Decentralization of Agricultural Extension Systems: Key Elements for Success Burton E. Swanson and Mohamed M.

Samy University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Introduction Future success of rural development efforts in developing countries will depend not only on the presence of technical expertise and availability of resources but also on each governments willingness to redefine the role of its institutions and to allow the active participation of rural people in formulating and implementing rural development programs. As partners in development, public extension systems in developing countries are under increasing pressure to prove their relevance and importance. These public extension systems will need to deal with specific policy and institutional issues that currently hinder their contribution to rural development. At the national level, inappropriate public extension policies, limited public funds, lack of accountability, and growing rural poverty have prompted developing countries to reexamine the relevance of agricultural extension to rural development (Shah, 1998). At the institutional level, problems of complexity, responsiveness, financing and cost-effectiveness, and growing demands for local services are all challenges that extension must address to prove its importance to rural development (Swanson and Samy, 2002). International agencies and scholars have been urging developing countries to decentralize their extension systems and to introduce other organizational reforms (e.g. improved management, accountability) in order to deal with many of these problems, as well as to realize rural development goals, such as the more equitable distribution of economic growth, and to facilitate grassroots participation in development (Cohen & Peterson, 1999). Purpose of the Paper Within the context of rural development, this paper outlines the rationale for decentralization, various alternative arrangements, and goals of decentralizing agricultural extension systems in developing countries. In addition, key elements necessary for the successful implementation of a decentralized agricultural extension system are discussed. This paper draws on institutional lessons learned from 24 case studies1 on different aspects of agriculture extension programs and systems in selected developing countries. Contextual Framework The historical development of agricultural extension systems in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are different, but the present policy and institutional context are similar. In Africa and Asia, many agricultural extension systems share a colonial heritage. Extension systems in countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Egypt, India, and Indonesia inherited civil service regimes that were highly centralized and, to a large degree, detached from the rural population (Shah, 1998). These regimes were established to control and exploit rural people; they were not designed to encourage or even allow effective participation as a fundamental element of rural development. Also in Latin America, extension systems have displayed similar conditions. In the cases of
Most of these case studies were prepared for the Workshop on Extension and Rural Development: A Convergence of Views on Institutional Approaches? That was held on November 12-15, 2002 at the International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington, D.C. and co-sponsored by the World Bank, USAID, and the Neuchatel Initiative.
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Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, extension systems are described by McMahon (1999) and Savioff and Lindarte (2002) as highly bureaucratic, inefficient and unresponsive to the needs of farmers. In addition to these historical barriers and, following their independence, many governments have enforced policies to control the political and economic behaviors of their citizens. As a result, these governments have limited the role of private sector firms and NGOs in providing educational and extension services to the rural people and depended mainly on their public sector institutions in providing these types of services. These governments polices have created centralized extension systems that have a monopoly on extension activities and the delivery of services to the rural poor. Suffering from lack of resources, ineffective management mechanisms and unreliable systems of accountability, these centralized extension systems have left many rural people in Africa, Asia and Latin America with very limited access to extension services; and frequently, these services are poorly suited to their needs. Since the early 1980s some governments have started to permit private sector firms to serve the technology needs of the commercial farm sector, thereby, widening the gap with the subsistent traditional farm sector. While agriculture continues to be the most important economic sector in many developing countries, government policies have frequently discriminated against rural people. They are often politically marginalized, excessively taxed, and lack adequate public services, including education, health services and agricultural extension (Parker, 1995). Furthermore, unfavorable public perception of the governments role, in general, and agricultural extension, in particular, limits the participation of rural people in agricultural extension activities. Various opinion surveys in Africa suggest that citizens tend to associate public sector with a predatory role (Shah, 1998). The Proper Role of Different Levels of Government: A Pre-Requisite for Decentralization To successfully decentralize a national extension system, both shareholders and stakeholders will need to understand what is involved and have a role in the process. To clarify the process, it is essential to differentiate between the functions of providing and producing public goods and services (Silverman, 1995). Making this distinction helps identify those managerial and financial tasks to be maintained at the central level, and those functions to be delegated to and produced by local level extension units (e.g. district or county level). Central governments should shift from attempting to control decision-making and economic behavior to the more limited role of encouraging public participation and providing an enabling environment for private firms and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Shah, 1998). The central government should be responsible for the provision of public goods and services (actual allocation of resources to produce a particular good or service), although it is not necessary that it be directly involved in producing them (Silverman, 1995). This change in the role of government is expected to improve the managerial and financial capacity at different levels of the government. Moreover, this distinction helps assess the impact of central-local arrangements on the achievement of rural development goals. For example, the central level of an extension organization has a comparative advantage in national priority-setting, strategy formation and financial planning issues the provision function; while local levels of the extension systems have comparative advantage on locationspecific and service delivery issues - the production function. Limiting central extension systems to the provision function resolves many issues related to the inability of the central administration to tailor programs and delivery methods to meet the diverse needs of farmers and

rural people in different areas of the countrya capacity that is essential for successful program implementation. At the same time, the local level of the extension system has a comparative advantage in designing programs to suit local conditions and in addressing local needs (i.e. producing public goods). Finally, a number of functions and tasks can be shared by different levels within an extension system, including the state, provincial and/or regional level; these tasks include the provision of technical support, producing extension materials and conducting mass media activities. In determining which level of government should have the authority for specific functions, the World Bank AKIS Thematic Team points out that the authority should be delegated to the lowest level of government at which economies of scale and scope are not compromised, and the costs and benefits are internalized (World Bank, 2000). For example in India and China, the authority for managing, financing and delivering extension services has been transferred from the central government to the state and district (India; see: Sharma, et. al. 2001), and the county and township (China; see Nie, et. al. 2002) governments; while in Colombia and Venezuela, the municipal extension offices have been delegated the responsibility for managing and funding extension programs and projects at the municipal level (Garfield et. al., 1998) (Savioff & Lindarte, 2002). Decentralization Active participation of the rural population is an essential factor for real and sustainable rural development to occur (Uphoff, et al, 1979). Furthermore, involvement of appropriate levels of government in decision-making, implementation, and evaluation of development programs is another essential factor contributing to the success of rural development. The complexity of developmental problems cannot be fully addressed, using the conventional topdown extension approach. Successful rural development requires the transfer of authority or decentralization of specified planning, financial, and management functions to different levels of government in a territorial hierarchy under the jurisdictional authority of the central government (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). This demands the participation of rural people and the development of appropriate extension capacity, at different levels, especially at the local levels. The decentralization of program planning, management and financial functions could help ensure that extension systems are more effective, efficient and responsive to the needs of the rural people. However, decentralization of a national agricultural extension system is an intricate process and requires not only strong commitments and careful planning, but it is also an enormous effort that demands the understanding and coordination of all parties involved to ensure successful implementation. For example, Trinidads efforts to decentralize its extension system illustrate some of the things that can go wrong, when key planning and management functions are not fully considered (Seepersad and Douglas, 2002). A World Bank study of decentralization efforts in developing countries during the early 1990s found that only 6 out of 19 countries showed varying levels of success towards decentralizing their extension systems. Colombia, Jiangxi (China), the Philippines, and Nusa-Tenggarra-Timor (Indonesia) were relatively highly decentralized, while Poland and Tunisia showed some evidence of decentralization (World Bank, 2000). There are three major factors involved in the decentralization process: 1) transferring specific decision-making functions to local people, starting with simple managerial functions such as program planning and implementation, then priority setting and fund allocation, and ending with a more complex set of functions including accountability and financing/co-

financing; 2) public participation factor, reflecting the degree of authority that is transferred to rural people starting with advisory capacity in program planning and implementation, and ending with the assumption of total control over selected financial planning and the accountability functions; and 3) local government involvement, which indicates the level of government or local institutions, including private firms and NGOs, that assume control over specific functions, starting with provincial and regional levels, and ending with district, county and/or municipal levels. The term decentralization has been used in the literature to describe four alternative institutional arrangements: deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and transfer to private firms and NGOs (Parker, 1995) (Cohen & Peterson, 1999) (Smith, 2001). These four institutional arrangements reflect different combinations of the three decentralization factors mentioned above. These four types of institutional arrangements are briefly described below and illustrated in Figure 1: Figure1. Conceptual Framework Depicting Different Forms of Decentralization

Functions
ate ri v s P O r to sfe & NG n a Tr irms F

Participation

Management: Co-financing

Program Financial Accountability

Devolution

Management:
Program Priority Setting & Fund Allocation

Delegation

Program Management Planning Implement

Deconcentration

e at v i r s o P GO t N r fe ns ms & a Tr Fir

Central

Regional/ State

Municipal/ County

Private Level of Firms & Government NGOS

Deconcentration In this institutional arrangement, selected managerial functions, such as program planning and implementation, are assigned to sub-national levels within the national agricultural extension system. The extension system exists at local levels, including state or province, district or
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county, mandal or township, and village, in the form of discrete offices. The training & visit (T&V) extension system is an example of the deconcentration of managerial responsibilities (Parker, 1995). During the 1970s and early 1980s many African and Asian countries tried to address the shortcomings of the conventional extension systems by adopting the T&V system to organize their systems in a single line of command under the Ministry of Agriculture in each state/district, and with a field office at the sub-district level. Two more recent examples of deconcentration of extension systems have been established in Trinidad and Ghana during the late 1990s. In reforming the Ministry of Agriculture, the extension system in Trinidad was modernized and decentralized by setting up mini-central extension systems at the regional level and, to some extent, at the county level. These deconcentrated regional extension offices are staffed with representatives from various technical divisions, similar to the staffing pattern of national extension office. These regional and county offices have the responsibility only for planning and implementing extension programs, including identifying farming communities, and determining the timing and scope of extension programs (Seepersad & Douglas, 2002). The Ghanaian example of government reform involved the deconcentration of the agricultural extension system to the regional and district levels in 1997. The main goal of deconcentration was to transfer management and technical functional powers from the central extension directorate to the district extension offices (Amezah & Hesse, 2002). In both Trinidad and Ghana the main goal was to transfer management and technical functions from the central extension administration to the regional and district extension offices (Seepersad & Douglas, 2002) (Amezah & Hesse, 2002). Concerns have been raised in both cases about the lack of rural participation in program planning and the ability of this form of decentralization to effectively respond to farmers needs. Delegation Delegation is the form of decentralization that takes place when a parastatal or semiautonomous government agency is assigned responsibility for implementing rural development programs and providing extension services. Some managerial, priority setting and fund allocation functions are delegated to regional extension systems, which, in turn, deconcentrate responsibilities for internal managerial and administrative systems to their own sub-regional units. One form of delegation was seen in Integrated Rural Development projects with extension components. These projects were carried out in several countries including Kenya, Mali, Sri Lanka, Mexico, and Brazil during 1970s and 1980s (Parker, 1995). Limited to the project implementation phase, such an arrangement was useful in focusing directly on the needs of rural people in a particular region or geographic area. In these projects, extension services were linked to integrated farming systems research and other necessary services such as credit and marketing (Parker, 1995). Success of the extension components in these projects was due to the administrative freedom of autonomous administrative units in decision-making, priority setting, and in tailoring programs to local conditions (Ruttan, 1975). However, lacking the support of the national extension systems, most of these autonomous administrative units, which were created to by-pass incompetent government extension staff at the local government level, could not survive after the end of the project funds. Recent examples of delegation include projects in India and Benin. In India, Agricultural Technology Management Agencies (ATMAs) were formed as registered civil societies in each pilot district to coordinate and direct agricultural extension and rural development programs in

each district in late 1990s (see Sharma, et. al, 2001). A development project was launched in Benin in 1999 that targeted 250 villages. In this project, the responsibilities of management and fund allocation were delegated to local village development communities allowing them to draw up local development plans, submit funding requests and to contract for extension workers (Chabeuf, et al, 2002). Devolution Under devolution, program planning, management and co-financing responsibilities are transferred to state, regional and/or county governments. These local governments have discretionary authority to exercise their responsibilities and are only bound by national policy guidelines. Agricultural extension systems in China, several European countries and the U.S., have assigned management and co-financing responsibilities to state/regional/county governments. This form of decentralization is different from deconcentration and delegation in two important aspects: 1) extension administrators are primarily responsible to the local government rather than to central government, and 2) local government co-finances extension services. Devolution may include elements of both deconcentration and delegation, but it goes beyond that by recognizing the important role of public participation through political, fiscal, and management control in satisfying the demands of local people. China, Philippine and Venezuela are good examples of devolution in developing countries. In 1993, China made each level of government responsible for funding and managing its own respective extension program (Nie, et. al 2002). In 1991 the Philippine government devolved the delivery of basic services, including agricultural extension to the provincial and local governments in order to promote participatory bottom-up planning (World Bank, 2000). Started in 1995, the reform of Venezuelan agricultural extension system placed key responsibility and decision-making powers for implementing extension programs at the municipal level. The reform also included a co-financing matrix for sharing the cost of extension programs between the national, state, and municipal governments and with the farmers (Savioff & Lindarte, 2002). Transfer to Private Firms and NGOs Decentralization in this form involves shifting responsibilities for extension activities from the central government to private firms, farmers associations and NGOs at different levels. Private sector firms have become completely responsible for providing extension services in countries such as Australia and The Netherlands; while they have become the main partner in the transfer of agricultural technology in Brazil. Farmers associations in some European countries, such as Denmark and Sweden carry out extension services with partial support of the government (Rivera, 2000) (FAO, 2000). In some developing countries, the decentralization of extension systems has relied heavily on the participation of professional and civil societies, including several civil extension associations, in the case of Venezuela (Savioff & Lindarte, 2002) and India (Sharma, et. al, 2001); and civil society organizations in the case of Uganda (Nahdy, 2002). NGOs have become more effective in providing educational and other services to small and marginal farm households. For example, NGOs in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal have provided funding and technical assistance to small farmers in the areas of marketing, soil conservation, and reforestation as well as in gardening and crafts (Amanor & Farrington, 1991). In Zimbabwe, it was estimated that 44 percent of the farmers belong to some form of voluntary

agricultural association (Bratton, 1986). In Latin America, NGOs have supplied small farmers with seeds in Ecuador, and provided technical assistance for major crops in the case of Bolivia and Honduras (Amanor & Farrington, 1991). Linking Decentralization of Agricultural Extension Systems to Rural Development: The Goals of Decentralization Some forms of decentralization are needed to achieve rural development with equity. As a separate strategy or as a complement to reform and modernization, decentralization produces more efficient and equitable service delivery by actively engaging rural people in development and making better use of local resources and knowledge. Decentralization also leads to greater participation resulting in more understanding of the governments role and, in turn, helps improve the image of extension (Bird, 1994). Decentralized extension systems have shown evidence of increased resource mobilization and reduced strain on central finance, greater accountability, and more responsive administration (Bird, 1994). Decentralization of agricultural extension systems can achieve three major goals. Serving the Interests of Rural People Decentralization provides rural people with real control over local extension activities in terms of planning, implementing, and monitoring. It has the potential to be a powerful tool for improving extension services by seeking contributions from various groups at the local level. For example, in Venezuela decentralization of the extension system allowed rural communities and poor farmers to participate in planning and implementing extension programs and to demand services to meet their needs (Savioff & Lindarte, 2002). Enhancing the representation of a wide variety of political, religious, ethnic, and other social groups in planning and carrying out of extension programs will, in turn, improve equity in the allocation of resources and the delivery of services (Silverman, 1992). In Uganda, farmer groups on sub-county and district councils were able to have direct input into planning and decision-making of extension programs and awarding of extension contracts, which was formerly carried out by the government at the district and national levels (Nahdy, 2002). Improving Management of Extension An important goal of decentralizing agricultural extension systems is improving managerial capacity by reducing administrative overload and congestion in the communication channels. Improving managerial capacity would improve technical capacity to deliver services at field levels as well as permit timely reaction to emerging problems. Several examples have mentioned decentralization as a main force behind improving management capacity of extension systems in such cases as China, Ghana, and Nepal (Nie et al, 2002) (Amezah & Hesse, 2002) (Thapa & Ojha, 2002). Improved performance can also be expected to result from improved information about local resources and conditions, and from the participation of the users in planning, implementation, and monitoring of extension programs such as in the case of Uganda (Nahdy, 2002). Improving Financial Performance of Extension Decentralization can contribute to improving financial performance and maintaining the fiscal stability of agricultural extension systems at the local levels. To achieve this goal, extension administrators at the local level can use a number of financial and managerial tools,

including rational decisions to balance expenditures with revenues, reforming the mechanisms for managing and recruiting staff, providing incentives and motivation, and increasing the revenue for public extension. The central government can help improve financial performance at the local level by providing clear financial guidelines and promoting transparency and accountability. Moreover, empowering farmer groups through active participation will allow farmers to watch over the implementation of extension programs including the utilization of extension funds, such as the case of Uganda (Nahdy, 2002). Decentralization: Key Elements for Success From the case studies that were prepared for the Workshop on Extension and Rural Development: a Convergence of Views on Institutional Approaches?2 and other published case studies, a number of key elements were found to be important in the successful decentralization of national extension systems. Also, it should be noted that the speed and effectiveness of implementing decentralization is influenced by factors beyond extensions control, especially governments policy and regulations. The key issues that were identified follow: Legal Framework There is a need to establish a legal framework and structure of authority that defines the decentralized extension levels, and how they relate to each other (Silverman, 1992). In addition, enabling legislation and regulatory laws that a) describes the role and tasks of extension at various levels, b) limits to the authority and responsibilities, and c) specifies coordination mechanisms among the different levels are all essential to the success of decentralized decisionmaking in extension (Shah, 1998) (Cohen & Peterson, 1999). In China, the establishment of clear guidelines by the central government (Extension Law passed in 1993) to delegate authority to the provincial, prefecture and county levels was instrumental to the success of public extension reform (Nie et al, 2002). In Venezuela, a key element for successfully decentralizing extension system was improving inter-institutional coordination among national, regional, and local levels of government (Savioff & Lindarte, 2002). On the other hand, the lack of political and legal support, as well as unclear guidelines can hinder decentralization efforts. For example, lack of political will in Ghana delayed the decentralization of the extension system for two years during 1990s and since then it has been only partially implemented and with poor results (World Bank, 2000). While in Trinidad, ambiguities in design, implementation, and coordination between central and regional extension levels led to confusion and frustration (Seepersad & Douglas, 2002). Stakeholder Participation There is wide agreement that user participation is an essential element in decentralizing an agricultural extension system. An active civil society assists significantly in implementing decentralization (Parker, 1995). A World Bank study concludes that development of civil societies provides important support for decentralizing extension systems (World Bank, 2000). In Ghana, local communities have well developed political institutions. The impact of decentralization was felt through increased participation in local extension activities. In India,
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This workshop was organized the Sustainable Agricultural Systems and Knowledge Institutions (SASKI) Thematic Group at The World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in cooperation with the Neuchatel Initiative during November 12 15, 2002.

ATMAs were controlled by a Governing Board composed of stakeholders and it received direct input and feedback from Farmer Advisory Committees that were formed in each block (Sharma, et al, 2001). In contrast, the results of one-party rule in Ivory Coast, and the repressive nature of rural social relations in Bangladesh did not permit the majority of rural people from participating in and benefiting from decentralization activities (Parker, 1995). Strengthening Management Capacity Decentralized extension systems need to have adequate managerial capacity at the lower system levels to carry out the responsibilities devolved to them (Parker, 1995). Improving managerial capacity can be achieved through a combination of personnel development, information technology, and revised organizational structure to fit local conditions (Cohen & Peterson, 1999). A key element contributing to the success of the Venezuelan decentralization is the implementation of a well-defined system of human resource management (Savioff & Lindarte, 2002). Furthermore, making use of new information technology (IT) tools allows decentralized extension systems to better gather and manage information appropriate to local conditions and, at the same time, reduces the need for some middle-level administration. In Nepal, computers are used to improve management capacity and program support (Thapa & Ojha, 2002). In India, each ATMA established its own administrative office that was electronically linked to the state and national levels (Sharma, et al. 2001). Improving Technical Capacity Enhancing the knowledge and technical skills of extension agents and adopting a useroriented extension approach are key factors affecting the success of decentralization. Effective linkages with research, adequate in-service training, and sufficient number of subject-matter specialists at the local levels are necessary elements in improving extensions technical capacity. In India, technical backstopping and training was provided to extension agents by Krishi Vigyan Kendra (KVK) and zonal research station (ZRS) staff (Sharma, et al. 2001). In case of Venezuela, training helped improve technical skills and motivate extension agents (Savioff & Lindarte, 2002), but weak links with research were a serious problem in decentralizing Colombias extension system (http://www.ciesin. org/ decentralization/ English/Issues/ Agrextension.html). Operational Level Funding Adequate funding for local level extension units is an essential element for the successful implementation of decentralized extension systems. In China, the development of new revenue generating mechanisms was essential to the success of decentralization (Nie et al, 2002. Lack of adequate funding for lower-level governments was the single most important factor that undermined decentralization attempts in many developing countries (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983). Depending on their fiscal management capacity, decentralized extension systems can be offered different financial packages that include central government funds, competitive grants, raising taxes, and leveraging users fees. However, it is imperative for these decentralized extension systems to develop simple financial control and monitoring mechanisms to balance revenue with expenditures.

Accountability Maintaining transparency and accountability is another key element to improving the performance of decentralized agricultural extension systems. If decentralization is to work, agricultural extension systems must be accountable to those who fund their programs and activities, and those who benefit from them. In other words, there is a need for a reliable system of accountability at each decentralized level for both shareholders and stakeholders. Key means for promoting accountability are: political and legal oversight, institutional competition, and administrative mechanisms (Cohen & Peterson, 1999). The most important means of decentralized accountability are external, particularly capable and committed leaders, as well as well-defined legislative and regulatory laws (Cohen & Peterson, 1999). One approach for political leaders to enhance accountability is by linking spending and taxing responsibilities. In India, the combination of district level ATMA Governing Boards and block level farmer advisory committees were established in all project districts to increase accountability (Sharma, et al. 2001). Allowing private firms and NGOs to compete and contract for providing extension services eliminates the government monopoly over extension services. Creating this type of institutional competition environment will improve efficiency and accountability. Administrative mechanisms include establishing reliable monitoring systems, an effective scheme of incentives, as well as encouraging professionalism among extension staff. Risks Associated With Implementing Decentralization There are several management, financial and technical risk factors associated with implementing the decentralization of agricultural extension systems in developing countries. These factors can significantly undermine the efforts of decentralization and development. First, local extension levels are likely to duplicate the rigid employment policies and staffing patterns of the central extension system that can cause administrative and supervision problems, and an increase in the number of local employees. Second, financial limitations can result in the deteriorating of service delivery, the number of people served, as well as in reducing staff incentives. Third, inadequate numbers of qualified subject matter specialists at the local levels can often lead to poor quality of extension programs, content, and delivery methods. Finally, mechanisms for information and technology flow to decentralized local extension units tend to be poorly developed, especially with regard to research-extension linkages and the training of extension agents. References Amanor, K and Farrington, J. (1991). NGOS and Agricultural Technology Development. In Rivera, W. and Gustafson, D. (Eds.). Agricultural Extension: Worldwide Institutional Evolution and Forces for Change. Elsevier, New York. Amezah, K. & Hesse, J. 2002. Reforms in the Ghanaian Extension System. Unpublished Extension Case Study. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Bird, R. (1994). Decentralization Infrastructure: For Good or Ill? Policy Research Working Paper 1258. The World Bank, Washington D.C. Bratton, M. (1986). Farmer Organizations and Food Production in Zimbabwe. World Development. 13 (3), 367-84. Chabeuf, N., Toledano, J., and Bouarfa, Y. 2002. Benins Faster and Less Costly Community Development. Unpublished Extension Case Study. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

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Cheema, G.S. and Rondinelli, D. A. (Eds.). 1983. Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries. Beverly Hills: Sage. Cohen, J.M. and Peterson, S.B. 1999. Administrative Decentralization: Strategy for Developing Countries. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2000. Agricultural and Rural Extension Worldwide: Options for Institutional Reform in the Developing countries. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. Garfield, E., Guadagni, M. and Moreau, D. 1998. Colombia: Decentralization of Agricultural Extension Services. (http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Networks?ESSD/ icdb.nsf/f16d571b1acb206e852566b400) McMahon, M. 1999. Latin AmericaModernization of Agricultural Extension. Presentation at the World Bank AKIS Retreat. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. Nahdy, S., 2002. Case Study on the Role of Agricultural Extension in Rural Development. The Uganda National Advisory Services (NAADS). Unpublished Extension Case Study. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Nie, C., Swanson, B.E. and Feng, Y. 2002. Financing of Extension: Lessons from China. Unpublished Extension Case Study. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Parker, A. 1995. Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development. Policy Research Working Paper 1475. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. Rivera, W. 2000. Agricultural and Rural Development Worldwide: Options for Institutional Reform in the Developing Countries. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Ruttan, V. 1975.Intergrated Rural Development Programs: A Skeptical Perspective World Development. 12. 393-401. Savioff, M. and Lindarte, E. 2002. Reforming National Extension: The Recent Experience of Venezuela. Unpublished Extension Case Study. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Seepersad, J. and Douglas, V. 2002. Decentralization of the Extension Services in Trinidad. Unpublished Extension Case Study. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Shah, A. 1998. Balance, Accountability, and Responsiveness. Lessons about Decentralization. Policy Research Working Paper 2021. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. Sharma, R., Swanson, B., and Sadamate, V. 2001. Field-Testing New Methodology for Planning and Implementing Extension Programs: A Comparison of Innovative Extension Projects in India and the United States. Proceedings of the 17th Annual Meeting of the Association for International Agricultural and Extension Education. Baton Rouge. Silverman, J. 1992. Public Sector Decentralization. Economic Policy and Sector Investment Programs. World Bank Technical Paper No. 188. Africa Technical Development Series. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. Smith, L. (2001). Reform and Decentralization of Agricultural Services: A Policy Framework. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Swanson, B. and Samy, M. 2002. Developing an Extension Partnership among Public, Private and Non-Governmental Organizations. Journal of International Agricultural and Extension Education. Vol. 9. No. 1. Spring 2002. Thapa, T. and Ojha, G. 2002. Projectization in the Context of Extension Reform in Nepal. Unpublished Extension Case Study. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. World Bank. 2000. Decentralizing Agricultural Extension: Lessons and Good Practice. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

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