ABACUS, Vol. 44, No.

2, 2008

doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6281.2008.00256.x

ABACUS 0001-3072 Abacus ABAC ORIGINAL XXX DISCUSSION 2008 Accounting ARTICLES OF WHITTINGTON Foundation, Unviersity of Sydney Blackwell Melbourne, Publishing Australia Asia

MICHAEL BRADBURY

Discussion of Whittington
In this Abacus Forum edition, Whittingon (2008) critiques the International Accounting Standards Boards perceived preference for fair value. This is achieved by using the alternative views expressed in the IASBs discussion papers on fair value (IASB, 2007) and the conceptual framework (IASB, 2006). My commentary on Geoffrey Whittingtons Forum paper comprises three parts. The rst discusses the alternative views published by IASB in relation to attributes of the conceptual framework and the joint IASB/FASB project in particular. The second compares the underlying characteristics of fair value accounting with these alternative views. The third delves into particular International Financial Reporting Standards to further illustrate the dissenting viewpoints that have been expressed. Alternative views are the opinions of individuals written on a piecemeal basis to dissent from IASB discussion papers, exposure drafts, and IFRS. Whittington moulds these alternative views to offer an Alternative World View (AWV), which is then compared with a Fair Value View (FVV). There is prior literature that uses these dissenting views to criticize fair value accounting: examples include the brieng paper on the IASBs proposals on insurance contracts (ASB, 2007), discussion of principles-based and rules-based accounting (Benston et al., 2006), and discussion of accounting for liabilities (Lennard, 2002). Whittington provides a more comprehensive and cohesive set of arguments. Assembling and establishing the links between the alternative views is not an easy task and is the papers contribution to the literature. This commentary does not focus on the rst part of the paper.1 However, I touch on the issue of the perceived preference for fair value. This is followed by questioning the characterization of fair value accounting in Whittingtons FVV. I then discuss the preferred measurement objective. This section incorporates my world view on what I think is the underlying problem. Before concluding, I raise the question of whether alternative views should be included in the standard setters publications. Whittington notes that the AWV is informed by his own experiences in writing a number of the IASBs alternative views. Similarly, this commentary is a product
1

My views on the IASB discussion papers have already been expressed in comment letters to both the framework and fair value discussion papers.

Michael Bradbury (m.e.bradbury@massey.ac.nz) is Professor in Accounting in the School of Accountancy at Massey University. The author is grateful to Geoff Whittington and Graeme Dean for comments on earlier drafts of this discussion.

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of my own standard-setting experience with the New Zealand Financial Reporting Standards Board (200008), the International Joint Working Group of Standard Setters, Financial Instruments (19982000) and the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (200408).2 THE FAIR VALUE CONSPIRACY Whittington gives the impression that the IASB (and FASB) are revising the framework with a hidden agenda to promote fair value. This begs the question: why is fair value becoming more generally accepted (at least by standard setters)? Is there a fair value conspiracy? The IASB and FASB have agreed that fair value accounting is the most relevant and reliable measurement objective for traded nancial instruments. A logical extension is to use the same measurement objective to non-traded nancial instruments. A major complaint about fair value is that it causes an accounting mismatch with other nancial statement items that are not measured on a fair value basis. An obvious solution is to extend the use of fair value to new issues, transactions, events and conditions. Of course, some supporters of the published alternative views (Lennard, 2002; Benston et al., 2006; and Whittington, 2008) argue that current values are appropriate in some circumstances, but that fair value is only one of several current value methods. Furthermore, the alternative view supporters might conclude that fair value has hijacked the current value debate. However, any current value measure, other than fair value, would not eliminate the accounting mismatch created by fair valuing nancial instruments. The impression from Whittington is that the IASBs perceived preference for fair value as a measurement objective is likely (p. 140). However, it is not the IASBs perceived preference but the perception of others, fuelled by alternative view supporters. Liz Hickey (Director of Technical Activities at the IASB) and Sir David Tweedie (IASB Chairman) have stated there is no secret agenda to promote fair value accounting in the conceptual framework and other projects (see IASCF, 2007). CHARACTERIZATION OF FAIR VALUE The second section of Whittington describes features of the conceptual framework that support the drive for fair value accounting and the features that support the AWV. Whittington notes that in articulating two world views a degree of stylization is necessary. I think the stylization of the FVV is incorrect.3 That is, I do not think that the objectives of nancial reporting, the needs of users, or
2

Please note that the views in this paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to IFRIC or the FRSB. The views of IFRIC and FRSB are determined only after due process. I agree with Whittington on several issues, including a stronger role for stewardship, and the importance of current shareholders as primary users of nancial statements. However, none of these diminishes my belief in the usefulness of fair value as the measurement objective.

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DISCUSSION OF WHITTINGTON Table 1 COMPARISON OF FVV AND AWV USING FEATURES OF THE FRAMEWORK (Based on Whittington, 2008) Feature Objective of nancial reporting: Usefulness for economic decisions is the sole objective (FVV) Stewardship is a distinct objective ranking equally with decision usefulness (AWV) Users of general purpose nancial reports: Current and prospective investors and creditors (FVV) Present shareholders have special status as users (AWV) Principal need of users: Forecasting future cash ows, preferably as directly as possible (FVV) Future cash ows may be endogenous . . . accounting reports may inuence management decisions (AWV) Qualitative characteristics: Relevance is the primary characteristic (FVV) Reliability is less important (FVV) Reliability is an essential characteristic, because nancial reporting relieves information asymmetry (AWV) Implication

Stewardship is not a distinct objective, although its needs may be met incidentally to others (FVV)

Present shareholders have no special status (FVV) Needs of present shareholders must be met (AWV) Past transactions and events are relevant insofar as they can assist in predicting future cash ows (FVV)

Prudence is a distortion of accounting measurement (FVV) Prudence can enhance reliability (AWV)

the qualitative characteristics will lead to a specic measurement objective. If this were the case, the measurement objective would not be a missing part of the Framework. Table 1 extracts statements on the FVV and AWV from Whittington. It is incomplete and only lists the issues that I wish to discuss: the objectives of general purpose nancial reports, the users of such reports, the principal needs of users and the qualitative characteristics. I comment on these features below. I leave it to the reader of Whittington to decide whether the implications for the FVV and AWV logically follow the features of competing world views. The Objective of Financial Reporting General purpose nancial reports should provide relevant information for assessing wealth (e.g., the level of resources and obligations), wealth generation (the ow 171
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of resources and obligations) and wealth distribution (including reinvestment). Therefore, such reports ought to be useful for assessing: how well management has used the resources over which it has responsibility (e.g., the accountability or stewardship view); and the allocation of resources between investments (e.g., the valuation view).4 In any particular situation, one of these views might dominate. For example, for a small private rm, where there is no market for shares, an assessment of managements resource allocation decisions (i.e., the stewardship view) arguably is more important than the valuation use. The stewardship objective is necessary in the framework and is not inconsistent with fair value accounting. For instance, the stewardship objective serves as a reminder to managers who invest in electricity derivatives and then claim they cannot fair value them because there is no market. Stewardship also serves as a reminder to managers who want to distribute assets to shareholders at the carrying amount because they claim they cannot estimate their fair value. The New Zealand Statement of Concepts is sector neutral (i.e., it applies to both prot-oriented and public benet entities). Thus the accountability and service performance objectives of nancial reporting are emphasized more than the IASBs Framework. Developed under the Statement of Concepts, FRS 3, Accounting for Property, Plant and Equipment, requires the cost of a donated or subsidized item of property, plant and equipment to be its fair value at the date of acquisition (para. 5.22). This requirement in FRS 3 was primarily included for public benet entities, which have strong accountability objectives. FRS 3 allows depreciated replacement costs where the fair value of the asset is not reliably determined using market-based evidence. However, the measurement objective is fair value. Whittington includes agency theory in the AWV as support for the stewardship objective. However, agency theory provides only limited support for the stewardship objective for general purpose nancial reporting. Agency theory is used to describe contracting situations between principals and agents. In this situation principals have the ability to contract for their own information. Hence agency theory is primarily concerned with specic purpose nancial reports. Of course, to lower the cost of contracting, general purpose nancial reports might be used as the base from which to make adjustments. Debt agreements often require adjustments to generally accepted accounting standards when measuring leverage constraints (e.g., the exclusion of intangibles from the asset base or the inclusion of contingent liabilities in the debt base).5 Furthermore, several regulatory authorities have accepted general purpose nancial reports prepared under IFRS as having sufcient quality for analysts, current and future shareholders.
4

There is commonality between these two views. For example, management might use nancial statements to assess the allocation of resources to subsidiaries and divisions. In this case the nancial statements would be regarded as specic purpose. However, to the extent that the same nancial statements are used in the preparation of general purpose nancial reports, the cost of such reports is lower. See Leftwich (1983) for a survey of debt contracting practices.

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DISCUSSION OF WHITTINGTON Table 2 THE RELATION BETWEEN SELECTED CURRENT VALUE METHODS Current value Market value Entry value (price plus transaction costs) Fair value (price) Exit value (price less transaction costs) Entity specic value Value-in-use (price plus management skill intangible)

Users of General Purpose Financial Reports The AWV claims that current shareholders have a special status as a user of nancial instruments. This is also true for fair value accounting. Current equity holders make decisions on whether to hold or sell their shares. Potential shareholders make decisions on whether to buy securities in entity A or in entity B. The information used for buying and selling ought to be the same. This is the fair in fair market value, which aims to estimate the transaction price between a willing buyer and willing seller:
Fair value. Present market value; such sum as the property will sell for to a purchaser desiring to buy, the owner wishing to sell; such a price as a capable and diligent business man could presently obtain from the property after conferring with those accustomed to buy such a property. (Blacks Law Dictionary, 1951, p. 718).

Focusing on the current residual equity holder has two further advantages. First, it makes the cost/benet criteria operational. It is the current shareholders who pay for general purpose nancial reports. It might be acceptable to enhance such reports for other users (e.g., creditors) as long as the cost to existing shareholders is not too great. Second, a focus on the existing residual equity holder is more likely to make a cleaner distinction between debt and equity. Reliability, Subjectivity, Veriability Table 2 (discussed more fully in the next section) shows that current values comprise the estimated market price, either adjusted for transaction costs (i.e., entry and exit values) or for management skill intangibles (i.e., value-in-use). Fair value is an estimate of the (unadjusted) market price. Given that current values, other than fair value, are adjusted prices it is surprising that such bases can be considered more reliable, less subjective and more veriable than an unadjusted price (fair value).6
6

A notable exception to this generalization is the case of securities that are sold in markets where there is a buy/sell margin. Quoted bid-ask spreads provide evidence of entry and exit prices. However, these prices would need further adjustment for the capitalization of acquisition or deduction of direct selling costs.

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Of course, a non-current value system (e.g., historical cost) might be considered by some to be more reliable, less subjective and more veriable. It is not clear that is the case when, for example, under the cost method of accounting for property, plant and equipment the transaction date fair value is adjusted for the capitalization of transaction costs, the valuation adjustment (depreciation) is arbitrary (see Thomas, 1969) and based on an estimate of the residual amount at the end of the assets useful life. Surely the estimation of a future price is less reliable, more subjective and less veriable than estimating todays price. Prudence The issue of prudence was raised several times during the Forum. There seemed to be three notions of prudence held by various participants: 1. The amount of evidence needed for a particular measurement. This would seem to be more related to veriability and the task of auditors rather than standard setters. 2. The impairment of assets. Of course, this type of prudence (i.e., the downward revaluation) is automatic under a current value system. Hence, holders of this view can only regard historical cost as the measurement objective. 3. The bias in measurement error. It was argued (at the Forum) that this bias is justied on the basis that markets are asymmetrical. It is not obvious, at least to me, why asymmetrical accounting would reduce the information asymmetry found in markets. If prudence is implemented by management, how can it stop the bias in measurement by management? The U.K. ASBs 1999 Statement of Principles, as quoted by Whittington, suggests prudence in judgment is required to ensure that gains and assets are not overstated and losses and liabilities are not understated. This can be achieved by deducting 10% from all asset values and adding 10% to all liabilities. Those that support information asymmetry might prefer to use +15% for assets or 5% for liabilities. True asymmetry supporters would no doubt want to use a different set of prudence adjustments the following year (say 7% and +12%). However, given that prudence adjustments are made at the discretion of management, it is most likely that in good times the adjustments will be larger and in poor times the adjustments will be smaller. This results in income smoothing. Furthermore, over time, the outcome (income smoothing) has become the measurement objective. Asymmetric smoothing adjustments do not meet the qualitative characteristics of neutrality, consistency, comparability and understandability (in that the level of prudence is not transparent). Preferred Measurement Objective The IASB project on fair value is still only in the discussion paper phase. Hence, the meaning behind the term fair value is still on the table. I am not convinced that an exit value is the most appropriate measurement base for a liability. The IASB fair value DP and SFAS 15 view the fair value of a liability from the wrong perspective. We can think of a transaction involving two steps: (1) the 174
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DISCUSSION OF WHITTINGTON Table 3 THE RELATION BETWEEN EXIT AND ENTRY PRICES

exchange and (2) the settlement. We can also view the exchange from two points of view: (1) the seller and (2) the purchaser. These are shown in Table 3. From the sellers viewpoint, the most relevant price for the sale of an asset is the exit price. Thus, it seems reasonable to view the measurement objective of an asset as the exit value in an actual or hypothetical exchange. The seller does not have a liability but exchanges one asset for another (i.e., an asset for a receivable or cash). It is the purchaser that has the liability. From the purchasers perspective of the exchange, the entry price of the asset establishes the appropriate amount for the liability. It is the entry price of the liability that is the appropriate measurement basis. It is difcult to understand why, when moving from price to value, SFAS 157 and the IASB Discussion Paper (2006) switch focus from the purchaser (entry) to the seller (exit price).7 At a conceptual level it doesnt matter if the measurement objective is an entry or exit price, because in any exchange the entry price and exit price are the same; it is the amount on the cheque. However, at a practical level the different viewpoint might make considerable difference in the way in which fair value is measured. From an entry value perspective, the fair value of the liability exchange is the legal cash ows of the entity to satisfy the obligation (principal and interest) at the entitys current borrowing rate (assuming the entitys current business risk and leverage). Thus the fair value of a borrowing, from an entry perspective, is a

Entry value and exit value can also be the same (at least conceptually) in perfect markets. Entry values and exit values are likely to differ because of market imperfections (including transaction costs). Furthermore, exit price and exit value are likely to be different due to market imperfections (including transaction costs).

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hypothetical re-nancing. This is much more realistic than a hypothetical sale of a borrowingwhich is an extremely rare transaction. However, SFAS 157 and the IASB Discussion Paper provide a set of rules to factor in the attributes of a hypothetical purchaser of the liability (e.g., credit risk). This arises because the DP views the transaction from the wrong viewpoint. If entry value is the measurement basis of a liability, it is the credit risk of the reporting entity (i.e., the liability holder) that is relevant. THE PREFERRED MEASUREMENT OBJECTIVE I agree with Whittington, that the crucial issue for the joint IASB/FASB Framework project is the measurement objective. As a background for discussion, Table 2 illustrates the relation between fair value and other current value methods.8 Fair value, under the recent discussion paper (IASB, 2007), is an exit price (the price received to sell an asset), ignoring transaction costs and free of entity specic assumptions. Entry value is the replacement price with the capitalization of acquisition transaction costs. Exit value is the selling price less selling transaction costs. Value-in-use is an example of a current value method that is based on entityspecic assumptions. Value-in-use can be thought of as the price plus management skill (see Barth and Landsman, 1995). What should the measurement objective be? My view is that it depends. It depends on what decision has to be made. In an ideal world we could report multicolumn nancial statements and have governance and incentive systems to report truthfully (see Ronen, 2008).9 A current perception of accounting raises headlines such as lies, damned lies and managed earnings (Loomis, 1999). Researchers view abnormal accruals as earnings management. These views are aided and abetted by the current reporting system. By current practice I mean the mixed attribute model. In my opinion the mixed attribute model causes problems, not because multiple measurement methods are inappropriate, but because it accepts multiple methods as the measurement objective. Under the mixed attribute model, multiple measurement objectives exist.10 That is, without a measurement objective in the Framework, standard setters are at the mercy of a mixed attribute model supported by alternative views (although possibly not by the AWV, which seems to lean towards deprival value). Multiple

This is not a comprehensive schema, nor is it the only way current values can be classied; see Nobes (2001) and Miller and Loftus (2000). Furthermore, all of these terms have a long history and were well canvassed in the in the price level accounting debates in the 1960s 80s (see Tweedie and Whittington, 1984; Clarke, 1982). There is increasing evidence that multi-column matrix nancial statements can be understood, and may even be better, than a single column statement (see Tarca et al., 2008). The mixed attribute model allows multiple capital maintenance concepts, in that revaluations can go either to income (nancial capital) or direct to equity (physical capital).

10

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measurement objectives, supported by the anarchy of alternative views, have created a number of undesirable features in accounting: Prior to IAS 39, it allowed losses on nancial instruments to be reported as assets; Prior to IAS 39, it allowed losses on instruments to be off-balance sheet; It allows basis accounting (e.g., accounting for assets at the forward rate of forward contract used to hedge the asset); It allows managers to cherry pick, such as using asset sales (e.g., Bartov, 1993, Hermann et al., 2003); and It allows managers to structure transactions to achieve a particular result (e.g., to structure the terms of a lease to achieve operating lease accounting). The mixed attribute model has made it acceptable for accountants not to exercise professional responsibility to perform a fundamental task of accountingto measure. It is easier to smooth (by dividing goodwill by 10, 20 or 40). It is easier to ignore assets (by expensing research and development expenditure). It is easier to ignore volatility and measurement uncertainty rather than report it. It has led to accounting practice being dominated by rules and exceptions rather than professional judgment. The collection of rules, exceptions and multiple accounting methods in IAS 39 (e.g., held-for-trading, available-for-sale, through income, cost, held-to-maturity, plus exceptions for hedge accounting) are a product of the mixed attribute model rather than the adoption of fair value accounting.11 Standard-setting is a piecemeal activity. The Current Cost Accounting debates in the 1970s and 1980s and the Joint Working Group for Financial Instruments exposure draft (2000) indicate that we cannot simply switch accounting paradigms. Hence an incremental approach is necessary. My suggestion for the next incremental step is to adopt fair value as the measurement objective. Fair values (i.e., exit prices) are more reliable and less subjective than exit values, entry values and value in use (all of which require adjustments to exit prices).12 Furthermore, there is recent support for fair value accounting from analysts. The CFA Institute has stated that fair value is the most relevant information for nancial decision making (CFA, 2007). The distinction between a measurement objective and measurement methods is important. We should allow experimentation with measurement methods to achieve a particular measurement objective. For example, depreciated historical costs (method) might be a low cost method to estimate fair value (objective). We should also experiment with governance systems (e.g., Ronen, 2008). With experimentation, at some future date we might begin reporting different measurements in different columns (i.e., multi-column reporting).

11

Held-for-trading and available-for-sale have the same measurement objective but differ in the capital maintenance concept. Also, see Walker and Jones (2003) for a comparison and evaluation of alternative asset and liability attributes.

12

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DO WE NEED ALTERNATIVE VIEWS? One issue that was not raised at the Forum, but that is worth reecting on, is: should alternative views be separately acknowledged when a discussion paper, exposure draft or standard is issued? Clearly, support for discussion papers, exposure drafts and standards will not be unanimous. My views on this reect my standard-setting experience on the FRSB and the IFRIC.13 The FRSB (and its predecessors) have promulgated New Zealand specic standards since February 1973 (see Bradbury, 1998, for a brief history), without having alternative or dissenting views. The exposure draft and nal standard are accepted by constituents as the majority view of the board. Contentious issues, where there are serious disagreements among Board members, are raised for public comment in the questions for comments wraparound. The IFRIC also has a consensus view and any alternative views are expressed within the Basis for Conclusions.14 The consensus view in IFRIC has the effect of voting on whether the draft interpretation is an (incremental) improvement on existing practice, not whether it is the best conceptual answer. CONCLUSIONS Whittington takes the opinions from individual alternative views in IASB documents to mould an Alternative World View. While the published alternative views have been through due process, they are not a framework and cannot replace a framework. In developing an AWV, Whittington does not undertake a systematic review of all dissenting views.15 The AWV does not purport to be complete. Nor is it consistent. For example, AWV supports both the amortization of goodwill and the prudence of impairing goodwill. Yet there is no acknowledgment that fair value accounting has made a more relevant and reliable initial measurement of purchased goodwill.16 There are many preferred measurement objectives in alternative views and it is not clear which set of these should replace fair value accounting. The AWV will be supported by those that support deprival value; those that support replacement cost accounting; and those that support historical cost accounting. Arguments

13

The JWG had two dissenters. However, both of these approved the release of the document. This raises interesting issues: What are the in-house rules for making a dissenting view? Should board members be able to dissent against a principle contained in the Framework? In IFRS, alternative (or dissenting) views are added at the end of Basis for Conclusions. However, there is no basis for distinguishing alternative views from other minority arguments in the Basis for Conclusions, except that it is the whim of the dissenter. For example, Whittington does not include the dissenting views in IAS 39 that support a fair value approach rather than the mixed attribute model in IAS 39. It is more reliable because the under and over valuation of assets and liabilities in a business acquisition are impounded into goodwill.

14

15

16

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made in alternative views will be used by accounting Luddites that want no change from current practice. However, the current value approaches in the AWV have more in common with fair value than historical cost accounting and the current mixed attribute model. Furthermore, if we made deprival value the subject of the critique, the alternative views would still be considerable (i.e., it would include all replacement cost supporters, historical cost supporters, etc.) and it would also include all the fair value supporters. It is possible that replacement cost is a better measurement method on some dimensions; deprival value is better on other dimensions; and even historical cost is better on certain dimensions. However, it is still possible for fair value accounting to be, on average, the best. This is, of course, exactly what the Board members on the IASB/FASB, with their considerable collective expertise and diverse background, have decided after a due process that has considered the views of constituents (including the alternative views). references
Accounting Standards Board, Brieng Paper, IASB Proposals on Insurance ContractsImplications for Other Business Sectors, ASB, 2007. Barth, M. E., and W. R. Landsman, Fundamental Issues Related to Using Fair Value Accounting for Financial Reporting, Accounting Horizons, December 1995. Bartov, E., The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation, The Accounting Review, October 1993. Benston, G. J., M. Bromwich and A. Wagenhofer, Principles-Versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards: The FASBs Standard Setting Strategy, Abacus June 2006. Bradbury, M. E., Harmonizing with Overseas Accounting Standards: A New Zealand Perspective, Australian Accounting Review, November 1998. CFA Institute, Centre for Financial Market Integrity, A Comprehensive Business Reporting Model: Financial Reporting for Investors, CFA, July 2007. Clarke, F. L., The Tangled Web of Price Variation Accounting, Garland, 1982. Hermann, D., T. Inoue and W. Thomas, The Sale of Assets to Manage Earnings in Japan, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2003. International Accounting Standards Board, Discussion Paper, Preliminary Views on an Improved Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: The Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-Useful Financial Reporting Information, IASB, 2006. , Discussion Paper, Fair Value Measurements, IASB, 2007. International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, Insight Q3, Discussing Measurement Round Tables Provide the Platform, IASCF, 2007. Leftwich, R. W., Accounting Information in Private Markets: Evidence from Private Lending Agreements, The Accounting Review, January 1983. Lennard, A., Liabilities and How to Account for Them: An Explanatory Essay, Accounting Standards Board, 2002. Loomis, C. J., Lies, Damned Lies and Managed Earnings, Fortune, February 1999. Miller, M. C., and J. Loftus, Measurement Entering the 21st Century: A Clear or Blocked Road Ahead, Australian Accounting Review, July 2000. Nobes, C., Asset Measurement Bases in UK and IASC Standards, Certied Accountants Educational Trust, 2001. Ronen, J., To Fair Value or Not Fair Value: A Broader Perspective, Abacus, June 2008.

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ABACUS Tarca, A., P. Brown, P. Hancock, D. Woodliff, M. Bradbury and T. van Zijl, Identifying Decision Useful Information With the Matrix Format Income Statement, Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, forthcoming 2008. Thomas, A. L., The Allocation Problem in Accounting Theory, Studies in Accounting Research No. 3, American Accounting Association, 1969. Tweedie, D. P., and G. Whittington, The Debate on Ination Accounting, Cambridge University Press, 1984. Walker, R. G., and S. Jones, Measurement: A Way Forward, Abacus, October 2003. Whittington, G., Fair Value and the IASB/FASB Conceptual Framework Project: An Alternative View, Abacus, June 2008.

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