ROAD TUNNELS MANUAL

2. SAFETY

All rights reserved. World Road Association (PIARC)

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2. Safety
With the increasing number of tunnels under construction or in planning throughout the world, and the growing volume of traffic using existing tunnels, safety issues are becoming increasingly important. Incidents and accidents in road tunnels may be no more frequent than those on the open road, indeed road tunnels can provide a safer, more controlled driving environment for road users. However, the consequences of major incidents in the confined tunnel environment are potentially significantly more severe than on the open road and usually raise stronger reactions from the public. In a modern road tunnel, safety is assured by taking an integrated approach. Sets of well developed tools - like risk assessment, safety inspections and safety procedures - are available to help achieve the safety objectives from the initial planning and design stages of a new tunnel, through to the operation and upgrading of existing tunnels." An appropriate level of safety for tunnels that is comparable with that on the open road is achievable through a structured and integrated approach to the design and operation of tunnels that focuses on the prevention of serious incidents and the mitigation of consequences through the encouragement and facilitation of self rescue in the first instance and the subsequent effective intervention of the emergency services. Accident in a bidirectional road tunnel (Video)

If you can not see this video, click here to load the video file. Important lessons can be learned from the experience of past tunnel incidents, these are discussed in Section 2.3. Previous tunnel incidents have led to an increased international awareness and interest in tunnel safety impacts; indeed, following the report of the investigation after the Mont Blanc fire in 1999, a number of countries throughout the world initiated a review and update of national standards and guidelines for tunnel safety. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) established a group of experts on road tunnel safety, with PIARC representation, which produced Recommendations in 2001 on all aspects of road tunnel safety. These recommendations have contributed to the development and update of international standards for tunnel safety. In Europe, the European Commission prepared a Directive on minimum safety requirements for road tunnels on the Trans European Road Network which entered into force in 2004.

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Action has also been taken in other parts of the world. In the USA, the national standard for fire safety in road tunnels (NFPA 502) has undergone a periodic update, taking account of developments through research and learning from past tunnel incidents. The minimum requirements set out in the European Directive relate to tunnels that are on the Trans European Road Network. In countries throughout Europe and elsewhere, the regulations and requirements for tunnel safety may be more onerous than the requirements of the Directive. Such standards may be derived to account for the particular circumstances in the individual countries and to deal with tunnels that are not governed by the Directive, such as particular urban tunnels for example. The PIARC Technical Committee on Road Tunnel Operation has advanced the main issues regarding tunnel safety through the publication of a series of reports under dedicated Working Groups. In addition to its own activities and the legislative developments, a number of research projects and thematic networks, mainly in Europe, have contributed to the knowledge and understanding of the principles of tunnel safety and guided the tunnels community to the conclusion that there is a need for an integrated approach to road tunnel safety. These general principles are the subject of Section 2.1 of this Manual and the integrated approach is addressed in Section 2.2. More details on the international cooperative efforts aimed at better understanding and improving tunnel safety can be found in the following documents:
"Fire safety in tunnels" special issue Routes/Roads 324 (Oct. 2004) (8,65 MB) Initiatives since 2000 on road tunnel safety in Chapter 2 "Recent initiatives on road tunnel

safety" of report 2007R07

Appendix A "International projects and networks" of report 2007R07

Further to these activities, PIARC supports the Committee on Operational Safety of Underground Facilities (ITA-COSUF) of the International Tunnel and Underground Space Association (ITA) as an international network for exchange of experience and promotion of safety. Key to the integrated approach to road tunnel safety is the establishment of safety level criteria, the analysis of safety and the evaluation of the balance between the costs and the benefits to achieve an acceptable level of safety. Fundamental to this is risk assessment, an essential tool for tunnel safety management, discussed in Section 2.4. Of particular importance and requiring particular attention in the analysis and evaluation of tunnel safety are fires in tunnels, discussed in Section 2.5 and the transport of dangerous goods, discussed in Section 2.6. To maximise the effectiveness of tunnel safety management, certain tools are needed to support strategy, to drive critical decisions and keep a constant and traceable view of all safety issues over a tunnel's lifetime. The three major tools regarding tunnel safety management are the Safety Documentation; the Collection and Analysis of Incident Data and Safety Inspections. These are described in some detail in Section 2.7. New requirements regarding safety, as well as increase in traffic, lead to upgrading existing tunnels. This raises specific problems which are examined in Section 2.8.

Contributors Input to this Chapter was coordinated by Working Group 2 of the C4 committee (2008-2011) in which:
Didier Lacroix (France), former president of the committee, supervised the writing of the

chapter and reviewed the French text Gary Clark (UK), reviewed the English text and authored Sections 2.0, 2.1 and 2.2 Alejandro Snchez Cubel (Spain), authored Sections 2.3 and 2.7 Bla Luin (Slovenia) and Bernhard Kohl (Austria), authored Sections 2.4 and 2.6 Ignacio del Rey (Spain)and Fathi Tarada (UK) from WG4, authored Section 2.5 Jerome NKaoua (France) authored Section 2.8.

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2.1. General principles

The management of safety has particular challenges in road tunnels where hazards of moving vehicles carrying loads are significant and the outcome of serious incidents may be significantly affected by human behaviour which can be difficult to predict (Chapter 3). A'holistic' approach is necessary to take into account all aspects of the system consisting of the infrastructure, operation, emergency services, road users and vehicles. The first step in the assessment of requirements is to define the safety objectives. These are normally established at a national level in compliance with national laws, regulations and national standards with safety provisions being a function of the specific characteristics of the tunnel and the associated risk as defined through analysis and evaluation. Risk analysis and the evaluation of the acceptability of risk are addressed in Section 2.4 of this Manual. The fundamental principle to be followed is that in the event of an emergency in a tunnel, tunnel users will self-rescue. After the self-rescue phase of an emergency, the fire and rescue services will intervene to fight the fire and assist any remaining tunnel users that are unable to self-rescue. Safety objectives may be defined in various ways but the work of PIARC, the UNECE and the European Union agree on the broad definition of objectives as being: to prevent critical events, and to reduce the consequences of accidents. Integrated safety for tunnels (Section 2.2) requires that attention be given to both of these two objectives. Such an approach may be presented as a "safety circle" from pro-action and prevention through to mitigation, intervention and evaluation; and back to pro-action, as shown in Fig. 2.1-1. More information on the objectives and general principles of safety is given in Chapter 3 "General principles" of report 2007R07. Actions aimed at meeting safety objectives and reducing risk may be classified in the following categories:

Fig. 2.1-1: Safety circle

Tunnel user behaviour (Chapter 3) Operational and management measures (Chapter 4) Tunnel geometry (Chapter 6) Tunnel structural facilities (Chapter 7) Tunnel equipment (Chapter 8)

Information regarding each of the above topics is given in the relevant chapters of this manual as shown above. General information on the choice of safety measures can be found in the following documents:

Chapter 2 "Safety concepts for tunnel fires" of report 05.16.B Technical report 05.13.B "Good Practice for the Operation and Maintenance of Road Tunnels" Chapter 4 "Safety practices" of report 2007R07 Technical report 2008R15 "Urban road tunnels - Recommendations to managers and operating bodies for design, management, operation and maintenance" Chapter 5 "Recommended additional measures to prevent escalation of critical traffic conditions in road tunnels" of report 2008R17

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The aim of safety planning and implementation is to achieve the right balance between the optimal safety level provision and the reasonable construction and operating costs. This may be achieved by taking an integrated approach to tunnel safety (Section 2.2).

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2.2. Safety elements and integrated approach

Safety is not the simple adoption of all possible safety measures but is the consequence of a balance between the forecast risk factors and the safety measures. With the establishment and development of international regulations, recommendations and guidelines, there is a need for a framework within which all aspects of tunnel safety are taken into account. Such a framework may contain the following principal elements:

Safety level criteria (regulations & recommendations) Infrastructure and operational measures Socio-economic and cost-benefit criteria Safety assessment techniques (safety analysis and evaluation) Road tunnel usage Stage of tunnel life (planning, design, construction, commissioning, operation, refurbishment, upgrade) Operating experience Tunnel system condition These safety elements are described in the Chapter 5 "Elements in an integrated approach" of report 2007R07.
An integrated approach is a framework to plan, design, construct and operate a new tunnel or an upgrade to an existing tunnel, fulfilling the required safety levels at each stage of the tunnel life. This should take place in accordance with a safety plan, following the right safety procedures. The opposite figure shows a schematic representation of a proposed integrated approach for the safety of new and in-service tunnels, comprising the elements listed above (figure from Chapter 6 "Conclusion" of report 2007R07.

Fig. 2.2-1: Integrated approach

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2.3. Experience from past tunnel incidents

Information on incidents and accidents in tunnels, as well as lessons drawn, have been addressed by various reports of the PIARC Committee on Road Tunnels. Earlier reports present a statistical census of breakdowns, accidents and fires in selected tunnels, as well as the lessons to be drawn from such events for the geometric design of the tunnel, the design of the safety equipment and the operating guidelines - thus presenting a collection of data of vital importance to engineers and decision-makers involved in tunnel design :
Technical report 05.04B "Road Safety in Tunnels" Chapter 2 "Fire risk and design fires" of report 05.05B : Chapter 2 "Information on previous large tunnel fires" of OECD/PIARC report on Transport of

Dangerous Goods through Road Tunnels :

Appendix 12.1 "Norwegian incident and accident statistics" of report 05.16B :

The incidents of Mont Blanc, Tauern and St. Gotthard (1999 and 2001) led to an increased awareness of the possible impact of accidents in tunnels. The likelihood of escalation of accidents into major events is low, however the consequences of such incidents can be severe in terms of victims, damage to the structure and impact on the transport economy. Year 1978 1979 1980 1982 1983 1996 1999 1999 2001 2001 2006 Tunnel Velsen (The Netherlands) Nihonzaka (Japan) Sakai (Japan) Caldecott (USA) Pecorile (near Genova, Italy) Isola delle Femmine (Italy) Mont-Blanc (France-Italy) Tauern (Austria) Gleinalm (Austria) St. Gotthard (Switzerland) Viamala Tunnel (Switzerland) Lenght 770 m 2 km 460 m 1,1 km 660 m 148 m 11,6 km 6,4 km 8,3 km 16,9 km 750 m Nbr Tubes 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 Casualties 5 fatalities and 5 injured 7 fatalities and 2 injured 5 fatalities and 5 injured 7 fatalities and 2 injured 9 fatalities and 22 injured 5 fatalities and 20 injured 39 fatalities 12 fatalities and 40 injured 5 fatalities and 4 injured 11 fatalities 9 fatalities and 6 injured

Table 2.3-1: Fires in road tunnels with 5 or more fatalities (due to fire or preceding accident) since 1950 A more complete table can be found on Table 2.1 "Serious fire accidents in road tunnels" of report 05.16.B. These catastrophes demonstrated the need for improving preparation for, as well as preventing and mitigating, tunnel accidents. This can be achieved by the provision of safe design criteria for new tunnels, as well as effective management and possible upgrading of in-service tunnels, and through improved information and better communications with tunnel users. Conclusions drawn from the enquiry following the Mont Blanc tunnel fire were that fatal consequences could be greatly reduced by:
a more efficient organisation of operational and emergency services (harmonised, safer and

more efficient emergency procedures, specifically for cross-border operation),

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more skilled personnel, more effective safety systems and greater awareness among users (car and truck drivers) on how to behave in emergency

situations. A detailed description of the Mont Blanc, Tauern and St. Gothard accidents including the original configuration of the tunnels, and a step-by-step guide to the accident, fire progression, and the behaviour of operators, emergency services and users, as well as the lessons to be drawn can be found in Chapter 3 "Lessons learned from recent fires" of report 05.16.B : . The lessons learnt are summarised in Table 3.5 of this report. Similar information is given in Routes/Roads 324 "A comparative analysis of the Mont-Blanc, Tauern and Gotthard tunnel fires" (Oct. 2004) on p 24. After the accident of march 24th 1999, the Mont Blanc tunnel required significant renovation before it was able to be reopened to traffic. The ventilation system comprised a significant portion of the rehabilitation design work - a description of the dimensioning, automatic operation and full-scale fire tests can be found at Appendix 12.2 "The Mont Blanc Tunnel Renovation" of report 05.16.B. See Appendix 8 "Austrian statistical study of 2005: Comparative Analysis of Safety in Tunnels, during 1999-2003 period" of report 2009 R08 for a contrast of traffic safety of road tunnels on motorways and expressways compared with safety on other types of roads, and also traffic safety in tunnels carrying bi-directional traffic with safety in tunnels with uni-directional traffic.

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2.4. Risk assessment

In the past, in many countries, the safety design of road tunnels to a great extent was based upon prescriptive regulations and guidelines. If the applicable prescriptions of relevant guidelines were fulfilled the tunnel was regarded as safe. However, this prescriptive approach has some shortcomings:
Even if a tunnel fulfils all regulatory requirements it has a residual risk which is not obvious and

not specifically addressed.

A prescriptive approach defines a certain standard of tunnel equipment etc. but is not suited to

take the specific conditions of an individual tunnel into account. Furthermore, in a major accident the situation is completely different to normal operation and a great range of different situations exceeding existing operational experience may occur. Hence, in addition to the prescriptive approach, a risk-based approach - called risk assessment - can be used to address the specific features of a tunnel system (including vehicles, users, operation, emergency services and the infrastructure) and their impact on safety. Various types of risk can be addressed in a risk based approach, such as harm to a specific group of people (societal risk), or to an individual person (individual risk), loss of property, damage to the environment or to immaterial values. Commonly, risk analyses for road tunnels focus on the societal risk of tunnel users which can be expressed as the expected number of fatalities per year or as a curve in the FN diagram showing the relationship between frequency and consequences (in terms of number of fatalities) of possible tunnel accidents. Risk assessment is a systematic approach to analyse sequences and interrelations in potential incidents or accidents, thereby identifying weak points in the system and recognising possible improvement measures. Three steps characterise the risk assessment process:
Risk analysis: Risk analysis is concerned with the fundamental question: "What might happen

and what are the probabilities and consequences?". It involves the identification of hazards and the estimation of the probability and consequences of each hazard. Risk analysis can be carried out in a qualitative or in a quantitative way or as a combination of both. Two families of approaches are suitable for road tunnels: - a scenario-based approach, which analyses a defined set of relevant scenarios, with a separate analysis for each one, - a system-based approach, which investigates an overall system in an integrated process, including all relevant scenarios influencing the risk of the tunnel, thus producing risk indicators for the whole system. For system-based risk analyses, quantitative methods are common practice. Thus probabilities of accidents and their consequences for different damage indicators (e.g. in terms of fatalities, injuries, property damage, interruption of services) and the resulting risk are estimated quantitatively, taking due account of the relevant factors of the system and their interaction.
Risk evaluation: Risk evaluation is directed towards the question of acceptability and the

explicit discussion of safety criteria. In other words risk evaluation has to give an answer to the question "Is the estimated risk acceptable?" For a systematic risk evaluation safety criteria have to be defined and determination made of whether a given risk level is acceptable or not. Acceptance criteria must be chosen in accordance with the type of risk analysis performed. For instance, scenario-related criteria can be set to evaluate the results of a scenario-based risk analysis, while criteria expressed in terms of individual risk (e.g. probability of death per year for a specific person exposed to a risk) or societal risk (e.g. reference line in a FN diagram) can be applied for a system-based risk analysis. There are different methods of risk evaluation: it can be done by relative comparison, by a cost-effectiveness approach or by applying absolute risk criteria. However, in practice a combination of different approaches is often applied.

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Planning of safety measures: If the estimated risk is considered as not acceptable, additional

safety measures have to be proposed. The effectiveness (and also cost-effectiveness) of the additional measures can be determined by using risk analysis to investigate the impact on the frequency or consequences of different scenarios. Planning of safety has to answer the question "Which measures are best suited to get a safe (and cost-efficient) system? The simplified flowchart in Figure 2.4-1 illustrates the main steps of the risk assessment process. Risk assessment of road tunnels allows a structured, harmonised and transparent assessment of risks for a specific tunnel including the consideration of the relevant influencing factors and their interactions. Risk assessment models provide a much better understanding of riskrelated processes than merely experiencebased concepts may ever achieve. Moreover, they allow evaluation of the best additional safety measures in terms of risk mitigation and enable a comparison of different alternatives.

Fig. 2.4-1: Flowchart of the procedure for risk assessment

Hence, the risk assessment approach in the context of tunnel safety management can be an appropriate supplement to the implementation of the prescriptive requirements of standards and guidelines. In practice, there are different methods to approach different kinds of problems. It is recommended to select the best method available for a specific problem.
Although risk models try to be as close to reality as possible and try to implement realistic base data, it is important to consider that the models can never predict real events and that there is a degree of uncertainty and fuzziness in the results. Considering this uncertainty, the results of quantitative risk analysis should be considered accurate only to an order of magnitude and should be supported by sensitivity studies or similar. Risk evaluation by relative comparison (e.g. of an existing state to a reference state of a tunnel) may improve the robustness of conclusions drawn but care should be taken in the definition of the reference tunnel. Basic principles and important components of risk analysis methodologies are presented in the : Technical Report 2008R02 "Risk analysis for road tunnels". This report also presents a survey of practical methods as well as a collection of case studies. The various approaches to risk evaluation are presented and discussed in a new report entitled: "Current practice for risk evaluation for road tunnels". This report also includes updates regarding risk analysis and is currently being finalised.

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2.5. Principles and tools for fire safety

Among the possible risks to be considered in road tunnels, vehicle fires give rise to particular concern because they are not very rare events and their consequences may be far larger underground than in the open if no appropriate measures are taken. For this reason, several PIARC reports treat the issue of fire safety in road tunnels. Part of the material included in these reports relates to specific tunnel features and is dealt with in the corresponding chapters of this manual, for instance:

fire and smoke detection in Section 8.3, ventilation for smoke control in Section 8.5 fire-fighting equipment for the users and emergency services in Section 8.6 fixed fire fighting systems in Section 8.7 tunnel response to fire in Chapter 9.

However, before fire-safety measures can be defined, general principles, basic information on tunnel fires and study methods must be available. These are the issues dealt with in this section. On the basis of the general safety objectives for road tunnels stated in Section 2.1 above, more precise aims have been proposed for fire and smoke control:

to save lives by making self evacuation by users possible, to make rescue and fire fighting operations possible, to avoid explosions, to limit damage to tunnel structure and equipment and to surrounding buildings.

These objectives are discussed in Section I "Objectives of fire and smoke control" of report 05.05.B, which includes a detailed discussion on tenability criteria under fire situations. Complementary guidance is included in Section 2 "Safety concepts for tunnel fires" of report 05.16.B. In order to help assess the risk and provide data to be used as a basis for design, information on the frequency of fires, design fires and design fire scenarios is given in Section II "Fire risk and design fires"of report 05.05B. Design fires for life safety considerations are normally specified as as either a constant or time-varying heat release rate, which is related to the assumed type vehicles on fire (e.g. one or more passenger cars or an HGV), and on the loads carried. Guidance on the selection of design fires is available from the PIARC report "Design Fire Characteristics for Road Tunnels". An understanding of how smoke behaves during a tunnel fire is essential for every aspect of tunnel design and operation. This understanding will influence the type and sizing of the ventilation system to be installed, its operation in an emergency and the response procedures that will be developed to allow operators and emergency services to safely manage the incident. Detailed discussion on the topic can be found in Section III "Smoke behaviour" of report 05.05.B and Section 1 "Basic principles ofsmoke and heat progress at the beginning of a fire" of report 05.16.B, which analyse in detail the influence of different parameters (traffic, fire size, ventilation conditions, tunnel geometry) in the development of an incident. To help scientists and designers, an exhaustive description of basic (full and small scale experimental results) and advanced (computer simulation) techniques available to approach fire safety studies is given in Section IV "Study methods" of report 05.05.B.

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2.6. Dangerous goods

Dangerous goods are important for industrial production as well as everyday life, and they must be transported. However, it is acknowledged that these goods may cause considerable hazards if released in an accident, on open road sections as well as in tunnels. Accidents involving dangerous goods are rare, but may result in a large number of victims and severe material and environmental damage. Special measures are needed to ensure as safe a transportation as possible. For these reasons, the transport of dangerous goods is strictly regulated in most countries. Dangerous goods transport raises specific problems in tunnels because an accident may have even more serious consequences in the confined environment of a tunnel. The following questions must be addressed:
Should dangerous goods movements be restricted in some tunnels, and what should be the basis

for decisions on such restrictions?

What type of regulation should be applied to restrict dangerous goods movements in tunnels? If dangerous goods are allowed, what risk reduction measures should be implemented, and what

is their effectiveness? From 1996 to 2001, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and PIARC carried out an important joint research project to bring rational answers to the above questions: OECD. Transport of dangerous goods through road tunnels. Safety in Tunnels, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2001 ISBN 92-64-19651-X. The following paragraphs summarise the outputs of this project and the further developments.

2.6.1. Regulations regarding transport of dangerous goods through tunnels The first step of the joint OECD/PIARC research project was an international survey of regulations regarding the road transportation of dangerous goods in general and in tunnels. The survey showed that all investigated countries had consistent regulations for the transport of dangerous goods on roads in general, and that these regulations were standardised within large parts of the world. For instance, ADR (the European agreement concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by road) is used in Europe and the Asian part of the Russian Federation. Most States in the USA and provinces in Canada follow codes in compliance with the UN Model Regulations. Australia and Japan had their own codes, but Australia has aligned with the UN system. In contrast, the survey highlighted a variety of regulations regarding the transport of dangerous goods through tunnels. Restrictions applied in tunnels showed considerable variations between countries and even between tunnels within the same country. The inconsistency of the tunnel regulations posed problems for the organisation of dangerous goods transport and led a number of vehicles carrying dangerous goods to infringe restrictions.. As part of their joint project, OECD and PIARC made a proposal for a harmonised system of regulation. This proposal was further developed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE), then implemented in Europe in the 2007 and further revisions of the ADR. The harmonisation is based on the assumption that in tunnels there are three major hazards which may cause numerous victims or serious damage to the tunnel structure, and that they can be ranked as follows in order of decreasing consequences and increasing effectiveness of mitigating measures: (a) explosions; (b) releases of toxic gas or volatile toxic liquid; (c) fires. Restriction of dangerous goods in a tunnel is made by assigning it to one of five categories which are labelled using capital letters from A to E. The principle of these categories is as follows:

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Category No restrictions for the transport of dangerous goods A Category Restriction for dangerous goods which may lead to a very large explosion B Category Restriction for dangerous goods which may lead to a very large explosion, a large C explosion or a large toxic release Category Restriction for dangerous goods which may lead to a very large explosion, a large D explosion, a large toxic release or a large fire Category Restriction for all dangerous goods (except five goods with very limited danger) E Table 2.6-1: List of the 5 ADR categories More information on this topic is available on the following websites:
UN ADR 2009 documents website Australian ADG code website Canadian TDG regulations

2.6.2. Choice of the most suitable regulation for a tunnel Banning dangerous goods from a tunnel does not eliminate the risks, but modifies them and moves them to a different location, where the overall risk may actually be greater (diverting through a dense urban area for instance). For this reason, the joint OECD/PIARC research project recommended that decisions on authorisation/restriction of dangerous goods in a tunnel should be based on a comparison of various alternatives and should take into account the tunnel route as well as possible alternative routes. A rational decision process was proposed, with the structure shown in the figure below. The first steps would produce objective risk indicators, based on quantitative risk analysis (QRA). The last steps would take into account economic and other data, as well as the political preferences of the decision maker (risk aversion for instance). These later steps could be based on a decision support model(DSM).

Fig. 2.6-2: Rational decision process

The OECD/PIARC project has developed a QRA model as well as a DSM. The QRA model is currently used in a number of countries. It is a system-based risk analysis model (see chapter 2.4 for definition) and produces indicators of the societal risk (F-N curves for the tunnel users and for the permanent neighbouring population), as well as the individual risk (for people permanently living in the neighbourhood of the tunnel) and damage to the tunnel and the environment. It is applicable both to routes including tunnels and to open-air routes, so that the risks on various alternative routes can be compared. The model is based on 13 accident scenarios representative of each of the five tunnel categories (although categories D and E cannot be distinguished because they lead to similar risks). This model can be bought from PIARC and is described in more detail in its website.

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Additional information as well as examples of application can be found in the following PIARC references:
"Quantitative Risk Assessment Model For Dangerous Goods Transport Through Road Tunnels"

in Routes/Roads 329 (2006)

Section 4.6 "OECD/PIARC Dangerous goods QRA model" of report 2008R02 and Annex 3.7

"OECD/PIARC DG QRA model" of report 2008R02.

2.6.3. Risk reduction measures The joint OECD/PIARC research project also included an investigation of measures that could reduce the probability and/or consequences of an accident involving dangerous goods in a tunnel, where such goods are allowed. Firstly a state of the art was established, resulting in identification and description of all possible measures, most of which are described in part 2 of this manual (chapters 6-9). The second, more challenging step was an attempt at evaluating the cost-effectiveness of these measures with respect to dangerous goods hazards. Costs were not examined in detail as they will be specific to a particular tunnel project and can be studied for each individual project. The focus was put on the effectiveness of measures. Some of the possible risk reduction measures are directly taken into account in the QRA model developed under the project (see above). These were called "native" measures. The effectiveness of each of these measures, or each combination of measures, can be assessed by running the model with and without the measure(s) and comparing the results. A large number of tests were made and showed that no general conclusion could be drawn regarding the effectiveness of measures because the effectiveness very much depends on the specific case. Assessment of effectiveness should thus be made on a project basis. The effectiveness of the other, "non-native" measures was much more difficult to assess and methods were proposed to take a number of them into account. More information can be found in chapter VII of the OECD project report (Risk reduction measures).

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2.7. Safety procedures

To ensure safety in road tunnels, the necessary structural, technical and organisational measures need to be put in place so that incidents can be prevented as far as possible and their impact can be kept to a minimum. The level of safety in tunnels is influenced to varying degrees by a variety of factors that can be collectively summarised in four main groups: Road Users, Infrastructure, Vehicles, and Operation. Most of the measures needed to ensure a safe tunnel are based on the above influencing factors and aim to prevent or mitigate the danger which arises from incorrect user behaviour, inadequate tunnel installations or operation, vehicle technical defects or other faults. See Chapter 1 "Why are tools for tunnel safety management needed?" of report 2009R08. All the above necessary safety measures have to be combined under effective tunnel safety management. To maximise the effectiveness of tunnel safety management, certain tools are needed to support strategy, to drive critical decisions and keep a constant and traceable focus on all safety issues, over a tunnel's lifetime. The three major "tools" for tunnel safety management are described below.

2.7.1. Road Tunnel Safety Documentation Safety documentation is a key aspect of safety management and should be compiled for each tunnel. The demands for this information are different depending on which stage the tunnel is at in its lifecycle: design, commissioning, or operation. At the design stage the safety documentation focuses on the description of tunnel infrastructure and traffic forecasts, whereas at the operation stage the operational aspects, such as emergency response plans and measures for transportation of dangerous goods, gain importance. The degree of detail in the information increases as the project develops. The safety documentation should comprise'living' documents which are continuously developed and updated; including detailing changes in tunnel infrastructure, traffic data, etc, as well as important findings from operational experience (i.e. analysis of significant incidents, safety exercises, etc.). More information is available on Chapter 2 "Road Tunnel Safety Documentation" of report 2009R08.

2.7.2. Collection and Analysis of Data on Road Tunnel Incidents Collection and analysis of incident data, as detailed on Chapter 3 "Collection and Analysis of Data on Road Tunnel Incidents" of report 2009R08 are essential for the risk assessment of a tunnel and for the improvement of its safety measures. These comprise a two fold process, starting at the local tunnel level to cover specific needs, like input data for risk analysis, and extends to fulfil legal obligations such as reporting statistics at national/international level. The evaluation of specific events (accidents and incidents) may help to identify specific hazards in a tunnel as well as to optimise operational procedures and the reaction of safety systems. As well as analysis for real accidents, analysis of data from safety exercises can help to gain experience in the management of incidents under realistic circumstances.

2.7.3. Safety Inspections of Road Tunnels Safety inspections, as explained in Chapter 4 of the technical Report 2009R08 (Safety Inspections of Road Tunnels) are a tool to assess the current tunnel safety level either within a legal framework (European Directive for instance) or against an accepted level of risk. PIARC has developed an organisational scheme based on the EU Directive 2004/54/EC to describe the chain of safety responsibility concerning safety inspections and clarify the responsibilities of the involved parties. It also proposes the contents of a safety inspection (infrastructure and systems, safety documentation and existing procedures, tunnel management organisation, training and quality assurance) along with a comprehensive roadmap with all the necessary steps and preparation needed to carry out a safety inspection.

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2.8. Assessing and improving safety in existing tunnels

2.8.1. Why upgrading existing tunnels As a consequence of the major disasters in road tunnels (Mont Blanc tunnel fire in 1999, Tauern tunnel fire in 1999 or Gotthard tunnel fire in 2001), specific attention was turned to the safety standards of existing tunnels. Existing tunnels require specific approaches and tools to identify and evaluate the need for safety upgrade programmes. Substantial research and studies followed these major tunnel fire incidents, demonstrating that many existing road tunnels require additional and specific means to ensure a safe environment for users. Even where previous improvement programmes have been carried out, existing tunnels may not be in line with the current safety standards because of upgrading of regulations in the meantime. These incidents and subsequent studies have raised awareness of tunnel risk amongst individuals involved in road tunnels from designers and operators to authorities' representatives. It has become clear that safety upgrade is not only a matter of improving the structure and/or equipment, but that there is also, and sometimes mainly, a strong need to clarify safety management organisation and to adapt procedures. In the assessment of safety in existing tunnels, special attention should be paid to changes in the tunnel environment (traffic volume and composition, dangerous goods transport, construction works in the surrounding area, etc) which may also induce the requirement for upgrading measures. 2.8.2. Proposed methodology to assess and improve existing tunnels A structured approach for assessing and preparing refurbishment programmes is proposed with two main tasks:
The first task aims to assess the current situation of the tunnel, like an instantaneous picture of

the tunnel, in order to identify the current safety level. First of all a reference safety level must be defined, which is generally provided by regulatory frameworks. Then the current tunnel functionalities and the state of the facilities which perform them have to be analysed. On this basis it must be assessed whether the existing tunnel is currently in line with safety-relevant design criteria. Furthermore, specific risks should be assessed by risk analysis which is an appropriate tool to evaluate the current safety level of a tunnel in operation. From these initial analyses, actions can be defined and priorities can be set
The second task aims to define the future tunnel situation after renovation works which can be

acceptable in relation to the defined safety level goal. This can be done by developing renovation programmes and assessing again the safety level of the renovated tunnel including all upgrading measures. Once again risk analysis can be applied to demonstrate an adequate safety level or to evaluate various alternatives of upgrading measures, including cost-effectiveness criteria. Renovation programmes depend on the specific context of each tunnel, its constraints and its environment. An iterative process of risk analysis may be followed where agreement is reached on a projected safety level that is acceptable to all stakeholders in the project. The multistage process for the preparation of a tailor-made renovation programme for a tunnel in operation can be summarised in the flowchart below. It describes the functional links between the various steps and their respective outputs. In detail, the content of each step is to be adapted to the specific conditions of the individual tunnel, its environment, and of course specific local practice. Depending on the tunnel situation, the process can be stopped after step 3 with a simple comparison to the reference state if the analysis is demonstrating that the required safety level is already achieved. Indeed, for tunnels already renovated, step 3 can be the end of the process.

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Fig. 2.8-1 : Flowchart of the multistage process If not, step 3 may highlight urgent mitigation measures which canbe implemented immediately to improve the tunnel safety level with non-substantial actions such as closure barriers, signalling or traffic control measures. In some cases, such measures may be sufficient to obtain the required safety level. If more substantial works are required, temporary modifications of the operating conditions may be a useful tool for a temporary increase in the tunnel safety level, if necessary. The preparation of renovation works for a tunnel in operation is an iterative process as it is a combination of technical issues, safety measures, costs implication and works phasing constraints. This is why step 4 and 5 can be refined several times to obtain an adapted refurbishment programme taking into account all relevant parameters which may influence the decision. Design activities can start after step 5. The new report "Assessing and improving Safety in Existing Road Tunnels" provides guidelines for each step within this process, up to the definition of an improvement programme. Typical weak points (safety deficiencies) in existing tunnels are presented. Additionally, case studies of existing tunnels in Europe demonstrate the strategy adopted for renovation works and upgrading measures implemented.

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