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Date: Sun, 27 Jul 2003 15:14:02-0700
From: "Tucker, David USA" <dctucker@nps.navy.mil>^
To: hurley <cmhcal@compuserve.com>l?, hurley commission <mhurley@9-11 commission.gov>4P
Subject: [No Subject]
Part(s): |gj 2 jhe Problem with Using Counterterrorism Forces.doc application/msword 35.58 KB @

Mike -- attached is an elaborated but brief bullet version of one of the things
that we talked about on Friday. I hope its useful. I will follow this with
another e-mail but am sending this along now so that you get it as soon as
possible.

David

«The Problem with Using Counterterrorism Forces.doc»

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?Horde=6e3f79a9f02ffce501efa47a9... 7/28/03
The Problem with Using Counterterrorism Forces and a Possible Solution

• These forces undertake missions that are high-risk for those involved and for the
politicians that send them forth
o Failure damages the United States, can destroy policies, and put an end to
careers
• October 3 in Mogadishu killed the Clinton administration's policy
of aggressive multilateralism and ultimately cost Aspin his job
o Failure is more likely in these operations for three principal reasons
• The operations are at the limit of the operationally feasible
• They depend decisively on surprise and secrecy is hard to maintain
• Intelligence is never good enough
• Gathering the intelligence creates its own risks
• The higher the risk of the mission, the more carefully it must be supervised to
make sure that potential benefits outweigh the risks
o If asked for a plan, the CT units will develop one. They want to fight and
will take every opportunity to do so. They cannot be trusted to evaluate
risk by themselves.
o Supervision has to extend to the tactical and operational details because
these details have strategic and political consequences.
• The problem: Who supervises so risk management is conducted properly and
these forces can be used properly?
• Conventional commanders have a limited ability to do so
o Most senior commanders (three and four stars) have no experience with
special operations and do not understand the requirements and risks of the
missions
• Special operations are different from conventional operations,
emphasizing principles of war different from those that
conventional commanders rely on and understand
o Many conventional commanders are suspicious or skeptical of special
forces
• They dislike elitism: "Any good infantryman .. ."
• They see SOF as forces limited in what they can do compared to
general purpose forces, yet as forces that siphon off the best
soldiers and consume lots of resources
• SOF are cowboys: "They can get you into trouble but can't get
you out."
• Politicians have a limited ability to do so
o Civilians lack understanding of special operations and often of military
matters altogether
o Close supervision by civilians runs counter to accepted American view
that civilian and military matters are separable and should be kept
separate: "civilians set the policy and the military carries out the
operation."
o Military advisors with whom civilians typically deal do not themselves
know enough about special operations to properly advise civilians
 o Politicians are limited in their ability to intervene in military affairs ("Give
me more options or I will fire you")
• Overruling, changing or interfering in military plans carries huge
political risks for any politician who does it (consider Johnson and
the bombing of North Vietnam and Aspin, both unfairly accused
but who have nevertheless paid a price)
• Accepted understanding of military professionalism, which helps
keep the military out of politics, also works to keep the civilians
out of military business
• A Solution?
o From the moment that the new administration comes into office, it must
exercise the use of these forces in realistic scenarios at the highest levels
(President/NSC); military participants must include the one star and O-6
commanders of the units that will be in the field
• Exercises will build knowledge in civilians and experience
weighing risks and benefits, while increasing awareness of
political implications of their work among commanders
• Experience will lead to greater confidence and reasonable
decisions to employ the CT forces
o Precedents
• The British have used a similar system over the years, involving
the Prime Minister in the training exercise of the SAS and SBS
• The first President Bush approved a special operation that was part
of JUST CAUSE (Panama) only after an iterative process of
briefing and questioning that built his confidence and made for a
better plan