Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the

United States

Team #2

Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management,

Oversight and Resources

"Team Members: Kevin Scheid

Gordon Lederman
Bruce Berkowitz

Item #1: Key Questions of the Investigation

Item #2: - Suggested Unclassified Readings for

Commissioners and a Briefing Plan

Item #3: Categories of Documents

Item #4: Proposed Interviews

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Team #2

Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight and Resources

Key Questions of the Investigation

1. Who was in charge of counterterrorism intelligence collection and analysis prior to

September 2001? What was the strategy? How did counterterrorism rank among
competing national security threats? How effective was the prioritization process; how
effective was the overall strategy?
2. How did the intelligence community perform collection, analysis and production of
strategic and tactical counterterrorism intelligence for the President and the NSC prior to
September 2001? What were there collection and analysis strategies? How effective
were these strategies, particularly in regards to al Qaida during the 1990s?
3. What covert actions were conducted to support US counterterrorism policy? Which
agencies were involved, how did it evolve during the 1990s leading up to September
2001? How effective was it, who managed it, and who was responsible for overseeing it?
4. Did any government officials or organizations act irresponsibly, negligently, or illegally
in executing their responsibilities for monitoring terrorism prior to September 2001; or
did they actively impede the ability of the US to attain warning of the 9-11 attacks?
5. What were the strategic and tactical warnings provided to government officials prior to
September 2001? What warning was provided and who received it prior to: the attacks
against US personnel in Yemen in 1992; the~WTC bombing in 1993; the Khobar Towers
attack in 1996; the bombings of the US embassies in 1998; the Millennium celebrations
of 2000; and the USS Cole attack in 2000? When was warning effective, when was it
not? What'response did the warning elicit from government officials?
6. How did the Intelligence Community respond (new actions, changed policies, revised
practices) and what did it learn from the succession of terrorist attacks against the US
during the 1990s; how effectively did it apply these lessons to its on-going foreign
intelligence and covert action operations? ...
7. How have various policies governing intelligence activities - e.g., the assassination ban,
the ban on using human rights violators for intelligence sources, and various FISA
restrictions - impacted US efforts to thwart terrorist activities?
8. How much was spent on counterterrorism intelligence and covert action from 1989 to
September 2001? How was it spent? What was requested in the President's Budget for
this mission; how much was reallocated within the President's Budget; how much was
provided through supplemental appropriations; and how much was provided through
third parties (both cash and in kind)? Were the counterterrorism efforts of the
Intelligence Community adequately funded?
9. How did the Executive Branch conduct oversight of US counterterrorism intelligence and
covert action programs prior to September 2001? How did Congress conduct such
oversight? Was the oversight effective? Did the level of operational detail requested by
the Congress impede or improve the effectiveness of the programs? How has this
changed since September 2001?

DRAFT
Team #2: Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight and
Resources

Selected Bibliography

4 U.S. Response to the 9-11 Attacks: Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the
September 12 Era (Simon & Schuster, 2003).

4 Radical Islamic Terrorism: Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror:
Radical Islam's War Against America (Random House, 2002).

4 Oven>iewofU.S. Intelligence:

> 'Richard Betts, "Fixing Intelligence," in Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002), pp. 43-
59.
> Bruce Berkowitz, "The New Protracted Conflict: Intelligence and the New War on
Terrorism," in Orbis (Spring 2002), pp. 289-300.
> Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Congressional Quarterly
Books, 1999). _. ~ _
> Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge University Press,
1996).
> Reference Work: Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community 4th ed. (Westview
Press, 1999).

4 Warning: Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (Harvard University
Press, 1988).

4 Distant Precedents:

> Ernest May, "Intelligence in the Fall of France, 1940," available from Commission staff,
and ideally, Ernest May, Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (Hill and Wang,
2000). " ~ •" "
> "CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire: The Politics of 'Getting it Right'" (Kennedy
School of Government case, 1994), available from Commission staff.
> "Prelude to War: U.S. Policy toward Iraq 1988-1990" (Kennedy School of Government
case, 1994), available from Commission staff.
> "Lebanon and the Intelligence Community" (Kennedy School of Government case,
1988), available from Commission staff.
> David Kahn, "United States Views of Germany and Japan in 1941," in Ernest May, ed.,
Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars •
(Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 476-502.
> Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight," 43 Foreign
Affairs (1965), pp. 691-707, and ideally, Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor Warning and
Decision (Stanford University Press. 1962).
 IJKAM

Team #2: Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Management, Oversight

and Resources

Categories of Documents to be Requested

1. President's Daily Brief (July, August, September 2001)-

2. Presidential Transition Briefing Papers (Briefing by Mr. Tenet to President Bush
and Dr. Rice on global terrorism and the threat posed by UBL)
3. Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (July, August, September 2001)
4. National Strategic Watchlist (1995 to 2003)
5. National Intelligence Estimates related to Terrorism
6. Global Terrorism Situation Reports and Warning Intelligence
: " a. July / August / September 2001
b. November / December 2000
c. May / June / July .1998 _
7. After Action Reports
a. CIA 9-11 After-Action Report / Analysis (2001)
b. Kansi Shooting Investigation reports, related materials to his capture in
Afghanistan/Pakistan (1993)
c. Intelligence Community WTC Bombing after action report (1993)
d. Intelligence Community Khobar Towers after action report (1996)
e. Intelligence Community Nairobi and Dar es Salaam after action report
(1998)
- f. Intelligence Community Millennium Attacks after action report (2000)
8. National Security Agency
a. SIGINT Counterterrorism Reporting
b. SIGINT Assessments (2001 to 2003)
c. Warning reporting prior to major terrorist attacks (1985 to 2003)
d. Counterterrorism Product Line charter, mission, funding, etc.
9. Presidential Directives and Related Papers on Intelligence and Terrorism
a. Presidential Decision Document #35 (President Clinton, 1995)
b. Presidential Transition Papers on Intelligence (Bush to Clinton (1992) and
Clinton to Bush (2000))
c. Annual Report on Counterterrorism Resources of the Government (1998
to 2003)

DRAFT
 UKAr-

10. Annual Repon of the US Intelligence Community, Classified Annex (1998-to

2003)
11. Classified annex to the Intelligence Authorization Act (1985 to 2003)
12. Classified annex to the Defense Appropriations Act (1985 to 2003)
13. Office of Management and Budget, "Budget Passback" to the DCI and Secretary
of Defense (1985 to 2003)
14. Director of Central Intelligence program guidance on terrorism (1985 to 2003)
15. Office of the Secretary of Defense
a. Program Guidance on counterterrorism efforts
b. Department of Defense Intelligence Production Priorities
16. Covert Action
. .a. Presidential findings related to terrorism
b. Memoranda of Notifications related to such terrorism findings (1985 to
2003)
17. DCI Directives " "" —
a. Related to terrorism, funding for counterterrorism, warning processes
b. Budget, Oversight of Counterterrorism efforts, Congressional relations
18. Counterterrorism Center
a. Charter, mission, funding, related start-up documentation
b. CTC global terrorism collection strategy (1986 to 2003)
"£. CTC global terrorism analysjs strategy (1986 to 2003)
19. UBL Task Force charter, mission, funding, related start-up documentation,
performance, reporting (1996 to 2003)
20. Assistant DCI for Collection " "
a. 1C collection strategy
b. Terrorism related studies
21. Assistant DCI for Analysis & Production
a. Analysis strategy
b. Terrorism related materials
22. Organization Charts
a. Office of the DCI, CIA, NS A, NMA, DIA, CTC, UBL Task Force
23. Collection Strategies
a. CIA HUMINT strategies against terrorism (1985 to 2003)
b. NSA SIGINT strategies against terrorism (1985 to 2003)

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 DRAFT

c. N1MA IMINT strategies against terrorism (1985 to 2003)

d. FB1S Open Source strategies against terrorism (1985 to 2003)
24. President's Budget for the US National Foreign Intelligence Program
a. Vol. 1 CBJB, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
25. Finished intelligence produced by the Counterterrorism Center from 1995 to 2001
on al Qaeda, UBL, the use of airplanes as weapons, threats against building in the
United States, and related topics.
26. Chronologies of terrorism events provided to policymakers
27. NSC Tasking memoranda resulting from NSC Deputies Committee or Principal
Committee meetings
a. Global terrorism
b. Al Qaeda
c. Warning of terrorist attacks on the United States

DRAFT
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/20/2008

BOX: 00001 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 66 DOC ID: 31206573

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 3

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Teams Workplans & Action Plans

DOCUMENT DATE: 01/01/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: List

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT: Team #2
Candidates for Interview

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Closed by Statute

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE