Good or Bad A|d for Agr|cu|ture

and Rura| Deve|opment?

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Ed|tors: A|essandra Sgr and Akse| Nrstad
Good or bad aid for
agriculture and rural
development?
Case studies and overviews of support for agriculture
and rural development
Editors Alessandra Sgr and Aksel Nrstad
1
2
Good or Bad Aid for Agriculture and Rural Devlopment?
Published in November 2009
by the More and Better campaign
Reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product
for educational or other non commercial purposes are authorized without
any prior written permission from the copyright holders provided the
source is fully acknowledged. Reproduction of material in this book
for resale or other commercial purposes is prohibited without written
permission of the copyright holders. Te book can be ordered from:
International Secretariat of More and Better
c/o Terra Nuova
Via Gran Bretagna, 18 00195 Rome, Italy
secretariat@moreandbetter.org
www.moreandbetter.org
Cover photo: painting from training and conference centre CHASAADD
CHAINE DE SOLIDARITE ET DAPPUI AUX ACCTIONS DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE in
Cameroon
ISBN 978-82-91923-11-6
3
Contents
Good or bad aid for agriculture and rural development? 5
Suf cient investment in agriculture:
an efective means to reach the worlds poor 10
CASE STUDIES
Case study 1: ETHIOPIA
Shifing paradigms: famine prevention 23
Case study 2: ETHIOPIA
Te quality of aid to Ethiopia 37
Case study 3: KENYA
Enhancing agricultural productivity in Kenya - An example of good aid 51
Case study 4: KENYA.
Te agricultural extension programme phase I - An example of bad aid 59
Case study 5: MALAWI
Engaging communities as genuine partners in development processes 69
Country study 6: MALI
How to provide better aid for agriculture in African countries 80
Country study 7: MOZAMBIQUE
Peasants ownership community strengthening and conservation
agricultures practices: the case of Massalane and Tsenane 87
Case study 8: TUNISIA
Good support for innovation in dif cult rural areas. Te IRZOD project 101
Case study 9: LEBANON
Sustainable agriculture and agribusiness for rural development 107
Case study 10: PAKISTAN
A donor - driven disaster: Tinkering with wheat trade 114
Case study 11: INDONESIA
Bad aid: Asian Development Bank (ADB) technical assistance 129
Case study 12: PHILIPPINES
Assessment development projects for agrarian reform in Mindanao 141
Case study 13: VIETNAM
Empowering farmers and improving agricultural diversity 155
Case study 14: CHILE
Case study on the salmon 168
Case study15: COLOMBIA
Women immersed in the rural crisis of Colombia 181
4
COUNTRY FACTS AND REPORTS
ETHIOPIA country facts and report 193
KENYA country facts 197
MALAWI country facts 198
MALI country facts 199
MOZAMBIQUE country facts 200
TUNISIA country facts and report 201
LEBANON country facts and report 203
PAKISTAN country facts 206
INDONESIA country facts 207
PHILIPPINES country facts and report 208
VIETNAM country facts 211
CHILE country facts 212
COLOMBIA country facts and report 213
ORGANIZATIONS and MORE and BETTER
Organizations and institutions which have contributed to the book 217
Te More and Better Campaign 220
More and Better common principles 221
5
Good or bad aid for agriculture and rural
development?
Alessandra Sgr and Aksel Nrstad
Te More and Better campaign
1
hopes that this book will contribute to more discussions
about what kind of support is needed for agriculture
2
and rural development in developing
countries, and how the support should be delivered. Hopefully, increased attention and
debate will lead to the crucial changes required.
Only a small proportion of the national budgets in developing countries and of
development aid goes to agriculture and rural development, despite the fact that the
majority of the people, the majority of the poor and the majority of the hungry and
malnourished people are living in rural areas, and most of them are peasants, pastoralists,
artisanal fsher folk and landless workers and their families. Climate change is hitting
food producers in developing countries very hard and thus making it even more vital to
increase the support, so the food producers can adapt to the new conditions.
In 2003, African leaders gathered in Maputo and declared that they wanted to increase
the share of the state budgets going to agriculture from an average of below 5 percent to at
least 10 percent within fve years. Less than ten of the 57 African countries have reached
that goal. Te of cial development aid (ODA) from the rich countries for agriculture,
forestry and fsheries declined from close to 29 percent in 1983, to less than 5 percent in
2006. It is impossible to eradicate hunger and poverty without more support and more
investment in agriculture and rural development.
Te trend seems to have turned now. More money is going to agriculture and rural
development from the governments in the South, from the rich countries and from
foundations. As a response to the food crisis in 2007-2008, many governments in the South
have prioritized food production for domestic consumption higher than before. In July
2009 the G 8 countries in the LAquila Food Security initiative promised to give support
of USD 20 billion over the next three years to support predominantly African countries with
agriculture. Te aim of the project was to develop more ef cient agriculture. Other countries
have also promised substantial increases in their support for agriculture. But not all of this
is new money. It is dif cult to fnd out which money has already been promised before and
which is new, and as a result, promises and reality are not always matching. Te economic
crisis is also impacting both the willingness and the possibilities to support and invest in
agriculture and rural development, and the total support is still very low. Terefore it is still
vital to advocate and campaign for more support for agriculture and rural development.
1 See more information on page 220 and on www.moreandbetter.org
2 Agriculture in this article and in other material from the More and Better Campaign includes cropping, livestock husbandry,
pastoralism, sheries, forestry and other natural resource use for food production and food gathering, which is dispersed throughout
rural, urban and peri-urban areas.
6
Sometimes less is better
More support is not always better. Unfortunately there are many examples of support
and aid doing more harm than good. Food aid brought in from abroad has destroyed or
harmed local food production and local markets. Te promotion of chemical fertilizer
and pesticides has contributed to the drastic reduction of biodiversity and soil fertility and
widened the gap between rich and poor.
Support for cash crop production and export orientated agriculture
has weakened food production and made local people more food insecure.
Development aid has created aid dependency and contributed substantially to increased
corruption in many countries. Furthermore, many projects are implemented without any
real involvement of the people afected and therefore fail. Sometimes less aid is better.
Tis is why the More and Better campaign also focused on better aid, not only more.
With more money going to agriculture and rural development, it is even more
important to focus on the quality of the support and investments. Te search for quick
fxes for solving the problems created by the climate change and the push for boosting
production which is now coming from many international institutions, governments,
foundations and companies, will probably do more harm than good, and makes it even
more crucial to discuss what is good support for agriculture and rural development.
Wat kind of food production?
Business as usual is no longer an option. Tat is one of the main messages from
the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for
Development (IAASTD)
3
. Te high input industrial agriculture and industrial fsheries are
not sustainable and cannot be the model for food production. To feed the world in the
future it is necessary to implement ecological production
4
as the model.
A ferce political battle is going on, openly and hidden, about what kind of food
production should be promoted. Te multinational agro- and biotechnology industry,
some governments and institutions are strongly promoting the unsustainable model of
production which has led to a drastic reduction of biodiversity and soil fertility, overuse
of water, increased hunger and malnutrition, and which contributes to climate change on
a large scale. We cannot act as though it does not matter what kind of production model
is the base for support of agriculture and rural development. We need to raise discussions
about the production model when support for agriculture and rural development is
discussed. No projects or programs are neutral.
3 IAASTD (International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development) is approved by
58 governments in 2008. 400 scientists developed the full report of about 2500 pages. IAASTD found that a move towards
agroecological sciences is necessary if hunger is to be eradicated, equity realised and the environment restored.
(Finding # 7) www.iaastd.net
4 Denition of Ecological Production: A system of agricultural, livestock aquatic and sheries production that conserves the natural
assets (air, soils, waters, biodiversity), through their sustainable use, by rehabilitating and valuing local and traditional knowledge and
using socially just and appropriate technologies, for the production and equitable trade, at local and national levels, of healthy food
and other products, whilst ensuring food sovereignty, and securing livelihoods and sustaining life.
7
In the common principles for More and Better we state that New policies and practices
for agriculture, pastoralism, fsheries and global food trade are needed to end hunger and
poverty, and to promote sustainable development. Changes in the delivery and focus of aid
are needed to achieve this.
Policies and actions to eradicate hunger and malnutrition
An important document has recently been presented by organizations from all over the
world: Policies and actions to eradicate hunger and malnutrition
5
Te initiative to develop
this document came from the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty
(IPC)
6
and the More and Better campaign. Organizations of peasants, farmers, pastoralists,
fsher folk, indigenous peoples, women, youth, environmental organizations, development
and humanitarian organizations and other NGOs took part in the development of
the document. We encourage governments, institutions and organizations to use this
document and to sign on to the open letter and the summary of the document.
The case studies
Te cases studies presented in this book look at examples of both successful support and
bad aid. Due to limited economic resources, it has not been possible to make as many and
comprehensive analyses as we would have liked. However, we think these case studies are
very valuable. Tey show very clearly that good intentions, plans and funding do not give
any guarantee for positive outcome of projects. It is necessary to follow principles and
guidelines for how to decide what kind of support is needed, for the goals of the programs
and projects, and how they should be carried out.
Te More and Better Campaign has developed some common principles for good
support.
7
Tese principles were developed a few years ago through consultations and
discussions over period of two years. Organizations of peasants and farmers in developing
countries played the key role in this process. Tese principles have been used in the case
studies to evaluate concrete examples of support for agriculture and rural development.
Te case studies show that the common principles developed by More and Better are
very valid and important. Actually, we are very proud of these principles. Tey should be
used actively by all governments, institutions and donor agencies as the base for support
for agriculture and rural development. Yet we also see the need to develop the policies
of More and Better. We will therefore highlight two interlinked issues which we think
are important to have as a base for all development support for agriculture and rural
development, together with the principles developed by More and Better.
Diferent sources have been used for the facts in the case studies and the country reports so
diferences might occur and we have not had the capacity to check all the data. However,
we think the country reports give a useful overview of the situation in these countries.
5 See www.eradicatehunger.org
6 See www.foodsovererignty.org
7 See More and Better Common Principles at page 220 in this book.
8
Te more and Better campaign is not responsible for the content of these case studies.
Te analysis and viewpoints presented in the case studies and articles are those of the
authors.
The right to adequate food and food sovereignty
Support for agriculture and rural development should have the fulfllment of the right to
adequate food for all as an overall goal, and food sovereignty (which includes the right to
adequate food) should be the overall policy framework.
Te right to adequate food is a basic human right and all governments are obliged to
fulfll this right. Governments should be held accountable for their how they fulfll the
right to adequate food and Te voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realization
on the right to adequate food in the context of national food security should actively be
used. States should, in close cooperation with food producers organisations, social
movements and organisations working with food and nutrition related issues, develop
strategies and concrete plans of actions for the realisation of the right to adequate food and
all associated rights. States and international institutions should put in place and comply
with appropriate monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Civil society organizations
should now discuss how we can build a strong common campaign for the fulflment of
the right to adequate food. Such a campaign should include demands that governments
commit to work out strategies and plans for the eradication of hunger and malnutrition in
close cooperation with civil society.
Food sovereignty has been developed by social movements as the overall policy
framework for food and agriculture, and support for agriculture and rural development
should be based on it. Te Nylni conference
8
defned food sovereignty as the right of
peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and
sustainable methods, and their right to defne their own food and agriculture systems. It puts
the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of
food systems and policies, rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends
the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It ofers a strategy to resist and dismantle
the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and
fsheries systems determined by local producers and users. Food sovereignty prioritizes local
and national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven
agriculture, artisanal fshing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, distribution and
consumption based on environmental, social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty
promotes transparent trade that guarantees just incomes to all peoples as well as the rights of
consumers to control their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage lands,
territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce
food. Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between
men and women, peoples, racial groups, social and economic classes and generations.
8 www.nyeleni.org
9
Take part in More and Better
More and Better is an international network and campaign for more and better support
for food, agriculture and rural development to eradicate hunger and malnutrition. Global,
regional, national and local organizations in about 50 countries are taking part. We hope
that more organizations will join. More information on page 206 and on
www.moreandbetter.org
10
Sufcient investment in agriculture:
an effective means to reach the worlds poor
Christoph Langenkamp, Daniel Gerecke, and Shaughn McArthur
Secretariat of the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development
Summary
Troughout history, human development has always depended on agricultural
development. Tat is no less true today: Tree-quarters of the worlds poor live in rural
areas, and over one billion people are hungry or food-insecure. Tats one out of every six
people!
As the 2008 World Development Report Agriculture for Development highlights,
agricultural development is fundamental to the global fght against poverty; particularly
so in agriculture-based economies. Investing in agricultural development for productive
rural areas substantially increases economic growth, and is two to three times more
efective in providing income to the poorest third of the population than investment in
any other sector. Whats more, agriculture and rural development (ARD) has tremendous
potential to help correct gender imbalances, promote environmental stewardship and,
naturally, improve food security.
More investment in ARD targeting smallholders is urgently needed. Increased fnancial
fows must also be made more efective; managed in a way that refects the principles of
the development efectiveness agenda, while creating incentives for the sustainable use of
natural resources.
However, investment in agriculture cannot escape an overarching characteristic of the
ARD sector that importantly shapes the challenge at hand: Although ARD can deliver on
issues of global PUBLIC importance (such as food security, poverty eradication, sustainable
natural resource use, and climate change mitigation and adaptation), agriculture is
principally a PRIVATE-sector activity, run by individual farmers. Whether acting on
their own at household level or institutionalised in farmer organisations, cooperatives
or small businesses, farmers are the principal actors in the sector. Consequently, farmers
savings constitute the main source of funding to the sector.
Still, the state and its institutions have essential roles to play in agricultural growth.
While national public fnancing and international assistance can provide desperately
needed additional resources, the public sectors key function in rural areas is mainly that of
regulator and service provider. ARD underpinned by appropriate regulations and services
should encourage private investment, while ensuring participation and ownership by all
relevant stakeholders, including farmers, farmer organisations and CSOs.
In keeping with the principles of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for
Action, of cial development assistance (ODA) from donors is provided merely to support
these processes, though it remains essential in many countries. Despite its importance, the
11
agricultural sector has been neglected in the policies of most partner countries over many
years, as refected in dwindling national budget allocations and declining international
ODA commitments to ARD.
Tis signals the need to develop and pursue new ways to organise (farmer-based,
gender-balanced, inclusive, and sustainable approaches) and fnance (public and private,
including payments for eco-services, national and international) the sector. Te success of
such mechanisms, however, ultimately depends on political will to ensure ARD policies
are appropriately prioritised, and strengthened institutions with the capacity to deliver. It
is also crucial that farmers are trained to interface efectively with the market, and given
incentives to champion sustainable food-production techniques and act as environmental
custodians. Adequate fnancing for successful agricultural development is fundamental
for poverty eradication. It is also well within our means.
Approaches to agricultural development
Recent history
Development thinking in both OECD countries and the newly independent African states
in the 1950s overlooked agriculture as an avenue for economic development (Table 1). Te
prevailing view at that time was that state-led industrialisation could transform agrarian-
dominated societies into modern industrial nations in just one generation (Eicher, 2003)
Table 1. Development paradigms from the 1950s to 2000s, and associated issues related to
ARD.
Decade Development paradigm Agriculture and rural development issues
1950s State-led growth through
industrialisation
Agriculture not seen as a driver of economic growth
1960s Growth through industry and
agriculture
Emphasis on social aspects (basic needs approach);
nationalisation of production, marketing, research;
Asian food crisis
1970s Redistribution with growth and
basic needs
Emphasis on food self-suf ciency/Green Revolution;
integrated rural development; aid to smallholder
agriculture
1980s Economic liberalisation and
structural adjustment
Sustainable development; training and visit (T&V)
1990s Poverty alleviation Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs),
introduction of Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps);
participatory rural development; T&V abandoned;
introduction of farmer feld schools
2000s County-led development
partnerships
Partnership approach, Programme-based Approaches
(PBAs), Joint Assistance Strategies (JASs), budget
support, aid efectiveness; rediscovery of agriculture;
food security and climate change
12
Tis paradigm shifed under the impact of the Asian food crisis of the 1960s.Te
subsequent Green Revolution refected the new prominence attached to agriculture as
a driver for development. Increasingly, resources became available, both from national
budgets and development partners pursuing integrated rural development (IRD) and
training and visit extension.
By the time ODA fows peaked in the mid-1980s, however, agricultures share had
become fragmented and diluted, victim to an increasingly thematic diversifcation of
national and international development priorities. Against the backdrop of failed public-
sector investments (e.g. marketing boards, government-run large-scale schemes) and the
lack of evidence for the impact of IRD, public allocations to the agricultural sector began to
decline.
Evolving approaches
Te introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Sector-Wide
Approaches (SWAps) in the 1990s saw weak agricultural institutions further sidelined
as priorities shifed towards the social sectors. Soon, growing frustration over the poor
performance of aid gave rise the aid efectiveness process, leading to the Rome (2003) and
Paris (2005) Declarations and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). Tis groundbreaking
trilogy has transformed the way aid is delivered: country ownership and the need to work
in partnerships and accept mutual accountability are today considered crucial levers for
more efective investments in development.
Even so, and despite the improvements in second generation new aid modalities,
including rural SWAps, PRSPs, and Joint Assistance Strategies (JASs), agriculture continues
to be poorly refected in national development processes - particularly when it comes to
policy choices and resource allocations.
One explanation for this shortcoming refects the institutional complexity of the
ARD sector which, being private sector-led, encompasses a wide range of predominantly
non-state actors. Growing recognition of the importance of agricultural development
has triggered an additional diversifcation of actors, with foreign investors, CSOs
and philanthropic organisations now providing vast amounts of money to the sector.
Complexity is compounded further as ARD actors strive to integrate cross-cutting issues
(such as sustainable natural resource use and gender) into their policy formulation and
implementation, and choose between competing paradigms (like rights-based, demand-
driven, market-oriented, or farmer-centred approaches).
Still, the aid efectiveness agenda and new aid modalities have brought considerable
improvements to the way aid is delivered in ARD, leveraging impact by enhancing
ownership and accountability.
Financing agricultural development
Tere is no given model for fnancing agricultural development. Financing models are
diverse, involve diferent actors, and need to be tailored to the specifc contexts (political,
13
socio-economic, value chain, farming system and environment) and benefciaries (farmers
or institutions) they are to serve.
Te principal sources of fnancing available to farmers in rural areas are private, and
range from savings and lending to insurance and remittance services. A wide range of actors
provides these services, from the individual level, involving lending between relatives,
friends, shopkeepers, traders or money lenders, to the institutional level, populated by
traditional savings and lending groups, microfnance institutions or banks (Klerk, 2008).
Te state and the international donor community come in at the upper end of this range.
Somewhere in-between, NGOs and philanthropic organisations represent an increasingly
important component of the actor constellation whose contributions to ARD have grown
substantially in recent years.
Meanwhile, for the past 25 years national public resources and international ODA
allocated to ARD have declined. Tis downward trend can be variously attributed to:
new donor priorities (e.g. social protection, health and education, AIDS, development
policy lending, anti-corruption, public administration) and a trend in favouring
agriculture projects requiring less money (e.g. irrigation rehabilitation, micro-credit,
agriculture research and knowledge, soil rehabilitation, land management, land
titling);
changes in the role and scope of the state in the sector, largely driven by agricultural
sector reviews and the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s. Tese put
signifcant pressure on governments in general, and agricultural ministries in particular,
to withdraw from direct service delivery and dismantle costly and ofen inef cient
extension services and parastatals;
perception that agricultural problems can be largely addressed outside the sector
(e.g. through transport and communication infrastructure and international trade
regulations);
increases in the share of public spending being given to the social sectors, in line with
the frst-generation PRSPs and SWAps;
the high visibility of urban poverty;
international availability of cheap food (partly caused by domestic-oriented subsidies
in rich countries) contributed to a relaxation of priority on food security in developing
countries.
Nevertheless, the growing recognition of the importance of ARD in recent years has led
to an overall rise in allocations to the sector. Exactly how the current fnancial crisis will
afect public and ODA allocations is yet to be seen, but commitments by the international
community to act with the scale and urgency needed to achieve sustainable global food
security at the recent G8 summit in LAquila are promising.

14
Private sector ows
Private capital ows
Low-income countries are the most vulnerable to changes in private equity fows,
which ofen make up a large share of their GDP. Although foreign direct investment (FDI)
to developing countries increased signifcantly over recent years (from USD 32 billion
in 1990 to USD 500 billion in 2007), FDI tends to focus on a few countries and sectors
Least Developed Countries and agriculture being comparably minor recipients.
Developing countries as a whole are experiencing the fnancial and economic crisis with
a time lag. One of the most overlooked channels for this transmission involves remittance
fows (Table 2). Remittances are a critically important fnancial source for smallholders in
agriculture-based economies, and foreign workers in high-income countries were amongst
the frst to experience the impact of the economic downturn. Tis seriously compromises
the shares on their incomes that they can aford to send back home. For more than a
quarter of low-income countries, these remittances account for 10 percent of GDP.
All considered, in 98 out of 104 countries external fnancing needs are expected to
exceed private supply this year, leaving a fnancing gap of $268-700 billion. Tis gap could
seriously jeopardise developing countries spending and debt fnancing capacities, and
progress made toward the MDGs.
Private donor ows
With the decline in national public resources and ODA to agriculture, new actors
particularly NGOs and, more recently, philanthropic organisations have become
increasingly important players. According to estimates by the Advisory Group on CSO
Aid Efectiveness, CSOs managed in 2005 some $40 billion. Te OECD calculates that
development grants from CSOs and foundations totalled $18.5 billion in 2007, up from
$8.8 billion in 2002. Trough innovative microfnance and insurance schemes, for example,
these organisations have proven increasingly versatile providers of fnancial services to
smallholders in rural areas areas unviable for the models used by traditional fnancial
service providers.
Private fnancial fows investment, philanthropy and remittances from all donor
countries now exceed public fows to the developing world. In 2006 (latest available data),
private fows together accounted for over 75 percent of donor countries entire economic
transactions with developing countries, with government aid accounting for less than 25
percent of these fows (Hudson Institute 2009). Tis global picture, however, does not
always correspond with national-level realities; in many countries, development assistance
still accounts for as much as 60 percent of national budgets.
15
Table 2. Financial fows from private donors to developing countries in 2006.
Source Amounts in billion USD
Foundations 4.0
Corporations 5.5
Private and voluntary organisations (PVO) 10.6
Value of volunteer time 2.2
Universities and colleges 3.7
Religious organisations 8.8
Remittances* 221.0
Total 255.8
* Developing countries inows -
Source: Hudson Institute, 2009.
Public sector ows
National budget
Agricultural development requires appropriate resource allocations from national budgets.
Adequate funding for institutions both those operating nationally and in rural areas - is
particularly critical to the establishment of an environment enabling private investment
in the sector. It is striking that while Asian countries spend 8-14 percent of their national
budgets on agriculture, most countries in Africa many of them agriculture-based
economies allocate just 3-10 percent to the sector. Under-investment by governments
in agriculture was taken into account in the Maputo Declaration of 2003, under which
African countries pledged to commit 10 percent of their national budgets to ARD. Tough
the situation is gradually improving (see Table 3) the bulk of African countries are still far
from reaching this target.
Ofcial development assistance (ODA)
Financing of ARD through ODA has undergone a succession of paradigm shifs in
approach, scope and methodology. Among the most important trends are the shifs from
a donor-driven to a partner-owned approach, and from a project modality to a mixed-
modality approach. Increasingly this entails to use of programme-based approaches
(PBAs), combining diferent forms of budget support, with a trend towards national
investments in ARD being increasingly accounted for on-budget.
16
Figure 1. Agricultural expenditures and the CAADP 10% target, 2007.
Source: Fan, S. et al, 2009
ODA to agriculture, forestry and fsheries peaked during the early 1980s and then
declined sharply, both in real terms and as a percentage of overall fows (Figure 2). Studies
attribute the decline to unresolved issues concerning development approaches in ARD
coupled with the low interest of national governments and donors in the sector. Changing
aid modalities (with the introduction of PBAs, particularly in social sectors where the
government plays a greater role with greater absorption capacity), and diversifcation of
development priorities accelerated the decline in resources allocated to ARD from close
to 29 percent of total ODA in 1983 to 2.9 percent in 2006.
ODA is increasingly implemented using Joint Assistance Strategies (JASs). However,
ARD has so far not fared well in most JASs. Despite the recent widespread awareness of
its potential to deliver on food security, poverty and the MDGs following the food price
crisis, ARD remains a relatively minor contender in partner countries political space. Tis
highlights the need for further advocacy at international and national levels and capacity
development.
17
Figure 2. International of cial development assistance (ODA) to agriculture, forestry and
fshing, between 1983 and 2007 at constant prices (2006)

Figure 3. Number of donors per recipient country, averaged by region over diferent time
periods.
18
From more to better aid for agriculture and rural development
Sustainable development requires functioning institutions that utilise available resources
efectively and deliver on expected impacts for the targeted benefciaries. In addition
to better aid and indeed development efectiveness, policy reforms and more resources
are required from both national budgets and external assistance. In June 2008, the FAO
estimated that USD 30 billion is required each year to adequately address poverty and
hunger at the global level. Similarly, the Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA)
identifed a global public fnance shortfall of USD 25 to 40 billion.
Estimates for Africa, calculated by diferent organisations, include:
Overall needs:
UN (2001): USD 20 billion per year by 2015.
WB (2002): USD 54-62 billion per year by 2015.
Incremental needs:
IFPRI (2005): + USD 8 billion per year for sub-Saharan Africa during 2005-2015.
IFPRI (2008): + USD 7-8 billion per year by 2015.
FAO for CFA (2008): + USD 8 billion per year by 2015.
However, these fgures should be treated with caution.
While it is vital to estimate the public resources needed to reach particular agricultural
targets, it is equally important to prioritise investments. Evidence suggests that investments
in agricultural research and extension, rural infrastructure and rural education may
have the greatest impact on agricultural growth and poverty reduction (Fan et al., 2009).
Financial resources are required, but their impact depends on the existence of an enabling
environment and functioning institutions.
Actors in the sector must have the capacity to translate available resources into
measurable outputs, outcomes and impacts for the poor and the sustainable use of natural
resources. Tis requires not necessarily the perfect plan, but good enough policies
and strategies that are owned by key stakeholders, particularly farmers and the public-
sector institutions best positioned to create an enabling environment. In the use of public
resources, it is critical to pursue gender-specifc approaches while building the capacity
of all stakeholders, including farmers, the public sector, CSOs and donors, as soon as
possible.
Coordination between donors is also vital to increasing the efectiveness of aid. With
a view toward addressing remaining gaps between development objectives (poverty
eradication and other MDGs) and resource allocations for ARD (the most potent
sectorfor poverty eradication in many countries), in 2003 a group of committed donors
created the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development (Platform).
9
To ensure an
efective translation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action into the
9 www.donorplatform.org
19
context and the characteristics of the ARD sector, the Platform developed Joint Donor
Principles for ARD programmes (Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, 2009).
Te principles call on donors to: support government leadership in ARD and promote
efective participation and capacity development of key agricultural stakeholders;
contribute and sign up to partner countries existing poverty reduction strategies while
considering the important roles played by decentralised government institutions, civil
society and the private sector; Improve complementarities between national development
strategies, agricultural sector policies and common funding mechanisms via PBAs and
SWAps in ARD; support efective resource management through measurable and sector-
specifc tracking and reporting of development results; and, work with key stakeholders to
promote and develop sector-level accountability frameworks for assessing mutual progress
toward ARD targets.
Today, prospects for more and better investment in ARD are improving. In 2007 the
World Bank published the World Development Report Agriculture for Development,
a milestone report. Te food price crisis that same year put ARD frmly back onto the
political agenda, restoring its status as a target for private and public investments from
local and international sources, and the trend of declining public investment went into
reverse. In keeping with the principles of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for
Action, most countries now have donor coordination groups or round tables to address
this fragmentation and to advance donor harmonisation and alignment to partner
country programmes and policies (Global Donor Platform for Rural Development,
2008).
Conclusion
In the shadow of so many declarations made with good intentions
10
it is not acceptable
that in todays world over one billion people remain hungry and food-insecure. Te
fgures appear even starker next to predictions that global populations will increase by 50
percent, to reach 9 billion people by 2050. Te FAO estimates that this will require a 70
percent increase in food production in the same period. In order to meet this formidable
challenge, rural actors and national governments need the support of the international
community to ensure that the agricultural sector, meaning farmers, have the capacity to
respond.
In the past, increased agricultural production was achieved mainly by expanding
agricultural cropland and increasing productivity. But this was too ofen accompanied by
severe environmental damage deforestation and land degradation/contamination and
marginalisation of smallholders. New ways of doing business are required: resources are as
limited as ever, and biodiversity loss and climate change
11
demand sustainable solutions.
10 World Food Summit 2008; Millennium Declaration; Right to Food.
11 Agriculture has a large environmental footprint, e.g. accounting for 85% of global fresh water use and contributing an estimated
30% of greenhouse gas emissions. But it is a major provider of environmental services, such as sequestering carbon, managing
watersheds, and preserving biodiversity. Climate change is a major challenge and a real threat to global food security, with rising
temperatures and an increasing number of oods and droughts affecting production.
20
Agricultural production and increases in agricultural productivity be pursued in
tandem with the protection of eco-systems and the preservation of (agro-) biodiversity.
At the same time, a focus needs to be put on smallholder agriculture. Smallholders and
their families number some two billion people, yet until recently they were seen as little
more than a poverty problem. In reality, smallholder farmers, men and women alike,
are a vital global asset. Tey can be tremendously more productive, and are a key factor
for economic growth and development. Furthermore, their agricultural activities make
them vital to climate change adaptation and mitigation. How smallholders manage
natural resources, vegetation, forests and farming practices can either worsen climate
change, or, through sustainable farming systems, actually help sequester greenhouse
gases.
Te 2008 World Development Report clearly demonstrates that agricultural
development focusing on smallholders is the most efective way to increase the incomes of
the poor: agricultural growth is at least 2.5 times more efective in increasing the available
expenditure for the poorest third of the humankind than investments in any other segment
of the economy. Whats more, developing countries can build strong overall economic
growth on the agricultural sector, as seen for example in Ghana and Vietnam.
It is therefore critical that national budget allocations and international support to
ARD increase further. Future major sources of agricultural fnancing may arise with the
increasing recognition of farmers as providers of environmental services and custodians of
the largest terrestrial CO
2
pool. Tis may, in turn, result in farmers benefting from carbon
fnancing or from payments for environmental services. Any future fnancing scheme
related to climate change or environmental services must ensure access and benefts for
developing countries smallholder farmers.
Besides a broad mix of fnancing sources and origins, the fnancing of agricultural
development requires a creative mix of modalities for implementation that pays tribute to
the many realities in the agricultural world and that can be applied in specifc contexts and
locations. Modalities range from fnancing and providing technical assistance via projects
ideally as part of country-owned comprehensive programmes and supporting PBAs
and SWAps, to basket funding and sector- or general-budget support. In particular, PBAs/
SWAps ofer opportunities for up-scaling agricultural development and ensuring greater
efectiveness.
Attached to increased fnance and fnancing mechanisms is an urgent need in
ARD as in all other development sectors to apply and implement the principles of the
Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. Tese carry enormous potential to
enhance overall aid and development efectiveness and avoid the mistakes of the past.
Great emphasis must be placed on the coherence of policies in various dimensions and
at various levels. Within countries, agricultural policies and programmes must be in line
with other sectoral policies and with overall development policies and poverty reduction
programmes. Te international donor communitys agricultural policies need to be aligned
to the national ones and should be harmonised among donors themselves.
21
Te nexus function of ARD should also not be ignored. It is crucial to link poverty
reduction and agricultural development policies with climate change and sustainable
development policies at national and international levels. Economic development and
poverty reduction, the sustainable use of natural resources (including climate change
adaptation and mitigation), and food security are contingent upon one-another.
Understanding of this interconnectedness must be refected in all levels of policy.
To achieve the desired objective of sustainable, inclusive, country-owned and pro-poor
ARD, the process needs to be owned by partners, involving all stakeholders. Better aid
and development efectiveness is as much required as additional fnance. Te calls for the
establishment of enabling environments, built on the foundation of appropriate policies.
Above all, it requires functioning institutions that are capable of delivering on their
mandate. At farm level, there is an immense demand for agricultural advisory/extension
services, for making good use of existing knowledge. At the same time, other areas of
agricultural development urgently need more research activities, for example, adaptation
to climate change at the farm level. Tis highlights institutional capacity building as a
critical focus for investment in the agricultural sector.
Tere remain mixed signals for the fnancing of agricultural development. Overall,
public investment in ARD (national and international) is on the rise due to the new
visibility of agriculture. In Africa, the number of countries that meet or exceed the
Maputo pledge of 10% of national budget for ARD is growing. But many OECD countries
will fnd it hard to deliver on their pledges (like the pledge at Gleneagles and LAquila) in
the current economic climate. Te impacts of the fnancial and economic crisis seemed
to reach developing countries later than the developed world, but they too have been
hit hard. Already there is evidence of signifcantly reduced net private capital infows,
including foreign direct investment, and lower levels of remittances. Tis will surely have
an efect on the fnancing of agricultural development.
Te fnancial crisis should not be allowed to avert us from the fact that improving
agriculture is the single most cost-efective investment in economic development. If
anything, it should strengthen our commitment to pursuing sustainable and equitable
economic growth that is capable of withstanding the shocks of climate change to come.
Tis can be achieved if the necessary political will is forthcoming, creating an enabling
environment and unlocking required fnance. A mixed modalities approach to agriculture
and rural development, informed by the principles of aid and development efectiveness,
can provide the necessary leverage.
22
References
Advisory Group on Civil Society Aid Efectiveness (2008). Te International Forum on
Civil Society and Aid Efectiveness: A Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue. Final Report. Advisory
Group on Civil Society Aid Efectiveness, Gatineau, Canada.
De Klerk, T., 2008. Te rural fnance landscape: A practitioners guide (Agrodok 49).
Agromisa Foundation and CTA, Wageningen, the Netherlands. Available at: http://www.
networklearning.org/library/task,doc_download/gid,112/
Eicher, C., 2003. Flashback: Fify years of donor aid to African agriculture; revised
conference paper presented at the InWEnt, IFPRI, NEPAD, CTA conference Successes
in African Agriculture Pretoria December 1-3, 2003. Available at: http://www.ifpri.org/
events/conferences/2003/120103/papers/paper16.pdf
Fan, S., Omilola, B., Lambert, M., 2009. Public spending for agriculture in Africa (ReSAKSS
Working Paper No. 28). IFPRI, Washington, DC, USA. Available at: http://www.resakss.org/
Fan, S., Johnson, M., Saurkar, A. and Makombe, T., 2009a. Investing in African agriculture
to halve poverty by 2015 (ReSAKSS Working Paper No. 25). IFPRI, Washington, DC, USA.
Available at: http://www.resakss.org/
Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, 2009. Sharpening the rural focus of Poverty
Reduction Strategies Context, lessons and way forward.
Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, 2009. Joint Donor Principles for ARD
Programmes.
Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, 2008. An Overview of Agricultural Donor
Coordination Structures at the Country Level in Africa.
Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, 2006. On common ground: A joint donor
concept on rural development.. Available at: http://www.donorplatform.org/component/
option,com_docman/Itemid,/task,doc_download/gid,388/
Hudson Institute, 2009. Index of global philanthropy 2008. Center for Global Prosperity,
Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, USA. Available at: https://www.hudson.org/fles/
documents/2008%20Index%20-%20Low%20Res.pdf
OECD (2009). OEC.Stat Extracts. DAC1 Of cial and Private Flows. http://stats.oecd.org/
Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE5. Accessed 4 September 2009.
World Bank, 2007. World Development Report 2008 Agriculture for Development.
Washington, DC, USA.
World Bank (2009). 2009 World Development Indicators. Washington, DC, USA.
World Bank (2009). Swimming against the tide: How developing countries are coping
with the Global Crisis. Washington, DC, USA.
23
Case study 1: ETHIOPIA
Shifting paradigms: famine prevention
Maria Strintzos and Mulugeta Berhanu
Relief Society of Tigray (REST)
Tis case study examines outcomes of the Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP)
and the ability of well-structured investments in agricultural productivity and actions
for improving resiliency, to graduate poor households out of chronic food insecurity.
Introduction
Food insecurity in Ethiopia is chronic and pervasive. Key triggers are recurrent
shocks, usually drought, and factors that create and augment vulnerability to shocks
and undermine livelihoods. Tese factors include land degradation, limited household
assets, low levels of farm technology, lack of employment opportunities and population
pressure (compounded by low levels of education and human capabilities and high
disease prevalence). For decades the common response to persistent food insecurity
was emergency relief resourced through an unpredictable annual appeals process. Even
though large-scale food aid deliveries were provided, ofen at great expense, these were
rarely adequate, timely or exerted meaningful impact. To cope households disposed of
assets and restricted consumption, causing a downward spiral into poverty and eventual
destitution.
Emergency spending continues nevertheless to crowd out development spending
even though the majority of poor Ethiopians live in rural areas, rely on agriculture
for their livelihoods and face predictable annual food defcits caused mainly by
agricultural production constraints and poverty. Moving out of intractable food
insecurity therefore demands fexible, predictable and long term development
support which avoids the failure of past prescriptions and instead seeks to build
on clear and identifable development successes. Recent experience in Ethiopia
suggests that encouraging innovative and collaborative thinking around agricultural
and rural development does ofer the best pathways out of chronic food insecurity.
Agriculture in Ethiopia
Agriculture in Ethiopia faces multifaceted challenges and is characterized as low input,
low output, subsistence oriented and mostly rainfed. Less than 1.5 percent of the total
cultivated area is under irrigation, despite massive fuctuations in rainfall (about half the
African average), impacting on productivity and exposing millions of poor to ever-growing
levels of vulnerability to shocks such as drought and market price fuctuations. Severe
environmental degradation, high rates of farmland soil erosion and poor soil fertility are
aggravating factors. High population density and limited options for labour mobility and
24
migration has resulted in small land plots that are subjected to further fragmentation. Tis
is particularly the case in the eastern highlands of Ethiopia (includes Tigray the location
of this case study), where the average household landholding size is about 0.6 hectares
and per capita food production is a mere 110 kg and does not meet minimum subsistence
needs even in normal year. Diversifcation of rural household livelihoods is poor and
consistent with low rates of non-farm returns which account for only 24 percent of rural
household incomes. Ultimately development assistance designed to bolster agricultural
productivity and food security in Ethiopia must properly address the challenges presented
by access to water for farming, conservation and restoration of existing environments and
associated soil degradation, and the lack of livelihood diversifcation.
Ethiopia productive safety net program and the international
aid response
Responses to food insecurity in Ethiopia have conventionally been dominated by
emergency relief that save lives but not livelihoods. Between 1994 and 2003 an average
of fve million Ethiopians were declared at risk and in need of emergency assistance every
year. Since 1998 the number of food aid benefciaries in Ethiopia fuctuated between fve
and fourteen million.
Realizing that food security was worsening, in 2005 the Government of Ethiopia
launched the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) to reduce the number of Ethiopians
sufering from extreme hunger, malnutrition and poverty and to create viable platforms
for sustainable community development. A fagship component of the Ethiopian Food
Security Program, the PSNP represents a marked shif away from a focus on short-
term food needs met through emergency relief, to addressing the underlying causes of
household food insecurity on a predictable and multi-year basis.
Te PSNP provides guaranteed social transfers to individuals chronically afected by
food insecurity as a means of preventing asset depletion at the household level, and in
compliment, to generate assets of high food security value at the community level. Multi-
layered and comprehensive, the program has fve aims:
to address immediate consumption needs;
to contribute to the rural transformation process;
to prevent the long-term consequences of short term consumption shortages;
to encourage household investment in productivity, and
to promote the viability of local markets by increasing household purchasing
power.
Currently, cash and food transfers are provided to over 7 million Ethiopians on the
basis of participation in labour-based public works (focus on the rehabilitation of the
environment to make agriculture more productive and sustainable), or in the form of
direct support to households who are labour poor and cannot undertake public works.
Te ultimate program goal is to facilitate a stepped process of graduation out of food self
25
insuf ciency - a process defned by the national safety net guidelines as having occurred
when in the absence of safety net transfers a household is able to meet its food needs for all
12 months of the year and is adequately resilient to withstand modest shocks.
Ethiopias PSNP is principally a government program implemented within government
structures and systems, but is fnancially resourced in full, by international donors. Main
donors are the European Union (EC), the World Bank (WB), Development Cooperation
Ireland (DCI), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Canada
International Development Agency (CIDA), and UK Department for International
Development (DFID) and the Netherlands Development Agency (NDA). Because there
is signifcant donor commitment to the program, by 2008 the PSNP grew into one of the
largest social protection schemes in the countrys history having channeled assistance to
nearly 7.3 million food insecure people (about 11% of Ethiopias total population) located
in 274 Waredas (Districts), spread over 7 of Ethiopias 10 regions. Te annual operational
budget ranges from US$ 250 million to US$ 300 million. And for the frst time, ODA for
the PSNP is channeled via common and harmonized government fnancial systems on
the basis of government development policies, priorities and implementation guidelines,
signaling improved donor coordination and approaches to aid delivery in Ethiopia. Tis
is in line with the More and Better (MaB) principle 1: Aid should support the programs and
policies developed by the recipient communities and countries.
Aid should be provided in a manner that does not disrupt local production and
markets. It should support long term development and respond to the expressed needs of
local communities. Local and national food security should be a top priority for aid. Aid
should lead to greater autonomy and self- reliance of the recipient countries with regard
to food production and availability of food for all. Aid should strengthen the local control
of resources and reach the intended benefciaries in rural areas.
The Productive Safety Net Program in Tigray
Tigray is one of the most food insecure regions in Ethiopia owing to high levels of
vulnerability caused by repeated shocks (drought and confict) together with diminished
entitlements, low natural resource endowments and limited access to infrastructure
(water and health services). Since the late 1970s, the fragility of household economies in
the region has increased in the face of eroded coping strategies and limited opportunities
for income and employment. Malnutrition, ill health and asset depletion has followed
pushing households further down the poverty ladder and placing them at risk of famine.
Responses to these food security crises have in turn perpetuated the vicious poverty cycle
by applying relief solutions to fundamentally structural problems and taking action afer
coping strategies and lives have been lost.
To reduce vulnerability to shocks in rural subsistence economies in Tigray,
the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), an Ethiopian NGO established in 1978, began
implementing the Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Program in January 2005.
Efectively using cash and food resources donated by USAID, REST adapted the
26
Productive Safety Net Program framework to better refect the Tigray context and
introduced innovative approaches and interventions that have sustainable livelihood
and food security benefts for almost 400,000 benefciaries in 6 Waredas (Districts).
Targeting mechanisms and aid delivery to the most needy
Targeting is defned as the process of identifying the intended benefciaries of a program,
and then ensuring that, as far as possible, the benefts actually reach those and not others
(Sharp: 2001). In situations where aid budgets are constrained and poverty objectives
dictate that assistance is given only to specifc vulnerable groups, selecting some people
and excluding others, is unavoidable if scarce aid resources are to be allocated efectively.
In ensuring efectiveness of aid in reaching the worlds poor and hungry, the design of
appropriate and fair targeting instruments is crucial, as stated in the MaB principle 8:
Eforts should foster linkages between the local, national and global, opportunities for learning
and knowledge sharing. Better Aid should provide platforms for the exchange of experience
globally, provide nationally coherent programs for delivery of Aid, and should foster linkages
among local eforts. It should address problematic structures and mechanisms that limit the
efectiveness of aid in reaching the worlds poor and hungry.
Coherence and linkages
Eforts should foster linkages between the local, national and global, opportunities for
learning and knowledge sharing. Better Aid should provide platforms for the exchange
of experience globally, provide nationally coherent programs for delivery of Aid, and
should foster linkages among local eforts. It should address problematic structures and
mechanisms that limit the efectiveness of aid in reaching the worlds poor and hungry.
Targeting of PSNP benefciaries in Tigray is participatory and community based. Conducted
in compliance with the government PSNP Program Implementation Manual (PIM), the
selection of public work and direct support benefciaries is carried out by democratically
elected Community and Food Security Targeting Committees. Decisions are made on the
basis of full discussions by participating communities and an assessment of food insecurity
and humanitarian needs, at mass meetings of the local council (Baito). Local Development
Committees prepare a list detailing the neediest in the community, and present this to
the community for further information, debate and verifcation. In this way benefciary
identifcation and selection takes place in a participatory manner from the village level.
Te presence of the full community is considered to allow for objective and exhaustive
assessment of whom the program should target and also which activities to pursue based
on appropriateness and priority. Specifc eligibility criteria in Tigray include:
households that are vulnerable, chronically food insecure, face severe household food
shortages and are profoundly asset-poor;
having received relief food aid for a period of 3 or more consecutive years and
experiencing household food gaps of 3 or more months;

27
deteriorating health and nutrition status;
without the assistance will resort to negative coping mechanisms such as distress
migration;
alling under the identifed Productive Safety Net Program operational area characterized
as environmentally degraded and afected by drought and war; and
willingness to participate and work on food security initiatives.
Errors and abuse are inevitable in any targeting system. Te key question is: how
efectively are these detected and corrected? To circumvent targeting weaknesses,
the PSNP in Tigray incorporates a grievance procedure at local level to allow
individuals who feel unfairly excluded from the program to appeal for inclusion.
Te community targeting process is closely monitored by REST to verify
transparency and check for fair and participatory elements, especially in the
targeting of vulnerable households, and in particular those headed by women.
Gender targeting in the Ethiopia productive safety net program
Gender is a key
Women play a major role in agricultural production and in local food security. Better
Aid facilitates the empowerment of women, recognizing the fundamental importance
they hold in providing food for their families and for the community (MaB principle 6).
Women constitute nearly half the rural workforce in Tigray and are deemed vulnerable
and poor making them a priority for PSNP inclusion. PSNP eligibility criteria are
well-defned and are generally well applied by local targeting institutions, but practical
challenges in the targeting of women persist. Major concerns are the proper accounting
of labour poor women headed households in labour-intensive public works; the heavy
workloads generated by public works; and the potential weakness of womens voice in
appeal systems.
To address these challenges and ensure women are empowered to gain adequate access
to opportunities provided under the PSNP, REST has long advocated for PSNP targeting
using a gender lens and for the inclusion of women as safety net benefciaries and as
decision makers. As a result poor women are increasingly represented in local PSNP
decision making structures like community targeting and appeal systems, and there are
notable improvements in working hours on public works enabling women to combine
participation in the safety net program with other domestic and social activities. Direct
support transfers are also now guaranteed to pregnant and lactating women and eforts are
made to reduce the burden of child care and free up womens time to take part in public
work activities. Te key measures REST has taken to mainstream gender in the PSNP and
at the local level are:
Direct negotiations with local Food Security Task Forces to increase the representation of
women in local targeting as well as appeal committees resulting in the representation of

28
women through their local women association in local community targeting committees
(currently 30% of committee members) and enhanced decision making powers.
Sensitizing grassroots program implementers and community targeting systems
through a set of gender awareness trainings to negotiate on womens participation and
ownership of the PSNP.
Design and promotion of alternative, innovative public work activities that are less
labour intensive and ft the livelihood circumstances of labour poor women headed
households. E.g. training of women heads of households as Community Resource
Persons to provide health, hygiene and HIIV/AIDS education to PSNP households and
enumerated as a public work transfer; and recommending the need for fexibility in
the targeting system for inclusion of labour poor women households as direct support
benefciaries.
Although the targeting of PSNP benefciaries is primarily the task of the government, the
direct involvement of REST in targeting has proven instrumental in embedding fairness
and checks and balances in the process. Opportunity costs associated with PSNP inclusion
have generally been minimized by REST by especially designed gender-sensitive public
works that reduce work burdens, by better applying direct support transfers to maintain
womens health status and inserting women within the governance structure of the PSNP
as a strategy for heightened empowerment.
Implications for sustainable livelihoods
Sustainability
Livelihoods are sustainable when they can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks
that threaten food security without undermining their natural resource base. Building local
capital, social systems, fnancial capital and the natural resources on which they depend
is critical. Better aid should be guided by a clear development paradigm supportive of
the principles of social, economic and environmental sustainability and intergenerational
equity (MaB principle 7).
Te majority of safety net programs aim to redistribute resources to poor people as a
means of reducing chronic poverty or to protect the poor against livelihood risks. Safety
nets can both reduce poverty in the short-term and, when coupled with other eforts, have
the potential to contribute to broader and sustainable livelihood improvements in the
long run. To achieve both short term and long term goals equally and efectively, critical
enabling elements in the wider environment need to be in place.
By efectively using cash and food resources contributed by USAID, REST has adapted
the Productive Safety Net Program framework to better refect the Tigray context and
introduced an array of approaches and interventions that have sustainable livelihood and
food security benefts for many rural poor (MaB principle 7) as follows.

29
Maximizing public works to attain sustainable livelihoods
Public works are an important element of safety net programs in reaching the poor
throughout Africa. Transfers for public works ofer short term wages or food inputs to
meet immediate consumption needs, and if carefully designed, can build needed assets at
community level. In Tigray, REST invests its public work resources largely on environmental
conservation, water harvesting and irrigation, basic social services (schools, clinics), and
the facilitation of market access through road and market shed construction.
Environmental conservation executed as public works encompass integrated physical
and biological measures to conserve soil and water resources and consist of hillside
terraces, check dams, gully reclamation, bund stabilization with grass/fodder trees and
soil fertility enhancements, natural regeneration of indigenous vegetation through area
enclosure, tree seedling production and plantation on degraded lands. Utilizing integrated
and sequenced watershed management approaches, achievements to date in recovering
the environment and improving rural livelihoods are impressive. Tis has been done
by creating environmental balance through increased vegetation cover and halting land
degradation, and by generating additional and sustainable means of livelihoods to bolster
household economic and social development.
REST treats water access as a frontline measure to bring about sustained food security
and livelihood improvements due to its profound role in reducing risk, increasing health
and improving agricultural productivity in highly rain dependant agricultural farming
systems such as in Tigray. By mobilizing thousands of PSNP benefciaries under the
public work component, numerous water harvesting and micro-irrigation structures have
been constructed for household and community level use and for potable water supply at
community schools and clinics. Technologies include: river diversions, check dam ponds,
mini-dams, underground water tankers, hand dug wells, community ponds, springs and
roof rainwater harvesting schemes. As a result, access to irrigation water, drinking water
and water for livestock has improved signifcantly and is contributing to sustained food
security through improvements in productivity, health, income, and employment.
Promoting the means of livelihood diversication
In a dry land area like Tigray in which rainfall is erratic and landholdings are small,
building sustainable livelihoods through seasonal safety net transfers alone is dif cult.
What safety net transfers can do, at most, is fll short term food security needs and create
the conditions by which the chronically poor can seize opportunities. Rather it is this
relatively secure position of the poor, which can be built on through exposure to new
livelihood options capable of diversifying incomes and serving as sustainable platforms
out of chronic food and livelihood insecurity.
In Tigray safety net transfers combined with community assets developed using
public works are laying the foundation for the emergence of new livelihoods. Following
the implementation of various soil and water harvesting structures, tree plantation
and expansion of area enclosures (communal multi-purpose conservation zones), the
30
natural resource potentials in most REST project sites is growing and this is refected in
increased top soil accumulation, increases in the level of surface and underground water
and increased vegetation cover. Te build-up of these resources is in turn providing new
opportunities for boosting food production and for diversifying the livelihoods of target
communities.
To take advantage of the growing environmental resources for livelihood gains, REST
is supporting its PSNP benefciaries through the supply of small-scale technologies that
enhance capacity to utilize the developed environmental resources. Technology inputs in
support of livelihood diversifcation eforts are: treadle, hand and motor pumps for lifing
harvested water so that farmers can engage in small scale irrigation activities; improved
beehives to make use of the increased vegetation cover on communal lands for honey
production; improved livestock production for fattening and milk production by adopting
controlled grazing and using fodder collected on a cut and carry system from rehabilitated
communal lands.
Even though small on a regional scale, the livelihood diversifcation actions promoted
by REST are signifcantly contributing to increasing household incomes and thus food
security, underpinning the potential for suitable livelihoods among numerous households.
Many farmers are now involved in small-scale irrigation activities and in producing
high value crops like vegetables, fruits starting to earn better incomes. Area enclosures
(communal multi-purpose conservation zones) are an added bonus especially for landless
youth who are now keeping bees and producing honey, taking advantage of the increased
vegetation cover on communal areas. Degraded and marginal lands reclaimed using
erosion control measures are also providing these young people with access to land
through the redistribution of rehabilitated communal lands facilitated by REST.
Improving smallholder linkages and access to markets
Improved environmental and water endowments generated by the PSNP are impacting
on agricultural productivity and farm enterprise in high value crops, fruit and honey
production to result in a gradual expansion and diversifcation of household income sources.
For accelerated and sustained graduation out of the PSNP however, complimentary eforts
that promote access to markets by smallholder producers are essential.
In its PSNP, REST is promoting better access to markets by strengthening community
institutions (producer/user groups and cooperatives), facilitating access to capital by linking
farmer groups to local microfnance institutions, and developing market infrastructure
(rural access roads, market sheds, processing centers and storage facilities). Over the past
four years, more than 220 honey/bee producer groups, 20 milk processing and marketing
cooperatives and over 150 irrigation water user groups have been organized with the
support of REST and are now facilitating the marketing of agro-products for members. In
addition to its role in encouraging the formation of marketing groups and skill training,
REST is facilitating access to critical agricultural inputs and technologies such as honey
31
processing and packaging materials, and milk processing equipment to increase shelf life.
Infrastructure development is a crucial market intervention and includes the construction
of rural access roads to ease the transportation of agricultural products and stimulate
market penetration; and the construction of market-sheds for village petty traders (who
are mostly women) involved in grain and vegetable production to improve marketing
facilities and to avoid product wastage at market sites due to improper handlings and
storage. In general, those eforts have been instrumental in enabling producer groups to
improve the quality of their produce and gain access to sustainable market outlets having
a better return.
Additional eforts to link local producer groups with the private sector are also bearing
encouraging results. To date REST has built strong linkage between honey producer
groups and two private honey processing and packaging companies that operate in Tigray
and have commenced the export of local Tigrayan honey to the Middle East. Eforts are
also underway to establish livestock fattening farmer groups with a recently established
privately run abattoir. As most of the production in Tigray is subsistence orientated with
limited commercialization of farming, REST will continue to focus its support in preparing
smallholders for market entry, and in creating market opportunities and linkages at the
local, regional and national levels.
Building human capabilities
Building capacity goes hand in hand with building and maintaining partnership. By desire
and by necessity, REST works with many partners ranging from the Tigray government
and non-governmental agencies to local communities. Te strength of these relationships
infuences the program outcomes and the ability to sustain the results over time.
REST does this by providing continuous training and skill development to strengthen
human capital in PSNP target areas such that communities and public of ces have the
physical and intellectual capacity to implement and sustain food security actions in an
accountable manner. Major interventions are capacity development of public of ces in
the implementation and management of productive safety net and other poverty oriented
programs, group and cooperative formation, training and technical assistance and Early
Warning Systems for disaster mitigation and preparedness.
RESTs activities in the Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Program
A broad menu of linked public work and direct support activities are ofered in the REST
PSNP and stress market-led approaches as a strategy out of food insecurity. Drawing on
available REST technical expertise twinned with food aid and cash inputs from USAID,
the REST PSNP activities are diverse and vast in number, have technical depth, utilize
local capabilities and exert good impact and cost-efectiveness. In 2008 REST expended
over 90 percent of its public works budget on natural resource management and water
32
harvesting activities. Tis is in line with organizational priorities to invest in strategies
that mitigate the devastating impacts of extreme moisture stress, climatic variability and
environmental degradation on livelihoods in rural Tigray.
Impacts of the Productive Safety Net Program
REST has found that the productive safety net program is superior to traditional food aid
programs due to the guarantee of predictable resources available to fll household food
gaps and to bolster asset portfolios at multiple levels
12
. Although there are areas of the
PSNP that require further work such as linkage with other food security programs to
accelerate graduation, and access to markets, positive results are evident. By 2008, about
19,846 people (5 percent of the REST PSNP caseload) achieved food self suf ciency and
exited the PSNP. Graduates credited successive food transfers combined with access to
irrigation water and opportunities for livelihood diversifcation (beekeeping, dairy and
small ruminants) as the main reasons for their success.
REST Nutrition and Household Economic Studies (REST 2008) found that household
asset ownership of livestock, tools and domestic belongings doubled in value since 2005. In
other areas of Ethiopia, by 2006, three out of fve benefciaries avoided sale of productive
12 Assessment of PSNP impact are currently being undertaken however the ndings are not available for this case study.
Menu of REST PSNP Activities
Natural Resource Management (soil and water conservation, reforestation, capacity
building in NRM)
Rural Roads
Water Harvesting and Micro Irrigation (wide and small diameter hand dug wells,
underground water tankers, springs for irrigation, irrigation check dams, mini-dam,
river diversion)
Roof Rainwater Harvesting (for schools, health facilities)
Livestock Development (fodder development/enrichment, livestock watering points,
bee fora and water points)
Crop Development (production and distribution of fruit, vegetables, root crops and
oil crops)
Strengthening Agricultural Marketing (construction of market sheds)
Education (formal school upgrading, Adult Functional Literacy, advocacy on girl
child education)
Health (health, nutrition and HIV/AIDS education, capacity building of Community
Resource Persons)
33
assets (animals) to buy food - a common distress response and over 90 percent of them
attributed this directly to the PSNP (UNDP: 2008b); (Sharp et al: 2006).
Nutrition security is improving with falls in stunting, underweight and wasting by 11.8%,
10.7% and 3% over the period 2005 to 2008.
Agricultural productivity results include: increases in crop yields, increases in
underground water availability at shallow depths, reemergence of once dried-up springs,
increased access to irrigation and high value crop coverage, enhanced vegetation coverage
on communal lands with over 10 million seedlings planted annually.
Public work outputs between 2005 to 2008 are: soil and water conservation structures
like terraces and bunds constructed over 40,158 hectare of hillside catchments and
farmlands, 105 gullies treated, 337 water harvesting check dams built, 594 hand dug wells,
139 underground tankers, 16 small river diversions, 10 mini dams, 850 km of rural access
roads constructed, 5,803 adults attended functional literacy classes, 10,778 households
accessed information/knowledge on health, nutrition and HIV/AIDS
Lessons learnt
Since the commencement of the PSNP a number of key lessons have emerged:
Te Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Program can be considered an important and positive
indicator of renewed donor commitment of aid to Ethiopia. Implemented through a
common negotiated framework (including a Memorandum of Understanding on key
agreements and principles of the program, and operational manuals such as the Program
Implementation Manual (PIM), Community Based Watershed Management manual
(CBWM), a critical platform for good donorship is evidenced in harmonized systems
of aid channeling, willingness to coordinate and align with Government of Ethiopia
policies, priorities and programs, and entrenched ownership and accountability in the
recipient country. Good governance by the Government of Ethiopia is indicated by
the robustness of PSNP institutional arrangements from the village to national levels,
participatory dialogue and program formulation with donors and NGOs, and program
implementation and management.
Te Productive Safety Net Program has triggered a unique process of rural transformation
in Tigray and created the right conditions for economic take-of. Tis has been achieved
by taking deliberate and integrated actions using food transfers to preserve, expand
and diversify asset ("tiret in Tigrinya) portfolios; encourage risk-taking, particularly
in the uptake of credit for agricultural investments; boosting incomes via returns on
farm enterprises and sale of agricultural produce including staple and high value crops;
and promoting agricultural productivity and diversity overall. Social capital has also
developed through improved rates of food consumption and better access to education
and health services. Building peasant farmer confdence and aspirations to invest in
productivity and seek out routes that best lead to livelihood improvements is essential.
To continue creating opportunities to climb out of poverty, the prevailing momentum

34
must be maintained at current or higher levels of funding/investment in order to
complete the graduation cycle and ensure sustainability of PSNP results.
Integration and linkage of the PSNP with other food security programs and resources
is imperative if graduation is to be achieved. In particular, market linkages should
be strengthened to prompt on- and of farm income diversifcation and encourage
viable farm enterprise. Participation of NGOs and the public and private sectors are
recommended.
While the safety net program afords important food security support to poor women,
there are parallel opportunity costs inherent in their PSNP participation that must be
checked. Opportunity costs include exceptionally high work burdens, performance
of energy sapping physical activities for extended periods of time in extremely harsh
conditions that may worsen food and nutrition security rather than improve it (i.e.
potential for more kilocalories to be expended in carrying out public works against
kilocalories consumed), and lowered opportunities and time available to take-up
agricultural packages or engage in alternative productive activities.
Te PSNP is promoting social cohesion, efective social mobilization strategies and
peaceful coexistence within communities. Tis has arisen due to joint actions in
targeting, the implementation of "common good" initiatives over extended periods of
time, and deepened social responsibility towards marginalized groups such as people
living with HIV/AIDS and orphans (e.g. establishment of community funds comprised
of small food contributions by PSNP benefciaries to support people living with HIV/
AIDS).
Combating chronic food insecurity requires an integrated watershed management
approach that comprehensively addresses all dimensions of food security (availability,
access and utilization), and equally considers the interplay of economic, social and
political factors as key determinants of poverty. Terefore, for observable change
in food security and as incentive to smallholder farmers to invest in broad based
development actions, watershed approaches need to be scaled-up and activities
integrated overall (intensifcation). It is therefore important to continue investing in
high quality and a diverse range of public works sequenced with support for livelihoods,
market development, capacity building, health and education if sustained graduation is
ultimately to occur.
Policy implications
Donor support for aid programs that create platforms out of food insecurity by the
majority of smallholder farmers in Ethiopia, and are aligned with government and
community priorities and structures, have proven to work well. Good donorship
and robust donor with government/community engagement is enshrined in the

35
Productive Safety Net Program launched in 2005 as an innovative move away from
relief food-based responses to structural challenges. Designed to provide transfers to
chronically food insecure households to smooth consumption and preserve assets as
a means of building resiliency to shocks, an enhanced PSNP is called for with a focus
on concentrated investments in public works that generate community assets that have
fow-on livelihood impacts for the household. For this to happen means suf cient
resources are available to provide the material and human investments needed to ensure
the quality and sustainability of PSNP outputs (e.g. check dams, roads) and execute a
quality safety net program overall.
Aid to Ethiopia is leveling of and new commitments are falling. Tis is unfortunate
as it comes at a time when aid for helping the people of Ethiopia should be increasing
and when capacity for aid delivery and utilization is expanding. Scaling-up aid for
Ethiopia is a feasible proposition and both donors and government owe it to the people
of Ethiopia to make this a reality.
If chronic poverty is to be eradicated, it is necessary to prioritize livelihood security,
reduce vulnerability and increase opportunity. A much greater emphasis is needed on
preventing and mitigating the shocks and insecurities that create and maintain chronic
poverty. Tis is not only about providing recovery assistance but also giving chronically
poor people a secure position from which to seize opportunities and demand their
rights. Tis demands a greater focus on programs that promote sustainable and diverse
livelihoods and ofer integrated solutions to food insecurity that are also suited to local
contexts and capabilities.
Aid efectiveness for sustained results is essential. In Ethiopia channeling of aid for
agriculture and rural development to local stakeholders ofers development pathways
that guarantee ef cient returns on investments, and promotes processes that are
participatory, consultative and embed ownership of development agendas and results
in local hands. Transformation of channels of aid in Ethiopia is a precursor for building
social and economic assets of the most vulnerable to transition out of poverty.

36
Abbreviations /Acronyms
CBWM Community Based Watershed Management
CIDA Canada International Development Agency
DCI Development Cooperation Ireland
DFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
EU European Union
LPWHH Labour Poor Women Headed Household
MOFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (of Ethiopia)
NDA Netherland Development Agency
ODA Of cial Development Assistance
PLWHA People Living With HIV/AIDS
PIM Program Implementation Manual (for Ethiopias Safety Net Program)
PSNP Productive Safety Net Program (of Ethiopia)
REST Relief Society of Tigray
UNDP United Nation Development Program
USAID United State Agency for International Development
WB World Bank
Methodology used for this study
A mix of approaches is used for the More and Better case study in Ethiopia encompassing: a
review of literature to gauge ODA and agricultural performance in Ethiopia (Government
reports and assessments of poverty and ODA; case institution reports and program reviews;
donor country strategies); consultations with rural communities and local governments to
establish the factors that facilitate better aid and agricultural outcomes; assessment of the
contributions and impacts of the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) on food security;
and interviews with program implementers, Relief Society of Tigray (REST), to establish
the efectiveness of aid in lifing vulnerable households out of poverty, on a practical
level.
37
Case Study 2: ETHIOPIA
The quality of aid to Ethiopia
Abstract of a Research Report prepared for The Citizens Solidarity for Campaign
Against Famine in Ethiopia (CS-CAFE
13
), by Ethiopian Economic Association/
Ethiopian Economic Policy research Institute
14
.
Introduction
Te general objective of the study is to critically assess the quantity and quality of aid to
Ethiopia with particular focus to agriculture, rural development and food security since
the year 2000 as a point of departure, but comparing with performance of aid in previous
years.
It is quite well known that due to inadequate domestic resources needed to implement
development needs and to cope with shocks like drought and famine, Ethiopia has been
dependent on international assistance in many ways: humanitarian- relief, donations
and technical assistance over the last three decades. To date, a large number of people
in the country, especially in rural areas, is supported by foreign assistance in the food
security and productive safety-net programs. Of cial aid also serves as important resource
for other national development programs. According to the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC), net disbursements of ODA to Ethiopia rose to over 1.8 billion USD
from it average level of 1.2 billion USD in 1989 -1990. Ethiopia is one of the Sub-Saharan
African countries known for receiving signifcant amount of foreign aid. It receives 5%
of the total aid given to Africa. Total aid received as a percentage of GDP has increased
from 5.7% in 1990/2000 to 11.8% in 2003/04. During this period aid contributes to 38%
and 59%, respectively, of the resource gap of the country. Resource gap is the diference
between gross domestic investment and gross domestic saving.
Given its history the role of external aid for the national economy of Ethiopia has
been signifcant. Not only has the aid in the form of food saved millions of lives during
disasters following recurrent droughts and famine, but also contributed resources needed
to implement various development programs and projects. However, there is not much
evidence documented as to how far the various components of aid to the country were
of the required quality. Similarly, the efectiveness of the aid resources utilization, the
adequacy of the countrys absorptive capacity were not adequately known. With the
premises that Ethiopia will continue to seek signifcant amount of foreign aid in the foreseen
future, quality aid and its efective utilization for attaining the desired socio-economic
development is imperative. Tis study tries to assess and empirically address pertinent
questions related to foreign aid for Ethiopia. Efective use of aid has become a topical issue
13 CS-CAFE is a member of the More and Better campaign
14 The Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute (EEPRI) is the research, training, and publication wing of the Ethiopian
Economic Association, a not for prot organization. The full report is available at http://eeaecon.org/research.php
38
global issue. Hence, a large part of the literature on foreign aid has been devoted to the
analysis of aid efectiveness and its determinants. Literature underlines that Aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa has been less efective in promoting economic development than has
aid to other regions. Among other factors, policies in the recipient countries of Africa
play the most important role in determination of aids efectiveness. Tere is a general
understanding that Ethiopia does not have aid policy. Although some regions had the
desire to prepare aid resources strategy, there is no government policy directive to base
on. Tere is, however, an aid resource allocation strategy in the framework of County
Action Plan for Budget. Financial resources fow to the regional governments through
the various channels used by the government. Tese are called channels I, II and III.
Channel I and II are channels for the fow of budgetary resources allocated from the
treasury. Channel III refers to the fow route used by the UN agencies. Tis study reveals
that the mechanism of foreign aid resources fow and its accounting is very complex. It
is only lately that foreign aid resources have started to be coordinated and channeled
through defned regional government organs. In addition, the fow of aid resources to
regions used to be in a fragmented way without having a coordination of fows from
various sources. It is observed that foreign aid resources allocation to regions is not
clearly known to the regional states. Some of them say that although they know what
the country gets, what they get is not known to them exactly. Tere is a varying view
among the regional governments experts as to which modality of aid deliver mechanism
is suitable (e.g. in the form of direct budget support vis a vis the recent basic services
protection).
One aspect of aid channeling mechanism is how aid is allocated to regions. According
to the formula devised by the federal government aid resources from the UN- agencies
reaches all regions. But there are other resources (aid as well as loan) which are not
shared by all regions. Tere are also equity issues raised on basic information as to which
NGO works where. Experts are of the opinion that, lack of clear and transparency in aid
allocation could be unfair leading to inequity of access to aid resources between regions.
Te implication is that there is a need for adequate information so that it will be possible
to integrate the various resources into budget formula. Budget of-setting is a serious
challenge to the regional governments. Because of the practice of budget of-setting (from
the amount received from treasury), regions do not want the increase in the amount of
aid they receive. Among the problems mentioned bout foreign aid are the use of foreign
consultants in conducting project appraisal resulting in delay of completion by several
months, serious delays of aid resources disbursement, composition of aid in Sof part vis
a vis hard parts, etc. Delay in disbursement of aid has to do also with the way aid resource
decision is made. Some donations need decisions to be made in USA, where the decision
making body is. A solution suggested for this kind of problem is to have some regional
liaison of ce. Among the various factors that afect aid quality, conditionality, schedule of
disbursement, timely delivery, the aid components and their extent (sof or hard parts),
the speed of decision made (e.g. no objection), harmonization of donors, resource use
39
fexibility, area specifcity, extent of bureaucratic decisions, extent of partnership created,
are widely raised.
With regard to the volume of aid resources, the issue of reaching the remote areas and
addressing equity is indicated to need more resource. In terms of volume, the amount
of aid received is not enough. Because the government resources largely (8090%) go
to recurrent budgets, it is more or less the donors money and popular participation (i.e.
labour input) that goes for investment purposes. Inability to use resources and report
on time is raised as a serious problems related to aid resources utilization. Staf turnover,
inadequacy in documentation, and information management particularly at the lower
levels are some of the challenges. Tere is a compliant on the government system for not
being able to provide mechanisms for staf incentive. Among the factors that determine
impact of aid resource are timing in delivery, conditionality, and extent of partnership.
Tere is also a view that aid will have an efect in a sustainable way if it is used in a holistic
manner and integrated, not using in a fragmented way. Decentralization is one of the
factors that have efects in aid resource allocation and use.
Financial management capacity at lower level is a major challenge of decentralization.
In recent years, a large volume of resource has been moving down to the woreda level.
In some cases, there is a case mentioned of the problem of (attitude) not seriously seeing
aid resources as important as the treasury resource. While donors complain about the
problem of low capacity of resource utilization, regions also request for more capacity
assistance by the donors. Tere is a need for harmonization of aid resources in order to
improve aid efectiveness. Due to lack of harmonization, there are conficts between free
access to benefts and some benefts upon payments. Tere is an argument by experts
interviewed in this study that while some woredas have no capacity to absorb budget
resources others with capacity have not suf cient resource. Te issue is whether capacity
to utilize resource is important than the equity aspects. In the same way, the comparative
advantage and return from investing a large amount of development assistance or treasury
resources in low potential drought-prone areas vis a vis high potential areas is raised by
experts.
Monitoring of development interventions supported by donor aid resource is an
important aspect that needs attention. Tere is no adequate monitoring of the efects of
aid resources on socio-economic development. Te reasons are problems of ef ciency of
the benefciary sectors and the fact that only physical assessments are made which are not
adequate to show the real efects. Problem of aid project distribution in a given region
is mentioned as one of the challenges. Tere are some arguments that donor fnanced
projects are not equitably distributed in a given region.
Constraints to efective utilization of foreign aid resources are motioned to be due
to inability to meet the commitments in time from the donor side and, and lack of
implementation capacity particularly at the lower implementing bodies (woreda) is
frequently raised as a major obstacle.
Based on the assessments made in this study and the major fndings, some policy
40
implications and way forward are suggested. Tese include: making solutions for
implementation problems and support for capacity building as part of aid; capacity
building at the lower levees of aid implementing bodies; for some donors to have regional
liaison of ce for fast decisions; the need for adequate information on aid resource
sharing so that it will be possible to integrate the various resources into budget formula;
the need for strengthening aid resources documentation, and reporting mechanism
at the lower levels (woreda) where resources are utilized; establishment of properly
functioning and strong aid resources utilization and impact monitoring mechanism in
order to help not only improve aid efectiveness, but also to resolve the problems and
constraints that hinder utilization of resources, including improvements in utilization
of the existing human and material resources capacity, if the country succeeds to obtain
more international aid.
The role of foreign aid in development in Ethiopia
Seen on all parameters, Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries of the world. Tis is illustrated
by the fact that signifcant proportion of the population live on less than a dollar per day
income, which is below the minimum required level of income for livelihood. Recent data
provided by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED, 2005)) shows
that Some 31 million people live below a poverty line equivalent to 45 US cents per day.
According to Government fgures (MoFED, 2007), the national poverty measured by the
headcount index has fallen by nearly 7 percentage points, from 49.5 % in 1996 to 38.7
% in 2005. Te Ethiopian Economy is predominantly an agrarian, in which agriculture
accounts for 47 % the GDP, more than 80% of exports, and employs 85% of the population.
Despite potentially productive and huge resource base, the agricultural sector sufers a
periodic drought that inficts food shortage and famine, soil degradation, deforestation,
high population and pressure on resources, low water resources development, and poor
infrastructure and services. As a result this large sector is characterized by low land and
labour productivity. Te average annual per capita income is about 120 USD
15
, which is the
lowest compared to the other Sub-Saharan countries. With regard to the other aspects of
human development, among others, the country is characterized by high infant mortality
rate, HIV/AIDS infection, and illiteracy. Recent achievements in expansion of education
and basis health services are very much encouraging.
Due to inadequate domestic resources to implement development needs and to
cope with economic shocks like drought, Ethiopia has been dependent on international
assistance in many ways: humanitarian- relief, donations and technical assistance over the
last three decades. Even to date, quite a large number of people in the country, especially in
rural areas, is supported by foreign assistance in the food security and productive safetynet
programs, and of cial aid serves as important resource for other national development
programs. To break out of the quagmire of pervasive poverty and to realize long-term
15 The latest report by the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE, 2006/07) provides that in the year to 2006/07, per capita GDP at current
market price reached 255.4 USD.
41
and sustainable development in the country, the role and importance of more and better
quality international assistance is still very high.
As all needs cannot be met all at once with international assistance, the development
needs should be focused and to be put forward in an order of priority. Prompting and
supporting the agricultural and rural development sector and ensuring food security
is taken as a priority number one development agenda for the country. To emancipate
the country from the shackles of abject poverty, diferent policies and strategies have
been formulated and implementation is underway. Agricultural Development Led
Industrialization (ADLI) strategy, the poverty reduction strategies- the frst generation
called Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) and its second
generation Plan for Accelerated Development to Eradicate Poverty (PASDEP) are popular
examples, among others.
As poverty reduction is not only a national agenda, but has also become an international
concern, several donors are committed to support SDPRP and now PASDEP as part
of their commitment to realize the poverty reduction eforts of Ethiopia. Te Poverty
Reduction Strategy Programs and a plan to achieve the Million Development goals, and
other sectoral plans have been designed envisaging signifcant infow of fnancial resource
from external aid.
Another important mode of aid delivery to Ethiopia is food aid. Ethiopia has been
receiving food aid amounting to an average volume of over 700,000 MT per annum during
the last two decades. Te amount of food aid has been increasing with large volumes
during years of serve droughts in the country. Food aid has been delivered in various
forms including emergency food aid, project- based food for-work, monetized food, etc.
Given its history the role of external aid for the national economy of Ethiopia has
been signifcant. Not only has the aid in the form of food saved millions of lives during
disasters following recurrent droughts and famine, but also contributed resources to the
implementation of various development programs and projects. However, there is not
much evidence documented as to how far the various components of aid to the country
were of the required quality. Similarly, the efectiveness of the aid resources, the adequacy
of the countrys absorptive capacity and utilization are not adequately known. With
the premises that Ethiopia will continue to seek foreign aid in the foreseen future, the
fow of quality aid and its efective utilization for attaining the desired socio-economic
development is imperative. Tis study tries to empirically address pertinent questions
related to foreign aid for Ethiopia.
Aid to agriculture and rural development in Ethiopia
According to the world development report (World Bank 2008), Ethiopia received 129
million USD for agricultural sector in the form of ODA, an average for the pried 2003-
2005. During the same period food aid received was 1.2 million MT in cereals equivalent
On the other hand of cial government data obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture
and Rural Development (MOARD) shows that there are 23 projects in agricultural sector
42
and food security fnanced by external aid, loan and government money during the period
2002 to 2013. Out of these 18 of them are included in the capital budget while 6 are not
included. Te share of fnancial resources that comes from foreign aid amounts to 66% of
the total fnance of these projects.
Aid for food security
Food aid has been one of the major forms of foreign aid for Ethiopia. Data obtained from
DPPA shows that the food aid requirement, food delivered and distributed over the last
years has been fuctuating from year to year depending on the situation. Over the nine
years period (1998 -2006) a total of over 58 million people needed food aid. Te amount
of food required was 8.4 million MT out of which 5.1 million MT was delivered. Te total
quantity of food distributed was higher than the amount delivered may be due to domestic
resources supplementation . Te total estimated value of the distributed food during the
same period amounts to over 1.1 billion USD.
Resource allocations for food security programs and projects
Tere are various interventions in the national food security strategy and program
implementation processes. Various multilateral and bilateral donors are involved in
the support for food security. Food security programs are also supported by signifcant
amount of government budgets. Tere are also limited cases of loan for food security.
Although it is dif cult to distinguish between the diferent projects concerned with
food security, the data obtained from the MOARD shows that recently there have been
two major interventions in food security. Tese are the Productive Safety Net Program
(PSNP) fnanced by the EU, CIDA, DFID, IDA and the Food Security program mainly
supported by a loan from IDA and the Ethiopian government treasury resources. Tere
are also projectiles categorized under Food-For-Work and Household Food Security and
Nutrition Improvement.
In general, food security programs and projects valued at over 15.8 billion birr obtained
from donors in the form of aid have been under implementation. On the other hand over 1
billion birr has been obtained in the form of loan to implement the various foods security
program projects. In addition to the aid and loan resources, the Ethiopian government has
allocated over 6.4 bullion birr to implement the food security programs planned for the
years 2002-2008 and 2005-2010.
Te productive safety net program is benefting about 7.2 million people who are living
in 244 woredas in the country. Out of this total number of benefciaries, 3.6 million gets
assistance in the form of food while 3.6 million gets cash transfers.
Food security programs are the mandates of the federal government. Te program
includes: PSNP and Food Security. Te regional governments make agreement with the
federal government. Reporting of utilization of the food security budget is done by the
regional BOFEDs, while the program implanting sector report to BOFEDs. Te food
43
security related aid resources are channeled through BOFED. According to experts
interviewed at the regions, this approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. Te
advantage is that it would be possible to implement a centralized regional development
plan of poverty reduction. On the other hand the disadvantage is bureaucratic chains to
access the fnance and lack of capacity to efectively deliver the service. According to an
expert in the planning division of BOARD of Tigray it is since the last 2 years that they
started to well document both project budgets and use of the resources.
Regional governments have food security coordination of ces at woreda level. Tis
of ce coordinates the aid resources utilization, manages targeting activities and plans the
type of activities to be performed. Tere have been some complexities in the way food
aid resources have been channeled to regions. Earlier the aid resource for food security
used to be sent to food security accounts. But now days, it is sent to the regional BOFEDs
accounts. It shows that the mechanism for aid resources fow has been changing from
time to time, and is one of the factors for efective resource utilization. Food security
resource allocation pattern is in the order that 80% is for investment while 20% is for
program running cost. In the case of Tigray region, 80% of the resource is for watershed
management while the use of 20% is decided by woredas. Donors have strict follow up of
the food security program. Tere is a biannual joint review by donors and government.
Also independent sample evaluation is practiced.
Te aid resources absorption capacity is a big question. For instance, in Amhara region
20-22 donor projects are said to be implementing in the year 2007/08. Te performance of
projects is said to be low, and varying from project to project. Capacity of resource utilization
is still low. Some of the donor projects that are cited as having good performance in Amhara
region include the Swedish SIDA (SARDEP), Austrian Integrated Livestock Development
Program and a Project Funded by Finland (FINIDA). According to experts in the region
other donor programs are fragmented in nature with varying volume of aid resources.
Conclusions and way forward
Due to inadequate domestic resources needed to implement development needs and to
cope with shocks like drought and famine, Ethiopia has been dependent on international
assistance in many ways: humanitarian- relief, donations and technical assistance over the
last three decades. Even to date, quite a large number of people in the country, especially
in rural areas, is supported by foreign assistance in the food security and productive
safety-net programs. Of cial aid also serves as important resource for other national
development programs. To break out of the trap of pervasive poverty and to realize long-
term and sustainable development in the country, the role and importance of more and
better quality foreign assistance is still very high.
Given its history the role of external aid for the national economy of Ethiopia has
been signifcant. Not only has the aid in the form of food saved millions of lives during
disasters following recurrent droughts and famine, but also contributed resources needed
to implement various development programs and projects. However, there is not much
44
evidence documented as to how far the various components of aid to the country were
of the required quality. Similarly, the efectiveness of the aid resources utilization, the
adequacy of the countrys absorptive capacity were not adequately known. With the
premises that Ethiopia will continue to seek signifcant amount of foreign aid in the
foreseen future, quality aid and its efective utilization for attaining the desired socio-
economic development is imperative. Tis study tries to assess and empirically address
pertinent questions related to foreign aid for Ethiopia. Methods employed in this study
include review of relevant literature, exploration of the available secondary data and
extensive consultation and discussion with various stakeholders related to aid resources
planning, management and utilization.
Efective use of aid has become a topical issue global issue. Hence, a large part of
the literature on foreign aid has been devoted to the analysis of aid efectiveness and its
determinants. Literature underlines that Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has been less efective
in promoting economic development than has aid to other regions. Among other factors,
policies in the recipient countries of Africa play the most important role in determination
of aids efectiveness.
Tere is a general understanding that Ethiopia does not have aid policy. As reported in
one of the regions, although regional governments have taught of preparing aid resources
strategy, there is no government policy directive to base on. Tere is aid resource allocation
strategy in the framework of County Action Plan for Budget. Te 18 months country
action plan for budget operates in all regions including Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.
Financial resources fow to the regional governments through the various channels
used the government. Tese are called channels I, II and III. Channel I and II are
channels for the fow of budgetary resources allocated from the treasury. Tese are on-
budget resources. Channel III refers to the fow route used by the UN agencies. It is also
referred to as of-budget. In this category, resources for emergency aid, training, HIV/
AIDS, capacity building are fowing. It is reported that resources that fow through channel
III are not audited by regional fnance bureaus; but there is a practice of joint evaluation
based on documents by sectors and woredas.
Tis study reveals that the mechanism of foreign aid resources fow and its accounting
is very complex. It is only lately that foreign aid resources have started to be coordinated
and channeled through defned regional government organs. In addition, the fow of aid
resources to regions used to be in a fragmented way without having a coordination of
fows from various sources.
Foreign aid resources allocation to regions is not clearly known to the regional states.
Some of them say that although they know what the country gets, what they get is not
known to them exactly. Tere is a varying view among the regional governments experts
as to which modality of aid deliver mechanism is suitable (e.g. in the form of direct budget
support vis a vis the recent basic services protection).
One of the latest approaches in aid budget allocation is what is called Protection of Basic
Services (PBS). Tis approach involves that the aid resource comes from treasury for use
45
by regions in the form of subsidy/grant. Te public (benefciary) community is informed
about the amount of the budget. Resource disbursement is an incremental i.e. every
year woredas get increased amount of budget. It is argued that it enhances the resource
utilization capacity. It was acknowledged by the regions that the approach has enabled
good budget allocation of basic sectors and is a good one. On the other hand, others argue
that as far as transparent system exists where people are informed, government direct
budget support is a good quality form of aid resource.
One aspect of aid channeling mechanism is how aid is allocated to regions. According
to the formula devised by the federal government aid resources from the UN- agencies
reaches all regions. But there are other resources (aid as well as loan) which are not shared
by all regions. In this case regions do not know how the aid resources are allocated. It
depends on availability of the necessary information to MOFED. Tere is also equity
issues on basic information as to which NGO works where. Experts are of the opinion
that, lack of clear and transparency in aid allocation could be unfair leading to inequity of
access to aid resources between regions. Te implication is that there is a need for adequate
information so that it will be possible to integrate the various resources into budget formula.
As a new aid delivery mechanism the UN development assistance fund (UNDAF) that
pools resources of UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, UNFPA, has been operating since January 2007.
Te idea of UNDAF is to increase the aid efectiveness through better information on the
volume of aid that fows and forging better partnership with stakeholders in development.
Budget of-setting is a challenge to the regional governments. Discussions held with
experts in the study region reveal that because of the practice of budget of-setting (from
the amount received from treasury), regions do not want increase the amount of aid they
receive. Tere is a feeling that the regional governments are not happy with the federal
governments policy of budget of-setting policy in relation to donors aid resources. Tose
regions whose budget is of-set following donors fund feel disadvantaged.
Te other problem mentioned is the use of foreign consultants in conducting project
appraisal at abroad and resulting delay of completion by several months, although it has
been improving through time. Serious delays of aid resources disbursement for several
months are reported by regional government. One other aspect of the quality of aid is its
composition. With some donors the Sof part of aid is usually larger than hard parts
(like aid for infrastructure development).
One of the reasons for delay in disbursement aid has to do with the way aid resource
decision is made. For instance, the IDA resource decisions should be done waiting for no
objection from the USA, where the decision making body is. A solution suggested for this
kind of problem is to have some regional liaison of ce.
Among the various factors that afect aid quality, conditionality, schedule of
disbursement, timely delivery, the aid components and their extent (sof or hard parts),
the speed of decision made (e.g. no objection), harmonization of donors, resource use
fexibility, area specifcity, extent of bureaucratic decisions, extent of partnership created,
are widely raised.
46
Resource use fexibility is considered by aid users as an aspect of quality of aid. Tere
is a diference in possibility of shifing resources in budget lines between the resources that
come through BOFED and direct support provided by NGOs. In the former case shifing
is possible only if permission is obtained while in the case of the later internal shifing is
possible. Some experts see that one of the limitations of aid and loan is lack of fexibility in
utilization since both are earmarked or are project specifc. In addition, donors pre-requisite
is complex. Experts also complain about the biases of donors. i.e. they are area-based
16
.
With regard to the volume of aid resources, the issue of reaching the remote areas and
addressing equity is indicated to need more resource. In terms of volume, the amount
of aid received is not enough because the government resources largely (8090%) go to
recurrent budgets. It is more or less the donors money and popular participation (i.e.
labour input) that goes for investment purposes.
Conditions set by donors can also be mentioned as an aspect of aid quality. From
the donors side, there is need for modality of reporting the use of resources. From the
user side, there is a problem of inability to use resources and report on time. Serious
problems related to aid resources utilization and reporting are staf turnover, inadequacy
in documentation and information management particularly at the lower levels. Tere is
a compliant on the government system for not being able to provide mechanisms for staf
incentive. Tese problems need improvement and solution.
Discussions with experts at the regions indicate that some of the factors that determine
impact of aid resource utilization are timing in delivery, conditionality, and extent of
partnership. Tere are some aid resources which dont come at all, and which dont come
on time, either. In terms of timing regions report that there is poor quality of aid resource.
Tere is also a view that aid will have an efect in a sustainable way if it is used in a holistic
manner and integrated, not using in this or that sector in a fragmented way.
Decentralization is one of the factors that have efects in aid resource allocation and
use. Financial management capacity at lower level is a major challenge of decentralization.
In recent years, a large volume of resource has been moving down to the woreda level. But
a big challenge is the capacity to use the resource, to report to the government and donors.
Decentralization is a process, but there is a need for capacity to efect decentralization.
Tere is a case mentioned of the problem of (attitude) not seriously seeing aid resources as
important as the treasury resource.
In the interest of maximizing the benefts from aid resources, regions are trying
to reduce the net resource reducing factors. In addition, comparing the diferent
mechanisms and routes of fow of resources (treasury, support for sector, and donors own
implementation), in some cases regions aim for pushing towards more support to come
through BOFED. Using channel I, UN agencies are nowadays more coordinated to assist
woredas in development.
While donors complain about the problem of low capacity of resource utilization,
16 The Amhara region BOFED has a donors map that shows the engagement of donors with different development interventions in
different parts of the region.
47
regions also request for more capacity assistance by the donors. Sectoral of ces are also
reported to have been complaining about the bureaucratic chains fowed in accessing
aid resources. To overcome the challenges of aid resources utilization, regions have been
taking their own measures. Other issues of major concern in aid resources utilization
include motivation of the technical staf in relation to efective resource use, the need for
institutional memory, and continuity of work.
Tere is a need for harmonization of aid resources in order to improve aid efectiveness.
Te regional BOFEDs have the mandate of coordinating, and harmonizing aid resources
in order to lower duplication of eforts. In some regions, it was reported by donor projects
that the productive Safety net program has negatively afected their program in its mode
of payment. Tere are conficts between free access to benefts and some benefts upon
payments.
Tere is an argument by experts interviewed in this study that while some woredas
have no capacity to absorb budget resources others with capacity have not suf cient
resource. Te issue is whether capacity to utilize resource is important than the equity
aspects. Experts suggest that absorption can improve when constraints are removed and
community is given development resources.
In the same way, the comparative advantage and return from investing a large amount
of development assistance or treasury resources in low potential drought-prone areas vis
a vis high potential areas is raised by experts.
Monitoring of development interventions supported by donor aid resource is an
important aspect that needs attention. According to interviewed experts in the government
departments, there is no adequate monitoring of the efects of aid resources on socio-
economic development. Te reasons are problems of ef ciency of the benefciary sectors
and the fact that only physical assessments are made which are not adequate to show the
real efects. Although the regional BOFEDs meet with Donors and MOFED to discuss
on performances, and problems encountered in implementation of development projects,
shortage of staf and logistic at the region, however, hinders adequate monitoring.
Problem of aid project distribution in a given region is mentioned as one of the
challenges. There are some arguments that donor financed projects are not equitably
distributed in a given region. Experts also feel that aid dependency syndrome has
been created in some areas that used to receive aid resources over longer period of
time.
Discussion with various experts of the government departments both at the
federal and region shows that there are constraints to effective utilization of foreign
aid resources. On the side of donors there are problems with inability to meet the
commitments in time and amount pledged. On the overhand, lack of implementation
capacity particularly at the lower implementing bodies (woreda) is frequently raised
as a major obstacle.
Efective utilization of more aid needs some pre-conditions. Tese are: i) If aid comes
through and coordinated by BOFED aid may be well managed; ii) Efective utilization of
48
aid needs change in attitude; iii) Improved accountability particularly at the lower level of
administration and resource users; iv) Timely delivery of aid; v) Proper job assignment and
coordination of the stakeholders. i.e. proper coordination and monitoring of aid utilization.
Policy implications and suggestions
Based on the assessments made in this study and the major fndings, the following policy
implications and way forward are suggested.
As the current aid resources utilization has many defciencies and faces many challenges,
it is suggested that donors consider solutions for implementation problems and support
for capacity building to be part of aid.
Quite ofen, the challenge of development resources utilization including aid is the
inability to utilize the existing capacity. Hence, solution should be sought as to how
to improve the utilization of the existing human resources and technical capacity in
government institutions.
Financial management capacity at lower government level is one of the major challenges
of implementing decentralization. In recent years, a large volume of resources is moving
down to the woreda level implementing structures. Decentralization is a process, but
there is a need for capacity building to properly efect decentralization.
Tis study reveals that one of the reasons for the delay in disbursement of aid resources
relates to the way aid resource decision is made. Sometimes decisions should be done
waiting for no objection from decision making bodies abroad. A solution suggested for
this kind of problem is for the donors to have some regional liaison of ce.
Experts are of the opinion that lack of clear information and transparency on how
resources are shared among regions could lead to inequity of access to aid resources
between regions. There is a need for adequate information on aid resource sharing
mechanisms so that it will be possible to integrate the various resources into budget formula
of the regional states.
Problems underutilization and lack of/poor reporting of aid resources are staf turnover,
inadequacy in documentation and information management particularly at the lower
implementing levels. Tese problems including staf incentives need resolved in order
to efectively utilize foreign aid resources.
It is found out that for many reasons aid resources and budgets are not fully utilized.
Some of the reasons include problems of implementation and timely reporting that
hinders subsequent disbursements. Hence, aid resources documentation, and reporting
mechanism should be strengthened particularly at the lower levels (woreda) where
resources are utilized.
Currently, there is a confict between increased aid allocations to the regions on the
one hand and an equivalent amount of budget of-set practices. Solutions should be

49
solicited so that the of-set mechanism will not be a disincentive to more and efective
aid resources utilization for development purposes.
Experts consulted in regions argue that the mechanism of allocating bilateral (or all)
aid is not very clear. In the interest of better and efective utilization of aid resources,
mechanism of aid allocation should be clarifed and known to users.
Aid resources utilization and impact monitoring mechanism need to be properly
established and strengthened. Tis helps to improve aid efectiveness, to resolve the
problems and constraints that hinder utilization of aid resources, and helps to devise
better strategy of aid utilization if the country succeeds to obtain more international
aid.

50
Abbreviations /Acronyms
ADB African Development Bank
ADF African Development Fund
ADLI Agricultural Development Led Industrialization
BOARD Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
BOFED Bureau of fnance and Economic Development
CSO Civil Society Organizations
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DPPA Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency
EU European Union
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNI Gross National Income
GNP Gross National Product
GTZ German Technical Cooperation
ICO International Cofee Organization
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MOARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MOFED Ministry of fnance and Economic Development
MT Metric Ton
NGO Non-governmental Organizations
NLDP National Livestock Development Program
ODA Of cial Development assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORDA Organization for Rehabilitation and Development of Amhara
PASDEP Plan for Accelerated Development to Eradicate Poverty
PBS Protection of Basic Services
PSNP Productive Safety Net Program
SDPRP Development and Poverty Reduction Program
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SNNPR Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAF UN Development Assistance Fund
UNDP United Nations Development Program
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WFP UN World Food Program
WOFED Woreda of fnance and Economic Development
51
Case Study 3: KENYA
Enhancing agricultural productivity in Kenya
An example of good aid
By Kenya Federation of Agricultural Producers (KENFAP)
Te case study covers initiative launched by the Kenyas government during the 2004 to
2007 period. Te initiative, whose frst phase has just been concluded, aims to a long
term objective: contribute to sustainable increase of Kenyas agricultural productivity
and improvement of the livelihoods of its rural communities, through the improved
performance of the agricultural technology supply and demand system. Tis case study,
according to the More and Better principles clearly shows an example of good aid.
Background and programme context
Despite steady economic growth in the immediate post independence period, Kenyas
economy performed considerably below its potential in the years preceding 2004. For
the previous two decades, productivity had declined, competitiveness eroded and
international fnancial support diminished. Poverty and food insecurity had increased.
Average GDP growth declined from about 7% in the 1970s to just over 2% in the 1990s.
By the time of planning for improved productivity, the economy was growing at merely
2% pa. Underlying factors included persistent and pervasive governance problems, poorly
implemented reforms and low, ill targeted investments in infrastructures, and social and
economic services.
Kenyas agricultural sector growth generally mirrored the poor performance of the
economy during the same period. Average annual agricultural GDP growth fell from 3.5
percent during the 1980s to 1.0 percent during the 1990s. External factors such as declining
global agricultural commodity prices and vulnerability to climatic shocks explained part,
but not the entire decline. Domestic policy shortcomings created distortions in input
and output markets. Inadequacies in the legal and regulatory framework raised costs of
business. Poor infrastructure increased costs of marketing. High incidence of HIV/AIDS
contributed to reduced labor productivity. Dysfunctional public support services slowed
the renewal of agricultural technology. Te end result was therefore increased rural poverty
and food insecurity, decline in competitiveness, and virtual cessation of both private and
public investment in the agricultural sector.
Te new Governments development strategy to address the above issues was articulated
in the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) (2003-
2007). Te strategy identifed agriculture, trade and industry and tourism as the prime
movers of the recovery program and placed particular emphasis on sustainable agricultural
growth as a critical element in poverty reduction. Te Government also launched a
Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture (SRA) whose objective was to provide a policy
52
and institutional environment that is conducive to increasing agricultural productivity,
promoting investments, encouraging private sector involvement in agricultural enterprises
and agribusiness.
Kenyas agricultural performance had to turn around quickly and efectively if the
country was to recover lost ground and make progress toward meeting the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) for eradicating poverty and hunger. Te public sector had
to play a signifcant role in that process, but over the previous decade, many external
partners had withdrawn support, both technical and fnancial. As a consequence, the
immediate and then existing donor interventions had been fragmented and piecemealed.
Te new Government ushered into of ce in 2003, had recognized the need for ambitious
reforms to improve agricultural productivity, and therefore sought partnership to enrich its
ideas, coordination and investment. Te fnancier was well qualifed to provide leadership
on all three elements, building on a foundation of support for agricultural research in
Kenya and intellectual leadership in reforms of agricultural services in the region and
globally. Perhaps more importantly, no other major partner was in a position to provide
the needed partnership in a timely manner.
In order to contribute to the fnanciers overarching countrys goal of helping to reverse
the countrys decline in economic growth and equity, the project was to contribute towards
achieving the sectoral goal of increasing agricultural productivity, in close alignment
with Kenyas ERS-WC/PRSP, which was centered on three pillars: economic growth
with macroeconomic stability, equity and poverty reduction, and improved governance.
Te project was to support those goals by contributing to:
higher farm real incomes through increased adoption of proftable and
environmentally sound technologies, particularly among smallholders and
subsistence farmers;
raising the productivity of public investments; improving the climate for private
investment in agriculture and for private provision of agricultural services; and
developing options and actions to improve the policy and regulatory framework
in agriculture.
Te project was also to support the Government's efort to decentralize authority
and responsibility for service delivery to local governments as part of the process of
devolution.
Programme description
A phased Adaptable Program Loan (APL) lending instrument was proposed in light
of the long period required to succeed with reforms of agricultural services, and the
logic of separating the credit period into distinct phases with identifable triggers.
Te APL combines both IDA credit and grant facilities. Tis was to be supplemented by a
de-linked but associated GEF grant which was to support sustainable land management
practices and technologies.
53
Te long-term objective of the program was to contribute to sustainable increase
of Kenyas agricultural productivity and improvement of the livelihoods of its rural
communities through the improved performance of the agricultural technology supply
and demand system. To this extent three project phases of 3, 4, and 5 years periods are
anticipated. In this report we will describe the phase I.
Phase I (2004-2007) was to support continuation of ongoing reforms in agricultural
research, initiation of a participatory process of change in extension services and farmer
empowerment, pilot testing of extension methods and delivery systems, and adoption of
improved farming systems for natural resource management in selected areas of high risk.
More specifc activities included: progress toward establishment of a pluralistic research
system, with continued support for reform of the existing institutions; a process of
building consensus for the reform of extension services and the empowerment of client;
pilot interventions in 20 districts to test innovative and decentralized extension research
education activities; and initiation of activities for improved management o f soil and
water (expected to be supported by an associated GEF project) in 5 selected catchment
areas.
Subsequent phases of the program were to focus on consolidating reforms in research,
implementing reforms in extension, and building the basis for sustainable fnancing of the
entire system. Phases I and II had an anticipated budgets of US$ 70million and US$ 100
million respectively. Te Government had confrmed the acceptance of the objective and
scope of the overall program in a Letter of Sectoral Policy (LSP) to the fnancier.
Project development: objective and key indicators
Te projects development objective was to improve the overall system by supporting
generation, dissemination and adoption of agricultural technology through:
Reforms in extension to increase pluralism, responsiveness to clients, and
participation by private providers;
An evolutionary change in the existing system of agricultural research to improve
accountability and impact; and
Increased empowerment of producer organizations to infuence the planning,
design, implementation, funding and monitoring and evaluation of research,
extension, training and capacity building activities.
Focusing on the More and Better principles
Programme and policy support
Te government had just emerged from economic recession characterized by low
productivity in all sectors and huge losses occasioned by corruption and mismanagement
of resources. Te economic recovery blueprint was consultatively developed though
participation at various levels. At the very local level (where poverty is real) diferent types
54
of actors were brought together by the common purpose of redressing the core causes of
the prevailing situations. Concerns from diferent parts of the country were collected and
collated by the then opposition party (the National Rainbow Coalition-NARC) to form
the party manifesto. A parallel planning process spearheaded by the then government
had yielded the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) of the country. Te PRSP was
also generated through an iterated process encompassing a tiered consultative, consensus
building process. Trough the latter process, needs of the various functional levels of
governance and development were consolidated to generate the PRSP. Afer resumption
of of ce in late 2002, the NARC government used its manifesto and the PRSP document
to develop the Economy Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS-
WC). Tis strategy (the economic blueprint of the country) was popularized through
sector wide discussions to identify and quantify the actionable areas of the various sectors.
A total of 18 such consultations were held, with an aim of sensitizing the various sectors/
sub sectors on their roles in delivering the requirement of the ERS-WC.
Te agricultural sector stakeholders lifed their concerns from the ERS-WC,
popularized them among various stakeholders at diferent levels to build consensus
on advisable themes. Tis led to the development of the Strategy for Revitalization of
agriculture (SRA). Indeed the agricultural sector needed revitalization afer many years
of stagnation and at times negative growth. Te case under review was developed to
contribute to the revitalization of agriculture by:
Supporting analytical work to uniform policy and institutional reforms.
Laying the ground work for the pluralistic agricultural extension and learning systems.
ntegrating and rationalizing the national research eforts into the national agricultural
research systems.
To facilitate empowerment of farmers to access and apply proftable and sustainable
technologies.
In view of the above, the development aid clearly addressed policies of both the country
and the people.
Local participation in delivering policy inputs
Te programme component No.4 (empowerment of clients) involved creation of farmer
consultative fora from the farm level to the national level. Farmers were facilitated to form
producer groups along commodity lines otherwise referred to as Common Interest Groups
(CIGs). Representatives from each CIG participated at the local level farmers fora to discuss
their concerns based on the experiences at the CIG level. Some of the concerns (problems
or challenges) required higher level inputs, thus forming the agenda for divisional level
consultative fora. Consultations at the divisional level farmers fora encompass discussions
on outstanding issues raised at the locational level fora, all of which originated from the
CIGs at the farm level. Te outgrowth (unresolved issues) of the divisional levels fora are

55
lifed to the district farmers fora where participating divisions in that district engaged in
structured consultations with input from the district level stakeholders. At this level, all
the eforts available as a result of regional placement (districts) were evaluated in view
of resolving the outstanding issues. Whatever did not get a solution at the district level
was lifed to the national farmers forum, which deliberated on outstanding district level
issues with a view of categorizing into research or policy domains, depending on their
orientation.
Outcomes of the national farmers forum signifcantly informed the national research
and policy agenda, as core contributions from farmers as clients. Based on the fact that
consultations were by representations right from the local to the national level and the
fact that issues generated at the farm level are progressively developed to contribute to the
national policy and research agenda entirely supported by resources from the development
aid under reference, it therefore follows that support clearly addressed the principles of
participation of the concerned communities in the implementation of the programme.
Tis clearly shows that the development support embraced a culture of participation at
diferent levels.
Community and social organizations participation
Te development support engaged a total of 1115 groups from 20 districts spread
across the country picked on the basis of poverty index. Each of the CIGs were at
liberty to and actually identify an enterprise of their choice. Te development support
further facilitated the groups to identify and commission/engage a service provider
based on the enterprise type. Tose service providers (recruited and paid for by the
group from the programme facilitation) assisted the group to come up with Enterprise
Development Plans (EDPs). Each district service unit (the coordination structure at
the district level) verifed the EDPs, approved and forwarded the same to the National
Steering Committee (NSC) for fnancing. Te NSC studied the EDPs , rationalized
the resource requirements and authenticated them for programme fnancing.
Resources for EDPs were channeled to the respective District Service Units (DSUs) for
onward transmission to the respective CIGs to support implementation to the EDPs.
Programme evaluation reports rate levels of implementation of EDPs as satisfactory.
According to the fnancing agencies rating, satisfactory means commendable levels of
achievements of the specifc objectives of the undertaking in view of local community
participation.
On the other hand the programme supported profling of 20 producer organizations
in the country, through which specifc and general needs were identifed and prioritized
on the basis of the scope (relative coverage of the country) and levels of ownership
(membership in categories) to confrm ownership by the farming community. Te
programme prioritized enhancing ownership of the Commodity Organizational (COs) by
prioritizing membership recruitment, resolution of governance issues and development
of the strategic orientations for the commodity organizations. Tis is the frst government
56
sourced development support in the history of the countrys post independence agriculture,
to have specifcally targeted and supported community and social organizations.
Diversity and cultural knowledge enhancement
Te programme supported up scaling of technologies through the concept of Enterprise
Development. Tis was delivered in 2 ways:
Promotion of local innovations chosen as enterprises of reference.
Promotion of collaborative research initiatives aimed at the verifcation/ validation of
technologies / innovations for up scaling.
Trough inter-organizational collaboration (minimum of 3) several competitive grants
were issued to drive the research based knowledge enhancement. Outcomes from the latter
category were out scaled in the relevant project areas thus leading to increased diversity
and injection of new knowledge to the farming community.
Gender equity and sustainability
At the common interest group level, although the selection criteria were enterprise
based, majority were women groups. Tis considerably encouraged the ownership of
the programme activities by the local community. Te project evaluation related higher
adoption rates to women membership in the groups. Membership retention was also
higher with respect to women dominated as opposed to men dominated groups, implying
that survivability is inclined towards women membership in a group.
Trough support from this programme, the concerned groups easily accessed other
forms of support from other development eforts. For instance, many benefted from the
governments Constituency Development Fund (CDF). Some groups also easily accessed
credit from fnancial institutions which are attributable to their success in delivering the
running programmes objectives. Most of the credit was modeled through group guarantees
which are a new development in the countrys agricultural lending domain.
Coherence and linkages
Te countrys agricultural extension system has for a long time begged for change in
approach based on the low levels of investment, despite the increasing demand for the
service. Te farming situation is characterized by increasing farming population and
reducing sizes of holdings, the resultant scenario calling for development of innovative
technologies that would: halt the current trend and possibly reverse it; increase productivity
per unit and increase competitiveness under the declining land sizes.
Te agricultural extension services have continuously sufered loss of manpower with the
last recruitment having occurred in 1988/89 fnancial year. Despite the loss in human
resource resulting from natural attrition and deliberate exit from service into the upcoming
opportunities coupled with increasing demand for extension services, the policy shif has
over time proposed synergistic relationship between diferent actors to deliver the service.

57
Although the government considers extension as a public good, it has become increasingly
dif cult for optimal service delivery under the changing circumstances. Te Strategy
for Revitalizing Agriculture (SRA) clearly proposes holistic approaches to agricultural
extension. Te support under review purposed to lay groundwork for a pluralistic
agricultural extension and learning system. Tis was achieved through formulation of a
National Agricultural Sector Extension Policy (NASEP) which besides other provisions:
Recognizes the need to address the diminishing levels of extension staf ng through
appropriate approaches.
Opens up for participation of other extension providers than the government under
the principle of pluralistic extension.
Amplifes the role of ICT in extension service provision.
Te NASEP policy recognizes the need to create an extension provision system that
capitalizes on development of synergies between public and private service providers
(SPs), standardization and quality controls of extension service and utilization of
appropriate approaches to counter the emerging challenges. Te NASEP Implementation
Framework (IF) is designed to optimize linkages and consultations which could be vertical
or horizontally to efectively deliver extension.
Trough a series of external evaluations, the development support under review
has created opportunities for knowledge and experience sharing between the project
management, the steering committee and the coordination group by way of bringing in
experts from other parts of the world. Apparently three evaluations have been conducted
besides the pre and appraisal missions at the initial stages of the project. Trough the
many interactive sessions, knowledge and experience fow has been realized between the
nationals and external consultants. On the other hand, the project supported a foreign
education tour for the steering and management groups to India and Malaysia. Trough
facilitated interactions, fruitful exchange of ideas, experiences and knowledge were realized
during the two weeks tour in late 2007, which in efect immensely informed the follow up
actions in the fnalization of the phase I of the project that ended in December 2008.
Specifcally, this particular tour immensely informed the national agricultural research
policy formulation in view of the advancements learnt from the two countries as having
been spearheaded by research and development.
Conclusions
Te country case reviewed to a great extent addresses the principles of good aid in its
design, focus and targeting. Although unforeseen at the project design stage, the
implementation spirit followed consultations and consensus building to come with agreed
way forward in the event of need. Indeed during the second evaluation, the mission report
recognized the need for greater private sector involvement in the programme activities as
key strategic partners in the elaboration and implementation of especially the framer/
client empowerment component. In total, the programme contributed signifcantly to

58
the overall growth of the sector, in line with its role of driving the strategy for revitalizing
agriculture. Generally, sector growth recorded a 7% performance come the end of 2007,
from merely 2% in 2002. Phase II of the programme was under development by the
time of conducting this review, and preliminary outputs show greater possibilities of a
successful second phase.
Te good case documented has clearly shown how the principles developed by the More
and Better campaign have been applied, especially to cause local peoples participation in
the programme design and implementation as has been the desired position over time.
One of the strong qualities of the case is the external evaluation report which rates the
performance as satisfactory, meaning that most of the objective s had been met. Many
lessons could be drawn from this case in view of consultative structure formation and
operationalization at all levels, in order to capture and include the views of diferent
individuals in the policy and research dialogue processes. Private sector participation and
the focus on the opinion of the benefciaries is also another important lesson.
59
Case Study 4: KENYA.
The Agricultural Extension programme phase
I (2000/01 2004/05). An example of bad aid
By Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers (KENFAP)
Phase I of the Agricultural Extension Program aimed at scaling-up the concepts of
some previous successful experiences: activity planning and budgeting, participatory
approaches, plurality in service provision, demand driven extension and promotion of
adaptable and feasible technologies. On the other hand, phase I was to include recognition
of farmers technologies and initiatives, gradual move from emphasis only on technologies
for production to the whole continuum encompassing production to marketing to
processing and consumption, inclusion of gender concerns in program activities and
creating awareness on HIV/AIDS concerns in agriculture. From the outset, the program
aimed at addressing most of the principles of better aid supported by More and Better.
Background and programme context
In the late 1990s the Kenya government decided to adopt a modifed version of the soil and
water conservation service model for its national advisory services on crop and livestock,
based on a comprehensive framework encompassing both agriculture and livestock based
extension. Tis formed the frst phase of support for the period 2000/01 to 2002/03 but
later on the same was extended by two more years to 2004/05. Te program had three
components (1) Extension; based on Shifing Target Area Approach (implemented by the
then one ministry of agriculture and livestock development) , (2) Research component;
implemented by the national agricultural research institute and the international centre
for research in agro-forestry, in two separate regions of the country and (3) advocacy
implemented by a group of three NGOs.
Two teams, one internal, the other external, undertook a mid-term review during the
frst half of the third year of the frst phase (the extended phase). Te internal team limited
its review to the extension component of the program while the external team looked at all
the three components. Te reviews attempted to assess what the program had achieved and
to what extent the adopted approach met the requirements of the major farmer categories
as envisaged in the policy documents that guide rural development.
Focusing on the More and Better principles for good aid
Aid should support the programs and policies developed by the recipient
communities
Majority of the countrys small scale producers rely heavily on public extension service
provision, which had been grossly afected by decline in budgetary provisions in the
60
previous two decades accompanied by mismanagement of resources and apathy from
much unmotivated public servants. In the extension service, part of the reason for lack
of motivation had been inadequate transport facilities for feldwork and lack of of ce
accommodation and equipment, including computers.
No relevant mechanisms had been developed and ofered in the policy documents viz.
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the Rural Development Strategy (RDS), National
plans or the extension policy itself, on how to reach and address the resource poor and
vulnerable farmers. Incidentally, many of those farmers sufered from lack of productive
assets, farming tools and production skills. During phase one, the program under review
carried out a baseline survey that concluded that poverty is multi faceted and results from
lack of empowerment, institutional failure, failure of regulatory mechanisms, and lack
of protective resources such as technical expertise, supplementary water, education and
infrastructure.
A major challenge to adoption of agricultural technologies, which contribute to a
failure in extension services themselves, was limited access to capital either through credit,
savings or revolving fund. Most afected by limited access to credit, land and markets
remain women but even marginalized men are in a similar situation. From experience
of phase one and the fact that 56% of Kenyans then lived below the poverty line, farmer
groups such as Common Interest Groups (CIGs) or the Target Area Development
Committees among others, commonly characterized by poor resource base, ofered
important avenues for dialogue with service providers. In disseminating information on
micro-fnance institutions and markets, the program little focused on enterprise based
CIGs and paid little attention to self help organizations initiated to reach and address
the poor and vulnerable female headed households, the HIV/AIDS afected, youth,
disabled and the elderly. Increased participation of these groups to articulate their needs
and make their voices heard would have anchored the program onto the right track in
making tangible contributions towards reducing poverty and vulnerability, but this was
to be realized in signifcant volumes. Towards this end the program had established that
dialogue, counseling and capacity building were necessary to create working partnerships
for development of resource poor and vulnerable farmer groups, but did not make
deliberate eforts to realize this and related objectives.
Te other major challenge to extension was access to extension facilitating factors such
as market availability, infrastructure, health facilities and supplementary water. During
the frst phase of the program, institutionalizing fora for stakeholders was an avenue for
bringing all those dealing with various aspects targeted at addressing rural development.
Institutionalization of stakeholders fora was however not specifcally done to target
resolution of the market related problem, but establish a debate platform at divisional,
district and provincial levels and expect them to deliver. Tey are yet to rise to their
expectations especially in view of the composition and management of those consultative
structures, where instead of representation basis being deliberate eforts to bring in the
poor to voice their concerns, this philosophy is not necessarily premised.
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Increasing environmental demands had multiple social and economic dimensions,
including population growth, resource scarcity and food shortage, changing consumption
patterns and migration, social segmentation and various forms of poverty and vulnerability.
Insecure land titles and insensitivity to the gender dimension of inheritance, lack of
credit together with environmentally damaging farming practices accentuated by poverty
were strong disincentives to viable conservation and management of natural resources
such as water, forests and soils. In the long term, environmental degradation not only
interfered with continuity in economic and social development and investment but was
also to become a threat to internal peace and stability. Environmental conservation and
management interventions and proper environmental impact assessment, monitoring
and evaluation needed promotion.
Mechanisms for targeting rural resource poor and vulnerable groups did not take a
comprehensive view of poverty and vulnerability, seen as the denial of basic rights and
livelihood opportunities and choices most rudimentary to human development. Such a
broad perspective was crucial as there was need for a strong link between alleviation of
poverty, local empowerment, and rights to basic livelihood needs, utilization of natural
resources, gender sensitivity, democratic governance, transparency and equity.
Participation of local community and peoples organizations
Training needs were to be assessed and addressed on regular basis to make implementing
staf remain relevant to the program. Training was to address participatory planning,
marketing, post harvest processing, farming as a business to name a few. Particular focus
was to be put on poverty, gender, human rights, democracy, governance and environmental
issues. Included, was the focus on soliciting/outsourcing essential advisory services. Also to
be included were collaborative programs with other service providers capable of planning,
monitoring and carrying out poverty and gender analysis involving capacity building and
empowerment. It was also to include allocation of high caliber staf and resources to the
local level. Tere was need for a clear job descriptions and well performing staf recognized
through appraisals. According to the end phase evaluation report, most of the proposed
outputs and outcomes were not achieved.
With respect to collaboration and extension facilitating factors, phase I played a leading
role in facilitating the institutionalization of collaboration at the Divisional, District,
Provincial and National levels. However, results oriented collaboration was stronger at the
division than at the district, with local level collaboration being minimalistic. Stakeholders
had to some extent been able to develop joint work plans and have activities implemented
at the target area level. Te program did not make deliberate eforts to ensure that this was
achieved. Te potential for collaborative efort by the stakeholders was therefore not fully
utilized mainly because the concept of collaboration had not been well articulated. Most
districts held stakeholder workshops simply because there were budgetary provisions to
do so, thus yielding no tangible outputs. Te challenge was how those fora could become
the driving force in guiding the focus on emerging issues, networking and promoting the
62
development of relevant institutions and processes that would support rural development.
Te fora could have elected a management or implementation decision taking body to
ensure coordinated planning and to avoid duplication of eforts, but this did not happen.
Te end phase evaluation therefore recommended that the program dissociates support
to agricultural research from the program framework but include budget provision for
contracting of research services from suitable research organizations. Representatives
of interested research organizations were to be included among the members of the
Collaborative committee at district level. Indicators for participation should have ensured
focused, client responsive, efective and result oriented service delivery, which was not
achieved under phase one.
Te research extension linkage had been weak despite the program having made
provisions in the budget for extension research workshops. Tis had eventually become
a means of exchanging information rather than discussing pertinent emerging issues that
would have been the basis for formulating a research agenda. Also respective research
stations made some eforts to produce pamphlets and brochures but while this was
appreciated, a wider approach to technology dissemination needed to be explored if
the existing technology opportunities were to be taken up. Te program could easily
have also taken a lead in establishing linkages with existing producer based Savings and
Credit Cooperative Organizations (SACCOs) (some with mobile services), donor funded
programs, or other micro-fnance institutions (MFIs) schemes to enable the resource poor
and women in particular to access credit facilities, but this did not happen.
With respect to the extension approaches themselves, the adopted approach
implemented during phase I showed a number of weaknesses including; the number of
farmers reached being small compared to total number of farmers requiring the service,
a limited number of farmers benefted from training because of the localized nature of
the approach, poor and vulnerable farmers being deliberately avoided or not reached/
thus loss of benefts from the program, relevance of some of the program content and
competence of staf developing them was questionable, low rate of implementation of
specifc deliverables of the program, very little time spent at the target area (two years)
thus impairing sustainability, too little interaction with and services ofered to CIGs,
potential of so formed development committees not utilized and the program being a
very demanding activity on staf in view of their other activities.
Tere was therefore a need to disaggregate poor and vulnerable farmers in female-
headed households and poor and vulnerable farmers in male headed households. Te link
between economic poverty, lack of basic rights and voiceless as it afected children, youth,
and disabled as well as the elderly were compelling realities in the agriculture and livestock
sector that the program could not have easily wished away. Te program should have
been open ended to several combinations of targeting mechanisms and methodologies
that would have been tested and validated other than adopting one rather un popular and
segregative approach. Before the end of the frst phase, the evaluation report recommended
that viable approaches should be promoted and replicated, guidelines developed and the
63
resource poor and vulnerable farmers successfully reached and empowered economically
and socially.
Building on local culture and knowledge
Some major limitations in ofering attractive extension packages were identifed
during phase I as to include; narrow thinking in the provision of agricultural extension
technologies and skills mainly biased towards production, top-down know it all attitude
of agricultural extension facilitators and managers and other service providers. Te service
providers ofen ignored thorough consultation with farmers to understand opportunities,
problems and priorities. On the other hand, lack of competence in non-formal technical
training such as managerial and administrative, report writing, economics aspects of
farming, participatory methods, advocacy, equality and rights issues and counseling on
the part of extension managers and facilitators was considerably lacking.
Despite the fact that there was a chain of command in the provision of extension services
in the agricultural sector, there was very little interaction and sharing of information
between the various technical divisions especially at national level. Tis cascaded to the
local level where actual involvement or enhanced facilitation of the benefciaries was
highly curtailed or limited to stereotypic interactions.
Encouraging and supporting a culture of participation
Te program operated in areas with predominantly mixed farming and implementation
was through collaboration between the two ministries as equal partners. Tis new situation
required an efective institutional set up for coordination to ensure that the interests of
both ministries are catered for during implementation. Tis was however riddled with
a multiplicity of problems including; unequal manpower strength of the two ministries,
diferent geographical priorities in operation, program management unit in one of the
implementing ministries, unmotivated staf to be involved in delivering the outputs, lack
of needed technical and managerial skills among staf, rigid program plans that could not
adjust to changing situations, poor staf mobility and poor of ce infrastructure, weak M&E
lacking participatory component hampering feedback into the planning and monitoring
of impacts, background to program strongly edged on soil & water conservation, only
in the ministry of agriculture and misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the policy
guiding agricultural extension and the program itself within the ministries and among
other stakeholders thus hampering the overall implementation
Te two ministries needed to put in place, a coordination structure aimed at balanced
management of inter-ministerial activities. Stakeholders consultative fora at district
and divisional levels needed to be created and strengthened. Other members of the
fora included nongovernmental organizations, CBOs and CSOs to represent the poor
and other vulnerable groups such as family headed households and people living with
HIV/AIDS and those afected as well as child headed households, youth and the elderly
who efectively needed to be encouraged to collaborate and infuence decisions through
64
the stakeholder fora at every level. Attention was specifcally focused towards creating a
mechanism for incorporating voices of vulnerable groups in the districts and divisions
through the stakeholder fora. Te stafs at divisional level were to be strengthened following
decentralization of implementation. Staf appraisals ought to have been supported in order
to motivate the hard working of cers, an aspect that never quite saw the light of day during
the phase I. Regular reviews were to be done on the program so as to assist in updating
the work plan and avoid repetition of inefective procedures. A planning reserve was to
be set aside to cater for fexibility in handling new situations as the program progressed.
Most of those provisions were not realized, which in efect hampered implementation
a great deal. On the other hand, project implementation reports declared consistent
and progressive realization of the project outputs, which for the purpose of this analysis
appeared misleading. Te external evaluation reports were fairly balanced thus forming
the credible sources of information herein, which is consistent with the realities on the
ground.
With respect to collaboration with private sector and other service providers, apart
from striving to have close collaboration and working in partnerships, the program
ought to have contracted out specifc areas of extension, which required specialized
and private sector oriented expertise such as entrepreneurial and business development
skills. Terefore the support at divisional level for strong, transparent and accountable
collaboration for that is market oriented; gender and human right responsive pursuits
should have been a priority for the frst phase, but was pushed to the next. Te forum
could also have been used to isolate key emerging issues afecting development in the focal
areas, which were beyond the capacity of the divisional personnel and resources. A data
bank for all the collaborators and stakeholders must have been generated and reviewed
as the situation so demanded. Te challenge should have been how the collaborators fora
could become the driving force in addressing emerging issues, networking and promoting
the development of relevant institutions and processes that would have supported rural
development.
Modalities for improved research-extension-farmer interaction could have worked
with well organized extension fora, which would have been contracted whenever situation
dictated, leaving the program at discretion of choice. Any district with a justifable
research proposal would have had access to funds in consultation with the management
unit, which did not occur in the frst phase. On the other hand, economic ef ciency
and cost efectiveness of the program was designed in such a way that farmers were not
to be provided with subsidies in form of inputs (except limited levels of demonstration
inputs, which is part of extension). Tus the program was primarily a capacity building
process and this was principally a public good, given the focus on small-scale farmers
who are generally poor. Te program was therefore to make important contributions to
the attainment of sustainable extension services, most of which would ultimately have
to be paid for by the benefciaries. Promoting a pluralistic approach to service delivery
allows for scarce resources to be well utilized and protects other service providers from
65
undue competition. Tere would have been signifcant savings in terms of faster decision
making, reduction of duplication of activities in resource use especially at feld level,
which was not survived thanks to the technical failure to encourage or support the culture
of participation in the context of the program.
Extension service delivery alone could not be successful in reducing poverty and
vulnerability unless there were interventions that increased access to social services in
order to reduce inequality and improve the situation of the poor even before the impact
of rapid economic growth begun to be felt. In this respect, a 3-year recovery period,
could not be allowed to await general economic improvement but needed to be tackled as
part of a wider socio-economic agenda. Te program ought to have promoted multiple
approaches in the target areas. Te program underlined that advice for resource poor and
vulnerable multifaceted in scope and delivery of services should emphasize dialogue and
consultation, bottom-up decision making and collaboration between the public sector
and the private sector, which in efects remained mere rhetoric.
With respect to capacity building in savings and credit for CIGs, an exercise for both technical
of cers and CIGs was critical if the farmers were to beneft from rural fnancial services. Te
experience would have been reviewed and successes replicated to other target areas.
Promotion of sustainability
Te program adopted a top down planning process which did not necessarily deliver
an appropriate approach. A bottom up planning process should have been adopted, to
advantage districts with the fexibility to choose suitable methodologies and improve
ef cacy of the extension approaches that best responded to or accommodated farmers
needs. Some districts may have preferred to include farmers feld school instead of the
popular target areas in their approaches. Other districts can work with larger target areas
with extensive presence over longer period than was the case in the frst phase of the
program under review. Lack of the opportunity to choose methods within program
barred the target groups from integrating and later on evaluating their contributions to
efective and ef cient delivery of extension services on a large scale. All methodologies
should have had in-built mechanisms for meaningful participation of the resource poor
and vulnerable households in participatory planning, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation of the program acclivities to enhance sustainability.
Mainstreaming of advocacy, rights and governance issues required capacity to enable
the program train its staf to conduct appropriate policy debate with various actors at
national, district and divisional levels in order to play an exemplary role on issues related
to poverty and vulnerability reduction, service delivery, transparency and accountability.
Tis was not integrated into the frst program phase. On the other hand, mainstreaming
of environmental issues missed out as the program did not formulate environmental
sustainability goal and develop indicators to assess its impact on the environment. It should
also have been able to infuence the policy through practical contribution and promotion
of technologies that enhances environmentally sustainable agricultural and livestock
66
development and in turn infuence the long-term policy in relation to accountability to
sustain a viable agro-ecological environment, all of which were not achieved.
Te program conceived that CIGs would organically evolved to form themselves into
apex bodies based on specifc enterprises or commodities, then they would have been
able to advocate for their rights as farmers and network with others within and outside
the country. Tis has never happened in the history of development, thus making such
an assumption misplaced. To date, all the groups formed under the program, currently
totaling to more than 25,000 remain isolated and not hooked up to any national farmer
organization eforts. Building capacity in the farming communities on participatory
monitoring and evaluation would have ensured that farmers were be able to identify
the value for their eforts in all activities, then carry out as individuals, groups or as a
community the added roles of organizational development. Presently the level and ability of
rural communities to evaluate the impact of rural development activities is inadequate.
Agricultural extension cannot be successful without the accompaniment of extension
facilitating factors such as credit, marketing information, infrastructure, etc that are
provided by other service providers, and this would create a good environment and
encourage other service providers to invest and collaborate. Also, the collaboration fora
would have been able to link with the existing and proposed structure of the decentralization
of services to local areas, which did not happen.
Coherence and linkages
Te program adopted a top-down know it all attitudes of the many government agricultural
extension facilitators and managers and other service providers thus hindering efective
communication at the expense of thorough consultations with farmers to understand
their opportunities, problems and priorities. Tis tended to harm particularly those who
did not attend functions organized by extension e.g. resource poor men and women,
children, HIV/AIDS afected, elderly and disabled. Ministries extension services were
not coordinating donor support suf ciently and there was intense competition for donor
support instead of benefting from the complementarities roles. Support was ofen
provided without coordination to achieve targets, and was also thinly spread, leading to
wasteful duplication of efort.
Te program M&E for efective implementation and assessment was rated as weak
and in need of prioritization of a comprehensive participatory system by both ministries.
Te program management unit was to support the M&E technical divisions in both
ministries to ensure that trained and well equipped personnel were posted at the district
and provincial of ces to efectively undertake the functions. Issues on rights, advocacy,
governance and environment were to be mainstreamed into the programs M&E system,
which did not quite succeed in the frst phase.
Promotion of gender as key to development
Deliberate eforts were to be made to sensitize men on gender at farm level. Interventions
67
were designed with a focus on improving the performance of both men and women at
the community level and increase their participation in development interventions. Te
Mid-Term review reported that the gender concept had apparently not trickled down to
the divisional level. Staf members in charge of target areas did not seem to recognize
important gender issues. Further on, the basic analytical tools of looking at access to
resources and control over resources were frequently not applied. It was therefore important
that the program improved the analytical capacity of the extension staf and their scope
to capture the gender dimension of poverty and vulnerability to ensure full integration
of gender concerns into extension messages. Despite the alarming documented evidence
on the link between gender and feminization of poverty, (more women into poverty trap)
the entire investment ended its frst two year phase with another two year extension before
it efectively considered and addressed the gender concerns. Te program ought to have
encouraged CSOs and paralegals to join the district and division based stakeholder fora and
play a leading role of infuencing culturally inherent gender values in the way that would have
creates new values of equality and fair distribution of resources between men and women.
Tere was need to evolve from documentation of gender sensitive technologies to
accessing gender sensitive advisory services as gender is about equity in terms of resource
distribution, fairness and equity in terms participation in decision making process and
economic and social empowerment. Tis is in line with the programs implementation
Framework that endorsed attention to poor and marginalized households and gender
aspects, empowerment and accountability to benefciaries, an aspect of the deliverables
glaringly missing out of the frst phase. Of importance, signifcant failure to reach the male
component of the community was recorded in the frst phase. As such, the female gender
failed to access important information due to their disadvantaged resource base such as
landlessness, age and disability or lack of social capital and networks to access information
connected to rural and social development agencies. Interventions should therefore have
been designed with a focus on improving the performance of both men and women at the
community level and increase their participation in development interventions.
Conclusions
Te program under review was very clear and well focused on the good development
assistance principles at the planning stage, but considerably failed to address most of
them at implementation of the frst four year phase. Intensive training was also glaringly
missing out in the implementations through assumptions that uniform interpretation
would prevail throughout the program, which was not to be the case. Tis could be linked
to varied interpretation of the program at various levels of implementation and lack of
involvement of the benefciaries at the planning stage.
Te program approach was such that activities would be concentrated on a specifc
area of a district for two years, then move to a totally new are thereafer. In pursuit for
quick wins, the program favored the most productive areas of a district, thus leaving out/
marginalizing the rest. Intra district poverty indexes were not considered in prioritization.
68
As such, although aimed at poverty reduction, the same did not quite premise poverty
reduction. Te specifc area focus approach did the program major setbacks in that upon exit,
sustainability was not ensured. Te end result was isolated initiatives as opposed to continued
progress long afer. In fact to date, the groups formed are named by the program.
Te program did not build the necessary social fabric in strengthening the local level
institutions to take charge of their issues. To date, no farmer institutions have arisen from
the immense and costly efort, meaning that the program did not build on sustainability
principles. Linkages at various levels were also not well cemented thus losing out on
the synergistic interactions proceeding such an intervention. It has been dif cult to
incorporate groups from the program domains into the meso and macro level institutions
because of the culture developed through the programmatic interactions.
Although efectively supported by the program to form, the stakeholders consultative
fora have merely contributed to the national research and policy agenda. An ideal
business for such a formation would have been focused consultations aimed at various
levels contributing to refned national policy and research inputs. Tis is a clearly missed
opportunity while it was well articulated in the program design.
Methodology applied for the two case study from KENFAP
Immense literature review of a purposive sample of fve projects under implementation
in the Kenyan agricultural sector preceded the choice of the two cases covered under
the study. Tese included the National Agricultural and Livestock Extension Program
(NALEP), the Agricultural Sector Program Support (ASPS), the Kenya Agricultural
Productivity Program (KAPP), the Smallholder Dairy Commercialization Program
(SDCP) and the National Accelerated Agricultural Input Access Program (NAAIAP).
Verifcation of the information in the program/project documents was enhanced through
feld visits to three distinctly diferent regions of the country, where the fve progams
are taking place. Te need to get the actual situation concerning implementation and
talk to the benefciaries necessitated the feld tour that covered the following provinces:
Eastern (Embu, Meru Central and Machakos districts), Rif valley (Nakuru, Nandi and
Trans Nzoia) and Nyanza (Kisii, Kisumu and Siaya). Experiences from diferent districts
collected at the various levels enabled the researcher to form an opinion on the actual
implementation arrangements and the realities in view of the levels of engagements and
articulation of the program activities by the benefciaries.
A cross check with the stakeholders and project/program teams was conducted to
validate some of the lessons learnt from the feld and verify the authenticity of the statements
made at various levels. Based on the verifed evidence from the various actors, a report for
each of the cases was compiled in clear view of the principles. It is important to note that
discerning a clearly good and bad case of development support was dif cult task because
application of the principles was varied. Te extent of use of the principles in packaging
and realizing support was therefore used as the gauge for choice of a representative case,
from which background therefore, this was considered a good example of aid.
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Case study 5: MALAWI
Engaging communities as genuine partners
in development processes: Chikwawa
community, Rumphi District, Malawi
Chimwemwe A.P.S Msukwa Engaging
Introduction
Tis article presents a case study of Chikwawa community in Rumphi District in Northern
Malawi. Te case study shows deliberate eforts to enable development aid to reach and
address the needs of the diferent sectors of the community, particularly the marginalized
poor. It illustrates practical application of three principles of the More and Better campaign,
namely a) Better aid should work with local communities and social organisations as full
partners; b) Better aid should promote a culture of participation; and c) Better aid should
address problematic structures and mechanisms that limit the efectiveness of aid in
reaching the worlds poor and hungry.
Te Rumphi Food Security Project demonstrates that a focus on processes on how to
efectively engage local communities as full partners in development work can contribute
to quality of development aid. What is interesting in the Chikwawa community case
study is the depth to which issues afecting the community were tackled and how people
have taken advantage of the dialogue forums to openly discuss and resolve controversial
issues in order to sort out some structural problems impeding development work such
as corruption, and jealousy. In addition the communities have managed to prescribe for
themselves governance systems that are capable of bringing about genuine participation of
all citizens in processes aimed at improving their livelihoods. Te projects however need to
create a conductive environment that allows dialogue to take charge so that decisions are
based on consensus within communities between the communities and service providers.
Tis however takes time.
In search for an appropriate approach for greater engagement and participation of
farmers in livelihood development processes, as citizens; the FAIR program in Malawi
initiated a consultation process with communities in Rumphi District. Tis consultation
included a pre-project design rights based participatory situation analysis with diferent
stakeholders within the district development planning structure (at district, sub district,
village and household levels). Te results of the participatory situation analysis were
incorporated in the development of the Rumphi Food Security Project concept, i.e. the
project components and the implementation approach to be adopted. In addition the
consultations between the service providers and the community stakeholders continued as
an integral part of the project implementation process through an on-going participatory
monitoring and evaluation process. Tis participatory monitoring and evaluation process
70
enabled the service providers and the community stakeholders to check whether the
agreed upon concepts were being implemented as designed as well as jointly assess their
outcomes. Tis case study is based on a review of the one year implementation process of
the Rumphi Food Security Project in the Chikwawa community.
Communities as managers of interventions
Chikwawa community comprises twenty-two villages in the area of Paramount Chief
Chikulamayembe, about ffeen kilometers west of Rumphi district headquarters. Rumphi
District is about 60 kilometers north of Mzuzu City in the Northern Region of Malawi.
Chikwawa community is one of the many communities benefting from the Rumphi Food
Security Project funded by the European Union, and implemented as part of the Fair
program in Malawi. Te Fair program is implemented through a partnership of three
international development organizations Development Fund of Norway, Self Help
Africa and Find Your Feet, with diferent local partners in Malawi. For the Rumphi Food
Security Project the local partners are Mzuzu Agriculture Development Division, Rural
Foundation for Aforestation, Malawi AIDS Counseling and Resource Organisation, the
Smallholders Farmer Federation and Centre for Environmental Policy and Advocacy.
Te Rumphi Food Security Project aid to the community is partly provided through
a grants facility provided directly to the community. Te community has to manage
the grants in form of a revolving fund particularly for income generating activities.
For more general interventions such as natural resource management, HIV and AIDS
interventions, the project provides resources to support implementation of community
action plans. Te events of one year implementation process of the Rumphi Food Security
Project in Chikwawa community can be categorized into two phases the pre-design
stakeholder consultation and planning phase and the implementation phase. Each of these
phases was designed to ensure that the service providers work in partnership with local
communities so that the communities develop their own capacities and eventually take
over ownership and management of the implementation processes of the food security
and other development interventions.
The pre-project design stakeholder consultation and planning phase
Tis subsection provides highlights of the processes and outcomes of the pre-project
design consultation and planning phase. Te phase had four key activities namely:
A rights-based participatory situation analysis process.
Development of the community governance structures and action plans by the
communities.
Participatory assessment of the governance structures and action plans
Development of a community managed participatory monitoring and evaluation
system.
Te processes in these activities were designed to usher the Chikwawa community

71
stakeholders into the driving seat of the project implementation and management
processes. Te processes and approach adopted in this phase were very much in line with
three principles of the More and Better Campaign better aid should work with local
communities and social organisations as full partners; better aid should promote a culture
of participation; and better aid should address problematic structures and mechanisms
that limit the efectiveness of aid in reaching the worlds poor and hungry.
The pre-planning consultation process
Te preoccupation of the Fair Programme management was to be diferent by implementing
projects in which members of the benefting communities genuinely participated in the
management of the project interventions. Te entry point for this mission was a consultation
process with the potential benefciaries about what form such projects would take.
Consequently, prior to the design of the Rumphi Food Security Project concept, the
Fair programme management unit mobilized a team of feld facilitators to facilitate a rights-
based participatory situation analysis process in several willing communities including
Chikwawa community. In the Chikwawa community, the team facilitated participatory
situation analyses at two levels namely village development committee (VDC) level
involving members of the VDC and all the twenty-two chiefs within the community; and
at village level with each of the twenty-two village communities involving the village chief,
men women and youths.
Te purpose of the rights-based participatory situation analysis process was to
engage the community stakeholders in a critical analysis that will establish a common
understanding and consensus amongst community stakeholders and the Fair Programme
partners (service providers). Te analyses would focus on the social economic
circumstances in which the households lived, specifcally focusing on the food security
and livelihood statuses in general (i.e. assess the extent to which households had realized
food security and the rights of the members in general). In addition, the situation analysis
focused on mechanisms sanctioned to deliver community transformation towards food
security and improved livelihoods (i.e. critique the current development approaches with
a view of identifying aspects to be improved).
Te analyses were guided by the following key questions: - How do community
members visualize a developed household? How do they visualize a food secure household?
How far have the households within Chikwawa community gone towards realizing their
vision of a developed or a food secure household? What opportunities are available to
these household that would enable them realize food security or improved livelihoods in
general? What needs to be improved if each household in Chikwawa community has to
become food secure? Considering the current development approaches, what needs to be
improved if development aid has to contribute to the improvement in food security and
livelihoods of the majority of the households in Chikwawa community?
Focusing on food security, the Chikwawa community described their vision of a food
secure household as one that has diferent types of foods available to members always
72
regardless of the seasons. Te foods should include staples such as maize, cassava or sweet
potato, legumes such as beans, groundnuts or pigeon peas, vegetables, fruits and animal
products. Te community used a local Chichewa language expression mwana alilenji to
denote food security. Te expression literary means whatever food a child cries for, the
mother will provide.
Trough further analysis, the community members noted that each household was
capable of producing enough of some of the foods using locally available resources. For
example every household would grow enough vegetables, sweet potato, cassava, legumes
and keep local chickens, ducks and doves for domestic consumption or even for sale if
they wanted to. And with external aid, almost every household was capable of realizing
their food security vision within fve years. Tey however observed that even the foods
which could be produced with locally available resources in the community were not
readily available in the majority of households. Many households tended to focus more on
maize and tobacco production following routine production systems without using any
comparative assessments of the available options.
Te analysis also revealed that there were many opportunities available to the Chikwawa
community, which if efectively utilised, any household would easily become food secure.
First, every household in Chikwawa community has access to naturally fertile farmland
suitable for growing a wide range of crops - maize, tobacco, beans, groundnuts, cassava,
sweet potato, soy beans, vegetables, and fruits with or without chemical fertilizers. Second,
the households have access to Lunyina, a perennial river that passes through fertile felds
with a very big potential for irrigation farming. Apart from Lunyina river, there is Luviri
river which has created a fertile wet land that can be used for production of diferent types
of crops throughout the year. Te resource is however currently underutilized. Tird the
Chikwawa area is suitable for production of diferent types of livestock such as beef and dairy
cattle, goats, sheep, pigs and poultry. Fourth, the community has access to development
aid and related services from the government (the government was at the time of the study
implementing a farm inputs subsidy programme), and nongovernmental organizations.
Fifh, Chikwawa community has a good road network accessible throughout the year and
they are very close to Rumphi district headquarters.
Te community observed that the problem of food insecurity persisted for the majority
of the households in Chikwawa community despite all the available opportunities. Tey
identifed several aspects that they needed to improve on their side, if they had to work in
true partnership with development agencies and manage the interventions efectively on
their own beyond project support. Tese are described below:
Community organizational structure to facilitate development
interventions need to be reorganized
Te decentralisation structure which starts with the District Assembly at district level,
then area development committee (ADC) at the sub-district level and the village
development committee (VDC) at the community level is the of cial channel through
73
which development aid is supposed to reach the community. From the VDC development
aid is supposed to reach individuals or households through village communities, special
interest group such as a farmer club, or a community based organisation or sometimes
directly to the individuals. Te community members noted during the situation analysis
that Chikwawa village development committee (VDC), which was supposed to provide a
link between the twenty-two village communities and the funding or development service
providing institutions did not adequately represent the village communities.
Some village communities did not have any persons to represent them at the VDC
level. For the villages which were represented, some leaders were not acting in the interest
of the communities they represented. Furthermore, the VDC did not convene to discuss
issues from the diferent villages they represented; instead they only met when requested
by an NGO or project to discuss specifc issue based on agenda external to the community.
Consequently, there was poor communication, lack of transparency and accountability
in the way development aid was managed. For example, selection of benefciaries of
development aid was mostly in the hands of VDC members and village chiefs. Tese ofen
chose their relatives or friends to beneft from development aid. Consequently, while
certain sections of the society were bypassed others were oversupplied with aid. Tis created
tensions and conficts in the communities. Tose who were lef out (ofen the majority)
ended up boycotting development meetings. To address these issues, particularly to ensure
that the majority of the community members owned processes and efectively participated
in the planning and implementation processes of the Fair programme interventions, the
Chikwawa village communities made the following resolutions:
Tey were going to revise their village development committees instead of having
only ten members they decided to have a committee with 22 members so that each
village community had its own representative in the committee. In addition, the village
communities which were not happy with their representatives resolved to replace them
with more competent individuals. Tey would ensure that the VDC regularly convenes
to discuss development issues from all the twenty-two villages as well as those from the
development agencies and provide a more efective two way communication system.
Te communities resolved to establish as many special interest groups as possible
in each of the twenty-two village communities. Tis would provide an opportunity for
members from every household to prominently feature and participate in the special
interest group forums and activities of their choice. Te special interest groups would
provide the primary avenue where members would plan and implement specifc
interventions based on their needs and interests. Special interest groups would provide
an opportunity for diferent social economic categories of the community particularly the
poorest to access development aid directly.
Have realized the benefts of dialogue through the participatory situation analysis
process, the communities resolved to establish their own development forums at special
interest group, village and VDC levels, where they would discuss development related
issues, plan and review development interventions. Te forums would facilitate easy
74
communication and feedback mechanism for community stakeholders as well as with
the external service providers. In addition, the forums would provide a more transparent
platform for identifying benefciaries for specifc aid packages.
In order to ensure efective management of the grants received, the community
resolved to have a committee in each village to coordinate the activities of the special
interest groups, particularly those that have received aid. At the VDC level they resolved
to establish a steering committee that would coordinate and manage the grants on behalf
of the VDC and all the twenty-two village communities.
The community to develop food security strategies
and action plans
Te community noted from the situation analysis that many households were not attaining
food security status despite the available opportunities because production was routine
and not based on a thorough analysis of the costs and benefts of available options in
order to invest their time, labour and land resources in interventions that would give the
best returns. Tere was a tendency for households to focus more on production of maize
and tobacco even when they could not aford the associated chemical fertilizers. Tey
further observed that many people were mostly interested in external aid associated with
handouts. Tese handouts were unfortunately ofen mismanaged because the benefciaries
did not have appropriate plans to efectively utilize the resources provided. To reverse this
situation, the Chikwawa community resolved to put in place the following measures:
Based on the common food security vision defned during the participatory situation
analysis, each special interest group would clearly defne the changes they would like
to realize for each of their members (outline key objectives with key indicators), and
considering all the available opportunities they would outline the key interventions in
order to achieve the set objectives. Similarly each village community would outline its key
objectives to be realized over a specifc period of time and outline the key food security
interventions that they will implement to realize the set objectives.
For each intervention, the community stakeholders would delineate the external
support that they need and indicate the service providers they would approach for
support. Based on the information obtained from the Fair Programme staf on grants,
Chikwawa community pledged to develop as many proposals on agricultural based
income generation activities as they could. At the VDC level, the community resolved to
outline key activities on food security and develop common food security strategies for
the entire Chikwawa community.
Te community envisioned producing master food security strategies and action plans
so that any interventions by diferent service providers coming to support Chikwawa
community on food security would implement their interventions within the framework of
these community food security strategies and action plans. Tis would provide synergy for the
diferent food security interventions funded by diferent service providers in this community.
75
The community to establish constitution to govern
development work
Te participatory situation analysis revealed that there was too much freedom and laxity
in the way the community managed development interventions. Tey cited cases of
people who had been misusing development aid; and others who deliberately chose not
to participate in development function but no one held them accountable or apprehended
them. Tey observed that development interventions were ofen seen as external to the
community. Similarly, there was too much freedom in the way diferent service providing
agencies dealt with the community. Te community noted that diferent organizations or
projects brought with them diferent approach for delivering aid. Some of these approaches
were counterproductive or even compromised the dignity of the community membership.
Tey cited examples of NGO or government workers making wrong decisions on behalf
of the community because they did not adequately consult the communities before
making the decisions. Te community members noted that they did not have appropriate
systems for managing development interventions as compared to the systems they had for
managing traditional rituals such as funeral, wedding and initiation ceremonies.
To address this situation, the Chikwawa community resolved to establish a constitution
to govern the implementation of development interventions and the behaviour of the
stakeholders at VDC, village community and special interest group levels.
Tey further resolved that the traditional leadership system the village chiefs and
the group village heads would reinforce the constitution because they have appropriate
authority over all the community stakeholders as they do during the funerals.
On the side of the service providers and donors, the community members identifed
several aspects that needed to be improved if the support they provide has to translate into
improved food security at household level. Te community complained that development
agencies tend to prescribe community organizational structures, rural and regulations for
managing development activities implemented with their support. Tese practices ofen
bring conficts and jealousy with the existing community structures and undermine the
existing capacities in the community. To address this situation the members of Chikwawa
community recommended development agencies to approach them using participatory
approach. Such approaches would allow the community members to negotiate the terms
for engaging with development agencies.
Development of the governance systems food security
strategy and action plans
At the end of the rights-based situation analysis process the community developed a take
home plan which they pledged to implement. Te plan included all the things they resolved
to improve such as putting in place an appropriate organizational structure to facilitate
community participation and management of food security interventions, to establish a
constitution to govern implementation of development interventions and develop food
76
security strategies, work plans, and project proposals for the grant facility. Te Chikwawa
community leadership chiefs and members of the VDC on their own will organized a
series of meetings with the wider community to develop their governance system and
develop food security action plans. Afer completing this task, which took them about
four months, they requested for a joint assessment with the Fair programme facilitators
of the governance structures and action plans that they had developed. Tis assessment
focused on checking whether the community had made all the improvements that they were
supposed to make according to the rights-based participatory situation analysis fndings.
Te process also enabled the community stakeholders demonstrate their seriousness and
readiness to take a leading role in the management of the implementation of food security
interventions and the grants facilities to be fnanced through the Fair Programme.
Te Chikwawa community worked very hard and managed to demonstrate during
the assessment that they had put some system in place that had already started working.
Te assessment however revealed that the process of developing a governance system
and workplans was not a onetime thing, but a continuous joint learning process. Te
assessment revealed new aspects, which the community needed to make improvements
on in order to perfect their governance systems and action plans.
Developing a community managed participatory monitoring
and evaluation system
Te process of assessing the communitys readiness to take the leading role in the
implementation of the Fair Programme interventions revealed that if whatever the
community had planned to do, have to be done, and the changes they wanted to occur
in the households had to be realised, they needed to put in place a checking mechanism.
Tus, the community needed a system for checking whether their governance system was
improving or not, the action plans were being implemented as planned or not, and for
measuring whether the households were changing as a result of the interventions or not.
Such a process would be a handy tool for the community stakeholders to consolidate their
own governance systems and drive the food security implementation processes.
Te Fair Programme facilitators facilitated a process to help the community stakeholders
(VDC members, chiefs and representatives of the wider community) put in place such a
system that they could run on their own. Tey outlined the following that would help
them track the implementation process of interventions:
Te special interest group, village communities, and VDC would regularly meet to continue
the dialogue and joint analysis initiated amongst the stakeholders. Trough these forums they
would continuously analyse their livelihoods situations, plan or replan interventions, review
their organisational structure and implementation process and learn from their experiences.
Te VDC, village coordination committee, steering committee would make follow up
visits to check and verify the implementation of planned activities at household, special
interest group or village community level and provide feedback of their fndings to other
community stakeholders.
77
Special interest groups and committees would be producing and submitting reports
of their activities to the village forum. Individuals representing their respective village
communities at the VDC, would compile progress reports on activities implemented
and submit them to the VDC. Te VDC progress reports would be shared with the area
development committee and the FAIR partners.
Te community defned indicators and methodology for measuring the impact of
the various food security and related interventions. Tey would use these to occasionally
check if any changes were occurring in the households as a result of the interventions
being implemented.
The project implementation phase
Tis section provides highlights of the implementation phase of the Rumphi Food Security
Project in Chikwawa community and presents some experiences of the community
members on the concept and approach adopted.
Highlights of the implementation phase
Te Rumphi Food Security Project concept which was developed from the outcomes
of consultation with various community stakeholders, supports poor food insecure
households with a number of interventions namely:- grants for agriculture and natural
resource related income generation activities. Te community have to use the grants
obtained as a revolving fund for special interest groups to tap from; funding for a wide
range of community food security initiatives such as irrigation projects, goats revolving
schemes, seed multiplication activities; natural resource management interventions such
as aforestation projects, soil and water conservation and soil fertility improvement; HIV
and AIDS prevention and mitigation activities; and advocacy activities to infuence policy
changes.
Te Chikwawa community has so far received a grant which has supported fve
income generating activities for special interest groups. Tese include:- Tokozani club
(10 members) has received four work oxen, two oxcarts, 2 ridgers and 2 ploughs. Te
members will use the newly acquired assets for their own use at a small fee as well as hire
out the equipment to other farmers at commercial prices. Lusungu club for people living
with HIV/AIDS (15 members) has received support to produce poultry (egg production)
for cash, food and manure. Disabled and elderly peoples club (20 members) has received
support for egg production for cash, food and for manure to improve soil fertility.
Tilipo goat club has received support for 11 goats to generate capital and manure for an
irrigation project. Takondwa dairy farmers club (8 members 4 women and 4 men) has
received support to produce dairy cows. In addition, the community has been supported
with other activities on HIV and AIDS prevention and mitigation, and natural resource
management.
78
Opinions of the people on the approach adopted for the Rumphi
Food Security Project
A participatory review of the project concept and processes with some members of the
VDC and benefciaries of the grants facility highlights several factors which community
members identifed as unique.
First, the community members consulted argued that the approach particularly that
of channeling grants directly to special interest groups, has opened up a channel for
disadvantaged groups such as the people living with HIV and AIDS, disable and old
people and those not close to the leaders, who are ofen lef out, not only to directly access
development aid but also to take full control of the implementation process and the sharing
of the benefts. We have made our own system for managing chickens which is convenient
to us as people living with HIV and AIDS. We know how to support the members who are
critically ill, explained Mrs Joice Viyuwa, leader of Lusungu club. Tis system has given
hope to many people who had given up in life. You can see that our club has 20 members,
but there is also another club of twenty disabled people which has just been formed and
is closely working with us. In addition there is another club of twenty people living with
HIV and AIDS closely working with Lusungu club. Tese clubs are waiting to start their
own IGA from the money we will pay back to the community steering committee. We are
already being pressurized to start paying back to the community revolving fund.- Antony
Gondwe member disabled and elderly peoples club.
Second, members of all the fve clubs that benefted from the grant facility argued that
what made this project unique was the on-going consultations and joint analysis of the
situation between the Fair partners and the community stakeholders. Te discussions
have enabled our community to openly discuss controversial issues and address most
of the factors which have been impeding successful implementation of development
interventions. In short the approach has addressed some of the fundamental problems
of our community jealousy and corruption, observed Mr Evans Tembo member
Tokozani club.
Te approach used has provided an opportunity for members of a particular special
interest group to decide on the project they would like to implement and how they would
do it. In addition, the roles have been shared between the community stakeholders and
the service providers. Te Fair partners have provided funding and technical training for
each intervention, while the communities have put in place their own mechanism for
managing the interventions. We work in shifs of 2 3 people per shif. If a member on
shif is too ill, he or she sends a relative or caretaker. We are fully responsible for managing
the chickens and the proceeds we will get from them - explained Ms Beatrice Khungu
treasurer for Lusungu club. In fact all the ideas we are using in this project are our own
ideas, the Fair Programme partners seem to have set a trap to see if our ideas can really
work Ellen Mkandawire member Tokozani club.
79
Conclusions
Tis case study demonstrates that a systematic process oriented approach based on
continuous dialogue with the community stakeholders in search for more appropriate
methods for addressing factors that prevent development initiatives from benefting the
wider community is capable of transforming community structures from being passive
recipients of development aid to become active participants and managers as well alongside
service providers.
80
Country Study 6: MALI
How to provide better aid for agriculture in
African countries
Youssouf Traore and Ibrahima Coulibaly, CNOP Mali
Tis study is intended to be a contribution on the debates promoted by the MORE AND
BETTER campaign on funding and support to agriculture and rural development in
developing countries. Our refections investigate as well on the correlation between the
role of benefciaries of aid as decision-makers and the efectiveness of the support granted
to them with the aim to provide rather then the evidence of this correlation, concrete
examples on how it could be work.
Introduction
Since 2001, Mali has recorded a consistent and regular increase in the Of cial Development
Assistance (ODA). The countrys ODA rose from 351 million USD in 2001 to 691 million
USD in 2005, registering an increase of 97%.
Tis result could be considered as the translation of commitments made by donors
at international level, in the framework of initiatives such as the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative (HIPC) or, among the others, the Millenium Development Goals.
However, parallel to this increase, technical and fnancial partners, governments and
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) started to question on the efectiveness of aid. Te frst
two actors expressed their concerns within the framework of the aid reform that led to the
Paris Declaration and its follow up mechanism. Several concerns came as well from CSOs
through independent debates.
Te involvement of CSOs should be considered extremely important for the new
architecture of international aid. Tanks to their mission of public utility service, CSOs
have favored the opening of spaces for the participation of citizens in general and farmers
in particular in national and international debates.
Te weak participation of CSOs is one of the main limits of the Paris forum and its fnal
declaration both. Te implementation of the Paris declaration thus raises some concerns
about the aid efectiveness for what concerns: the support to programmes and policies
developed by the benefciaries of aid; the cooperation with local communities and CSOs
as full partners; the recognition of local culture, knowledge and expertise; the involvement
of the benefciaries at all stages of the programs in order to strengthen local communities
in their development efort.
Mali generalities and the socioeconomic situation
Mali is a continental country located in western Africa; it covers an area of 1. 240. 192
km
2
and share its boundaries with seven countries: Algeria to the north, Niger to the east,
81
Burkina Faso and Cte dIvoire to the south-eastern Guinea to the south, and Mauritania
and Senegal in the west.
Mali generally has three seasons: a cold season running from November to February
with an average temperature of 21
0
; a hot season running from March to May with an
average temperature of 35
0
; a rainy season running from September to October with
an average temperature of 25
0
. Tese seasons are divided between three climates type:
Saharan, Tropical and Sahelian.
Te Malian population is estimated at about 12 000.000 inhabitants. It is mainly
composed of rural (about 70%) and young people (49% is under 15 years old), while
women account for the 52% of total population.
According to the poverty analysis Mali ranks among the least developed countries:
nearly 60% of the population lives below the poverty line. By place of residence, there is
a signifcant gap between rural (80.9%) and urban (32.8%) people. Tis proportion has
remained unchanged for decades.
Agriculture: the strength of Mali and a woman looking sector
Te countrys economy is mainly based on the agriculture/rural sector which employ
8,912,459 people
17
, more than 70% of the population. It contributes nearly 40% of GDP
(estimated at 5.6 billion dollars in 2005
18
). Almost all agricultural products are provided
by household farmers mostly constituted by women. Despite all the limitations they
have to face (limited access to land, lack of education, lack of funds and equipments),
rural women account for 77% of workers in the agricultural sector and 46% of the work
force. Tey are active at 75% in the feldwork, livestock, fsheries and forestry and ofer
their services at all stages of agricultural work, individually or organized in groups by
age.
Mali agriculture and rural development represent the major challenges in terms
of economic strength, employment, livelihoods, food sovereignty, utilization of natural
resources and gender equity. However, despite the weight that the agriculture /rural sector
has for the countrys economy, it still does not receive an adequate attention in terms of
funding and support, nor from the government neither from donors.
Aid context: the broken down locomotive!
Household farming in Mali needs to be modernised .Its fnancial service needs should
be addressed to the improvement of the physical, economic, social and legal production,
an easier access to inputs, credit, appropriate forms of savings and insurance services.
Te characteristics of the demand for fnancial support (type of service, amount, rate of
repayment of the loan, type of warranty mobilized, etc.) are extremely diverse, varying
accordingly to the agro-ecological areas, the production systems, the types of actors (men,
17 Strategic Planning Cell/Ministry of Agriculture Assessment of farming campaign 2004/2005
18 The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006
82
women, youth, agricultural entrepreneurs, farmers organizations, etc.), the degree of
market integration.
Te supply of agricultural fnance has four sources: the informal sector, the
private sector (commercial banks, suppliers, operators), the middle sector of
micro fnance and the public sector. Commercial banks tend to concentrate their
funding on ofer to secure some sectors (export crops, irrigated production ...) and
venture with great care in ensuring food security. Terefore, we note that the main
recipient sectors of banking competition are: trade, manufacturing and services. Te
agricultural sector which employs over two-thirds of the workforce is marginalized.
Despite the increase in ODA, poverty and food insecurity persist and worsen. Te State
cannot allocate suf cient budgetary resources to the agricultural productive sector which
is supposed to be the engine of the countrys economy: it keeps investing in wagons, while
the locomotive of the train that should lead the country towards sustainable development
is broken down!
According to the results of a study conducted by the commissioner for food security
(a commission under the presidency of the republic) and published in November 2006
19
,
the rate of undernourished population is estimated at 29% in 2002, thus locating Mali in
category 2
20
(over 5) of FAO classifcation. According to reliable sources, only 14,9% of
current public investments are destined to the agricultural sector and only 20% of this
percentage is for productive investment (while the rest serves administrative purposes
and other related activities).
Tis situation clearly explains why the food crisis of these recent years is a reminder of
the failure of agricultural in general and agricultural fnancing in particular. Meanwhile
this also serves as a strong call to all actors regarding the objective consideration to be
made about aid, especially about its target.
Methodological approach
To conduct this study, the following methodology was adopted and followed:
Step 1: identifcation of cases may be the object of study;
Step 2: gathering information from stakeholders. Gathering information on the cases
selected for the study;
Step 3: analysis and information exchange with stakeholders.
Tese steps were conducted through interviews, review of studies or reports that are
interrelated, with diferent perspectives around the issue of fnancing agriculture and
efectiveness of ODA development.
19 Mali Mobilisation of Initiatives Project for Food Security ( PROMISAM)
20 Fairly high rates
83
A case study: beneciaries at the centre of decision making:
Sahelian Development Fund Zone (SADEFU) Programme
1999-2009
In Mali, political reforms undertaken since 1992 marked the beginning of active
involvement of the civil society in project management / rural development programs
and disengagement of the state. Tese developments, associated with decentralisation and
ongoing democratisation process, are favourable to local initiatives and direct participation
of rural communities in the management of their personal afairs.
It is in this context that FODESA was established following the agreement signed
February 19, 1999 between the Government of Mali and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) amounting to 29.5 billion FCFA (approximately
45.000.000 Euros).
Te programs overall aim is to contribute to reducing rural poverty in areas of program
intervention, by increasing incomes and improving their living conditions. To achieve
this goal, the program aims to facilitate the realization by actors of civil society including
OP benefciaries of micro-community through a local development fund, through the
promotion of micro fnance for individual activities, strengthening local capacity and
management of natural resources.
Te programmes implementation strategy relies on initiatives determined by
benefciaries. It also favours implication of all poor social strata and especially the
vulnerable populations such as women and youths.
Benefciaries main tasks for an efective participation in the programme are the
following: identify major needs, prepare micro projects fles whose funding are solicited;
dentifying priority needs, preparation of records on which the micro-fnancing is
sought;
identifcation of monitoring indicators and elements of self-evaluation;
set up organised structures destined to manage micro projects;
identify of skills yet to be acquired, either in terms of management, institutional
functioning, of a micro integrated project in a set of coherent support activities;
participation in the programme management through their representatives on the
associations.by assigning representatives in associations.
At local (regional) level, programme management is guaranteed by an organised regional
association with the following structures:
A General Assembly (GA) made up of all duly mandated representatives of Farmers
Organisation (FO), of elected delegates to echo their voice in associations;
The Board of Directors (BD), made up of representatives of leading
organisations elected by the General Assembly, with a predominance of Farmers
Organisation;
A Regional Agency for Execution and Management (RAEM) whose mandate is to carry

84
on regional association missions, in conformity with the agreement concluded with the
national association and with the general assembly policies orientations.
Te major activities of regional associations are stated as follows:
Te defnition of working programme at regional level;
Te selection of eligible villages for the programme support
Te approval of requests for support from the villages, or associations;
Te animation of the program across the region;
Managing the bank account for advance payment
Follow-up and execution of programmes activities in collaboration with partners and
benefciaries;
RAEM Manager and Financial manager recruitment by public job opportunity
notifcation afer getting approval from the organisation and from IFAD.
Regional associations are accountable to the national association made up of representatives
of regional associations. Its prerogatives are:
General coordination of programme activities;
Te grouping of activities;
Approval of consolidated programme of activities;
Assistance to the execution of such activities;
Special account management;
Organising audits;
Annual activities assessment and consolidation of programme implementation results;
National coordinator and Agency Financial manager recruitment by public job
opportunity notifcation afer getting approval from the organisation and from IFAD.
At the end of the year 2008, SADEFU coordination, in collaboration with the programmes
benefciaries assessed the state of activities carried on. Te achievements recorded in this
assessment were appreciated by all farmers and rural development actors and credit was
given to the programmes approach.
As an innovative approach, SADEFU peculiar character resides in that it is managed
by peasant organisations to which the government of Mali has entrusted (thanks to IFAD
and FOs willingness) the management of loans through a national convention. Tis
agreement is signed between the government and the national association, who in turn,
signs agreements with regional associations of regions involved in the programme.
Currently the programme is over, but farmers organisations have decided to further
its implementation for their own interest and to extend it to other organisations, and it
all works!

85
Proof: a benecial initiative with mitigated results!
Te Government of Mali as well as other countries in the developing world who, under
pressure from the Breton Wood institutions programs committed themselves to liberalize
their economies and dismantle their systems of public market intervention, especially in
regard to food have all been facing a severe food crisis following the unprecedented boom
in recent years of the price of basic foodstufs including rice.To respond to this alarming
situation, the Malian government has mobilised huge means, supporting farming (precisely
rice growing) for almost FCFA 42 billions.
Te initiative called rice initiative aimed to signifcantly increase of the rice production
to 1.6 million tones of paddy rice (or 50% increase) corresponding to 1 million tons of rice
merchant. Tis was to cover the entire internal demand of food with an amount of rice
estimated at 900 000 tones and to generate an exportable surplus of about 100 000 tones
In order to achieve these results, the rice farmers and their organizations have been
involved in identifying all factors encouraging increased production. Following
participatory approach taking into account the concerns and decisions of the agricultural
profession, the prerequisites for the success of the initiative have been correctly identifed
and producers have been supported through the provision of tillers, fertilizers, and seeds.
Field cultivation has also been developed.
Several assessments of the campaign have shown that expected quantities have been
produced. Tese conclusions were confrmed by the media. On the production view point,
there is no doubt that the initiative was not only a success, but it equally proved that
household farming can yield enough foodstufs to feed the entire population if farming
receives adequate support.
Despite this success ( signifcant increase of production), there is still no rice on the
market and the President of the Republic has been obliged to grant exemptions to traders
to import rice only a few months afer the harvest!
Where is the rice initiative gone? The post production phase
Quite some time before harvest, farmers organisations suggested to the government to
buy the surplus production, given that farmers organisations had neither the fnancial
power nor the storage infrastructures to assume this responsibility. Te purpose of this
approach aimed frst to avoid a drastic fall in rice prices to producers and secondly to
ensure a constant supply of the market.
Unfortunately, authorities rather yielded to Breton Wood institutions instructions (
namely the World Bank) which stated that the market economy is self regulatory. At the
same time, the comrades of circumstance George Bush, Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown
... straightened private companies with public money! Limitations of wild liberalism were
once again obvious.
As such, this situation benefted wholesalers who plundered farmers of their rice
production to export it in neighbouring countries at high prices
86
With regard to goals of the rice initiative that aim at producing enough rice for the
malian population, the following two main lessons can be outlined:
Producers were associated satisfactorily in the decision making process during
production and there was surplus. Tis was certainly not the only factor that led to
production surplus but it is one among the most important.
Te views of producers weighed too low in the balance against that of the Breton Wood
institutions in post harvest and there was no rice to the population.
Key factors for success
Te willingness and confdence of managers and technical and fnancial partners (TFP)
towards producers and their organizations;
Programmes and projects better suits concerns of benefciaries when these benefciaries
are associated (from the identifcation, to the implementation and monitoring/
evaluation).
Ownership (of projects and programs) is more obvious when the benefciaries are at the
center of the decision making process;
Te implication of benefciaries in decision making makes for greater commitment and
consciousness in relation to their role in the utilisation of aid ( fnancial support) and
the openness of farmers organisations to work in synergy with other actors;
Farmers organisations are more motivated as they get involved in projects/programmes
management;
Farmers organisation involvement in projects/programmes management creates
mutual confdence among themselves, the State and TFP, and also favours emulation for
the adoption of good habits in managing post projects phases.

87
Country Study 7: MOZAMBIQUE
Peasants ownership community
strengthening and conservation agricultures
practices: the case of Massalane and Tsenane
Andrew Mattick, Faustino Jose and Diamantino Nhampossa
Executive summary
Tis document is the fnal report of the Study into the farmer association movement in
Funhalouro and Panda districts of Inhambane Province, In Mozambique. Te study was
conducted in 2008 and it aligns with More and Better (MaB) principles of good aid. Te
study team comprised the authors and members of UNAC staf from the national and
district of ces. Te objective of the study was to evaluate the model being used by UNAC
to promote the farmer association movement in the two districts and evaluate up to what
point the model is contributing towards the achievement of food sovereignty.
With support of Oxfam Australia the National Small-scale Farmers Union in
Mozambique (UNAC) has been implementing over the last four and a half years a
successful association model in Funhalouro and Panda Districts of Inhambane Province.
Te model is being implemented with aid provided by APAC (Australian Partnership
with African Communities) and the overall objective of the Program is to reach food
sovereignty through community capacity building. UNACs association model promotes
self-organisation of rural communities into farmers associations. It emphasises both
institutional and technical capacity building. It values traditional mutual assistance
mechanisms, improves existing production techniques and promotes organic and
conservation agriculture.
As a result of the application of this model, a basic association structure composed
by 33 associations with a total of around one thousand members, was build up over a
period of four years in two of the poorest districts in the south of Mozambique. Te
current association structure has three levels: farmers associations at the village level,
pre-unions at the locality level and unions at the district level. Te majority of the
association members are women (77%) and their representation in the social councils
(management bodies) of the associations is about 50%. In terms of access to and control
of resources and decision making their participation is improving. A signifcant part of
the members are from vulnerable families. Te participation of young persons (<30 years
old) in the associations is unfortunately still low.
Trough the APAC Program the majority of the association members nowadays
have a basic knowledge of the various (Government) laws and regulations. Some of the
association members started to participate in the District Consultative Councils and
88
several associations were trained to apply for the community funds (7million) installed
by the Government
21
.
Te association members also have a good awareness of HIV and AIDS and slowly
started to change their behaviour. Tey also gained more experience about sustainable
natural resource management and they know better how to mitigate and respond to
natural disasters. Trough the use of the model, there are positive signs of the existence
of a sustainable association movement in the two districts. UNAC is aware that its model
has a strong emphasis on promoting institutional strengthening and lately it tries to giving
equal weight to the promotion of proftable economic activities because the original model
is likely to delay the realisation of food sovereignty. UNAC assists the associations with
several agricultural production activities like the diversifcation of drought resistant crops.
As a result of technical training, the association members have improved their traditional
production techniques; they gained a greater awareness of the negative implications of
uncontrolled burning of their plots and the forest, started adopting mulching in their
felds and began using animal manure for vegetable production.
Te program approach was to strengthen existing traditional and local self help
organizations in the community providing them with tools that should help them
to improve. In doing so, the program was in line with the MaB principle according to
which, aid should work with local communities and social organizations. Better aid
supports local communities, community-based organizations particularly in building:
political empowerment; the capacity of people to articulate their views; implementation
their own development models; and meaningful participation in development processes,
recognizing that the needs and realities of rural communities are at the core of solutions
to solve hunger and poverty.
Tis case study shows how the program closely aligns with the MaB principle according
to which aid should support the programs and policies developed by the recipient
communities and countries. Aid should be provided in a manner that it does not disrupt
local production and markets. It should support long term development and respond to the
expressed needs of local communities. Food sovereignty was the priority for aid provided,
taking into account the cultural, political and economic characteristics of the districts. Te
program was implemented in such a way that it focused on bringing greater autonomy
and self- reliance of the peasants and their associations in what regards the approach used
for production and distribution of food. Increased knowledge on resources available and
awareness on existing decision making structures in the districts have strengthened the
local control of available resources.
21 The Government has established a local development fund of MZM7 million (U$280,000) for each of the 128 Districts of the
Country. Consultative Councils are spaces where Government and non-state actors decide where funds should be allocated and
monitor their implementation.
89
Introduction
Te National Union of Small-scale Farmers (UNAC) is a movement whose mission is
to fght for the greater role of camponeses (small scale farmers) in the construction of a
more just, prosperous and equal society. UNAC became legally registered in 1994 and is
a member of La Via Campesina, the international peasant movement. A larger number of
UNAC members are organised in farmer associations and co-operatives. UNAC is also an
active member of the More and Better Campaign and it has undertaken various activities
in the country in harmony with the action plan of the Campaign
22
.
In the districts of Funhalouro and Panda in Inhambane UNAC is implementing a
project in partnership with Oxfam Australia through the Australian Partnership with
African Communities Programme. Te project is entitled Achieving Food Sovereignty
through Community Strengthening. It began in October 2004 with duration of 5 years.
Te project was conceived on the basis of lessons learned in Mavume (Funhalouro) where
UNAC worked in partnership with Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (OCAA) between
2000 and 2006. In the district of Funhalouro, the (UNAC/APAC) project works in the
locality of Tsenane with 16 farmer associations while in Panda the project base is in the
locality of Massalane where UNAC works with 8 farmer associations. Te project is
currently expanding to include two new localities (1 in each district) where the initial
participatory appraisals have already been carried out.
Tis case study has been undertaken under the auspices of UNAC (National Peasants
Union) to illustrate the principles of the More and Better Campaign
23
(MaB) trying to answer
the question What is better aid for agriculture/fshing, food and rural development?. Te
report is going to focus on two of the M&B principles according to which 1) the program
must strengthen existing traditional and local self help organizations in the community
providing them with tools that should help them to improve and 2) aid should support the
programs and policies developed by the recipient communities and countries.
The case of Massalane and Tsenane: Associative structure
functioning
Strengths
A basic structure or peasants exists in both districts Panda and Funhalouro. Each district
has a district association union. In the localities studied there are locality zone nuclei of
peasants (Tsenane, Mavume, Massalane). At the community level one fnds the farmer
associations. At this moment UNAC has 16 member associations in Tsenane and eight
in Massalane. Tese associations currently comprise 577 members of which 77%
are women. Tere is only one association that has more men than women members.
Tere are vertical linkages between the various levels of the association structure.
22 a) National Seminar in Beira 2006, b) Articles presented and published in the Conference and Book Can Africa Feed Itself? c)
dissemination of the principles amongst members and use them as advocacy tool for better aid in the Country.
23 More and Better: www.moreandbetter.org
90
Te village level associations have representatives in the nuclei and the nuclei have
representatives in the unions. At all levels the camponeses are members of UNAC. Te
associative machine is, therefore, ready to work and the challenge is to strengthen itself
to achieve food sovereignty.
At all levels the associations possess a General Assembly comprised of all members
and a Management Council, but not always with all the posts flled. Only a few of the
associations have a complete, functioning Supervisory Council which is the body that
controls and supervises the working of the Management Council and General Assembly
Council.
Participation of women in the associations
Women comprise about 77% of the members of the associations in Tsenane and Massalane.
Although one notes a decline in the number of members of most associations (comparing
2007 and 2008), and particularly that of men, the percentage of women members is stable
or in some cases rising
24
. In the UNAC/APAC programme the participation of women is
highest in Massalane (83%) and lowest in Tsenane, Matlale village, (63%). In the locality
of Mavume, a small sample indicates the participation of a higher proportion of male
members than in Massalane or Tsenane.
Womens representation in the various councils is very encouraging. 12 of the 22
associations visited have women presidents, nine have women vice/presidents, 16 have
women book-keepers and nine have women secretaries. On average, one concludes
that women occupy half the posts in the various social councils. As stated above, the
Supervisory Councils are not well organised but in four of the six associations where they
exist the presidents are women.
However, despite the fact that women number more than men in almost all associations
and that they are well represented in the social councils, in terms of access and control
of resources, decision making etc they are still observed to be subordinate to the men.
During group interviews consultants noted a lack of gender sensibility among some male
members in almost all associations. Tis notwithstanding the positive gains made by
the project in the dissemination of the Family Law which has redefned mens role in
reproductive (household) tasks such as child care, cooking, water collection etc.
Participation of vulnerable families in the associations
Without doubt, a signifcant part of association members are from vulnerable families.
Te majority of these are widows, single mothers, elderly and families caring for orphans.
During the days of work in the collective felds, the weaker members are given lighter tasks
such as looking afer the babies and sweeping the foor of the area used for association
meetings. Te vulnerable families generally lack labour to cultivate their felds. It is thanks
to the mechanisms for mutual assistance practiced by the associations (and promoted by
UNAC) that these families manage to grow crops and produce food.
24 Except in Vondo where there has been a sharp decline in membership in general.
91
Leadership, decision making and conict resolution
Before the creation of the associations, decisions were taken on behalf of the community by
the political and traditional leaders in an autocratic manner. Leadership was top-down.
Te community was not consulted and there was no community participation. Conficts
were resolved by the same leaders with the assistance of the respected elders. Today,
with the creation of the associations which possess democratically elected leaders, the
community is more involved in debates and decision making on important issues. While
the community leaders and elders still retain considerable infuence (which is necessary to
guarantee the sustainability of the programme), conficts are resolved and decisions taken
in a more democratic and open manner than before.
Knowledge by the members of laws, regulations and other important
messages
Te UNAC approach for disseminating information in the community is the following:
each association has one or more community agents, relatively well educated persons,
chosen by the General Assembly, to inform the other members about their rights and
obligations according to the various laws. About 50% of the Ccommunity Agents are
women. Te Community Agents receive training form UNAC provincial and district
teams, in collaboration with technical staf from the District Government (e.g Tsenane
has a resident agricultural extension worker from the SDAE
25
). Afer their training, the
Community Agents pass on the information received to the other members.
Te majority of the members in the associations visited have at least a basic
knowledge of the Land Law, the Forest Law and the Family Law. As well as this they
have received information on HIV and AIDS (from UNAC, ACORD and the District
Health Dept.), health and hygiene (District Health Dept.), agricultural techniques
(UNAC, SDAE). However, one notes a tendency for the camponeses to mix up the
various laws and messages, for example confusing the Land Law with Forest Law and
Health & Hygiene with Family Law. Despite this, as a result of the knowledge they have
acquired, association members gave the following examples of how they have changed
they attitudes and practices:
Forest and wildlife law
We possess a Community Management Committee to help us combat uncontrolled forest
burning and conservation of forest resources (Tsenane)
We dont burn the forest as we did before to conserve wild fruits, animals and other products
that we depend on for our survival
Weve reduced the hunting of wild animals in the breeding season and we avoid killing
females where possible
We control the cutting of high value trees and the indiscriminate cutting of other trees
25 SDAE Agriculture and Economic District Services
92
We control the cutting of tree and hunting of animals by persons from outside the
community
We police the timber merchants and we are close to getting the 20% of the license fee which
these people pay for their timber concessions which is our right under the law
(Tsenane nucleus, Community Management Committee)
Family and Gender Relations
Te young men help the women and girls carry water from the well to the house which they
did not do before
We men heat up water for our wives bath when they are delayed in the felds
We men help our wives to bathe and dress the young children
We men prepare food for our wives and children
When we are on a trip, the men help their wives carry the bags and the young children
Cross-cutting issues
Association members have a good knowledge of HIV and AIDS and know how it is
transmitted and prevention strategies. In terms of sexual practices, the men say they
know they should not have girlfriends outside their marriage. Whether they practice this
advice is not possible to know.
Challenges Low representation of young people in the associations
Te majority of the association members are in the age range from 40 to 60 years. Tere
are also a signifcant proportion of members over 60 years. However the under 30s are
not well represented in the associations. One knows that many of the young men are
working away from their home area (some in South Africa). When asked why there are
few young women in the associations, members explained that many of them are still at
school and as there are no secondary schools in Panda or Funhalouro they have to leave
the districts to study. Encouraging the more active participation of young people is
a constant challenge for UNAC in its promotion of farmer associations. As well as the
absence of many young people in the communities, one must also face the fact that small-
scale farming is not trendy and is viewed by the younger generation as an occupation for
those who do not have other opportunities in life.
Access and control of resources and participation of women in decision making
In terms of number, the participation of women is very good. However, there are doubts
about their degree of infuence in terms of access and control of resources and decision
making. For example, all the associations received cattle through the UNAC/APAC
programme but it is the men who look afer the cattle, ofen in their own corrals. Te
story is the same with the goats distributed through the programme. One way to increase
93
womens access to resources would be to change the distribution methodology and give
the animals/plant materials to individual members (women and men) rather than to the
association as a whole.
High rate or illiteracy and low level of enrolment in literacy campaigns
In order for an association member to participate efectively in the running and development
of his/her association he/she should ideally be able to read, write and do simple arithmetic.
Currently an average 77% of association members are illiterate (men 65%, women 89%)
26
.
Tis includes a large part of the treasurers and secretaries! Meanwhile, enrolment in the
Government Adult Literacy Programme which extends throughout the country is low.
Only 1.5% of illiterate men and 13.5% of illiterate women in the associations are enrolled in
the programme. Increasing the level of literacy of association (and community) members
represents a big challenge for UNAC in the future. Higher levels of literacy, particularly
for women, are one of the best ways to ensure greater access and control of productive
resources by women.
The District Nucleus of Camponeses of Funhalouro
Te district nucleus (union) was formed in April 2007 and has a Management Council
that comprises 1 member from Tsenane, 1 from Tome, 2 from Mavume and 1 from
Funhalouro town. According to information obtained during feld work the GA meets
annually and the MC monthly. Te nucleus has elaborated its work plan for 2008 with the
assistance of UNAC and this was submitted to the District Government in February. Te
plan includes the following:
Accompanying visits (monitoring) of the associations in Tsenane and Mavume once a
month;
Training of members in associativismo (association building), internal organization
and management;
Identify and secure a plot of land in Funhalouro town to build a headquarters.
While the creation of the district nucleus was an important step in the development of the
association structure in Funhalouro, the nucleus is still very new, weak, decapitalised and
does not have complete social councils (for example it doesnt have a functioning social
council). Tis nucleus is an important mouth piece for the aspirations of the associations
that it represents. However in order to be more efective it requires more technical training
(adult education: reading, writing basic maths), political and civic education on policy
issues and legislation. It is also necessary to undertake training on basic management
skills, transparency and good governance in association and leadership.
Relationship with local State organs
Te Panda district union and the Funhalouro district nucleus have their bases in the
26 Sample survey carried out during eld work

94
district capital towns. Tey both have linkages with the District Administration, the
SDAE and the INGC (Institute for Disaster Management). However, they do not have
representation on the District Advisory Councils
27
which pre-selects projects for possible
funding through the Government Fund for Local Development Initiatives (the so-called
7 million Meticais fund), nor on the Technical Team that makes the fnal decision on
which projects to fnance; although it is the right of civil society to participate in these
two bodies. Getting campons representation on these two bodies would greatly increase
the infuence of the camponeses in the use of the fund which is, afer all, destined to assist
farmers increase their production and productivity.
Venn diagrams compiled in Massalane and Tsenane during feld work show closer
linkages between the communities and the district education and economic activities
(agriculture) departments since the beginning of the UNAC/APAC programme. Tis is
partly a result of the presence of the project but also the presence of the adult literacy
campaign and the Government Fund for Local Development Initiatives which mainly
funds agricultural and livestock development activities.
Food sovereignty
Food sovereignty is defned in the UNAC Strategic Plan (2004-2008) as: the right of all
people to defne their own production policies and strategies, distribution and consumption
of foods that guarantee the right to an adequate diet for the whole population
Strengths
Diversication of crops
Te introduction of drought resistant crops increased the diversity of crops in farmers
felds and thereby increased their level of food security. Te associations that have
adopted this practice used PRAs (participatory rural approaches) to seek solutions to their
problems. During this process they had identifed drought as one of the main threats for
the community and they decided to introduce crops that can resist to the poor conditions
of the soil in the area. Tey have done exchange visits with communities of surrounding
Districts (Inharrime, Jangamo) that were already using this approach and selected crops
according to their needs and learned with other peasants how these crops should be cared.
About 15 people from each of the region take part in the exchange and training and act as
community agents to disseminate information to member of the associations.
In Panda district the emphasis until now has been on the distribution of pineapple
crowns/cuttings of the large fruit variety called abacaxi. All 8 association received crowns/
cuttings. Te cuttings were planted in the collective felds and not in the felds of the
individual members. Few of the members have managed to get cuttings for their own
feld to date. Te pineapple plants produce fruit twice a year (Dec/Jan & June/July). At
harvest time the pineapples are sold or divided between the members that participate
27 But various associations have members that are part of the advisory councils at the locality and administrative post level.
95
in work in the collective felds. Te selling price depends on the size of the fruit and
varies between 3 and 10 Meticais
28
for each pineapple. When the fruits are sold from the
collective felds rather than being distributed to members, the receipts are put into the
association petty cash box and are used for current expenses, for example, to pay transport
costs for association leader to participate in meetings in Panda town.
Many pineapple cuttings were also distributed to the association in 2006 but the results
have not been as good as in Massalane. Te plants are not developing because of the
poor quality of the soils where they were planted. To date there has been no harvest of
fruit. However, the distribution of cassava cuttings to the associations is making positive
impact. Te cuttings were planted in collective and individual felds (at least some of the
members). During the feld work the team had the opportunity to visit various cassava
felds (in Vondo) where the cuttings were planted in November of last year. Te plants
are healthy and the owners are already harvesting the leaves to make various dishes
(types of food).
Organic and conservation agriculture practices
In visits to the collective and individual felds of the association members of the team
noted the adoption of soil conservation techniques and the use of animal manure in
vegetable plots. Most farming in the area is practised according to traditional knowledge.
With the decrease of soil fertility, major changes in and scarcity of rainfall, and increased
temperature, traditional knowledge of the area started to reach its limits. Although most
farmers are also cattle breeders and have access to a range of organic materials that could
be used to improve the quality of soil, they never used them because they were never
necessary before. UNAC has been undertaking national discussions and campaigns
on climate change and the value of sustainable agriculture to mitigate their efects. Te
project used some manuals developed by UNAC in articulation with ANAP (Associacion
Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos Cuba) as well as the campesino a campesino (farmers
to farmers) methodology to demonstrate how peasants could reduce the efects of climate
change. Tis approach is used by some peasants who produce vegetable in nearby districts.
Tey passed on their knowledge to other farmers in Panda and Funhalouro who quickly
adopted afer campesino a campesino exchange. A limited number of peasants selected
by the community participate in the training exercises and they globalise knowledge
afer returning to their communities and associations. Local Government does not have
enough extension staf to cover the whole district. Extension in these areas is a very
expensive service. Peasants are trained by fellow peasants who got experience and more
information.
Association members, for example, were trained not to burn the weeds afer weeding
but to spread them on the soil surface as a mulch to conserve water and increase soil
organic matter content. Another technique observed is the use of weeds and crop residues
as organic fertilizer (compost) in the production of bananas e other fruits. In arid zones
28 U$D1=MZM26
96
with poor soils such as those in many of the villages visited, the techniques being promoted
by UNAC (and other partners) are important to increase production and the sustainability
of land use for agriculture.
One more practice that UNAC is encouraging is planting cassava and pineapples in
lines which facilitates weeding and the planting of legumes in between the lines to enrich
the soil. Growing more than one crop in the same feld reduces the risk of crop failure.
Te photo of Mariamo Mutuque above shows the cassava planted in lines with cow peas
growing in between the rows. Farmers are encouraged not to mix crops that are known
to deplete soil nutrients such as cassava and pineapples. Farmers are advised to intercrop
these with legumes.
Collective elds as a source of food and seeds
All the associations have at least one collective feld where the members work, normally
one day a week. It is on this day that the planning meetings mentioned above take place
afer the work is fnished. Members discuss and analyse their progress, resolve problems
and make plans for the next season. Te collective felds are not generating income for the
associations (except for the small income from pineapples which shows some potential).
However, the collective felds serve as sources of food and seeds which increase the level of
food security of the members. Te maize harvested from the collective felds that will be
used as seed for the next season is dried and conserved in the open air, without dehusking,
as the photo below shows. Maize for consumption is dehusked and stored in a covered,
raised granary as the second photo shows.
Restocking farmers with cattle
Livestock has always been part of food sovereignty strategy of peasant in Panda and
Funhalouro. However due to the war and recurrent droughts many animal were lost.
UNAC/APAC program distributed animals to association in both areas. Te animals
supplied to the association were mainly females, many of them young heifers when they
were delivered (June 2006). Animals are breeding well and the mortality rate is low in
spite of negligible levels of veterinary back-up from the still not functioning network
of community animal health workers. Te multiplication rate is an average 61% and
mortality is 5.7%, both very encouraging.
Exploration of the low-lying areas
UNAC is promoting the use of the low-lying areas (baixas) where there are water sources
that permit the production of food crops year round. In these areas peasants did not use
extensively these areas for agriculture. Te reason why remains to be understood. In
order to promote the use of these areas the project organised planning meetings with
community and associations in which advantages of planting certain crops on the river
banks became obvious. In Massalane, the 8 associations have felds in the baixas where
they produce rice, bananas, sugar cane and vegetables. Production levels are very low
97
at present but there is huge potential to increase production through the introduction
of simple, improved techniques, incorporating conservation and organic practices. In
Funhalouro, water sources are very scarce but there are some baixas (ex. Vondo) that are
not currently being used except for grazing the cattle. Tese too could be better utilised
for food crop production.
Te UNAC/APAC promotes the exchange of experiences between the associations
in the two districts and with associations in other provinces. For example, some
farmers from Tsenane were taken to Tete Province (1500Km) to visit a community
natural resource management project (Tchuma Tchato) in Caborra Bassa district.
Facilitating this type of exchange of ideas and experience between farmers is one of the
most efective ways of strengthening the associations and encouraging the adoption of
improved production practices.
The forest in times of scarcity
In terms of attaining food sovereignty, Tsenane is one of the most challenging localities in
the district of Funhalouro. It is highly drought prone and does not possess any perennial
water courses/sources. Tese days, the farmers say that the situation has become so bad
that there isnt really a defned cropping season anymore. In the words of one association
member in Matlale village when we have seeds, we plant them with any rain that falls in
the hope that we get some production. In this situation of constant food insecurity, the
forest and its rich resources provide a safety net against hunger. As a result of training
in the sustainable use of forest resources and disaster mitigation given by UNAC, there
are signs that the communities are placing more value on the conservation of the forest.
Te introduction of activities like beekeeping in the forest could encourage the further
strengthening of forest resource management.
Challenges
Increasing production
In Tsenane and Massalane, the 2007/2008 harvest was not as good as the year before due
to the irregularity of the rain. Even in a normal year, agricultural production is much
lower than it could be if improved, appropriate production techniques were widely
adopted (without recourse to a lot of purchased inputs). Te houses of the association
members visited during feld work have food reserves for 3 to 6 months. At present,
according to the district chief of the Institute for Disaster Management, there is no
need for emergency food distribution in the two districts. But, he said, from August
onwards, as food stock run out, this situation is almost certain to change (particularly
in Tsenane). Tis year the camponeses say they have not sold any maize, beans, cassava
or peanuts as they do not have surpluses.
Assisting the farmers to increase their produce and thus reduce food insecurity,
especially in drought years, poses a great challenge for UNAC, the government and
the NGOs. It is necessary to invest in crop diversification, intercropping with legumes
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and improved cultivation practices (mulching, use of compost and manure, crop
rotation, sowing in lines, timely weeding), and the promotion of cashew trees, fruit
trees and improved use of the baixas. An increase in food production would reduce
the food shortage periodically affecting all the camponeses and thereby increase food
security.
Community animal health workers/agents
Tese agents are part of the UNACs efort to develop a national peasant school. To
undertake training and formation, UNAC has a training Team that coordinates all training
activities of the movement. Tis Teams works with 25 trainers in the whole country. In
the region where the project was implemented UNAC has two trainers who are part of the
national network. Tese trainers get updated periodically and are provided with tools to
train trainers at local level. Te promoteres mentioned above are local trainers that focus
their attention to a specifc problem raised by peasants in their daily life.
Te (Government) District Livestock Services do not have staf in the localities
where the UNAC/APAC programme is working. At the district level, their coverage, in
terms of the provision of basic veterinary services is weak. To improve this situation,
UNAC (and various NGOs) select and train farmers as community animal health
workers (promotores). In the UNAC/APAC programme each association has at least one
promotor who is (or should be) responsible for the health and production of the animals
distributed by UNAC and the animals of other farmers in their respective villages. Te
promotores received basic training (from UNAC) in animal nutrition and reproduction
in 2006 but have not received any training in animal health, which, from the point of
view of an increase in animal numbers, is the most important element of their training.
Te promotor programme must be based on cost recovery (no free treatment) through
the introduction of a payment scale based on the type of treatment and the specie of
animal.
Recommendations for advocacy and action
For advocacy
Promote peasant leadership training on policy issues at district level especially those
related to local participation in policy processes and development of projects for
community enhancement;
Disseminate More and Better principles and actions within the peasant communities to
show linkages with local actions and promote discussion with local authorities on the
role of State and global donors in their implementation;
Struggle for institutionalised contact with local authorities to discuss priorities for
peasants in the districts.

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For action
Institutional capacity building (self-organisation) of the associations:
General capacity building for the members of the association. Topics would include
leadership, the role and functions of the members of the social councils, how to organise
meetings, minute taking, prioritising activities, planning, book keeping, etc;
Training and closer follow-up of the Community Agents responsible for the dissemination
of information to other members is necessary to improve their performance and
impact;
Encourage the communities to enrol in the Government literacy programme. Where
there is no literacy teacher, assist the community to select someone suitable and approach
the District Education Department to provide the necessary support to this person;
Conduct more gender training to empower women members. Specifc courses (not just
integrated within other messages as a cross-cutting theme) are necessary to challenge
and change attitudes and practices that discriminate against women.
In the theme of food sovereignty:
Strengthen the association leaders (members of the social councils) in the identifcation
and elaboration of proposal for submission to the Government Fund for Supporting
Local Development Initiative ;
More ef cient exploration of the low-lying, high potential zones through the use
agroecological methods.
Methodology used for this case study
Instruments and methods used for data collection:
A formal questionnaire.
A semi-structured questionnaire based on the project logical framework.
Support questions for gender analysis.
Venn diagram.
Interviews with focus groups in the associations, ofen divided by gender, and sometimes
divided into groups of association leaders and simple members.
Semi-structured interviews with individual key informants and non-members of the
associations (control group)
Debates in plenary sessions to explore such topics as gender, HIV and AIDS, access and
control of resources by women, participation in collective work, survival strategies.
Interviews with chiefs of the localities (political and traditional leaders)
Farm walks to the collective and individual felds
House visits to randomly selected association members
Visits to the community livestock corrals and the sites where the associations tie their goats

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Study location
Te feld study took place in the localities of Tsenane, Mavume and Massalane. A total of
22 farmer associations were contacted during 16 days of feld work.
In Tsenane locality, the study was conducted in the villages of: Tsenane; Vondo;
Matlale
In the locality of Mavume the team worked in Mavume village and the village of
Mahomu
In Massalane, the study took place in Massalane town and in the villages of: Hambula;
Mugume; Nhachecuane; Malawo; Nhamuganguele.
References
Norfolk, S. et al., Assessment of Agricultural Information Needs in ACP States for CTA
Products and Services, Country Study Mozambique, 2006;
Hanlon, J., Open University, Is Poverty Decreasing in Mozambique?, London;
Ministrio de Agricultura, Relatrio Anual de Desempenho do MINAG, 2008;
Governo de Moambique, Balano do Plano Econmico e Social de 2008.

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Case study 8: TUNISIA
Good support for innovation in difcult rural
areas. The IRZOD project
by the Association for Sustainable Development (ADD - Medenine)
Introduction
Te IRZOD (Innovation Rurale en Zones Dif ciles ) project is based on a new approach, on the
assumption that solution to problems of its concern lies in the development of new activities
diferent from conventional farming activities practiced within dif cult rural zones, with the
intention to improve employment and revenues without increasing pressure on resources.
Tis has do with the valorisation of local resources (natural landscape, architectural,
historical, crafs and specifc local products) knowing the approach adopted is territorial,
multi-sectoral and managed by local actors.
Te main objective of the diagnosis conducted by the project work team was to assist
communities and local actors in the project area to better understand their culture and
local know-how.
Tis diagnosis facilitated the adoption of an approach and principles that led to a
better way of helping local communities to promote sustainability of rural live in the area,
and a partnership partnership spirit amongst local business and social actors through the
setting up of a Committee in charge of the project Animation and Execution (CLAR), and
the assumption by the women of the rural zone of the handicraf and farming activities.
Te approach adopted by the project fts perfectly and meets the principles of the
More and Better Campaign: better aid is also to assist the rural community to develop
their economic activities and promote the diversity of their cultures and their methods of
production.
An overview of the country
Due to its location on the Mediterranean basin, Tunisia has experienced a cross fertilization
of many civilisations. Tunisia was a nation-state, a symbol of national identity, during the
early years of its independence. Te Prerogatives and infuence of traditional institutions
such as tribes were eroded to the beneft of the States apparatus. State institutions, political
and administrative structures became compulsory passages for citizens, to the detriment
of their participation in civil society.
Since 1973, Tunisia has been fxing fve year economic and social development plans.
Rural development orientations are equally specifed. During the 1970-1980 decade, the
essential strategic orientations were the promotion of employment and the improvement
of vulnerable populations revenues. However, the implemented programme did not
yield expected results. Tis observation led the government to elaborate Integrated Rural
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Development Programmes (IRDP) where both improvements of living conditions and
the promotion of productive actions were associated. Despite this new approach and the
decentralisation of development eforts at regional level, poor citizen participation and the
dif culty of consolidating achievements were highlighted. With the 1980 economic crises
and the openness to a greater democratisation, the state then sought to mobilise civil
society, thus aligning with the international trend. Experimental participatory approaches
were then carried on with NGOs.
Farming and aid policy
Tunisia surface area is 163,610 km2. Arable felds are estimated at 4 071,4 millions acres
with 360 000 acres of irrigated perimeters. Farming represented 16,0 % of the GDP in 2002
(source: National Institute for Statistics), and contributed for over 9 % of goods exportation;
providing jobs to over 22 % of the active population. Te main farming products are: Olive
oil, les citrus fruits, cereals and dates. Water resources in the country are estimated at 4 236
millions m3 per year. 68 % of surface water is mobilised. Te strategy implemented since
1990 comprise a hydraulic mobilisation plan spread over a ten year period comprising
the construction of 21 dams, 203 collinear dams and one thousand retention lakes, 1 760
drillings, 98 purifcation stations. Performances of the farming sector have enabled
the country to attain self-suf ciency in most products. Tunisia recently became self-
suf ciency in milk whereas national production supplied close to 50 % of demand in the
early nineties.
Self-suf ciency was consolidated for other products despite the rapid increase in
demand resulting from population growth and individual demand due to salary increments.
As for the farming and fshery contribution to national growth eforts, it should be noted
that this sector contributes averagely up to 13, 5 % to the GDP. Tis contribution varies
from one year to the other, according to climatic changes, but has never been less than 11
% and increased above 16 % during productive years.
Consequently and thanks to diverse measures taken at this juncture, in relation with
the mobilisation and rationalisation of hydraulic resources, the extension of irrigated
felds, the promotion of biological farming and of blue fsh fshing; the intensifcation of
scientifc research studies and the vulgarisation of such research results, this sector has
been able to achieve success sustained by most of the products.
In addition of its benefcial multiplier efect on the rest of other economic activities,
more especially food industries, the transport and commerce sector, farming and fshery
sectors expansion helps in fostering living conditions in rural areas and in reinforcing
population stability.
All of this is a huge efort made by the Tunisian government more especially to
encourage farming investments. As a matter of fact, the promotion policy carried on by
the Tunisian government is peculiar mostly through State subventions granted to farming
investors for over 25 % of investment expenditures, with a consequent adoption of a sof
farming investment tax policy.
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On the other hand, Tunisia has opted for a broad and diversifed partnership for the
promotion of farming, especially the development of the countrys rural areas.
Women have a leading role in reproduction and home management, in farming and
extra-farming production, as well as in community services. Responsibilities emanating
from such duties hinder women to invest in the development process in the same way
that men do. Womens growing visibility in farming activities has led to an increasing
consciousness of the socioeconomic role they play in rural development dynamics. Tey
have shifed from being passive benefciaries, socially assisted, to gaining an important
status of active economic actors of modern farming and regional development.
However, civil society involvement is progressively increasing in assuming
responsibilities to develop disfavoured areas.
Tus the association, initiator of the project related to the present case study has
succeeded, but for the aid instruments set up by government, in raising funds to aid local
populations in creating an economic dynamics within their locality, by supporting the
community and the countrys elaborated development policy (1
st
principle in the M&B
campaign).
In this perspective the choice was made about the presentation of a project which
can serve as a model for promoting human resource in rural areas by developing and
valorising local resources through local know-how.
To this efect, IRZOD project areas of interest were methodologically developed to make
for a better identifcation of the constitutive elements of the MORE AND BETTER concept.
The IRZOD project
During the seventies, the years of independent Tunisia, State concerns regarding natural
resources management and environmental protection gradually appeared in economic
and social development plans. Tis trend grew stronger from the Rio conference (June
1992) which set the pace for sustainable development. Te new trends on the management
of resources in conformity with international standards triggered the process of an
international regulation for their utilisation.
Te new qualitative development approach in which Tunisia involved itself without
wasting time did not erase the concern to achieve prosperity based on a development
that guarantees national wealth: increasing growth rate on economic and social aspects,
sustainable improvement in living conditions, especially in urban areas. Meanwhile
household subsistence farming was the dominant activity. However, the collapse of the
farming sector automatically caused the departure of the one time less stable population.
Tus, rural areas experienced similarly to such parallel delegation phenomenon of exodus
and migration.
In these conditions, successively from one stage to another, the rural character of dry
regions, especially in dif cult zones is afected by deterioration of the ecological landscape
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ecological disturbance or area fragility, on the economic development backwardness)
and social (plague: joblessness, exodus and migration) aspect.
Te IRZOD project experience is a rural development one. It fts within the framework
of development policy which Tunisia does not hesitate to support. Besides, it is partnering
and innovative. It is therefore necessary in this respect to get interested about a diferent
experience which concerns European rural development programmes.
More precisely, European structural funds which are apportioned in diverse funds
are jointly funding regional development programmes, namely Leading programmes
about which the frst batch came to live from 1991. Tese rural are designed for local
development in rural areas.
Project zone
Te Beni Khedache Delegation of the Medicine Governorate is almost 100 % a rural area:
A surface area of 1 250 km2, for the same year, 13 Imadas (sectors) with 12 located in rural
area. Beni Khedache (project zone) Delegation is of negligible size compared with the
Medicine Governorate in terms of surface area and population.
Te main constrain of this dif cult region can be summarised in the following
dif culties: the zone is mountainous (dif cult access), scarce natural resources, a dispersed
population and a very weak farming productivity. Its assets are however important: a rich
biodiversity, mostly fora, superfcial water resources are interesting and the technical and
cultural know-how is ancestral, especially in farming and handicraf aspects.
Geographic and administrative locations
Te Beni Khedache Delegation (lands of the olive and fg trees) created as far back as 1956,
is located westward to the Medicine Governorate which is found eastward to the country.
It is limited northward by Mareth Delegation (Gabes), southward by Ghoumrassen and Bir
Lahmar (Tataouine), eastward by Medenine North and westward by the great eastern erg.
Te BK Delegation is caracterised by a landscape dominated by the mountainous chain of
Matmata. Tis mountain separates two distincts regions. Te Jefara plain in the east, the
great Erg basin blowing from the east to the west.In Beni Khedache, Matmata mountains
are composed of a succession of steep slopes corresponding to cuesta landscape.
The projects, its origins and objectives
Project institutional framework
Within the framework of decentralised cooperation, the Regional Medenine Council
signed cooperation agreements with the General Council of France Herald. Department,
precisely the master agreement of 1995. At such scientifc cooperation research level, Te
Arid Regions Institute (ARI) signed a technical protocol with Montpellier Institute of
Mediterranean Agronomic (MIMA) to conduct a research and development programme
in zones described as dif cult.
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Partnership
Tus, organisations who contributed in executing the project are classifed according to
their level of partnership. Research and development institutions, main engine of the
partnership, (ARI and MIMA) are supported by regional bodies (Medenine Regional
Council and the General Council department of Herault). Development operators/
Sustainable Development Association in Beni Khedache-Medenine ADD Medenine
and the Leading programme + the Herault department (Leader + 34) are representatives
of this experience throughout the territory.
Methodology
Te year 2001 was devoted to the diagnosis. In 2002 the development strategy was defned,
and a few experimental operations were identifed. For the year 2003, the project started
with an organisational phase coupled with the fnal identifcation of a plan of actions.
Te determination of a development strategy within the zone focussed on the results of
the diagnosis. Te foundation expects the support of assets in order to curb or cancel
constrains. It comprises the statement of strategic objectives that outline the major
principles of the new development trends which actors would adopt.
Furthermore, beside the research and development work executed by investigations,
feld trips and the organisation of meetings, workshops, study missions, students internship
will reinforce the approach to enlighten some scientifc and development aspects.
Objectives
Te IRZOD project is an integrated rural development project. It consists of supporting the
implementation of some development operations such as experimental mountainous zones
and is designed to explore new ways of developing such areas. It is interested about most
sectors of activities within that can exist around that zone. It is essentially multisectorial.
Given these reasons, a project is made up of three big rural development characteristics:
territorial vocation, multisectorial and hopes to be managed by local actors.
Development orientations
Patrimonial tourism orientation: this aspect was acknowledged as federative for the entire
project. Tis orientation intends to signifcantly improve on the tourist potential of the
Beni Khedache zone, to register the territory as a tourist destination for discovering the
landscape / patrimony / genuine products.
Handicraf orientation: the handicraf potential of the zone (specifc products, local
know-how, existing initiatives ) underscores the presence of weaving activities on Beni
Khedache territory though insuf ciently developed. Te strategy in this orientation aims at
supporting the emergence of weaving crafsmanship as an autonomous economic activity
through diversifed actions beyond the mere consideration that it is a petty business.
Specifc farming products orientation: the region provides a wide range of specifc farming
products (olive oil, dry fgs, honey, medicinal plants, etc). Te objective sought for is to
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labour for the emergence of local products in order to build a label. More specifcally,
pre-feasibility studies have led to the identifcation of specifc best seller products Beni
Khedache fgs. Interventions are primarily focussed on valorising fgs and improving on
the commercialisation of local products.
Water orientation: Te optimal management strategy in the mountainous zone of Beni
Khedache is based on the achievement of the following plan of actions:
Preservation and conservation of the hydro-agricultural patrimony having a typical
landscape
Environmental protection
Increasing capacities of storing rainfall waters
Results of the experience
Results are mostly applied to tourist orientation where research experience is concrete
and identifable. Teir materialisation is perceptible in the choice of the new development
dynamics. Tis means that the valorisation of local potentials through a mechanism that
links up various sectors (tourism, farming, and handicraf) and guarantees the promotion
of new products.
During the years of the project, execution, participatory and partnership approaches
were carefully followed without contradicting the status quo in terms of development,
because experimentation favours the materialisation of a programme that accompanies the
local development process in dif cult rural zones. In this perspective the project considers
that the process of sustainable development within the zone begins at this juncture. In
other words, the project defnes sustainability as an integrated development that concerns
all sectors of activities in the zone and not the rational management of resources, being a
form that can strengthen the concept of sustainability.
Te scientifc approach accompaniment has nonetheless introduced the requirement
for the product to be new and durable. In this perspective, the creation of qualitative
tourism guests houses has easily found both, the scientifc feasibility and the automated
approval of development partners.
Conclusions and recommendations
IRZOD experimental project has constituted an ideal working partnership. Its vision for
development was so clear that one could say it is realistic and concrete. Despite some
hesitations in the execution of actions, its certainty was transparent to all partners. Te project
accompaniment was also in perfect convenience with activities that were easily executed.
While executing this case study, we noticed that More and Better approach is not only
a Campaign, but it is an approach having principles of good practices that are worth being
adopted.

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Case study 9: LEBANON
Sustainable agriculture and agribusiness for
rural development
Ali Darwish
Tis case study looks at two projects implemented by World Vision Inc. Lebanon
within USAIDs Expanding Economic Opportunities Programme. Te projects entitled
Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development (SARD) and Sustainable Agribusiness
Initiative in Lebanon which was implemented (SABIL). Tese projects were implemented
back to back from October 2002 till September 2005 and from October 2005 till September
2007. Te reason behind choosing two projects is that the SABIL attempted to continue
activities started within SARD and fll gaps identifed through its implementation; and
to highlight a point neglected by the donor community which is related to the minimum
duration to achieve concrete results in agricultural projects.
Te case reported in this document is directly related to the principles of MaB in terms
of the relevance of the proposals and objectives to the MaB principles mentioned at the
beginning of this document.
Relevance to country or community priorities and policies
Te diferent agricultural policies set by the Lebanese Government identify Organic
Agriculture as a major option to provide a special market space in view of the increased
competition in an increasingly globalized region and the liberalization of markets. A major
faw in these policies is that this same option is being considered by neighboring countries
as a great potential for accessing increasingly demanding markets at the regional and
international markets. Additionally, the development of the diferent national strategies
was defcient with respect to the participation of farmers and farmer groups. Proponents
of these strategies argue that this is mainly due to the structure of the farmer community
and farming itself.
Despite these facts, both projects sought to deal with organic agriculture as the
alternative for the marketing problems that face Lebanese farmers ignoring the priority
action areas encountered by farmers and mentioned in the project proposal. Tese are:
lack of community and cooperative spirit, dependency on the agrochemical industry
for material and advice, shortage of irrigation facilities, bad agricultural roads, high
production cost, harsh weather conditions, and lack of governmental support in extension
and in market access.
Work with local communities and organisations
Within this context, both projects sought to work closely with the local communities
in the clusters or growth poles as mentioned in the design documents that refer to the
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communities and their support and involvement as a key factor in the success of the
project. Project and evaluation reports note some 50,000 people were informed about
the SARD project mostly in the clusters rather than the centre which is Beirut, the major
internal market for organic products (about 9% of the awareness activities were conducted
in Beirut). Tere is no assessment about the impact that these people had on the organic
market and to what extent their enhance awareness afected the sales.
Te two projects worked in 5 clusters in the North, South and Bekaa. While this is not
mentioned in any of the documents, the population of these clusters or growth poles is
from one confessional group, namely the Christian community. Tis fact is not mentioned
anywhere in the project documents or evaluation reports. Rather, there is an attempt to
disguise this fact through reporting the confessional distribution of the population in the
target region where the clusters are located. In a country of such diversity and with a
history of sensitive relationships among the confessional groups like Lebanon, this could
still be seen as normal when such actions are implemented in a predominantly Christian
or Muslim region (District or Governorate). However when 5 or more villages of a single
confessional group are selected as target sites by such development aid projects, this would
and actually it did generate some disappointment and sensitivity on the side of farmers of
the neighboring villages. Tis has expanded the gap between the diferent religious groups
at a time where all eforts were attempting on strengthen reconciliation and secularism.
Tis perception does not come from an analysis of reports, rather stems from statements
frustration expressed by farmers and researchers residing and/or working in these areas.
Some statements went as far relating organic agriculture to a confessional group, something
which harms the sector instead of promoting it and increasing peoples interest in it.
Understanding and recognition of local culture and knowledge
Like many of the development projects active in Lebanon, very little attention is given
to local cultural aspects and indigenous knowledge. Tis project, like many others, was
developed to respond to a request for proposals coming from the side of the donor with
the main theme entitled expanding economic opportunities. Te implementing agency,
having already contacts and activities in the target areas besides information about income
and unemployment facing these communities as described in its proposal embarked on
this initiative. What was not adequately considered, is that afer years of abandonment
by governmental authorities and the presence of foreign assistance through regional or
international donors providing charity support, many people developed a trend to accept
whatever technical assistance, in kind or fnancial support that they are ofered as long
as it is present, while they would resort to their original practices upon the end of this
external support. Hence, one would see that rural people who had no history in raising
livestock would accept support in the form of animals, to go back and sell these animals
aferwards. In the case of this project, the number of farmers who joined the project was
192 according to the project reports in 2005. Tis number is reported to be the same in
2008. However, by referring to the data of the two organic certifcation bodies active in
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Lebanon, the total number of certifed organic producers (supported by this and other
projects does not exceed 120). Te 496 hectares reported to have been converted to organic
are in reality less than 100 hectares, including the areas planted by farmers working with
other programmes.
Additionally, it is a known fact in Lebanon that farmers tend to have a higher confdence
in the extension agents of the Agrochemical frms as compared to other extension agents.
Te fact that the extension agent of the agrochemical industry has a better and longer
presence in the feld, and provides better services compromises the credibility of the
development extensionist whose presence is limited in terms of time and resources.
Additionally, the project report indicates the provision of library services for farmers
and agricultural engineers as educational means. Te independent evaluation conducted
by World Vision indicated that this service was only used by engineers and not by farmers.
Te fact that most literature was scientifc in nature and in a foreign language indicates
that this activity required a more thorough planning as generally Lebanese farmers do not
read except Arabic and when they need advice, they resort mostly to representatives of
the agrochemical frms and not to the Chamber of Commerce where one of the libraries
was located. Te reason behind this is that the Chambers of Commerce Industry and
Agriculture are commonly known as Chamber of Commerce and hence most people
still relate it to the Commercial activities only.
Promoting participation
Te independent project evaluation indicated that, afer three years of work, the
communication issue needed improvement at all levels, whether internally between staf
or with farmers. Te report indicates that much of the communication depended on the
personal relations without frequent exchange of information for agricultural engineers.
Te communication with partners was irregular and partners indicated that they were
unaware of project progress. Te project did not have a steering structure consisting of
representatives of all stakeholders and benefciaries.
Te project included in its activities the strengthening of BioCoop Lubnan, the frst
cooperative for organic agriculture in Lebanon. Te objective was to strengthen Bio Coop
which was already established and funded through the activities of another NGO, increase
its farmer membership and enhance their cooperation with the objective of empowering
organic farmers.
According to members of the oversight committee of BioCoop Lubnan, the elections
that took place in 2004 did not have any real farmer participation and was rather staged
by an outgoing board dominated by Project Staf. Te independent project evaluation
indicates that farmers did not really see themselves as partners and that contact with
the Cooperative was only during feld work and training workshops. Farmers were not
adequately informed about the project progress and they repeatedly referred to World Vision
as a buyer of their products not BioCoop. Ideally, farmers should see the cooperative,
among other, as their collective efort to enhance their market position and marketing
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eforts. Te evaluation concludes that neither the Cooperative branches nor the centers
provided a platform or meeting place for farmers.
Empowerment of women
Te project proposal nicely describes the objective to strengthen, empower and increase
the income of women who constitute about 50% (18% unemployment) of the population
and are increasingly subject to economic pressures due to the growing crisis in the country.
Te women issue is mentioned on several occasions in the design document.
Te second proposal submitted in 2005 clearly states a gender mainstreaming
component. It bases its work on the fact that women comprise 40.7% of the Agricultural
labour force in Lebanon and head an increasing proportion of rural households.
On this basis, the proposal indicates an intention to consider gender sensitivity in the
design of training programmes, provide easier access for women groups to credit and
enhance the position of women through a better assessment of their role.
Te independent evaluation does not provide an assessment of this component. Tere
is only one note that most project staf were men. An interesting statement says: At least
in some areas in Lebanon, women perform the same hard physical work as men; therefore
this cannot count as excuse for less women participation. Tere is no indication how the
evaluators would come to this statement, but apparently it is coming from the management
level and it is strictly contrary to what was stated in the project proposal about the role of
women in agriculture production and their ability to produce like men. Tis should give a
signal to donors concerning such statements, as these are not related to activities rather to
principles and approaches in development.
Within the new BioCoop management, there is also a marginal role of women. Te
cooperative women membership does not exceed 10%. Again this neglects women despite
their mentioned important role in agriculture and does not provide a diference from the
current approach to women in agriculture.
Te fnal report presented in 2008, has no indication on the achievements related to
women empowerment and gender mainstreaming.
Promoting sustainable livelihoods
Sustainability, the frst word in the project title is given special importance in the project
design document. Te proponents based the activities on the assumption that the local
communities and farmers will fully adopt the project structures and continue their
operation. Te stated specifc project objectives are strongly refected in activities that
promote sustainable livelihoods; through promoting a sustainable agriculture which
reduces the dependence of farmers on the agrochemical industry and also reduces their
ecological footprint.
Te project activities were quite numerous ranging from providing organic seedlings
and compost to farmers through regional nurseries and mobile compositing facilities
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located at the regional support centres; to packaging facilities, participating in a farmers
market, participating in food and agricultural exhibitions. Training and demonstration
centres were also established and there were attempts to establish a farmer quality control
system.
It was possible to amend project activities and add ones that were not mentioned in
the original proposal, such as the composting services, a key aspect in organic production
noting the importance of compost in the organic cycle.
Sustainability of these activities was the most crucial and detrimental issue. Te
duration of the project (3 years) is very short to achieve all the objectives stated in the
project design. At the basics, while all of the farmers and producers who participated
in the project started their conversion periods with its onset, a minority of them achieved
certifcation, hence started delivering organic produce prior to the end of the project period.
Tese facts hindered the possibility of really testing the market opportunities of the products
and also reach a visible market presence. Many consumers were unaware of the location of
the products or marketing outlets, and on many occasions consumers were complaining
about the quality and diversity of the produce. Price was also an impediment to enhancing
the marketing with some products being sold at up to 3 times the market price.
On another level, most of the activities were dependent on the fnancial and in
kind support provided by World Vision. While this dependency is understandable in
such projects aiming at introducing radical changes in production systems; the initial
assumption to achieve sustainability within three years was unrealistic and it should have
been well considered by the donor as well as the applicant.
At the higher level of management within World Vision, an extension project has been
considered since the beginning, but this was not refected in setting the timeframe of
activities. At the feld level, the of cers were subject to continuous pressure to achieve
their objectives; and in some instances, this has lead to the addition of some activities and
the removal of others contrary to the project design.
A deeper assessment of the situation towards the end of the project, the evaluation
shows that sustainability was far from being reached. Project staf consumed an average
minimum of 480,000 USD/year comprising one third of the project budget. Tese qualifed
staf could not be absorbed by the BioCoop Structure, which itself is not sustainable
fnancially and institutionally, or another similar national structure working in the organic
sector. Te regional development and training centres were not based on a fnancially
stable structure and hence were also not sustainable.
Most individual farmers did not run a fnancially sustainable operation by the end of
the two projects. Certifcation costs and participation in weekly markets are currently still
paid by international projects other than World Vision.
It is worth noting that the total sales reported between 2005 and 2008 did not exceed
1 million US$ for an investment exceeding 12 million US$ of grant money and recipient
contributions, the recipients being World Vision and the farmers. Te reports indicate the
creation of a total of more than 700 jobs without any indication of the kind of these jobs
112
whether daily, seasonal or permanent. Unfortunately, the independent evaluation did not
tackle this aspect adequately.
In terms of return on investment, the two projects could be classifed within the charity
category that will wither gradually upon the withdrawal of the donor who is basically
bufering these processes.
Relevance to problematic structures and mechanisms at
country level
In national debates, the issue of relevance and scale of international support to Agriculture,
environment and development has increasingly become a matter of debate among
development actors (some local and international NGOs, international organisations,
private sector and government) and development advocates working individually or
within organised structures or organisations.
While proponents of the frst group argue that these investments serve in strengthening
the individual impoverished and marginalised groups and contribute to the overall
economic growth and poverty reduction, the second group disagree with this view and
claim that this kind of development approach with relatively huge budgets is promoting
clientelism at the level of specialists and recipients. It even goes to claim that some donors
unintentionally have developed development merchants and traders that make the most
fnancial gains leaving the remnants to reach the needy poor.
With respect to agriculture, the diferent international and national assessments of the
agriculture sector repeatedly revealed that most of the problems facing this sector are due
to the high cost of production that reduce competitiveness, the absence of infrastructure
such roads, storage facilities, reliable power supply, irrigation water etc. Te absence of
essential social services such as proper health care, education and communication has
caused an additional pressure on rural people forcing to move towards cities. Additionally,
the post war neoliberal economic policies and market liberalization was the kind of the
last strike to many of the already exhausted small farmers.
Tese external (in terms of irrelevance to the contribution of international aid agencies)
limiting factors, in addition to what was mentioned in earlier discussion, contribute greatly
to the reduced ef ciency of international assistance and its impact on the impoverished
and marginalised communities.
Promoting organic agriculture is a key element in agricultural development and the
strengthening of farmers on the road to food sovereignty and security; and it fosters
environmental and biodiversity conservation. However, this promotion should be done
systematically to ensure its sustainability.
In the case of Lebanon, while this sector was undergoing a gradual growth and the
quality systems in terms of standards and regulations were being developed, and while
the agricultural input and product market was still underdeveloped, the above mentioned
project came in involve a signifcantly large number of farmers in organic farming when
the enabling political and infrastructure environment was not ready.
113
Large scale donors should support the rural areas through the enhancement of the
transport network, power supply and water management. Farmers in remote areas lose
a signifcant portion of their crops due to the inability to get it into the high demand
markets on the cities. Current storage facilities depending mostly on privately generated
electricity render the storage operation very expensive and reduce the competitiveness of
the products for exports. Tere are, to date, no fast track methods for shipping perishable
products abroad in peak production periods where the national market is saturated. Finally,
there is a need putting in place legal systems that support farmers willing to produce
sustainably through for example a payback system taxing the agrochemical industry for its
environmental impact and diverting the funds to sustainable agriculture.
Aid and donor agencies should have a paradigm shif in their approaches, giving
equal weight to capacity building and in kind support with the reduction of overheads.
Tey should also attempt to reduce the cost of experts through depending on locally
or regionally available expertise which has a signifcantly lower cost. Serious impact
assessment should be conducted for development projects to be able to understand
reasons behind un-sustainability and behind the absence of the really needy groups
from the scene. Tis would contribute to undermine an increasingly growing belief that
international donor support is intended to serve political interests of the donor countries
rather than serving the really needy groups and their interests.
114
Case study 10: PAKISTAN
A donor - driven disaster: Tinkering with
wheat trade
By South Asia Partnership-Pakistan (SAP-PK)
29
Tis case study is about how development assistance should not be given - a donor-driven
project which concluded in 2008; Te Agriculture Sector Program Loan-II, fnanced by
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). According to the declared aims of the loan it was
to assist in addressing key constraints in the agriculture sector regarding productivity and
proftability with an emphasis on small and marginal farmers. Tough the loan dealt
with the whole agriculture sector (fertilizer, seed, research and commodities like rice
and cotton) but the entire package had a very heavy tilt towards wheat trade. Wheat is
a staple crop providing 42 per cent of the caloric consumption in Pakistan. It is also a
political crop.
Background
Poverty in Pakistan, as in most of the South Asian countries, is largely a rural phenomenon
around 80 per cent of the poor live in the rural Pakistan. Despite having a decade of
reasonable agriculture growth (4.6 per cent) during the 1990s, there was no long-term
change in rural poverty.
30
In the second week of February 2009, the government issued the
latest poverty fgures and has conceded a phenomenal rise of 15 per cent in the poverty
incidence up from 23 per cent a year ago to 38 per cent at present.
31
Most independent
researchers, however, put it even higher by three to four per cent.
Tough the situation has largely been unchanged since independence in 1947, the
of cial fgures, however, had shown a marked improvement between 2001-02 and 2004-
05 in poverty reduction. During this period, which, unfortunately is widely suspected for
fgure fudging, the real agriculture GDP rose by 7.4 per cent. Rural poverty came down by
5.1 per cent from 39.1 per cent to 34 per cent.
32
Per capita expenditure of the poorest two
quintiles rose by 3.1 per cent. Te of cial fgures in the subsequent years also kept painting
a rosy picture: like, according to them, Pakistan per capita income rose by 11 per cent in a
year (from 2005-06 to 2006-07) from $833 to $925 (budgetary fgures) but the poverty
trend, especially in the rural areas, continued unabated.
Rural non-monetary indicators, even as per of cial claims, have not shown any
improvement during the last few decades. Te infant mortality per 1,000 births remain
29 The author (Ahmad Fraz Khan) is a journalist, working with one of the largest English newspaper (Dawn), and has been writing on
agriculture, agri-trade and food issues for the last two decades.
30 Pakistan economic survey
31 Federal Bureau of Statistics
32 World Bank report 2005
115
high at 82 (88 in rural areas), compared to 62 in India, 56 in Bangladesh and 12 in Sri
Lanka. Te national primary school enrollment rate for girls is only 48 per cent (42 per
cent in rural areas), compared to 86 per cent in India.
Social conditions of villages further reveal the magnitude of poverty and urgency for
efort to improve them. According to Pakistan Agriculture Census (2003), total number
of villages stood at 39,197. Out of them, only 20,372 were electrifed. Only 6,607 had lined
drains and 9,765 of them mud drains. Some 7,482 villages have lined streets, and 11,511
partially lined or mud streets.
One-third of them (13,702) have only mosque schools (seminaries), only 691 of them
have Adult Educational Centres and 1,356 vocational training schools. Tis explains why
rural literacy rate hovers around 40 per cent against 69 per cent in urban areas, and only 10
per cent rural women can read or write, who, otherwise, make 55 per cent of population.
33
Tough 80 per cent rural population have access to some kind of medical care, largely
private clinics, but of cial per capita expenditure on healthcare remains abysmally low
$15 per year. About 2.3 per cent rural households are estimated to have experienced
fnancial catastrophe due to health care costs. In practical terms, it means, as documented
by the UNICEF, 38 per cent of Pakistani children are underweight, 37 per cent sufer from
stunted growth and 13 per cent are not able to attain the expected weight in their entire
childhood. In addition, an appalling 44 per cent Pakistanis do not have access to tap-water
and only 42 per cent use fxed toilets.
34
Who are the poor?
Although agriculture remains central to rural development, but the majority of rural poor
are neither farm owners nor tenant farmers. Landless (excluding agricultural laborer
households) accounted for over half (54.8 per cent) of the rural poor in 2006-07 and
non-agriculturists were 47.47 per cent. Around 29.58 per cent are un-paid workers and
economically non-active people account for 2.09 per cent of rural economy. Agriculture
laborers constitute 37 per cent of the rural workforce.
Overall agriculture income accounts for only 34.8 per cent. Te poorest 40 per cent
derive only 30 per cent of their income from agriculture and farmers comprised only 35 per
cent of households in the bottom 40 per cent of rural per capita expenditure distribution.
Average monthly income of 20 per cent rural rich, according to the HIES (2004-05), was
Rs12,658 ($158.22) against urban income of Rs19,233 ($240.41). In the poorest quintiles,
the diference was Rs5,446 ($68) to Rs6,203 ($77.53).
According to of cial data, crop, livestock and agricultural wage labour incomes account for
only 25, 8 and 4 per cent, respectively, of total rural incomes; non-farm incomes (40 per cent),
remittances (9 per cent), and other income (15 per cent) comprise the remainder. Even for
farm households, crop incomes account for only about half (49 per cent) of total income.
35
33 Pakistan Agriculture senses organisation 2003
34 UNICEF report on Pakistan 2007
116
The evolution of poverty
Poverty did not hit Pakistan out of blue at some stage of its existence; it is rather as old an
issue as the state itself and it has been one of the most documented phenomena. For the
last four decades, individual researchers and institutions have been trying to understand
the issue in its all manifestations and fnd out the workable solutions. International
institutions like the World Bank and the IMF have been at the forefront, but have also
been regularly accused of taking a stunted view of the whole issue; wrong diagnosis and
even worst prescription.
All of them have tried to estimate incidence of poverty, employing diferent methods
of cial poverty line, calorie intake, infationary pressures and vulnerability factor
at various times since the sixties. Te diference of methodologies also explains
sometimes difering fgures at various times, as they largely depend on the measurement
methodology.
36

Pakistan has also devised an elaborate mechanism of diferent institutions the
Planning Commission, HIES, PSLM and Agriculture Census Organisation to
periodically gauge the incidence of poverty and devise remedial measures. Tough these
institutions have sometimes been accused of tempering with data to politically beneft
the government, but their contribution to highlighting the issue remain formidable;
their annual reports are the main reference material for all the researchers, even for
critics.
Dealing with poverty
Successive governments in Pakistan have tried to deal with poverty, especially rural, ever
since it was born and applied a range of methods and projects, mostly donors-driven, to
bring it down but, if statistical realities are something to go by, with little, and in some
cases, no success. According to the World Bank, 36 per cent (58.46 million) of total 162.4
million Pakistanis still live below the poverty line.
37
Te attempts to deal with poverty, especially rural, include eight Five-Year Development
Plans during 1955-1998, Tameer-e-Pakistan (developing Pakistan) Project of 2003,
Khushhal (prosperous) Pakistan Fund (2005-10), Social Action Programme (SAP) and
the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP).
38
36 Some of the prominent works include Naseem (1973, 1979); Alauddin (1975); Mujahid (1978); Irfan and Amjad (1984); Kruijk and
Leeuwen (1985); Malik (1988); AhmadLudlow (1989); Ercelawn (1990), Malik (1991, 1994); Amjad and Kemal (1997); FBS (2001);
World Bank (1995, 2002); Anwar and Quershi (2002); Planning Commission (2003) and Malik (2005).
37 World Bank report 2007
38 Tameer-e-Pakistan (developing Pakistan) programme: It was Rs4.4 billion (some $7.5 million at the then exchange rate) plan
under which every parliamentarian was given Rs5 million ($80,000) development funds for his constituency.
Khushhal (prosperous) Pakistan Fund: It was a $1 billion development plan, nanced by the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank, was aimed at improving standard of living
Social Action Programme (SAP): Mainly nanced by Asian Development Bank, the plan, originally launched in 1993 and continued till
2006, was aimed at social development, including improving primary school enrolment, health cover and creating social security net.
The plan had mixed success; it substantially increased primary school enrolment but failed to achieve targets in other two areas.
117
Te federal government has also recently launched Rs35 billion ($437 million) Benazir
Income Support Fund to directly contribute to the income of the poor and the Punjab
government also spared Rs21 billion ($262 million) for direct poverty alleviation efort.
But most of these projects failed to achieve desired results for a variety of reasons, which
included institutional weakness, lack of political will, hard-to-implement conditionality of
the loan and frequent changes in the governments.
Another common factor in all the projects remains the donors insistence on what
to do rather than how to do it, as advocated by More and Better. Most of these
projects were developed by the lenders, leaving no, or little, space for adjustment to local
conditions and cash starved governments were told to implement them in letter and spirit.
Te implementation part was lef to the government without considering institutional
realities (existence, understanding and capacity) of the host. Tat is why, some of these
projects ended up in contributing to institutional confusion and poverty level rather than
alleviating it. In some cases, they simply shifed a portion of rural poverty to urban areas
and declared victory for marginally bringing down rural poverty.
Agriculture Sector Programme Loan (ASPL-II)
Te ADB-fnanced Agriculture Sector Programme Loan-II commonly known as
ASPL-II, which concluded in 2008, is one such donor-driven project. With the beneft
of hind sight, one could claim that the strings attached to the loan added to institutional
and social chaos in Pakistan: it shook the existing institutions by roots and branches
without replacing or even modifying the existing ones to implement the conditionalities.
Te government, on its part, could not aford social and political cost of the reform package
and rolled back most of them.but the damage had largely been done if the farmers the
afected community are to be believed.
Rural poverty has only worsened (consider the latest 15 per cent rise in poverty incidence)
as the caterlisation of grain markets made life dif cult for everyone in the country.
Tough it is hard to put the entire blame on the loan conditionalities for caterlization of
the grain markets because bad governance also played its part. But its implementation
certainly created an enabling environment for formation and sustaining of cartels by creating
policy space for them by the retreating state institutions. Agriculture Sector Programme
Loan (ASPL-II) was approved by the ADB on December 13, 2001, comprising three loans
totaling $350 million, the loan agreement was signed on April 1, 2002, and it took efect
on September 24, 2002, with the release of the frst tranche. According to the declared
aims of the loan, it was to assist in addressing key constraints in the agriculture sector
regarding productivity and proftability with an emphasis on small and marginal farmers.
In order to achieve the objectives of the loan, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) had to
carry out certain reforms in agriculture marketing system.
National Rural Support Programme (NRSP): Established in 1991, the NRSP was the largest Rural Support Programme in terms
of outreach, staff and development activities. It had presence in 32 out of 101 districts in the country. It was aimed at providing
loans and social guidance to the poor but economically active in the rural areas and create social networking among different rural
grassroots organisations.
118
Te GoP committed to fulfll 32
conditions in three time-bound phases.
Tese 32 policy conditions were grouped
into seven modes of intervention. Of
these conditions, 11 were met under
the frst tranche, eight under the second
and remaining seven under the third
phase.
39
Wheat-related
conditionalities
Tough the loan dealt with the whole
agriculture sector (fertiliser, seed,
research and commodities like rice
and cotton) but entire package had a
very heavy tilt towards wheat trade:
out of total 32 conditionalities, 12 were
wheat-specifc. Te ASLP-II asked the
government of Pakistan to get out of
wheat procurement (read food security)
business and restrict itself to strategic
reserves of one million tons one-sixth
of its historical procurement. It was also asked to abolish provincial food directorates and
reform food departments, let the private sector replace them and keep wheat movement
free within Pakistan. Diferentiate between market and support price and operationalise
support price only if the former drops below the latter.
Te loan also charged the GoP with phasing out price support and subsidies, closure
or restructuring and divestiture of state-owned enterprises and public agencies, like the
Food Directorates of Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan, PASSCO (Pakistan Agriculture
Services and Supply Corporation). It also included termination of all budgetary support
or subsidies to the Trading Corporation of Pakistan. Provincial seed corporations were
also to be abolished.
40

The signing of ASPL-II
Te circumstances, which led to negotiation, agreement and signing of the loan, reveal
how cash-starved countries sign on dotted lines without realizing political, economic
and social cost of their action.
During the late nineties, Pakistan went through two most tumultuous events of its
history, which strangulated its economic life. On May 28, 1998, it exploded a nuclear
39 Project Document
40 Project Document
BOX 1: ASLP reform package
Increased private sector involvement in
the wheat market.
Increased private sector competition in
cotton and rice markets and export to
overcome market imperfections.
Increased competition in sugar
production and marketing with
imports.
Increased private sector competition in
fertiliser imports.
Removal of the public sector monopoly
in seed sector and increased private
sector participation.
Rationalisation, increased autonomy,
and fnancial self-reliance of research
institutions.
Increased focus on extension services.

119
device in defance to the world pressure and faced international economic sanctions.
Tese sanctions virtually brought the country to its knees it was unable to service its
debts and was running the risk of defaulting on its international fscal obligations.
On October 12, 1999, military staged a coup to convert Pakistan into a global pariah:
totally isolated diplomatically, economy grinding to a halt and foreign remittances drying
up due to the seizer of foreign currency accounts afer the nuclear blast. Desperate for
money, Pakistan was hardly in a position at that point of time to refuse money because
of conditionalities, however harsh. Tese were the circumstances under which the then
government negotiated the loan package. But it, does not, in any way, absolves the
Government of Pakistan from accepting bad conditions for temporary monetary gains.
Te federal government went ahead with the loan agreement despite stif opposition
by all federating units, especially the Punjab producer of 80 per cent of agriculture. Te
provinces continued resisting the loan for harsh conditionalities even afer signing the
agreement and the PC-I (project cost-1) of diferent projects for utilization of loan were
prepared as late as in 2005 to get second tranche of loan.
Te bureaucrat, who negotiated the loan on behalf of the government of Pakistan
and thrust it down to the provincial throats, got a three-year directorship at the ADB
Headquarters at Manila.
Institutional crisis
Both the ADB and the GoP never considered institutional realities in Pakistan; they
neither found ways to modify existing institutions nor tried to create new ones for
implementation of the conditionalities: like, the loan wanted the GoP to abolish three of
four food directorates without creating any mechanism to regulate private sector in the
absence of these decades-old institutions.
In 2001, Pakistan was perhaps at the weakest point of its history as far as its agriculture
and agri-trade institutional setup was concerned. Te crippling economic sanctions,
imposed afer the nuclear explosion and military coup, had started biting the country and
weakening its institutions.
Te military take-over had started eating into all civilian institutions and the military
regime was experimenting with a novel decentralization (devolution) plan, which no
one at that time knew what shape it would fnally take. Agriculture sector, which was,
hitherto, split between federal and provincial governments, was devolved to the emerging,
un-trained and untested district governments. Te sector thus became an administrative
football among federation, provinces and the newly-created district governments. All of
them were involved not only in administering the sector but also in policy making with
gross and confusing overlapping.
Te provincial governments were being bypassed in most of the cases because of direct
federal support to the district governments.
Te provincial governments, which were to oversee the performance of the district
setups, neither had any sense of ownership of the loan nor its conditionalities. Te
120
federation, afer obtaining the frst
tranche, started selling the package to
reluctant provinces because some of the
policy conditions of ASPL-II fell under
their formal jurisdiction.
It was under these conditions that
the ASPL-II arrived with its recipe
of restructuring and limiting public
institutions and let the private sector fll
in the gap. Te space vacated by state
institutions was to be simply handed over
to a new class of traders (private sector)
and let it deal with farmers and farming
the way it wanted to.
Tere was nothing in the package to
refne existing huge private sector, which
was already involved in wheat trade in
shape of middlemen and has been part
of production cycle for decades. Te role
of middlemen (totally private sector)
could be gauged from the fact that they
meet around 60 per cent of total loan
requirements ($10 billion at current
exchange rate) of farmers and hold
around 80 per cent of crop as collateral.
Tese middlemen have been part of the
production cycle for over a century, but
the ASLP-II excluded them from the list of
private sector and riveted all its attention
on trimming the state institutions.
Wheat the staple
According to the FAO, consumption
of wheat provides 1,042 calories per
person per day 42 per cent of caloric
consumption.
41
Te HIES data show a slightly higher
fgure of 1,052 calories per person per day. Rural consumption per capita 10.3Kg per
person per month is 42 per cent higher than the urban consumption 7.24Kg per person
41 Food Balance Sheet for Pakistan 2006
BOX 2: Wheat related reforms
Free import and export of
commodity.
Closure of three of four food
directorates.
No new subsidies on imports,
marketing and fertiliser.
Market based sale price.
Market based price for of cial
procurement.
Closure of Sindh Agriculture
Supplies Organisation.
Closure of Agriculture Development
Authority (NWFP).
Restructuring of PASSCO (federal
wheat procurement agency).
End of budgetary support, subsidy
and preferential loans.
Trading Corporation of Pakistan
(TCP) to be reformed on private
sector lines.
Reforming agriculture research and
extension wings on private sector
lines.
Abolishing provincial seed
corporations.
Government to restrict itself to
strategic stock of one million tons,
one-sixth of traditional procurement.
Te rest of the wheat should be
handed over to private trade.

121
per month.
Budget shares of wheat are high for both urban and rural poor households: 12.9 per
cent for the poorest urban quintile and 15.8 per cent for the poorest rural quintile, which
will go up by at least 50 per cent in 2009 because of 50 per cent increase in wheat support
price from Rs625 ($7.81) in 2007-08 to Rs950 ($11.87) in 2008-09.
42
Te APCOM surveys in major wheat surplus districts in Sindh and Punjab indicate
that 42 per cent (Sindh) and 55 per cent (Punjab) of wheat production is sold within three
months (April-June) of harvest. Overall about 28 per cent of production hit the market.
Farms larger than 25 acres accounted for an estimated 81 per cent of wheat sales in
Sindh and 67 per cent in Punjab.
43
Te HIES data also indicate that wheat sales are highly concentrated. Te top 10 per
cent farmers in terms of sales account for 47 per cent of total sales; the top 20 per cent
of wheat farmers in terms of sales (only 5 per cent of Pakistans households) account for
67 per cent of total wheat sales. Overall, only 20 per cent of Pakistans households have a
surplus of wheat production over home consumption and 23 per cent of wheat farmers
are net wheat purchasers.
Wheat a political crop
Wheat is more of a political crop in Pakistan. Ever since its independence, the federal
government hogged the role of wheat trade regulator on the plea that one part of the
country (formerly East Pakistan, now Bangladesh) does not produce wheat and it has to
regulate the trade in order to keep the federal food picture correct.
Afer the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, the same argument was extended to
the rest of Pakistan i.e. since two of the four provinces (NWFP and Balochistan) do not
produce enough wheat, thus the federation has to keep the role of regulator.
In fact, the wheat and four milling industry became a means to control feudal/
industrialist elite in the country. A look at the anatomy of the milling industry corroborates
this version of food favor.
Granting a four mills license has been a political favor for almost 55 out of 60 years of
Pakistans life. It has, however, been liberalized now. During this period, the government
issued licenses for over 1,500 four mills, with a daily grinding capacity of around 230,000
tons seven times more than total need of the country; which is around 32,000 tons daily.
44
Flour milling has been a lucrative industry because the government procures wheat
at a high price during April-June and sells it to the millers during Oct-March at a highly
subsidized price for keeping four prices low. During 1991-2007, the Punjab government
alone had paid $3.41 billion in such subsidies (at current exchange rate of Rs80 per dollar,
though the fgure becomes higher if progressive devaluation of rupee is also take into
consideration.)
42 Household Integrated Economic Survey 2007
43 Pakistan Agriculture Price Commission 2005
44 Punjab Food Department data
122
In 1991, the exchange rate was Rs30 to a dollar) in such subsidies. Te amount excludes
targeted subsidy for the poor ($5 million at current rate), which was also routed through
the millers.
45
Both these amounts show how juicy four milling business has become in
Pakistan.
The locations of the mills further substantiate the patronage allegations. Most of
the mills are located in and around twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad being
capital and traditional seat of residence of politicians: Rawalpindi, despite being a
hugely wheat deficit division, has 134 mills against the most populated and wheat
surplus Lahore district that has 21 mills. These politicians/industrialists/feudals set
up mills near their residences in federal capital rather than on their lands where wheat
is actually grown.
Tese mills are further facilitated by the government through wheat quota system. Te
mills get quota from provincial food departments regardless of their grinding. More than
two-thirds of mills sell their quota to those, which have bigger market share but cannot
meet the demand because of quota restrictions and make money without incurring any
cost on mills operation.
Since 1994, the Punjab Food Department maintained quota policy except for one year
(2002) when it had a record crop and the department could not manage the storage of 6.3
million tons that it had purchased previous year.
ASLP-II and farmers
Tough the Asian Development Bank, the lending agency, declared the project a success,
which has bought far reaching changes in wheat trade, creating new pressure groups that
would ensure continuity in liberal wheat trade policies and government commitment not
to reverse the process, but, in practical terms, it created two distinct classes of winners
and losers by the time it concluded in 2008. Te farmers, the intended benefciary of the
loan, unfortunately, are now counting themselves in the latter category.
Farmers claim that the traders, hoarders and a class of investors, which were never
part of the production cycle, unlike the middlemen, have benefted immensely during the
last few years. Tey flled the gap lef behind by retreating government institutions, took
over the entire trade chain and minted money at the cost of the poor farmer and urban
consumers, thus contributing to worsening poverty incidence. According to the recent
of cial poverty fgures, the total population of Pakistan is 161.9 million and poverty level
at 38 per cent. By that calculation, 61.522 million Pakistanis still live below the poverty
line and 80 per cent of them in rural areas.
SAP-PK survey of the community
A survey made by South Asia Partnership-Pakistan (SAP-PK) of farmers community of
Sheikhupura, part of Central Punjab and a wheat surplus district, tells the tale how their
45 Punjab Food Department Data
123
life became more dif cult as government inducted private sector in wheat trade.
Farmers from the district producer of 892,000 tons of wheat on an area of 307,000
hectors claim that they have become worse of by at least 30 per cent during the last
eight years on the wheat account alone. Tough, according to them, other factors also
contributed to their poverty, but the private sector a product of ASPL-II must share the
major part of the blame. An overwhelming majority (90 per cent) hold low wheat prices
with cartelization of trade being the major reasons for sustained and worsening poverty.
According to the survey conducted for this study, around 93 per cent small and medium
farmers go to the middlemen (arthi, as known in local language) for loans throughout the
year. Tey claim that dealing with middlemen is easy because of trust level which has been
built during the last many decades. Tere is no documentation or legal formalities and the
money come on when and as much as required, even for social events.
Tese 93 per cent are also those farmers who pledge their crop with the middleman as
collateral for loan. Tey take their entire crop to the middlemen, who sell it, deduct their
money along with mark up (3 per cent as per books but there are reports of high charging)
and return the rest of the money to the farmer.
Tere are around 37 four mills in the district which used to be major wheat buyers
but not anymore. Since the government lifs wheat movement ban occasionally under
pressure from donors (one of the condition of the ASLP-II) or due to corruption in the
system, buyers from as far as Afghanistan and Central Asia arrive to procure the crop and
create dangerous domestic shortages. Tough they pay much better prices, but farmers do
not beneft as 80 per cent of their crop is already pledged to the middlemen and even sale
of the rest of the 20 per cent is carried out through them.
Some 94 per cent farmers say they do not have holding capacity and have to sell their
wheat within two weeks of harvesting to clear their debts and purchase inputs for the next
crop (mainly rice). Tus, over 90 per cent wheat in district changes hands by the end of
May.
Tis stress sale provides the middleman or hoarders chances to make money at the
cost of farmers. Since most of the farmers do not have graders, they also lose money on
the quality pretext.
Te support price of wheat increased by around 105 per cent during the last eight years
from $3.8 per 40Kg in 2000-01 to $8 in 2007-08 but market price during these years
went up by more than 300 per cent ($12.5 at current price level). Te beneft of 200 per
cent price increase went either to the middlemen or investors and stockists.
Te farmers claim is also substantiated by Punjab Food Department Price data that the
price starts increasing every year by the end of May or beginning of June when the crop
had reached the investors stores or the mills. In fact, they are the one raising price through
stocks manipulation and squeezed supplies. Te power of market manipulators could be
gauged from the fact that Pakistan ended up importing one million tons of wheat in 2006-
07 to ease domestic market and avoid four riots, when the private sector, according to
124
of cial fgures the country still had stocks of 700,000 tons.
46
Te reason for import was
that the private sector did not increase wheat supply to ease four market.
In 2007-08, Pakistan again imported wheat at a staggering amount of $575 million when
the country, as per claims by of cial fgures, had produced 23 million tons of wheat one
million more than its domestic requirement. In May 2008, the private sector, which was
allowed to export 500,000 tons out of one million tons surplus, managed to export over
one million tons due to corruption in the system and hoarded another million, creating
dangerous four shortage in the country, which threatened bread riots. Interestingly, the
private sector exported it for a price of $220 per tons and later the government imported it at
a phenomenal price of $651 per ton because international prices have shot up by then.
47
Te farmers claim that the newly-created private sector is always ahead of food
directorates because of immense money and its ability to recover the same later on through
stocks and prices manipulation in the absence of regulatory body to look afer the hapless
consumers. Te of cial agencies cannot raise price in the middle of procurement drive
because of policy restrictions whereas the investors can easily procure at higher rate as
they can recover it later. During 2008, when Pakistan Agriculture Services and Supplies
Corporation unilaterally increased price of procurement by Rs15 (18 cents) per 40
kilogram, the Punjab Food Department got the decision reversed saying that it could not
follow the suit and would thus not be able to meet its procurement targets.
During the last three years, the Punjab Food department could not meet its targets
because of higher market price and induction of private sector, which was facilitated
through some policy measures delayed start of of cial purchase drive and preferential
loans for private sector as compared to farmers. But, the huge proportion of beneft of
the higher price went to the private sector rather than the farmers. According to 90 per
cent farmers in the district, entire beneft of the raised market price went to middlemen,
investor and the millers because they carefully set the timing of price increase to make
windfall profts at the cost of the growers.
Around eight per cent wheat growers, who do not get loans from middlemen, however,
say that their wheat income grew by 10 to 15 per cent over support price during last eight
years. Some two per cent big farmers, who deal with formal fnancial sector for loans and
have holding capacity, however, concede up to 150 per cent (market and support price)
increase in their wheat income during 2001-08.
Tose 90 per cent farmers say that the price is at its lowest because of fresh arrivals at
the time of harvesting and, unfortunately, it is the time when they are forced into stress
selling for economic reasons. Tus, the beneft largely goes to moneyed investors rather
than farmers.
According to farmers, the most lethal legacy of the loan conditionalities is opening
up wheat trade to speculative pressures. Te hoarders and stockists create an artifcial
shortage in the market, generate pressure on supply side and mint money. Since they get
46 The State Bank of Pakistan data base on commodity nance amount that it had advanced
47 Pakistan Economic Survey
125
loans at 80/20 ratio of purchase (a policy space that the ASLP-II created for them), these
hoarders invest only 20 per cent of total investment and rig the market against farmers
and consumers.
Te GoP and the ADB should have realised that creating such space for greed-driven
private sector is suicidal in inef cient and fragmented markets like Pakistan. Even the
most ef cient market in the world, like the USA, has not been able to control private
sector greed. Te recent American economic crisis has only proven the power of private
greed. It happened despite the USA having the most stringent regulatory mechanisms and
relatively transparent economic system. How could Pakistan have survived the pressure
generated by the private sector, where markets are inef cient and regulatory bodies non-
existent.
Teir complaint is not only restricted to output side, but they claim that same
cartelisation has also taken over the inputs trade again at the cost of farmers. If one
adds of cial corruption and incompetence, which willingly or unwillingly supplement
these cartels, one has a recipe for disaster for farmers, especially smaller ones. During
the institutional confusion earlier this decade, the government had also imposed 15 per
cent general sales tax (GST) on all inputs, which is over and above exorbitant profts by
private sector. Even those two per cent farmers, who report up to 150 per cent raise in
wheat income, say that this raise has not turned the overall sector proftable; the income
from wheat provided only a partial relief because prices of other commodities rice and
cotton went down by 30 to 40 per cent in 2007-08 as private sector refused to buy them
on time.
Policy reversals
As political, social and economic cost begun to dawn on the government of Pakistan, it
started reversing all conditionalities of the ASPL-II. Stung by the unbearable social and
political cost, the then government, which subsequently lost elections due to increasing
poverty both in absolute numbers and its magnitude had started heavily intervening
in trade of agriculture commodities.
Tough the compliance was never complete and third tranche of the ASLP-II was
delayed by almost two years due to these compliance complaints, but the situation is now
being totally reversed. Te government is currently expanding its role even in sugarcane,
rice and cotton trade to limit the role of hoarders and investors a product of the ASPL-II
in their trade. All three crops were traditionally traded exclusively by the private sector
before ASLP-II.
Under the loan package, the government, for qualifying second loan tranche, was
supposed to phase out commodity prices support and subsidies. It was also asked to move
to market-based price of wheat, market-based procurement price, restructure PASSCO
and TCP, close down three of four food directorates and end budgetary support, subsidies
and preferential credits for the PASSCO and TCP.
But these sorts of conditionalities, when and if met, were complied with only briefy.
126
During the frst three years of the loan, the government tried to keep the agriculture sector
subsidy free. But, it was forced to subsidize the sector as its growth grinded to a halt
falling to 2.4 per cent in 2003-04 before picking up to over six per cent for next two years
with the government partially restoring subsidies.
During the last four years, the government has spared around Rs61 billion ($762
million) on fertiliser subsidies alone.
48

Te Trading Corporation of Pakistan and PASSCO, which were supposed to be
reformed and operated on market-oriented lines, have not been touched and so are food
directorates. All of them are still surviving on of cial handouts, preferential loans and
budgetary supports: their role rather has increased in the agriculture sector and trade.
Te pressure generated by tinkering with the wheat trade has been so intense for the
government that these institutions have now (2008-09) been told to procure rice, cotton
and even grams, which they never did before. Te Trading Corporation of Pakistan and
PASSCO have been given the target of purchasing one million tons of rice to save the
farmers from cartels formed by the private sector.
Te government was asked to restrict itself to strategic wheat reserve of one million
tons and leave the rest of the trade to the private sector. During the last fve years (2003-
08), the government has been setting even higher procurement targets (around 6.5 million
tons) to keep the market stabilized. Tough the of cial agencies have not been able to meet
these targets, but the mere announcement of big target helps stabilize price on the higher
side. Te Punjab Food Department alone had set target of 3.5 million tons for 2003-06
before slashing them to 2 and 2.5 million tons for the next two years. For the coming
season, the Punjab Food Department is preparing for 3.5 to 4 million tons procurement.
Te loan also wanted closure of three provincial seed corporations and hand over seed
sale to the private sector. Te GoP only closed down Sindh Seed Corporation in February
2001 but revived it on February 24, 2004, as the private sector failed to fll the gap.
Te ASPL-II also wanted to keep the wheat movement free among districts and
provinces. But the government of Punjab only lifed ban for three (2001, 2002 and 2004)
years: that too because of bumper crop in 2000 and of cial desperation to clear carry over
stocks. For the rest of fve years of the loan life, the provincial government never lifed the
ban. It rather reversed all policies of preferential loans and raided the stocks of investors
and hoarders to recover wheat stocks. Te government of Punjab never abolished quota
system a political favour for some for millers during the entire loan period.
What good aid should aim at
Te case study goes to almost conclusively prove fve of nine principles promoted by More
and Better, which includes:
Better aid should support the programs and policies developed by the recipient countries
and communities.
48 Pakistan Economic Survey

127
Better aid should work with local communities and social organisations as partners.
Better aid should be based on thorough knowledge and recognition of local culture and
knowledge.
Better aid should promote sustainable rural livelihood.
Better aid should address problematic structure and mechanisms that limit the
efectiveness of aid reaching the poorest and hungry.
Te ASLP-II, unfortunately, failed on all these principles. In Pakistans context, the aid
must help promote:
Institution and capacity building should remain at the heart of good aid
At present, it severely sufers on both accounts and they have been main reasons for failure
of almost all poverty alleviation eforts. Te Water and Power Development Authority
(Wapda) has failed to develop both water resources and power generation per capita
water availability has dropped 500 per cent since its creation and the country sufers a
crippling power shortage of 40 to 50 per cent throughout the year. Irrigation Departments
failed to revive irrigation network and tail-end users do not get water for crops and
transmission loss is over 15 per cent.
Some 35 research institutions in the country have failed to produce seeds for three of
fve major crops (sugarcane, maize and cotton) and the two (wheat and rice), which they
did produce, are now more than 15 years old loosing vitality and sufering all kinds of
diseases.
Te government might not be able to easily manipulate better equipped, both human
and material resources, institutions, which could also bring some credibility to the system.
Brain drain rate in Pakistan has been very high in the last few decades as the governments
failed to develop systems of governance and institutions and create jobs.
The lender should leave space for policy adjustments to indigenous realities
So far, their preference of putting the recipient country into the straight jacket of
conditionalities, mostly drawn from the IMF and World Bank agenda, has not helped
alleviate poverty. Pakistan has met all these conditions during the last decade or so and
even the World Bank and the IMF have acknowledged the compliance, but its poverty level
has increased, both in absolute numbers and wretchedness. Te social and economic pain
that the Pakistanis have sufered as result of creating space for private sector (a lenders
condition) in agriculture trade has been enormous. Tough a lender cannot be blamed
for failure of governance, which led to cartelization of markets, but it can be accused of
ignoring local conditions (inef cient markets) and transitionary pains.
The good aid should help improve local governance and rural
development services infrastructure, markets, nance and employment
Pakistan has been living with a borrowed belief that if macro-economic indicators remain
stable, a trickledown efect would automatically reduce poverty. Te poverty fgures

128
during 2002-2004 have ofen been cited to prove the point. But, the futility of the fgure
became soon evident and it has been proven subsequently that a direct approach to
poverty reduction was needed. Te government needs to invest directly into rural sector
and provide them employment, infrastructure and access to credit. Te lenders need to
push Pakistan into investing in rural infrastructure to bring the poverty level down.
Pakistan not only needs growth in rural areas but inclusive growth.
Te political structure of Pakistan does not leave any space for the rural poor. Institutions
are rigged against them and so is access to other services needed for growth and poverty
reduction. Tough strong institutions can largely take care of them but still direct approach
of creating political space for the rural poor developing leadership from the grassroots
level is necessary. Devolution plan in the beginning of this decade was a good step,
but it failed to deliver because of political interference and currently has become bone of
contention for the same reason. Its gains should be consolidated and weaknesses must be
strengthened to include the poor in political process.
Abbreviations /Acronyms
ADB Asian Development Bank
APCOM Pakistan Agricultural Prices Commission
ASPL-II Agriculture Sector Programme Loan-II
GoP Government of Pakistan
HIES Household Integrated Economic Survey
PASSCO Pakistan Agriculture Services and Supplies Corporation
PSLM Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement
SAP-PK South Asia Partnership-Pakistan
TCP Trading Corporation of Pakistan
129
Case study 11: INDONESIA
Bad Aid: Asian Development Bank (ADB)
technical assistance on enhancing the legal
and administrative framework for land project
Serikat Petani
Tis case study of Asian Development Bank (ADB) technical assistance on making Draf
Land Law in Indonesia. Serikat Petani Indonesia identifes that this particular aid will
aggravate the condition of agriculture in Indonesia, which will ultimately increase the
number of poor people and hunger.
Background information
Te Asian Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1966 and has 66 member
countries, consisting 47 countries in Asia-Pacifc and also from outside of the region. ADB
started its activities in Indonesia in 1969. From the 47 countries in Asia-Pacifc region,
43 countries of the ADB member are debtor, which fall into the category of Developing
Member Countries (DMCs). Indonesia is among this category. ADB fnanced by a tax
paid by each member country and this fnancial institution also obtains income in the
form of debt payment. ADB also gets beneft from the issuance of bonds in international
market shares.
Agriculture accounts for 14.0% of Indonesias gross domestic product (GDP).
However, agriculture employs more people than other sectors, accounting for 44.3% of
the 95 million-strong workforce.
49
However, the Government of Indonesia does not make
the agricultural sector as the priority in the target of development. Its showed by the fact
that government preferred to enhance the development of the industrial sector. Since
the regime of New Order
50
to the current, the government always encourages foreign
investment or foreign debt as the main solution for fnancing the countrys development.
While foreign investment and expanding the industrial sector would contribute to
the continuing decrease in the amount of agricultural land, which the consequence is
decreasing of food production.
In the late 1980s,

foreign investment fooded into Indonesia, particularly into the
rapidly developing export-oriented manufacturing sector, and from 1989 to 1997, the
Indonesian economy grew by an average of over 7%. Indonesia was the country hardest hit
49 http://www.spi.or.id/?p=149
50 New Order regime ruled Indonesia under President Suharto for 32 years since 1966. It was a very dictatorial regime where there
were many violations of human rights occurred in Indonesia. It was also time when Indonesia rstly open for foreign investment in
1967. Suhartos administration encouraged industrialization and also nance the development with foreign debt. New Order regime
tumbled in 1998 by peoples force.
130
by the East Asia Finacial Crises of 199798. Against the US dollar, the currency, Rupiah,
dropped from about Rp. 2,000 to Rp. 18,000, and the economy shrank by 13.7%. Te
Rupiah has since stabilized at around Rp. 10,000, and there has been a slow but signifcant
economic recovery. Political instability since 1998, slow economic reform, and corruption
at all levels of government and business, have contributed to the patchy nature of the
recovery. GDP growth, however, exceeded 5% in both 2004 and 2005, and is forecast to
increase further. Tis growth rate, however, is not enough to make a signifcant impact
on unemployment, and stagnant wages growth, and increases in fuel and rice prices have
worsened poverty levels.
51

Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Indonesia
ADB is an international development fnance institution whose mission is to help its
developing member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their
people
52
. Nonetheless, within the neo-liberal and globalization system, fnancial institutions,
including ADB, are a multilateral instrument to run developed countries intervention and
exploitation over developing countries. ADB is one among several consistent institutions
who recommend the government in developing countries to implement development
agenda based on economic growth and free market. For that reason, the government
must decrease its role in protecting the people, while at the same time the role of the
private sector in the economic feld should be strengthened. Trough ADB and other
international fnancial institutions, private sector has been success in order to persuade
the government to open and provide legal certainty for investors in achieving growth
and increasing the welfare of the people. Furthermore, privatization, liberalization and
deregulation have been facilitating huge capital to conduct natural resources exploitation
in developing countries.
In 1980s, ADB implemented a set of requirements that must be met by the aid-receiver
state. Aid (loan, grant, debt) application can be accepted if the state meet the requirements
which were put in the matrix policy. Te matrix policy contains, among others: give and
provide any policies or regulations that supply facilities for private parties in the economic
and public sector such as energy, transportation, and water sector; conduct privatization
of state-owned company; and open the land market and market on agricultural products.

ADBs aid and its efectiveness
Until the end of 2007, the total accumulation of ADB aid to Indonesia reached 22.56
billion USD. In addition, this institution has provided technical assistance to 491 projects
valued 253.66 million USD. During 2008 ADB gave aid in total amount of 1.085 billion
USD to Indonesia. Te amount is increasing in 2009 by 1.75 billion USD. According to
1999 data, it was indicated that most of the aid is used to fnance social infrastructure
projects (35%), energy sector (23%), industry and fnance (18%), agriculture and natural
51 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia
52 www.adb.org
131
resources (14%), transport and communication (9.5%), and multi-sector (0.5%). Te
situation was changed, eight years later the agricultural sector became the frst rank in
the 2007 cumulative ADB aid. Te proportion of aid in 2007 in succession starting from
the agricultural sector and natural resources (17.13%), energy (17.09%), fnance (13.5%),
multi-sector (12.58%), transport and communication (12.03%), education (9.5%), law and
public policy (8.69%), health and social security net (7.74%), trade and industry (3.08%),
and water and waste sanitation (1.67%).
Te aid is not efectively successful. Te data from the ADB in 2007 shows the variety
rate of efectiveness. Te data said that the highest rate of aid efectiveness occurred in
transportation and communication sector that reached for 0.95 which means that it was
95% successful. Meanwhile, for the agricultural sector and natural resource management
the efectiveness rate reached 0.37. It means that 63% of the ADBs aid in agricultural
sector has failed in achieving the objectives.
One of the fndings from Environmental Defence Fundan environmental advocacy
organization from the United Statesshowed that based on the assessment standard
of project sustainability from the Commissions Congress (USA) on the International
Finance (Meltzer Commission) in 2000, showing that at least 70% of ADB projects in
Indonesia are less likely to bring long term beneft both in economic and social aspect for
Indonesia
53
. According to the standard, there are four criteria to measure the success of
projects and programs: relevance, efective, ef cient and sustainability. Next to the Meltzer
Commission standard, many analysts show the failure of the ADBs aid in the terms of
technical implementation. However, the ADBs aid has becoming a great failure since its
main goal is only to support liberalization in natural resources management. Tis visions
consequence is peoples sufering as their source of life and livelihood has been depleting
day by day.
The role of ADB in Indonesias agricultural sector
Hundreds of ADB aid project were implemented in Indonesia since 1967. A large
number of civil society organizations have identifed them as failed projectsprojects
that abandoned peoples access towards natural resources. One among those projects
is Promoting Sustainable Irrigated Agriculture in Northern Sumatera Project. Te
immediate goal of the project is to raise agricultural productivity by improving irrigation
systems and institutions, including farmers associations. Te total project cost is 217
million USD. Te government will provide fnancing of 83.9 million USD and the farmers
3.1 million USD. Tis project went along with water privatization process that is also
being supported by the World Banks Water Resources Adjustment Loan (WATSAL). On
smoothing the process of liberalization, a Draf of Water Privatization Law is required,
and fnally this project was delayed for 4 years (1997 to 2001). Te project then cannot
achieve the aim, since there is no fnalization of the entire irrigation infrastructure as
written in the proposal.
53 http://www.edf.org/documents/2898_ADBinitsownwords.pdf?redirect=adb
132
Alongside with the Northern Sumatera Project, Nusa Tenggara Agricultural
Development Project also resulted in failure. Tis 137 million USD irrigation project was
started in 1992 and completed in 1996. Te project was aimed at irrigating a total area of
1,440 hectares in Kambaniru, Sumba Timur. Te project was judged by ADB as generally
successful. However, the project led to the relocation of more than 1,000 families and the
loss of fertile lands. Other failure agricultural project that happened in Indonesia are Food
Crop Sector Program, evaluated in 1997, worth 250 million USD; Agro-Industries Credit
Project,
54
evaluated in 1996, 29.5 million USD; and ADBs Loan for Renewable Energy
Sector, evaluated in 2002.
The bad aid: No genuine agrarian reform in Indonesia, thanks
to ADB
On December 2007, the technical assistance entitled Enhancing the Legal and
Administrative Framework for Land Project (TARs/INO/37304-INO-TAR) was issued
under project number 37304, and signed by the ADB and Government of Indonesia. Te
technical assistances aim is mainly for a general intervention, especially in improving
legal and administrative framework for land including involuntary resettlement. BPN will
be the executing agency for this project. Te outcome of the technical assistance will be
improved awareness and implementation of land rights and involuntary resettlement in
keeping with international best practice.
In 2002, the ADB (via its Regional Technical Assistance, RETA) with the National Land
Agency (BPN) delivered a Draf Land Acquisition Law and a set of recommendations to
facilitate the implementation of the new law. Based on this result, the ADB then confrmed
a funding for a technical assistance in order to facilitate the establishment of a legal and
administrative framework for land acquisition and resettlement.
Te speeding process was no shocking, as in January 2005 the government held the
Indonesia Infrastructure Summit, aimed to lure mega investment in various infrastructure
projects. In the summit, the government promised to issue some 14-packages of policy
which will guarantee business and investment to run smoothly in the country. In the same
year, some projects related to land were issued, such as the World Banks Land Management
and Policy Development Project (LMPDP).
Yet the technical assistance was not signed, because the government issued a
Presidential Decree number 36/2005
55
instead of the proposed Land Acquisition Law.
Within one year, public resistance was rising, especially from peasant organisations. Te
amended version, Presidential Decree number 65/2006, then came out one year afer. Te
regulation still caused a lot of commotion though, as it was very much contrary to the
spirit of the Basic Agrarian Law No. 5/1960 (UUPA) for a genuine agrarian reform. As
usual, peoples voices are lef out in the process and ongoing implementation. Within these
years, the ADB through its technical assistance is still putting cards on table and with
54 Report nds 70% ADB projects in RI unsustainable, The Jakarta Post, 2004
55 Presidential Decree number 36/2005 (later amended to Presidential Decree number 65/2006) is a regulation aiming to tackle the
matters on land acquisition for the use of public interest.
133
the National Land Agency (BPN) and the National Planning and Development Agency
(Bappenas) were doing a fact-fnding mission in conjunction to this issue.
For the record, in March 2007, a new by sector law is passed, the UU No. 25/2007
(Investment Law). Tis law was also rejected by the public, and Serikat Petani Indonesia
with its national coalition Gerak Lawan (the Indonesian Peoples Movement against
Neocolonialism-Imperialism) submitted a judicial review on this law to Constitutional
Court of Indonesia. Tis law then proved to be conficting with the 1945 Constitution
of Indonesia, especially the article regarding incentive to investors on land titling.
Te article then called of by the court. Tis process should taken into account on the
background of making the Draf Land Law, and the land market and liberalisation in a
bigger picture.
On the other hand, the proposed technical assistance is still welcome for modifcation,
and its on the move again. Afer the fact-fnding mission in 2007, BPN requested the
proposed technical assistance for preparing a land law and related implementing
regulations, which the government identifed as a priority in that time, and signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in October 2007.
As the executing agency for this project, National Land Agency (BPN) will form under
its leadership the Legal and Technical Working Group (LTWG) consists of some elements
from the government, such as Bappenas, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Afairs,
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public Works, State Minister for Womens Empowerment,
Ministry of Religion and the State Secretariat.
Bad aid, bad law
Te focus issues in the Draf Land Law would be within the framework of the already-
established agrarian law, in this case the Basic Agrarian Law No. 5/1960 (UUPA).
Nonetheless if we carefully read the project document, there are tendencies that the Draf
Land Law will be continuing the efort of the previous regulation on revoking rights to
land for public interest. As in the history of the agrarian regulation, this was tackled in the
previous Presidential Decree number 65/2006.
Te Basic Agrarian Law No. 5/1960 (UUPA) in general covers the land tenure, rights
to land, and land registration issue. However, in order to conduct massive and rapid
development including infrastructure and investment, the government said that there is
a need for a technical regulation which tackles on how to make land available as soon
as possible. Within this framework, land acquisition and resettlement is important. Te
previous Presidential Decree number 65/2006 supposed to handle that, but not very much
in detail and strong, as many premises from businesses and investors side saying that land
acquisition is one major hurdle to investment
56
.
Te similar sentiment is also echoed by the Bappenas and ADB, particularly what
56 The issue often raised in national media, with pros and cons, see for instance: Infrastructure sector draws interest, (The Jakarta
Post, 05/06/2009), Easing land acquisition, (The Jakarta Post 05/11/2005), Poorly drafted law, (The Jakarta Post, 07/15/2004), The
nationwide controversy over government land acquisition, (The Jakarta Post, 07/14/2005), Land acquisition a long-standing snag,
(The Jakarta Post, 01/05/2009)
134
the Indonesian Infrastructure Summit (2005) saying that land acquisition and
resettlement remains one of the main causes of delays in project implementation
and disbursement
57
. The rejection from the public stressing on point that there are
numerous experiences show that land acquisition failed to address the right of people.
For instance people who live in rural area have been getting unjust treatment regarding
this issue: the government miscarried the program as land acquisition for project
mostly ended up in expropriation, or problem of compensation and replacement
cost, or remedy, or livelihood restoration, especially to fulfil the economic, social and
cultural rights of the people.
Te Draf Land Law will therefore tackle the issue of involuntary resettlement,
which the technical assistance document said that the current experiences and problems
appears to be caused by (i) lack of an updated legal framework guaranteeing equitable and
rapid involuntary resettlement; (ii) absence of comprehensive involuntary resettlement
implementing regulations; and (iii) inadequate capacity for involuntary resettlement tasks.
Furthermore, what the Presidential Decree number 65/2006 took on seems to focus
on the land acquisition per se. In development process, especially in developing countries
like Indonesia, the overall policy of agrarian sector should ensure land to the tiller. As
we know, developing countries like Indonesia, still have a huge concentration of people
working in rural area and agriculture-related. Still, one obstacle to improve this basis of
development is the right to land as many interventions like investment and infrastructure
building would eventually distort the sector. Almost 46% of workforce in Indonesia is
involved in agriculture, and 70% of people still live in rural area. Yet the average ownership
of land for agriculture is only 0.5 hectare per household
58
.
Te Draf Land Law, which would emphasize on involuntary resettlement issue, will
also close the current gap that is regulated by the Presidential Decree number 65/2006. In
the presidential decree, compensation for the covering involuntary resettlement is only
for people with land titles, or traditional or customary rights. Should the Draf Land Law
is concluded, legal provision for informal dwellers and people who dont have any legal
basis to landwhich are very common in Indonesiawill be covered. Tis challenge is
specifed to be a signifcant constraint to promoting investment in infrastructure, with toll
roads being one of the most dif cult areas.
Some signs of this future process has been made by the government, with the
Bappenas has set a target for the BPN to issue one million land certifcates in 2008. Tis
will further processed under the work plan in year 2008 in order to deal with issues related
tenure, ownership, use and utilisation of land for a total of 10,000 parcels of land and
the redistribution of 300,000 land parcels. Tere is also process to confrm, and where
necessary, formalize the ownership of land in 380 districts/municipalities all across
Indonesia. Tis should be highlighted as the process of investment and infrastructure
57 Republic of Indonesia: Enhancing the Legal and Administrative Framework for Land Project, ADB, December 2007
58 The average ownership of land in Indonesia is 0.3 hectare in Java, and 1.19 hectare in outside Java
135
projects that are fostered by the government since the 2005s Indonesian Infrastructure
Summit. Legalisation and formalisation of land are being accelerated as well as the
involuntary resettlement and land acquisition process, and the government already issued
some regulations within these factors. All of these processes are under the program of
government-led agrarian reform, and the making of set regulations, including the Draf
Land Law, will be claimed under this program as well.
Unfortunately, the idea of government-led agrarian reform, investment and
infrastructure development, as well as natural resources exploitation, has not been
expressing the mandate of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia. In fact the idea is
very much conflicting, especially on what people and the government-led need
from agrarian reform. The people, especially via concerns and critics voiced by the
peasants organisations, are still wanting the agrarian reform to be integral, and watch
out for the access and right to land for the poor. The government-led agrarian reform
is very similar to the market-led agrarian reform, where land redistribution as part
of agrarian reform will not mean distribution of wealth, but only land as commodity
which can be bought and sold in the name of development. The certification and
provisions on land acquisition and involuntary resettlement, will only accelerating
the land market, as the rich will easily buy the land from the poor. With the
Presidential Decree number 65/2006 and the Draft Land Law (and should the draft
is concluded by the House of Representatives), the government will have a huge
power to expropriate people from their land in the name of development related to
investment and infrastructure.
The aid: How bad?
Based on the latest report (TARs/INO/37304-INO-TAR) and published process regarding
the technical assistance, the Draf Land Law raised some critical responses, generally from
peoples movement and especially from peasants. Serikat Petani Indonesia has released
a statement to criticise the process toward the Draf Land Law. Further analysis is as
follows:
The Draft Land Law focuses on investment in infrastructure
Majority of the people in Indonesia, especially the peasants, are longing for a genuine
agrarian reform, which will focus on the efort that is national, vast, drastic, in swif
period of time, and integrated wholly to fulfl peoples prosperity. Tis should be tackled
frst to assure the rights of land and access to productive agrarian resources, especially
in rural area. Te major issues to be implemented are mentioned already in the UUPA,
and therefore if the government is willing to do agrarian reform, there should be more
technical measures or regulations on specifc felds, inter alia:
Restriction of excessive land ownership and control; and establishment of the maximum
limit of land ownership and control.

136
Upholding the principle of obligation to cultivate or to exploit the agricultural land
actively by people who own the land while avoiding violation methods. Tis refects that
agricultural land cannot be owned in absentee mode.
59
Measures on land compensation over excess of the maximum limit and absentee land.
Measures on object (the land to be redistributed) and subject (benefciaries) of land
reform.
Measures on the arrangement of share-cropping or proft-sharing in agricultural land.
Mortgage restriction on productive land, mortgage will only be available temporary.
Tis coherence and linkages between local and national level are the demand of people,
even since the Independence Day in 1945. Some points that need to be addressed
politically and technically were not discussed in the process of the Draf Land Law. Within
the framework of the current process, there is so little context of rural development and
agriculture, which supposed to be the focus. Te Draf Land Law's concern is how to make
land available for investment and infrastructure projects. Tis proved that this aid by the
ADB is a bad aid, because the aid would not support long term development and respond
to the expressed needs of local communities
60
.
Within this focus on investment in infrastructure, there are 91 infrastructure projects
in 2005most of them are toll roads. From total investment in 5 years (2005-2009), the
project requires some 145 billion USD. Only 17% are funded by the government, the rest
(83%) are funded by foreign investment. Terefore, the to-be-law will not refect on what
people really need.

Participation: a huge problem
Since the MoU of the aid is signed in December 2007, the technical assistance project
has been handled in the matter of secrecy. Until now, people have got no opportunity to
see even one word of the Draf Land Law. Te proposed consultation with central and
local governments and people are not clear
61
. In the Common Principle for good aid
(More and Better), aid should working with local communities and social organisations,
for example peasants organisations. In doing this, participation can particularly build
peoples political empowerment, capacity of people to articulate their views, and also
implementation of their own development models. Te Draf Land Laws process should
involve people in general, not only in consultation. Afer all, the to-be law would be
59 Absentee is a term used in UUPA, means that the land is owned by someone who live outside the kecamatan (district). This
is what UUPA mandate to, and people have been pushing for, that agriculture should actively done by people who own the land.
Therefore, with this idea local economy and agriculture can develop and land is not only a commodied factor of production.
Nowadays, a large amount of land is owned by several people who do not live in the district and therefore rural agriculture and local
economy has not been in a good shape. This is one major reason why peasant organisations are pushing for a genuine agrarian
reform.
60 Common Principle for good aid, More and Better
61 Consultation should put rst before drafting, as people and civil society could contribute on making the academic document for the
drafting of a law. In the technical assistance report, a public consultation will be done later after 14 months of the project (April or May
2009). But so far, there is no such thing happened.

137
crucial in handling production which are important for the country and afect the life
of people.
Te methodology of drafing the land law should also put into question: BPN as the
executing agency of this technical assistance advised ADB that Indonesia does not have
the capacity to prepare the land law on its own. Terefore, a group of international with
the addition of a few national consultants will be handling the process drafing in order
to keeping with international best practice. Consequently, this fact is also impacting the
budget-wise of this project: Almost half of the budget will be allocated for remuneration
and per diem of international (and national) consultants. Out of 500,000 USD budget,
227,500 USD (or 45.5%) is spent for consultants.
Te latest update is also not so cleareven confusing, as the BPN stated there is no
draf yet, or even an academic text for the Draf Land Law do not exist. BPN said they are
still doing legal diagnostic related to land matters, to know what is really needed by the
current context and symptoms of social and legal issues related to land in the community.
However, there is no target in the process. Meanwhile the ADB document said clearly that
this project should be completed in February 2010.
62
Accelerating land market: deteriorating peoples right and livelihood
Te Draf Land Law will take into account the problem of formalization and certifcation
of land seriously. Tis, as matter of fact, will contribute to the acceleration of land market:
the easier it is to make the land into a piece of paper, the easier it is to buy or sell. Tis
happens all the time in Indonesia, where poor people are forced to sell their farmland to
the government or private companies. Even if they could resist doing so, in the name of
development, as regulated in the Presidential Decree number 65/2006 and the proposed
land law, government can expropriate and the rights of the land can be revoked. Tis
will have a negative impact on agriculture, as the people, mostly the poor and peasants,
who have a small farmland, will lose their livelihood. Many peasants in rural area and
semi-urban are expropriated from their land because of infrastructure projects. During
the 1999-2002, conversion of agricultural land devoted to non-agricultural use such as
housing, industry, of ces, roads, and other public facilities an average of 187,720 hectares
per year
63
. Tis means that there are around 514 hectares of agricultural land per day to
switch the function to non-agricultural use.
In rural area and forest, the expansion of plantation is ofen the case as the government
has also been supporting this agribusiness model. Because the acceleration on land market,
many people and households who rely on land for their livelihood cannot live in dignity
and should go into urban area to become workers in manufacturesor else, go abroad as
migrant workers.
Tis phenomenon is very common in Indonesia, as the intergenerational agriculture is
almost impossible because the land to cultivate is getting smaller day by day. Te acceleration
62 Result from the last hearing with BPN, May 19, 2009
63 Tinjauan atas Kebijakan Subsidi Pertanian dan Pangan di Indonesia, Serikat Petani Indonesia, 2008
138
of land market will have negative impacts for the sustainability of peoples livelihoods, as it is
going to be almost impossible for the rural people to build their local capital, social systems,
fnancial capital and natural resources on which they depend for
64
.
Unsustainable rural development
Infrastructure and investment do need a large amount of land. Furthermore, the negative
efect of this vast process will not only be the exact land for the site. Tere is a great
possibility that the surrounding area will have to change functions as well. For instance, if
the land law is to be concluded, the ADB, BPN and Bappenas will carry on the Trans Java
Toll Road Project . Tis will trigger land conversion in many points, as the area next to toll
roads will be built into housing, commerce, or industry.
Te recent report from Serikat Petani Indonesia and civil society on this plan claimed
that around 655,400 hectares of land will be changing functions, especially agricultural
land
65
and water resources along southern Java (Cilacap, Gunung Kidul, Jember regent).
In case the to-be Land Law is used for the basis of plantation expansion, the plan for 1.5
million hectares of expansion until 2010 will surely have negative impacts. Te monoculture
application by big companies will convert millions hectares of land (mostly forest and peat
land) into plantation. Tis can only means 2 consequences. One, the indigenous people,
whose livelihood are mostly very dependant to forest, will have dif culties to continue
their way of living and to pursue their local wisdom. Two, the biodiversity is threatened
to vanish, as monoculture model will change drastically the ecosystem and whatever
that lives in the surrounding. Tis also means addition to the negative impact of climate
change, and will further endanger the planet. When a better aid should promote diversity,
this would destroy human, mode of production, biodiversity, and environmental ones
66
,
this aid would have consequences in the opposite.
Worsening agrarian conicts
Without a genuine agrarian reform, there is no way that agrarian confict should reduce
in Indonesia. With the false market-led agrarian reform and partial approach like we
perceived in the technical assistance report and its process, the Draf Land Law will only
worsen the current situation, especially regarding the settlement of agrarian conficts. Te
Draf Land Law, followed by land acquisition and involuntary resettlement for investment
and infrastructure projects, undoubtedly will add signifcant number of cases and conficts
among the tiller of land versus the government and private sectors.
Undermining peoples food sovereignty
Te provision of land conversion over the implementation of land law in short and medium
term will have a negative impact on peoples food sovereignty. Te food production will
64 Common Principles for Good Aid, More and Better
65 Tol Trans-Jawa Menggerus Lahan Pertanian, Darwis Syahruddin, 2008
66 As stated by More and Better, aid should promote diversitieshuman, cultural, biological, environmental, and in production
methods
139
fall short eventually, because the land is used to other functions. Te civil society claims
that land conversion in Java will contribute to rice production about -7.43%. Tis rough
calculation is still not considering others who connect with agricultural production
(retails, distribution, food processing). Tere is a future grave danger if the Draf Land
Law is to be passed, and if this condition intertwined with the current food crisis we know
how bad the condition will be for all the people.
Abbreviations /Acronyms
ADB Asian Development Bank
Bappenas National Planning and Development Agency
BPN National Land Agency
DMCs Developing Member Countries of ADB
GDP Gross Domestic Product
Gerak Lawan Indonesian Peoples Movement against Neocolonialism-Imperialism
LAP Land Administration Project
LMPDP Land Management and Policy Development Project
LTWG Legal and Technical Working Group
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
Prona National Land Operations Project
RETA Regional Technical Assistance
USD U.S Dollar
UUPA Basic Agrarian Law No. 5/1960
VOC Dutch East-India Company
WATSAL Water Resources Adjustment Loan
140
References
www.moreandbetter.org
www.wikipedia.org
www.spi.or.id
www.adb.org
Report fnds 70% ADB projects in RI unsustainable, Te Jakarta Post, 2004
Dampak Ekonomi pada Kesterlambatan Pembebasan Tanah di Infrastruktur Jalan Tol,
Lukas B Sihombing,
Asian Development Bank Is the Crisis: Sebuah Model Kegagalan Pembangunan yang
Dibimbing Utang, Asian Peoples Movement Against ADB, 2009
Infrastructure sector draws interest, Te Jakarta Post, 2009
Land Acquisition a Long-standing Snag, Te Jakarta Post, 2009
Prinsip Kerja Umum Perjuangan Pembaruan Agraria, Serikat Petani Indonesia, 2008
RUU Pertanahan sebagai Agenda Liberalisasi Pertanahan, Serikat Petani Indonesia, 2008
Tol Trans-Jawa Menggerus Lahan Pertanian, Darwis Syahruddin, 2008
Republic of Indonesia: Enhancing the Legal and Administrative Framework for Land
Project, Asian Development Bank, 2007
Infrastruktur Pro Rakyat, LKIS, 2007
Terobosan Besar di Investasi?, Sri Hartati Samhadi, 2006
Easing Land Acquisition, Te Jakarta Post, 2005
Te Nationwide Controversy over Government Land Acquisition, Te Jakarta Post, 2005
Poorly drafed law, Te Jakarta Post, 2004
An Impact Evaluation of Systematic Land Titling under the Land Administration Project
(LAP), Smeru, 2002
Tinjauan atas Kebijakan Subsidi Pertanian dan Pangan di Indonesia, Serikat Petani
Indonesia, 2008
141
Case study 12: PHILIPPINES
Assessment of two foreign funded development
projects for Agrarian Reform in Mindanao
Ananeza Aban and Catherine Gordo
Integrated Rural Development Foundation of the Philippines - IRDF
Introduction
Two case studies are presented in this paper to provide an example of both a good and a bad
aid. Te frst case discusses the project Support to Agrarian Reform in Central Mindanao
(STAR CM) , which is a grant project with funding from the European Commission. Te
second case study presents the learnings from the Agrarian Reform Infrastructure Support
Project Phase II (ARISP II) which is a loan contracted by the Philippine government from
the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). Both projects supported agrarian
reform communities (ARCs) in selected regions in Mindanao. In this particular study the
STAR CM project is located in the Municipality of Makilala, Province of Davao del Sur while
ARISP II is located in the Municipality of Las Nieves, Province of Agusan del Norte.
It was the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) which directly implemented STAR
CM while the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) implemented the ARISP II, an agency
under the Department of Agriculture, although the funding was channeled from DAR
Central Of ce. Both projects supported community infrastructure projects benefting the
agrarian reform benefciaries (ARBs) of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP), governments program for land distribution to landless farmers.
Te STAR CM project, which costs PhP 4.6 million, funded the installation of a water
system for three barangays in Makilala. Te ARISP II project, worth Php140million
was intended for the construction of a communal irrigation project servicing six ARC
barangays in Las Nieves. Te STAR CM project was formally turned-over to the farmers
organization in year 2007 while the ARISP II project in Las Nieves is only 85 percent
complete. An additional Php50 million is needed to fnish the said irrigation project. To
date, the respective implementing agencies have of cially terminated these projects.
Statement of the problem
Tis study, in armony with the principles developed by the More and Better campaign
aims to answer the following questions:
1. Are the projects relevant and address the need of target benefciaries?
2. What are the mechanisms that ensure the efectiveness of the project?
3. What level has these projects achieved in terms of ef ciency?
4. What is the efect of the project on the supposed target benefciaries/ communities?
5. What are the mechanisms installed to ensure project sustainability and viability?
142
Signicance of the study, scope and limitations
Tis study was conducted from April 7 to May 7, 2009 with the aim e to present two cases
of rural development projects which received foreign aids. t wants to seek how these aids
in agriculture are benefting farming communities in Mindanao and how the benefciaries
look at themselves and their participation in the project, afer the projects have been
of cially terminated.
In the broader context, the study wants to contribute to strengthen the peoples
campaign and actions to demand for an increase in both the quantity and quality of aid
for agriculture, especially in Mindanao. However, this study does not dwell too deep on
the technical, engineering and physical features of the two infrastructure projects. Also,
the cases being discussed could not be generalized for other projects with other similar
circumstances (fund source, implementing agency, etc.). Nevertheless, the comparative
analysys of the two case studies aims to illustrate the process that may or may not contribute
to the success or failure of the two projects.
Although It gave primary importance to the views of the benefciariesthe study also
sought the views and opinions of the diferent implementing agencies by interviewing
some of its representatives and of cials.Members of the barangay local government units
were also interviewed
Methodology
Te study made use of diferent but complementary design, viz:
Multiple one-shot case study: this study only focused on the efects or to some
extent, the impact of the foreign-funded projects on the present situation of
identifed project benefciaries in terms of quality of life and sustainability.
Comparative analysis- afer presenting the fndings of each case, this study presents an
analysis comparing the strength and weaknesses of both projects. Te formulation of
recommendations is based on the success and failed practices of each case.
Non- experimental design- results of this study is valid only for the specifc
research sample. Although there might be patterns similar to the situation of other
communities receiving donors from international agencies, this study cannot
generalize or conclude that all have the same situation.
Te following are the main instruments used in data gathering:
- Key Informant Interviews (KII)
1
- Focus Group Discussion (FGD)
2
;
- Secondary data gathering
1 The key informants are the following: Community development specialists from STAR CM, NIA, PARCOM (Provincial Agrarian
Reform Committee- Agusan del Norte); Ofcials from the Department of Agrarian Reform; Chairperson and other ofcials of the
project organizations- both MAGARBUWASA and LAMMP IA; Project beneciaries of MAGARBUWASA and LAMMP IA; Local
Government Unit (barangay level)
2 Provincial Engineering Ofce under the Planning, Programming Section- Agusan del Norte; LAMMP IA members; Women farmers
in MAP-CIP area; MAGARBUWASA Board of Directors

143
Te key informants are the project benefciaries and those who are knowledgeable
about the project. Although It gave primary importance to the views of the benefciaries
the study also sought the views and opinions of the diferent implementing agencies
by interviewing some of its representatives and of cials.Members of the barangay local
government units were also interviewed.
3
Referrals from non-government organizations
and from informants earlier interviewed was also used as a technique. Availability of
informants and time conditions of the feld visits was also considered
Te secondary data sources are the following: web; documents from project
benefciaries, government agencies; memorandum and related documents from the
DAR.
Case 1: Support to Agrarian Reform in Central Mindanao
(STAR CM). Construction of Potable Water System Level II in
Makilala, North Cotabato
Te Support to Agrarian Reform in Central Mindanao (STAR CM) was a seven-year
project targeting ffy (50) agrarian reform communities in Central Mindanao. Te project
formally started on mid-May 2001 and ended last May 2008.
The objectives of the project
Increased self-reliance, living standards and quality of life for farming households;
Improved capacity of Peoples Organizations (POs) and Local Government Units (LGUs)
to plan, implement, manage and maintain development projects;
(Establishment of) rural infrastructure to better support farmer productivity and
welfare;
Agricultural production and household income from non-agricultural enterprises is
increased in a sustainable way, and;
Farming households in the target ARCs have better access to the fnancial services
provided by Government Financing Institutions (GFIs) and Private Financial Institutions
(PFIs).
Te Municipality of Makilala was one of the project sites in the region with 71 per cent
or 24,459 hectares of the municipalitys total land area devoted to agriculture. An ARC
participatory action planning (ARC-PAP) was conducted from February 19-21, 2003
with the participation of ARBs in the three barangays of Malasila, Garsika and Buenavida,
forming the MAGARBU-ARC cluster. Te process is said to be documented in the ARC
Development Plan.
Te output of the ARC-PAP served as the basis of the project proposal submitted by
3 The eld visits and eld interviews in Makilala and Kidapawan were done on April 8-9 and April 18 and in Butuan and Las Nieves on
April 25-27, 2009. These were carried out in three barangays in Makilala namely: Malasila, Garsika and Buenavida; three barangays
in Las Nieves which include: Mat-i, Pinanaan, and Ambacon and one barangay in the Municipality of Esperanza, Barangay Langag.
The Kidapawan and Butuan interviews were for government agencies and other stakeholders.

144
the Municipal Government of Makilala to STAR CM / DAR dated July 15, 2003 for the
Construction of Potable Water System Level II benefting the 3 ARC barangays
Tereafer, the STAR CM/DAR, Municipal Government of Makilala and MAGARBU
Barangay Water System Association (BAWASA) signed a tripartite Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) on June 2, 2004. Under this MOA, the LGU served as the Implementing
Partner with the MAGARBU-BAWASA as the Project Proponent. Tese three barangays
were chosen partly because of the following reasons:
cluster of ARC communities
at least 100 hectares of land were distributed under the agrarian reform program
ARC communities with most number of indigent families
Barangay with approved Barangay Development Plan
Te projects total cost is Php4, 652,948.48. Te Php3, 716,506.50 (79.80%) was requested
from STARCM, Php343, 469.17 (7.50%) was the LGUs counterpart and the remaining
Php592, 970.81 (12.70%) served as the community's local counterpart.
Barangay Malasila is four (4) kilometers away from the Poblacion of Makilala while
Barangay Garsika is eight (8) kilometers and Barangay Buenavida is ten (10) kilometers
from the town proper. Collectively known as MAGARBU-ARC, these clusters cover
4,770 hectares or 11 per cent of the Municipalitys total land area, consisting mostly of
agricultural lands planted with rubber, coconut, corn and banana. Around 710.31 hectares
(14%) in the area are under CARP.
Based on 2003 fgures, the total population of MAGARBU ARC is 7,206, having a total
of 1,419 households. Out of the clusters total population, 3,409 individuals (47.30%) are
ARBs.
One of the prevailing problems in the area includes the low productivity of their
agricultural land. Te DA set the standard of 2.4 tons/hectare (ton/ha) for rubber
production while the cluster has been producing 1 ton/ha, which is only half of the
standard productivity rate. Te municipal government is estimating an average of 0.5 ton/
ha for banana production but the ARC cluster has been producing a mere 0.2 ton/ha.
In the 1970s, rubber production was the main source of income for most of its
residents. But the industry experienced a major drop sometime in the early part of 1990
where its selling price reached a low Php8.00 per kilo. In 2000, Dole-Stanflco started to
operate their banana plantation in the area and ofered to pay Php1, 000.00 per hectare per
month for land rental, for a total annual lease of P12,000 per hectare. Most of the residents
decided to convert their crop to banana plantation under Dole-Stanflco, and entered into
a long-term lease agreement and eventually sought labor employment in the plantation.
Casual labor in the plantation is being paid Php220.00 per days work.
Electricity reached the community in 2001 through the assistance of House
Representative Gregorio Epong. Water came in much earlier. In year 1976, barangay
water systems were constructed with 3 sources in Barangay Buenavida, discharging 1,954
liters of water per second, suf cient enough to cover all the households in the ARC. But

145
a large part of the community remained unserved due to improper and insuf cient
infrastructure facilities. In a Participatory Rural Appraisal Social Census conducted in
year 2000, 66% or 4,700 individuals depended on open wells for their drinking water and
domestic use.
Prior to the implementation of the project, Barangays Malasila, Garsika and Buenavida
were consulted and informed that a funding from STAR CM/ DAR was approved to
construct a potable water system for their barangays. Pre-implementation phase included
a participatory consultation, involving the deployment of a community development
facilitator.
During this phase, ad hoc committees were formed to assist in the actual
implementation-construction phase. Committees include a pre-construction committee
which took charge to oversee and prepare the water/road right of way, construction
working committee to ensure manpower and labor support while the project management
committee was tasked to ensure project sustainability.
Te LGU provided for the use of heavy equipments, forming part of its counterpart
to the project. Te community counterpart came in the form of pintakasi or labor
counterpart.
Te project involves the construction of 11 kilometers water pipelines, 1 collection box,
2 reservoirs, 33 tap stands and the institutionalization of the services of MAGARBUWASA
in the community.
Te water source is located in Brgy. Buenavida with three diferent water sources. A
collection box was constructed 230 meters away from the water sources to distribute water
to the two reservoirs; reservoir 1 has a volume capacity of 75 cubic meters and reservoir
2 has 65 cubic meter volume capacity. Water is then re-distributed to the 33 tap stands
located at the three barangays, servicing an average of 5 to 10 households per tap stand.
Te initial intention of the project was for the construction of level II water system.
Presently, there are 420 member households or 181 households (43%) who already have
access to level III water system, which means that each household is having individual
faucets.
Aside from the technical and fnancial assistance, STARCM also provided institutional
strengthening support to prepare the community in managing the project. Some of the
capability building supports include trainings and workshops on leadership, fnancial
management, simple bookkeeping, enterprise development management and even
computer skills. A workshop was also held in aid of the formulation of MAGARBUWASAs
Policy, Systems and Procedure Manual.
Te management of the project was formally turned-over to the community in 2007.
Presently, the water system is being managed by a Chairman and Board of Directors
with a bookkeeper and a fulltime plumber/collector. Each household is expected
to pay a minimum of Php30.00 per month for minimum water consumption. Te
MAGARBUWASA is expecting a monthly collection of Php15, 000.00. Two years afer the
turn-over, MAGARBUWASA now has an income of Php72, 000.00 to cover Maintenance
146
and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), honorarium for its of cers (Php500.00) and
salary for their full-time plumber/collector (Php1, 500).
Presently, MAGARBUWASA is planning to raise the level of the remaining member
households from level II to level III so that access will not only be to ensure greater
accessibility to its services but to further improve collection and repayment rate. Also,
its of cers are planning to expand its services to include more member benefciaries and
develop additional water sources.
Case II: Agrarian Reform Infrastructure Support Project II
(ARISP II)
Community Irrigation Project, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte
Te Agrarian Reform Infrastructure Support Project (ARISP) was the frst Japanese
Of cial Development Aid (ODA) loan assistance that supported the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in the country. ARISP provided infrastructure
project such as irrigation, farm-to-market roads and post-harvest facilities to ARBs
nationwide. Institutional development support was also given to farmers association,
irrigators association and cooperatives.
ARISP Phase I (1995-2002) received a total of Php6.151 billion loan which the
government pays with an interest rate of 2.7% per annum in thirty years. ARISP Phase II
(March 2000-December 2005) provided a total of Php6.7 billion fund Php5.6 billion of
which came from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) with a counterpart
fund of Php1.07 billion from the Philippine Government. Presently, Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) is implementing the third phase of the project or ARISP III.
Te ARISP II targeted 150 Agrarian Reform Communities (ARCs), benefting 100,000
Agrarian Reform Benefciaries (ARBs) and covering 43,000 hectares of land under CARP.
Te program was implemented in 55 provinces and distributed in the countrys 14 regions.
Under the implementation arrangements, DAR is tasked to identify the ARCs/ project
site, conduct planning and consultation for the packaging of ARISP proposals, provide
institutional development, take charge in the over-all project supervision, coordination,
monitoring and evaluation and fnancial management.
4
Other partner implementing agencies include National Irrigation Administration
(NIA)for the construction of irrigation and post-harvest facilities, the Department of
Public Works and Highways for farm-to-market roads, Local Government Units for the
potable water supply, Development Academy of the Philippines for baseline surveys and
other institutional development services, and the Local-Based Partner Institutions for
organizing and strengthening of farmers associations and cooperatives.
One of the main purposes of the program is to increase farmers productivity. It
also aims to transform ARCs into viable, organized, self-reliant, socially prepared and
technically capable communities.
4 www.fapsodar.org.ph/faps_jbicarisp2.htm
147
An ARC site identifed for ARISP II is the Municipality of Las Nieves in Agusan del
Norte, a fourth class municipality with 20 barangays. Te MAP-ARC (Mat-I, Ambacon
and Pinanaan) is the target community benefciary of the Communal Irrigation Project
(CIP) approved under the program. Te MAP-ARC covers 467 hectares of land planted
with rice and coconuts with more or less 160 farmer-benefciaries.
Te project involves the construction of an irrigation project that will irrigate 800
hectares of rice felds in the Municipalities of Las Nieves and Esperanza of Agusan del
Sur. Tere were four target barangays in Las Nieves which include Ambacon, Mati-i, EG
Montilla and Pinanaan and two barangays or villages in Experanza, namely: Barangays
Remedios and Langag.
Te local government of Brgy. Mat-i said that ARBs in the area have asked DAR to
support agricultural production afer the release of their Certifcate of Land Ownership
Awards (CLOAs) given through the agrarian reform program.
Te communitys main source of irrigation is primarily rainwater. Given this, low farm
yields are generally experienced especially during dry season. In 1998, the Municipal
Local Government of Las Nieves submitted a proposal to DAR to get funding support
under the ARISP II for an irrigation project.
Te project has an initial funding appropriation of Php129-Million, as loan from JBIC.
Te construction started in June 2003. Additional funding request of Php11-Million was
released to cover increase in the cost of materials and equipments due to the delay in
project implementation. With a total project cost of Php140-Million, the project involves
the construction of one (1) diversion dam, main canal with access road and lateral
canals.
Both DAR and NIA declared the project terminated last April 3, 2007 with 85.46%
physical completion and 100% fnancial releases.
Te causes of the delay and subsequent project incompletion were due to fooding
in the project site, backing-out of contractors due to increase in the cost of construction
materials and supplies as well as the peace and order situation in the area. DAR and
farmers both agree that the peace and order problem is related to the concerns raised by
the indigenous peoples (IPs) in the Agusan del Sur, occupying the land where the proposed
irrigations main gate is located. Some IP groups in the area are reportedly asking fnancial
support for their rituals or cultural practices in consonance with the irrigation project
construction.
Presently, the project reported a massive and continuing scouring on the lef side of
the embankment, afecting almost half a hectare of land. Already, NIA alloted P20M for
2009 to complete the project but DAR sees it as insuf cient where the required funding for
complete lined canal and damages repair is more than P50-Million.
5
Tis additional allocation is expected to irrigate at least 300 out of the 800 (37.50%)
hectares of lands originally targeted. DAR further requested its Central Of ce for additional
budget in order to complete the project.
5 Letter of DAR Agusan del Norte PARO II Andre Atega, CEO VI to DAR Secretary Nasser Pangandaman, March 25, 2009
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Part of the projects aim is the formation of Irrigators Association, which they called
the Langag, Ambacon, EG Montilla, Mat-I and Pinanaan Irrigators Association (LAMMP-
IA). Tis association is tasked to manage the irrigation system afer construction and shall
collect service/maintenance fees from the member benefciaries. However at this point, it
is not yet clear how the irrigation fee will be given. Some benefciaries understand that they
have to give four bags or sacks of palay (rough rice) per hectare per cropping while others
say its one bag or sack. While concerned government agencies mentioned monetary as
fee. All concerned have yet to agree the exact details of payment.
While government documents say that the project is a loan from the JBIC which
bears a 2.7% interest rate per annum, members of the community especially those who
are members of LAMMP IA are unaware of the nature of the fund source. For the farmers,
they believe that the fund was a foreign grant, not a loan.
Comparative analysis of the two projects
On project relevance and targeting
Te STARCM project is better suited to the needs and problems of the target
communities. While both project proposals were prepared by their respective municipal
local governments with assistance from the Department of Agrarian Reform, the
STARCM project conducted participatory action planning where farmer benefciaries
identifed their needs and priority issues and the planning output served as the basis for
the formulation of the proposal. Tis process was not clear in Las Nieves. Moreover, for
the STARCM project, the benefciaries were aware that the European Commission was
the source of fund for the construction of their water system while for the ARISP project
in Las Nieves, everyone who was interviewed asserted that the fund was a grant from
JBIC. Clearly, for the second project, the benefciaries were not properly consulted nor
oriented as to the nature and source of project funds.
Tere is active participation of benefciaries in the STARCM project, while in
ARISP benefciary participation has been minimal. Te participation of the project
benefciaries and afected communities should not be limited to the project identifcation
and planning phase. As direct benefciaries and stakeholders, they should be treated as
project partners and not merely as aid recipients. In STARCM Makilala, the farmer
benefciaries took an active role in the project implementation phase by providing labor
counterpart and even forming committees with clearly defned tasks and functions.
Tey were regularly consulted for project updates and status. In preparation prior to the
project turn-over, a workshop was conducted to install Policy, Systems and Procedures
(PSP). A management structure was also institutionalized. As a result, the project
benefciaries have been regularly conducting board meetings and general assemblies
and pro-actively revising their PSPs based on the need and demand of their members.
Financial records of the project were also turned-over to the community afer the
termination of the project. In contrast, the Las Nieves experience limited the role of the

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farmer/community partners as project recipients. Although an Irrigators Association
was formed, its tasks and functions are not clearly defned. Even the associations
of cers have varied information as to project status, funding details and other vital
information concerning the project. Although the project was declared terminated in
year 2007, project documents especially the fnancial records, were not handed out to
the association.
Te STARCM project in Makilala has instilled in the benefciaries a sense of ownership
of the project. One of the many good reasons why there is a need for any development
initiative to put a premium on peoples participation is because it is a means to somehow
ensure that they will have some sort of ownership for the project. When people feel
this sense of ownership, they tend to protect the project and support it. In Makilala,
the association is focused on how to further improve the quality of its services for its
members. Tey are continuously planning on how to maintain, improve and expand their
water systems. In contrast, the project in Las Nieves revealed that one of the problems
that the project encountered was having their materials stolen. If the community was
organized and made to realize that these materials are necessary for the construction of
the irrigation facility and that the project would improve agriculture productivity and
increase their incomes, then this could have been avoided.
On Project effectivity
Projects should have continuing support for community organizing and capability
building of community leaders. One important aspect of the Makilala project was
its clear support for the capability building of the farmer association/organization.
Te farmer leaders who were interviewed in Las Nieves failed to mention capability
building and organizational support given by either NIA or DAR. Also, the STARCM
project in Makilala designated a Community Development Facilitator who took charge
in community organizing and supervise the project implementation. Tis was lacking
in the ARISP II project in Las Nieves.
Coordination among the diferent stakeholders and partner agencies is crucial
to ensure smooth project operations. For project with big funding portfolio, several
agencies may be involved in its implementation. For instance, the STARCM project has
DAR as the main implementing agency and in direct partnership with the municipal
local government and farmers association. Te ARISP II project has NIA as the
implementing agency, DAR as the partner agency in-charge of capability building, the
provincial government and the irrigators association as direct partners. However, it was
observed that some of the project stakeholders have questions on the credibility of NIA
as the project implementor. And there were problems encountered about coordination
among the diferent partners. Also lacking is the defned and clear management
structure that must be known to the benefciaries to further ensure project transparency
and accountability.

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Timely monitoring and assessment is necessary to make sure that targets are
achieved. Te STARCM project was able to activate the existing farmers association by
regularizing its meetings and capability building trainings. As a result, project update
and project status were closely monitored and community members were actively
involved in planning and re-programming. One of the main problems identifed in the
ARISP II project was the rising cost of materials and equipments. However, this should
have been dealt with if project planning, monitoring and assessment were conducted on
a regular basis. Te project management unit could have realized sooner that they have
to make necessary adjustments to the actual project cost vis a vis the available funds.
Good aid should be based on a thorough understanding of local issues and knowledge. It
should pay special attention to promoting diversity and addressing problems of sectors
that maybe afected.
An efective project is one that builds upon a recognition of local issues and problems
as well as local knowledge. Te STARCM project for instance studied frst the possible
efect of the project on diferent groups and worked out some mechanisms to address
potential problems that may arise. Te STARCM created a local committee composed of
benefciaries that would take charge in preparing the waters road right of way. One of the
committees tasks was to negotiate with the landowners of the properties where the pipes
would pass. Also, there are some ARC members who could not avail of the water services
because materials run short. Community leaders consulted and talked with the afected
ARC members and ensured that this group will not cause delay to the project. In contrast,
the Las Nieves ARISP project was not able to respond to the demands of an indigenous
peoples group to have their ancestral customs and practices preserved, in the face of some
threats arising from the construction of the new irrigation system. Te negotiations with
the indigenous peoples communities who were initially opposing the project remained
at the hands of NIA and some local government of cials. Primary partner benefciaries
remained at the back seat.
On project efciency
Cost to benefciary ratio. Te STAR CM water system project which costs Php
4,652,948.48 benefted 420 households and the ARISP II irrigation project which costs
Php140million pesos is expected to irrigate 800 hectares of land. For the water system
in Makilala, the project spent Php11, 078.44 for every benefciary. Assuming that each
household owns an average of one hectare, the Las Nieves irrigation project already
spent Php175, 000.00 for each household. Tis excludes the interest rate of 2.7 percent
per annum. However, this so-called mega-buck infrastructure project remains not yet
operational.
Transparency. Te farmers association and partner benefciaries of the STAR CM

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project in Makilala played a crucial role in closely monitoring the project, especially on
how the budget is being used. Tey have secured a copy of the budget appropriation and
they exactly know how much is allocated for each budget item (cement, pipes, etc.) Tis
way, the community can help in tracking variances in the budget and make necessary
adjustments. Financial documents were also turned-over to the community. None of
these was observed in the ARISP II irrigation project.
On project benets
Target benefciaries should realize immediate benefts from the project. Women should
equally beneft from the project. Te benefciaries of the STARCM project concretely
recognized the immediate efect of the project. Women are benefted the most since
they were the ones who used to get and carry gallons of water from a water source to
their homes. Te project helped in unburdening their work loads and having more
time for other chores. Unfortunately, the uncompleted irrigation project in Las Nieves
resulted to rising frustration of farmer benefciaries not only about the project but of
the agency implementing the project.
Development projects should strengthen community-based organizations. One
indirect efect of a good development project is when it mobilizes and strengthens the
community-based organizations. In Makilala, the water system project encouraged the
inactive farmers association to revive their ARC cluster. Te regular meetings and
assemblies paved the way to discuss other issues that concern them as farmers and one
of their resolutions is to request DAR for seedlings. In Las Nieves however, the farmers
association passively waits for NIAs actions and plans.
On sustainability and viability
Empowering community-based organizations. One of the measures in ensuring project
sustainability is when community-based organizations have the capacity and capability
to manage and protect the project gains. It is important that the community learns from
the processes of project development, implementation and management and plans for
improving the project development process. Tat is why any development project should
promote and put primacy on capacitating and strengthening not only selected leaders
but the community organizations as well. To a certain degree, this was demonstrated by
the farmers association in Makilala.
Development projects should contribute to the over-all livability of the community.
A projects success or failure is largely dependent on the benefts that such brings to
the community. In this sense, a project is always interconnected with the other aspects
of community life, specifcally it is related to the socio-economic lives of the people,
the political and cultural conditions and the environmental health of the community.
Development projects therefore should be able to contribute to the general quality
of life of the community and should not be seen merely as a stand-alone physical

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infrastructure project. Te Makilala water system project is still under threat of possible
water contamination because of the expanding banana plantation near the water source.
Presently, the organization has observed decreasing water level especially during dry
season. Te banana plantation was identifed as one of the competing factors in terms
of water resource use. Tis could be a threat to the project. Te capacity to pay water
use among those working in the banana plantation always depend on their ability to
liberate themselves from the cycle of indebtedness to money lenders brought about by
low wages they received from the plantation company.
Sustainability should be seen beyond project operations itself but on the capacity of
benefciaries to improve their present living conditions. As such, sustainability would
signifcantly be related to economic stability of the community whose income is largely
dependent on banana plantation. Signifcant number of ARBs have leased their awarded
land to Dole Stanflco and have opted to apply jobs in the plantation as agri-workers.
In the same way, local agriculture that will sustain the capacity of these ARBs to increase
their income should also be enhanced to strengthen the benefciaries capacity to regularly
pay their monthly dues and increase their repayment rate for future project expansion
and maintenance.
In Las Nieves, the sustainability of the project remains a big question since besides
not being fully completed, the irrigation project is found to have already displaced several
households because of fooding. Based on the site interviews conducted, indigenous
peoples have showed resistance to the project.
Recommendations
A multi-stakeholders planning approach is needed especially if an infrastructure project
will have direct impact on diferent sectors. Tere should be active participation of
community members and sectors at all levels- from project identifcation, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation. Te role of women in project development must be recognized
and enhanced. Tere should be equal participation of men and women, with bias on
promoting gender equity.
Moreover, projects should take of from concrete community conditions and the
communitys proposed solutions. In this way, people will recognize their ownership of the
project and are encouraged to explore ways of sustaining their initiatives.
Te diferent stakeholders should be actively involved in project monitoring and
evaluation to encourage transparency in project implementation and also to prevent
corruption and incompetence.
To ensure both sustainability and operational feasibility of infrastructure projects, a
comprehensive integrated approach in project assessment must be undertaken taking into
account the bio-physical, economic, socio-cultural and environmental condition obtaining
in the project areas. Local knowledge must input into the designing of appropriate
development strategies. It is crucial though that complementary strategies such as soil and
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water conservation, watershed management and forest resource protection are embedded
within the irrigation project design.
In order to achieve the target objective of irrigation projects of raising agriculture
productivity and incomes of poor farmers, the project should also provide opportunity
for farmers to practice a diversifed organic farming approach, which in some areas have
been proven to increase productivity and improve farmers quality of life.
To ensure efective implementation of the project, the roles and responsibilities of
government agencies should be clear among project benefciaries. Tese agencies must
consciously observe their accountability to the benefciaries. Te ARISP II irrigation
project, which is now hounded by problems of inoperative facilities and scouring of
embankments, needs immediate completion. Te DAR Central Of ce may call for an
investigation of the project through the Presidential Agrarian Reform Committee (PARC),
the highest policy-making and coordinative body of the CARP, as mandated by law.
Te COA which is tasked to audit and inspect the project together with the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), should be actively involved in the
investigation. NEDAs presence is crucial by virtue of its mandate as a clearing house for
ODA loans.
Prior to project implementation, project proponents should take into consideration
the rights of the diferent stakeholders. In the ARISP II case, these are the indigenous
communities who are living in the project sites and the farmers whose small farmlots near
the river were afected by the dam construction. Te project implementors must be able
to devise mechanisms to protect the rights of the small farmers and indigenous peoples to
their land and to practice their culture.
Farmers or local communities must be recognized as partners and not merely as
project recipients. Future government-initiated projects can replicate strategies from the
STARCM case where community involvement in project management is dominant and
dynamic.
Taking the lessons learned from the ARISP II experience particularly in contracting
huge loans that eventually are not benefcial to the intended benefciaries, the government
needs to review the feasibility and sustainability of such mega infrastructure projects in
addressing rural poverty and hunger, taking into account the lack of full participation
of farmers and indigenous peoples in the identifcation and designing of the project as
well as in the implementation and monitoring. While the project is designed to support
the Agrarian Reform Communties (ARCs), the agrarian reform benefciaries were not
active in the various stages of the project development. Tey became passive recipients, yet
they are given the obligation to pay for the cost of investments and to take charge of the
operations and maintenance of the facility. But without the project being completed, the
benefciaries will not get the benefts and will not be able also to pay back the cost.
Finally, the ARISP II project puts into question the sustainability of incurring foreign
loans, in view of the countrys increasing indebtedness, which now reaches to $87 billion.
Tere maybe a need to review the countrys external debt and review the policy of
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acquiring more debts to fnance capital expenditures including irrigation infrastructure,
not only because it increases the stock of debt and diminishes the countrys fscal space
to solve budget defcits especially within the context of the global fnancial crisis, but also
because it brings with it disastrous policy impositions that are found to have weakened
governments support and intervention in the economy and promoted market-oriented
reforms that have devastating impact on peoples livelihoods.
On project impact and sustainability
Measuring sustainability is going beyond product delivery. It should be anchored on the
overall livability and degree of self-reliance of communities. Infrastructure projects for
CARP benefciaries should be consistent to the over-arching objective of CARP that is to
increase the living standards and improve the quality of life of these poor and used to be
landless farmers. Terefore, agricultural productivity of these farmers should be a priority
with particular consideration on natural resources management, where farming is largely
dependent. In the Makilala case, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCOM) should review the lease agreements entered into by the MAGARBU ARBs
and the banana plantation in Makilala based on sentiments of community members that
their colleagues have entered into onerous contract with this corporate plantations that
now impact their ability to pay the monthly water repayment.
Note: Te matrix of fndings for the two case study discussed in this chapter can be
consulted on the More and Better website at: www.moreandbetter.org
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Case study 13: VIETNAM
Empowering farmers and improving
agricultural diversity
Case Study of Community Biodiversity Development and Conservation
Biodiversity Use and Conservation in Asia Program (CBDC-BUCAP) in Vietnam
by SEARICE
Tis case study presents the experiences of SEARICE (Southeast Asia Regional Initiatives
for Community Empowerment) in Vietnam in close to 10 years of working to strengthen
farmers management of their local seed resources as a cornerstone of eforts to secure
the local food system. Te work of SEARICE in Bhutan, Lao PDR, Tailand, Philippines
and Vietnam was supported through development aid channeled through civil society
organizations. On the one hand, the results of our work are far from perfect, but, on
the other hand, it has highlighted points for refection that would ultimately contribute
towards defning what constitutes better development aid for food, agriculture and rural
development.
Agriculture and economic development
Vietnam is a country in transition. With around 75% of the total population, or 90% of the
poor, living in rural areas (World Bank, 2007a), Vietnam was able to transform itself from
a food defcient country in the early 1980s to one that is food secure in less than a decade.
It is currently the 2
nd
biggest exporter of rice in the world. Agriculture contributes as much
as 22% of the countrys Gross Domestic Product (GDP)despite receiving only 6% of
government spending; 30% of exports; and 60% of employment. Te World Bank attributes
this performance to the Doi Moi (renovation) policies, introduced in the late 1980s. Tese
policies were geared towards decollectivization of agriculture and introduction of market
based incentives through the liberalization of the trade in agricultural commodities. Under
the doi moi reforms, village households were recognized as autonomous economic units,
though not as independent family farmers. Land use rights and decision-making power
were transferred from state run cooperatives to households (Owen, et.al. 2005).
Te country opened itself up to investments with the revision of laws to encourage
domestic and foreign investors. However, an examination of the details of Vietnams
success reveals that the country prioritized food security before opening up to market
reforms. In particular, Vietnam set up the following measures:
Equal access to land and the establishment of tenurial rights;
Continued imposition of import tarifs and provision of export subsidies, along with the
liberalization of its domestic and export markets, in order to support and protect its rice
producers and exports;

156
Continued support for domestic production, with relevant decisions devolved to the
provincial level;
Government intervention through state owned enterprises, for domestic price
stabilization of fertilizer and rice market (Reyes-Cantos, 2005).
While Vietnam is food secure at the national level there are still concerns such as
malnourishment, hunger and poor health status. Te World Bank (2007b) has reported
that the country sufers from food poverty, i.e., expenditure on food is so low that the per
capita food requirement of 2,100 calories/day cannot be met), and that, as of 2004, food
poverty is higher in rural areas (9.7) than in urban areas (0.8). Tis is ironic, considering
that food is mainly produced in the rural areas, and that the country is a leading rice
exporter. Te incidence of poverty among indigenous communities living in upland
areas is also higher than that among urban residents and the dominant ethnic group
(Kinh). Indigenous people constitute 14% of the total population and accounts for 59%
of the hungry (World Bank 2007b). In 2006, 52% of indigenous peoples lived in poverty
compared to 10% of the dominant Kinh and Chinese groups (World Bank, 2007b). Tus,
there are divides within Vietnam that arise from unequal access to food and inequitable
distribution of wealth. Tis is the backdrop to the case study.
The case study
In highly market integrated, intensive production type of agro-ecosystems, genetic erosion
is more pronounced, as farmers move to plant similar high-yielding crops and varieties
that have a high market demand. Tis is exemplifed by the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, in
which 4M hectares of rice land are planted to a few rice varieties. Such uniformity puts
the area at great risk of disease or pest infestation. A farming system that has limited
diversity lacks resilience. Tus, the challenge lies in increasing diversity while maintaining
economic returns under prime irrigated and market oriented systems. As an organization
with a long history of promoting social justice, it is also the objective of SEARICE to
strengthen farmers management over these resources and fnd (political) spaces for
farmers to articulate their experiences and participate in community development, in
particular, and nation-building, in general.
When SEARICE started work in Vietnam in the early 1990s, there were no local non-
government organizations (NGOs) or farmers groups to speak of. Te Farmers Union,
the mass organization of the Communist Party, was the only farmers group at the local
level. In the face of criticism from other civil society organizations, SEARICE worked
with government agencies to implement an on-farm conservation and crop improvement
project for Vietnamese farmers.
Institutional arrangements
Te illustration below shows the institutional arrangement for the project in North
and Central Vietnam, particularly identifying the diferent stakeholders involved. Te

157
Plant Protection Department (PPD), or more specifcally, the National Integrated Pest
Management Program within the PPD, is SEARICEs major partner.
Te PPD is ubiquitous throughout Vietnam, with each province having a Plant
Protection Sub-department (PPSD) that provides technical backstopping on pest
management issues. In contrast, the engagement with rice plant breeders and researchers
is undertaken on an individual capacity (rather than institutional) and only upon request
from the PPSD. Te PPSD was the operational arm of the project, facilitating processes
for farmers.
At the provincial level, the PPSD is administered by the Department of Agriculture
and Rural Development (DARD) of each province. Te DARD is primarily responsible
for setting the direction for agriculture in the respective provinces, including their rice
production schemes.
Te project (BUCAP) sought the support of the DARD, local of cials at provincial,
district, and commune levels in order to undertake the project with Vietnamese farmers.
In general, the local government (including local mass organizations, such as the Womens
Union and Farmers Union) has been supportive of the project for the simple reason that
it is an agriculture project of the PPSD.
In South Vietnam, the project is jointly undertaken by 3 universities, 7 seed centers,
6 extension centers and the Department of Crop Production (DCP) South Vietnam, and
covers all the 13 provinces of the Mekong Delta, where 50-60% of Vietnams rice exports
come from. Te institutional arrangement in South Vietnam is simpler, with the Mekong
Delta Research and Development Institute (MDI) of Cantho University serving as the
main actor linking together the other organizations to jointly implement a project for
farmers.
Learning processes
Many mistakes were made before clear methods of work could be identifed and dramatic
impacts, achieved. Building on these lessons, SEARICE, together with a select team
from the PPD and the FAO-IPM (UN Food and Agriculture Of ce- Integrated Pest
Management) program in Vietnam, adapted the FAO-IPM farmers feld school approach
(FFS) to IPM, to on-farm conservation and crop improvement to secure local seed systems.
Using a discovery based learning process, a group of 25 to 30 farmers meet regularly for
one season. Farmers observe and conduct experiments in a common learning area, and
through a facilitated process of self-discovery, learn the skills and develop the knowledge
for crop improvement and seed management. Towards the end of the season, farmers have
to report back to the whole community the results of the season-long experiment through
a Farmers Field Day. Farmer groups, formed through the series of farmers feld schools,
also take this opportunity to lobby local of cials to support their work and to get media
coverage for the results of the experiments and their future plans, and thus encourage
more farmers to participate in the future.
In the next season, more specialized topics are introduced to the farmers through the
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facilitation of project trained extension agents or PPSD personnel. Afer three seasons,
the support to the project ends and the farmers are expected to adapt the skills they have
learned in their own farms, and/or continue with group learning/experimentation with
support from local government units and cooperatives. Tis leads to the establishment of
a farmers group.
Every 2 or 3 years, a provincial and national Farmers Technical Conference (FTC) is
held, at which farmers from diferent villages, provinces (and even countries) share with
other farmers the results of their experiments. Such events also serve as a venue for policy
dialogues; farmers discuss current policies (e.g., seed certifcation) based on their actual
feld experiences. Te project complements this localized dialogue by organizing fora,
workshops and exposing farmers and policy makers to other countries and international
negotiations. Tese processes help to sustain a healthy debate and positive discussion
between farmers and policy makers.
What has made these events feasible is the direct involvement of key organizations (and
cadres) in project implementation, which analyzed the situation, identifed the avenues
for discussion to advance the work of farmers and allowed farmers voices to be heard.
At the same time, the project developed an alternative approach to the expose-oppose-
propose type of advocacy, in deference to project partners in government. What evolved
was a more developmental approach to policy advocacy one based on actual feld results,
providing concrete (living) evidence to justify a review of policies and program. Te
discrepancy between policy and practice/reality is tackled by highlighting the success of
farmers, on the ground, and identifying the impediments to continuity and advancement.
Most of the challenges for continuing farmers work pertain to the absence of support
or enabling policies. Tus, the need for a review of policies and the development of new
programs.
Some results
Formation of Farmer Groups capable of sustaining the work
In 2008, the project covered 525 communities in 26 of the 69 provinces of Vietnam.
Around 15,890 farmers are actively participating in the project. Of which, 200 farmers can
train other farmers. In North and Central Vietnam alone, these farmer trainers trained
a total of 29,230 more farmers in seed management, crop improvement and on-farm
conservation aimed at securing local seed supply. Tese farmers (directly involved in the
project) are mostly organized into groups (seed clubs or BUCAP clubs) at the community
level.
In the Mekong Delta region of the South, 325 seed clubs, whose members number
8,000, have been organized through the project. Meanwhile in North and Central Vietnam,
100 BUCAP clubs have been established. Tis is a signifcant development considering
that at the start of the project, the only farmer group in the community was the Farmers
Union. Apart from continuing with the work on seeds, most of these farmer groups have
started to take on broader issues of farmers rights, such as the right to irrigation and
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social services and the need to be heard in policy discussions and dialogue (Mekong Delta
Research and Development Institute and SEARICE, unpublished), as exemplifed by the
advocacy work of the seed club in Long Anh province.
In Quang Nam province, 16 of the 18 BUCAP communes are managed by BUCAP
Clubs with support from local authorities. As mentioned earlier, direct project support
for farmer experimentation (in the feld) ends afer three seasons. Farmers and local
governments continue with the work in their own capacity, sustaining their initiatives
as part of local government programs and as a continuing community activity. Such
willingness to sustain the gains from the project could only be explained by the fact that
the farmers and local of cials recognize the benefts of conservation and plant breeding in
relation to improving rice production in the community.
Te same story is true for Hue where 12 out of the 19 communes where the project is
being implemented are sustaining the work on their own, despite limited project support,
e.g., occasional farmer exchanges and attendance in some trainings. PPSD trainers
concede that the continual interaction among farmers in the same community for at least
three seasons facilitated the formation of farmer groups.
Development of new rice varieties by farmers from selection and plant
breeding
In 2001-2006, the PPSD in Hoa Binh reported the development of 17 farmer varieties
in Hoa Binh province, with one farmer variety--MD25 (developed by farmers from
Muong indigenous group)--covering at some point 10,000 hectares of land. But despite
this massive coverage and use, MD25 is not considered a variety because it has not gone
through the national varietal testing process. Nevertheless, the local government was
forced to issue a local seed certifcation for the seeds of MD25, to legalize the spread
and promotion of the variety. Tis experience with MD25 initiated discussions for the
inclusion of a value for use criterion in bestowing automatic recognition for a variety
that covers a certain hectarage.
In 2008 alone, farmers involved in the project released in their respective communities
some 130 rice varieties which they themselves had developed. In addition, farmers in South
Vietnam identifed 7 farmer varieties that are adapted to saline soil; 8 varieties adapted to
acidic soil; and 3 varieties adapted to acid-sulphate soil. Teir identifcation was based on
years of actual feld observations of performance and adaptability. Farmers also reported
that, farmers are now using an average of 9-17 varieties per community compared to 3-5
varieties previously. Te local genepool has been improved with the introduction and re-
introduction of varieties which farmers can use.
Currently, government agencies are facilitating the seed certifcation process for 16
farmer varieties in North and Central Vietnam and 14 farmer varieties in the Mekong
Delta. Tis comes as a response to the clamor among farmers to be allowed to trade their
seeds across provinces. Legally, only certifed seeds can be sold across provinces. Some
farmers from the seed clubs noted that they have suf cient surplus seeds to trade across
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provinces, but cannot do so for fear of violating existing laws. Tey are therefore asking the
government to revise the policy in their favor. Instead of revising the policy, seed centers
and the DARD are waiving fees and assisting in gathering the technical requirements
for seed certifcation. Naturally, seeds of farmer developed varieties cannot be certifed
unless the material is registered as a variety. Tus, farmer developed varieties are subject
to several trials to ascertain that they are distinct, uniform and stable. Tree out of 14
varieties from the Mekong Delta are already registered (i.e. HD1, NV1 and HD4). HD1
has been granted provisional national certifcation afer passing national tests. Tis af rms
the great potential of farmers to develop varieties that are equally good if not better than
formal-released varieties. HD1 has in fact surpassed the performance of formal varieties
when it survived the serious attack of yellow dwarf disease and brown plant hopper in
2008 which almost wiped out all the other rice varieties in Mekong Delta. Tis incident
also highlighted the need to seriously look at existing seed laws insofar as these afect
the development of farmer varieties. Only one (HD1) out of 130 new varieties developed
by farmers has been provisionally registered as a variety. Furthermore, despite lacking
the needed registration, the remaining 129 varieties are already being used by farmers
in Vietnam. In the Mekong Delta, more than 100,000 hectares are planted with farmer
varieties and around 21% of the total number of varieties grown in the region (Mekong
Delta) in 2008 is farmer varieties.
Seed production
In the Mekong Delta, Seed Clubs produced and sold more than 83,000 tons of good
quality seeds in 2008, satisfying 16% of the total seed requirement in the region. Tis is
a major contribution considering that in the same year the formal seed sector produced
and distributed about 19,000 tons of seeds, satisfying only 3.5% of the seed requirement
in Mekong Delta.
In North and Central Vietnam, a total of 452,326 kilograms of seeds were produced
and distributed by farmer-partners to other farmers in 2008. Tis willingness and capacity
of farmers to produce and share good quality seeds have resulted in better access by all
farmers in the community to seeds that are adapted to their local conditions. More than
82,000 farmers in North and Central Vietnam were able to access the seeds produced by
farmers involved in the project.
Empowering farmers
But more than the material benefts, farmers claim that their enhanced knowledge and skills
have helped to boost their confdence. Tey enjoy the respect and admiration accorded to
them by fellow farmers in the community and the recognition by government authorities
and professional plant breeders. Even the initial results of community self-assessment
would show the overwhelming appreciation of the farmers for the seed security that their
communities are now enjoying as a result of the project. Farmers testify that now we
can produce the seeds that we need according to our own preferences and we are also
161
assured of quality. Other farmers also expressed their relief and gladness for not having
to depend on external sources for their seeds. Some have even started to speak up against
the introduction of hybrid rice seeds from China, pointing out that the money would be
better spent on supporting farmers to develop seeds (and varieties) on their own.
Tis clearly shows the great potential of farmers to secure the local seed system with
locally adapted varieties that respond to farmers specifc requirements. Te absence or the
very limited role played by farmers in the formal breeding process has been a major factor
contributing to the inef ciency of the formal plant breeding system. Te formal process
takes a long time and requires a lot of resources, yet is able to produce only a few varieties
that qualify for national release. Sometimes, even the few varieties that get approval are
not adopted by farmers since they do not meet the farmers requirements.
Other initiatives by farmers
Apart from securing their local seed supply, farmers in North Vietnam have developed
their own system of rice intensifcation (SRI), which reduced their seed requirement by
50-70%; pesticide use, by 80%; use of urea, by 20-30%; and use of irrigation water, by 30-
50%. Around 8,000 hectares of rice are now under SRI. Recognizing the potential of SRI,
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Vietnam has issued a Decision
promoting its use in the northern provinces of the country. Tis is seen by SEARICE as a
positive development towards a more sustainable and organic rice farming system in the
country.
In addition, farmers in the Mekong Delta have started to practice diversifcation in their
rice areas to augment their food sources and income. Most have likewise started to explore
low input agriculture as an initial step towards a more sustainable rice farming system.
Strengthening local groups to support farmers
On top of developing farmers groups, the project has also contributed to the strengthening
of the capacities of local institutions to support community management of their seeds.
As farmers gain confdence in managing their plant genetic resources, extension agents,
teachers, plant breeders and researchers, who are supporting the work of farmers, begin to
recognize the tremendous potential of farmers in managing their own seed (agricultural)
resources and are starting to look more closely at how best to support farmers instead of
trying to do the work for them.
Tere is already an established network of institutions that are linked together and
provide support to the Seed Clubs (in Mekong Delta) and BUCAP Clubs (in North
and Central Vietnam) on a continuing basis. It is interesting that the Vietnamese look
at farmers groups as local institutions. Tese farmers groups are supported by skilled
technicians and local government leaders. Currently, there are 150 PPSD personnel,
576 commune/cooperative leaders and 58 extension agents from the Extension Centers
and Seed Centers who are trained to support community-based seed management and
facilitate the formation of farmers groups.
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Policy and practice outcomes
Te positive results on the ground have encouraged local authorities to support the project
fnancially and technically, and thereby, to develop a sense of ownership of the project. In
fact, the local support is greater than what the project (CBDC-BUCAP) has managed to
provide. In Mekong Delta alone, local support in 2008 was valued at US$ 247,879. Tis
is funding support for various activities, such as farmer feld schools, farmers feld days,
on-farm trials, follow-up training, study tours, seeds, and agricultural equipment. In An
Giang province, for example, the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
has been allocating resources for the project since 2006 in order to train more than
80 communes in the province. Local authorities in other provinces have made similar
investments in the project. In North and Central Vietnam, out of 200 communities
involved in the project, only 90 communities were funded by the project in 2008. Te
rest were supported mostly by the local government authorities with additional funds
from other organizations.
When local government of cials were asked why they supported the project, most
of them responded that they see the project as a safety net for farmers who will be lef
vulnerable once agriculture (in particular the rice sector) is liberalized, with the accession
of Vietnam to the World Trade Organization. Tey explained that before the country
opens up its seed market (for rice, as in this case) to private enterprise, Vietnamese farmers
would already have made some headway in producing their own seeds. In the end, with
strong skills, capacity and support (for seed production/processing equipment from local
government), farmers can compete with private enterprises, even doing away with the
need to buy seeds by producing seeds in their own farms. Tis in turn contributes to
immediately securing food production with readily accessible seeds that are adapted to
the farmers own management system and environment.
At the same time, a number of of cials are concerned with maintaining the quality
of rice for export. Tey fear that growing a diverse range of seeds could undermine
the consistency of grain quality. Tis is currently a subject of debate and observation.
However, some local government units (e.g., An Giang in 2007) have enjoined state
enterprises to support FFS to promote the development and use of good quality seeds
produced by farmers. Te state enterprises think that by encouraging farmers to develop
good varieties and good seeds, the grain harvest will improve both in quality and quantity,
thus beneftting the enterprise, in particular, and Vietnam, in general. In Hue, the
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development has provided incentives (subsidized
cost of seeds) to encourage farmers to use farmer developed varieties, for 2 seasons. Other
local government units and cooperatives have included farmer developed varieties in the
coverage of crop insurance; this despite the fact that only 1 farmer developed variety, so
far, has been recognized as a variety through national varietal registration. At the local
(provincial) level, because of the overwhelming production of new varieties and seeds by
farmers in several communities, and possibly because of stronger pressure (more in direct
163
contact) from farmers, local governments have started reviewing local seed certifcation
and varietal registration laws. Some farmer varieties have been given provincial seed
certifcation and de facto recognition as varieties.
At the national level, the government has given several awards to recognize the
work of farmers. In 2008, 16 Green Address Awards (given by the Department of Crop
Production to individuals who have contributed to the protection of the environment and
promotion of clean and green agriculture) and 16 Certifcates of Merit on plant genetic
resources (award given by the National Extension Center to farmers who have signifcantly
contributed to seed conservation and development) were given to farmers. Tese awards
represent social recognition of the capacity of farmers to improve their conditions and
contribute positively to local development.
In 2007 SEARICE facilitated a national process to look at Farmers Rights and the plant
variety protection (PVP) law of Vietnam. Farmers shared their experiences and argued for
better recognition and support. Te authors of the PVP law acknowledged that at the time
of the laws drafing, they were not aware that farmers could actually develop their own
varieties. One of the results of the series of dialogues was the development of an Ordinance
to support the work of farmers and to determine if the PVP law is fexible enough to allow
the inclusion of farmers varieties and to support the work of farmers. Tus, in February
2008, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) issued a regulation
for on-farm variety production. Tis had both positive and negative efects. On the one
hand, all agencies were required to support the work of farmers. On the other hand, the
ordinance gave rise to contentious discussions. Te MARD decision was achieved with
no written policy brief. Te process was facilitated by the involvement of national and
local government agencies as well as by the actual feld visits, and debates/discussions that
policy makers engaged in with farmers.
At the international level, the work of farmers in Vietnam was presented by farmer
representatives during side events at international negotiations (the Convention on
Biological Diversity and the International Seed Treaty). Tis elicited mixed reactions from
diferent organizations but ultimately helped to advance the debate on the role of farmers
in seed management.
Development aid
Te total cost of the project in North and Central Vietnam is valued at US$740,861, spread
over 9 years, i.e., from 2000 to 2008. With this amount, the project has , trained a total
of 225 communities with more than 8,000 farmers directly participating, and indirectly
beneftting 30,o00 other farmers; developed the capacity of about 150 PPSD personnel,
and 100 farmer trainers, who are now capable of facilitating community processes
to support farmers to manage their seeds. Tis core group of trainers has not yet been
mobilized to their full capacity, as each trainer has a potential to handle at least 3 sites and
train more trainers within their ranks. Easily, for each season, the number of communities
can reach 450. For this amount of development aid, farmers have produced more than
164
100 new rice varieties; increased diversity on-farm by rehabilitating their old seeds and
re-introducing their old/heirloom seeds; secured their local seed supply; reduced the cost
of inputs through SRI; engaged local and national policy makers to review seed laws; and
shared their experiences at the international level, hopefully to infuence international
policy deliberations. On top of this, local government of cials have attributed to the project
an increase in production and as a result, a signifcant reduction in poverty. In particular,
the local government in Ha Bi commune of Hoa Binh province reported a 0.5 to 1.0ton/
hectare increase in production due to the project, which led to a reduction in poverty
incidence in the commune by 0.1%. If this is an accurate fgure, imagine the potential
impact in poverty reduction in over 225 communities where the project is implemented.
On a dollar per dollar basis, this is development aid well spent.
Te Mekong Delta Research and Development Institute calculated that in 2008, farmers
involved in the project produced 83,659 tons, valued at US$6.7M. Tis was achieved by
spending just US$91,354 in 2008 and local counterpart of US$247,879. If this is a business,
the return on investment is impressive. And this comes on top of contributing to the
development of vibrant farmers groups capable of engaging local and national policy
makers, while securing their local production and food system.
Conclusions
Tere are many factors that have contributed to the success of the project, but the key
factors were:
1. Finding the political spaces at the provincial level and exploring these spaces for
positive action.
While Vietnam has a centralized economic planning setup, decisions on rice production
(and agriculture in general) have been devolved to the local level. Farmers Field Days and
Farmers Technical Conferences, where provincial (and local) policy makers were invited
to see the results of farmers work in their felds, were a good platform for lobbying and
advocacy by farmers themselves. It was through these processes that farmers were able to
get the commitment of local of cials, who in turn lobbied within their agencies to support
farmers work. Local governments defned diferently how to proceed with liberalization,
with most opting to equip farmers with skills to be self-suf cient, and to wean themselves
from their dependence on corporations for seeds and ultimately food production. Tis is
a clear prioritization for food security over market reforms.
2. Involving diferent stakeholders in institutional arrangements for project
implementation developed strong local ownership.
Some of the key institutions and individuals were involved as early as project inception.
In fact, there were feld visits and farmer interviews undertaken to defne the problems
and develop ways of addressing these problems. In the process, collective ownership was
developed which, in turn, proved to be key in sustaining the work. Te diferent actors
involved developed a stake in the project and thus wanted to see it through completion.
165
Tus, some of the work of farmers became part of the school curriculum or was adapted
as projects of local governments and other non-government organizations or continued
by cooperatives and the farmer groups themselves through marketing and joint activities.
Tere were diferent ways developed by diferent institutional partners and actors to
sustain the results on the ground. Te project took on a life of its own, when farmers
and communities defned, on their own, how the project should evolve within their local
context.
3. Direct engagement of key institutions in actual feld work led to the development
of strong supporters within the government to push for policy changes and project
support.
Tis did not happen overnight; rather it was the result of a series of dialogues complemented
by compelling feld results.
4. Building on local knowledge.
Te project takes pride over being a fully Vietnamese initiative. Project management
was done by the Vietnamese; there were no expatriates attached to the project to oversee
implementation and provide technical backstopping. SEARICE (mostly Filipinos)
provided initial backstopping, mentoring and networking support--but without
establishing an of ce in the country--and by linking Vietnamese groups with one another,
and Vietnamese groups with other groups in Southeast Asia. Te Farmer Field School
process likewise was built around the local knowledge and observation skills of farmers
themselves. FFS enabled farmers to observe on their own the growth and performance of
varieties in diferent conditions and fnd ways to improve the varieties they prefer either
by adjusting management practices or through selection for good genes.
5. Policy changes grounded on actual feld results.
Te project demonstrated the importance of having concrete/solid results from the feld
(through discovery based learning) which built the confdence of farmers, who in turn
broached to policy makers the possibility of receiving support and of reforming local (and
later national) programs and policies. Policy advocacy in Vietnam (by farmers at that) was
unheard of, 10 years ago. But the voices of farmers were heard and government of cials
were not antagonized because the farmers provided solid feld results, grounded on their
experiences as compelling argument to call for policy reviews.
Te impacts of the project became more visible over time. Development takes time.
Tere is therefore a need to re-think the delivery of development aid, particularly for
agriculture, which currently tends to focus on short-term (though substantial) funding.
Te experiences of SEARICE have shown that even with limited funding, dramatic impacts
can be achieved, if development support is sustained over a long period of time.
166
Methodology used for this case study
SEARICE is a regional non-government organization based in the Philippines which
looks at the link between science and policy as it engages diferent actors in practical/feld
work in farmers felds and in policy advocacy, alongside lobbying and campaigning at
local, national, regional and international levels. Te organization traces its roots to the
late 1970s, at the height of the anti-dictatorship movement in Southeast Asia. It served as
a platform for activists to share and advance their diferent causes for human rights, civil
liberties and social justice. In 1989, in response to changes in the political and economic
landscape in Southeast Asia, SEARICE focused its work on seeds/plant genetic resources
for food and agriculture (PGRFA) and Farmers Rights (FRs) as part of its continued work
for human rights, and social and environmental justice. Tis case study provides a glimpse
of SEARICEs work in Vietnam in partnership with diferent actors.
While this case is written by SEARICE, it is backed by data generated from community
self-assessment processes and national workshops participated in by diferent stakeholders
in Vietnam (CBDC-BUCAP 2008). Te main text of the case study was presented during
an international meeting of diferent organizations working on seeds, in Hanoi, last March
2008 (SEARICE 2008). Other supporting documentation can be gleaned from local
government reports in Vietnam and can be verifed by actual feld visits and interviews
with farmers, including the institutional partners SEARICE worked with, such as the Plant
Protection Department, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Vietnam
including the 13 Plant Protection Subdepartments of Hanoi, Hoa Binh, Bac Kan, Nge
Anh, Quang Nam, Hue, Dien Bien, Lao Cai, Yen Bai, Ha Tay, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh and
Phu Yen; the Mekong Delta Development Research Institute, Cantho University, Vietnam
and their network of seed centers, agriculture extension agencies and universities.
Tis case study presents the results and impacts of a 10-year project (called BUCAP-
Biodiversity Use and Conservation in Asia Programme) aimed at strengthening farmers
capacity to manage their agricultural biodiversity in Vietnam at a time when the country
is moving to liberalize agriculture and intensify rice production for export
167
Abbreviations /Acronyms
BUCAP Biodiversity Use and Conservation in Asia Program
CBDC-BUCAP Community Biodiversity Development and Conservation
Biodiversity Use and Conservation in Asia Program
DARD Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
DPC Department of Crop Production
FAO-IPM UN Food and Agriculture Of ce- Integrated Pest Management
FTC Farmers Technical Conference
FFS Farmers feld school
FRs Farmers Rights
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IPM Integrated Pest Management
MARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MDI Mekong Delta Research and Development Institute
NGOs Non-governmental Organizations
PGRFA Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture
PPD Plant Protection Department
PPSD Plant Protection Sub-department
PVP Pant variety protection
SEARICE Southeast Asia Regional Initiatives for Community Empowerment
SRI System of rice intensifcation
References
CBDC-BUCAP 2008 Annual Report. 2008. SEARICE internal document
Mekong Delta Research and Development Institute and SEARICE. Unpublished.
SEARICE internal document
Owen, N.G., Chandler, D., Rof W.R., Steinberg D.J., Taylor J.G., Taylor R.H., Woodside
A. and Wyatt D.K. 2005. Te Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia, A New History.
Singapore University Press, Singapore.
Reyes-Cantos, J. 2005. State Intervention in the rice sector in selected countries,
implications for the Philippines. SEARICE and Rice Watch Action Network.
Russel, S. undated. Political and Cultural Geography of Southeast Asia, http://www.
seasite.niu.edu/crossroads/russell/seageog.htm
SEARICE. 2008. Revisiting the streams of Participatory Plant Breeding. www.searice.org.ph
World Bank. 2005. Accelerating Rural Development in Vietnam. Rural
Development and Natural Resources Sector Unit (EASRD) East Asia and the
Pacifc Region. Te World Bank Group in Vietnam. http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTEAPREGTOPRURDEV/Resources/573691-1141228934263/2280904-
1141235339090/Vietnam-RD-Strategy-07.pdf. Accessed 2 September 2009.
World Bank. 2007a. Rural Development and Agriculture in
Vietnam. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPREGTOPRURDEV/
168
Case study 14: CHILE
A case study on the salmon
Mario Ahumada
1
and Ral Donoso
2
Introduction
Te rural development model implemented in Latin America, based mainly on politics of
agricultural products exportation, has originated huge economic, social and environmental
transformations in the felds of agriculture and fsheries in the region, through the
intensifcation of the productive activities which had as a result, during last decades, the
massive increasing of productivity and production, and the concentration of wealth and
goods in the rural areas and in the Communities.
In most of the countries and more particularly in Chile, this model has secured the
implementation of support policies to agriculture, rural development and food. Te sectors
which have obtained more benefts are the ones of the big national and transnational
capital. On the other side, a majority of the rural population is a victim of poverty, hunger,
migration, degradation of natural resources, lack of productive resources, disappearance
of the rural culture and life, increasing and extended loss of food sovereignty.
Beyond their positive results for production and economy, the politics of promotion
and support of the salmon industry in Chile illustrate that an irregular development
had negative effects, causing disasters, more particularly concerning environment
and social justice protection. The objective of the present study is therefore to trace
the birth of this productive activity, its exponential increase and its breakdown, with
the successive economical, environmental and social collapse in the region and in the
country. It witnesses also the fact that the supports to agriculture, to rural development
and to food have contrasting effects with elimination of hunger and poverty in our
Communities.
Context of the country and the region
Chile is a country with a population of about 15 million inhabitants (CENSO 2002, INE)
and a territory of more than 4.300 Km of coast; it has a special position in the geographical
map, in the southern American continent.
Te country is divided in 15 regions, each of them with economies founded on the
respective activities of the area. Te main economical activities are mining, agriculture
and forestry; the sector of fsheries was, in the past, an important activity, but due to the
drop of indexes, it has been cut down, except for the salmon which had an increased
1 Veterinarian, Degree in Rural Development, Professor at the School of the Agricultural Sciences, University of the Sea, Regional
Coordinator of the Comity for the Sovereignty of Latin America and Caribbean.
2 Graduate in Agricultural Sciences, Professor at the School of the Agricultural Sciences, University of the Sea. Degree in formulation
and evaluation of projects PUC, M Sc (c) National University of Costa Rica.
169
development reaching 5.1% in the exportation of Chile as a whole.
Salmon industry in Chile is concentrated between the Region of Los Lagos (Region
X) and the Region of Magellan and Chilean Antarctic (Region 12), even if the larger
concentration of this activity is registered in the Region X, in the Island of Chilo.
Te Region X is composed of 4 provinces: Osorno, Llanquihue, Chilo and Palena.
In the following table, some information has been summarized by the Province and the
Community concerning the population

Province Capital Number of Communities Inhabitants
Osorno Osorno 7 221,509
Llanquihue Puerto Montt 9 321,493
Chilo Castro 10 154,766
Palena Chaitn 4 18,971
Source: www.educarchile.cl
Te Community of Castro counts 39,366 inhabitants and concentrates 25% of the
inhabitants of the Province with 39% of rurality. Te medium rate of the country is 14.2%
(Rurality in Chile: Present and Future, Jos Villarroel de la Sotta, Department of Statistics
and Health information, MINSAL 2007)
It is important to point out that Chile and the Region X are likely to reach the
Millenium objectives. Tey both succeeded in reducing considerably the poverty and
misery indexes.
Moreover, the indexes of Human Development in Chile is 0.775 and the one of the
Region X is 0.725; the last one is included at the 10th place in the classifcation upon 13
Regions at the date of this index calculation (PNUD, 1998)
Te Chilean GIP per inhabitant reached US$10,300, which indicated that a new stage
towards development was marked; even though there is a dramatic diference between the
incomes throughout the population.
Te Region X is below the national average respect to the medium GIP per capita by
region. For this reason, the receipts from the salmon industry have had a determining
role.
Te Gini coef cient of the country is 0.54, which correspond to the 17th place in the
classifcation of the countries with the less favorable distribution worldwide. Tis value
has been maintained respect to the previous years (0.55 in 1987).
Concerning the Gini coef cient by region, Region X is in a medium position with a
value of 0.54, similarly to the unequal distribution of the Country. (Encuesta CASEN,
MIDEPLAN).
170
History of the salmon industry in Chile
Te salmon history in Chile began in 1905, when 400,000 fsh eggs were brought from
Hamburg, Germany, to Rio Blanco, Chile. From that moment, a series of fsh eggs
importations began and the frst sowings were realized in the Center and the South of the
country.
Te fsh eggs exportations in Peru, Argentine, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Falkland
Islands took place between 1937 and 1955. Te salmon culture was spreading more and
more, with the creation of new farms. In 1971 the fsh farming enterprises of Pullinque
was ultimate; it was the frst establishment with high capacity of that period.
Te frst private initiatives which transformed the Chilean trout farms began in 1974
with the beginning of the de la culture de rainbow trout, with commercial scopes for
the national consumption and for exportation. Ten, in 1976, were built the frst baskets
for fngerlings and 500 million of Coho salmon eggs (or silver salmon) arrived in our
country.
Te year afer, took place an open circuit culture and more than 200 million Coho
salmon eggs fngerlings were liberated in the Popetn Lake and 170 million Chinook
salmon fngerlings in Curaco de Vlez (Region X).
In 1978, Te Under Secretary of Fisheries and the National Service of Fisheries (under
the name Sernapesca) were created. From that moment, between 1978 and 1980, some
private initiatives begun to take place and a certain number of enterprises were created
focused on trout farms.
Te production of salmons increased and reached 80 tons in 1981 and 100 tons in
1985 with 36 operational centres for culture. 1986 is the year for the fnal take-of, when
it becomes clear that the projects proftability presented outstanding results and there was
born the Asociacin de Productores de Salmn y Trucha de Chile, A.G. (Association
of the Salmon and Trouts Producers of Chile). In 1990, exportations reached already an
amount of 265 million dollars. Ten, in 1995, the Institute of Salmon, Intesal, was created,
with the scope to provide support to the producers, increasing their ef ciency through the
amelioration of the productive technology and research in fsh production. From 2000
on, the industry counted on more than 870 million dollars of exportations with a selling
prevision of 3,000 million dollars in 2010.
More than three quarters of the salmon production comes from the Region of Los
Lagos, even if the production area of Chile is situated between the Lake Llanquihue and
the area of Punta Arenas.
From the commercial point of view, the industry produces fve species: silver salmon,
king and massou, rainbow trout and Atlantic salmon. Te silver salmon (or Coho) is
produced mainly in summer, while the Atlantic salmon is produced all the year long.
171
Figure 1. Localisation of the Salmonids production in 2006, Region of los Lagos
Source: Environmental Report of the Aquaculture 2005-2006. State Secretariat for
Fisheries.
The importance of the salmon industry
During the last decade, industry expanded at a medium annual rate of 22%, salmon was at
the third place as an exportation product of Chile, reaching 65% of the fsheries exportation
as a whole. In this way, Chile became the second exportator of salmon in the world.
Figure 2:
World
producers
of truit and
salmon year
2007.
Source:
Salmn Chile
(Saumon Chili)
172
Salmon industry exportations, from 135,000 tons and a value of 538 millions dollars in
1996, reached 397,000 tons and a value of 2,241 million dollars in 2007. Almost 70% of the
exportations correspond to products with an aggregate value. (Salmn Chile)
In the same way and due to the fact that the consumers needs changed constantly, the
development of products with aggregate value has been stimulated. Tis situation drove
to the implementation of three key areas: Research, Innovation and Development of the
salmon Cluster.
Te salmon cluster is one of the biggest at the national level, taken into acount
considering that more than 80% of the activity is concentrated in only one region. Te
development of the human resources capital inside the Cluster is a very important element.
Tere are more than 1,200 providers working in the salmon industry (INE) and 500 key
enterprises based on the salmon culture (100 providers of manpower and 400 services
enterprises). In 2008, Te Society for Production Development (CORFO - Corporacin
de Fomento de la Produccin) has engaged 25 million dollars for the fsh farming sector,
50% of which has been destinated to the salmon Cluster.
Economies by region are characterized by the output in each sector. In the case of the
Region X they clearly distinguish themselves thanks to salmon. In the following chart,
are indicated the numbers composing the GIP divided by region. As you can see, in the
Region X, the fsheries sector is the one which contributes more.
Table 1. Distribution of the GIP Sector 1991-1993 (Pourcentage). Source: Rifo (2007) on the
basis of Mideplan and Banco Central de Chile
173
According to INE and the Servicio Nacional de Aduanas (National Service of Customs),
in 2007, in the Region X, the food exportations reached 92% of the total amount, 62% of
which concerned the salmon exportation.
Respect to the increase of foreign currency supply in the country, in 2007, according to
ODEPA (Chile Potencia Alimentaria), 3,560 million dollars of sea products were exported,
2,135 million dollars of which corresponded to exportations of salmons. In 2008, Chile
exported a record amount of 45,000 tons of salmon and trout reaching a turnover of
almost 2,400 million dollars.
In this region, and more particularly in the Island of Chilo, was concentrated 50% of
the national production and 20% of the world production of salmon. Tanks to its rapid
growth, this industry exports annually around 500 millions of tons for a value of around
1,500 million dollars. Te salmon became, in this way one, of the principal exportation
products of Chile.
Te activity linked to salmon has stimulated the development of the economy, mostly
in the Region X which was still a marginalized area a few years ago. Presently, the area is
a development hub. Actually the data released by the Survey CASEN/Mideplan highlight
the fact that between 1990 and 2006 in the Region of Los Lagos poverty has decrease
from 40.1% to 11.8%; also the population with lost incomes reduced from 13.4% to 2.8%,
both of the data being below the national average. Consequently, the importance of the
activities linked to salmons represents a big part of these successes. Employment shows a
medium growth rate for that period of 2.5% which represents a creation of employment
equal to 67 million of working positions. Actually as far as the trout farming is concerned,
it employs 24 million of workers.
Only in the Island of Chilo, it employs around 53,000 workers (directly and indirectly),
with 70% of them women. (Observatorio Laboral y Ambiental de Chilo Observatory for
Employment and environment of Chilo - Published on August 19 2006).
Te salmon crisis
Te salmon industry is the productive activity with the major economic growth in Chile.
It has been facilitated by an easy legislation in the feld of Environment (there is no
obligation to present an Environmental Impact Study, it is suf cient to present a declaration
under oath attesting good intentions). With a good work capacity and good report quality/
price of water, (100 dollars for 1 compound), the salmon industry has registered an almost
1000% development during the last 15 years, with, as a consequence, enormous social,
environmental and economical impacts on the country, and, more particularly, on the
regions where it takes place. However, due to its huge intensifcation and to an insuf cient
taking over by the State of sanitary and environmental conditions, the salmon industry,
from 2007 on, has began to sufer, at a large scale, from the social and environmental
efects which threaten its sustainability.
174
Environmental impacts
Te enormous productive growth of the trout farms in Chile, in a short period of around
two decades, is mainly to the excessively intensive system of production which has been
implemented in Chile.
In this country are produced up to 40 kilos of salmon for each cubic meter of water,
even if the Servicio Nacional de Pesca/National Service for Fisheries (Sernapesca)
recommends only 15 kilos. In Norway, the main producer for salmons in captivity of the
world, a maximum of 5 kilos for cubic meter is allowed.
Tis high density of fsh per cubic meter means a high quantity of excrements and
waste feeding products, having as a result the oxygen liquefaction, the death of the other
forms of marine life and the disease dissemination. Moreover, the artifcial and intensive
productions use considerable quantities of chemical products: in Chile, there are used 75-
times more antibiotics by kilo of salmon than in Norway. Tis data provides an indication
on the sanitary approach of this industrial activity.
One of the frst sanitary efects appeared in 2006, when the frst signs of the salmon
plague (Caligus) came out. Te Caligus Rogercresseyi is a sea lice, a parasite crab with a size
of half a rice grain, almost transparent, which was well known but described only recently
(since 1977). It was transmitted from Chilean sea perch to the salmon of the trout farms.
Normally in nature, it is balanced with other parasites, but afer the indiscriminate control
with the emamectin benzoate and other pesticides, a strong resistance was created which
caused a sanitary disaster without any solution.
Te sea lice stitches the salmons, causing injuries under the skin, which prevent them
to grow and fatten and fnally hurt them so much that their bleeding wounds facilitate
infections with several types of bacteria until they die.
Te epidemic caused a signifcant increase between 10% and 30% - of mortality for
microbial disease and a reduction of the size and the weight of the salmon production,
when the average percentage normally rises to 3%. Te sea lice plague was expanding in
all the waters from Puerto Montt in the South, until the fords of Hornopirn, Riihu and
Pilln, areas were are concentrated 84% of the whole national salmon industry, destroying
thousands of fsh in their baskets. Te epidemic was increasing more and more as the
parasite extends its life cycle in the high temperature of the water, which has reached,
during the last period even 21 degrees. Te only emergency solution that has been found,
except the augmentation of the antibiotics doses, in order that the sea lice injuries do not
get infected, has been to take them of the infected culture centres and place them in
the southern area, in colder and clearer waters, resulting in important losses from the
production point of view.
In parallel, in July 2007, the salmon industry in Chile was afected by the virus which
causes the Infectious Salmon Anemia (Anemia Infecciosa del Salmn ISA). Tat
virus distinguishes itself by an infection which causes the death of the fsh for internal
hemorrhages, and there is no vaccination of therapy available against it. Te mortality of
175
the fsh increased with a percentage of about 12% respect to the normal aquatic activity.
Te way in which the disease had been introduced in Chile is not clear, even if it is probable
that it is due to an error in the procedures adopted by the Norwegian enterprise Marine
Harvest operating in the country.
Previously, Scotland, EU and Norway have been afected by that virus and there
had been signifcant losses in the production. Tey succeeded to control it imposing
environmental regulations much more restrictive than in Chile.
When Norway, the biggest world salmon producer, had been afected by the epidemic,
ISA, they increased the number of the trout farms, reducing the stress of the fshes and
applying strong regulations against the indiscriminate use of antibiotics. An intensive
research on vaccinations was also carried out. In Chile, actually the epidemic is not under
control, due to the excessive concentration of fshes in fragile ecosystems, exceeding 8 times
the threshold allowed in Norway and more or less 3 times the threshold recommended by
the Chilean Authorities. Furthermore, the fsh become resistant to the antibiotics because
of the indiscriminate use of antibiotics which have weak regulation and controls as well as
a growing black market.
In 2007, when the virus was discovered in Chile, the enterprise Marine Harvest closed
14 about its 60 centers in order to transfer to the South, in Aysn, in less contaminated
waters. Nevertheless, the virus extended also in that area with diferent access focal spots.
Te impact had consequences on a large scale because of the speed of the propagation
and the seriousness of the illnesses that afected caused the salmons immunologic system.
Te Sernapesca end-result shows that from the discovery of the disease since July 2007
until July 2008, 74 trout farms with an in sea production, have presented positive results
to the virus, 44 of which have been classifed as centres with access focal spots.
Around 89% are situated in the Region of Los Lagos and remaining 11% in the Region
of Aysn. 71% of the production is concentrated on the 12 main enterprises. Te February
2009 records indicate a total of 13 compromised enterprises with access focal spots. Tis
has caused huge economic losses during the last months.
Beyond the control measures that have been implemented against the ISA virus, for
instance the early capture to avoid the contamination, the Salmon Chile Corporation
foresees that the production will decrease until 30% in 2009 with heavy economical losses
for the industry.
Te same information had been previously ratifed by the FAO and provided through
the report of the Globefsh market. Te ofer may decrease from 375 million tons in
2008 to 250 million tons in 2009, which means a reduction of 33.33%. Te value of the
exportations in 2007 reached 2,135 million dollars (www.sernapesca.cl); it represents 60%
of the sea products exportations. In economical terms the reduction of the production
considered by FAO means a loss even bigger than 700 million dollars, revalued on the
basis of the past season prices.
Another element that threatens the salmon production in Chile is a type of red tide
caused by harmful seaweeds (FAN), also known under the name of bloom de algas,
176
characterized by a high grade of concentration. Tis problem has been in existence in Chile
for 15 years, beginning from Chilo in the South, in the fords area. It is the result of the
economical changes as the high temperatures and light levels, the high quantity of nutrient
substances derived from industrial organic wastes, causing a massive growth of the toxic
micro seaweeds. Tese microorganisms can cause the death of the fshes from asphyxia.
Te high concentration of fsh in the baskets causes a big production of organic matter
which is deposited on the sea bed and makes it up to the desert. Under the salmon baskets,
no life is possible, because of the eutrophication due to the abnormal and excessive
augmentation of the nutrient substance. Some of the consequences are the unicellular sea
weeds proliferation which inhibits the light passage, the total absence of photosynthesis
and the consequent diminution of the oxygen levels. Te direct causes are the excess of
organic matter coming from the fsh fours falling directly on the sea bed without being
consumed, and the excrements of the thousands of salmons concentrated in the culture
rafs. Tey have a heavy impact on the environment involving above all the organic
contamination of the waters and of the coasts.
Another source of danger is the salmons themselves which escape from the baskets
which can become millions in only one year. Te salmon is an exotic species that does not
exist in the Chilean waters. It is essentially a carnivore fsh which can represent a high risk
for the autochthonous maritime ecosystem if it lives in a wild state, because it can have a
negative impact on the fsh populations living in these waters. Such fsh are the basis of the
food and economies of these small scale fshermen communities. Salmons, even the ones
living in the wild state, belong to the companies and not allowed to be caught.
Impact on employment and economy
Te crisis highly burdens production and receipts; the growth annual rate of 20% has
dropped; it is actually even negative and will be restored only in 2010 or 2011. In 2009,
when the production will have a reduction between 30% and 50%, the crisis will be even
worse. A diminution of the benefts of at least 10% is foreseen and, by the end of the year,
the sales may reach only 1,900 million dollars.
During the frst 4 months of 2008, the shares quoted at the stock exchange of the
two establishments producing salmon in Santiago, Multiexport (Multifood at the stock
exchange) and Invertec (Ivermar at the stock exchange) registered a drop of more than
40%. Te price for 1 pound of Chilean salmon which was quoted at 4 dollars in 2006 was
quoted only 1 dollar in 2007 and 2008.
Te social impact, due to productive and economical losses of the salmon industry, has
a damaging input, above all in the Southern region of Chile where it ruins the employment
market. .
In December 2008 in the Region X, layofs afected about 2,000 workers; in February
2009, 6,000 people were fred and the prevision for March was the suppression of 15,000
jobs. Te sector will continue to contribute 19.5% to the totality of employment in the
Region. Te percentage of total loss as far as employment is concerned will be 4.7%.
177
Unemployment indicators in the Region do not refect correctly the damages undergone
by the workers. In a general context of 6,000 jobs, an average of 200,000 dollars/month
and an exchange rate of 600 Chilean dollars for 1 dollar, the evaluation is that in this
sector, the loss of receipts rises presently to 24 million dollars each year and that it will
reach 60 million from March on. Tese resources correspond to receipts inserted directly
in the local economy in terms of goods and service resources acquisition in the Region.
Impact on human health
Cultured salmons have not the same color than the ones we fnd in the shops. Coloring
agents are added in their food, most of them being forbidden in the European Union,
but used in Chile for costs reasons. Tese substances cause problems to the retina of the
human beings.
Anti-fouling is also used, a paint for raf culture which avoids the fxation of marine
organisms. Tis product contains copper and benzene that can have serious consequences
on the workers health and on environment.
In February 2007, United Kingdom Authorities detected an illegal chemical substance,
the violet crystal, inside cultured salmons coming from Chile.
During the same year, Sernapesca confrmed the discovery in Russia of Chilean marine
products afected by staphylococcal.
In September 2007, Taiwan Authorities detected Chilean salmon contaminated by
residues of leuco malachite green, a carcinogen product which was forbidden in our
country since 2002.
Huge doses of antibiotics used by the industry to solve the infection problems caused
by the high concentration of fshes, constitute a permanent threat for human health, as
they are able to enhance resistance on the consumers and develop secondary efects on
health.

Impact on food security
Cultured salmon is submitted to a special diet; its food (made with fsh four and oil) comes
from the following fshes: mackerels, pilchards and anchovies from Peru. To produce one
kilo of salmons for exportation, it is necessary to catch between 4 and 5 kilos of wild
species fshes in order to manufacture the fsh four, which is 50% of the productions fxed
costs. Considering that the annual Chilean salmon production is 600 million tons, the
fshing boats extract between 3 and 6 million tons of marine resources to feed salmons.
With the resources dedicated to that industry, each Chilean could eat around 300 kilos of
fsh each year.
In addition, it has substituted almost completely small scale-fshing of the coastal
communities, as diferent private compounds began to slowly occupy the best fshing
areas. A project is presently studied for the expansion of the salmon industry during the
next ten years to export successfully more than one million tons.
178
On the other hand, most of the enterprises dedicated nowadays to the culture of
salmon in Chile are multinational frms and the production is almost totally exported.
On the national market, only a small part of the production is commercialized and at very
expensive prices, that is to say that only the privileged socioeconomic classes have access
to it. Most of the population does not consume salmon.
Chile is on the list of the 12 countries with the worst welfare distribution; 22% of the
total population does not succeed to respond to its daily needs for food. In brief, in Chile
many people are sufering from hunger. It seems paradoxical if we take into consideration
the fact that the country disposes of 4,000 kilometres of coasts and fshing resources
suf cient to feed all the population.
Social impact
Chile has the worst indicators worldwide concerning work in the salmon industry. A staf
member of a salmon processing work station can be asked to work up to 14 hours a day
earning only 300 dollars per month; the salaries are rather low with respect to the ones
of the other producing countries. Norwegian enterprises operating in Chile pay lower
salaries than the ones performed in Norway for the same jobs.
Te salmon industry dedicates between 4% and 12% of its receipts to the payment of
its employees salary. Even if the productivity and the proft have progressively raised, the
increase of the salaries has not followed the same path. Tat is to say that the contractors
are the only ones who take advantage of the high profts and productivity.
In the salmon industry, too many practices against the trade unions are taking place.
Most of the workers recruitment is done through intermediary or contracting enterprises
and they do not respect the workers rights; the new employees are obliged to sign contracts
which specify that they are not allowed to be a member of a trade union.
Working conditions appear inhuman; in most of the services people work in cold
places, and the sub-contractor does not provide the necessary warm clothes to the workers
who have to stay in temperatures under zero degrees. In the process of salmon flleting,
very sharp instruments are used and the work is ofen done without protection for the
hands; it is the cause of many accidents. Te low State fnancing capacity concerning work
in Chile makes it possible for enterprises not to respect the workers fundamental rights,
such as working in a secure place, having enough time to rest during the break and being
free to join a trade union.
Tis is the sad and amazing story which has been implemented in Latin America from
the 80s until now, a development model founding its philosophy on a quick and impressive
growth of the production and on profts obtained thanks to the massive and unsustainable
exploitation of the natural resources. A model which, afer a while, is collapsing, leaving
serious damages, ofen irretrievable, on the environment and, more particularly, on the
thousands of inhabitants who had greater expectations concerning their economy, their
job, their family and their culture.
Te Region of Los Lagos, the cities and the population as a whole, are undergoing
179
the crisis of that industry which has grown without thinking to ensure its sustainability
and without elaborating the necessary and indispensable conservation measures for the
trusteeship of the natural resources used. Te salmon industry recovery and its possible
future will be able to be contemplated only if a radical change of the production model
will be operated.
All this proves that the aid to agriculture, fsheries and rural development in Chili is
not oriented to eradicate hunger and poverty of the undernourished populations living
in the rural areas. Economical interests of the multinational frms (enriching themselves
providing food products dedicated to an elite) are always supported, even if their
consequences are the out of control use and the depletion of our natural resources.
It is the reason why it is crucial to demand a deep change of the aid policies, aiming
to obtain from the entire society and from the organizations which are part of it, a clearer
defnition of what could be adequate aid. It is important to insist on the necessity to
consider, not only solving the economic growth problems of the country, but also saving
the sustainability of the environment linked to the food production, and the possibility for
all the population to have access to it, in particular the most vulnerable families.
180
References
Agostini Claudio. Hacia un mapa de la desigualdad comunal en Chile-Facultad de
economa y negocios. Universidad Alberto Hurtado.2008.
lvarez Roberto. La Regin de Los Lagos en perspectiva. Gerencia de Investigacin
Econmica. Banco central de Chile. 2007.
Gemines Consultores. La industria del salmn en Chile, Informe Gemines N 244. Enero
2001.
Subsecretara de Pesca, Gobierno de Chile. Informe ambiental de acuicultura, 2005-
2006. Octubre 2008
Revista Poder. Las penas del salmn. mayo 2009
Rodrigo Infante V. Industria del salmn en Chile, Un Ejemplo de Innovacin. Salmn
Chile AG 2008
Universidad de La Frontera. Distribucin del Ingreso por Comunas: ndice de GINI.
Observatorio Econmico Social.
Villarroel De La Sotta Jos. Ruralidad en Chile: Presente y Futuro. Departamento de
estadstica e informacin de salud, MINSAL 2007
www.aduana.cl Servicio Nacional de Aduanas
www.bcentral.cl/ Banco Central de Chile
www.diariollanquihue.cl Diario El Llanquihue. La geografa del clster. Julio 2004
www.educarchile.cl
www.elmostrador.cl Se aproxima el peor momento de la crisis del salmn
www.ine.cl Instituto Nacional de Estadsticas.
www.Lanacion.cl Viernes 30 de enero de 2009
www.mideplan.cl/casen/ Encuesta Casen
www.noetmengiselmon.org/
www.olach.cl/ Observatorio Laboral y Ambiental de Chilo; Publicado el 10 Agosto 2006
www.salmonchile.cl/ Salmn Chile A.G. Boletn N 1, Octubre 2008
www.sernapesca.cl Servicio Nacional de Pesca. ISA es una enfermedad prevalente en la
X y XI regiones martes, 12 de agosto de 2008
www.undp.org/spanish/ PNUD. Desarrollo humano en las comunas de Chile. N 5.
181
Case study 15: COLOMBIA
Women immersed in the rural crisis of
Colombia
Claudia Gimena Roa
1
Fundacin de Expresin Intercultural, Educativa y Ambiental, FUNDAEXPRESIN
2
Introduction
On the occasion of the V International Conference of the Via Campesina, the womens
peasant movement declares: We are women with a history and common struggles for life,
land and territory, food sovereignty, justice and dignity we commit ourselves to struggle
together to get comprehensive agrarian reform in order to eliminate all forms of violence
generated by capitalist modes of production, and that have caused the global food crisis,
climate change, the advance of monocultures, GMOs and agribusiness.
3

In a country inficted by social injustice such as Colombia, the situation of rural women
is just as drastic. While 68.2% of rural people in Colombia are impoverished and 27.5%
live in extreme poverty, the condition of women is more critical: the index of women
without any self-supporting income in 2003 was 42%, compared to 20% of men.
4
Likewise,
the repercussions of rural displacement and urbanization for women and female-headed
households
5
imply that they are signifcantly more exposed to impacts such as malnutrition
6
,
as rural womens livelihoods are intrinsically linked to natural-based resources.
One of the foremost conquests of peasant women in Colombia was the declaration
in 1984 of the frst National Policy for Peasant Women, which constituted an event in
the history of agrarian polices in Latin America
7
, ironically at a time when the agrarian
reform in Colombia (since 1961) was shown to be a failure. Te visibility achieved by
peasant women was due to the confuence of various factors: the world conferences on
women, the food crisis which began to be felt at national and international level, and
social investigations which highlighted the inequity and exclusion of women in society.
1 Special thanks to Adam J. Rankin, for his collaboration in the co-investigation of this report.
2 www.fundaexpresion.org/Email: roankine@telecom.com.co / fundaexpresion@gmail.com
3 Food Sovereignty now, Unity and struggle of the people - Declaration of the V International Conference of La Via Campesina,
Maputo - Mozambique, 19-22 October, 2008.
4 Food Sovereignty now, Unity and struggle of the people - Declaration of the V International Conference of La Via Campesina,
Maputo - Mozambique, 19-22 October, 2008.
5 According to governmental surveys (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar - ICBF), 25% of the economically-active female
population of Colombia correspond to female-headed households; these women have had to fend for themselves and their families
alone due to reasons of being made a widow, separation, abandonment, family violence and/or physical incapacity of their spouse.
6 The problems of hunger in sectors of the population of Colombia are alarming: 45% of pregnant women are diagnosed with
anaemia, 58.2% of rural families declare that a child goes to bed without having a meal, and more than 80% of children (less
than 5 years old) in various indigenous and afro-descendent communities suffer from chronic malnutrition - gures as reported in
the investigation: Right to Food in Colombia : Situation, Context and Failures - an approximation of the Colombian State in the
framework of the Voluntary Guidelines, Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos - Observatorio de Seguridad Alimentaria
- Comision Interfranciscana - Fundaexpresion - FIAN, Bogot, December, 2007.
7 Ana Isabel Garca Q., Enrique Gomriz M., La perspectiva de gnero y mujeres rurales en las estrategias y polticas de desarrollo
territorial sostenible, Serie Cuaderno Tcnico / IICA (No. 24), San Jos, 2004.
182
One important outcome of this national policy was its catalysing efect to create the frst
national organization of peasant women: Asociacin Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas e
Indgenas de Colombia - ANMUCIC.
8

Consequently during the last 25 years, there has been a progressive multiplication
of womens peasant organizations in Colombia at regional and local scales, and these
organizations have been crucial in the empowerment of women by giving voice to their
struggles. However, the work of womens groups has been fraught by the inequalities of
land distribution, patriarchal models of society and the limited possibility to participate
in institutional scenarios.
Te Colombian Law 731 on Rural Women (2002), which was considered to be a great
achievement in terms of access to credit for women and institutional participation, has
fallen far short in its ambit of application and efectiveness. Equally disturbing has been the
impact of the armed confict on womens organizations, moreover, many struggles led by
women to demand social justice are being repressed and criminalized by governments.
Tis panorama is suf cient enough to demonstrate the vital importance of womens
peasant associations and movements in Colombia, which are highlighted as a key
point of action within the Agrarian Mandate
9
, proclaiming for the: Recognition and
protection of the role of women in the construction of cultural identity, in the permanent
defence of the integrity of communities and as guardians of life (as well as) guarantees
for the decisive participation of rural women in the scenarios of planning, management
and development.
As regional partners of the More and Better campaign, we strive to consolidate and
disseminate this platform of common principles which can improve the quality of rural
cooperation targeted for agriculture, fsheries and local development, giving particular
attention to the empowerment of women and the recognition of the fundamental role of
women to uphold agriculture, biodiversity, cultural identity and food autonomy.
Hence, this case-study seeks to illustrate some of the fundamental principles, community
experiences and underlying policy issues related to womens empowerment in Colombia,
taking as a testimonial example, the work of peasant associations in the Soto Province of
the Department of Santander - Colombia
10
, and specifcally the 14 years of accumulated
life-stories of the Women Peasant Association of the municipality of Lebrija.
Brief background to the case study
We came to set up home in El Salado, and I remember that there were always trees,
vegetation and water to be seen. We cultivated yuca, pineapple, plantain, cofee and a variety
8 Donny Meertens, UNIFEM - Programa Paz y Seguridad - Colombia, Tierra, derechos y gnero: leyes, polticas y prcticas en
contextos de guerra y paz, Bogot, enero de 2006.
9 Agrarian Mandate of Colombia, April 2003.
10 FUNDAEXPRESIN has recognized the importance of intercultural dialogue and territorial identity to safeguard the vitality,
traditions and cultural patrimony of peasant and sher-folk peoples. We have recreated and disseminated this collective knowledge
through testimonial literature, poetry, radio and videos to give voice to women, youth and rural associations. Readers are invited
to consult our following publications: testimonial journal Despertar Campesino, radio series Por Aqui Pasa el Ro and Son de
Maklenke, video Pia Dulce, Agua Amarga, among others.
183
of fruits, but pineapple was only grown in small plots, and our families could live a good life
of the land (Rosala Jimnez (community elder of Lebrija)
Pineapple is one of the many exotic and desired fruits of the tropics. However, beneath
its sweet aroma, there hides a sour truth, involving peasant communities who have seen
their quality of life rapidly deteriorate, due to mono-cropping and agri-business. Tis is
the case of the municipality of Lebrija
11
(Santander), situated 17 km from the metropolitan
area of Bucaramanga in the north-eastern Andes region, and considered to be one of the
principal centres of pineapple production in Colombia. Months of continuous drought
more than 5 years ago, were enough for the rural people from Lebrija to understand what
the word desertifcation meant. Mono-cropping, climate change and agri-business
have transformed the landscape into a desert, gravely afecting nutrition and the peasant
farming community. Moreover, these families confront an ongoing struggle to obtain
basic rights of access to water supplies.
Te landscape is highly fragile, as it has been devastated by intensive mono-crop (slash
and burn) pineapple production
12
, causing extended desertifcation, water contamination
and malnutrition for the underprivileged peasant community. Irrational precipitation
regimes and over-exploitation of water resources by agro-industries (poultry and pig-
farming) have also accentuated water scarcity. In general, women and youth have been
more exposed to the impacts of water contamination and scarcity in the rural areas.
Womens participation in rural society is immersed in complex socio-cultural
scenarios, where men have typically worked the mono-crop production and controlled
economic income, while women have been more dedicated to subsidiary activities:
small livestock, vegetable and fruit plots. However, experience has shown that the path
to social and ecological recovery necessarily requires a process of social organisation and
empowerment of the local community. Understanding the historical transformation of the
landscape and its people, has motivated the women to recover traditional seed varieties
as food-crops and implement diverse rain-water harvesting techniques and declare
community forest reserves. Women have gained communication skills and political-
standing in their communities, and have contributed to forging a dynamic, self-dependent
and unifed process.
Case study
Women reclaim solidarity, agro-biodiversity and cultural
identity
Te strength which constitutes a group of women is the combined potential of each of its
members and the accumulated experience of the organization, manifested Cecilia Ibagos,
11 The municipality of Lebrija is conformed of an area of 549.85 km2 with a total population of 30,980 inhabitants (2005), 13,898
people in the urban area (44.8%) and 17,082 people (55.2%) in the rural area.
12 The area cultivated in pineapple production is an estimated 5,074 hectares, being the principal activity of subsistence for 1,800
peasant families of Lebrija and represents 35% of the cultivated land; the region is also a major producer of citric fruits, vegetables
and cacao. The economy is also dependent on pig-farming and poultry (6.35% of national production).
184
founding member of the Association of Peasant Women of the Municipality of Lebrija -
AMMUCALE, in a meeting of women leaders in the month of March 2009.
13
Tis meeting
as on other occasions has been part of a continuous process of refection and planning,
which these peasant women have sustained since the association was constituted in 1996.
Tis case-study report has permitted the women to appraise their joint endeavours, and
the many projects and initiatives developed during 14 years, accompanying more than
300 families af liated in 12 rural committees of Lebrija.
Our analysis has taken as a central feature the signifcance of autonomy seen through
the eyes of this community process and how diferent projects of cooperation have had
a positive or negative impact in the womens association. Emperatriz Roman, currently
the president of AMMUCALE, says assertively: we embrace rural cooperation as long as
it does not afect our dignity. Furthermore, the concept of dignity is established in the frst
article of the Political Constitution of Colombia, as follows: Colombia is a Social State of
Rights, (), founded in the respect of human dignity, in the work and solidarity of the people
that it integrates and the prevalence of the common good
Based on the accumulated experience of AMMUCALE, as well as the many years of
work and struggle it has shared with peasant and social sectors from the region, it is clear
that the women members hold diverse perceptions with regards to the concept of rural
cooperation and the signifcance of development aid, be it good or bad. Nevertheless the
most meaningful form of analysis has been through the optical of human dignity; and
here it is undeniable, that the prevalence of the common good which should be upheld by
the Colombian State, has not been efectively applied and even less when we consider the
drastic situation of peasant women and their families:
With regards to gender equity, the women of Lebrija subsist in conditions of discrimination
and inferiority with regards to their male counterparts and the society as a whole, which
represents a barrier to gain access and full control over the resources they require for self-
development. Hence, the women of AMMUCALE have had to face up to these limitations
and obstacles, which in essence has confgured their course of action from the beginning,
including: the lack of recognition of productive, domestic and communitarian work of
women; inter-family violence; low self-esteem and subordination; high level of illiteracy and
lack of access to the educational system.
14

In the following sections we will take some daily examples of how human dignity is a
central aspect to the lives and struggles of these peasant women:
13 The experience of AMMUCALE initiated in 1996, the year in which the idea to establish a community organization which could
bring together and represent peasant women in the municipality of Lebrija was nally consolidated. The association was founded on
the principles to transform gender relations, to promote integral development and to improve the livelihoods of the women associates
and their rural families, through leadership, empowerment and the development of social, economic, environmental and cultural
projects. During this same period, rural women also showed progressive levels of representation in the Communal Boards of Action
and the parent - teacher associations, as well as other peasant movements at a national level. For more information, please contact
AMMUCALE at the following e-mail: ammucale@hotmail.com
14 CIDEMOS - RIMISP - Fondo Minka de Chorlav, Sistematizacin de la experiencia organizacional de la Asociacin Municipal de
Mujeres Campesinas de Lebrija, Bucaramanga, December 2005.
185
Debt with rural education
Te educational debt is plainly evident in the rural territory; this concept is employed
within a report
15
published by the Colombian Ministry of Education in 2001, which
announces the inequalities of rural education: Te problems inherent in the Colombian
rural sector are in great part caused by the low coverage, defcient quality and unsuitability
of the educational service which does not respond to social needs and is far-less an agent
of renovation for the local people. Tis is refected by the levels of poverty, increasing
unemployment and violence which inficts many rural areas of the country.
Tis debt continues and certainly has not improved much with time; the fgures
reported by the current Minister of Education, Cecilia Mara Vlez, ascertains: Today, in
Colombia, there are 720,905 peasant children, between the ages of 5 and 16 years, who are
not in the educational system primary school enrolment is close to 98%, however rural
children do not surpass this level and on average only study up to 5th grade, the schools
where they can fnish secondary education are usually situated far away from their homes,
and continuing in the educational system, means moving to the city with high economic
costs.
16
In the case of the women who belong to AMMUCALE, many of them have to send
their children long distances to be able to attend the schools and educational centres,
which mean paying high transport costs when it is not possible to walk, as Colombia is also
characterised for its expensive fuel costs. Furthermore, in the face of the multiple problems
of youth displacement and uprooted communities, including mandatory military service
and the lack of appropriate educational systems, it is vital to develop training strategies
that focus on building values of self-esteem, cultural identity and sense of belonging to
the land.
Popular education, from peasant to peasant
Te Agroecological Peasant School is an innovative training process which involves
vulnerable peasant communities, and emerges from the need to establish a fruitful
dialogue among rural communities of the Soto Province - Santander, and socialization
with other community initiatives (peasant, indigenous, fsher-folk and afro-descendent)
at a national level. Te methodology of the Agroecological School is based on the
collective construction of knowledge, including ancestral wisdom, the implementation of
appropriate technologies and the itinerant interchange of experiences between farm-lands
and rural localities.
When the frst invitations to participate in the Agroecological School were distributed
to the women of AMMUCALE, none of them thought of the consequences and obstacles
15 According to the article: Ms campo para la educacin rural, Al Tablero No. 2, Ministerio de Educacin Nacional, March
2001: The index of coverage in rural areas is 30% compared to 65% in urban sectors, and the rate of school desertion of the rural
population is 10.9%, compared to 2.5% in the cities. The participation in pre-school educational programs is less than 4% in rural
localities. (available in web-page: http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/1621/article-87159.html)
16 Cerca de 720 mil nios campesinos del pas estn por fuera del sistema educativo colombiano, El Tiempo, 24th of July 2008,
available in: http://abc.gov.ar/lainstitucion/noticiasdeladgcye/v072/internacionales/internacionales.cfm?id=3284
186
this implied. Firstly, for any peasant women, to attend monthly training sessions implies
a immense workload at home moreover, the need to prevail over the resistance shown
by their husbands or the so-called boss of the house-hold is no minor task. But evermore
intimidating, the biggest challenge was to interact and participate with participants who
came from other regions. To deal with outsiders, overcome their own fears and complexes.
Tus, a great challenge arose: to face-up to her mental and social ties that society has created
to subdue women. - Cecilia Ibagos
Te women of AMMUCALE have been acclaimed for their traditional knowledge in
relation to their agriculture and husbandry such as natural medicines, ways to perceive life,
forms to cultivate, traditional cooking, and their dedication to raise their children. Tis
internal life-force is evident in the way changes and transformations are proposed: from
within to the outside world, from an individual approach to public and communitarian
renovation, from their farmlands to food processing, their relationships with neighbours,
communities and the region as a whole, as an act which is none diferent than the sacred
giving of birth to life.
AMMUCALE has been appraised for its initiatives to promote food sovereignty,
community forest conservation, micro-enterprises, communication and the recovery of
traditional seeds, and as it was acclaimed by Mario Mejia (a well known agroecologist
in Colombia) the women members of the Agroecological School have been able to
understood their great capacity for self-nutrition, autonomous organisation and social
management.
17

Ecological debt, health and sanitation
According to Paulina Rodriguez, president of the Communitarian Board - El Salado
(Lebrija) and member of Ammucale: We sufer daily problems caused by water
contamination from poultry and pig industries; the lack of drinkable water for our families.
Also, our animals have health problems. Likewise, we face social and environmental impacts
due to the scarcity and unfair water distribution.
Tis testimony is confrmed by data from the hospital of Lebrija which shows
that intestinal infections, skin-rashes and parasites represent 20% of illnesses in the
municipality. Tis problem is a direct consequence of water contamination, which afects
the most vulnerable population, women, children and elders. In the rural area of Lebrija,
only one water supply plant has adequate treatment facilities, the rest of the countryside
population (aprox. 95%) uses crude or untreated water.
18
By confronting these dif cult circumstances, peasant women have shown both
commitment and tenacity to uphold a process of change to recover their dignity
and landscape. With regards to their struggle to reclaim water as a fundamental and
collective right, AMMUCALE have started to question the root causes of the scarcity
17 Mario Meja Gutirrez in the book: Agricultura y Ganadera Orgnicas a Condiciones Colombianas (2006, page 298).
18 Data as reported in the Municipal Development Plan, Alcalda de Lebrija.
187
and contamination of their principle water resources. Women have actively supported
the Civil-Society Water Referendum
19
as a tool to promote environmental awareness,
demonstrating alternatives such as the community management of their aqueducts and
the conservation of essential ecosystems.
Technological packages versus food sovereignty
Here again, Paulina Rodrguez questions why many development projects come as
technological packages and underlines: there was a governmental project that obliged
us to reforest an area of one hectare per family, but with exotic species (inappropriate
for our local ecosystems); can you imagine, we had to cut and burn native vegetation
to plant these trees. The conditions of the project obliged us to plant a mono-crop of
acacias and then when the local community discovered that these trees brought more
damage than benefits, they began to sow native trees again .... We as women know the
importance of the natural forest, but many times our ancestral knowledge as peasants is
disregarded.
For this reason, several women of AMMUCALE have determined to auto-recognise and
declare their farm-lands and niches of forests as part of the Collective of Peasant and
Community Reserves of Santander, with the vision to conserve the environmental and
cultural patrimony of Andean forests.
We should also highlight that amongst the many families associated to AMMUCALE,
there are diverse viewpoints regarding how development projects have been implemented
and the criteria established about food-aid, external assistance and technological packages,
which varies according to the specifc family experiences and community needs in each
rural locality.
However, in general, we have perceived a decisive move forward by women in aspects
such as rural public policies, environmental planning and civil-society education. Tis has
involved recognition and an awareness of the signifcance of territory, based on strategies
such as crop diversifcation, catchments management and the empowerment of women in
municipal planning scenarios. Furthermore, it is now commonplace to hear in the debates
and discussions of these women, concepts such as sustainable development, agroecology,
native seeds and food sovereignty.
20

Various members of AMMUCALE have decided to put into practice and multiply the
option of food sovereignty as an alternative life-project. Rosa Isabel Rincn, for example,
gives priority to projects of internal cooperation, in other words, initiatives created,
conformed and self-developed by the diverse peasant and community associations of the
region, which also dimension the empowerment of women and youth: When I started
working on my farm, I was totally dependent, I would buy everything I needed from the
shops and suppliers. Now I cultivate my own maize, yucca, plantain, coco beans, spinach
19 For more information of the civil-society Water Referendum in Colombia: http://www.agua.ecofondo.org.co/
20 CIDEMOS, ibid.
188
and vegetables. With the maize, I make my own products: ayacos, tamales, tortas, coladas
and I have plenty to feed all my family and my livestock. I almost dont need anything from
the outside, just the basic elements.
It is apparent for this leader of AMMUCALE, that food sovereignty signifes autonomy
and the freedom to consume healthy food products and without the dependence of having
to buy outside: In times of economic crisis, if there is food available it is a lot easier to
survive, we produce our own food. Solidarity and cultivable land are the most important
elements of our work as peasants
Road infrastructure and market strategies
Te majority of AMMUCALE have expressed their constant problems of transport and
the awful state of road infrastructure interconnecting rural localities and which limits
access to the urban centres. It is clear that the governmental discourse which makes
emphasis on topics of business ef ciency and competitiveness, falls far short when we
analyse the situation of rural areas, and specifcally in this case the municipality of Lebrija;
this ef ciency is greatly diminished when we see that the conditions of rural transport
are very precarious.
In the planning and evaluation meetings, the women of AMMUCALE wrote in their
note-books phrases such as: we need autonomy to transport people and supplies between
rural localities, and then added but the road infrastructure does not exist. Tis reality,
signifes that any proposal defned within the so called <agribusiness market chains>
promoted by government policies, are really a paradox when we consider that the dream
of ef ciency clashes with the non-existent infrastructure in many of the rural areas of
Colombia.
Although the goals of various Colombian Ministries aim at achieving competitiveness
as a strategy linked to export market economies, many peasant organisations and
specifcally AMMUCALE has understood that the most direct and benefcial way to sell
their products is by strengthening local market schemes, which are much more tailored
to the needs of crop diversifcation and food sovereignty, and also giving the possibility to
exchange or barter goods.
Moreover, through initiatives of micro-enterprises and local food processing, we have
seen the benefts of taking full advantage of the harvest. Hence, fruits can be transformed
into pulps, marmalades and wine. Home-made bread and chocolate are also processed
locally. With medicinal plants, they prepare soaps, oils, creams; these products not only
provide an economic incentive, but also permit a community learning process to recover
alternative and natural remedies.
Women custodians of seeds and native breeds
Norma Henriquez and Bertina Sandoval, members of AMMUCALE, are distinguished
in their rural sectors as custodians of agro-biodiversity. Norma has collected and grown a
189
Principles of the Seeds of
identity campaign - Colombia
Seeds and biodiversity are essential
to promote and uphold sustainable
livelihoods of local people.
Seeds and traditional knowledge
are a collective patrimony that
must not be privatised, and are
fundamental elements to achieve
food sovereignty.
Te defence of seeds is tied to the
defence of life, land, territories and
cultures.
No to the use of genetically-
modifed organisms, because they
put at risk the integrity of seeds
and the traditional forms of life and
subsistence of rural populations.
Reject public policies and laws
at national and international
levels that endanger native seeds,
biodiversity and their collective use
and exchange by farmers.

great variety of maize, beans, yucca, fruits and medicinal plants; whilst Bertina has raised
and multiplied more than 30 traditional breeds of hens. Likewise, Hercilia Hernandez,
another womens leader, has recovered and put into practice her ancestral knowledge to
use biomaterials such as natural fbres and dyes for handicrafs and clothing.
In this way, the participation of AMMUCALE and the Agroecological Campesino
School in national and international campaigns
21
such as the Campaign Seeds of
Identity, the Campaign for Human Rights to Food, and the Campaign for Food
Sovereignty - SALSA,
22
have allowed local communities to begin to envision development
and cooperation projects according to the following principles:
Women, agrarian reform and
land-rights
Te issue of land-rights on behalf of peasant
women is a vital and urgent matter, because
many women in AMMUCALE still do not
possess access to land titles. According to a
study developed by the women members in
Lebrija, and in the words of Cecilia Ibagos:
when the issue of purchasing land is defned,
in most cases, men are assigned to hold the
land titles, according to them, to be able to
get a mortgage, to rent or to sell the land later
on.
In general, AMMUCALE is aware that
the fact of not holding land-titles, puts
women at a great disadvantage to be able
to implement development projects. Even
when women are identifed as priority
benefciaries, as was once the case with a
project with the Municipality of Lebrija, it
was impossible to access funding, as many
of the women did not have titles, and did
not even fgure as joint-owners with their
husbands.
In addition, to the evident problems of
traditional machismo, women without
land, female headed-households or
displaced women have to confront many
21 A description of the context and application of these campaigns in the region of Santander is highlighted in the following article:
Minga social y comunitaria en defensa del patrimonio ambiental y la soberana alimentaria, Fundaexpresin, Revista Semillas No.
28 / 29, Bogot, June 2006.
22 Food Sovereignty Campaign in Colombia - SALSA, see web-page: http://salsa.ecofondo.org.co/
190
obstacles with the institutions of agrarian reform, which in Colombia falls under the
mandate of INCODER.
23
Empeatriz Roman af rmed: as a peasant woman, head of my
household, and without any land-titles, I went several times to present a formal proposal
for land distribution for small-hold farmers, but the situation is very dif cult, since much of
the paper-work necessarily requires having to pay commissions either to civil-servants or to
private agents, so that they can even begin to consider studying your case.
It is clearly evident that the right to land for peasant women signifies a fundamental
right, since it relates directly to the possibility to cultivate or harvest their own
products, which also defines other civil liberties such as the right to dignified work,
the right to food and the opportunities for personal development. Another factor
that has restricted and complicated the work of this womens peasant organization
has been the control of some rural territories of Lebrija by legal or illegal armed-
groups. This has been a limiting factor in some occasions for AMMUCALE, as these
armed-groups many times do not allow the conformation of womens committees,
they restrict autonomous decision-making and they also control the access of visitors
to the region.
Conclusions and recommendations for actions
As women we have a tendency to renovate and to be innovative, to seek structural
changes, especially with regards to this macho society, dominated by male chauvinism.
We have shown our capacity to transform this reality that we live on a daily-basis I
think signifcant changes have taken place, when we have been empowered by popular
education, but not only at a family level, also within our communities and municipalities.
Tis process has brought us together and united us as peasant associations, Rosa Isabel
Rincn (AMMUCALE)
Our contribution as part of the More and Better Campaign and the investigation of
this case-study, has allowed us to comprehend the importance of efective cooperation;
which necessarily requires adhesion to basic principles of human dignity and dialogue
between agrarian and fsher-folk peoples of the world. Terefore, through this platform
provided by More and Better, we are convinced that womens peasant and indigenous
associations can fnd a strong voice to promote alternatives for sustainable rural
livelihoods. Tis will permit us to discuss structural problems and issues of equity,
social dignity and environmental justice. Likewise, we would like to share the following
conclusions and recommendations, which can be taken onboard within the framework
of the campaign, with an aim to strengthen our incidence in national and international
public policies, and specifcally towards the empowerment and participation of rural
women:
A countless number of factors impede the efective implementation of development
and cooperation projects, primarily due to the structural conditions of inequity and
marginalization in rural areas, and evermore when we consider the vulnerable position
23 Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural - INCODER

191
of women in society. However, many women have shown great vision, and are active
leaders in scenarios such as peasant associations, community boards, municipal and
regional planning bodies.
We acknowledge that the role and position of women is at a disadvantage in the face of
social and cultural models that are deeply-rooted in family, community and governmental
structures. Nonetheless, it is evident that womens networks and associations in Colombia
have historically been and are a vibrant platform to demonstrate real alternatives and
life-projects towards upholding social, cultural, environmental and economic rights of
local communities.
Te empowerment of women implies a process of building self-awareness to examine
the factors that have an infuence on their own lives, to develop confdence and self-
esteem to analyze and express this reality, enhancing opportunities to create real and
efective forms of participation in rural cooperation projects. In the case study, we speak
of food sovereignty, local markets, economic autonomy, which are all essential for rural
women and their family livelihoods.
Peasant women have understood the importance of the concept of dignity, as a means
to reaf rm their customs, traditions, cultures and ways to preserve life, in the face of
antagonist models which promote the commodifcation of life, inequity, violence and
harmful technological packages.
We have seen the positive results brought about through a process of dialogue among
grassroots womens groups, which can be promoted through exchanges with other
community-based organizations: indigenous women, afro-descendents, fsher-folk and
communitarian mothers. In a broader sense, this dialogue implies sharing of knowledge,
experiences and the defning of common priorities and plans of action at regional,
national and international levels.
It is fundamental to provide a new outlook to cooperation projects which takes as a
basis-line the cosmovision of peasant and indigenous women as its starting point, from
a perspective of food, culture, production and environmental issues. Tis implies a full
recognition of the implications of ecological debt and food insecurity, and the inequities
of decision-making and political structures and the restrictions of access to common
resources (land, water, biodiversity, seeds), particularly as an approach to uphold
womens rights.
We should actively encourage and stimulate womens participation through national
and international meetings, where decision-making by women is brought to a forefront
in planning and development of rural projects, especially regarding initiatives of
food sovereignty, rural housing, alternative education and their valuable insights to
conserve biodiversity, mitigate climate change and to build a society of justice and
peace.

192
Equally, we seek to strengthen alternative economic schemes for rural women, giving
emphasis to rural micro-enterprises, agro-productive gardens and farming plots,
use of medicinal plants, food-processing techniques, husbandry and animal raising,
handicrafs, amongst many others. Moreover, we should promote the recovery of
ancestral knowledge and practical skills relating to the sustainable use and conservation
of agro-biodiversity.

193
ETHIOPIA country facts and report
Total Population (2007): 73.918.505
Agricultural population (2007): 84 % of total population
Gross national income per capita (2006): $ 170
Population below income poverty line % (1995-2000): $ 1/day: 23%; $ 2/day: 77,8%
Population below national poverty line(1990-2004): 44,2%
Undernourished, % of total population (2004-04): 46%
Agricultural Employment % of total employment (2003-06): 44,1 %
Agricultural land % of land area (2003-05): 33%
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (2001-03): 3
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: n/a ; 2004-06: 112,1
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 1.234 ; 2004-06: 1. 374
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-2000: 2,4%, ; 2000-06: 5,0%
Agriculture % of GDP: 1995: 57 % ; 2006: 47%
Government spending on agriculture: 2001: 8,5% ; 2005-06: 15,2% ; 2007-08: 11,7%
Merchandise exports % of total:
Food: 1995: 73% ; 2006: n/a
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 13% ; 2006: n/a
Merchandise imports % of total:
Food: 1995: 14% ; 2006: n/a
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 2% ; 2006: n/a
Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) per capita: 2000: $ 10 ; 2006: $ 25
ODA as % of GNI: 2000: 8,7% 2006: 14,7%
ODA to agriculture: 2001: 9%, 2005-06: $ 267 million, % of total aid to agriculture : 24%
Sources of development aid to agriculture
European Union (EC), World Bank (WB), Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI),
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Canada International
Development Agency (CIDA), UK Department for International Development (DFID),
Netherlands Development Agency (NDA) are main donors
Source: Te World Bank Development Indicators 2008.

194
Agriculture in Ethiopia and the current nancial crisis
Te current global fnancial crisis is impacting on Ethiopias agricultural export earnings,
especially cofee. Cofee constitutes one of Ethiopias traditional and major agricultural
export items contributing more than half of the countys foreign currency earnings
annually. Global oil price increases too pushed the local price of all major agricultural
items and staple foods in Ethiopia to unprecedented highs that are continuing to this day.
Local prices staple crops tef, maize, sorghum and wheat doubled in comparison to cereal
prices before mid-2007 without any change in demand causing the government to import
wheat for over 2 million poor and low income citizens, mostly located in urban centres
where food prices are the highest. Tis suggests that the countrys agriculture sector still
has a long way to go to address the food needs of the nation.
Key points to reform agricultural aid to Ethiopia
Rebalance and refocus quality development assistance on options and opportunities
that build the capacity of rural households and the economy more broadly to withstand
shocks that will inevitably occur, and break the reliance on emergency relief.
To prevent further decline in growth potential as a result of productive asset erosion, the
lives and livelihoods of the chronically food insecure must be protected and those with
productive capacity must be provided with opportunities to diversify their livelihood
base and participate in rural economic growth. Linking productive safety nets with
livelihood actions is a proven famine prevention model in Ethiopia.
Replace food aid with capacities to grow food locally and avoid dependency on
imports.
Increase ODA investments in productive safety net programs complimented by increased
investments in agricultural enterprise as an accelerated pathway for graduation out of
food insecurity.
Channel development assistance to local organizations and institutions (rather than
international organizations) to create ownership of rural development and empower
local communities to defne development agendas.
Revisit aid conditionality in line with donor commitment to respect the centrality
and ownership of development by recipient governments and citizens, and increase
the transparency and dependability of donor aid, in particular by backing long-term
sustainable agricultural development.

Development assistance context in Ethiopia
Ethiopia is the largest country recipient of Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) in
Africa. External aid increased from US$1.05 billion in 2005/06 to US$1.5 billion in 2006/07
as did annual per capita aid fows from US$14 in 2001 to US$26 in 2005 but remains low
at only 60 percent of the Sub Sahara African average. Bilateral and multilateral donors

195
constitute the major sources of ODA to Ethiopia (60 percent of ODA disbursements).
Development assistance channelled through NGOs is also signifcant but is not well
accounted for especially at the national level.
Eforts to achieve sustained growth in the agricultural sector are modest. Since 2001,
support for agriculture rose from 9 percent of ODA to approximately 24 percent in 2005/06
(c.f. declining ODA for agriculture between 1997 at 13 percent to 6 percent in 2002).
Donors concentrated ODA in the Productive Safety Net Program (referred to as use-
proliferation), and reduced direct monetary support to the government and for-balance-
of payments. By 2005, questions about human rights violations in the afermath of the
National Elections caused ODA disbursements to level of and new aid commitments to
fall. MOFED ODA commitment data for the year 2005/06 indicate a virtual halving of aid
commitments, falling from US$2,075 million in 2004/05 to US$966 million in 2005/06,
refecting not just a fall in multi-sector commitments, but also in aid commitments for
agriculture, energy and water. Emergency aid is also a major feature of net ODA to
Ethiopia. Between 2003 and 2005 US$ 1,868 million or 35 percent of net ODA was for
development food and emergency aid. In 2003, USAID alone used almost US$500 million
to support emergency eforts and provided less than US$5 million to support agricultural
programs even though preventing crises is cheaper than responding to them.
Ultimately, reversing the decline in new ODA commitments in Ethiopia is tantamount to
improving the livelihoods of millions of Ethiopians trapped in chronic food insecurity and
susceptible to risk from climate change, the global fnancial crisis and escalating food prices.
Ethiopian government spending on agriculture is fuctuating. It grew from 8.5 percent
in 2001 to 15.2 percent in 2005/06 of total government expenditure, but by 2006/07 it fell
back to 12.9 percent and to 11.7 percent in 2007/08 (MOFED: 2008), refecting donor
concerns about national elections held in 2005. By comparison, government expenditure
on non-monetary social development sectors (health, education and water/sanitation)
steadily increased from 45 to 64 percent during the period 2001/02 to 2007/08, with
the highest allocation going to education. Te percentage of people afected by food
insecurity and threatened by famine continues however to be unacceptably high and grew
from 4 percent to over 19 percent in the period 1973 to 2003. Tis was matched by sharp
increases in the proportion of areas afected by drought and famine: 8 percent in 1984, 49
percent in 1994 and 53 percent in 2003, calling for innovation in the way structural food
insecurity is addressed (EU Diagnostic Survey of Ethiopia: 2007).
196
Ethiopia
Table.1: Trends in ODA Disbursement (In Million US$)
SOURCE 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 8 YEAR
TOTAL
Multi-lateral 268.46 454.18 734.5 552.4 652.5 736.0 632.5 964.8 4995.34
Bilateral 101.66 140.40 133.8 141.1 285.0 320.1 474.5 579.8 2176.34
Total: 370.12 594.58 868.3 693.5 937.5 1,056.0 1,107.4 1549.3 7176.7
Grants 222.06 238.24 259.59 274.86 601.34 705.79 768.68 1256.51 4327.61
Loan 147.52 356.34 608.73 418.73 336.12 350.17 338.68 292.83 2849.12
Grant share(%) 60.14 40.07 29.9 39.63 64.15 66.86 69.42 81.1 60.30
Loan share(%) 39.86 59.93 70.1 60.37 35.85 33.16 30.58 18.9 39.70
Source: MOFED (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development)

Table 2: Sectoral Distribution of ODA Disbursements
Sectoral Distribution of ODA Disbursements
(US$ Million)
2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 Total Years %
Agriculture/
Rural Development 77 72 60 181 267 657 15
Roads 119 112 100 134 107 572 13
Energy 38 59 36 33 163 329 8
Health 43 48 37 93 124 345 9
Education 56 50 19 70 82 277 8
Water 19 16 7 25 19 86 2
Trade and Commerce 19 15 7 13 2 56 1
Multi Sector 475 285 378 490 239 1867 43
Other Sectors 17 31 6 15 102 171 4
Grand Total 869 694 652 1056 1107 4378 100
Source: MOFED, 2007

197
KENYA country facts
Total population (2008): 38.53 millions
Rural population % of total (2006): 79
Agricultural employment % of total employment (1992): 19.0
Gross national income per capita (2008): US$ 770
Population below national poverty line (1997): 52% (53% rural; 49% urban)
Proportion of the population below $ 1 per day (2002): 56%
Share of undernourished people of total population (2004): 31 %
Agriculture land % of the land area (2005): 47.4
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (2003-05): 25
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: 85.7 ; 2004-06: 104.3
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 1,645 ; 2004-06: 1,709
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-92: 1.9 ; 2000-06: 3.2
Agriculture % of GDP: 1995: 31 ; 2006: 27
Merchandise exports % of total:
Food: 1995: 56 ; 2006: 52
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 7 ; 2006: 16
Merchandise imports % of total:
Food: 1995: ; 2006: 10
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 2 ; 2006: 2
Net Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) USD: 2000: 510 ; 2006: 943
ODA per capita $: 2000: 16 ; 2006: 26
ODA as % of GNI 2000-06: 4.1
ODA to agriculture: USD 112.4 million
ODA % of total (2003-05): 10.4
Sources: World Development Indicators database, 2008 and April 2009, UNDP

198
MALAWI country facts
Total population (2008): 14.28 millions
Rural population (% of total ,2006): 82.3
Agricultural employment % of total employment: 90%
Gross national income per capita, Atlas method (2008): US$ 290
Population below income poverty line (1997-98): 65.3 (66.5 rural)
Proportion of undernourished in total population (2002-04): 35
Agriculture land (% of the land area, 2005): 48.8
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (2001-03): 6
Food production index 1999-2001=100 (2004-05): 95.6
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare (2004-06) : 1,099
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-2000:8.6 ; 2000-06:-0.8
Agriculture % of GDP (2006): 34
Government spending on agriculture (2004-2007): 12.3%
Merchandise exports % of total:
Food: 1995: 90 ; 2006: 83
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 2 ; 2006: 3
Merchandise imports % of total:
Food: 1995: 14 ; 2006: 15
Agricultural raw materials: 1995/2006: 1
Net of cial Development Assistance (ODA): 2000: 446 ; 2006: 669
Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) per capita $: 2000: 38 ; 2006: 49
Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) as % of GNI: 2000: 26.1 ; 2006: 21.4
Sources: World Development Indicators database, 2008 , 2009, CIA World Fact Book
2009; SAC, Southern African Development Community, 2008; UNECA, UN Economic
Commission for Africa (2007)
Development Assistance
Malawi has relatively fewer donors compared to her neighbors. However, few as they are,
they still contribute about 40 percent to Malawis annual budget. Overall, the main donors
in Malawi are DFID, EC, World Bank, African Development Bank, Norway, and USAID.
Tese account for over 90 percent of Malawis development assistance. Other donors
include the traditional UN institutions (notably UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, and WFP),
JICA, and GTZ.

199
MALI country facts
Total population, millions (2008): 12.71
Rural population, % of total (2005): 70
Agricultural employment % of total employment (2003-05): 41.5
Gross national income per capita, Atlas method (2008): US$ 580
Population below national poverty line % (2005): 47.5
Population below income poverty line %: $ 1 /day: 51.4% ; $ 2/day: 90.6 %
Proportion of undernourished % total population (2007): 16
Agriculture land % of the land area (2005): 32.4
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land: 1990-92: 11 ; 2001-03: 6
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: 78.6 ; 2004-06: 109.6
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 840 ; 2004-06: 1,008
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-92: 2.6; 2000-06: 5.0
Agriculture as % of GDP: 1995: 50 ; 2006: 37
Merchandise exports % of total:
Food: 1995: 23 ; 2006: 14
Agricultural raw materials:1995: 75 ; 2006: 74
Merchandise imports % of total:
Food: 1995: 20 2006: 14
Agricultural raw materials: 1995 - 2006: 1
Net Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) $ millions: 359 (2000) ; 825 (2006)
ODA per capita: 2000: 36 ; 2006: 69
ODA as % of GNI: 2000: 15.0 ; 2006: 14.9
ODA to agriculture (% of total): 6.46(2002) 6.74 (2004) 5.29 (2006)
Sources of data: World Development Indicators database, 2008 and April 2009 (online
database); UN Department of Economic and Social Afairs Population Divisions; AfDB;
Statistical portal of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Major donors for development
Aid to Mali is likely to be scaled up from a growing number of sources. Some traditional
bilateral partners (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) have
selected Mali as a focus country for their external aid in the coming years and non-
traditional partners (i.e., China and India) are increasingly present in the country. Tus,
Mali is faced with the challenge to unite donors around a joint donors strategy and to use
aid more efectively through stronger donor coordination and harmonization and a better
rationalization of aid. Te preparation of this joint strategy is underway.
(Source: World Bank 2009)

200
MOZAMBIQUE country facts
Total population (millions, 2008): 21.78
Rural population (% of total, 2006): 64.7
Agricultural employment % of total employment (2009): 81%
Gross national income per capita (2008): US$ 370
Population below income poverty line: 70 % (2001 est.)
Proportion of undernourished in total population: 1990-92: 66 ; 2002-04: 44
Agriculture land (% of the land area) (2003-05): 61.8
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (2001-03): 14
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: 64.7 ; 2002-04: 106.1
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 330 ; 2004-06: 938
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-2000: 10.2 ; 2000-06: 12.4
Agriculture % of GDP: 1995: 57 ; 2006: 47
Merchandise exports % of total:
Food: 1995: 66 ; 2006: 16
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 16 ; 2006: 3
Merchandise imports % of total:
Food: 1995: 22; 2006: 14
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 3 ; 2006: 1
Net Of cial Development Assistance (ODA): 2000:876 ; 2006:1,611
ODA per capita: 2000: $ 48 ; 2006: $ 77
ODA as % of GNI: 2000: 21.8 ; 2006: 26.2
Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) for agriculture as % of total ODA:
1980-84: 23.6 ; 1985-89:15.0 ; 1990-94:9.0 ; 1995-99:9.2 ; 2003-04:4.3 (Change: -82%)
Sources: World Development Indicators database, 2008 and April 2009, CIA WORLD Facts
Book, University of Copenhagen Papers.

201
TUNISIA country facts and report
Total population (millions) (2008): 10,33
Rural population (% of total) (2006): 34.3
Agricultural employment % of total employment (2002): 22
Gross national income per capita, Atlas method (2008): US$ 34.00
Population below income poverty line (1995): 7,6 %
Proportion of undernourished in total population (2002-04): <2.5
Agriculture land (% of the land area): 1990-92: 58.4 ; 2003-05: 63.0
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (2001-03): 126
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: 91.2 ; 2002-04: 101.6
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 1,401 ; 2004-06: 1,630
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-2000: 2.3 ; 2000-06: 3.4
Agriculture % of GDP (1995-2006): 11
Merchandise exports % of total:
Food (1995-2006): 10
Agricultural raw materials (1995-2006): 1
Merchandise imports % of total:
Food: 1995: 13 ; 2006: 8
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 4 ; 2006: 3
Net Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) $ millions: 2000: 222 ; 2006: 432
ODA % per capita $: 2000: 23 ; 2006: 43
ODA as % of GNI: 2000: 1.2 ; 2006: 1.5
Sources: World Development Indicators database, 2008 and April 2009, CIA WORLD
FACTS BOOK 2009.
Country overview
Since 1973, Tunisia has been fxing fve year economic and social development plans.
Rural development orientations are equally specifed. During the 1970-1980 decade, the
essential strategic orientations were the promotion of employment and the improvement
of vulnerable populations revenues. However, the implemented programme did not
yield expected results. Tis observation led the government to elaborate Integrated Rural
Development Programmes (IRDP) where both improvements of living conditions and
the promotion of productive actions were associated. Despite this new approach and the
decentralisation of development eforts at regional level, poor citizen participation and
the dif culty of consolidating achievements were highlighted. With the 1980 economic
crises and the openness to a greater democratisation, the state then sought to mobilise civil
society, thus aligning with the international trend. Experimental participatory approaches
were then carried on with NGOs.

202
Farming and aid policy
Tunisia surface area is 163.610 km2. Arable felds are estimated at 4.071,4 millions acres
with 360.000 acres of irrigated perimeters. Te main farming products are: olive oil, citrus
fruits, cereals and dates. Water resources in the country are estimated at 4.236 millions
m3 per year. 68 % of surface water is mobilised.
Te strategy implemented since 1990 comprise an hydraulic mobilisation plan spread
over a ten year period comprising the construction of 21 dams, 203 collinear dams and
one thousand retention lakes, 1.760 drillings, 98 purifcation stations. Performances of the
farming sector have enabled the country to attain self-suf ciency in most of the products.
Tunisia recently became self-suf ciency in milk whereas national production supplied
nearly 50 % of demand in the early nineties.
Self-suf ciency was consolidated for other products despite the rapid increase in
demand resulting from population growth and individual demand due to salary increments.
As for the farming and fshery contribution to national growth eforts, it should be noted
that this sector contributes averagely up to 13, 5 % to the GDP. Tis contribution varies
from one year to the other, according to climatic changes, but has never been less than 11
% and increased above 16 % during productive years.
Consequently and thanks to diverse measures taken at this juncture, in relation with
the mobilisation and rationalisation of hydraulic resources, the extension of irrigated
felds, the promotion of biological farming and of blue fsh fshing; the intensifcation of
scientifc research studies and the vulgarisation of such research results, this sector has
been able to achieve success sustained by most of the products.In addition of its benefcial
multiplier efect on the rest of other economic activities, more especially food industries,
the transport and commerce sector, farming and fshery sectors expansion helps in
fostering living conditions in rural areas and in reinforcing population stability.
All of this is a huge efort made by the Tunisian government more especially to
encourage farming investments. As a matter of fact, the promotion policy carried on by
the Tunisian government is peculiar mostly through State subventions granted to farming
investors for over 25 % of investment expenditures, with a consequent adoption of a sof
farming investment tax policy.
On the other hand, Tunisia has opted for a broad and diversifed partnership for the
promotion of farming, especially the development of the countrys rural areas.
Women have a leading role in reproduction and home management, in farming and
extra-farming production, as well as in community services. Responsibilities emanating
from such duties hinder women to invest in the development process in the same way
that men do. Womens growing visibility in farming activities has led to an increasing
consciousness of the socioeconomic role they play in rural development dynamics. Tey
have shifed from being passive benefciaries, socially assisted, to gaining an important
status of active economic actors of modern farming and regional development. However,
civil society involvement is progressively increasing in assuming responsibilities to develop
disfavoured areas.
203
LEBANON country facts and report
Total population (2006): 4.000.000
Rural population (% of total) 2006: 13.3
Agricultural employment % of total employment (2005): 7
Gross national income per capita, $ (2006): 5,580 (Rank 80)
Population below income poverty line: N/A
Proportion of undernourished in total population (2004): 3
Agriculture land (% of the land area) 2005: 38.1
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (2001-03): 465
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: 100.4 ; 2004-06: 100.8
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 2,001 ; 2004-06: 2,708
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-2000: 1.8 ; 2000-06: 0.8
Agriculture % of GDP: 1995 - 2006: 7
Merchandise exports % of total:
Food: 1995: 20 ; 2006: 16
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 2 ; 2006: 1
Merchandise imports % of total:
Food: 1995: 21 ; 2006: 16
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 2 ; 2006:1
Net Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) $ millions: 2000: 199 ; 2006: 707
ODA per capita $: 2000: 53; 2006: 174
ODA as % of GNI: 2000: 1.2; 2006: 3.2
Sources: World Development Indicators database, 2008; Lebanon Ministry of Agriculture
(2005)

204
Country overview: Agriculture
Lebanon is a small country on the Eastern Mediterranean, bordered by Syria from the
East and North and by Palestine from the South. Te total area of Lebanon is estimated
at 10452 km2 consisting of a coastal strip, two mountainous chains, Lebanon and Anti-
Lebanon which are separated by a fertile plateau, the Bekaa Valley. Tis topography
provides the country with more than 6 agro-ecological regions allowing the production of
crops special European (pome and stone fruits), subtropical (citrus, avocado and banana)
and arid to semi-arid climates (olives, carobs).
In terms of figures, the total agricultural area is about 273000 ha (about 25% of
total country area). Fruit trees, olives and vegetables cover 30%, 22% and 15% of this
area respectively. Cereals cover about 24% of the total area which is usually followed
by open field vegetables or fallow (Ministry of Agriculture 2005). The Agriculture
sector employs about 7% of the labour force as reported by the same source. This
figure could be challenged with regards to undeclared illegal and foreign labour, and
the fact that this employment is partial for a significant number of these workers.
Economically, the total value of agricultural products including plant and animal
production was estimated at about 1.34 billion US dollars as reported by the FAO/Ministry
of Agriculture (2005). Imports are about 400 million US dollars while exports are about
100 million US dollars.
Historically, Lebanese agriculture was predominantly private sector issue with a
limited role or involvement of the government in fnancial and technical support, and
extension services. Before the civil war (1975), the government had subsidy programmes
for fruits, cereals and Sugar beet through specialized bureaus. Afer the war, the subsidy
of wheat and sugar beet was continued. An assessment of the sugar beet proved that the
subsidy is abused by large land owners and infuential persons who were monopolizing
the production using small farmers as a cover. Wheat is still receiving subsidies, but this
support is subject to regular reviews due to the same reasons.
Currently, tobacco is still being subsidized through a specialized agency which buys
it from farmers based on a license system allocating a maximum cropping area and yield
per farmer. Tough it required hard labour and an all year round production cycle, some
farmers used skewed methods to acquire more licenses through friends or relatives in
order to get more of the subsidy.
Yet, post 1991, the picture of the agricultural sector looks as follows: agriculture does
not represent a major or the only source of income for small holders, and these depend
on other jobs to generate adequate income for their families; hence they could not be
classifed as farmers. Large land owners or tenants have the large produce and market
share.
Extension service is provided mainly by the Agrochemical industry which also controls
the seed market. Te extension agents working for these companies are basically salesmen
promoting their hybrid seeds and pesticides of all kind. Te strength and expansion of
205
the private sector service is mainly due to the weak structure of the extension service at
the Ministry of Agriculture (4 staf), and the insignifcance of the Ministry of Agriculture
among the other ministries (budget about 0.5% of National budget and staf average age
in the 50s.
Since 1991, three agricultural strategies were developed with the support of FAO and
the EU. Tere was and still is no implementation plan for any these strategies.
International aid to agriculture
Due to its unstable political and security situation, Lebanon has received international
aid for agriculture worth hundreds of millions of US dollars since 1991. Tis aid was
through grants or loans. Te most reputable loans were from IFAD to support agriculture
infrastructure (104.77 million), the irrigation rehabilitation and modernization project
(11.75 million) and the Small holder livestock rehabilitation programme (21.89 million).
Since 1998, USAID invested about 40-50 million US dollars in development aid annually,
most of which was designated for agricultural and rural development projects. Tese funds
were dispersed through US based NGOs working in Lebanon. EU support to Agriculture
also amounted more than 30 million Euros since 1991. Support to agriculture and rural
development is an important issue for the Italian cooperation who invested about thirty
million Euros in the last 10 years to enhance production, product quality, processing,
markets and know-how. Te German Cooperation (GTZ) is supporting the Government
in Combating land degradation and water management. Other donors from other parts
of the world invested money in agricultural development projects especially afer the 2006
Israeli aggression.
At some point and in some donor attractive areas, activities were never terminated,
switching between donors and projects with really tackling sustainability aspects. In
some cases, funds were dispersed inefectively leading to little or no impact and minimal
chances of sustainability. Tis will be discussed later in more details.
A thorough impact assessment for all the development programmes and projects that
were implemented in Lebanon since the end of the civil war should be conducted. Tis,
if undertaken by governmental authorities, would allow setting a strategy that regulates
donor interventions and channel them to achieve national objectives.
206
PAKISTAN country facts
Total population (2006): 159.000.000
Rural population (% of total) (2006) : 64, 7
Agricultural employment % of total employment (2003-05): 42.7
Share of female employed in agriculture (2003-06): 67
Gross national income per capita 2006: $ 800 (rank 162)
Population below national poverty line (1998-99): 32.6 (35.9 rural)
Proportion of undernourished in total population (2002-04): 24
Agriculture land (% of the land area) (2003-05): 35.2
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (2001-03): 149
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: 67.6 ; 2004-06:110.6
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 1,818 ; 2004-06: 2,533
Agriculture average annual % growth (2000-06): 4.4
Agriculture % of GDP: 1995: 26 ; 2006: 19
Merchandise exports % of total ($ millions) : 1995: 8,029 ; 2006: 16,930
Food: 1995: 12 ; 2006: 12
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 4 ; 2006: 1
Merchandise imports % of total ($ millions): 1995: 11,515 ; 2006: 29,825
Food: 1995 - 2006: 11
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 1 ; 2006: 0
Net Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) ($ millions): 2000: 692 ; 2006: 2,147
Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) per capita $: 2000: 5 ; 2006: 14
Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) as % of GNI: 2000: 0, 9 ; 2006: 1, 7
Sources: World Development Indicators database, 2008

207
INDONESIA country facts
Total population millions (2006): 223
Rural population % of total (2006): 50.8
Agricultural employment % of total employment (2005): 44.5
Gross national income per capita (2006): US$ 1,420 (Rank 140)
Population below national poverty line % (2004): 16.7
Proportion of undernourished in total population: 1990-92: 9 ; 2002-04: 6
Agriculture land - % of the land area (2003-05): 26.3
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (2001-03): 41
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: 82.8 ; 2002-04: 112.7
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 3,826 ; 2002-04: 4,354
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-2000: 2.0 ; 2000-06: 3.1
Agriculture % of GDP: 1995: 17; 2006: 13
Merchandise exports % of total:
Food: 1995: 11 ; 2006: 12
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 7 ; 2006: 6
Merchandise imports % of total:
Food: 1995 - 2006: 9
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 6; 2006: 3
Net Of cial Development Assistance (ODA)$ millions: 2000: 1,654 ; 2006:1,405
Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) per capita$: 2000: 8 ; 2006: 6
Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) as % of GNI: 2000:1.1 ; 2006: 0.4
Sources: World Development Indicators database, 2008, IFAD

208
PHILIPPINES country facts and report
Total population, millions (2007): 88.5
Rural population (% of total) (2006): 36.6
Agricultural employment % of total employment (2003-05): 37.1
Gross national income per capita (2008), Atlas method, US$: 1.890
Population below national poverty line % (1997): 25.1
Population below $1 (PPP) per day, %: 1994: 18.4; 1997: 14.4; 2000: 15.5; 2003: 14.8
Proportion of undernourished in total population: 1990-92: 26; 2002-04: 18
Agriculture land (% of the land area) (2003-05): 40.9
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (1990-2003): 20
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: 77.9; 2004-06: 115.5
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 2,070 ; 2004-06: 3,074
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-2000: 1.7 ; 2000-06: 3.8
Agriculture % of GDP: 1995: 22 ; 2006: 14
Merchandise exports % of total:
Food: 1995: 13; 2006: 5
Agricultural raw materials: 1995-2006: 1
Merchandise imports % of total:
Food: 1995: 8 ; 2006: 7
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 2 ; 2006: 1
Net Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) $ millions: 2000: 575 ; 2006: 562
ODA per capita $: 2000:8 ; 2006: 17
ODA as % of GNI: 2000: 0,7 ; 2006: 0.4
Sources: World Bank Development Indicators 2008

209
Overview: country
Te Philippines is an archipelago of 7,107 islands located in Southeast Asia between the
South China Sea and the Philippine Sea. Out of a total population of 88 million, one-third
of Filipinos are living below the poverty line, mostly found in the rural areas.
Since its birth as a republic in 1896 which ended 300 years of Spanish colonization
and afer regaining independence in 1945 from American and Japanese colonizers, the
Philippines has followed a development path characterized by neo-colonial trade relations,
primarily with the US and Japan. With the onset of globalization, the countrys industries
have been limited to producing low value-added and labor-intensive re-exports, mainly
of electronic parts and garments. Coupled with the problem of a debt-ridden economy,
the country has failed to achieve a suf cient level of national capital accumulation enough
to spur a robust and self-sustaining industrial development. Te only saving grace of
the Philippine economy at present is the huge amount of dollar remittances sent home by
millions of overseas Filipino migrant workers who managed to escape poverty by fnding
temporary work abroad (as seafarers, domestic helpers, and health workers). Remittances
has helped buoyed the countrys dollar reserves and balance of payments despite a
perennial balance of trade defcit and low-level FDI infow.
Overview: agriculture
Agriculture on the other hand has performed in a similar dismal fashion as industry,
failing to produce enough for the countrys food security, not to mention the absence of its
forward and backward linkages with industry. Te agrarian economy is predominantly
characterized by small plot production of traditional food and cash crops such as rice, corn,
coconut and vegetables, with an average farm size of 1.5 to 2 hectares. Large plantations
exist in either two types of production systems: the haciendas growing traditional export
crops such as sugarcane and coconut and the capitalist-run farms operated by subsidiaries
or subcontractors of TNCs in the southern island of Mindanao growing bananas,
pineapples and oil palm for export. (Bernardino 2008, p.13)
Although agricultures share in the countrys GDP has shrunk to only 18%, a large
portion of the population rely on agriculture for a living --- around 40% of the total
population and 35% of the total labor force. Tis makes the agriculture sector important
not only for economic, but more importantly for social policy considerations. However,
the pattern of development in Philippine agriculture has been characterized by economic
stagnation feeding on backward semi-feudal relations in production. Land monopoly
continues to exact feudal forms of exploitation from the peasantry such as land rent, usury
and merchant profts which for centuries have been the structural causes of poverty and
insurgency in the country. Te traditional land-owning elite remains a powerful political
force in Philippine society, occupying elective seats in the national and local government
and hence had succeeded in resisting any attempt at instituting a meaningful agrarian
reform policy. Instead, a conservative and loophole-ridden land reform program (CARP)
was put in place in 1987, which has failed to break land monopoly and remains until now
210
a contentious policy issue inside the legislature. Moreover, this land-owning elite has
failed to transform itself into a capitalist class capable of modernizing the backward state
of Philippine agriculture.
Given such state and level of development, the agricultural sector expectedly sufered
setbacks in the era of trade liberalization (which started in 1980s through SAPs and
later through the WTO and other free trade agreements). Te average applied tarif in
agriculture came down to 9% while the average bound rate was 34.6% covering 99.4%
of all agricultural tarif lines based on Philippine commitments to the WTO Uruguay
Round agreements. Studies done on the impact of agricultural trade liberalization in the
Philippines, in the last twenty years, show a bleak picture of the countrys uncompetitive
position in the world market. Since 2001, the countrys rice import dependency averaged
12% of domestic consumption from around 4% in the 1990s, showing a worsening picture
of food self-insuf ciency from a period in the 1970s when the Philippines used to be a
rice-exporting country. Te food crisis of 2008 underscored the countrys food security
problem as it was forced to buy half of the total imported rice (2.4 million mt) at an
exorbitant price of $1,100 per metric ton. Unlike its rice-exporting Asian neighbours
(e.g. Tailand and Vietnam), the Philippine government has not provided the necessary
support for domestic production, with only 4% of national government expenditure going
into agriculture in 2007. On the other hand, the traditional exports of coconut oil, bananas
and pineapples have not fared well enough in the export market. With increasing imports
and stagnant exports, the trade balance in agriculture, unsurprisingly, has continually
been on a defcit.
Sources:
Arze Glipo (2008). Te Rice Crisis: A crisis of Policy, an Opportunity for Reforms.
Quezon City: Integrated Rural Development Foundation.
Asian Development Bank: http//www.adb.org/statistics
Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. http://www.bas.gov.ph
Country Stat Philippines: Facts and Figures on the Philippine Agricultural Economy 2007.
http://countrystat.bas.gov.ph
National Statistical Coordination Board. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d_agri.asp
National Statistics Of ce. http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/sr04144tx.html.
Philippines in Figures 2008: http://www.census.gov.ph/data/publications/PIF2008_fnal.pdf
Natividad Bernardino (2008). Te Expiration of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program and its Implications to Social Movement Strategies for Agrarian Reform.
Quezon City: Integrated Rural Development Foundation.

211
VIETNAM country facts
Total population, millions (2006): 84
Rural population (% of total) 2006: 73.1
Agricultural employment % of total employment (2003-05): 58.8
Percentage of female employed in agriculture (2006): 60
Gross national income per capita (2006) $: 700 (rank 169)
Population below national poverty line (2002): 28.9 (35.6 rural)
Proportion of undernourished in total population:
Agriculture land (% of the land area) (2003-05): 30.8
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (2001-03): 247
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: 63.1 ; 2004-06: 124.4
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 3,096 ; 2004-06: 4,717
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-2000: 4.3 ; 2000-06: 3.9
Agriculture % of GDP: 1995: 27; 2006: 20
Merchandise exports % of total $ millions: 1995: 5,449 ; 2006: 39,605
Food: 1995: 30 ; 2006: 20
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 3; 2006: 3
Merchandise imports % of total $ millions: 1995: 8,155 ; 2006: 44,410
Food: 1995: 5 ; 2006: 6
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 2; 2006: 4
Net Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) $ millions: 2000: 1,681; 2006: 1,846
ODA per capita $ (2006): 22
ODA as % of GNI: 2000: 5.5 ; 2006: 3.1
Sources: World Development Indicators database, 2008.

212
CHILE country facts
Total population (millions) (2006): 16
Rural population (% of total) (2006): 12.1
Agricultural employment % of total employment (2003-05): 13.4
Gross national income per capita (2006) $ 6,810 (Rank 76)
Population below national poverty line (1998): 17.0
Proportion of undernourished in total population (2002-04): 4
Agriculture land (% of the land area) (2003-05): 20.4
Tractors per 100 sq. km of arable land (2001-03): 272
Food production index (1999-2001=100): 1990-92: 74.0 ; 2004-06: 112.8
Cereal yield, kilogram per hectare: 1990-92: 3,949 ; 2004-06: 5,822
Agriculture average annual % growth: 1990-2000: 2.2 ; 2000-06: 6.2
Agriculture % of GDP: 1995: 9 ; 2006: 4
Merchandise exports % of total:
Food: 1995: 24 ; 2006: 15
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 0 ; 2006: 4
Merchandise imports % of total:
Food: 1995-2006: 7
Agricultural raw materials: 1995: 2; 2006: 1
Net Of cial Development Assistance (ODA): 2000:49; 2006: 83
ODA per capita USD: 2000: 3; 2006: 5
ODA as % of GNI: 2000 - 2006 0.1
Numbers and percentage of Of cial Development Assistance (ODA) to agriculture
2000/2003 Social: 194.4 million, 70.6%; Production: 35.5 million, 12.9% ; Infrastructure: $
34.6 million, 12.6% ; Other: $ 10.9 million, 3.9% ; Total: 275.4 million dollars
Government Expenditures for agriculture (2004): $ 513.546 million, corresponding to
6.6% of total public spending. Priority areas: a) Promoting productive; b) Infrastructure
and c) Social services (health, rural housing, recreation and sports, transportation
subsidies, Promoting ethnic groups, women promotion, training, Regularization of
indigenous lands and waters).
Sources: World Bank Development Indicators 2008; Latin American Economic System;
Composition and regional distribution of public expenditure in rural areas in Chile, 1996-
2004. Alfredo Apey and Rene Guzman Delgado Arratia, 2006

213
COLOMBIA country facts and report
Facts and gures on rural development
Total population (2005)1 : 42,090,502 inhabitants
Rural population (2005)2 : 10,524,226 people living in rural areas (25% of population),
1,742,429 farming units (associated to a rural home), 3,844,623 people in agricultural
labor.
Women and men in agricultural labor (2005)3 : 6.5% of total female employment and
29.2% of total male employment are dedicated to agricultural labor.
Gross domestic product per capita (2006)4 : US$ 6,381
Proportion of undernourished in total population (2005)5 : 41% of Colombian households
sufer from food insecurity, with indices of food insecurity afecting 58.2% of rural people
and 87% of displaced families.
Government investment in agriculture (2008)6 : $ 815,661 million Colombian pesos
Of cial development assistance - total aid (2006)7 : US$ 988 million
Sources for development aid to the governmental sector (2007): United States (105), United
Nations (57), European Commission (35), International Organization for Migration (28),
Japan (13), Spain (10), Germany (7), Holland (6), (fgures in million US$)
Context of agriculture and rural development
Colombia is a country with an immense patrimony in cultural and biological diversity,
provided with a broad variety of agro-climatic landscapes, a coastline conformed of both
the Caribbean and Pacifc ocean, and a tradition of peasant, indigenous, afro-descendent
and fsher-folk people with the vocation to produce abundant and healthy food. It is a sad
paradox that Colombia is now facing conditions of hunger, malnutrition and poverty, and
that food-aid programs are evermore institutionalised as a governmental policy.
Over the last 20 years, agriculture in Colombia has sufered the extension of three
catastrophes, which have consolidated the rural crisis and threatened the county potential
to attain food sovereignty : the rapid decrease in the production of basic food-stufs and
cereals, due to a rising dependence on food imports ; the stigmatization and degradation of
rural-work and small-hold farming practices ; and the growth of inequitable distribution
of wealth and rural land.
With a total population of 42 million people in Colombia, there is a growing shif towards
urbanization. Now only 26% of people live in rural areas, while 74% are concentrated in
urban areas, with evident problems of inequity and social exclusion within rural and urban
society, as well as between regions. Tis is not surprising taking into account that the country
has been inficted by a legacy of violence and social injustice; some estimates report that
close to 4 million people in the last 15 years have been displaced from the countryside, and
that 6.8 million hectares of land have been taken by force and dispossession.
In this perspective of Colombia, it is inevitable to link the rural and socioeconomic
crisis with the increasing fragility and erosion of natural resources and agro-biodiversity,
214
including the privatization of environmental
patrimony. An estimated 40% of natural
ecosystems have undergone grave deterioration
and many regions are sufering problems of
access to clean and adequate water supplies. Te
tendency to open-up the country to international
investment through the implementation of
mega-projects (plantations, large-scale mining ,
hydroelectric dams, agribusiness and agro-fuels
) gravely threatens essential forest ecosystems,
traditional fsheries, as well as collective territories
of ethnic and rural communities.
Local communities have also had to afront
the brutal impacts of fooding, landslides and
desertifcation, distressing local peoples food
production and livelihoods. Te frst semester
of 2009 showed an increase of 42% in fooding
disaster victims in Colombia compared to
2008. Of cial fgures for this period show the
real calamity of climate change with damages
reported, among the others, to 14,616 homes and
22,289 hectares of farmland.
Tis panorama implies signifcant changes
in the focus and delivery of public policies
and international cooperation towards the
fundamental need to uphold cultural identity,
agro-biodiversity, sustainable rural lifestyles
and collective peoples rights. Development aid
should address problematic structures of social
- ecological justice which are entrenched within
rural society and sustained by the dominant
political - economic model. Moreover, is it vital
to recover the diversity of the rural economy
and enhance local - regional food circuits, since
it is not only necessary to ensure dignifed
livelihoods for women, peasant and fsher-folk
families, but also to ensure the adequate supply
of healthy, traditional and locally-produced food
for the urban population, strengthening cultural
ties, sustainability and solidarity within this
inseparable rural - urban relationship.
Box 1
Key action point headings
of the Agrarian Mandate of
Colombia (2003)
1. Right to life, democratic
liberties and respect of human
rights.
2. Food security and food
sovereignty.
3. Alternatives to Free-Trade
Agreements.
4. Right to land and integral
agrarian reform.
5. Reconstruction of the
small-holder farming and food
economy.
6. Environmental protection
and recovery of agro-
ecosystems.
7. Negotiated policies to resolve
the situation of cultivators of
illicit crops.
8. Social, economic and
cultural rights of peasant,
indigenous and afro-
descendent people.
9. Political recognition of the
peasant movement.
10. Recognition of peasant,
indigenous and afro-
descendent women and their
rights.
11. Right to cultural identity
and territory.
12. Put an end to forced
displacement of the population.
13. Political solution to the
social and armed confict.
14. Unity within the social and
popular sectors of society.
215
Proposals and alternatives from social movements and NGOs
A key point of reference of the present-day social movement in Colombia, is the Agrarian
Mandate of Colombia, a compendium of 14 points presented to the country in April
2003 by a broad range of civil-society groups (peasants, indigenous, afro-descendent
and NGOs) which combines in essence the rural crisis of Colombia and the collective
demands for change
In the same year, the catholic church issued a signifcant doctrine for rural teaching
and oration entitled La Tierra un Don de Dios, where they reclaim for fundamental
principles of solidarity, fair land distribution, food sovereignty and co-responsibility and
participation of all sectors of society to seek a real solution to the structural problems that
concern rural territories of Colombia, recognising the fundamental rights of all peasant
men and women to live with dignity and integral well-being.
More recently, the historic annulment of the Rural Development Statute by the
Constitutional Court opened up a new chapter in the debate on agriculture and agrarian
reform in Colombia. Te Statute was declared unconstitutional in March 2009 because it
did not comply with the requirement of prior consultation with indigenous peoples and
afro-descendent communities. Tis is the second piece of legislation that has fallen for
lack of adequate consultation, as the General Forestry Law was declared unconstitutional
in January 2008 for this same reason.
Tese two laws had been highly criticized by civil-society organizations as the policies
directly infringe fundamental rights of indigenous and Afro-Colombian people, and
also degrade the livelihoods of peasants, rural workers, and those displaced by violence,
particularly in terms of food sovereignty and food security. It is important to highlight, that
the fall of the Rural Statute was one of the objectives of the Minga Social y Comunitaria,
a mobilization of at least 10,000 indigenous people throughout the country, who marched
to the capital of Bogot during October and November, 2008.
Similarly, the diferent manifestations of the food, economic and ecological crisis have
brought together civil-society organizations from many regions of Colombia in a series
of national campaigns and social platforms to reclaim for food sovereignty, defence of
biodiversity and water as a fundamental right.
A notable example is the promotion of a national referendum to proclaim water as
a fundamental human right in the Colombian constitution. Te confuence of union
leaders, environmentalists, public service consumer groups, educational sector, youth
groups and peasant and indigenous communities was strategic in the achievement of
more than 2 million supporting signatures, which permitted the initiative to be registered
in the Colombian Congress in October 2008.
At the same time, a recent national meeting of 200 social, peasant, indigenous and rural
organizations from seven eco-regions of Colombia have demonstrated the importance of
designing a collective plan and platform for action to face the food crisis (see box 2)
216
Box 2. Civil-society proposals and alternatives to face the food crisis
in Colombia
Political and Organizational Actions
(i) Te need to promote and strengthen peasant and womens organizations, as well
as to ensure scenarios for community meeting and inter-exchange.
(ii) Tat institutional support is focused according to the social and ecologic realities
of the food crisis in the diferent localities and regions.
(iii) Regional and national networks that endorse public policies within a framework
of food sovereignty, and that are developed from the grass-roots and with the
participation of youth.
(iv) Promote the production and consumption of locally-produced and traditional
food products.
(v) Defend biodiversity, small-holder farming and indigenous territories as a
collective patrimony.
Cultural Awareness and Actions
(vi) Foster life-projects that dignify the peasant cultures and promote the sense of
territorial identity.
(vii) Processes of popular education that encourage local food production, based on
traditional knowledge.
(viii) Use media resources and alternative communication to disseminate
information on the rural and food crisis.
(ix) Public awareness on the right to healthy food, the protection of peasant lifestyles
and the impacts of GMOs.
(x) Collective work-days (mingas), bartering and community gatherings which
promote solidarity.
(xi) Civil-society mobilization to oppose the privatization of water and
environmental patrimony.
Alternatives for Sustainable Production
(xii) Promote the production and diversifcation of family vegetable and fruit plots.
(xiii) Conservation, use and exchange of native seed, plant and animal varieties.
(xiv)Dissemination of agro-ecological production practices and traditional
knowledge.
(xv) Alternative marketing schemes that link rural and urban communities.
(xvi) Pedagogical tools and technology transfer which focus on community-to-
community partnerships.
217
Organizations and institutions which have
contributed to the book
Association for Sustainable Development ADD, Medenine, Tunisia
Te ADD (Association for Sustainable Development) is a development association,
nonproft, created February 15, 2000. Postal Adresse: 4, rue Errachidya. Mdenine 4100.
Tunisie. ADD is a member of More and Better.
Campaign Against Famine in Ethiopia (CS-CAFE), Ethiopia
CS CAFE is a civil Society- Coalition against Famine focusing on poverty alleviation and
policy advocacy and lobbying. CS CAFE is a members of More and Better.
Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes du Mali CNOP Mali
CNOP is a member organization of La Via Campesina, the international movement that is
a part of a global movement of peasants, family farmers, indigenous and landless people.
CNOP Mali is a member of More and Better.
http://www.cnop-mali.org/
Developmet Fund, Norway
Te Development Fund is an independent non-government environment and development
organization (NGO) founded in 1978. It supports development projects through local
partners in Asia, Africa and Latin America and is also doing policy and lobbying. Te
Development Fund is the main donor of the More and Better campaign. It has contributed
to this publication by providing resources in fnancial and work time terms.
http://www.utviklingsfondet.no/English/
FUNDAEXPRESION, Colombia
FUNDAEXPRESIN institutional mission is to become a forum for education and
outreach of the various social events, cultural and environmental aspects of Colombian
and Latin American society, facilitating their active and creative participation in order to
contribute to entrenching a culture of coexistence and peace
FUNDAEXPRESION is a member of More and Better.
http://www.fundaexpresion.org/ppal.htm
Global Donor Platform for Rural Development - GDPRD
GDPRD consists of governments and international institutions. It is committed to
achieving increased development assistance impact and more efective investment in rural
development and agriculture. Since its creation in 2004, major bilateral and multilateral
development agencies are united in a coordinated endeavor to get the rural development
agenda right.
http://www.donorplatform.org
218
Green Line, Lebanon
Green Line is a non-governmental association independent of any government, group,
or individual. It embraces the principle of environmentally sound development in the
developing world. Green Line brings together all those who are concerned with preserving
the past, conserving the present, and giving the future a better chance.
www.greenline.org.lb
Indonesian Peasant Movement SPI, Indonesia
Indonesian Peasants Union--which shortly known as SPI-- is a movement organization for
small peasants, farm workers, and peasants-based indigenous community. SPI is actively
commitedto struggle for agrarian reform, peasants rights, food sovereignty, family farm
based agriculture and the Neo liberalism agenda.
http://www.spi.or.id/en/
Kenyan Federation of Agricultural Producers - KENFAP, Kenya
Te Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers is a non-political, non-
commercial, democratic federation of Kenyan farmers. It is the umbrella organization
representing farmers in Kenyan agriculture. Its key role is to articulate issues specifcally
afecting farmers and, generally, players in Kenyas agricultural sector. KENFAP enjoys
national, regional and international recognition, which explains its involvement in
spearheading lobbying and advocacy of farmers interests in Kenya.
KENFAP is a member of More and Better.
www.kenfap.org
National Union of Small Scale Farmers UNAC, Mozambique
Te National Union fghts for the greater role of camponeses (small scale farmers) in the
construction of a more just, prosperous and equal society. UNAC became legally registered
in 1994 and is a member of La Via Campesina, the international peasant movement. A
larger number of UNAC members are organised in farmer associations and co-operatives.
UNAC is a member of More and Better.
http://www.unac.org.mz/
Relief Society of Tigray REST, Ethiopia
REST is an Ethiopian non governmental indigenous organization. It was established
in 1978, initially to serve the needs of the people in the liberated areas of Tigray during
the then civil war and those afected by drought. In 1991 REST was registered as an
indigenous Non- Government Organization (NGO) in the Tigray Regional State in
Ethiopia. Te organization shifed from relief to development activities recognizing that
real development would not come without addressing the root causes of poverty and
backwardness. REST is a member of More and Better.
http://www.rest-maret.org/
219
South Asia Partnership-Pakistan (SAP-PK), Pakistan
It is a volunteer network of participatory development-support organizations operating
under the same name and for the same purposes in Canada and four South Asian
countries: Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. As member of South Asian civil
society movement, is striving to empower marginalized sections of society and working to
infuence policies in favor of people.SAP-PK is a member of More and Better.
www.sappk.org
Southeast Asia Regional Initiatives for Community Empowerment -
SEARICE, Philippines
SEARICE is a regional non-government development organization that promotes and
implements community-based conservation, development and sustainable use of plant
genetic resources in partnership with civil society organizations, government agencies,
academic research institutions and local government units in Bhutan, Lao PDR, the
Philippines, Tailand and Vietnam. Established in 1977, SEARICE is registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock, non-proft organization
based in the Philippines.
http://www.searice.org.ph/
Terra Nuova, Italy
Terra Nuova is a nongovernmental organization born in 1969 and based in Rome. It
designs, supports and implements development co-operation projects in Africa and
Latin America. It also promotes awareness-raising programmes aimed at informing and
sensitizing the European civil society in relation to development issues afecting the South
of the world. Since 2005 Terra Nuova is hosting the secretariat of the More and Better.
http://www.terranuova.org/archivio/terra-nuova-english-version
For more information about the organizations taken part in the More and
Better campaign please see: www.moreandbetter.org
220
The More and Better Campaign
More and Better was established to campaign for a major increase in, and signifcant
improvements in the quality of development aid to agriculture, rural development and
food as essential components to reduce hunger and poverty (1st Millenium Development
Goal)
More and Better is an independent campaign comprising social movements, civil societys
and nongovernmental organizations from over 40 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin
America.
Te campaign is based on a set of common principles developed when the campaign
was set up in 2003. Tey still serve as a base for a common platform of action, and can
be applied into the diferent political, social and geographical contexts in which the
organizations members are working.
Te More and Better cooperates, among the others, with the International Alliance
Against Hunger (IAAH) and the International CSO/NGO Planning Committee for Food
Sovereignty (IPC)
Te campaign has got a small secretariat in Rome hosted by the Italian NGO Terra Nuova
since 2005. Please write to secretariat@moreandbetter.org if you wish to have more
information on how to join the More and Better or go to www.moreandbetter.org
Some terms and denitions used in More and Betted documents
Aid in this document is synonymous with development assistance and other similar
terms. Diferent terms are used in diferent languages and by diferent organisations.
Agriculture, Pastoralism and Fisheries includes cropping, livestock husbandry,
pastoralism, fsheries, forestry and other natural resource use for food production and
food gathering, which is dispersed throughout rural, urban and peri-urban areas.
Farmers, Herders and Fisherfolk in this document refer to smallholder peasant/family
crop and livestock farmers, herders/ pastoralists, fsherfolk, landless farmers and
indigenous peoples, among other users of natural resources for food production.
Natural Resources include land, water, coastal commons, forests, genetic resources /
agricultural biodiversity,
Farmers, fsherfolks, herders, pastoralists, indigenous peoples and agricultural workers
among other natural resource users
221
More and Better common principles
Te climatic, natural, political, cultural and economic situations of countries are diverse
and ofen unique. However, there are several common principles which could improve the
quality of aid targeted for agriculture, pastoralism, fsheries and rural development.
1. Aid should support the programs and policies developed by the
recipient communities and countries.
Aid should be provided in a manner that does not disrupt local production and markets,
thus supporting long term development and respond to the expressed needs of local
communities. Local and national food security should be a top priority for aid. Aid should
lead to greater autonomy and self- reliance of the recipient countries with regard to food
production and availability of food for all. Aid should strengthen the local control of
resources and reach the intended benefciaries in rural areas.
2. Working with local communities and social organisations
Better aid supports local communities, community-based organizations and social
organisations particularly in building: political empowerment; the capacity of people to
articulate their views; implementation their own development models; and meaningful
participation in development processes. Better aid recognizes that needs and realities of
rural communities are at the core of solutions to solve hunger and poverty. Development
aid should give priority to strengthening small-scale production sector to ensure the
realization of sustainable livelihoods for the majority.
3. Building on local culture and knowledge
Knowledge held by communities is based on generations of people interacting with their
unique surroundings. Better aid should build on the wealth of local culture and knowledge
held by communities, supporting processes that facilitate appropriate technological
solutions.
4. Promoting diversity
Aid should promote diversities human, cultural, biological, environmental, and in
production methods.
5. Promoting a culture of participation
Better aid generates inclusive dialogue and engagement among diferent development
actors. Implementation of agricultural, pastoralism, fsheries, forestry and rural
development must be based on democratic consultations and meaningful ongoing
community participation. Aid should contribute towards reducing existing inequalities.
222
6. Gender is a key
Women play a major role in agricultural production and in local food security. Better Aid
facilitates the empowerment of women, recognizing the fundamental importance they
hold in providing food for their families and for the community.
7. Sustainability
Livelihoods are sustainable when they can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks
that threaten food security without undermining their natural resource base. Building local
capital, social systems, fnancial capital and the natural resources on which they depend
is critical. Better aid should be guided by a clear development paradigm supportive of
the principles of social, economic and environmental sustainability and intergenerational
equity.
8. Coherence and linkages
Eforts should foster linkages between the local, national and global, opportunities for
learning and knowledge sharing. Better Aid should provide platforms for the exchange
of experience globally, provide nationally coherent programs for delivery of Aid, and
should foster linkages among local eforts. It should address problematic structures and
mechanisms that limit the efectiveness of aid in reaching the worlds poor and hungry.
9. Changes in delivery and focus of aid
New policies and practices for agriculture, pastoralism, fsheries and global food trade are
needed to end hunger and poverty, and to promote sustainable development. Changes in
the delivery and focus of aid are needed to achieve this.
To support such new policies and practices aid should:
acilitate provision of suf cient, safe, nutritious food (food security);
put emphasis on income strategies, peoples livelihoods, local production systems, local
markets, fair trade, fair and good distribution systems, protection of markets where
needed to enhance national and local food security, and avoid the use of food aid where
it will threatened the marked for local products
support realization of land reform, water rights and unrestricted access to genetic
resources for food and agriculture and wider agricultural biodiversity for smallholder
farmers; exclusive fshing zones for artisanal fsherfolks; grazing rights for pastoralists;
improved common property resource management;
support sustainable, farmer-led, smallholder / family / community agricultural systems
(e.g. agroecology, sustainable agriculture, organic agriculture).
To achieve this requires improved education and public awareness not only for how to
implement this but also how to avoid problems cause by poorly conceived aid.

There |s an urgent need for more support for agr|cu|ture and rura| deve|opment.
But not a|| support |s good support. Somet|mes |ess a|d |s better than more.
Both governments |n deve|op|ng countr|es and donor countr|es are now g|v|ng
some more support to agr|cu|ture and rura| deve|opment - even |f |t |s st||| very ||tt|e.
W||| th|s support susta|nab|e agr|cu|ture or an agr|cu|ture mode| wh|ch contr|bute
to c||mate change, |oss of b|od|vers|ty and so|| degradat|on? W||| |t benef|t the poor
and undernour|shed or the agro-|ndustry and the r|ch peop|e? W||| the |ncreased
support to agr|cu|ture and rura| deve|opment do more harm than good?
The More and Better campa|gn |s advocat|ng for more and better support for
agr|cu|ture and rura| deve|opment. ln th|s book we focus on the qua||ty of the
support. The case stud|es from 12 countr|es |n Afr|ca, As|a and |at|n Amer|ca
- presented |n th|s book |ook at examp|es of both successfu| support and bad
a|d. They show very c|ear|y that good |ntent|ons, p|ans and fund|ng do not g|ve
any guarantee for pos|t|ve outcome of projects. lt |s necessary therefore to fo||ow
pr|nc|p|es and gu|de||nes for how to dec|de what k|nd of support |s needed, for the
goa|s of the programs and projects, and how they shou|d be carr|ed out.
*OUFSOBUJPOBM4FDSFUBSJBUPG.PSFBOE#FUUFS
c/o Terra Nuova, v|a Gran Bretagna, 18
00196 Roma lta|y}
Te|: + 39 06 80 70 847, Mob: +39 340 6741705
Fax: + 39 06 80 66 25 57
www.moreandbetter.org
secretar|at@moreandbetter.org