EO No. 57 58 14 and No. 14-A promulgated by former President Corazon Aquino by virtue of her legislative authority. It cited the case of Republic v. 59 Sandiganbayan and Marcos where the Court ruled that forfeiture proceedings are civil actions in rem. Given the validity of the service of summons, the respondent court held that petitioners failure to file a responsive p leading within the allotted period resulted in his default. The respondent court refused to lift the order of default on the ground that there was no fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that would justify such an action. Petitioner then filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and an Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion on December 19, 2006. Aside from asking for reconsideration, petitioner also prayed that the republics ex parte presentation of evidence be held i n abeyance until the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Petitioners motions were set for hearing on December 20, 2006 but the said hearing did not take place. Instead, the Sandiganbayan issued the following orders on December 19 and 20, 2006 respectively: Considering the difficulty in obtaining a quorum for the purpose of hearing the Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion dated December 18, 2006 of [petitioner] Herminio T. Disini, the Court resolves to cancel the hearing on the abovesaid motion on December 20, 2006, and instead require the [respondent] to file its written comment on the above-said motion on or before December 22, 2006, after which the motion shall be deemed submitted 62 for resolution. Considering the difficulty in obtaining a quorum for the purpose of hearing the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated December 19, 2006 of [petitioner] Herminio T. Disini which was filed at the close of office hours on December 19, 2006, the Court resolves to cancel the hearing on the above-said motion on December 20, 2006, and instead require the [respondent] to file its written comment on the above-said motion within a nonextendible period of three (3) days from receipt thereof, after which the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution, unless the parties or the 63 Court will set the matter for hearing anew after the submission of the above comment. The Republics ex parte presentation of evidence held before the Sandiganbayan Executive Clerk of Court began on December 20, 2006 as evidenced by 64 the transcript. While petitioner was not allowed to participate in the said proceedings, he was notified thereof and his counsels were present to observe the same. On December 22, 2006, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari. On January 2, 2007, he filed a Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari and 65 Prohibition protesting the continuation of the ex parte proceedings before theSandiganbayan as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of 66 jurisdiction. He also filed a Second Supplemental Petition on January 5, 2007. Proceedings before the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition On August 7, 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying petitioners Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The Republic presented 10 witnesses. It filed its Formal Offer of Evidence dated October 17, 2008, which offer was admitted in the Resolution dated 69 70 December 3, 2008. On February 11, 2009, the Republic filed its Memorandum.
68 67 60 61 55 54
53
Disini vs. SB
On July 7, 2009, despite the pendency of his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a 71 Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default dated August 27, 2002 the very same Order which is now at the heart of the present petition. On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Expunge or Cross-Examine Plaintiffs Witnesses. On September 15, 2009, 73 he also filed a Motion to Expunge Evidence Presented Before the Clerk of Court. On September 23, 2009, petitioner filed with this Court a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Memorandum, which was denied in a Resolution 75 dated September 30, 2009. On October 15, 2009, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Expunge Rolando Gapuds Deposition taken on October 18-20, 1995. On 77 October 19, 2009, he filed a Motion to Expunge or Cross-Examine Plaintiffs witnesses. On February 18, 2010, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a Supplement to the Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default dated August 27, 2002 78 79 with Motion to Take Judicial Notice. On March 4, 2010, he filed a Motion for Leave to Take Deposition. Issues Petitioner raised the following issues for our consideration: 1. Whether the Sandiganbayan court gravely abused its discretion in not lifting its default order against petitioner Disini 2. Whether the Sandiganbayan court gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex-parte while 80 petitioners Motion for Reconsideration *of the stay of the default order+ had not yet been resolved. Our Ruling Issue of Validity of Service of Summons Mooted by Voluntary Appearance In his Petition, petitioner originally sought the nullification of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan on the theory of lack of jurisdiction over his person, premised on the alleged impropriety in the service of summons. However, petitioner subsequently filed several motions with the Sandiganbayan which sought various affirmative reliefs from that court, sans any qualification of the nature of its appearance and without reserving or reiterating its previous objection on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person. These motions are: (a) Motion to Expunge Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "D," "E," "XX," "YY," "ZZ," "EE," and their Submarkings or Cross-Examine Plaintiffs 81 Witness, which sought to expunge various affidavits of the Republics witnesses; (b) Motion to Expunge Evidence Presented Before the Clerk of Court, which prayed that all the evidence presented before the clerk of court be stricken off the records for being taken in violation of the Rules; (c) Motion to Expunge Gapuds Deposition taken on 18-20 October 1995, which sought to remove from the records the deposition offered by the Republic; (d) Motion to Expunge Exhibits "FFF" and "GGG", which sought to strike off the mentioned exhibits of respondents and asked the Sandiganbayan to permit petitioner to cross-examine witness Jesus Disini; (e) Motion for Consolidation, which prayed that Civil Case No. 0013 be consolidated with Criminal Case Nos. 28001 and 28001; and (f) Motion for Leave to Take Deposition based on Section 1 of Rule 23 (Depositions Pending Action or De Benne Esse).
87 86 85 84 83 82 76 74 72
In regard to the last mentioned Motion for Leave to Take Deposition (which is the last pleading on record), it is important to note that there are two instances when the defendant can take depositions under Section 1 of Rule 23: (1) after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the property subject of the action; and (2) after an answer has been served. Both instances presuppose that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. By seeking the relief contained in this provision, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, petitioner may be held to have waived his objections regarding the lack of jurisdiction over his person by seeking affirmative relief through the said provision.
Disini vs. SB
While petitioner bewailed the mode of service of summons on him and questioned the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over his person, he has rendered his own arguments moot by his voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the 88 dismissal of the case. Issue of Non-Lifting of Default Order Dismissed for Forum-shopping When petitioner filed this Petition on December 22, 2006 assailing the Sandiganbayans December 18, 2006 Resolution, the latter was still the subject of a pending Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner with the Sandiganbayan. The filing of the instant petition before this 89 Court while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Sandiganbayan constitutes, strictly speaking, forum-shopping, which could have warranted the outright dismissal of the petition. However, in light of the due process issues raised by petitioner and the very real possibility that he had no other speedy remedy available to him, his Petition was given due course. Inexplicably, and in continuing disregard of the rules on forum-shopping and judicial courtesy, petitioner raised again the same issue (validity of the default order and the propriety of lifting said default order) in a Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default dated August 27, 2002 which he filed with the Sandiganbayan after the latter denied his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. This Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default was filed on July 27, 2009, admittedly during the pendency of the instant Petition. Both remedies seek from different fora exactly the same ultimate relief (lifting of the default order issued by the Sandiganbayan) and raise the same issue (validity of the default order and the propriety of lifting said default order). In availing himself of these two remedies, petitioner has engaged in forum-shopping. There is forum shopping when one party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either 90 pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court. Forum shopping is a prohibited malpractice and condemned as trifling with the courts 91 and their processes. It is proscribed because it unnecessarily burdens the courts with heavy caseloads, and unduly taxes the manpower and financial 92 resources of the judiciary. It is inimical to the orderly administration of justice as it creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by 93 94 two courts, and opens the system to the possibility of manipulation. In filing a Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default with the Sandiganbayan while the instant Petition is pending with this Court, petitioner has unfairly doubled his chances of securing the lifting of the default order. "This misdeed amounts to a wagering on the result of *petitioners+ twin devious strategies, and shows not only [his] lack of faith in this Court in its evenhanded administration of law but also [his] expression of disrespect if 95 not ridicule for our judicial process and orderly procedure." The situation here is strikingly similar to that in People v. Sandiganbayan. In that case, the petitioner had filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for consolidation of a bribery case with a plunder case. The Sandiganbayanrefused, leading the petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with this Court. While the said petition was pending with this Court, the petitioner filed another motion for consolidation with the Sandiganbayan, praying anew for the consolidation of the bribery case with a plunder case. The motion raised the same issues and prayed for the same remedy as the pending petition with this Court, namely, the consolidation of the bribery case and the plunder case. The Court held that "such move clearly constitutes forumshopping." This is almost exactly what happened in the instant case. Petitioner had filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to lift default order. The Sandiganbayan refused, leading petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with this Court. While the said petition was pending with this Court, petitioner filed another motion to lift default order with theSandiganbayan, praying anew for the lifting of the default order. Thus, following the ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, we rule that petitioners actuations clearly constitute forum -shopping. Because of the forum-shopping committed by petitioner, the Court cannot grant the relief he prayed for. Certiorari is an improper remedy Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for allegedly "railroading" the proceedings in violation of his right to due process and fair trial. More specifically, petitioner points out that when theSandiganbayan denied his Motion to Lift Order of Default (December 18, 2006), he immediately filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration (December 19, 2006). However, before the latter could be resolved, theSandiganbayan allowed the ex-parte presentation of evidence to proceed (December 20, 2006). This prompted petitioner to file the instant Petition with this Court two days later (December 22, 2006). While it may have been more convenient if the Sandiganbayan resolved first the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration before allowing the exparte presentation of evidence, we cannot say that the course taken by the Sandiganbayan constitutes grave abuse of discretion. We cannot infer from the Sandiganbayans deliberate speed that it was done to prejudice petitioner. There was adequate justification for the Sandiganbayans resolve to finish the twenty-year old forfeiture case with dispatch. Aside from the length of time that Civil Case No. 0013 has stagnated in the dockets, the Republics manifestation (that a resolution was necessary by December 30, 2006 in order to maintain the Swiss Federal Courts freeze order on
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Disini vs. SB
petitioners Swiss accounts) is reason enough not to further delay the case as a matter of public interest. Besides, it shoul d be remembered that when theSandiganbayan received evidence ex-parte on December 20, 2006, petitioner was still in default and his Motion to Lift Default Order has already been denied. The ex-parte presentation of evidence on December 20, 2006 was simply consist ent with petitioners default status as of that time. Grave abuse of discretion refers to such "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. The actions of theSandiganbayan were not thus tainted under the circumstances we described above. Thus, we cannot accept petitioners contention that the proceedings taken below must be nullified because of the alleged "railroading" by the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, Rule 65 petitions for certiorari are extraordinary remedies available only when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of 97 jurisdiction and the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for correcting such abuse. By filing a Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default and the various motions seeking the Sandiganbayanscorrection of the perceived errors during the Republics ex parte presentation of evidence, petitioner has revealed his belief that he had adequate remedies before the Sandiganbayan. A resort to a Rule 65 petition is, under the premises, improper. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
US vs Balsys
PROCUNIER V. MARTINEZ, 416 U. S. 396 (1974) Case Preview Full Text of Case U.S. Supreme Court Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) Procunier v. Martinez No. 72-1465 Argued December 3, 1973 Decided April 29, 1974 416 U.S. 396 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Syllabus Appellees, prison inmates, brought this class action challenging prisoner mail censorship regulations issued by the Director of the California Department of Corrections and the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates. The mail censorship regulations, inter alia, proscribed inmate correspondence that "unduly complain[ed]," "magnif[ied] grievances," "express[ed] inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs," or contained matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate." The District Court held these regulations unconstitutional under the First Amendment, void for vagueness, and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process, and it enjoined their continued enforcement. The court required that an inmate be notified of the rejection of correspondence, and that the author of the correspondence be allowed to protest the decision and secure review by a prison official other than the original censor. The District Court also held that the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates abridged the right of access to the courts and enjoined its continued enforcement. Appellants contend that the District Court should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality of the mail censorship regulations. Held: 1. The District Court did not err in refusing to abstain from deciding the constitutionality of the mail censorship regulations. Pp. 400-404. 2. The censorship of direct personal correspondence involves incidental restrictions on the right to free speech of both prisoners and their correspondents, and is justified if the following criteria are met: (1) it must further one or more of the important and substantial governmental interests of security, order, and the rehabilitation of inmates, and (2) it must be no greater than is necessary to further the legitimate governmental interest involved. Pp. 416 U. S. 404-414. Page 416 U. S. 397 3. Under this standard, the invalidation of the mail censorship regulations by the District Court was correct. Pp. 416 U. S. 415-416.
US vs Balsys
4. The decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter must be accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards against arbitrariness or error, and the requirements specified by the District Court were not unduly burdensome. Pp. 416 U. S. 417-419. 5. The ban against attorney-client interviews conducted by law students or legal paraprofessionals, which was not limited to prospective interviewers who posed some colorable threat to security or to those inmates thought to be especially dangerous and which created an arbitrary distinction between law students employed by attorneys and those associated with law school programs (against whom the ban did not operate), constituted an unjustifiable restriction on the inmates' right of access to the courts.Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483. Pp. 416 U. S. 419-422. 354 F.Supp. 1092, affirmed. POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined and in Part II of which DOUGLAS, J., joined, post, p. 416 U. S. 422. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 416 U. S. 428. Page 416 U. S. 398 MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the constitutionality of certain regulations promulgated by appellant Procunier in his capacity as Director of the California Department of Corrections. Appellees brought a class action on behalf of themselves and all other inmates of penal institutions under the Department's jurisdiction to challenge the rules relating to censorship of prisoner mail and the ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281, a three-judge United States District Court was convened to hear appellees' request for declaratory and injunctive relief. That court entered summary judgment enjoining continued enforcement of the rules in question and ordering appellants to submit new regulations for the court's approval. 354 F.Supp. 1092 (ND Cal.1973). Appellants' first revisions resulted in counter-proposals by appellees and a court order issued May 30, 1973, requiring further modification of the proposed rules. The second set of revised regulations was approved by the District Court on July 20, 1973, over appellees' objections. While the first proposed revisions of the Department's regulations were pending before the District Court, appellants brought this appeal to contest that court's decision holding the original regulations unconstitutional. We noted probable jurisdiction. 412 U.S. 948 (1973). We affirm. I First we consider the constitutionality of the Director's rules restricting the personal correspondence of prison inmates. Under these regulations, correspondence between Page 416 U. S. 399 inmates of California penal institutions and persons other than licensed attorneys and holders of public office was censored for nonconformity to certain standards. Rule 2401 stated the Department's general premise that personal correspondence by prisoners is "a privilege, not a right. . . ." [Footnote 1] More detailed regulations implemented the Department's policy. Rule 1201 directed inmates not to write letters in which they "unduly complain" or "magnify grievances." [Footnote 2] Rule 1205(d) defined as contraband writings "expressing inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs. . . ." [Footnote 3] Finally, Rule 2402(8) provided that inmates "may not send or receive letters that pertain to criminal activity; Page 416 U. S. 400
US vs Balsys
are lewd, obscene, or defamatory; contain foreign matter, or are otherwise inappropriate." [Footnote 4] Prison employees screened both incoming and outgoing personal mail for violations of these regulations. No further criteria were provided to help members of the mail room staff decide whether a particular letter contravened any prison rule or policy. When a prison employee found a letter objectionable, he could take one or more of the following actions: (1) refuse to mail or deliver the letter and return it to the author; (2) submit a disciplinary report, which could lead to suspension of mail privileges or other sanctions; or (3) place a copy of the letter or a summary of its contents in the prisoner's file, where it might be a factor in determining the inmate's work and housing assignments and in setting a date for parole eligibility. The District Court held that the regulations relating to prisoner mail authorized censorship of protected expression without adequate justification in violation of the First Amendment, and that they were void for vagueness. The court also noted that the regulations failed to provide minimum procedural safeguards against error and arbitrariness in the censorship of inmate correspondence. Consequently, it enjoined their continued enforcement. Appellants contended that the District Court should have abstained from deciding these questions. In that court, appellants advanced no reason for abstention other than the assertion that the federal court should defer to the California courts on the basis of comity. The District Court properly rejected this suggestion, noting that the Page 416 U. S. 401 mere possibility that a state court might declare the prison regulations unconstitutional is no ground for abstention. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 400 U. S. 439(1971). Appellants now contend that we should vacate the judgment and remand the case to the District Court with instructions to abstain on the basis of two arguments not presented to it. First, they contend hat any vagueness challenge to an uninterpreted state statute or regulation is a proper case for abstention. According to appellants, "[t]he very statement by the district court that the regulations are vague constitutes a compelling reason for abstention." Brief for Appellants 8-9. As this Court made plain inBaggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964), however, not every vagueness challenge to an uninterpreted state statute or regulation constitutes a proper case for abstention. [Footnote 5] But we need not decide whether appellants' contention is controlled by the analysis in Baggett, for the short Page 416 U. S. 402 answer to their argument is that these regulations were neither challenged nor invalidated solely on the ground of vagueness. Appellees also asserted, and the District Court found, that the rules relating to prisoner mail permitted censorship of constitutionally protected expression without adequate justification. In light of the successful First Amendment attack on these regulations, the District Court's conclusion that they were also unconstitutionally vague hardly "constitutes a compelling reason for abstention." As a second ground for abstention, appellants rely on Cal.Penal Code 2600(4), which assures prisoners the right to receive books, magazines, and periodicals. [Footnote 6] Although they did not advance this argument to the District Court, appellants now contend that the interpretation of the statute by the state courts and its application to the regulations governing prisoner mail might avoid or modify the constitutional questions decided below. Thus, appellants seek to establish the essential prerequisite for abstention -- "an uncertain issue of state Page 416 U. S. 403 law," the resolution of which may eliminate or materially alter the federal constitutional question. [Footnote 7] Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528, 380 U. S. 534 (1965). We are not persuaded. A state court interpretation of 2600(4) would not avoid or substantially modify the constitutional
US vs Balsys
question presented here. That statute does not contain any provision purporting to regulate censorship of personal correspondence. It only preserves the right of inmates to receive "newspapers, periodicals, and books," and authorizes prison officials to exclude "obscene publications or writings, and mail containing information concerning Page 416 U. S. 404 where, how, or from whom such matter may be obtained. . . ." (Emphasis added.) And the plain meaning of the language is reinforced by recent legislative history. In 1972, a bill was introduced in the California Legislature to restrict censorship of personal correspondence by adding an entirely new subsection to 2600. The legislature passed the bill, but it was vetoed by Governor Reagan. In light of this history, we think it plain that no reasonable interpretation of 2600(4) would avoid or modify the federal constitutional question decided below. Moreover, we are mindful of the high cost of abstention when the federal constitutional challenge concerns facial repugnance to the First Amendment. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 389 U. S. 252(1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 379. We therefore proceed to the merits. A Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration. In part, this policy is the product of various limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in state penal institutions. [Footnote 8] More fundamentally, this attitude springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons Page 416 U. S. 405 in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. [Footnote 9] Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities. But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional Page 416 U. S. 406 rights. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483, 393 U. S. 486 (1969). This is such a case. Although the District Court found the regulations relating to prisoner mail deficient in several respects, the first and principal basis for its decision was the constitutional command of the First Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 10] The issue before us is the appropriate standard of review for prison regulations restricting freedom of speech. This Court has not previously addressed this question, and the tension between the traditional policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and the need to protect constitutional rights has led the federal courts to adopt a variety of widely inconsistent approaches to the problem. Some have maintained a hands-off posture in the face of constitutional challenges to censorship of prisoner mail. E.g., McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (CA4 1964); Lee v. Tahash,352 F.2d 970 (CA8
US vs Balsys
1965) (except insofar as mail censorship rules are applied to discriminate against a particular racial or religious group); Krupnick v. Crouse, 366 F.2d 851 (CA10 1966); Pope v. Daggett, 350 F.2d 296 (CA10 1965). Another has required only that censorship of personal correspondence not lack support "in any rational and constitutionally acceptable concept of a prison system." Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (CA2 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). At the other extreme, some courts have been willing to require demonstration of a "compelling state interest" to justify censorship of prisoner mail. E.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 Page 416 U. S. 407 (CA5 1968) (decided on both equal protection and First Amendment grounds); Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F.Supp. 544 (WD Wis.1972); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F.Supp. 901 (SDNY 1970). Other courts phrase the standard in similarly demanding terms of "clear and present danger." E.g., Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670, 672-673 (CA2 1972). And there are various intermediate positions, most notably the view that a "regulation or practice which restricts the right of free expression that a prisoner would have enjoyed if he had not been imprisoned must be related both reasonably and necessarily to the advancement of some justifiable purpose." E.g., Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.Supp. 1014, 1024 (SDNY 1970) (citations omitted).See also Gates v. Collier, 349 F.Supp. 881, 896 (ND Miss.1972); LeMon v. Zelker, 358 F.Supp. 554 (SDNY 1972). This array of disparate approaches and the absence of any generally accepted standard for testing the constitutionality of prisoner mail censorship regulations disserve both the competing interests at stake. On the one hand, the First Amendment interests implicated by censorship of inmate correspondence are given only haphazard and inconsistent protection. On the other, the uncertainty of the constitutional standard makes it impossible for correctional officials to anticipate what is required of them, and invites repetitive, piecemeal litigation on behalf of inmates. The result has been unnecessarily to perpetuate the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration. Our task is to formulate a standard of review for prisoner mail censorship that will be responsive to these concerns. B We begin our analysis of the proper standard of review for constitutional challenges to censorship of prisoner mail with a somewhat different premise from that taken Page 416 U. S. 408 by the other federal courts that have considered the question. For the most part, these courts have dealt with challenges to censorship of prisoner mail as involving broad questions of "prisoners' rights." This case is no exception. The District Court stated the issue in general terms as "the applicability of First Amendment rights to prison inmates . . . ," 354 F.Supp. at 1096, and the arguments of the parties reflect the assumption that the resolution of this case requires an assessment of the extent to which prisoners may claim First Amendment freedoms. In our view, this inquiry is unnecessary. In determining the proper standard of review for prison restrictions on inmate correspondence, we have no occasion to consider the extent to which an individual's right to free speech survives incarceration, for a narrower basis of decision is at hand. In the case of direct personal correspondence between inmates and those who have a particularized interest in communicating with them, [Footnote 11] mail censorship implicates more than the right of prisoners. Communication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing words on paper. Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by the addressee. Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in securing that result, and censorship of the communication between them necessarily impinges on the interest of each. Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is
US vs Balsys
grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter, for the addressee as well as the sender of direct personal correspondence Page 416 U. S. 409 derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended communication. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965); accord, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 408 U. S. 762-765 (1972); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 319 U. S. 143 (1943). We do not deal here with difficult questions of the so-called "right to hear" and third-party standing, but with a particular means of communication in which the interests of both parties are inextricably meshed. The wife of a prison inmate who is not permitted to read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered an abridgment of her interest in communicating with him as plain as that which results from censorship of her letter to him. In either event, censorship of prisoner mail works a consequential restriction on the First and Fourteenth Amendments rights of those who are not prisoners. Accordingly, we reject any attempt to justify censorship of inmate correspondence merely by reference to certain assumptions about the legal status of prisoners. Into this category of argument falls appellants' contention that "an inmate's rights with reference to social correspondence are something fundamentally different than those enjoyed by his free brother." Brief for Appellants 19. This line of argument and the undemanding standard of review it is intended to support fail to recognize that the First Amendment liberties of free citizens are implicated in censorship of prisoner mail. We therefore turn for guidance not to cases involving questions of "prisoners' rights," but to decisions of this Court dealing with the general problem of incidental restrictions on First Amendment liberties imposed in furtherance of legitimate governmental activities. As the Court noted in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 393 U. S. 506 (1969), First Amendment Page 416 U. S. 410 guarantees must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment." Tinker concerned the interplay between the right to freedom of speech of public high school students and "the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id. at 393 U. S. 507. In overruling a school regulation prohibiting the wearing of anti-war armbands, the Court undertook a careful analysis of the legitimate requirements of orderly school administration in order to ensure that the students were afforded maximum freedom of speech consistent with those requirements. The same approach was followed in Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972), where the Court considered the refusal of a state college to grant official recognition to a group of students who wished to organize a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a national student organization noted for political activism and campus disruption. The Court found that neither the identification of the local student group with the national SDS, nor the purportedly dangerous political philosophy of the local group, nor the college administration's fear of future, unspecified disruptive activities by the students could justify the incursion on the right of free association. The Court also found, however, that this right could be limited if necessary to prevent campus disruption, id. at 408 U. S. 189-190, n. 20, and remanded the case for determination of whether the students had, in fact, refused to accept reasonable regulations governing student conduct. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), the Court dealt with incidental restrictions on free speech occasioned by the exercise of the governmental power to conscript men for military service. O'Brien had burned his Selective Service registration certificate on the steps Page 416 U. S. 411
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of a courthouse in order to dramatize his opposition to the draft and to our country's involvement in Vietnam. He was convicted of violating a provision of the Selective Service law that had recently been amended to prohibit knowing destruction or mutilation of registration certificates. O'Brien argued that the purpose and effect of the amendment were to abridge free expression, and that the statutory provision was therefore unconstitutional, both as enacted and as applied to him. Although O'Brien's activity involved "conduct", rather than pure "speech," the Court did not define away the First Amendment concern, and neither did it rule that the presence of a communicative intent necessarily rendered O'Brien's actions immune to governmental regulation. Instead, it enunciated the following four-part test: "[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 391 U. S. 377. Of course, none of these precedents directly controls the instant case. In O'Brien, the Court considered a federal statute which, on its face, prohibited certain conduct having no necessary connection with freedom of speech. This led the Court to differentiate between "speech" and "nonspeech" elements of a single course of conduct, a distinction that has little relevance here. Both Tinker and Healy concerned First and Fourteenth Amendment liberties in the context of state educational institutions, a circumstance involving rather different governmental interests than are at stake here. In broader terms, however, these precedents involved incidental Page 416 U. S. 412 restrictions on First Amendment liberties by governmental action in furtherance of legitimate and substantial state interest other than suppression of expression. In this sense, these cases are generally analogous to our present inquiry. The case at hand arises in the context of prisons. One of the primary functions of government is the preservation of societal order through enforcement of the criminal law, and the maintenance of penal institutions is an essential part of that task. The identifiable governmental interests at stake in this task are the preservation of internal order and discipline, [Footnote 12] the maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners. While the weight of professional opinion seems to be that inmate freedom to correspond with outsiders advances, rather than retards the goal of rehabilitation, [Footnote 13] the legitimate governmental Page 416 U. S. 413 interest in the order and security of penal institutions justifies the imposition of certain restraints on inmate correspondence. Perhaps the most obvious example of justifiable censorship of prisoner mail would be refusal to send or deliver letters concerning escape plans or containing other information concerning proposed criminal activity, whether within or without the prison. Similarly, prison officials may properly refuse to transmit encoded messages. Other less obvious possibilities come to mind, but it is not our purpose to survey the range of circumstances in which particular restrictions on prisoner mail might be warranted by the legitimate demands of prison administration as they exist from time to time in the various kinds of penal institutions found in this country. Our task is to determine the proper standard for deciding whether a particular regulation or practice relating to inmate correspondence constitutes an impermissible restraint of First Amendment liberties. Applying the teachings of our prior decisions to the instant context, we hold that censorship of prisoner mail is justified if the following criteria are met. First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Prison officials may not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements. Rather, they must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order,
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and rehabilitation. Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved. Thus, a restriction on inmate correspondence Page 416 U. S. 414 that further an important or substantial interest of penal administration will nevertheless be invalid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad. This does not mean, of course, that prison administrators may be required to show with certainty that adverse consequences would flow from the failure to censor a particular letter. Some latitude in anticipating the probable consequences of allowing certain speech in a prison environment is essential to the proper discharge of an administrator's duty. But any regulation or practice that restricts inmate correspondence must be generally necessary to protect one or more of the legitimate governmental interests identified above. [Footnote 14] Page 416 U. S. 415 C On the basis of this standard, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. The regulations invalidated by that court authorized, inter alia, censorship of statements that "unduly complain" or "magnify grievances," expression of "inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views," and matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate." These regulations fairly invited prison officials and employees to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as standards for prisoner mail censorship. Not surprisingly, some prison officials used the extraordinary latitude for discretion authorized by the regulations to suppress unwelcome criticism. For example, at one institution under the Department's jurisdiction, the checklist used by the mail room staff authorized rejection of letters "criticizing policy, rules or officials," and the mail room sergeant stated in a deposition that he would reject as "defamatory" letters "belittling staff or our judicial system or anything connected with Department of Corrections." Correspondence was also censored for "disrespectful comments," "derogatory remarks," and the like. Appellants have failed to show that these broad restrictions on prisoner mail were in any way necessary to the furtherance of a governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Indeed, the heart of appellants' position is not that the regulations are justified by a legitimate governmental interest, but that they do not need to be. This misconception is not only stated affirmatively; it also underlies appellants' discussion of the particular regulations under attack. For example, appellants' sole defense of the prohibition against matter that is "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate" is that Page 416 U. S. 416 it is "within the discretion of the prison administrators." Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants contend that statements that "magnify grievances" or "unduly complain" are censored "as a precaution against flash riots and in the furtherance of inmate rehabilitation." Id. at 22. But they do not suggest how the magnification of grievances or undue complaining, which presumably occurs in outgoing letters, could possibly lead to flash riots, nor do they specify what contribution the suppression of complaints makes to the rehabilitation of criminals. And appellants defend the ban against "inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views" on the ground that "[s]uch matter clearly presents a danger to prison security. . . ." Id. at 21. The regulation, however, is not narrowly drawn to reach only material that might be thought to encourage violence, nor is its application limited to incoming letters. In short, the Department's regulations authorized censorship of prisoner mail far broader than any legitimate interest of penal administration demands, and were properly found invalid by the District Court. [Footnote 15] Page 416 U. S. 417 D
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We also agree with the District Court that the decision to censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter must he accompanied by minimum procedural safeguards. Page 416 U. S. 418 The interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a "liberty" interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment. As such, it is protected from arbitrary governmental invasion. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,408 U. S. 593 (1972). The District Court required that an inmate be notified of the rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him, that the author of that letter be given a reasonable opportunity to protest that decision, and that complaints be referred to a prison official other than Page 416 U. S. 419 the person who originally disapproved the correspondence. These requirements do not appear to be unduly burdensome, nor do appellants so contend. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court with respect to the Department's regulations relating to prisoner mail. II The District Court also enjoined continued enforcement of Administrative Rule MV-IV-02, which provides in pertinent part: "Investigators for an attorney of record will be confined to not more than two. Such investigators must be licensed by the State or must be members of the State Bar. Designation must be made in writing by the Attorney." By restricting access to prisoners to members of the bar and licensed private investigators, this regulation imposed an absolute ban on the use by attorneys of law students and legal paraprofessionals to interview inmate clients. In fact, attorneys could not even delegate to such persons the task of obtaining prisoners' signatures on legal documents. The District Court reasoned that this rule constituted an unjustifiable restriction on the right of access to the courts. We agree. The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. This means that inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys. Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts are invalid. Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546 (1941). Page 416 U. S. 420 The District Court found that the rule restricting attorney-client interviews to members of the bar and licensed private investigators inhibited adequate professional representation of indigent inmates. The remoteness of many California penal institutions makes a personal visit to an inmate client a timeconsuming undertaking. The court reasoned that the ban against the use of law students or other paraprofessionals for attorney-client interviews would deter some lawyers from representing prisoners who could not afford to pay for their traveling time or that of licensed private investigators. And those lawyers who agreed to do so would waste time that might be employed more efficaciously in working on the inmates' legal problems. Allowing law students and paraprofessionals to interview inmates might well reduce the cost of legal representation for prisoners. The District Court therefore concluded that the regulation imposed a substantial burden on the right of access to the courts. As the District Court recognized, this conclusion does not end the inquiry, for prison administrators are not required to adopt every proposal that may be thought to facilitate prisoner access to the courts. The extent to which that right is burdened by a particular regulation or practice must be weighed
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against the legitimate interests of penal administration and the proper regard that judges should give to the expertise and discretionary authority of correctional officials. In this case, the ban against the use of law students and other paraprofessional personnel was absolute. Its prohibition was not limited to prospective interviewers who posed some colorable threat to security or to those inmates thought to be especially dangerous. Nor was it shown that a less restrictive regulation would unduly burden the administrative task of screening and monitoring visitors. Page 416 U. S. 421 Appellants' enforcement of the regulation in question also created an arbitrary distinction between law students employed by practicing attorneys and those associated with law school programs providing legal assistance to prisoners. [Footnote 16] While the Department flatly prohibited interviews of any sort by law students working for attorneys, it freely allowed participants of a number of law school programs to enter the prisons and meet with inmates. These largely unsupervised students were admitted without any security check other than verification of their enrollment in a school program. Of course, the fact that appellants have allowed some persons to conduct attorney-client interviews with prisoners does not mean that they are required to admit others, but the arbitrariness of the distinction between the two categories of law students does reveal the absence of any real justification for the sweeping prohibition of Administrative Rule MV-IV-02. We cannot say that the District Court erred in invalidating this regulation. This result is mandated by our decision in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969). There, the Court struck down a prison regulation prohibiting any inmate from advising or assisting another in the preparation of legal documents. Given the inadequacy of alternative sources of legal assistance, the rule had the effect of denying to illiterate or poorly educated inmates any opportunity to vindicate possibly valid constitutional claims. The Court found that the regulation impermissibly burdened the right of access to the courts despite the not insignificant state interest in preventing the establishment of personal power structures by unscrupulous jailhouse lawyers and the attendant problems of prison discipline that Page 416 U. S. 422 follow. The countervailing state interest in Johnson is, if anything, more persuasive than any interest advanced by appellants in the instant case. The judgment is Affirmed. [Footnote 1] Director's Rule 2401 provided: "The sending and receiving of mail is a privilege, not a right, and any violation of the rules governing mail privileges either by you or by your correspondents may cause suspension of the mail privileges." [Footnote 2] Director's Rule 1201 provided: "INMATE BEHAVIOR: Always conduct yourself in an orderly manner. Do not fight or take part in horseplay or physical encounters except as part of the regular athletic program. Do not agitate, unduly complain, magnify grievances, or behave in any way which might lead to violence." It is undisputed that the phrases "unduly complain" and "magnify grievances" were applied to personal correspondence. [Footnote 3] Director's Rule 1205 provided:
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"The following is contraband:" "* * * *" "d. Any writings or voice recordings expressing inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs when not in the immediate possession of the originator, or when the originator's possession is used to subvert prison discipline by display or circulation." Rule 1205 also provides that writings "not defined as contraband under this rule, but which, if circulated among other inmates, would, in the judgment of the warden or superintendent, tend to subvert prison order or discipline, may be placed in the inmate's property, to which he shall have access under supervision." [Footnote 4] At the time of appellees' amended complaint, Rule 2402(8) included prohibitions against "prison gossip or discussion of other inmates." Before the first opinion of the District Court, these provisions were deleted, and the phrase "contain foreign matter" was substituted in their stead. [Footnote 5] In Baggett, the Court considered the constitutionality of loyalty oaths required of certain state employees as a condition of employment. For the purpose of applying the doctrine of abstention, the Court distinguished between two kinds of vagueness attacks. Where the case turns on the applicability of a state statute or regulation to a particular person or a defined course of conduct, resolution of the unsettled question of state law may eliminate any need for constitutional adjudication. 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 376-377. Abstention is therefore appropriate. Where, however, as in this case, the statute or regulation is challenged as vague because individuals to whom it plainly applies simply cannot understand what is required of them and do not wish to forswear all activity arguably within the scope of the vague terms, abstention is not required. Id.at 377 U. S. 378. In such a case, no single adjudication by a state court could eliminate the constitutional difficulty. Rather it would require "extensive adjudications, under the impact of a variety of factual situations," to bring the challenged statute or regulation "within the bounds of permissible constitutional certainty." Ibid. [Footnote 6] Cal.Penal Code 260 provides that "[a] sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced . . . ," and it allows for partial restoration of those rights by the California Adult Authority. The statute then declares, in pertinent part: "This section shall be construed so as not to deprive such person of the following civil rights, in accordance with the laws of this state:" "* * * *" "(4) To purchase, receive, and read any and all newspapers periodicals, and books accepted for distribution by the United States Post Office. Pursuant to the provisions of this section, prison authorities shall have the authority to exclude obscene publications or writings, and mail containing information concerning where, how, or from whom such matter may be obtained; and any matter of a character tending to incite murder, arson, riot, violent racism, or any other form of violence; and any matter concerning gambling or a lottery. . . ." [Footnote 7] Appellants argue that the correctness of their abstention argument is demonstrated by the District Court's disposition of Count II of appellees' amended complaint. In Count II, appellees challenged the mail regulations on the ground that their application to correspondence between inmates
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and attorneys contravened the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Appellees later discovered that a case was then pending before the Supreme Court of California in which the application of the prison rules to attorney-client mail was being attacked under subsection (2) of 2600, which provides: "This section shall be construed so as not to deprive [an inmate] of the following civil rights, in accordance with the laws of this state:" "* * * *" "(2) To correspond, confidentially, with any member of the State Bar, or holder of public office, provided that the prison authorities may open and inspect such mail to search for contraband." The District Court did stay its hand, and the subsequent decision in In re Jordan, 7 Cal.3d 930, 500 P.2d 873 (1972) (holding that 2600(2) barred censorship of attorney-client correspondence), rendered Count II moot. This disposition of the claim relating to attorney-client mail is, however, quite irrelevant to appellants' contention that the District Court should have abstained from deciding whether the mail regulations are constitutional as they apply to personal mail. Subsection (2) of 2600 speaks directly to the issue of censorship of attorney-client mail, but says nothing at all about personal correspondence, and appellants have not informed us of any challenge to the censorship of personal mail presently pending in the state courts. [Footnote 8] See Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 7 Va.L.Rev. 841, 842-844 (1971). [Footnote 9] They are also ill-suited to act as the frontline agencies for the consideration and resolution of the infinite variety of prisoner complaints. Moreover, the capacity of our criminal justice system to deal fairly and fully with legitimate claims will be impaired by a burgeoning increase of frivolous prisoner complaints. As one means of alleviating this problem, THE CHIEF JUSTICE has suggested that federal and state authorities explore the possibility of instituting internal administrative procedures for disposition of inmate grievances. 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1128 (1973). At the Third Circuit Judicial Conference meeting of October 15, 1973, at which the problem was addressed, suggestions also included (i) abstention where appropriate to avoid needless consideration of federal constitutional issues; and (ii) the use of federal magistrates who could be sent into penal institutions to conduct hearings and make findings of fact. We emphasize that we express no view as to the merit or validity of any particular proposal, but we do think it appropriate to indicate the necessity of prompt and thoughtful consideration by responsible federal and state authorities of this worsening situation. [Footnote 10] Specifically, the District Court held that the regulations authorized restraint of lawful expression in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, that they were fatally vague, and that they failed to provide minimum procedural safeguards against arbitrary or erroneous censorship of protected speech. [Footnote 11] Different considerations may come into play in the case of mass mailings. No such issue is raised on these facts, and we intimate no view as to its proper resolution. [Footnote 12] We need not and do not address in this case the validity of a temporary prohibition of an inmate's personal correspondence as a disciplinary sanction (usually as part of the regimen of solitary confinement) for violation of prison rules.
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[Footnote 13] Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons sets forth the Bureau's position regarding general correspondence by the prisoners entrusted to its custody. It authorizes all federal institutions to adopt open correspondence regulations, and recognizes that any need for restrictions arises primarily from considerations of order and security, rather than rehabilitation: "Constructive, wholesome contact with the community is a valuable therapeutic tool in the overall correctional process. At the same time, basic controls need to be exercised in order to protect the security of the institution, individuals and/or the community at large." The recommended policy guideline adopted by the Association of State Correctional Administrators on August 23, 1972, echoes the view that personal correspondence by prison inmates is a generally wholesome activity: "Correspondence with members of an inmate's family, close friends, associates and organizations is beneficial to the morale of all confined persons and may form the basis for good adjustment in the institution and the community." [Footnote 14] While not necessarily controlling, the policies followed at other well run institutions would be relevant to a determination of the need for a particular type of restriction. For example, Policy Statement 7300.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons specifies that personal correspondence of inmates in federal prisons, whether incoming or outgoing, may be rejected for inclusion of the following kinds of material: "(1) Any material which might violate postal regulations, i.e., threats, blackmail, contraband or which indicate plots of escape." "(2) Discussions of criminal activities." "(3) No inmate may be permitted to direct his business while he is in confinement. This does not go to the point of prohibiting correspondence necessary to enable the inmate to protect the property and funds that were legitimately his at the time he was committed to the institution. Thus, an inmate could correspond about refinancing a mortgage on his home or sign insurance papers, but he could not operate a mortgage or insurance business while in the institution." "(4) Letters containing codes or other obvious attempts to circumvent these regulations will be subject to rejection." "(5) Insofar as possible, all letters should be written in English, but every effort should be made to accommodate those inmates who are unable to write in English or whose correspondents would be unable to understand a letter written in English. The criminal sophistication of the inmate, the relationship of the inmate and the correspondent are factors to be considered in deciding whether correspondence in a foreign language should be permitted." [Footnote 15] After the District Court held the original regulations unconstitutional, revised regulations were developed by appellants and approved by the court. Supp. to App. 194-200, 211. Although these regulations are not before us for review, they are indicative of one solution to the problem. The following provisions govern censorship of prisoner correspondence: "CORRESPONDENCE" "A. Criteria for Disapproval of Inmate Mail" "1. Outgoing Letters"
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"Outgoing letters from inmates of institutions not requiring approval of inmate correspondents may be disapproved for mailing only if the content falls as a whole or in significant part into any of the following categories:" "a. The letter contains threats of physical harm against any person or threats of criminal activity." "b. The letter threatens blackmail . . . or extortion." "c. The letter concerns sending contraband in or out of the institutions." "d. The letter concerns plans to escape." "e. The letter concerns plans for activities in violation of institutional rules." "f. The letter concerns plans for criminal activity." "g. The letter is in code and its contents are not understood by reader." "h. The letter solicits gifts of goods or money from other than family." "i. The letter is obscene." "j. The letter contains information which, if communicated, would create a clear and present danger of violence and physical harm to a human being. Outgoing letters from inmates of institutions requiring approval of correspondents may be disapproved only for the foregoing reasons, or if the addressee is not an approved correspondent of the inmate and special permission for the letter has not been obtained." "2. Incoming Letters" "Incoming letters to inmates may be disapproved for receipt only for the foregoing reasons, or if the letter contains material which would cause severe psychiatric or emotional disturbance to the inmate, or in an institution requiring approval of inmate correspondents, is from a person who is not an approved correspondent and special permission for the letter has not been obtained." "3. Limitations" "Disapproval of a letter on the basis that it would cause severe psychiatric or emotional disturbance to the inmate may be done only by a member of the institution's psychiatric staff after consultation with the inmate's caseworker. The staff member may disapprove the letter only upon a finding that receipt of the letter would be likely to affect prison discipline or security or the inmate's rehabilitation, and that there is no reasonable alternative means of ameliorating the disturbance of the inmate. Outgoing or incoming letters may not be rejected solely upon the ground that they contain criticism of the institution or its personnel." "4. Notice of Disapproval of Inmate Mail" "a. When an inmate is prohibited from sending a letter, the letter and a written and signed notice stating one of the authorized reasons for disapproval and indicating the portion or portions of the letter causing disapproval will be given the inmate." "b. When an inmate is prohibited from receiving a letter, the letter and a written and signed notice stating one of the authorized reasons for disapproval and indicating the portion or portions of the letter causing disapproval will be given the sender. The inmate will be given notice in writing that a letter has been rejected, indicating one of the authorized reasons and the sender's name."
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"c. Material from correspondence which violates the provisions of paragraph one may be placed in an inmate's file. Other material from correspondence may not be placed in an inmate's file unless it has been lawfully observed by an employee of the department and is relevant to assessment of the inmate's rehabilitation. However, such material which is not in violation of the provisions of paragraph one may not be the subject of disciplinary proceedings against an inmate. An inmate shall be notified in writing of the placing of any material from correspondence in his file." "d. Administrative review of inmate grievances regarding the application of this rule may be had in accordance with paragraph DP-1003 of these rules." [Footnote 16] Apparently, the Department's policy regarding law school programs providing legal assistance to inmates, though well established, is not embodied in any regulation. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring. I I concur in the opinion and judgment of the Court. I write separately only to emphasize my view that prison authorities do not have a general right to open and read all incoming and outgoing prisoner mail. Although the issue of the First Amendment rights of inmates is explicitly reserved by the Court, I would reach that issue and hold that prison authorities may not read inmate mail as a matter of course. II As Mr. Justice Holmes observed over a half century ago, "the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues. . . ." Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 255 U. S. 437 (1921) (dissenting opinion), quoted with approval in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 400 U. S. 416 (1971). See also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 381 U. S. 305(1965). A prisoner does not shed such basic First Amendment rights at the prison gate. [Footnote 2/1] Rather, he "retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from Page 416 U. S. 423 him by law." Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (CA6 1944). [Footnote 2/2] Accordingly, prisoners are, in my view, entitled to use the mails as a medium of free expression not as a privilege, but rather as a constitutionally guaranteed right. [Footnote 2/3] It seems clear that this freedom may be seriously infringed by permitting correctional authorities to read all prisoner correspondence. A prisoner's free and open expression will surely be restrained by the knowledge that his every word may be read by his jailors, and that his message could well find its way into a disciplinary file, be the object of ridicule, or even lead to reprisals. A similar pall may be cast over the free expression of the inmates' correspondents. Cf. Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 362 U. S. 65(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 357 U. S. 462 (1958). Such an intrusion on First Amendment freedoms can only be justified by a substantial government interest and a showing that the means chosen to effectuate the State's purpose are not unnecessarily restrictive of personal freedoms. "[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more Page 416 U. S. 424 narrowly achieved."
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Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 364 U. S. 488 (1960). [Footnote 2/4] The First Amendment must in each context "be applied in light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment,'" Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 408 U. S. 180(1972), and the exigencies of governing persons in prisons are different from and greater than those in governing persons without. Barnett v. Rodgers, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 296, 301-302, 410 F.2d 995, 1000-1001 (1969); Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F.Supp. 821, 827 (Neb.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1005 (CA8 1971). The State has legitimate and substantial concerns as to security, personal safety, institutional discipline, and prisoner rehabilitation not applicable to the community at large. But these considerations do not eliminate the need for reasons imperatively justifying the particular deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights at issue. Cf. Healy v. James, supra, at 408 U. S. 180;Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 393 U. S. 506 (1969). The State asserts a number of justifications for a general right to read all prisoner correspondence. The State argues that contraband weapons or narcotics may be smuggled into the prison via the mail, and certainly this is a legitimate concern of prison authorities. But this argument provides no justification for reading outgoing mail. Even as to incoming mail, there is no showing that stemming the traffic in contraband could not be accomplished equally well by means of physical tests Page 416 U. S. 425 such as fluoroscoping letters. [Footnote 2/5] If physical tests were inadequate, merely opening and inspecting -- and not reading -- incoming mail would clearly suffice. [Footnote 2/6] It is also suggested that prison authorities must read all prison mail in order to detect escape plans. The State surely could not justify reading everyone's mail and listening to all phone conversations on the off chance that criminal schemes were being concocted. Similarly, the reading of all prisoner mail is too great an intrusion on First Amendment rights to be justified by such a speculative concern. There has been no showing as to the seriousness of the problem of escapes planned or arranged via the mail. Indeed, the State's claim of concern over this problem is undermined by the general practice of permitting unmonitored personal interviews during which any number of surreptitious plans might be discussed undetected. [Footnote 2/7] When prison authorities have reason to believe that an escape plot is being hatched by a particular inmate through his correspondence, they may well have an adequate basis to seize that inmate's letters; but there is no such justification for a blanket policy of reading all prison mail. It is also occasionally asserted that reading prisoner mail is a useful tool in the rehabilitative process. The therapeutic model of corrections has come under increasing criticism, and, in most penal institutions, rehabilitative programs are more ideal than reality. [Footnote 2/8] Assuming the validity of the rehabilitative model, however, the State does not demonstrate that the reading of inmate Page 416 U. S. 426 mail, with its attendant chilling effect on free expression, serves any valid rehabilitative purpose. Prison walls serve not merely to restrain offenders, but also to isolate them. The mails provide one of the few ties inmates retain to their communities or families -- ties essential to the success of their later return to the outside world. [Footnote 2/9] Judge Kaufman, writing for the Second Circuit, found two observations particularly apropos of similar claims of rehabilitative benefit in Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (1971) (en banc): "'Letter writing keeps the inmate in contact with the outside world, helps to hold in check some of the morbidity and hopelessness produced by prison life and isolation, stimulates his more natural and human impulses, and otherwise may make contributions to better mental attitudes and reformation.' [Footnote 2/10]" and:
US vs Balsys
"'The harm censorship does to rehabilitation . . . cannot be gainsaid. Inmates lose contact with the outside world and become wary of placing intimate thoughts or criticisms of the prison in letters. This artificial increase of alienation from society is ill-advised.' [Footnote 2/11]" The Court today agrees that "the weight of professional opinion seems to be that inmate freedom to correspond with outsiders advances, rather than retards, the goal of rehabilitation." Ante at 416 U. S. 412. [Footnote 2/12] Page 416 U. S. 427 Balanced against the State's asserted interests are the values that are generally associated with freedom of speech in a free society -- values which "do not turn to dross in an unfree one." Sostre v. McGnnis, supra, at 199. First Amendment guarantees protect the free and uninterrupted interchange of ideas upon which a democratic society thrives. Perhaps the most obvious victim of the indirect censorship effected by a policy of allowing prison authorities to read inmate mail is criticism of prison administration. The threat of identification and reprisal inherent in allowing correctional authorities to read prisoner mail is not lost on inmates who might otherwise criticize their jailors. The mails are one of the few vehicles prisoners have for informing the community about their existence and, in these days of strife in our correctional institutions, the plight of prisoners is a matter of urgent public concern. To sustain a policy which chills the communication necessary to inform the public on this issue is at odds with the most basic tenets of the guarantee of freedom of speech. [Footnote 2/13] The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity, but also those of the human spirit -- a spirit that demands self-expression. Such expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual's worth and dignity. [Footnote 2/14] Cf. 394 U. S. Georgia, 394 U.S. Page 416 U. S. 428 557 (1969). Such restraint may be "the greatest displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him." J. Milton, Aeropagitica 21 (Everyman's ed.1927). When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his human quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a free and open interchange of opinions; his yearning for self-respect does not end; nor is his quest for selfrealization concluded. If anything, the needs for identity and self-respect are more compelling in the dehumanizing prison environment. Whether an O. Henry writing his short stories in a jail cell or a frightened young inmate writing his family, a prisoner needs a medium for self-expression. It is the role of the First Amendment and this Court to protect those precious personal rights by which we satisfy such basic yearnings of the human spirit. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins in Part II of this opinion. [Footnote 2/1] See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964);Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1230 (CA4 1971); Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F.Supp. 821, 827 (Neb.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1005 (CA8 1971); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F.Supp. 901, 903 (SDNY 1970). [Footnote 2/2] Accord, Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574, 576 (CA8 1972); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 547 (CA1 1971); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.Supp. 128, 131 (ND Cal.1972); Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F.Supp. 880, 884 (WDNY 1972); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.Supp. 1014, 1023 (SDNY 1970). [Footnote 2/3]
US vs Balsys
See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (CA2 1971) (en banc); Preston v. Thieszen, 341 F.Supp. 785, 786-787 (WD Wis.1972); cf. Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 186 (CA3 1972); Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F.Supp. 544 (WD Wis.1972);Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F.Supp. 776 (RI 1970); Carothers v. Follette, supra. [Footnote 2/4] The test I would apply is thus essentially the same as the test applied by the Court: "[T]he regulation . . . in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression . . . , [and] the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Ante at 416 U. S. 413. [Footnote 2/5] See Marsh v. Moore, 325 F.Supp. 392, 395 (Mass.1971). [Footnote 2/6] See Moore v. Ciccone, supra, at 578 (Lay, J., concurring); cf. Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F.Supp. 707, 719 (ND Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (CA6 1972). [Footnote 2/7] Palmigiano v. Travisono, supra. [Footnote 2/8] See generally J. Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment: The Prison Business (1973). [Footnote 2/9] See, e.g., National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections 67-68 (1973). [Footnote 2/10] See Palmigiano v. Travisono, supra, at 791. [Footnote 2/11] Singer, Censorship of Prisoners' Mail and the Constitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051, 1054 (1970). [Footnote 2/12] Various studies have strongly recommended that correctional authorities have the right to inspect mail for contraband but not to read it. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections, Standard 2.17, pp. 66-69 (1973);see California Board of Corrections, California Correctional System Study: Institutions 40 (1971); Center for Criminal Justice, Boston University Law School, Model Rules and Regulations on Prisoners' Rights and Responsibilities, Standards IC-1 and IC-2, pp. 46-47 (1973). [Footnote 2/13]
US vs Balsys
See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d at 547-548. [Footnote 2/14] Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 879-880 (1963). MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurring in the judgment. I have joined Part II of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion because I think it makes abundantly clear that foremost among the Bill of Rights of prisoners in this country, whether under state or federal detention, is the First Amendment. Prisoners are still "persons" entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed by procedures that satisfy all of the requirements of due process. While Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, stated that the First Amendment was applicable to the States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it has become customary to Page 416 U. S. 429 rest on the broader foundation of the entire Fourteenth Amendment. Free speech and press within the meaning of the First Amendment are, in my judgment, among the preeminent privileges and immunities of all citizens.
People vs. Pineda

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC
G.R. No. 44205 February 16, 1993 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Branch XXI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, and CONSOLACION NAVAL, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Salonga. Ordoez, Yap & Associates for private respondent.
MELO, J.: When Consolacion Naval, the herein private respondent, was separately accused of having committed the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 before Branch 19, and of falsification in Criminal Case No. 15796 before Branch 21, both of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal of the Seventh Judicial District stationed at Pasig, Rizal, she sought the quashal of the latter charge on the supposition that she is in danger of being convicted for the same felony (p. 16, Record). Her first attempt in this respect did not spell success (p. 34, Record) but the Honorable Gregorio G. Pineda, Presiding Judge of Branch 21 was persuaded to the contrary thereafter on the belief that the alleged falsification was a necessary means of committing estafa (p. 149, Record). It is this perception, along with the denial of the motion for reevaluation therefrom (p. 66, Record) which the People impugns via the special civil action for certiorari now before Us. The indictment for estafa against Consolacion Naval and her co-accused Anacleto Santos, reads: That on or about March 23, 1973 and soon thereafter, in the municipality of Pasig, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, by means of deceit and with intent to defraud, knowing that their parcel of land among others, situated in Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, and more particularly described as follows, to wit: OJA No. 5851 Isang lagay na lupa (bulubundukin) na nasa lugar ng Malaking Bundok, Bo. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, na may lawak na 14,615.5 metrong parisukat na may tasang P580.00 at may hanggahang gaya ng sumusunod: HilagaanHermogenes Naval (now part of Rev. Tax Dec. 9284; Silanganan-Nicolas del Rosario (now Jaime del Rosario); Timugan-Eduvigis, Consolacion, Apolinaria, Naval; Kanluran-Creek (sapang bato) was already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V. Ilano as can be gleaned from a document entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion" sometime on August 12, 1969; and the latter having paid the partial amount of P130,850.00 to the herein accused and without informing said Edilberto V. Ilano, the herein accused Consolacion Naval executed and filed an Application for Registration over the same parcel of land among others, which document is designated as LRC Case No. N-7485, "Consolacion, Eduvigis and Apolinaria, all surnamed Naval" of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Rizal, as a result of which the Presiding Judge of Branch XIII to which said case was assigned issued Original Certificate of Title No. 9332 in her name, which area was reduced to 10,075 sq. meters as appearing in item No. 2 in said OCT and subsequently referred to in TCT No. 370870 in favor of said accused Naval through Rodolfo Mendoza, sold more than one-half (1/2) of said parcel of land in her name in favor of Maria, Anacleto, Carmelo, Mariano, Cecilia and Teodorica, all surnamed Santos and Iluminada Tambalo, Pacita Alvarez and Pedro Valesteros which sales were registered and annotated with the Register of Deeds of Rizal at Pasig, Rizal; and likewise a portion of which was partitioned to herein accused Anacleto Santos; that despite repeated demands the accused refused and still refuse to return said amount and/or fulfill their obligations under said "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion", to the damage and prejudice of said Edilberto V. Ilano in the aforementioned amount of P130,850.00. (pp. 44-45, Rollo)
People vs. Pineda

while the charge for falsification narrates: That on or about the 17th day August, 1971, in the municipality of Pasig, province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then private individual did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, committed as follows: the said accused on August 17, 1971, executed a document entitled "Application For Registration" for parcels of land located at Taytay, Rizal, to the effect that "She is the exclusive owner in fee simple of a parcel of land situated in Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal with Psu-248206 and that she "does not know any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land or that any person has estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession remainder, reversion or expectancy", as a result of which the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein accused the true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free from all liens and encumbrances of any nature, when in truth and in fact the herein accused has already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V. Ilano said parcel of land referred to above as can be gleaned from a document entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion" dated August 12, 1969 and said Edilberto V. Ilano has already paid partial amount of P130,850.00 to the herein accused. Contrary to law. (p. 2, Rollo) The confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P130,850.00. About two years later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and that it was unencumbered. For those reasons, the corresponding title was issued in her name but she allegedly disposed of the half portion of the property to nine other persons. These antecedents spawned the simultaneous institution of the charges on September 17, 1975. On October 28, 1975, private respondent Consolacion Naval moved to quash the information for falsification, premised, among other things, on the apprehension that she is in danger of being condemned for an identical offense. The following day, Naval pleaded not guilty to the charge levelled against her for falsification (p. 22, Record) and on December 22, 1975, the court a quo denied her motion to quash (p. 34, Record). As earlier intimated, the magistrate below thereafter reconsidered his order of denial which gave rise to the corresponding unsuccessful bid by the People for reinstatement of the information for falsification. Hence the instant petition, which practically reiterates the same disqualification put forward in the proceedings below (p. 7, Petition; p. 47, Rollo). The issue of whether the court below correctly quashed the information for falsification must be answered in the negative for the following reasons: 1. Assuming in gratia argumenti that falsification was indeed necessary to commit estafa, which ordinarily constitutes a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and thus susceptible to challenge via a motion to quash under Section 2 (e), Rule 117 vis-a-vis Section 12, Rule 110 (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 4, 1980 Ed., p. 42; 230), still, it was serious error on the part of the magistrate below to have appreciated this discourse in favor of private respondent since this matter was not specifically raised in the motion to quash filed on October 28, 1975 (p. 16, Record). It was only in the motion for reconsideration where private respondent pleaded this additional ground after her motion to quash was denied (p. 39, Record). The legal proscription against entertaining another saving clause to abate the charge for falsification is very explicit under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court: Sec. 3. Motion to quash Form and contents Failure to state objection Entry of record Failure to record. The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the defendant or his attorney. It shall specify distinctly the ground of objection relied on and the court shall hear no objection other than that stated in the motion. It shall be entered of record but a failure to so enter it shall not affect the validity of any proceeding in the case. It must be observed that the denial of the motion to quash was re-examined not in the light of "res judicata dressed in prison grey" but on the aspect of whether falsification was supposedly perpetrated to commit estafa. The course of action pursued by the trial court in this context may not even be justified under Section 10 of Rule 117 which says that: Sec. 10. Failure to move to quash Effect of Exceptions. If the defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. If, however, the defendant learns after he has pleaded or has moved to guash on some other ground that the offense for which he is now charged is an offense for which he has been pardoned , or of which he has been convicted or acquitted or been in jeopardy, the court may in its discretion entertain at any time before judgment a motion to quash on the ground of such pardon, conviction, acquittal or jeopardy.
People vs. Pineda

for the simple reason that the theory of a single crime advanced by private respondent in her belated, nay, "second" motion to quash couched as motion for reconsideration is not synonymous with "pardon, conviction, acquittal or jeopardy". In effect, therefore, respondent judge accommodated another basis for the quashal of the information albeit the same was not so stated in the motion therefor. This should not have been tolerated because it is anathema to the foregoing proviso (Moran, supra, at p. 283, citing Suy Sui vs. People, 49 O.G. 967). Thiscaveat is now amplified in Section 8 of Rule 117 as amended, thus: Sec. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule. At any rate, it is virtually unacceptable to suppose that private respondent concocted the sinister scheme of falsification in 1971 precisely to facilitate the commission of estafa in 1973 such that both crimes emanated from a single criminal impulse. Otherwise, an unfounded verisimilitude of this nature will run afoul with what this Court already observed in People vs. Penas (68 Phil. 533 [1939]; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 Ed., p. 574) to the effect that the eleven estafas through falsification which the same accused therein committed between November 24, 1936 and January 3, 1937 including the falsification which he committed on January 8, 1937 were considered distinct offenses, not one complex crime, because they were committed on different dates, not to mention the discrepancy in places where they were accomplished. In the same breath, it necessarily follows that the suspended hiatus, between 1971 and 1973 in the case at bar will not afford the occasion to buttress the unwarranted submission that the first is an integral part of or intimately interwoven with the second felony. A simple perusal of the two informations will disclose, and this cannot be gainsaid, that the recitals thereof radically differ with each other. The indictment for falsification allegedly perpetrated in 1971 was levelled against private respondent because of the pretense in the application for registration of her exclusive dominion over a parcel of land notwithstanding the previous sale of the same lot in 1969 to Edilberto V. Ilano. By contrast, the inculpatory aspersions against private respondent in 1973 for estafa have their roots in the overt act of disposing the same piece of lot in favor of other persons subsequent to the conveyance in favor of Edilberto V. Ilano in 1969. Indeed, the intent to prevaricate on a piece of document for the purpose of securing a favorable action for registration within the context of Article 171 (4) in conjunction with Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code is definitely distinct from the perceived double sale contemplated by the first paragraph under Article 316 of the same code. 2. It was similarly fallacious for the lower court to have shared the notion that private respondent is in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal act, a circumstance recognized under Section 2(h) Rule 117 of the Old Rules as suggested in the motion to quash, because this plea is understood to presuppose that the other case against private respondent has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without her express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge (People of the Philippines versus Hon. Maximiano C. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992; Section 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended). In the Asuncion case, Justice Nocon said that: . . . according to a long line of cases, in order that a defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it is necessary that he had previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former case against him for the same offense has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge. Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the accused (People vs. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 586 [1982]; Nierras vs. Dacuycuy,181 SCRA 8 [1990]). In People vs. Miraflores (supra), the accused therein, after he had pleaded to the charge of multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 88173 and subsequent to his arraignment on a separate charge of Murder in Criminal Case No. 88174, invoked the plea of double jeopardy but Justice Barredo who spoke for the Court was far from convinced: But the more untenable aspect of the position of appellant is that when he invoked the defense of double jeopardy, what could have been the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even began. It is settled jurisprudence in this Court that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his consent. (Bulaong vs. People, L-19344, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 746; Silvestre vs. Military Commission No. 21, No. L-46366, March 8, 1978, Buscayno vs. Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, No. L-58284, Nov. 19, 1981, 109 SCRA 273). Moreover, it appears that private respondent herein had not yet been arraigned in the previous case for estafa. Thus, there is that other missing link, so to speak, in the case at bar which was precisely the same reason utilized by Justice Davide, Jr. in Lamera vs. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 186 [1991]) when he brushed aside the claim of double jeopardy of the accused therein who was arraigned in the previous case only after the judgment of conviction was promulgated in the other case. The ponente cited a plethora of cases in support of the proposition that arraignment of the accused in
People vs. Pineda

the previous case is a condition sine qua non for double jeopardy to attach (at page 13: People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People vs. Consulta, 70 SCRA 277; Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216; People vs. Bocar, et al., 132 SCRA 166; Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 415) and echoed the requisites of legal jeopardy as announced in People vs. Bocar thus: Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. (at p. 193.) To be sure, Chief Justice Moran said in his treatise on the subject under consideration that: Where there is no former conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of a former case for the same offense, no jeopardy attaches. (Comments on the Rules of Court, by Moran, Vol. 4, 1980 Ed., p. 281) Of course, We are not unmindful of the erudite remarks of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his Remedial Law Compendium that: It would now appear that prior conviction or acquittal in the first case, as long as the accused had entered his plea therein is no longer required in order that the accused may move to quash a second prosecution for the same offense on the ground of double jeopardy. (Volume 2, 1988 Edition, page 323; 339) xxx xxx xxx Jeopardy attaches from the entry of his plea at the arraignment (People vs. City Court of Manila, et al., L-3642, April 27, 1983). (Vide page 327). The sentiments expressed in this regard by Our distinguished colleague which rest on the ruling of this Court inPeople vs. City Court of Manila, Branch XI (121 SCRA 637 [1983], cited by Regalado, Vide, at p. 339 to the effect that jeopardy would already attach when the accused enters his plea due to the obiter dictum of the ponente in that case, based on the following factual backdrop: The question presented in this case is whether a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered. xxx xxx xxx In the case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1971. The following day, October 18, an information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against private respondent driver of the truck. On the same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died. On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to one (1) month and one (1) day ofarresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence. On October 24, 1972, an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against private respondent. On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respondent, issued an order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy. where it was opined, thus: Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged [implying that there is no need to show previous conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of a similar or identical charge] with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. (Emphasis supplied.) From the conclusion thus reached, it would appear that one simply "charged" may claim possible jeopardy in another case. However, a closer study of the case adverted to reveals that the ponente may have overlooked the fact that the accused therein was not only charged, but he actually admitted his guilt to the charge of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and more importantly, he was convicted of such crime and commenced serving sentence. Verily, there was no occasion in said case to speak of jeopardy being properly invoked by a person simply charged with an offense if he is again charged for the same or identical offense. It may be observed that in City Court of Manila the accused therein pleaded on the first offense of which he was charged and subsequently convicted, unlike in the scenario at bar where private respondent entered her plea to the second offense. But the variance on this point is of no substantial worth because private respondent's plea to the second offense is, as aforesaid, legally incomplete to sustain her assertion of jeopardy for probable conviction of the same felony, absent as there is the previous conviction, acquittal, or termination
People vs. Pineda

without her express consent of the previous case for estafa, and it being plain and obvious that the charges did not arise from the same acts. In short, in order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the charge must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of the previous case without his express consent thereafter. (Tolentino vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 97 [1938]). Justice Oscar Herrera, in his book "Remedial Law" enumerates the elements constitutive of first jeopardy, to wit: 1. Court of competent jurisdiction; 2. Valid complaint or information; 3. Arraignment and a 4. Valid plea (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; 853) 5. The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Declaro, G.R. No. 64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142; See also People vs. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143; People vs. Gines, G.R. No. 83463, May 27, 1991, 197 SCRA 481; Que vs. Cosico, 177 SCRA 410 [1989]; Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54; Lamera vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186 [1991]). ( Herrera,Remedial Law, 1992 Ed., Volume 4, p. 417). Citing cases, both old and of recent vintage, Justice Herrera continues to submit the idea that: The first jeopardy is said to have validly terminated upon conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case or otherwise terminated without the express consent of defendant (People vs. Garcia, 30 SCRA 150; People vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77; People vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; Buscayno vs. Military Commission, 109 SCRA 273; People vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 319; Galman, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1987.) (Vide, at page 423). In People vs. Ledesma (73 SCRA 77 [1976]), Justice Martin declared in no uncertain terms: . . . In the case before Us, accused-appellee was charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 439 before a competent court under a valid information and was duly convicted as charged. He was therefore placed in legal jeopardy for the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 439 for having failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale of an Avegon radio in the amount of P230.00 to the offended party. . . . (at p. 81) The same observation was made by then Justice, later Chief Justice Aquino in People vs. Pilpa (79 SCRA 81 [1977]): In synthesis, there is former jeopardy when in the first case there was a valid complaint or information filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, he was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was terminated without his express consent (People vs. Consulta, L-41251, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 277; People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851, 853). (86) At any rate, and inasmuch as this Court has spoken quite recently in People vs. Asuncion, (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992), the ambiguity stirred by the imprecise observation in People vs. City Court of Manila, a 1983 case, can now be considered modified in that a prior conviction, or acquittal, or termination of the case without the express acquiescence of the accused is still required before the first jeopardy can be pleaded to abate a second prosecution. While We are at a loss as to the status of the progress of the estafa case on account of private respondent's apathy towards Our order for the parties herein to "MOVE IN THE PREMISES" (p. 125, Rollo) which information could substantially affect the results of this case, from all indications it appears that the estafa case has not yet been terminated. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Orders of respondent judge dated January 23, 1976 quashing the information for falsification, and March 23, 1976 denying the People's motion for reconsideration therefrom are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the information for falsification be reinstated and this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings and trial. No special pronouncement is made as to costs. SO ORDERED. Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur. Quiason, J., took no part.
People vs. Pineda

Gutierrez, Jr., J., on leave.
Separate Opinions
REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting: I concur in the result reached in the eloquently articulated and well researched ponencia of Mr. Justice Melo in that the assailed order of respondent judge quashing the information for falsification should be reversed and the case be remanded to the lower court for appropriate proceedings. I regret, however, that some of the reasons advanced for that conclusion do not square with my own views as I shall shortly explain. 1. First, on the concessible areas of concurrence. The majority holds that private respondent Consolacion Naval failed to seasonably raise the issue, and respondent judge correspondingly erred in declaring, that she was supposedly being prosecuted for falsification perpetrated to commit estafa. The specific contention of the accused that she was charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification, in connection with her submission on double jeopardy, was allegedly not raised in a motion to quash but only subsequently in a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the preceding motion, hence under the omnibus motion rule expressed in Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1964 Rules of Court that ground was waived and could not be made the basis for the quashal complained of. To be more accurate, however, the accused did raise in her basic motion to quash filed on October 28, 1975 in Criminal Case No. 15796, not with the desirable explicitness required by the rules on pleadings but acceptable under a liberal application thereof, the issue of double jeopardy in this wise: 3. That accused is in jeopardy of being convicted for a similar offense that is pending in court. Attached to this motion is a zerox copy of the information in Criminal Case No. 15795, CFI, Rizal, which alleges the identical fact of giving alleged false testimony in the land registration proceedings that is alleged in the information before this Honorable Court. The defense of jeopardy is applicable not only to a situation where the accused has in fact been convicted but also to a situation 1 where he is in danger of being convicted for the same offense. At any rate, I would go a little farther, beyond that mere procedural lapse, especially since the main decision took recourse to that bar under the Rules prefaced by the assumption "in gratia argumenti that falsification was indeed necessary to commit estafa." During the deliberations in this case, I advanced the view that even under substantive law, specifically the provisions of and the jurisprudence on Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the offenses of which private respondent stands charged cannot be considered together as component offenses constitutive of a single complex crime. I am gratified that in the revised ponencia, the majority now shares my position. Private respondent was charged on the same day with estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 before Branch 19, and with falsification in Criminal Case No. 15796 before Branch 21, both of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. From the indictments in these two cases which are reproduced in the decision, the majority notes that "(t)he confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P130,850.00. About two years later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and that it was unencumbered. . . ." The foregoing allegations constitute the basis for the falsification charge for, as the information therein states, because of her aforesaid representations that "(s)he is the exclusive owner in fee simple" of the land and that she "does not know of any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, . . . the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein accused the true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free from all liens and encumbrances of any nature . . ." On the other hand, the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 alleges that on or about March 23, 1973, private respondent and one Anacleto Santos, "without informing said Edilberto V. Ilano, . . . executed and filed an Application for Registration over the same parcel of land among others, as a result of which the Presiding Judge of Branch XIII to which said case was assigned issued Original Certificate of Title No. 9332 in her name, . . ." and "sold more than one-half (1/2) of said parcel of land" to nine (9) other persons named therein.
People vs. Pineda
In his challenged order rendered on January 23, 1976 quashing the information in the falsification case (Criminal Case No. 15796), and with express reference to the "information for estafa . . . previously filed against the accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15795 assigned to Branch XIX of this Court," respondent judge arrived at the following conclusion: This Court, therefore, finds the contention of the accused that the crime of falsification charged in the present case and the estafa case pending in Branch XIX of this Court constitute the so-called complex crime. The falsification charge in the case at bar was the means for committing crime of estafa now pending in Branch XIX. In justice to the accused considering that if this case should not be dismissed she stands in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal act that she 3 allegedly committed, this court is constrained to grant the motion for reconsideration. I regret that I cannot follow the logic in the aforesaid disposition. The falsification charged in Criminal Case No-15796 was allegedly committed on August 17, 1971 with an application for land registration containing false statements. No private offended parties, other than Edilberto Ilano, were contemplated therein since no other sales of the land or portions thereof were alleged to have been effected. On the other hand, the estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 15795 was supposedly committed almost two (2) years later, on March 23, 1973, allegedly by the filing of another application for registration of parts of the same parcel of land, portions of which were thereafter sold to nine (9) other persons who would be the potential aggrieved parties. It is hard to conceive of how a falsification committed in 1971 which, at that time, had no probable or direct connection with the estafa committed in 1973, could be considered as the necessary means to commit the latter such that both could be considered a single complex crime. In this type of complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code known in Spanish law as a delito complejo, there must be a direct connection, both in point of time and intention, that the first felony committed by the offender was deliberately adopted by him as a necessary means to commit the other. That singularity of purpose, or unity of criminal intent, is the basis for penalizing both offenses with a single penalty, albeit in the maximum period of that for the graver offense, since this is the so-called case of formal or ideal plurality of crimes which is generated by a single criminal 4 resolution. Thus, in Regis vs. People, we stressed: . . . The statement in the appealed decision that there was only one intention to commit the falsification and the malversation of April 30 and May 2, 1931 is not supported by the facts of the case. They were committed on different dates sufficiently distant from each other (April 30 and May 2, 1931). It does not appear that when the malversation and the falsification were committed on April 30, it was already the intention of the appellant to commit also the falsification and the malversation of May 2, 1931, the same being necessary to justify the finding that, although they were committed on different dates, a single intention determined the commission of both. The acts being independent from each other and executed by different voluntary actions, each constitutes an independent offense. While the foregoing discussion may also apply to plurality of complex crimes committed on different dates, the rationale is the same. As already emphasized, there must be an evident nexus between the first and the second felonies, in that the first was resorted to precisely to ensure the commission and in anticipation of the second. Here, it defies sober analysis as to how the falsification in 1971 and the estafa in 1973 could be the component felonies of a single complex crime. On both procedural and substantive legal considerations, therefore, I hold that public respondent erred in quashing the information for falsification on the theory that, together with the estafa, a complex crime is involved, hence to charge private respondent in two separate criminal cases using each offense as the respective subject of each charge would put her in double jeopardy. Private respondent, under the factual milieu of this case, cannot be in double jeopardy. She is being charged with two separate and distinct crimes. On top of that, the thesis of the majority is that she even failed to duly raise the issue of a complex crime vis-a-vis the rule of double jeopardy in the manner which public respondent seized upon for the quashal of Criminal Case No. 15796. We could, therefore, stop here and write finis to the posturings of private respondent in this recourse, leaving the inquiry into the case on the merits to the court a quo. The majority, however, discourses on certain aspects of the doctrine of double jeopardy which, although obiter in light of the foregoing premises, warrants more than just the proverbial second look and on which I would like to make some respectful observations. 2. It is the postulation of the majority that "(t)he mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the accused." This would be correct if what had transpired was the mere filing of the two informations charging identical offenses, but what about the situation where the accused has already entered a plea to the first charge and is now confronted with a second charge for the same offense? To this, the majority ripostes that "in order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the charge must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of the previous case without his express consent thereafter." In fine, what the majority posits is that the doctrine of double jeopardy can be invoked only if there was a previous conviction, acquittal, or unconsented dismissal in the first case against the accused and he is now charged again with the same offense. Ergo, even if he was already arraigned on the first charge, or even if he was undergoing trial therein when the same offense is made the subject of a second charge, he cannot, for lack of a
5
People vs. Pineda

prior conviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal in the first charge, move to quash the second identical indictment on the ground of double jeopardy since putatively there is still no first jeopardy to speak of. This will necessitate an inquiry into and require clarification as to stage of or point in time in the criminal proceedings when an accused is considered as already in legal jeopardy or in danger of conviction either for the first or second time. Since our basic rules on double jeopardy are admittedly of American judicial origin, the rulings in that jurisdiction would be instructive. We find these annotations in Corpus Juris Secundum: The general rule established by the preponderance of judicial opinion and by the best considered cases is that, when a person has been placed on trial on a valid indictment or information before a court of competent jurisdiction, has been arraigned, and has pleaded, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn, he is in jeopardy, but that, until these things have been done, jeopardy does not 6 attach. xxx xxx xxx If jeopardy is considered to attach when the jury are sworn or when the first witness is heard, it is not ordinarily necessary that the prior trial shall have resulted in a valid judgment either of conviction or acquittal: it is sufficient if the prisoner was actually placed in jeopardy in that he was in danger of having a valid judgment pronounced as the result of the trial : it is not the verdict or judgment which places a prisoner in jeopardy. In those jurisdictions which follow the generally recognized rule, jeopardy attaches at the time the trial commences, and if the trial is to a jury, the trial commences when the jury are impaneled and sworn, and thus it is said that jeopardy attaches when the jury are impaneled and sworn. If the trial is to the court without a jury, it is well settled that, for the purpose of determining when the jeopardy attaches, the trial begins at the time of the commencement of the taking of testimony, that is, when the first witness is duly sworn, and, accordingly, in such a case, jeopardy begins after accused has been indicted, arraigned, and has pleaded, and the court has begun to hear the evidence, or the trial has begun to hear the evidence, or the trial has begun by the reading of the indictment to the court. In the application of these principles it is assumed that there has been a plea of not guilty, and that the 7 court has jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied) The doctrine above discussed to the effect that the accused is in legal jeopardy from the moment he enters a valid plea to the indictment is not terra incognita in our jurisdiction. As early as 1933, in applying Section 28 of the then Code of Criminal Procedure which was substantially incorporated in Section 9, Rule 117 of the 1964 Rules of Court (now Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure), this Court, with minor allowances for our procedural differences with criminal proceedings in American jurisdiction, substantially reiterated the above-quoted doctrines as a basic proposition of law. It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, a defendant in a criminal prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions: (1) In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the complaint or information. Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion that the appellee has been once in jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. . . . All that the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined." Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty . The mere calling of a witness would not add to the danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the process of being arrested, subjected to preliminary 8 investigation, arraigned and required to plead and stand trial. (Emphasis mine.) This is reiterated and clarified by a recognized authority who explains that legal jeopardy exists from the moment the accused has pleaded to the charge, and that the disposition of his case thereafter is merely the consequence of the former as to constitute a bar to another prosecution, thus: . . ., legal jeopardy does not exist and a plea to that effect is not accordingly available but under the following conditions : (a) upon a valid complaint or informations: (b) before a court of competent jurisdictions: and (c) after he has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. When all of these conditions are shown to exist, the subsequent acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res adjudicata and, therefore, a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense 9 which necessarily includes or is included therein. In other words, the concurrence of the three conditions above enumerated having placed the accused in legal jeopardy, he can invoke the ground in Section 3(h) of the present Rule 117; and after judgment has been rendered therein, the ground for quashal is furnished by Section 7 of the same rule which speaks of previousconviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal. Parenthetically, the overriding significance of a plea is underscored when we recall that after a plea has been entered, there can be no amendment in substance of the information or complaint, but only in form and this by leave
People vs. Pineda

and at the discretion of the court if it can be done without prejudice to the accused. 11 judgment without a valid standing plea to the charge.
10
And, of course, it is fundamental that there can be no valid
It is regrettable that the role of a plea entered to an indictment appears to have been denigrated in our decisional rulings on double jeopardy. While in almost all cases decided by the Court double jeopardy was sustained because of a previous conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case without the consent of the accused, these were so because the facts thereof really made out in each a case of autrefois aquit or autrefois convict. In addition, with the specific provision of then Section 9 (now Section 7) of Rule 117 providing for the requirements, and under the heading of "Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy" (now rephrased as such epigraph reading "Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy."), the impression created was that the doctrine of double jeopardy can be invoked only if there was prior conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case involving the same offense of which the accused is charged again. The writer respectfully submits otherwise. It has long been my position that the issue of double jeopardy arises in three different ways, that is, when: (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, in one of which he has validly pleaded; (b) The accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he has been previously convicted or acquitted thereof or the charge therefor had been dismissed without his consent; or (c) the prosecution makes a legally unauthorized appeal from a judgment in the same case. The first instance is contemplated in then Section 2 (now Section 3), paragraph (h), Rule 117; the second is covered by Section 7 of the same Rule; and the third is governed by Section 2, Rule 122. That the first and the third instances are rarely involved in cases or found in our jurisprudential annals is to the credit of our prosecutorial agencies which, with respect to the first instance, can seldom be faulted with simultaneously or successively charging the same person twice with the same offense in separate cases and, regarding the third instance, of scrupulously avoiding the proscribed appeals. Evidently, this is not to be construed to mean, however, that only the second instance, or "former jeopardy," can be the basis of a motion to quash. Section 3 of Rule 117 provides the ground for a motion to quash and, just like the provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court, includes therein as paragraph "(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of beingconvicted or acquitted of the offense charged." Indisputably, the first part of this paragraph regarding previous conviction refers to the "former jeopardy" embraced in the present Section 7 of this Rule. Now, unless we are prepared to treat the second part therein as faulty drafting or linguistic surplusage, that second part referring to the accused as "in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged" necessarily presupposes that he has not yet been convicted or acquitted of an offense identical to that with which he is again indicted. Since double jeopardy requires, aside from the other requisites, at least two cases involving identity of offenses but wherein the accused is in legal jeopardy in at least one of them, this consequently envisages the situation where the accused, who has already entered a plea to the first charge but wherein no final adjudication has yet been rendered, is again charged with the same offense. It is, to paraphrase from the American expression quoted in the main opinion, a proper case of "litis pendentia in prison grey" and wherein quashal of the second case may accordingly be sought pursuant to said Rule. Spelled out to the point of elemental details, said paragraph (h) actually provides for two modes constitutive of separate grounds for quashal of a second indictment for the same offense. Recasting its provisions for greater clarity, the first mode allows quashal where the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the same offense with which he is again presently charged and in danger of a second conviction. This would correspond, in civil procedure, to res judicata as a ground for dismissal. The second mode stated in the same paragraph contemplates the situation where the accused is only in jeopardy or danger of being convicted in the first case, since no judgment or final order has yet been rendered therein, and he is now charged anew with the same offense. This is equivalent, in civil case, to litis pendentia or auter action pendant, likewise a ground for dismissal. Now, in criminal procedure, these two variant grounds are provided for in a single paragraph but definitely not as identical, but alternative and discrete, grounds although embraced in the same concept of double jeopardy. While the censorious would prefer a more felicitous term for the second mode, instead of also referring to it as double jeopardy, this is a matter properly addressed to the framers of the rule or law thereon. I can very well live with that term since, whether or not the liability of the accused has been adjudged or still awaiting adjudication in the first prosecution, what is sought to be avoided is his subjection to another danger or jeopardy or being again convicted and sentenced for an identical offense. Judicial proceedings and determinations should never be the victims of the tyranny of labels. What should control is the legislative intendment and the purpose to be subserved. If we were to be squeamish about terminology, we need merely note that improper venue is not a ground for a motion to quash. Its counterpart in criminal procedure is lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged, under Section 3(b) of Rule 117, since in 12 criminal cases venue is jurisdictional as the court has no jurisdiction to try an offense committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Yet, we still have to hear any strident objection to the practice equating both terms as virtually synonymous objections to the validity of a criminal prosecution. Coming back to my preceding disquisition on double jeopardy, I humbly submit that a view contrary thereto could be productive of mischievous, if not preposterous, results. While, as earlier observed, it is a little remote for the same authority to charge the same accused with two criminal suits involving the same offense, this is not an absolute improbability, as witness politically-motivated harassment prosecutions. It is also possible that duplicity of suits on identical offenses may be brought about by acts of different authorities in separate local jurisdictions. Thus, to illustrate, if forcible abduction is committed and commenced in Manila and the victim is taken to Tarlac and thence to Cagayan, being a continuing crime the criminal action therefor may be instituted in the proper court of any province in which the offense is continued. If, by error or
13
People vs. Pineda

design, three cases involving the same parties and offense are lodged in Manila, Tarlac and Cagayan, either categorized under the same offense of forcible abduction or with two of them dissembled as different offenses of arbitrary detention or grave coercion through the expedient of variations in the particulars of the indictment, we would have the not improbable scenario of the same accused enmeshed in three different criminal actions which actually involve the same offense. Where, thereafter, the accused upon arraignment pleaded not guilty in Manila, it would be a judicial travesty that for lack of a final disposition in said case he cannot be allowed to move to quash the other two pending cases on the ground of double jeopardy, in the hearing of which motion the identity of the offenses can be proved and the dismissal of the other two actions could accordingly be ordered. Again, since the majority insists that a final judgment in the first case is a sine qua non for a motion to quash the other two cases, if the accused was convicted in the first case and said conviction is brought on appeal where it may remain pending for years, what happens to the other two cases? Shall they instead be consolidated for trial with the inevitable inconvenience and expenses necessitated by transfer of venue and production of witnesses from a different vicinage, not to speak of the awkward and improbable situation of two of the same cases being each consolidated with itself and with the court having to resolve all? Shall they be allowed to proceed on independent trial utilizing the same evidence or shall the proceedings therein be indefinitely suspended to await the ultimate outcome of the first? The absurdity of having to be unnecessarily confronted with the aforesaid options is further underscored by the fact that howsoever the first case is disposed of, the other two cases would be barred by previous jeopardy under Section 7 of Rule 117, hence the independent proceedings that may have been conducted or the suspension thereof in those two cases would be completely pointless and unnecessary. Permitting the accused to move to quash the said two cases after he had pleaded to the first would have obviated the impasse created by requiring a prior final decision and spared him the vexation and expenses for fees and bail in the other two improvident prosecutions. ..........MISSING LINE.......... This is where Section 3(h) of the same rule could have been overlooked, misconstrued, or altogether ignored. One final word. The majority points out that it was obiter for the Court to rule in People vs. City Court of Manila, Branch XI that the accused therein was in double jeopardy because he had already been charged for the same offense, emphasizing that such imprecision of language would give the impression that one simply charged may claim possible jeopardy in another case. This writer is aware that the ponente therein committed an innocent oversight hence in my comment thereon, as quoted in the main decision, it was explained that this would be so as long as the accused had entered his plea therein. Aware that such statement in that case could further be, as it is now, blandly dismissed as obiter, I also made the qualification that my comment was as the doctrine "would now appear" based on the holding in said case. Yet, as a statement of a rule of procedure, I believe that, properly and completely expressed, the view of the ponente in that case was in the right direction on that score. Also, we have held that while an obiter dictum is generally not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule, it 15 may be followed if sufficiently persuasive. I make this observation since it may also be argued that the present discussion regarding the bases of my dissent would be orbiter if we hold that in the present case the issue of double jeopardy is not really involved since the private respondent is not being charged with a complex crime, the component felonies of which have been made subject of separate suits, but of two distinct and independent crimes. Nonetheless, as ultimate arbiters of the law, we cannot and we should not continue to cleave with obstinate tenacity or persist in citing with rote-like consistency clearly inapposite or inapplicable doctrines catalogued in works notable not for logical analysis but by their reliance on the numerical weight of cases decided on the bases of disparate factual situations, or by reason of a slavish obsession for footnotes. Perpetuating a misconception spawned by the inertia of cavalier reliance on supposed precedents is a disservice to the doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier stated, therefore, since my present dissent is on an issue which I believe this court should soonest clarify, on the considerations hereinbefore expressed. I categorically submit that where an accused has validly pleaded to the appropriate indictment sufficiently charging him with an offense in a court of competent jurisdiction, he can seek and obtain the quashal of a subsequent charge for the same offense on the ground of double jeopardy even before the final disposition of the first case. Narvasa, C.J. and Feliciano, J., concur.
14
# Separate Opinions REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:
People vs. Pineda

I concur in the result reached in the eloquently articulated and well researched ponencia of Mr. Justice Melo in that the assailed order of respondent judge quashing the information for falsification should be reversed and the case be remanded to the lower court for appropriate proceedings. I regret, however, that some of the reasons advanced for that conclusion do not square with my own views as I shall shortly explain. 1. First, on the concessible areas of concurrence. The majority holds that private respondent Consolacion Naval failed to seasonably raise the issue, and respondent judge correspondingly erred in declaring, that she was supposedly being prosecuted for falsification perpetrated to commit estafa. The specific contention of the accused that she was charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification, in connection with her submission on double jeopardy, was allegedly not raised in a motion to quash but only subsequently in a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the preceding motion, hence under the omnibus motion rule expressed in Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1964 Rules of Court that ground was waived and could not be made the basis for the quashal complained of. To be more accurate, however, the accused did raise in her basic motion to quash filed on October 28, 1975 in Criminal Case No. 15796, not with the desirable explicitness required by the rules on pleadings but acceptable under a liberal application thereof, the issue of double jeopardy in this wise: 3. That accused is in jeopardy of being convicted for a similar offense that is pending in court. Attached to this motion is a zerox copy of the information in Criminal Case No. 15795, CFI, Rizal, which alleges the identical fact of giving alleged false testimony in the land registration proceedings that is alleged in the information before this Honorable Court. The defense of jeopardy is applicable not only to a situation where the accused has in fact been convicted but also to a situation 1 where he is in danger of being convicted for the same offense. At any rate, I would go a little farther, beyond that mere procedural lapse, especially since the main decision took recourse to that bar under the Rules prefaced by the assumption "in gratia argumenti that falsification was indeed necessary to commit estafa." During the deliberations in this case, I advanced the view that even under substantive law, specifically the provisions of and the jurisprudence on Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the offenses of which private respondent stands charged cannot be considered together as component offenses constitutive of a single complex crime. I am gratified that in the revised ponencia, the majority now shares my position. Private respondent was charged on the same day with estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 before Branch 19, and with falsification in Criminal Case No. 15796 before Branch 21, both of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. From the indictments in these two cases which are reproduced in the decision, the majority notes that "(t)he confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P130,850.00. About two years later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and that it was unencumbered. . . ." The foregoing allegations constitute the basis for the falsification charge for, as the information therein states, because of her aforesaid representations that "(s)he is the exclusive owner in fee simple" of the land and that she "does not know of any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, . . . the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein accused the true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free from all liens and encumbrances of any nature . . ." On the other hand, the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 alleges that on or about March 23, 1973, private respondent and one Anacleto Santos, "without informing said Edilberto V. Ilano, . . . executed and filed an Application for Registration over the same parcel of land among others, as a result of which the Presiding Judge of Branch XIII to which said case was assigned issued Original Certificate of Title No. 9332 in her name, . . ." and "sold more than one-half (1/2) of said parcel of land" to nine (9) other persons named therein. In his challenged order rendered on January 23, 1976 quashing the information in the falsification case (Criminal Case No. 15796), and with express reference to the "information for estafa . . . previously filed against the accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15795 assigned to Branch XIX of this Court," respondent judge arrived at the following conclusion: This Court, therefore, finds the contention of the accused that the crime of falsification charged in the present case and the estafa case pending in Branch XIX of this Court constitute the so-called complex crime. The falsification charge in the case at bar was the means for committing crime of estafa now pending in Branch XIX. In justice to the accused considering that if this case should not be dismissed she stands in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal act that she 3 allegedly committed, this court is constrained to grant the motion for reconsideration. I regret that I cannot follow the logic in the aforesaid disposition. The falsification charged in Criminal Case No-15796 was allegedly committed on August 17, 1971 with an application for land registration containing false statements. No private offended parties, other than Edilberto Ilano, were contemplated therein since no other sales of the land or portions thereof were alleged to have been effected. On the other hand, the estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 15795 was supposedly committed almost two (2) years later, on March 23, 1973, allegedly by the filing of another application for registration of parts of the same parcel of land, portions of which were thereafter sold to nine (9) other persons who would be the potential aggrieved parties. It is hard to conceive of how a falsification committed in 1971 which, at that time, had no probable or direct connection with the estafa committed in 1973, could be considered as the necessary means to commit the latter such that both could be considered a single complex crime.
2
People vs. Pineda

In this type of complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code known in Spanish law as a delito complejo, there must be a direct connection, both in point of time and intention, that the first felony committed by the offender was deliberately adopted by him as a necessary means to commit the other. That singularity of purpose, or unity of criminal intent, is the basis for penalizing both offenses with a single penalty, albeit in the maximum period of that for the graver offense, since this is the so-called case of formal or ideal plurality of crimes which is generated by a single criminal 4 resolution. Thus, in Regis vs. People, we stressed: . . . The statement in the appealed decision that there was only one intention to commit the falsification and the malversation of April 30 and May 2, 1931 is not supported by the facts of the case. They were committed on different dates sufficiently distant from each other (April 30 and May 2, 1931). It does not appear that when the malversation and the falsification were committed on April 30, it was already the intention of the appellant to commit also the falsification and the malversation of May 2, 1931, the same being necessary to justify the finding that, although they were committed on different dates, a single intention determined the commission of both. The acts being independent from each other and executed by different voluntary actions, each constitutes an independent offense. While the foregoing discussion may also apply to plurality of complex crimes committed on different dates, the rationale is the same. As already emphasized, there must be an evident nexus between the first and the second felonies, in that the first was resorted to precisely to ensure the commission and in anticipation of the second. Here, it defies sober analysis as to how the falsification in 1971 and the estafa in 1973 could be the component felonies of a single complex crime. On both procedural and substantive legal considerations, therefore, I hold that public respondent erred in quashing the information for falsification on the theory that, together with the estafa, a complex crime is involved, hence to charge private respondent in two separate criminal cases using each offense as the respective subject of each charge would put her in double jeopardy. Private respondent, under the factual milieu of this case, cannot be in double jeopardy. She is being charged with two separate and distinct crimes. On top of that, the thesis of the majority is that she even failed to duly raise the issue of a complex crime vis-a-vis the rule of double jeopardy in the manner which public respondent seized upon for the quashal of Criminal Case No. 15796. We could, therefore, stop here and write finis to the posturings of private respondent in this recourse, leaving the inquiry into the case on the merits to the court a quo. The majority, however, discourses on certain aspects of the doctrine of double jeopardy which, although obiter in light of the foregoing premises, warrants more than just the proverbial second look and on which I would like to make some respectful observations. 2. It is the postulation of the majority that "(t)he mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the accused." This would be correct if what had transpired was the mere filing of the two informations charging identical offenses, but what about the situation where the accused has already entered a plea to the first charge and is now confronted with a second charge for the same offense? To this, the majority ripostes that "in order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the charge must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of the previous case without his express consent thereafter." In fine, what the majority posits is that the doctrine of double jeopardy can be invoked only if there was a previous conviction, acquittal, or unconsented dismissal in the first case against the accused and he is now charged again with the same offense. Ergo, even if he was already arraigned on the first charge, or even if he was undergoing trial therein when the same offense is made the subject of a second charge, he cannot, for lack of a prior conviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal in the first charge, move to quash the second identical indictment on the ground of double jeopardy since putatively there is still no first jeopardy to speak of. This will necessitate an inquiry into and require clarification as to stage of or point in time in the criminal proceedings when an accused is considered as already in legal jeopardy or in danger of conviction either for the first or second time. Since our basic rules on double jeopardy are admittedly of American judicial origin, the rulings in that jurisdiction would be instructive. We find these annotations in Corpus Juris Secundum: The general rule established by the preponderance of judicial opinion and by the best considered cases is that, when a person has been placed on trial on a valid indictment or information before a court of competent jurisdiction, has been arraigned, and has pleaded, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn, he is in jeopardy, but that, until these things have been done, jeopardy does not 6 attach. xxx xxx xxx If jeopardy is considered to attach when the jury are sworn or when the first witness is heard, it is not ordinarily necessary that the prior trial shall have resulted in a valid judgment either of conviction or acquittal: it is sufficient if the prisoner was actually placed in jeopardy in that he was in danger of having a valid judgment pronounced as the result of the trial: it is not the verdict or judgment which places a prisoner in jeopardy.
5
People vs. Pineda

In those jurisdictions which follow the generally recognized rule, jeopardy attaches at the time the trial commences, and if the trial is to a jury, the trial commences when the jury are impaneled and sworn, and thus it is said that jeopardy attaches when the jury are impaneled and sworn. If the trial is to the court without a jury, it is well settled that, for the purpose of determining when the jeopardy attaches, the trial begins at the time of the commencement of the taking of testimony, that is, when the first witness is duly sworn, and, accordingly, in such a case, jeopardy begins after accused has been indicted, arraigned, and has pleaded, and the court has begun to hear the evidence, or the trial has begun to hear the evidence, or the trial has begun by the reading of the indictment to the court. In the application of these principles it is assumed that there has been a plea of not guilty, and that the 7 court has jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied) The doctrine above discussed to the effect that the accused is in legal jeopardy from the moment he enters a valid plea to the indictment is not terra incognita in our jurisdiction. As early as 1933, in applying Section 28 of the then Code of Criminal Procedure which was substantially incorporated in Section 9, Rule 117 of the 1964 Rules of Court (now Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure), this Court, with minor allowances for our procedural differences with criminal proceedings in American jurisdiction, substantially reiterated the above-quoted doctrines as a basic proposition of law. It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, a defendant in a criminal prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions: (1) In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the complaint or information. Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion that the appellee has been once in jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. . . . All that the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined." Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not add to the danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the process of being arrested, subjected to preliminary 8 investigation, arraigned and required to plead and stand trial. (Emphasis mine.) This is reiterated and clarified by a recognized authority who explains that legal jeopardy exists from the moment the accused has pleaded to the charge, and that the disposition of his case thereafter is merely the consequence of the former as to constitute a bar to another prosecution, thus: . . ., legal jeopardy does not exist and a plea to that effect is not accordingly available but under the following conditions : (a) upon a valid complaint or informations: (b) before a court of competent jurisdictions: and (c) after he has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. When all of these conditions are shown to exist, the subsequent acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res adjudicata and, therefore, a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense 9 which necessarily includes or is included therein. In other words, the concurrence of the three conditions above enumerated having placed the accused in legal jeopardy, he can invoke the ground in Section 3(h) of the present Rule 117; and after judgment has been rendered therein, the ground for quashal is furnished by Section 7 of the same rule which speaks of previousconviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal. Parenthetically, the overriding significance of a plea is underscored when we recall that after a plea has been entered, there can be no amendment in substance of the information or complaint, but only in form and this by leave 10 and at the discretion of the court if it can be done without prejudice to the accused. And, of course, it is fundamental that there can be no valid 11 judgment without a valid standing plea to the charge. It is regrettable that the role of a plea entered to an indictment appears to have been denigrated in our decisional rulings on double jeopardy. While in almost all cases decided by the Court double jeopardy was sustained because of a previous conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case without the consent of the accused, these were so because the facts thereof really made out in each a case of autrefois aquit or autrefois convict. In addition, with the specific provision of then Section 9 (now Section 7) of Rule 117 providing for the requirements, and under the heading of "Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy" (now rephrased as such epigraph reading "Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy."), the impression created was that the doctrine of double jeopardy can be invoked only if there was prior conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case involving the same offense of which the accused is charged again. The writer respectfully submits otherwise. It has long been my position that the issue of double jeopardy arises in three different ways, that is, when: (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, in one of which he has validly pleaded; (b) The accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he has been previously convicted or acquitted thereof or the charge therefor had been dismissed without his consent; or (c) the prosecution makes a legally unauthorized appeal from a judgment in the same case. The first instance is contemplated in then Section 2 (now Section 3), paragraph (h), Rule 117; the second is covered by Section 7 of the same Rule; and the third is governed by Section 2, Rule 122. That the first and the third instances are rarely involved in cases or found in our jurisprudential annals is to the credit of our prosecutorial agencies which, with respect to the first instance, can seldom be faulted with simultaneously or successively charging the same person twice with the same offense in separate cases and, regarding the third instance, of scrupulously avoiding the proscribed appeals. Evidently, this is not to be construed to mean, however, that only the second instance, or "former jeopardy," can be the basis of a motion to quash.
People vs. Pineda

Section 3 of Rule 117 provides the ground for a motion to quash and, just like the provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court, includes therein as paragraph "(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of beingconvicted or acquitted of the offense charged." Indisputably, the first part of this paragraph regarding previous conviction refers to the "former jeopardy" embraced in the present Section 7 of this Rule. Now, unless we are prepared to treat the second part therein as faulty drafting or linguistic surplusage, that second part referring to the accused as "in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged" necessarily presupposes that he has not yet been convicted or acquitted of an offense identical to that with which he is again indicted. Since double jeopardy requires, aside from the other requisites, at least two cases involving identity of offenses but wherein the accused is in legal jeopardy in at least one of them, this consequently envisages the situation where the accused, who has already entered a plea to the first charge but wherein no final adjudication has yet been rendered, is again charged with the same offense. It is, to paraphrase from the American expression quoted in the main opinion, a proper case of "litis pendentia in prison grey" and wherein quashal of the second case may accordingly be sought pursuant to said Rule. Spelled out to the point of elemental details, said paragraph (h) actually provides for two modes constitutive of separate grounds for quashal of a second indictment for the same offense. Recasting its provisions for greater clarity, the first mode allows quashal where the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the same offense with which he is again presently charged and in danger of a second conviction. This would correspond, in civil procedure, to res judicata as a ground for dismissal. The second mode stated in the same paragraph contemplates the situation where the accused is only in jeopardy or danger of being convicted in the first case, since no judgment or final order has yet been rendered therein, and he is now charged anew with the same offense. This is equivalent, in civil case, to litis pendentia or auter action pendant, likewise a ground for dismissal. Now, in criminal procedure, these two variant grounds are provided for in a single paragraph but definitely not as identical, but alternative and discrete, grounds although embraced in the same concept of double jeopardy. While the censorious would prefer a more felicitous term for the second mode, instead of also referring to it as double jeopardy, this is a matter properly addressed to the framers of the rule or law thereon. I can very well live with that term since, whether or not the liability of the accused has been adjudged or still awaiting adjudication in the first prosecution, what is sought to be avoided is his subjection to another danger or jeopardy or being again convicted and sentenced for an identical offense. Judicial proceedings and determinations should never be the victims of the tyranny of labels. What should control is the legislative intendment and the purpose to be subserved. If we were to be squeamish about terminology, we need merely note that improper venue is not a ground for a motion to quash. Its counterpart in criminal procedure is lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged, under Section 3(b) of Rule 117, since in 12 criminal cases venue is jurisdictional as the court has no jurisdiction to try an offense committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Yet, we still have to hear any strident objection to the practice equating both terms as virtually synonymous objections to the validity of a criminal prosecution. Coming back to my preceding disquisition on double jeopardy, I humbly submit that a view contrary thereto could be productive of mischievous, if not preposterous, results. While, as earlier observed, it is a little remote for the same authority to charge the same accused with two criminal suits involving the same offense, this is not an absolute improbability, as witness politically-motivated harassment prosecutions. It is also possible that duplicity of suits on identical offenses may be brought about by acts of different authorities in separate local jurisdictions. Thus, to illustrate, if forcible abduction is committed and commenced in Manila and the victim is taken to Tarlac and thence to Cagayan, being a continuing crime the criminal action therefor may be instituted in the proper court of any province in which the offense is continued. If, by error or design, three cases involving the same parties and offense are lodged in Manila, Tarlac and Cagayan, either categorized under the same offense of forcible abduction or with two of them dissembled as different offenses of arbitrary detention or grave coercion through the expedient of variations in the particulars of the indictment, we would have the not improbable scenario of the same accused enmeshed in three different criminal actions which actually involve the same offense. Where, thereafter, the accused upon arraignment pleaded not guilty in Manila, it would be a judicial travesty that for lack of a final disposition in said case he cannot be allowed to move to quash the other two pending cases on the ground of double jeopardy, in the hearing of which motion the identity of the offenses can be proved and the dismissal of the other two actions could accordingly be ordered. Again, since the majority insists that a final judgment in the first case is a sine qua non for a motion to quash the other two cases, if the accused was convicted in the first case and said conviction is brought on appeal where it may remain pending for years, what happens to the other two cases? Shall they instead be consolidated for trial with the inevitable inconvenience and expenses necessitated by transfer of venue and production of witnesses from a different vicinage, not to speak of the awkward and improbable situation of two of the same cases being each consolidated with itself and with the court having to resolve all? Shall they be allowed to proceed on independent trial utilizing the same evidence or shall the proceedings therein be indefinitely suspended to await the ultimate outcome of the first? The absurdity of having to be unnecessarily confronted with the aforesaid options is further underscored by the fact that howsoever the first case is disposed of, the other two cases would be barred by previous jeopardy under Section 7 of Rule 117, hence the independent proceedings that may have been conducted or the suspension thereof in those two cases would be completely pointless and unnecessary. Permitting the accused to move to quash the said two cases after he had pleaded to the first would have obviated the impasse created by requiring a prior final decision and spared him the vexation and expenses for fees and bail in the other two improvident prosecutions.
13
People vs. Pineda

..........MISSING LINE.......... This is where Section 3(h) of the same rule could have been overlooked, misconstrued, or altogether ignored. One final word. The majority points out that it was obiter for the Court to rule in People vs. City Court of Manila, Branch XI that the accused therein was in double jeopardy because he had already been charged for the same offense, emphasizing that such imprecision of language would give the impression that one simply charged may claim possible jeopardy in another case. This writer is aware that the ponente therein committed an innocent oversight hence in my comment thereon, as quoted in the main decision, it was explained that this would be so as long as the accused had entered his plea therein. Aware that such statement in that case could further be, as it is now, blandly dismissed as obiter, I also made the qualification that my comment was as the doctrine "would now appear" based on the holding in said case. Yet, as a statement of a rule of procedure, I believe that, properly and completely expressed, the view of the ponente in that case was in the right direction on that score. Also, we have held that while an obiter dictum is generally not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule, it 15 may be followed if sufficiently persuasive. I make this observation since it may also be argued that the present discussion regarding the bases of my dissent would be orbiter if we hold that in the present case the issue of double jeopardy is not really involved since the private respondent is not being charged with a complex crime, the component felonies of which have been made subject of separate suits, but of two distinct and independent crimes. Nonetheless, as ultimate arbiters of the law, we cannot and we should not continue to cleave with obstinate tenacity or persist in citing with rote-like consistency clearly inapposite or inapplicable doctrines catalogued in works notable not for logical analysis but by their reliance on the numerical weight of cases decided on the bases of disparate factual situations, or by reason of a slavish obsession for footnotes. Perpetuating a misconception spawned by the inertia of cavalier reliance on supposed precedents is a disservice to the doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier stated, therefore, since my present dissent is on an issue which I believe this court should soonest clarify, on the considerations hereinbefore expressed. I categorically submit that where an accused has validly pleaded to the appropriate indictment sufficiently charging him with an offense in a court of competent jurisdiction, he can seek and obtain the quashal of a subsequent charge for the same offense on the ground of double jeopardy even before the final disposition of the first case.
14
People vs.Velasco
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127444. September 13, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and HONORATO GALVEZ, respondents. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: This case nudges the Court to revisit the doctrine on double jeopardy, a revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense. In this case, after trial on the merits, the accused was acquitted for insufficiency of the evidence against him in the cases for murder and frustrated murder (although his co-accused was convicted), and finding in the illegal carrying of firearm that the act charged did not constitute a violation of law. But the State through this petition for certiorari would want his acquittal reversed. We narrate a brief factual backdrop. The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila, was shattered by gunshots fired in rapid succession. The shooting claimed the life of young Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled through his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it remained until extracted by surgical procedure. As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide - were originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. On 14 December 1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the same accused upgrading the crimes to murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated murder (Crim. Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93). Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866 (Crim. Case No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be filed. After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. There the cases were stamped with new docket numbers (Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-55487, respectively), and raffled to Branch 103 presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar, Jr. In the course of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and the cases were reraffled to respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89. On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated. The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law. The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt. The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal culpability of private respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal by the trial court should not be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy, for it is now settled constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates [1] where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be overturned. Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from [2] American constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United States, and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional course. Petitioner in this regard urges the Court to take a second look at Kepner, it being the "cornerstone of the battlement of the Double Jeopardy [3] Clause" in the Philippines and seriously examine whether the precedents it established almost a century ago are still germane and useful today in [4] [5] view of certain modifications wrought on the doctrine by the succeeding American cases of United States v. Wilson and United States v. Scott.
People vs.Velasco
Two (2) threshold issues therefore, interlocked as they are, beg to be addressed. One is the propriety of certiorari as an extraordinary mode of review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the result actually intended is the reversal of the acquittal of private respondent Galvez. The other is the permissibility of a review by the Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy. The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of alleged assassins (not discounting too the earlier dismissal of respondent judge from the service) may arguably have rendered these matters moot and academic, thus calling for a dismissal of the petition on this basis alone. The Court however is not insensitive to nor oblivious of the paramount nature and object of the pleas forcefully presented by the Government considering especially the alleged new directions in American jurisprudence taken by the doctrine of double jeopardy. We are thus impelled to respond to the issues advanced by petitioner for these bear unquestionably far-reaching contextual significance and implications in Philippine juristic philosophy and experience, demanding no less, explicit and definitive rulings. For it may be argued from a historico-analytical perspective that perhaps none of the constitutionally ensconced rights of men has followed a more circuitous and tortuous route in the vast sea of jurisprudence than the right of a person not to be tried or prosecuted a second time for the same [6] offense. This prohibition does not consist merely of one rule but several, each rule applying to a different situation, each rule marooned in a sea of [7] exceptions. It must have been this unique transpiration that prompted even the redoubtable Mr. Justice Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court to [8] remark in Albernaz v. United States that "the decisional law (in the area of double jeopardy) is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." It is therefore necessary that, in forming a correct perspective and full understanding of the doctrine on double jeopardy and the rules so far established relative to the effect thereon of appeals of judgments of acquittal, a compendious review of its historical growth and development be undertaken. This approach is particularly helpful in properly situating and analyzing landmark interpretive applications of the doctrine in light of the varying legal and factual milieu under which it evolved. Jeopardy, itself "a fine poetic word," derives from the Latin "jocus" meaning joke, jest or game, and also from the French term "jeu perdre" [11] which denotes a game that one might lose. Similarly, the Middle English word "iuparti" or "jupartie" means an uncertain game. The genesis of the concept itself however rests deep in the ancient Grecian view of tragedy and suffering and in the old Roman legal concepts of punishment. Greek law bound prosecutor and judge to the original verdict as can be seen in the remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that "the laws forbid the same man to be [12] [13] tried twice on the same issue." The Justinian Digest providing that "(a) governor should not permit the same person to be again accused of crime [14] of which he has been acquitted," suggests certain philosophical underpinnings believed to have been influenced by works of the great Greek tragedians of the 5th century B.C. reflecting mans "tragic vision" or the tragic view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed that man was continuously pitted against a superior force that dictated his own destiny. But this prevailing view was not to be taken in the sense of man passing from one misfortune to another without relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities. Rather, it expressed a universal concept of catharsis or vindication that meant misfortune resolving itself into a final triumph, and persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice for the same misfortune was anathema to ancient thought. The 18th century B. C. Babylonian king and lawgiver Hammurabi recognized that humans could err in prosecuting and rendering judgment, thus limits were needed on prosecutors and judges. A gruesome but effective way of preventing a second trial by the same prosecutor after an acquittal can be found in the first law of the Hammurabic Code: "If a man has accused a man and has charged him with manslaughter and then has not proved [it [15] against him], his accuser shall be put to death." The repugnance to double trials strongly expressed by the Catholic Church is consistent with the interpretation by St. Jerome in 391 A. D. of the [16] promise by God to his people through the prophet Nahum that "(a)ffliction shall not rise up the second time" and "(t)hough I have afflicted thee, I [17] will afflict thee no more." Taken to mean that God does not punish twice for the same act, the maxim insinuated itself into canon law as early as 847 [18] A. D., succintly phrased as "(n)ot even God judges twice for the same act." The most famous cause clbre on double jeopardy in the Middle Ages was the dispute between the English King Henry II and his good friend, Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry wished to continue the observance of certain customs initiated by his predecessors called " avitae consuetudines," one of the known purposes of which was that clerics convicted of crimes before Church courts be delivered to lay tribunals for punishment. He asserted in the Constitutions of Clarendon that the clergy were also subject to the kings punishment. This was met with stinging criticism and stiff opposition by the Archbishop who believed that allowing this practice would expose the clergy to double jeopardy. The issue between the two erstwhile friends was never resolved and remained open-ended, for Thomas was later on mercilessly murdered in his cathedral, allegedly at [19] the instance of his king. It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally institutionalized "as a maxim of common law" based on the universal principles of reason, justice and conscience, about which the Roman Cicero commented: "Nor is it one thing at Rome and another at Athens, [21] one now and another in the future, but among all nations, it is the same." But even as early as the 15th century, the English courts already began to [22] use the term "jeopardy" in connection with the doctrine against multiple trials. Thereafter, the principle appeared in the writings of Hale (17th c.), [23] Lord Coke (17th c.) and Blackstone (18th c.). Lord Coke for instance described the protection afforded by the rule as a function of three (3) related [24] [25] common law pleas: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and pardon. In Vauxs Case, it was accepted as established that "the life of a man shall not be twice put in jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or convicted ofthe same offense is a good plea x x x x" Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a formal acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England that "(n)o man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution before any court having competent jurisdiction [26] of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime. The English dogma on double jeopardy, recognized as an indispensable requirement of a civilized criminal procedure, be came an integral part of the legal system of the English colonies in America. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, an early compilation of principles drawn from the statutes and common law of England, grandly proclaimed that "(n)o man shall be twise sentenced by Civill Justice for one and the same crime, offence or
[20] [9] [10]
People vs.Velasco
Trespasse" and that "(e)verie Action betweene partie and partie, and proceedings against delinquents in Criminall causes shall be briefly and destinctly [27] entered on the Rolles of every Court by the Recorder thereof." Ineluctably, this pronouncement became the springboard for the proposal of the First Congress of the United States that double jeopardy be included in the Bill of Rights. It acknowledged that the tradition against placing an individual twice in danger of a second prosecution for the same offense followed ancient precedents in English law and legislation derived from colonial experiences and necessities. Providing abundant grist for impassioned debate in the US Congress, the proposal was subsequently ratified as part of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. In 1817 the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed an appeal by the Stat e after an acquittal from perjury, declaring that: A writ of error, or appeal in the nature of a writ of error, will not lie for the State in such a case. It is a rule of common law that no one shall be brought twice into jeopardy for one and the same offense. Were it not for this salutary rule, one obnoxious to the government might be harassed and run down by repeated attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Because of this rule, a new trial cannot be granted in a criminal case where the defendant is [28] acquitted. A writ of error will lie for the defendant, but not against him. Verily, these concepts were founded upon that great fundamental rule of common law, "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa," in substance expressed in the Constitution of the United States as:"Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense, to be twice put into jeopardy of life or limb." It is in the spirit of this benign rule of the common law, embodied in the Federal Constitution - a spirit of liberty and justice, tempered with mercy - that, in several states of the Union, in criminal cases, a writ of error has been [29] denied to the State. The relationship between the prohibition against second jeopardy and the power to order a new trial following conviction or dismissal stirred a [30] no small amount of controversy in United States v. Gibert. There, Mr. Justice Story, on circuit, declared that "the court had no power to grant a new trial when the first trial had been duly had on a valid indictment before a court of competent jurisdiction." The opinion formulated was that the prohibition against double jeopardy applied equally whether the defendant had been acquitted or convicted. But it must be noted that even in those times, the power to grant a new trial in the most serious cases was already being exercised by many [31] American courts, the practice having been observed from an early date, in spite of provisions of law against double jeopardy. For this reason, the [32] [33] rule in Gibert was stoutly resisted. As if to taunt Gibert, the 1839 case of United States v. Keen declared that the constitutional provision did not [34] prohibit a new trial on defendants motion after a conviction. InHopt v. Utah, the defendant was retried three (3) times following reversals of his convictions. Then in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ball affirmed that the double jeopardy rule did not prevent a second trial when, on appeal, a conviction had been set aside. It declared that a defendant who procured on appeal a reversal of a judgment against him could be tried anew upon the same indictment or upon another indictment for the same offense of which he had been convicted. This principle of autrefois convict was [36] expanded nine (9) years later in Trono v. United States where the Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippines by holding that "since the plaintiffs in error had appealed their convictions of the lower offense in order to secure a reversal, there was no bar to convicting them of the higher offense in proceedings in the appellate court that were tantamount to a new trial." Mr. Justice Peckham, holding for the Court, concluded that "the better doctrine is that which does not limit the court or the jury upon a new trial, to a consideration of the question of guilt of the lower offense of which the accused was convicted on the first trial, but that the reversal of the judgment of conviction opens up the whole controversy and [37] acts upon the original judgment as if it had never been." It was ratiocinated that the result was justified not only on the theory that the accused had waived their right not to be retried but also on the ground that "the constitutional provision was really never intended to x x x cover the case of a judgment x x x which has been annulled at the request of the accused x x x x" It must be stressed though that Ball also principally ruled that it had long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendants jeopardy, and, even when not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. It is one of the elemental principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal, even though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous. In 1891 the United States Judiciary Act was passed providing that appeals or writs of error may be taken from the district court or from the existing circuit courts direct to the Supreme Court in any case that involved the construction of the Constitution. The following year an issue was raised [38] in United States v. Sanges on whether this Act conferred upon the government the right to sue out a writ of error in any criminal case. In that case, existing rules on double jeopardy took a significant turn when the United States Supreme Court observed that while English law was vague on the matter, it had been settled by overwhelming American authority that the State had no right to sue out a writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance with express statutes, whether that judgment was rendered upon a verdict of acquittal, or upon the determination by the court of a question of law. The Court noted that in a few states, decisions denying a writ of error to the State after a judgment for the defendant on a verdict of acquittal proceeded upon the ground that to grant it would be to put him twice in jeopardy, in violation of [39] the constitutional provision. Sanges therefore fixed the rule that absent explicit legislative authority, the United States Government had no right of appeal in criminal cases in case of an acquittal as it would expose the defendant twice to jeopardy. Notably, however, in 1892 the Attorneys General of the United States began to recommend the passage of legislation allowing the Government to appeal in criminal cases. Their primary objective was to resist the power of a single district judge (under the law then obtaining) by dismissing an indictment to defeat any criminal prosecution instituted by the Government. No action was taken on the proposal until 1906 when President Theodore Roosevelt in his annual message to the US Congress demanded the enactment of legislation on the matter. Consequently, on 2 March 1907 such [40]40 legislative authority was provided when the Criminal Appeals Act became a law Ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.40 permitting the United States to seek a writ of error from the Supreme Court from any decision dismissing all indictment on the basis of the "invalidity or construction of the statute upon [41] which the indictments is founded." The law narrowed the right to appeal by the Government to cases in which the ground of the District Courts decision was invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the charge was founded, and that a verdict in favor of the defendant based on evidence could not be set aside on appeal no matter how erroneous the legal theory upon which it may be based. For these purposes, it made no difference whether the verdict be the result of the jurys decision or that of the judge. In other words, Government could appeal from a decision
[35]
People vs.Velasco
dismissing an indictment or arresting judgment on the basis of the statutory invalidity or misconstruction of the pertinent criminal statute and from a [42] decision sustaining a special plea in bar, so long as the defendant would not be put in jeopardy. On 10 December 1898 the Philippine Islands was ceded by Spain to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which was ratified by the State Parties on 11 April 1899. The Islands was placed under military rule until the establishment of the Philippine Commission in 1902. On 23 April 1900 the military government issued General Order No. 58 which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure then in force by, among others, extending to the Islands the double jeopardy provision under the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. This was pursuant to the 7 April 1900 Instructions of President McKinley issued to the Philippine Commission headed by William Howard Taft. The Instructions read in part: x x x the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should be made to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law x x x and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar x x x x Upon every division and branch of the Government of the Philippines therefore must be imposed these inviolable rules: x x x that x x x no person shall be put twice in jeopardy [43] for the same offense x x x x" General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 which permitted an appeal by the government after acquittal. The Philippine Civil Government Act of 1 July 1902 of the U.S. Congress repealed the Act, adopted and restored the same principle in Gen. Order No. 58 as enunciated in the Fifth Amendment and in McKinleys Instructions by providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same criminal offense. It did not take long however for the meaning and significance of the doctrine held forth in McKinleys Instructions to be placed under severe test and scrutiny. In 1901 Mr. Thomas E. Kepner, a practicing lawyer in Manila, Philippines, was charged with embezzlement of funds (estafa). He was tried by a court of first instance, minus a jury, and was acquitted of the crime. The U.S. Government appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and judgment was reversed. Kepner was sentenced with imprisonment and suspended from public office or place of trust. Questioning his conviction before the US Supreme Court, Kepner argued that the appeal by the US government to the Philippine Supreme Court of his judgment of acquittal constituted double jeopardy construed in light of existing US jurisprudence. On the other hand, the Attorney General for the Philippines and the Solicitor General of the United States jointly contended that the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902 which included the prohibition against double jeopardy should be construed from the perspective of the system of laws prevailing in the Philippines prior to its cession to the United States. Under this system, the Audiencia (Supreme Court) could entertain an appeal of a judgment of acquittal since the proceedings before it were regarded not as a new trial but an extension of preliminary proceedings in the court of first instance. The entire proceedings constituted one continuous trial and the jeopardy that attached in the court of first instance did not terminate until final judgment had been rendered by [44] theAudiencia. Double jeopardy was described not only in the Spanish law Fuero Real as: After a man accused of any crime has been acquitted by the [45] court, no one can afterwards accuse him of the same offense (except in certain specified cases), but also in the Siete Partidas which provided that: If a man is acquitted by a valid judgment of any offense of which he has been accused, no other person can afterwards accuse him of the offense x x x x Under this system of law, a person was not regarded as jeopardized in the legal sense until there had been a final judgment in the court of last resort. The lower courts then were deemed examining courts, exercising preliminary jurisdiction only, and the accused was not finally convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed upon in the Audiencia or Supreme Court, whose judgment was subject to review by the Supreme Court in Madrid (Spain) for errors of law, with power to grant a new trial. The U.S. Supreme Court however threw out the Governments argument and held that the proceedings after acquittal had placed t he accused Kepner twice in jeopardy.It declared in no uncertain terms that the appeal of the judgment of conviction was in essence a trial de novo and that, whatever the Spanish tradition was, the purpose of Congress was to carry some at least of the essential principles of American constitutional jurisprudence to the Islands and to engraft them upon the law of these people newly subject to its jurisdiction. There was little question therefore that Kepner soldered into American jurisprudence the precedent that as to the defendant who had been acquitted by the verdict duly returned and received, the court could take no other action than to order his discharge. x x x (I)t is then the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a defective [46] indictment. The protection is not x x x against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried again for the same offense." This doctrine was echoed in United States v. Wills where the Court further clarified that jeopardy implies an exposure to a lawful conviction [48] for an offense of which a person has already been acquitted x x x x It was reiterated in 1957 in Green v. United States in which Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, professed that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense. Thus, under the Fifth Amendment, a verdict of acquittal was considered final, ending the accuseds jeopardy and that once a person has been acquitted of an offense, he cannot be prosecu ted again on the same charge. American jurisprudence on the effect of appealed acquittals on double jeopardy since then sailed on, following the main sea lanes charted by Kepner, but not without encountering perturbance along the way. For it may be mentioned, albeit en passant, that the case of Bartkus v. [49] Illinois did cause some amount of judicial soul-shaking in 1959 when it burst into the scene. Alfonse Bartkus was tried before a federal district court in Illinois and was later acquitted by the jury. Less than a year later, Bartkus was indicted this time by an Illinois grand jury on facts substantially identical to those of the federal charge and was subsequently convicted. His conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a close vote of 5 to 4, affirmed the conviction. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declared that the Fifth Amendments double jeopardy provision was inapplicable to states so that an acquittal of a federal indictment was no bar to a prosecution by a state based on the same charge. Since there was no proof offered to show that the participation of the federal authorities in the Illinois state prosecution was of such nature as to render the state proceedings a mere cover for a federal prosecution to render the state indictment essentially a constitutionally prohibited second prosecution, no double jeopardy attached.
[47]
People vs.Velasco
Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas, with Mr. Justice Brennan writing a separate dissenting opinion. Black rued that the Courts ruling by a majority of one only resulted in "further limiting the already weakened constitutiona l guarantees against [50] double prosecution," citing the earlier case of United States v. Lanza, where the Court allowed the federal conviction and punishment of a man previously convicted and punished for identical acts by a state court. The dissent called attention to the fact that in Bartkus, for the first time in its history, the Court allowed the state conviction of a defendant already acquitted of the same offense in the federal court. This, Mr. Justice Black [51] asserted, was unacceptable, for as the Court previously found in Palko v. Connecticut, "double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit of our free country that they violate even the prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment since some of the privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights . . . have been taken over and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by process of absorption x x x x One may infer, from the fewness of the cases, that retrials after acquittal have been considered particularly obnoxious, worse even, in the eyes of many, than retrials after conviction." Whether such forceful pronouncements steered back into course meandering views on double jeopardy is open to question. Nonetheless, the [52] case of Fong Foo v. United States, decided per curiam, reaffirmed the pronouncements in Ball and Kepner that "the verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed x x x without putting (the petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution." In the meantime, from 1907 up to 1970 the Criminal Appeals Act underwent significant alterations. The 1942 amendment of its Section 682 permitted for the first time appeals to the circuit appeals court from orders sustaining demurrer to indictment in cases not directly appealable to the [53] Supreme Court. However, due to the many modifications the law was subjected to, construction and interpretation became more laborious, effectively transforming appeals into highly technical procedures. As such, the Criminal Appeals Act developed into a judicial bete noire, for even the [54] U.S. Supreme Court itself had "to struggle in a number of occasions with the vagaries of the said Act ." In one of those unhappy efforts, it concluded [55] that the Act was "a failure x x x a most unruly child that has not improved with age." The U.S. Congress finally got rid of the dismal statute in 1970 and replaced it with a new Criminal Appeals Act intended to broaden the right of Government to appeal whenever the Constitution would permit. It was apparent that the legislative body left to the courts the prerogative to draw the constitutional limits of double jeopardy rather than define them itself. Since then, pronouncements by the courts on the jouble jeopardy guarantee of the Fifth Amendment focused on three (3) related protections: against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; against a second [56] prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and, against multiple punishments for the same offense. In Wilson, the Court expressed that the interests underlying these three (3) protections are quite similar. Thus, when a defendant has been once convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he be not subjected to the possibility of further [58] punishment by being tried or sentenced for the same offense. And when a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found [59] guilty." It can thus be inferred from these cases that the policy of avoiding multiple trials has been considered paramount so that exceptions to the rule have been permitted only in few instances and under rigid conditions. Accordingly, in United States v. Scott the US Supreme Court synthesized two (2) venerable principles of double jeopardy jurisprudence: first, the successful appeal of a judgment of conviction on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge; andsecond, a judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a [61] reversal. It would seem that the conditionality of when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal was attached thereto because ordinarily, the procedure obtaining was that if on appeal a judgment of acquittal is reversed, i. e., a finding is had against the defendant, a remand of the case for another trial may be allowed if needed. At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve determination of evidence, such as when the judge: (a) issues a post-verdict acquittal, i.e., acquits the defendant on a matter of law after a verdict of guilty has been entered by a trier of facts (a jury); (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other than insufficiency of evidence, as when the statute upon which the indictment was based is defective; (c) conducts a judicial process that is defective or flawed in some fundamental respect, such as incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct; (d) issues an order arresting judgment, i.e., an act of a trial judge refusing to enter judgment on the verdict because of an error appearing on the face of the record that rendered [62] the judgment; or, (e) pronounces judgment on a special plea in bar (a non obstante plea) - one that does not relate to the guilt or innocence of the [63] defendant, but which is set up as a special defense relating to an outside matter but which may have been connected with the case. Interestingly, the common feature of these instances of dismissal is that they all bear on questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of evidence. Its logical effect in American law is to render appeals therefrom non-repugnant to the Double Jeopardy Clause. This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are allowed under American rules of procedure does not obtain in the Philippines. To be sure, United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. Mr. Justice Rehnquist explained that what may seem superficially to be a "disparity in the rules governing a defendants liab ility to be tried again" refers to the underlying purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong Foo illustrate, the law attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal however mistaken x x x would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that even though innocent he may be found guilty. x x x x On the other hand, to require a criminal defendant to stand trial again after he has successfully invoked the statutory right of appeal to upset his first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the x x x Clause was intended to protect."
[60] [57]
People vs.Velasco
In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy, petitioner insists that Wilson and Scott have unquestionably altered the seascape of double jeopardy previously navigated by Kepner and Ball. Using as its flagship the pronouncement in Wilson that appeals of acquittal are possible provided the accused will not be subjected to a second trial, it argues that this should apply to the case at bar because, anyway, a review of the acquittal of private respondent Honorato Galvez will not result in another trial inasmuch as the Court will only have to examine the evidence adduced below to pass final judgment on the culpability of the accused. Petitioners own hermeneutic sense of the phrase "another trial" is that which solely adverts to a proceeding before a competent trial court that rehears the case and receives evidence anew to establish the facts after the case has been finally disposed of by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it adheres to the Holmesian hypothesis inKepner and, for that matter, the concept under Spanish law then applicable in the Philippines before the American colonization, that a trial consists of one whole continuing process from reception of evidence by a trier of facts up to its final disposition by the Supreme Court. But petitioner conveniently forgets that this theory has been consistently spurned by both American and Philippine jurisprudence that has faithfully adhered to the doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench trial is, quintessentially, a new trial. In Kepner, the Court regarded the two (2) events, i. e., trial by the lower court and the appellate proceedings, as equivalent [64] to two (2) separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of multiple prosecutions. Although Kepnertechnically involved only one proceeding, the Court deemed the second factfinding, that is, the review by the appellate court, as the equivalent of a second [65] trial. Accordingly, in subsequent cases, the Court has treated the Kepner principle as being addressed to the evil of successive trials. No less than the case of Wilson, petitioners main anchor for its propositions, affirms this rule. There, the Court emphasized that it has, up to the present, rejected the theory espoused by the dissenting Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner that " a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the cause." It declared unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view that the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the Government to appeal after a verdict of acquittal." Wilson therefore pronounced that if acquittal is declared on the basis of evidence adduced, double jeopardy attaches for that particular cause. To explain further, Wilson involved an appeal by Government of a post-verdict ruling of law issued by the trial judge resulting in the acquittal of the defendant due to pre-indictment delay (a delay between the offense and the indictment prejudiced the defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been entered by the jury. But it was not an acquittal that involved factual resolution. It was one anchored on an extraneous cause. Factual resolution [67] is defined in United States v. Sorenson following the rulings in Ball, Fong Foo and Sisson as the finding that government failed to prove all the elements of the offense. It is clear therefore that the acquittal of Wilson, not being based on evidence, could be appealed. The rule therefore fixed in Wilson is that where a judge holds for the defendant on a ruling of law, and not on the basis of evidence, after a jury entered a verdict of guilty, the [68] prosecution may appeal the acquittal without violating double jeopardy, as this is allowed under the pertinent law. This is so since no second trial [69] will ensue, as a reversal on appeal would merely reinstate the jurys verdict. And if the prosecution is upheld, the case simply goes back to the trial court for disposition of the remaining matters. It bears emphasis that in Wilson, no double jeopardy problem was presented because the appellate court, upon reviewing the asserted legal errors of the trial judge, could simply order the jurys guilty verdict reinstated, no new factf inding would be [70] necessary, and the defendant would not be put twice in jeopardy. The case of Scott, also considerably relied upon by petitioner, involved an accused who, having been indicted for several offenses, himself moved for the dismissal of two (2) counts of the charges on the ground that his defense was prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. The trial judge granted the motion. Government appealed the dismissals but the appellate court rejected the appeal on the basis of double jeopardy. This time the US Supreme Court reversed, holding that "(w)here a defendant himself seeks to avoid his trial prior to its conclusion by a motion for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended by a second prosecution. Such a motion by the defendant is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forego his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined by the first trier of facts." The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once discernible. The dismissal of the charges against private respondent Galvez was not upon his own instance; neither did he seek to avoid trial, as it was in Scott, to be considered as having waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent. Here, trial on the merits was held during which both government and accused had their respective day in court. We are therefore insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioners concept of "another trial" because, as discussed above, it disregards the contextual interpretation of the term in light of the legal and factual morphology of the double jeopardy principle obtaining in Wilson and Scott. To sum up, in the cause before us, the records show that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the evidence presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case. Thus, to the extent that the post-verdict acquittal in Wilson was based on a ruling of law and not on a resolution of facts, Wilson is not, to reiterate, pertinent to nor persuasive in the case at bar. The same observation holds true for Scott. That it was the defendant who secured the dismissal of the charges against him without any submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, but on a ground totally outside evidentiary considerations, i.e., pre-indictment delay, definitely forecloses the applicability, if not relevance, of Scott to the instant case. Wilson, Scott and all other pertinent American case law considered, it still behooves us to examine if at this time there is need to rethink our juristic philosophy on double jeopardy vis--vis acquittals. In this respect, it would be instructive to see how Philippine law and jurisprudence have behaved since Kepner. Has the principle since then beneficially evolved, or has it remained an "unruly child that has not improved with age?" The moorings of double jeopardy in the Philippines, as Mr. Justice Manuel Moran observed in People v. Tarok, are not indigenous but are a matter of constitutional or statutory history. Enunciated in the Constitution of the United States, from there it found its way into this country, first, in the Philippine Bill of 1902, then in the Jones Law of 1916, and finally, in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Being thus a mere recognition of the maxim of the common law, and adopted from the Constitution of the United States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in this jurisdiction the same line of development - no narrower nor wider - as in the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
[71] [66]
People vs.Velasco
While some reservations may be had about the contemporary validity of this observation considering the variety of offsprings begotten, at least in the United States, by the mother rule since then, perhaps it is safer to say that not much deviation has occurred from the general rule laid out in Kepner. For Kepner may be said to have been the lighthouse for the floundering issues on the effect of acquittals on jeopardy as they sail safely [72] [73] [74] [75] home. The cases of People v. Bringas, People v. Hernandez, People v. Montemayor, City Fiscal of Cebu v. Kintanar, Republic v. Court of [76] [77] Appeals, and Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme, to name a few, are illustrative. Certainly, the reason behind this has not been due to a stubborn refusal or reluctance to keep up with the Joneses, in a manner of speaking, but to maintain fidelity to the principle carefully nurtured by our Constitution, [78] statutes and jurisprudence. As early as Julia v. Sotto the Court warned that without this safeguard against double jeopardy secured in favor of the accused, his fortune, safety and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness who might repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure. The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The discussions by the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 on the effect on double jeopardy of an appeal from a judgment of acquittal are enlightening. Foreclosing appeal on a judgment of acquittal was recognized by the Convention and the proposal to make an appeal from acquittal permissible even only "on questions of law provided that a verdict in favor of the defendant shall not be set aside by reason thereof" was strongly voted down. Thus MR. GULLAS: Dear Colleagues x x x x I wish to summarize our points. The amendment is commendable, but we submit that the reason against far outweighs the reason in favor of it. In the first place, it would tend to multiplicity of suits and thus increase the burden of the Supreme Court. Second, suits will be expensive if we meet fiscals who have an exaggerated opinion of themselves, who have more ego than gray matter or more amor propio. In the third place, as has been stated by a certain Gentleman, the provision would convert the Supreme Court into a sort of academy of consulting body. In the fourth place, as pointed out by Mr. Sevilla, fights in the Supreme Court would be one-sided.In the fifth place, as demonstrated by Delegate Labrador, the matter should be procedural rather than constitutional. And lastly, as explained by Delegate Singson Encarnacion, should the Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the lower court, the defendant would suffer morally for the rest of his life. He would walk around under a veil of humiliation, carrying with him a stigma. For all these reasons, Mr. President, we oppose the amendment. PRESIDENT: We can vote on the amendment. (Various delegates: YES). Those who are in favor of the amendment please say YES. (A minority: YES). Those against the amendment say NO. (A majority: NO). The amendment is rejected x x x x (1934 Constitutional Convention Record, Journal No. 95, November 24, 1934, p. 361) The case of People v. Bringas was the first case to be decided under this Constitution pertinent to the matter at hand. There the Supreme [80] Court, guided by Kepner, cited its finding in United States v. Tam Yung Way against the right of appeal by the government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a criminal case after he has been brought to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the merits or whether his discharge was based upon the trial courts conclusion of law that the trial had failed for some reason to establish his guilt as charged. The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 22, Art. IV thereof, reproduced verbatim the same double jeopardy provision of the 1935 Constitution. So did the 1987 Freedom Constitution drafted by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Noteworthy is that during the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission attempts were made to introduce into the Fundamental Law the right of government to appeal verdicts of acquittal promulgated by trial courts. The proposed text for Sec. 14, Art. VIII, on the Judicial Department read as follows Sec. 12. - x x x x An appeal by the State and/or offended party from a judgment of acquittal may be allowed in the discretion of the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that it is manifestly against the evidence with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of [81] jurisdiction. This proposal was strongly opposed, the controlling consideration as expressed by Commissioner Rustico de los Reyes being the "inequality of the parties in power, situation and advantage in criminal cases where the government, with its unlimited resources, trained detectives, willing officers and counsel learned in the law, stands arrayed against a defendant unfamiliar with the practice of the courts, unacquainted with their officers or attorneys, often without means and frequently too terrified to make a defense, if he had one, while his character and his life, liberty or property rested upon the [82] result of the trial." Commissioner Joaquin Bernas likewise articulated his fear that we could be subjecting an accused individual t o a very serious danger of harassment from a prosecutor x x x x The harm, however, which will follow from waving this flag of possibility of appeal x x x could be much more than [83] [84] letting a guilty person go." Put to a vote, the proposal was defeated. Then again, during the debates on double jeopardy under Sec. 23, Art. III, on the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla reopened the matter already settled at the deliberations on the article on the Judiciary. The following exchanges ensued: MR. PADILLA. x x x On Section 23, on double jeopardy, there was Davide resolution which allowed an appeal in a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case that states: An acquittal by a trial court is, however, appealable provided that in such event, the accused shall not be detained or put up bail. This has been deleted by the Commission x x x x
[79]
People vs.Velasco
FR. BERNAS. Yes. MR. PADILLA. I recall that when this same idea, but in different phraseology, was presented and approved by the Committee on the Judiciary, the great objection was that it would violate the immunity against double jeopardy. But I recall, the sponsor admitted, after I had explained the day before, that it did not violate double jeopardy but it was unnecessary and harmful. What is the real position, Mr. Presiding Officer? Is it in violation of double jeopardy or is it just because it need not be stated in the Bill of Rights nor in the Article on the Judiciary? FR. BERNAS: I explained my position on that, Mr. Presiding Officer, when we considered the matter in the Article on the Judiciary. The position I took was that it was not a departure from existing jurisprudence. In fact, it was more strict than existing jurisprudence in that it required not just abuse of discretion but it also required that the judgment be clearly against the evidence. MR. PADILLA. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer, because we want to make the exercise of that right by the state or offended party restrictive not only through a petition for review on certiorari in the discretion of the Supreme Court which may dismiss it outright, but also on certain grounds that are really covered by "in excess or lack of jurisdiction." But my common impression, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that most lawyers are of the opinion that when a judgment of acquittal is rendered by a trial court, that is final, executory and not appealable. Does not the sponsor think, Mr. Presiding Officer, an appeal from an arbitrary judgment of acquittal rendered by a few corrupt judges of the offended party or the state will improve the administration of justice? FR. BERNAS. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have expressed my position on this when we voted on Third Reading on the Article on the Judiciary. But if the Commissioner wants to raise the matter for reconsideration, he can present a motion on the floor. Padilla did not ask for a reconsideration.
[85]
The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the effect thereon of acquittals adhere strictly to constitutional provisions. The pertinent portions of Sec. 7 of Rule 117 thereof provide Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or informationx x x x From this procedural prescription alone, there can be no mistaking the requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant [86] was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be [87] had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan. Condemning the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this Court minced no words in declaring that "[i]t is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process x x x x [T]he sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial, and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused x x x x Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian president to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal, such as that in the case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw. It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. 'To paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law; he invites every man to become a law unto himself; he invites anarchy. The contention of respondent-accused that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ended the case and could not be appealed or [88] reopened without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People v. Court of Appeals: x x x x That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Court's Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void x x x x Private respondents invoke 'justice for the innocent.' For justice to prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society which they have wronged, must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due.
People vs.Velasco
Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham [89] because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process. The Court in People v. [90] Bocar rationalized that the "remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of [91] the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy." The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous [92] watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x" Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he [93] may be found guilty." It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance [94] criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined [95] exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a j urys leniency, will [96] not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a [98] single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government [99] [100] oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal proc ess. Because the [101] innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. Petitioner resists the applicability of the finality-of-acquittal doctrine to the Philippine adjudicative process on the ground that the principle is endemic to the American justice system as it has specific application only to jury verdicts of acquittal, and thus finds no valid use in our jurisdiction since the underlying rationale of jury acquittals, a special feature of American constitutional law, has no parallel nor analogy in the Philippine legal system. This is a rather strained if not facile approach to the issue at hand, for it attempts to introduce the theory that insofar as the objective of factfinding is concerned, factfinding forming the core of the philosophy behind double jeopardy, there exists a difference between a jury acquittal and a judge acquittal, Philippine version. To support its contention, petitioner sedulously explains that in the United States there is an emerging consensus to differentiate the constitutional impact of jury verdicts of acquittal vis--vis judgments of acquittal rendered by the bench. While this consensus may have emerged in the United States, it is not difficult to surmise that it must have been so because of countless instances of conflict between jury verdicts and judgments of trial judges in the same case. Resultantly, procedural statutes and jurisprudence have been wont to draw lines of distinction between the two, hopefully to keep each other at bay. Since this phenomenon does not occur in our jurisdiction, as we have no juries to speak of, petitioners hypothesis is inappropriate. Be that as it may, the invalidity of petitioners argument lies in its focus on the instrumentality empowered to rule against the evidence, i.e., the American jury versus the Philippine judge, no matter how emphatic it qualifies its proposition with the phrase "underlying rationale of jury acquittals," rather than on the essential function of factfinding itself which consists of reception, sifting and evaluation of evidence. Where the main task of factfinding is concerned, there exists no difference between the American jury and the Philippine trial judge. Both are triers of facts. This much petitioner has to concede. The attempt therefore to close the door on the applicability of the finality rule to our legal system abjectly fails when one considers that, universally, the principal object of double jeopardy is the protection from being tried for the second time, whether by jury or judge. Thus, "emerging American consensus on jury acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations cannot be appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and bounds of double jeopardy having been clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue of the effect of an appeal of a verdict of acquittal upon a determination of the evidence on the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused against being twice placed in jeopardy should now be finally put to rest. Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as blatantly inconsistent with the material facts and evidence on record, reason enough to charge respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction resulting in a denial of due process. Citing People v. [102] Pablo, it alleges that "respondent aggravated his indiscretion by not x x x reviewing the evidence already presented for a proper assessment x x x x It is in completely ignoring the evidence already presented x x x that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion." It adds that "discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, i.e., after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright [103] arbitrariness." Private respondent remonstrates against the propriety of petitioners certiorari as a mode of impugning the judgment of acquittal not only as a strategy to camouflage the issue of double jeopardy but also for the fact that, contrary to petitioners assertions, evidence in the case at bar was subjected to scrutiny, review, assessment and evaluation by respondent trial judge. By reason thereof, there cannot be perceived grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to warrant issuance of the great writ ofcertiorari. We agree. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according to the essential requirements of the law. However, the original function and purpose of the writ have been so modified by
[97]
People vs.Velasco
statutes and judicial decisions. It is particularly so in the field of criminal law when the state is applying for the writ and problems arise concerning the right of the state to appeal in a criminal case. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant contends, in effect, that the prosecution is attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and that his constitutional rights are [104] being thus encroached upon. Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions are available as guides to the court in determining the standing of the prosecution to secure by certioraria review of a lower court decision in a criminal case which has favored the defendant. In most instances, provisions setting forth the scope and function of certiorari are found together with those relating to the right of the state to appeal or bring error in criminal matters. There is some indication that courts view the writ of certiorari as an appeal in itself where the applicant shows that there is no other adequate remedy [105] available, and it is not uncommon to find language in cases to the effect that the state should not be permitted to accomplish by certiorari what it [106] cannot do by appeal. Thus, if a judgment sought to be reviewed was one entered after an acquittal by a jury or the discharge of the accused on the merits by the trial court, the standing of the prosecution to review it by certiorari is far more likely to be denied than if it were such an order as one [107] sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing the indictment, or granting a motion for arrest of judgment after a verdict of guilty. Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence received at trial.These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis--vis the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writs limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
People vs. Sandiganbayan

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 164185, July 23, 2008] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) AND ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, RESPONDENTS. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: This petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor assails the May 20, 2004 Decision of the [2] Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal Case No. 27465, granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence and [3] acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code. The facts culled from the records are as follows: During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now deceased), a relative of Villapando's wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando [4] [5] designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan. A Contract of Consultancy dated February 8, 1999 was executed between the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan and Tiape whereby the former employed the services of Tiape as Municipal Administrative and Development Planning Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor for a period of six months from January 1, 1999 to June 30, 1999 for a monthly salary of P26,953.80. On February 4, 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code [6] before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the following [7] Information dated March 19, 2002 charging the two with violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the Sandiganbayan: xxxx That on or about 01 July 1998 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in San Vicente, Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, committing the crime herein charged, in relation to and taking advantage of his official functions, conspiring and confederating with accused Orlando M. Tiape, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously appoint ORLANDO M. TIAPE as a Municipal Administrator of San Vicente, Palawan, accused Alejandro A. Villapando knowing fully well that Orlando Tiape lacks the qualification as he is a losing mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte during the May 1998 elections, hence is ineligible for appointment to a public office within one year (1) from the date of the elections, to the damage and prejudice of the government and of public interest. CONTRARY TO LAW. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27465 and raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan. Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the case against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved [9] his death which occurred on July 26, 2000. After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied his motion but gave him five days within which to inform the court in writing whether he will nonetheless submit his Demurrer to Evidence for resolution without [10] [11] leave of court. Villapando then filed a Manifestation of Intent to File Demurrer to Evidence, and was given 15 days from receipt to file his [12] Demurrer to Evidence. He filed his Demurrer to Evidence on October 28, 2003. In a Decision dated May 20, 2004, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division found Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence meritorious, as follows: The Court found the "Demurrer to Evidence" impressed with merit. Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Article 244. Unlawful appointments.-Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. (underscoring supplied) A dissection of the above-cited provision [yields] the following elements, to wit: 1. 2. 3. the offender was a public officer; accused nominated or appointed a person to a public office; such person did not have the legal qualifications [therefor;] and,
[8] [1]

4. the offender knew that his nominee or appointee did not have the legal qualifications at the time he made the nomination or appointment.
Afore-cited elements are hereunder discussed. 1. 2. 3. Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime was committed. Accused appointed Orlando Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan. There appears to be a dispute. This Court is now called upon to determine whether Orlando Tiape, at the time of [his] designation as Municipal Administrator, was lacking in legal qualification. Stated differently, does "legal qualification" contemplate the one (1) year prohibition on appointment as provided for in Sec. 6, Art. IX-B of the Constitution and Sec. 94 (b) of the Local Government Code, mandating that a candidate who lost in any election shall not, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government? The Court answers in the negative. In ascertaining the legal qualifications of a particular appointee to a public office, "there must be a law providing for the qualifications of a person to be nominated or appointed" therein. To illuminate further, Justice Rodolfo Palattao succinctly discussed in his book that the qualification of a public officer to hold a particular position in the government is provided for by law, which may refer to educational attainment, civil service eligibility or experience: As the title suggests, the offender in this article is a public officer who nominates or appoints a person to a public office. The person nominated or appointed is not qualified and his lack of qualification is known to the party making the nomination or appointment. The qualification of a public officer to hold a particular position in the government is provided by law. The purpose of the law is to ensure that the person appointed is competent to perform the duties of the office, thereby promoting efficiency in rendering public service. The qualification to hold public office may refer to educational attainment, civil service eligibility or experience. For instance, for one to be appointed as judge, he must be a lawyer. So if the Judicial and Bar Council nominates a person for appointment as judge knowing him to be not a member of the Philippine Bar, such act constitutes a violation of the law under consideration. In this case, Orlando Tiape was allegedly appointed to the position of Municipal Administrator. As such, the law that provides for the legal qualification for the position of municipal administrator is Section 480, Article X of the Local Government Code, to wit: "Section 480. Qualifications, Terms, Powers and Duties.-(a) No person shall be appointed administrator unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local government unit concerned, of good moral character, a holder of a college degree preferably in public administration, law, or any other related course from a recognized college or university, and a first grade civil service eligible or its equivalent. He must have acquired experience in management and administration work for at least five (5) years in the case of the provincial or city administrator, and three (3) years in the case of the municipal administrator. xxx xxx xxx."
It is noteworthy to mention that the prosecution did not allege much less prove that Mayor Villapando's appointee, Orlando Tiape, lacked any of the qualifications imposed by law on the position of Municipal Administrator. Prosecution's argument rested on the assertion that since Tiape lost in the May 11, 1998 election, he necessarily lacked the required legal qualifications. It bears stressing that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with absence or lack of legal qualification. A person who possessed the required legal qualifications for a position may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand, one may not be temporarily disqualified for appointment, but could not be appointed as he lacked any or all of the required legal qualifications imposed by law. 4. Anent the last element, this Court deems it unnecessary to discuss the same. WHEREFORE, finding the "Demurrer to Evidence" filed by Mayor Villapando with merit, the same is hereby GRANTED. Mayor Villapando is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED.
[13]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, representing the People of the Philippines. Villapando was required by this Court to file his comment to the petition. Despite several notices, however, he failed to do so and in a [14] Resolution dated June 7, 2006, this Court informed him that he is deemed to have waived the filing of his comment and the case shall be resolved on the basis of the pleadings submitted by the petitioner. Petitioner raises the following issues: I. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN INTERPRETING THAT THE "LEGAL DISQUALIFICATION" IN ARTICLE 244 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT INCLUDE THE ONE YEAR PROHIBITION IMPOSED ON LOSING CANDIDATES AS ENUNCIATED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. II. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING DUE [15] COURSE TO, AND EVENTUALLY GRANTING, THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. Simply, the issue is whether or not the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which states no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991, for its part, states that except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it ruled that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of lack of legal qualification. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a position are provided by law and that it may well be that one who possesses the required legal qualification for a position may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one-year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the law. There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this interpretation. On the contrary, legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code simply means disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code states: Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public o ffice any person lacking the legal qualifications therefore, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. Section 94 of the Local Government Code provides: SECTION 94. Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials; Candidates Who Lost in Election. - (a) No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no elective or appointive local official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. Section 6, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution states: Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. Villapando's contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division's interpretation of the term legal disqualification lack cogency. Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be circumscribed lexically. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Although this Court held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan that once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion . Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and [17] hostility. In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated. Further, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied Villapando's Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence yet accommodated Villapando by giving him five days within which to inform it in writing whether he will submit his demurrer to evidence for resolution without leave of court. Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, cannot be [18] the source of an acquittal. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having acted with grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the basic rules of statutory construction resulting in its decision granting Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting the latter, we can do no less but declare its decision null and void. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal Case No. 27465, granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
[16]
Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case The petition seeks the review of the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident gr ounding the second prosecution. The Facts Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
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After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the 4 arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying 5 petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved. Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petit ioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion. The Ruling of the Trial Court In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeitur e of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without 6 reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his 7 appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction. Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner a rgues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty. Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to mainta in his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical i njuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property. In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel. The Issues Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional rig ht under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. The Ruling of the Court We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803 Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph 8 of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions. The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. 9 Esparas undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 10 of Rule 124. The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post -arraignment hearings. Under 11 Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bon d (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing. Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proc eedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition. Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
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The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, 14 post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the 15 [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." We find for petitioner. Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads: Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos. A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
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punible," unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. 17 Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes: The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of 18 crimes. (Emphasis supplied) This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.
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Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes. Quizon, rooted in Spanish law (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated, stands on solid conceptual 22 foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of 23 committing it x x x," has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not 24 merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-Offense The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, 25 undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly 26 and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. 27 28 Lutero (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People 29 30 v. Silva (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per 31 32 Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals (promulgated 33 in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
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The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with bo th charges grounded on the 34 same act, the Court explained: Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains 35 one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon. There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas 36 v. Estipona, decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency w ith the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. 37 At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano. There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of 38 Buan: Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. xxxx . . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second 39 accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona. It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention: Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular 40 collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap." (Emphasis supplied) Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the 41 Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva, a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People 42 v. Belga:

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: [T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: . The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence. In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x xx xxxx The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of 43 which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its 44 application." We declined the invitation, thus: The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap 45 v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959. (Emphasis supplied) Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light 46 felonies ); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime. In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous 47 recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to "complex" the single quasioffense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365? Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by 48 "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other 49 hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts. Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly 50 sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691, the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period. Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses. The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one 51 52 charge, regardless of their number or severity, penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose, we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows: [T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows: When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos. The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another 53 for the damage to property, x x x. (Emphasis supplied) By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365. Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1 A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) anoffense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that

offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code: The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x: *T+he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slig ht physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court. [W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the 54 appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense. (Emphasis supplied) Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use. Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall 55 be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy. Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED.
Salvador vs. Mapa

THIRD DIVISION
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, for and in behalf of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 135080
- versus -
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., RAFAEL A. SISON, ROLANDO M. ZOSA, CESAR C. ZALAMEA, BENJAMIN BAROT, CASIMIRO TANEDO, J.V. DE OCAMPO, ALICIA L. REYES, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR., BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, SR., FRANCIS B. BANES, ERNESTO M. CARINGAL, ROMEO V. JACINTO, and MANUEL D. TANGLAO, Respondents.
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Acting C.J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
November 28, 2007 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Salvador vs. Mapa
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee), through Atty. Orlando L. Salvador (Atty. Salvador), filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-96-2428, dismissing the criminal complaint against respondents on ground of prescription, and the July 27, 1998 Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[2] [1]
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, which reads:
WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest;
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that The right of the state to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel;
WHEREAS, there have been allegations of loans, guarantees, and other forms of financial accommodations granted, directly or indirectly, by government-owned and controlled bank or financial institutions, at the behest, command, or urging by previous government officials to the disadvantage and detriment of the Philippines government and the Filipino people;
ACCORDINGLY, an Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS is hereby created to be composed of the following:
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government - Chairman
The Solicitor General
- Vice-Chairman
Representative from the Office of the Executive Secretary - Member
Representative from the Department of Finance - Member
Salvador vs. Mapa

Representative from the Department of Justice - Member
Representative from the Development Bank of the Philippines - Member
Representative from the Philippine National Bank - Member
Representative from the Asset Privatization Trust - Member
Government Corporate Counsel
- Member
Representative from the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation - Member
The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:
1.
Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers, including the principal officers and stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for granting the loans or who influenced the grant thereof;
2.
Identify the borrowers who were granted friendly waivers, as well as the government officials who granted these waivers; determine the validity of these waivers;
3.
Determine the courses of action that the government should take to recover those loans, and to recommend appropriate actions to the Office of the President within sixty (60) days from the date hereof.
The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any department, bureau, office, agency, instrumentality or corporation [3] of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for such assistance as it may need in the discharge of its functions.
Salvador vs. Mapa
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee were subsequently expanded, viz.:
WHEREAS, among the underlying purposes for the creation of the Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans is to facilitate the collection and recovery of defaulted loans owing government-owned and controlled banking and/or financing institutions;
WHEREAS, this end may be better served by broadening the scope of the fact-finding mission of the Committee to include all non-performing loans which shall embrace behest and non-behest loans;
NOW THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the power vested in me by law, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. The Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans shall include in its investigation, inventory, and study, all nonperforming loans which shall embrace both behest and non-behest loans:
The following criteria may be utilized as a frame of reference in determining a behest loan:
1.
It is under-collateralized;
2.
The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
3.
Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes;
4.
Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies;
5.
Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
6.
Use of corporate layering;
7.
Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and
Salvador vs. Mapa

8. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that while both may involve civil liability for non[4] payment or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal liability.
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions, the Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted.
Specifically, the investigation revealed that in 1978, PEMI applied for a foreign currency loan and bank investment on its preferred shares with DBP. The loan application was approved on April 25, 1979 per Board Resolution (B/R) No. 1297, but the loan was never released because PEMI failed to comply with the conditions imposed by DBP. To accommodate PEMI, DBP subsequently adopted B/R No. 2315 dated June 1980, amending B/R No. 1297, authorizing the release of PEMIs foreign currency loan proceeds, and even increasing the same. Per B/R No. 95 dated October 16, 1980, PEMI was granted a foreign currency loan of $19,680,267.00 or P146,601,979.00, and it was released despite non-compliance with the conditions imposed by DBP. The Committee claimed that the loan had no sufficient collaterals and PEMI had no sufficient capital at that time because its acquired assets were only valued atP72,045,700.00, and its paid up capital was only P46,488,834.00.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents Placido I. Mapa, Jr., Rafael A. Sison; Rolando M. Zosa; Cesar C. Zalamea; Benjamin Barot, Casimiro Tanedo, J.V. de Ocampo, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr., Francis B. Banes, Ernesto M. Caringal, Romeo V. Jacinto, Manuel D. Tanglao and Alicia Ll. Reyes.
[5]
After considering the Committees allegation, the Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution,
[6]
dismissing the complaint. The
Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to proceed with the conduct of preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed the complaint holding that the offenses charged had already prescribed, viz.:
[W]hile apparently, PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the subject loans were entered into; the financial accommodations were undercollateralized at the time they were granted; the stockholders and officers of the borrower
Salvador vs. Mapa

corporation are identified cronies of then President Marcos; and the release of the said loans was made despite non-compliance by PEMI of the conditions attached therewith, which consequently give a semblance that the subject Foreign Currency Loans are indeed Behest Loans, the prosecution of the offenses charged cannot, at this point, prosper on grounds of prescription.
It bears to stress that Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as originally enacted, provides that the prescriptive period for violations of the said Act (R.A. 3019) is ten (10) years. Subsequently, BP 195, enacted on March 16, 1982, amended the period of prescription from ten (10) years to fifteen (15) years
Moreover as enunciated in [the] case of People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241, the computation of the prescriptive period of a crime violating a special law like R.A. 3019 is governed by Act No. 3326 which provides, thus:
xxxx
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of the judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Corollary thereto, the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12 Supp., 50, ruled that when there is nothing which was concealed or needed to be discovered because the entire series of transactions were by public instruments, the period of prescription commenced to run from the date the said instrument were executed.
th
The aforesaid principle was further elucidated in the cases of People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241, 1992, and People vs. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521, 1990, where the Supreme Court pronounced that when the transactions are contained in public documents and the execution thereof gave rise to unlawful acts, the violation of the law commences therefrom. Thus, the reckoning period for purposes of prescription shall begin to run from the time the public instruments came into existence.
In the case at bar, the subject financial accommodations were entered into by virtue of public documents (e.g., notarized contracts, board resolutions, approved letter-request) during the period of 1978 to 1981 and for purposes of computing the prescriptive period, the aforementioned principles in the Dinsay, Villalon and Sandiganbayan cases will apply. Records show that the complaint was referred and filed with this Office on October 4, 1996 or after the lapse of more than fifteen (15) years from the violation of the law. [Deductibly] therefore, the offenses charged had already prescribed or forever barred by Statute of Limitations.
It bears mention that the acts complained of were committed before the issuance of BP 195 on March 2, 1982. Hence, the prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as provided in the (sic) Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.
Salvador vs. Mapa

Equally important to stress is that the subject financial transactions between 1978 and 1981 transpired at the time when there was yet no Presidential Order or Directive naming, classifying or categorizing them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans.
To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing Wilensky V. Fields, Fla, 267 So 2dl, 5, held that an ex-post facto law is defined as a law which provides for infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which when it was [7] committed, was innocent.
Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully recommended that the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO RESOLVED.
[8]
The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it on July 27, 1998.
Hence, this petition positing these issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019 HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER FILED ITS COMPLAINT.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 61 ARE EX-POST FACTO LAW[S].
[9]
The Court shall deal first with the procedural issue.
Commenting on the petition, Tantoco, Reyes, Mapa, Zalamea and Caringal argued that the petition suffers from a procedural infirmity which warrants its dismissal. They claimed that the PCGG availed of the wrong remedy in elevating the case to this Court.
Salvador vs. Mapa
Indeed, what was filed before this Court is a petition captioned as Petition for Review on Certiorari. We have ruled, time and again, that a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper mode by which resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reviewed by this Court. The remedy from the adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, review on certiorari under Rule 45.
[10]
not a petition for
However, though captioned as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we will treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. The averments in the complaint, not thenomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of the action.
[11]
In previous rulings, we have treated differently labeled actions as

[12]
special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as justice, equity, and fair play.
Having resolved the procedural issue, we proceed to the merits of the case.
As the Committee puts it, the issues to be resolved are: (i) whether or not the offenses subject of its criminal complaint have prescribed, and (ii) whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.
The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,
[13]
thus:
[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the [14] day of such commission.
The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Desierto,
[15]
wherein the Court explained:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an [16] exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.
Salvador vs. Mapa
This is now a well-settled doctrine which the Court has applied in subsequent cases involving the PCGG and the Ombudsman.
[17]
Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the offenses, and since discovery could not have been made earlier thanOctober 8, 1992, the date when the Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 4, 1996.
Even the Ombudsman, in its Manifestation & Motion (In Lieu of Comment),
[18]
conceded that the prescriptive period commenced from the
date the Committee discovered the crime, and not from the date the loan documents were registered with the Register of Deeds. As a matter of fact, it requested that the record of the case be referred back to the Ombudsman for a proper evaluation of its merit.
Likewise, we cannot sustain the Ombudsmans declaration that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their issuance and which was innocent when done.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
[19]
Even this Court does not decide a question of constitutional
dimension, unless that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
[20]
Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada,
[21]
where the petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6770 in his motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans decision, we had occasion to st ate that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative and memorandum orders.
In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the
Salvador vs. Mapa

punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
[22]
This
Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
[23]
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
[24]
The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative
Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.
One final note. Respondents Mapa and Zalamea, in their respective comments, moved for the dismissal of the case against them. Mapa claims that he was granted transactional immunity from all PCGG-initiated cases, loans.
[26] [25]
while Zalamea denied participation in the approval of the subject
The arguments advanced by Mapa and Zalamea are matters of defense which should be raised in their respective counter-affidavits. Since
the Ombudsman erroneously dismissed the complai nt on ground of prescription, respondents respective defenses were never passed upon during the preliminary investigation. Thus, the complaint should be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation of its merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Office of Ombudsman in OMB-0-96-2428, are SET ASIDE. The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with dispatch an evaluation of the merits of the complaint against the herein respondents.
Salvador vs. Mapa

SO ORDERED.
Valeroso vs. People

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 164815 February 22, 2008
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor 1-a a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect. These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws. Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng bagong batas ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na kriminal. We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding petitioner liable for illegal possession of a firearm. The Facts On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Division, Central Police District Command, received a 2 3 4 dispatch order from the desk officer. The order directed him and three (3) other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Ignacio 5 Salvador against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with ransom. After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a 7 8 tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner. They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched 9 10 11 12 him. Found tucked in his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition. Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning.
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A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to petitioner but to a certain 14 15 Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila. Epifanio Deriquito, the records verifier, presented a certification to that effect signed by Edwin C. 16 Roque, chief records officer of the Firearms and Explosive Division. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended. The Information read: That on or about the 10 day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her custody and control One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing Serial No. 52315 with five (5) live ammo. without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities. CONTRARY TO LAW. Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996. (Sgd.)
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Valeroso vs. People

GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP 18 Assistant City Prosecutor With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner pleaded not guilty when arraigned on October 9, 1996. Trial on the merits ensued. SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the manner stated above. Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined testimonies of petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson. Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, 20 21 Quezon City. He was roused from his slumber when four (4) heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. They trained their guns at 22 23 him and pulled him out of the room. They then tied his hands and placed him near the faucet. The raiding team went back inside and searched and 24 25 ransacked the room. SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him. Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may 26 nakuha akong baril sa loob!" Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that "we are authorized to shoot you because theres a shoot to kill order against you, so if you are planning do 27 28 so something, do it right now." He was also told that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, he was not shown any proof when he 29 30 asked for it. Neither was the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant. According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The gun seized from him was duly licensed and covered by necessary permits. He was, however, unable to present the documentation relative to the firearm because it was confiscated by the police. Petitioner further 31 lamented that when he was incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services of a counsel. Neither was he allowed to see or talk to his family. Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. While still with the Narcotics Command, he turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-related investigation involving friends of the said police officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the 32 Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the head of the unit that conducted the search in his boarding house. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to petitioner a Memorandum Receipt dated July 1, 1993 covering the subject 34 35 firearm and its ammunition. This was upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature on the said receipt. Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was arrested, testified that on July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered 36 37 38 his room as he was preparing for school. They grabbed his shoulder and led him out. During all those times, a gun was poked at him. He was asked 39 where petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to petitioners room. Four (4) policemen then entered the room. He witnessed how they pointed a gun at petitioner, who was clad only in his underwear. He also 42 witnessed how they forcibly brought petitioner out of his room. While a policeman remained near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others 43 44 45 went back inside the room. They began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his locker, which yielded the subject firearm. RTC and CA Dispositions On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Let the same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of the PNP. SO ORDERED.
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Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998. He appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC disposition. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
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Valeroso vs. People

Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is modified to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum. WHEREFORE, with the foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the decision appealed from is herebyAFFIRMED in all other respects. SO ORDERED.
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His motion for reconsideration having been denied through a Resolution dated August 3, 2004, petitioner resorted to the present petition under Rule 45. Issues Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW IN SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT THE SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN NOT UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY AND VALIDITY SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS(SIC) IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH PROVES HIS INNOCENCE OF THE 52 CRIME CHARGE (SIC). (Underscoring supplied) Our Ruling In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of proving the twin elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm 53 and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. The prosecution was able to discharge its burden. The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco. Defense witness Yuson also 55 56 identified the firearm. Its existence was likewise admitted by no less than petitioner himself. As for petitioners lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification of the Charter Arms Cal iber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that the seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the 57 name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila. As proof, Deriquito presented a certification signed by Roque, the chief records 58 officer of the same office. The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second 59 element of possession of illegal firearms. The prosecution more than complied when it presented both. The certification is outside the scope of the hearsay rule. The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own 60 61 perception. Otherwise, the testimony is objectionable for being hearsay. On this score, the certification from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which provides: Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. It may be true that the contents of said certification are only prima facie evidence of the facts stated there. However, the failure of petitioner to present controverting evidence makes the presumption unrebutted. Thus, the presumption stands.
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Valeroso vs. People

Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to no less than an acquittal. The assessment of credibility of witnesses lies with the trial court. First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm was invalid. The search was conducted after his arrest and after he was taken out of the 62 room he was occupying. This contention deserves scant consideration. Petitioners version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into the factual findings made by the trial court and its calibration of the credibility of 63 witnesses. However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares-Santiago in People v. Rivera: x x x the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy or evince if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth. We have consistently ruled that when the question arises as to which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the trial courts are generally viewed as correct and entitled to great weight. Furthermore, in an appeal, where the culpability or innocence of the accused depends on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the 64 veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect if not finality. (Underscoring supplied) The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence and belief. We find no compelling reason not to accept its observation on this score. Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who not only claims to be highly decorated, but have effected a number of 66 successful arrests as well. Common sense would dictate that he must necessarily be authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that framing up petitioner would have been a very risky proposition. Had the arresting officers really intended to cause the damnation of petitioner by framing him up, they could have easily "planted" a more incriminating evidence rather than a gun. That would have made their nefarious scheme easier, assuming that there indeed was one. The pieces of evidence show that petitioner is not legally authorized to possess the subject firearm and its five (5) ammunition. Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to possess the subject firearm and its ammunition on the basis of the Memorandum Receipt 67 issued to him by the PNP Narcotics Command. Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like policemen are accorded presumption of regularity in the performance of their 68 official duties, it is only a presumption; it may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it proved that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was anything but regular. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on the verbal instruction of his immediate superior, Col. 69 70 Moreno. However, a reading of Timbols testimony on cross-examination would reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner under questionable circumstances. Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as evidence is not fatal provided there is competent testimony as to its existence. Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and ammunition should have been excluded as evidence because they were not formally offered by the 71 72 prosecution in violation of Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the validity of the Memorandum Receipt and, at the same time, for the exclusion in evidence of the subject firearm and its ammunition. Petitioners act may result to an absurd situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared valid, while the subject firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly covered by the Memorandum Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the Memorandum Receipt useless. In any case, petitioners contention has no leg to stand on. Contrary to petitioners claim, the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were offered in evidence by the prosecution. Even assuming arguendo that they were not offered, petitioners stance must still fail. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by 76 testimony, even without its presentation at trial. InPeople v. Orehuela, the non-presentation of the pistol did not prevent the conviction of the accused.
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Valeroso vs. People

The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao.
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As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were established through the testimony of SPO2 78 79 80 Disuanco. Yuson also identified said firearm. Petitioner even admitted its existence. We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long as there is competent testimony as to its existence. Penal and civil liabilities Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. It provides that "[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended 81 P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law now states: SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000)shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Underscoring supplied) As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based 83 on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice." Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the 84 85 imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period fromreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which 86 is prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years and two [2] months). Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of 87 88 prision correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in consonance with the Courts ruling in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals and Barredo v. Vinarao. As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper disposition should be made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code which provides, among others, that the proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in full. SO ORDERED.
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Valeroso vs. People

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